This article was downloaded by: [134.117.10.200]On: 22 September 2013, At: 23:20Publisher: RoutledgeInforma Ltd Registered in England and Wales Registered Number: 1072954Registered office: Mortimer House, 37-41 Mortimer Street, London W1T 3JH,UK

Journal of Strategic StudiesPublication details, including instructions for authorsand subscription information:http://www.tandfonline.com/loi/fjss20

Why Culture Matters: Revisitingthe Sino-Indian Border War of1962Rudra Chaudhuri aa Department of War Studies, King's College London,UKPublished online: 17 Dec 2009.

To cite this article: Rudra Chaudhuri (2009) Why Culture Matters: Revisiting theSino-Indian Border War of 1962, Journal of Strategic Studies, 32:6, 841-869, DOI:10.1080/01402390903189618

To link to this article: http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/01402390903189618

PLEASE SCROLL DOWN FOR ARTICLE

Taylor & Francis makes every effort to ensure the accuracy of all theinformation (the “Content”) contained in the publications on our platform.However, Taylor & Francis, our agents, and our licensors make norepresentations or warranties whatsoever as to the accuracy, completeness, orsuitability for any purpose of the Content. Any opinions and views expressedin this publication are the opinions and views of the authors, and are not theviews of or endorsed by Taylor & Francis. The accuracy of the Content shouldnot be relied upon and should be independently verified with primary sourcesof information. Taylor and Francis shall not be liable for any losses, actions,claims, proceedings, demands, costs, expenses, damages, and other liabilitieswhatsoever or howsoever caused arising directly or indirectly in connectionwith, in relation to or arising out of the use of the Content.

This article may be used for research, teaching, and private study purposes.Any substantial or systematic reproduction, redistribution, reselling, loan, sub-licensing, systematic supply, or distribution in any form to anyone is expressly

forbidden. Terms & Conditions of access and use can be found at http://www.tandfonline.com/page/terms-and-conditions

Dow

nloa

ded

by [

134.

117.

10.2

00]

at 2

3:20

22

Sept

embe

r 20

13

Why Culture Matters: Revisitingthe Sino-Indian Border War of

1962

RUDRA CHAUDHURI

Department of War Studies, King’s College London, UK

ABSTRACT Strategic historians and practitioners associated with the 32-daySino-Indian border conflict of autumn 1962 have for long argued that India’sappeal for US military assistance during the war led to the abandonment ofIndia’s foreign policy of non-alignment. By asking for military assistance, Indiaentered into an alliance with the US. Triangulation of different accounts of thewar, declassified US State Department Papers and correspondence betweenIndian leaders during the time of the war counter these claims. This articledemonstrates how India’s political elite, informed by cultural beliefs had in factresisted allying with the US. Cultural beliefs, and not rational claims prescribingalliances, guided the strategic decision-making process in this period of nationalsecurity crisis.

KEY WORDS: India, China, Foreign Policy, 1962 War

On 20 October 1962, a long-standing territorial dispute betweenIndia and the People’s Republic of China (PRC) led to the outbreakof war. Fought on two fronts, the conflict ended on 21 November1962, when the PRC announced a unilateral ceasefire following thedefeat of the Indian Army. Scholars and practitioners have sinceargued that in the face of defeat, India’s first Prime MinisterJawaharlal Nehru made choices that led to the abandonment ofIndia’s foreign policy of non-alignment. In Nehru’s appeal forexternal military assistance from the United States (US), India, it wasopined, had abandoned non-alignment and entered into a militaryalliance with the US.

In the early works on the 1962 war, Neville Maxwell isa notable contributor to the thesis that India had abandoned

The Journal of Strategic StudiesVol. 32, No. 6, 841–869, December 2009

ISSN 0140-2390 Print/ISSN 1743-937X Online/09/060841-29 � 2009 Taylor & Francis

DOI: 10.1080/01402390903189618

Dow

nloa

ded

by [

134.

117.

10.2

00]

at 2

3:20

22

Sept

embe

r 20

13

non-alignment.1 A journalist for the The Times in the 1960s, andauthor of the controversial book India’s China War, Maxwell arguedthat the ‘whole arch’ of Nehru’s policies had been brought down by theSino-Indian Border War.2 In more recent scholarship, the chiefpropagandists of the alliance thesis include B.K. Nehru, the IndianAmbassador to the US in 1962 and a cousin of the Prime Minister;Brigadier (later Major General) D.K. Palit, the Director of MilitaryOperations (DMO) during the war, and Dennis Kux, a practitionerturned scholar.

According to Ambassador Nehru, in the post-war period, ‘we [India]continued to talk in terms of non-alignment but we [India] had becomein fact the allies of the United States in their confrontation at least withChina’.3 Palit notes that asking the US to intervene ‘could be seen in noother light than that of entering into a form of military alliance’.4 Morecritical of India’s traditional approach to international affairs ingeneral, Kux, in his seminal work Estranged Democracies wrote that inthe post-war period ‘India’s non-alignment seemed to be a thing of thepast.’5 These recent works, authored nearly 30 years after the war,reinforce the otherwise widely accepted argument that India hadabandoned non-alignment.6

This article contests the central premise of the above-mentionedarguments. Contrary to the argument made in these works, this articledemonstrates that although Nehru and his coterie of advisors had beenforced to amend the working parameters of India’s non-alignmentpolicy, India did not enter into a military alliance with the US orabandon non-alignment. Archival evidence and secondary sourceliterature suggests that Nehru had done everything possible to avoidentering into an alliance with the US, inviting a revision of existingnarratives.

Revisiting these accounts is as much a matter of historical interest asit is of theoretical import. For instance, the inference made from the

1Other works in the early period include: Werner Levi, ‘Indian NeutralismReconsidered’, Pacific Affairs 37/2 (Summer 1964); T.N. Keenleyside, ‘Prelude toPower: The Meaning of Non-Alignment before Indian Independence’, Pacific Affairs53/3 (Autumn 1980); Cecil V. Crabb, ‘The Testing of Non-Alignment’, WesternPolitical Science Quarterly 17/3 (Sept. 1964).2Neville Maxwell, India’s China War (London: Jonathan Cape 1970), 11.3B.K. Nehru, Nice Guys Finish Second (New Delhi: Viking 1997), 408.4D.K. Palit, War in the High Himalayas: The Indian Army in Crisis, 1962 (London:Hurst 1991), 343.5Dennis Kux, India and the United States: Estranged Democracies (Washington DC:National Defense UP 1992), 204.6Levi, ‘Indian Neutralism Reconsidered’; Keenleyside, ‘Prelude to Power’, Crabb, ‘TheTesting of Non-Alignment’.

842 Rudra Chaudhuri

Dow

nloa

ded

by [

134.

117.

10.2

00]

at 2

3:20

22

Sept

embe

r 20

13

works in the existing literature suggests that India reversed the policy ofnon-alignment and acted much like neo-realists would have predicted.7

According to neo-realist analyses, when threatened, states eitherbalance or bandwagon. This is exactly what B.K. Nehru and otherspredicted. That is, when threatened, India sought protection from astronger state, in this case the US, to balance against a perceivedaggressor, China. In contrast, this article will show that India’s strategicpreferences during the war were in fact informed by cultural beliefs,which fall outside the explanatory core of neo-realism.8 These culturalbeliefs were informed by India’s experience with colonial rule that, inturn, shaped the policy of non-alignment.9

Interweaving theoretical debate with empirical evidence, this articleseeks to solve what seems to be a puzzle central to the history of theSino-Indian Border War, which has not been fully addressed in theexisting literature, and that cannot be explained by neo-realism. Atdifferent stages of the conflict, Nehru and his Cabinet had been told bythe Army high command about China’s superior forces. LieutenantGeneral B.N. Kaul, in charge of operations to oust the Chinese fromIndian territory had repeatedly told Nehru the government’s objectiveswere impossible to achieve. Kaul had advocated abandoning non-alignment and forging an alliance with the US. This, he argued, was theonly way India could defend her borders against a better armedPeople’s Liberation Army (PLA). The government and Nehru inparticular, had accepted the assessment of China’s superior strength,but yet, rejected Kaul’s suggestions.

Elucidating why culture matters, the narrative will explain why theIndian government refused to adhere to Kaul’s suggestions. It exhibitshow cultural beliefs operated under extreme material counter-pressureand led India’s political elite to reject military advice in October 1962concerning the need for external assistance to counter Chineseincursions into India’s territory. Only in November 1962, when thethreat of Chinese invasion of all of Eastern India was perceived

7Kenneth Waltz, Theory of International Politics (New York: McGraw-Hill 1979) Alsosee Kenneth Waltz, ‘Structural Realism After the Cold War’, International Security 25/1 (Summer 2000), 28–39. Note: This article recognises that neo-realism is not a theoryof foreign policy, but it does predict that states will balance in order to survive. For adetailed analysis of neo realism and foreign policy, see Shibley Telhami, ‘KennethWaltz, Neorealism and Foreign Policy’, Security Studies 11/3 (Spring 2002), 158–70.8For an account of the explanatory core of neo-realism, see Jeffery Legro and AndrewMoravcsik, ‘Is Anyone Still a Realist?’, International Security 24/2 (Autumn 1999), 5–55.9For an elaborate discussion on cultural beliefs, see Alastair Johnston, ‘Thinking AboutStrategic Culture’, International Security 19/4 (Spring 1995), 32–64.

Why Culture Matters: Revisiting the 1962 Sino-Indian War 843

Dow

nloa

ded

by [

134.

117.

10.2

00]

at 2

3:20

22

Sept

embe

r 20

13

imminent did Nehru request US military intervention. Yet, even in thismoment of dire need, Nehru ensured that US assistance did not comewith strings attached; he did not let it impact on India’s independentforeign policy.

In the end, this article seeks to not only revise existing accounts of theSino-Indian Border War, but as importantly, provides a culturalexplanation of the same. Positing cultural beliefs as the constitutive,enabling factor that shaped the decisions made during the war, thisarticle expands the parameters of debate within Indian strategic studies,which has given limited attention to the importance of culture instrategy. This article will demonstrate that in order to understand themotivations that drive the strategic decision-making process in anystate, in this case in India, it is imperative to recognise why culturematters. Such an approach will help to better understand the nuancesembedded in Indian strategic behaviour, which, as the concludingsection of this thesis reveals, is as relevant to scholarly research as it isto contemporary policy formulation.

This article has been divided into four sections. The first highlightsthe debate on culture in international relations (IR) scholarship, and thelack thereof in the limited work on Indian strategic studies. The secondprovides a brief background to the ideational basis of non-alignmentand shows how India’s foreign policy choices affected US-Indiarelations till 1962. The third section covers two stages of the conflict,the first, the early stages between 8 September and 11 October, and thesecond between 11 October and 20 November. In both these stages,this article illustrates how India’s strategic preferences were shaped bycultural beliefs. The last section considers theoretical and policyrelevant conclusions that might be drawn from this narrative.

Why does Culture Matter?

The importance of culture in mainstream IR scholarship has beencontested, but at the same time firmly established.10 Strategic historiansand IR scholars use culture to explain state behaviour in ways that arenot always in consonance with neo-realist tenets.11 Neo-realists largely

10For an ensuing debate see: Michael Desch, ‘Culture Clash: Assessing the Importanceof Ideas in Security Studies’, International Security 23/1 (Summer 1998), 141–70. Alsosee John Duffield, Theo Farrell, Richard Price and Michael C. Desch, ‘Isms andSchisms: Culturalism Versus Realism in Security Studies’, International Security 24/1(Summer 1999), 156–80.11Peter Katzenstein, The Culture of National Security: Norms and Identity in WorldPolitics (New York: Columbia UP 1996); John Gentry, ‘Norms and Military Power:NATO’s War Against Yugoslavia’, Security Studies 15/2 (April–June 2006), 187–224;

844 Rudra Chaudhuri

Dow

nloa

ded

by [

134.

117.

10.2

00]

at 2

3:20

22

Sept

embe

r 20

13

reject cultural determinants as a sound basis for explaining an actor’sstrategic behaviour. ‘States are instrumentally rational’, ideas andbeliefs have little part to play in the manner in which the statemaneouvres itself within the international system.12 Culturalists, fortheir part, are unsatisfied with the neo-realist contention that ‘units’ orstates in the international system ‘are functionally undifferentiated’.13

This does not mean that those adopting a cultural perspective rejectneo-realism, they do not. They reject the neo-realist assumption thattheir research programme represents the dominant theoretical lens bywhich state behaviour can be explained. For culturalists, ‘differentstates have different predominant strategic preferences that are rootedin the early or formative experiences of the state’. State practices are‘influenced to some degree by the philosophical, political, cultural, andcognitive characteristics of the state and its elites’.14

The role of culture has been recognised in a whole body of literatureon military culture15 and military history.16 Strategic studies scholarshave gone to great lengths to demonstrate the impact of cultural beliefson the optimal means to fight war,17 in determining the nature ofmilitary campaigns,18 and in demonstrating the close connectionbetween strategic decisions and strategic identity.19 However, in thecase of India, the role of culture in foreign policy has been eitherneglected or dubiously debated. Unlike in Western IR scholarship, the

Theo Farrell, The Norms of War: Cultural Beliefs and Modern Conflict (London:Lynne Rienner 2005); For a review, see Theo Farrell, ‘Constructivist Security Studies:Portrait of a Research Programme’, International Studies Review 4/1 (Spring 2002),49–72.12John J. Mearsheimer, ‘The False Promise of International Institutions’, InternationalSecurity 19/3 (Winter 1994–95), 9–11.13Waltz, Theory of International Politics, 104.14Johnston, ‘Thinking About Strategic Culture’, 34.15Stephen Peter Rosen, ‘Military Effectiveness: Why Society Matters’, InternationalSecurity 19/4 (Spring 1995), 5–31; Stephen Peter Rosen, Societies and Military Power:India and its Armies (New York: Ithaca UP 1996); Jeffrey W. Legro, Cooperationunder Fire: Anglo-German Restraint during World War II (New York: Ithaca UP1995).16For a review, see Theo Farrell, ‘Memory, Imagination, and War’, History 87/285(Jan. 2002), 61–73.17Jeffery Legro, ‘Military Culture and Inadvertent Escalation of World War II’,International Security 18/4 (Spring 1994), 66–107.18Theo Farrell, ‘Strategic Culture and American Empire’, SAIS Review of InternationalStudies 35/2 (Summer–Fall 2005), 3–18.19Latha Varadarajan, ‘Constructivism, Identity, and Neoliberal (In)Security’, Reviewof International Studies 30/3 (2004), 319–41.

Why Culture Matters: Revisiting the 1962 Sino-Indian War 845

Dow

nloa

ded

by [

134.

117.

10.2

00]

at 2

3:20

22

Sept

embe

r 20

13

causal connection between cultural beliefs and its impact on action, ora state’s strategic behaviour, has not been adequately explored.

K. Subramanyam, the ‘originator of strategic discourse in India’,20

states that ‘the absence of national security decision-making struc-ture[s] . . . makes it difficult to have institutionalised memories’.21

Following Subramanyam’s line of argument, Jaswant Singh, a scholarand practitioner writes that the ‘absence of a historical sense’ has‘significantly impaired the development of strategic thought [inIndia]’.22 By ignoring in their analysis the role or the potential roleplayed by historical memory and cultural beliefs in the strategicdecision-making process, Subramanyam and Singh undermine therelative importance of culture in shaping strategic policy. As this articlewill demonstrate, such an approach to Indian strategic studies does notfully explain the underlying motivations that inform the state’s strategicchoices.

In contrast, George Tanham, in his widely read thesis on ‘Indianstrategic culture’, recognises the ‘complex effect culture has had on theIndian strategic process’.23 For Tanham, cultural perceptions are boundby ‘a non-linear view of time with no past and no future’, which in turnhas led Indians to pay ‘scant attention to history’.24 While theAmerican’s views are widely contested within India,25 he at leastidentifies culture as a potential determinant of strategic policy.However, the shortcoming in Tanham’s work is that he fails to showhow he reached his conclusions. Leaning on generalities, Tanham’sviews do little to show causation, leaving readers with a somewhatdubious treatise that in itself has not been fully explored.

In the end, unlike the extensive work done on culture in Western IRscholarship, within India, the culture debate hardly assumes a place ofdominance,26 at least in the field of strategic studies. Nonetheless,contrary to the ahistorical approach to Indian strategic studies adoptedby both scholars and practitioners, this article shows that culturematters. In the analysis of each of the two stages of the war, the paper

20Inder Malhotra cited in K. Subramanyam, Shedding Shibboleths: India’s EvolvingStrategic Outlook (Delhi: Wordsmith 2005), vii.21Ibid., 27–8.22Jaswant Singh, Call to Honour (New Delhi: Rupa 2006), 99.23George Tanham, ‘Indian Strategic Culture’, Washington Quarterly 15/1 (Winter1992), 130. Also see George Tanham, Indian Strategic Thought: An Interpretive Essay(Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corp. 1992).24Tanham, ‘Indian Strategic Culture’, 130.25See, for instance, Subramanyam, Shedding Shibboleths, 3–8.26For other works that lightly touch upon culture and Indian strategic studies see:Swarna Rajagopalan (ed.), Security and South Asia: Ideas, Institutions, and Initiatives(New Delhi: Routledge 2006).

846 Rudra Chaudhuri

Dow

nloa

ded

by [

134.

117.

10.2

00]

at 2

3:20

22

Sept

embe

r 20

13

demonstrates the causal link between culture and strategic decision-making. The article shows that in the least likely circumstances or in‘hard cases’,27 when – in accordance with neo-realists analyses – itwould have been strategically profitable to ask for military aid, forge analliance with the US and follow Washington’s line in the post-1962period, India’s political leaders made strategic decisions that wereinformed by cultural beliefs. In order to explain what these culturalbeliefs are, and where they come from, the following part of this articlebriefly examines the ideational roots of non-alignment and itsefficaciousness in the context of US-India strategic relations till theonset of the 1962 war.

Non-Alignment, Cultural Beliefs and US-India Relations till 1962

In late 1947, after attaining independence, the political elite within theruling Indian National Congress (INC) agreed that India was to enjoycomplete and uncompromising autonomy in its strategic decision-making process. Rather than joining either the US-led Western camp orthe Soviet camp, India would remain non-aligned during the Cold War.Non-alignment was not formally defined by the government nor was itofficially endorsed: ‘It was an attitude, a way of approach, a basis fordeveloping policies.’28 Informed by a culture of resistance, non-alignment was the ultimate expression of a newly independent nation’sreluctance to be bound by any other actor’s strategic needs andpreferences. As Nehru’s own sister and India’s first ambassador to theSoviet Union pointed out, ‘the policy of non-alignment means theexercise of one’s independence in the field of foreign relations’.29

For Nehru, non-alignment was directly connected to India’s pastexperience. Over a century of British rule had made him wary of anyform of subservience. Nehru was not interested in succumbing tobalancing acts that had the propensity to curb India’s new foundindependence. On the eve of 14 August 1947, when Britain’s lastviceroy to India, Lord Mountbatten prepared to salute the Indiantricolour, Nehru informed the Indian people that they were at last, free.He said, ‘long years ago . . . we made a tryst with destiny and now thetime comes when we shall redeem our pledge, not wholly or in full

27See Desch, ‘Culture Clash’, 158.28K. Shankar Bajpai, ‘Engaging with the World’, in Atish Sinha and Madhup Mohta(ed.), Indian Foreign Policy: Challenges and Opportunities (New Delhi: AcademicFoundation 2007), 83.29New Delhi, Nehru Memorial Museum & Library (NMML), V.L. Pandit Papers,Second Instalment, Sub File No. 16, ‘An article on the policy of non-alignment’,undated.

Why Culture Matters: Revisiting the 1962 Sino-Indian War 847

Dow

nloa

ded

by [

134.

117.

10.2

00]

at 2

3:20

22

Sept

embe

r 20

13

measure but very substantially. At the stroke of midnight hour whenthe world sleeps, India will awake to life and freedom.’30 In this veryspeech, Nehru alerted Indians, and the rest of the world, that Indiawould cherish her freedom. During formal as well as informaldiscussions in the foreign office, it was made clear that ‘there was noambiguity or uncertainty about the policy which new India underNehru’s leadership was to follow in the conduct of its foreignrelations’.31

The policy of non-alignment, born out of India’s struggle for freedomwas shaped by historical beliefs about who we are and what we want.In the early days of India’s independence, some American scholars readnon-alignment as a ‘social disease’. ‘Its probable causes: intimacy insome form with communism; its symptoms: mental confusion andmoral dereliction; its cure: unknown.’32 For many Americans, thepolicy of non-alignment simply did not make sense. At the time ofIndian independence, the US began to prepare for a potential hot waragainst the Soviet Union and limiting Soviet expansion was given toppriority. There was little tolerance for India’s non-alignment.33

Nevertheless, successive American administrations, although rattledby Nehru’s almost preachy approach to foreign affairs, tried hard todraw India into the Western orbit. In the subcontinent, US officials sawIndia as the ‘more valuable diplomatic prize’.34 India could potentiallyserve as a staging ground in the event of Soviet expansionism in theEast. India was also seen as a source for strategic materials, like cotton,mica, manganese, monazite (a source for thorium) and beryl.35 In 1949,when India was in desperate need of economic assistance, the USadministration had believed that by providing assistance, Nehru’s Indiawould be tempted to join the Western camp. All Nehru would have todo was curb his rhetoric about non-alignment; the US needed somerationale to provide India with assistance. After all, this was a countryviewed with suspicion in the US Congress, the legislative body whichheld the power to authorise external economic assistance.

30Subimal Dutt, With Nehru in the Foreign Office (New Delhi: Minerva Associates1977), 9.31Ibid.32Robert Scalapino, ‘‘‘Neutralism’’ in Asia’, American Political Science Review 48/1(March 1954), 49. For an objective review see Vincent Shean, ‘The Case for India’,Foreign Affairs 30 (1951–52).33Ibid., 77.34Robert McMahon, The Cold War on the Periphery: The United States, India, andPakistan (New York: Columbia UP 1994), 11.35Ibid., 11–15.

848 Rudra Chaudhuri

Dow

nloa

ded

by [

134.

117.

10.2

00]

at 2

3:20

22

Sept

embe

r 20

13

Contrary to expectations, during Nehru’s visit to the US in October1949, the Prime Minister did or said nothing that would appease the USCongress.36 Eventually, proposals for economic aid were cancelled, andNehru returned to India empty handed. As far as Nehru was concerned,receiving economic aid, even at a time when it was desperately needed,was not worth compromising any aspects of India’s non-alignmentpolicy.37 Cultural beliefs with regard to non-alignment defined India’sstrategic behaviour, even though it would have been strategicallyprofitable to act otherwise. Towards the end of the Trumanadministration, non-alignment continued to be seen as a problem thatneeded to be fixed. In a paper prepared by the State Department,titled ‘Means to Combat India’s Policy of Neutralism’, it was concludedthat in the ‘final analysis’, ‘Mr Nehru’s foreign policy of ‘‘neutralism’’militates against the achievement of collective security and therefore . . . isfavorable to the Soviet Union.’38 In reality, at this time, India’s contactwith the USSR had been minimal at best.

In the 1950s, the disdain in the American press for non-alignmentwas given forceful expression under a new administration. PresidentDwight Eisenhower and his Secretary of State John Foster Dulles haddecided to forge military alliances in the Middle East and Asia to stemSoviet expansion. On 19 May 1954, the US signed a mutual defencepact with Pakistan, which in effect, had become ‘America’s most alliedally in Asia’.39 In October 1954, the US Congress authorised $171million for military aid to Pakistan that was to be spread over the nextthree and a half years.40

Eisenhower wrote to Nehru stating that the US could enter into asimilar alliance with India.41 At a time when the USSR and India hadlittle contact, counter-balancing Pakistan’s newly acquired capabilitiesmade complete sense. However, even at this critical juncture, Nehru’sapproach to international affairs continued to be shaped by culturalbeliefs informed by historical memory of colonial rule. Nehru turneddown Eisenhower’s offer, stating in parliament that by entering into

36For details see Vijay Lakshmi Pandit, The Scope of Happiness (London: Weidenfeld1979), 253.37Ibid., 59.38‘Means to Combat India’s Policy of Neutralism’, Washington DC, 30 Aug. 1951, inForeign Relations of the United States, (FRUS) Vol. VI: 2 (Washington DC: USGovernment Printing Office 1977), 2172–3.39Robert McMahon, ‘United States Cold War Strategy in South Asia: Making aMilitary Commitment to Pakistan, 1947–1954’, Journal of American History 75/3(Dec. 1988), 812.40Ibid., 195.41[NMML] D.D. Eisenhower Papers, Eisenhower to Nehru, Washington DC, 25 Feb.1954.

Why Culture Matters: Revisiting the 1962 Sino-Indian War 849

Dow

nloa

ded

by [

134.

117.

10.2

00]

at 2

3:20

22

Sept

embe

r 20

13

such an alliance, the Indian government would be ‘hypocrites andunprincipled opportunists’.42 Earlier in December 1953, in anticipationof the US-Pakistan pact, a speech made by Nehru in parliament hadrevealed the significance of cultural beliefs on India’s strategicpreferences. Nehru stated:43

I remember how often in our country our own people were madeinto soldiers serving foreign nations, how they were sent to othercountries to help in enslaving other people. I do not like it and Ireact very strongly against anything that brings back that oldprocess even though it may be in small measure. It is a bad thing.So far as I am concerned, and I have no doubt that I speak in thismatter for every single member of this house, we will not tolerateany foreign army on our soil. We want no protection from others.

Between 1954 and 1956, when military aid began pouring intoPakistan, the Indian government’s stand remained the same. In a seriesof letters written to G.L. Mehta, the Indian ambassador to the US,there was no mention of searching for alliances or courting Washingtonfor obtaining military aid.44 Non-alignment, which, Nehru stated hadgrown out of India’s ‘national way of thinking with its roots in the longpast’ continued to represent the defining elements of Indian foreignpolicy.45

In 1961, when President John F. Kennedy came to power, the USapproach to India changed considerably. Kennedy realised that neutralcountries could not be won over by tempting treaties, the likes of whichhad been rejected in the past. For Kennedy, India was the mostimportant non-aligned country in the Third World. Winning hersupport was essential to curtail Soviet influence, but this could not bedone via military ties. Economic aid, development, and education werethe keys to win the support of India, ‘aid without strings’ was the policyto be pursued. In return, Kennedy felt that India might not join theWestern camp, but at least neither would she join the Soviets. Indiawould remain a neutral state with affinities for the West.46

42Nehru’s Statement in Lok Sabha, 1 March 1954, in Selected Works of JawaharlalNehru, Second Series Vol. I (New Delhi: Jawaharlal Nehru Memorial Fund and OUP1999), 341.43‘US Military Aid to Pakistan’, The Hindu, 24 Dec. 1953.44[NMML] G.L. Mehta Papers, 3rd and 4th Instalments, G.L. Mehta to Nehru,Washington DC, 6 Jan. 1954.45Nehru’s Letter, 1 Dec. 1953, in Letters to Chief Ministers, Vol. 3 (New Delhi:Jawaharlal Nehru Memorial Fund and OUP 1988), 455.46For details, see McMahon, Cold War on the Periphery, Chapter 8.

850 Rudra Chaudhuri

Dow

nloa

ded

by [

134.

117.

10.2

00]

at 2

3:20

22

Sept

embe

r 20

13

By October 1962, when the border war gained momentum, leadingultimately to the catastrophic defeat of the Indian Army, some in theKennedy administration had believed that military defeat wouldultimately expose the ‘folly’ of non-alignment.47 India, it was assumed,would give up on non-alignment and ally with the West.48 Asmentioned earlier, in the post-border war period, this is exactly whatB.K. Nehru, Palit, Maxwell and Kux advocated. After all, from theoutset, this was the most rational thing to do. However, as thefollowing part of this article demonstrates, even at this dire point inIndia’s relatively short post-independence history, cultural beliefscontinued to play a determining role in informing the manner andmethod by which Nehru’s government handled the 1962 crisis.

The Sino-Indian Border War

India was one of the few non-communist countries to establish formaldiplomatic relations with the PRC as early as 1950. Nehru had hopedthat maintaining friendly relations with China would help strengthenthe conceptual underpinnings of Asian solidarity. However, by theearly 1950s, it became clear to Indian leaders, Nehru included, thatdifferences in India’s and China’s approach to Tibet and disagreementsover border demarcations between the two countries would limit theprospects of closer Sino-Indian relations. Hence, to foster closerrelations, in 1954, Nehru and the Chinese premier Chou Enlaiintroduced the ‘Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence’ or Panchsheel.India had officially accepted Chinese sovereignty over Tibet.49 In April1955, at the first Afro-Asian conference or the Bandung conference (inIndonesia), Nehru and Chou Enlai stood on the same podiumdenouncing colonialism. The five principles of Panchsheel served asthe ideational basis of the Non-Alignment Movement (NAM), whichhad been tacitly recognised at Bandung. African and Asian nationsdeclared that they would not join either Cold War camp. For Nehru,Bandung was both a success for NAM as well as closer Sino-Indianrelations.50

However, by the late 1950s, the underlying basis of Panchsheel hadbeen overturned. In 1959, following a revolt in the Tibetan capital ofLhasa, the Dalai Lama fled to India. Nehru, who so far had recognised

47Ibid., 287.48Ibid., 11–15.49Chen Jian, ‘The Tibetan Rebellion of 1959 and China’s Changing Relations withIndia and the Soviet Union’, Journal of Cold War Studies 8/3 (Summer 2006), 80–9.50For details, see Chattar Singh Sharma, ‘Panchsheela and After: Sino-India Relationsin the Context of the Tibetan Insurrection’, Asian Survey 21/3 (May 1962), 426–8.

Why Culture Matters: Revisiting the 1962 Sino-Indian War 851

Dow

nloa

ded

by [

134.

117.

10.2

00]

at 2

3:20

22

Sept

embe

r 20

13

Tibet as a region of China, was viewed with suspicion by the Chinesefor now hosting the Dalai Lama.51 Between 1959 and 1962, relationsbetween the two sides were marked by mutual suspicion. In the secondhalf of 1962, territorial claims and misunderstandings with regards theSino-Indian border led ultimately to the Sino-Indian Border War of1962.

Stage One: 8 September – 11 October 1962

The war was fought on two fronts, on the Western and the Easternsectors.52 In the Western sector, the territorial dispute was primarilyover the Aksai Chin, the high wastelands located in the extreme north-east of Kashmir.53 The Eastern sector, which India claims has beendemarcated by the McMahon Line, is some 700 miles long. Chinarefused to accept this line as the formal border between India andChina. It claimed that the line actually lay elsewhere; giving Chinamuch more territory than it was allocated by the British-drawnMcMahon Line.54 In India, the area in which the war was actuallyfought lay between the McMahon Line and the Chinese line, and hasbeen referred to as the North East Frontier Agency (NEFA).55

Between 8 September and 11 October, small border skirmishes hadalerted India’s political and military elite of the seriousness of what theyperceived to be China’s aggressive stance. In this period, Chinese andIndian troops attacked and counter-attacked positions along thecontested border.56 On 9 September, the government ordered theIndian Army to evict Chinese positions believed to have been erected onthe Indian side of the McMahon Line.57 The eviction order was

51Jian, ‘The Tibetan Rebellion of 1959 and China’s Changing Relations with India andthe Soviet Union’, 85–6.52A detailed report on India’s boundaries in these sectors can be found in P.B. Sinhaand A.A. Athale, History of the Conflict with China, 1962 (India: Ministry of Defence1992), 1–5.53Details on other territorial issues in the Western sector can be found in AlastairLamb, The China–India Border (Oxford: OUP 1964), 7–8.54For Chinese perceptions of India’s position on the border between 1950 and 1962see: Jian, ‘The Tibetan Rebellion of 1959 and China’s Changing Relations with Indiaand the Soviet Union’; Niu Jun, ‘1962: The Eve of the Left Turn in China’s ForeignPolicy’, Cold War History International Project Working Paper No. 48 (WoodrowWilson International Centre for Scholars 2005).55Ibid., 7–13.56Sarvepalli Gopal, Jawaharlal Nehru: A Biography, Vol. 3 1956–1964 (Delhi: OUP1984), 207–8.57D.R. Mankekar, The Guilty Men of 1962 (Bombay: Tulsi Shah Enterprises 1968),45.

852 Rudra Chaudhuri

Dow

nloa

ded

by [

134.

117.

10.2

00]

at 2

3:20

22

Sept

embe

r 20

13

codenamed Operation ‘Leghorn’. The primary objective was todislodge newly erected Chinese posts in the Dhola area of the Kamengsector in the NEFA, on the Indian side of the border, in the trijunctionwhere the boundaries of China, Tibet and India meet.58

However, despite the government’s insistence on executing Opera-tion ‘Leghorn’, Lieutenant General Umrao Singh, 33 Corps comman-der, and Major General Niranjan Prasad, 4th Division commander,argued that it was beyond the capability of the Indian army in NEFA tochallenge a superior Chinese force.59 Between 9 September and the firstweek of October, despite the government’s insistence on evicting theChinese, Singh and Prasad maintained that this was a task that couldnot be fulfilled.60 On 14 September, General P.N. Thapar, the Chief ofArmy Staff (COAS), warned the government of the many deficiencies inthe Indian army posted in NEFA.61 Lieutenant General Daulat Singh,General Officer Commanding-in-Chief (GOC-in-C) of Western Com-mand had warned Defence Minister Krishna Menon that the Indiantroops in NEFA risked annihilation if they attacked the Chinese.62 On22 September, Thapar cautioned that Chinese reaction to India’sattempt at engaging them in the Dhola area could result in retaliationelsewhere in NEFA and even in Ladakh, in the Western sector.

Notwithstanding the Army’s concerns with the eviction order,Foreign Secretary M.J. Desai made it clear that evicting the Chinesefrom Dhola was of primary importance, even if this meant retaliatoryattacks in Ladakh.63 Eventually, given that Umrao Singh hadbeen a vociferous advocate of opposing the government’s orders,Thapar, Krishna Menon and Lieutenant General L.P. Sen, the GOC-in-C Eastern Command, decided to replace Singh. B.N. Kaul, commanderof the newly created 4 Corps, was given the task of evicting the Chinesefrom NEFA.64 Trusted by Nehru, Kaul was said to have been broughtin to ‘save’ the situation.65

58For a brief analysis of early Chinese advances into Indian territory, see Lorne J.Kavic, India’s Quest for Security (Berkeley and Los Angeles: Univ. of California Press1967), 169–72. Note: Determining which side actually started the war is an issue thatcontinues to be debated. The debate falls outside the scope of this article, for areappraisal, see Srinath Raghavan, ‘Sino-Indian Border Dispute, 1948–1960, AReappraisal’, Economic & Political Weekly (Sept. 2006).59Mankekar, The Guilty Men of 1962, 46.60Maxwell, India’s China War, 305.61Mankekar, The Guilty Men of 1962, 46.62B.N. Kaul, The Untold Story (New Delhi: Allied Publishers 1967), 358.63Palit, War in the High Himalayas, 219–21.64Kaul, The Untold Story, 367–8.65Romesh Thapar, ‘Handling the Chinese’, Economic Weekly 14/41 (1962), 1611–12.

Why Culture Matters: Revisiting the 1962 Sino-Indian War 853

Dow

nloa

ded

by [

134.

117.

10.2

00]

at 2

3:20

22

Sept

embe

r 20

13

After Kaul arrived in Tezpur, the headquarters of the 4 Corps, on4 October, he realised the extent of the difficulties faced by thearmy. Men were attired in summer clothing at 16, 000 feet and eachhad only 50 rounds of ammunition.66 According to Palit, this wouldat best stock the men for maybe an hour-long battle.67 Nonetheless,having been given command of the 4 Corps, and to prove hismantle, Kaul ‘could not bring himself to recommend the slightestretraction from the government’s belligerent stance’.68 However,Kaul’s predisposition lasted only till 10 October. On 10 October,while the Indian army prepared to execute the eviction orders,69 afull battalion of the PLA attacked Indian positions at Tseng Jong.The Chinese had opened fire, and as Kaul recalls, ‘this was the firsttime that China had engaged herself in a battle with us in the realsense’.70

The Chinese attack had a strong impact on Kaul. B.N. Mullick, theDirector of the Intelligence Bureau remembers a ‘frightfully alarming’telegram sent by Kaul to Army HQ. Kaul stated that the Chinese hadsuperior numbers, artillery and mortars. He thought they had thecapability to occupy Towang and Bomdila, two major Indian-administered posts in NEFA, as well as the plains of Assam.71 Withina few hours, Tseng Jong had been lost and the Chinese were said to be‘pouring out of Thag-La like ants’.72 On 11 October, Kaul decided toreturn to New Delhi, where a meeting was to be held in the PrimeMinister’s house.

The 11 October meeting at the Prime Minister’s house was attendedby Nehru, Menon, Thapar, Kaul, L.P. Sen, Mullick, CabinetSecretaries, and the Secretaries for External Affairs and Defence.73

Although there are mixed accounts of the eventual decisions made atthe meeting, it is certain that Kaul had clearly and without ambiguitytold Nehru and the rest of his advisers that the Indian Army wasincapable of evicting the Chinese from Indian territories. Mullick statedthat for ‘nearly half-an-hour, he [Kaul] argued with great strengthand conviction that not only was it impossible to drive the Chineseacross the Thag La ridge . . . but it would be impossible to hold the

66Palit, War in the High Himalayas, 224.67Ibid., 209.68Ibid., 223.69For details see: Kavic, India’s Quest for Security, 173.70Kaul, The Untold Story, 382.71Mullick, My Years with Nehru, 361.72Palit, War in the High Himalayas, 225.73Mullick, My Years with Nehru, 361–2; Maxwell, India’s China War, 340; Kaul, TheUntold Story, 386.

854 Rudra Chaudhuri

Dow

nloa

ded

by [

134.

117.

10.2

00]

at 2

3:20

22

Sept

embe

r 20

13

Namka-Chu river front’.74 Kaul himself states that ‘if we attacked theChinese, as things stood then, we were bound to have a reverse’.75 Palitwrites that Kaul had ‘unambiguously stated at the PM’s conferencethat the Chinese were in such overwhelming strength and insuch dominating positions on Thag-La ridge that there was nopossibility . . . of being able to launch a clearing up operation on theThag-La slopes’.76 This, ‘the PM had seemed to accept . . . withoutdemur’.77

Maxwell, having conducted interviews in the post-war period,including those with Kaul, states that in the meeting, Kaul had proposedthat ‘India should seek speedy and copious military assistance from theUnited States’.78 His suggestion however, ‘was dismissed, apparentlywith some irritation, by Nehru’.79 While Maxwell is the only author whohas provided this particular piece of information, there is little reason todoubt his account. Early in 1961, Kaul had advocated asking the US formilitary equipment, in terms of aid if need be.80 Given Kaul’s earlierposition regarding military assistance, it is hardly surprising that inOctober 1962, after having actually witnessed China’s supposedsuperiority and admitted to the weaknesses of the Indian Army’sposition in the NEFA, Kaul suggested asking the US for assistance.

At the end of the meeting at Nehru’s house, it had been decided thatOperation ‘Leghorn’ would be suspended.81 Under the given circum-stances, the events leading up to the meeting on 11 October are crucialfrom the perspective of this article, indeed this mini-case serves as a‘hard case’ for cultural analyses. Since the beginning of hostilities inearly September, the political leadership had been told time and againabout China’s superior forces and the Indian Army’s inability to oustChinese troops from the NEFA. On 11 October, even Kaul, the onecommander who had sent optimistic accounts of the army’s endeavoursbetween 4 and 10 October, changed his tune. Advocating asking theWest for military assistance, Kaul laid bare the army’s near hopelessefforts in the NEFA.

74Mullick, My Years with Nehru, 362.75Kaul, The Untold Story, 386.76Palit, War in the High Himalayas, 227.77Ibid.78Maxwell, India’s China War, 340.79Ibid.80B.K. Nehru, Nice Guys Finish Second, 344. Read with Kaul, The Untold Story, 320.81For variations in the accounts see: Kaul, The Untold Story, 386; Palit, War in theHigh Himalayas, 232; Sinha and Attale, History of the Conflict with China, 101;Mullick, My Years with Nehru, 363; Mankekar, The Guilty Men of 1962, 50;Maxwell, India’s China War, 34–342.

Why Culture Matters: Revisiting the 1962 Sino-Indian War 855

Dow

nloa

ded

by [

134.

117.

10.2

00]

at 2

3:20

22

Sept

embe

r 20

13

Interestingly, even after having been told about the difficulties facedin the NEFA, neither Nehru nor his advisers considered approachingthe West for military assistance. From the outset, this is puzzling. TheArmy had informed Nehru of China’s apparent superiority. Nehru hadseemed to accept this, after all, why else would the Indian leadershipsuspend eviction orders? Clearly, the political elite had taken stock ofthe Army’s warnings. Under the given circumstances, neo-realistswould argue that any actor would seek assistance to balance against astronger state (i.e. China) that was considered a threat.82 The fact thatIndia’s political elite had accepted these warnings, but at the same timedid not approach any Western nations for assistance demonstrates thatthe tension between institutionalised beliefs and strategic realities wasnot easily reconciled. Evidently, ahistorical or ‘objective’ variables suchas military capabilities and levels of threat were not the dominantconsiderations of a country in war.83 Cultural beliefs, rooted in India’spast experience with colonial rule seemed to have informed thestrategic preferences of the Indian state. Otherwise, as had beenaffirmed above, why did Nehru and his coterie of advisers not at leasttake preventative measures to ensure India’s survival?

At a pinch, it might be argued that it is unrealistic to assume that astate like India, which had rejected security relationships for the past 15years would suddenly change course. However, it might have beenperhaps reasonable to assume that having been told about the diresituation faced by the army in the NEFA, the Indian political leadershipwould at least take the precaution of enquiring about the possibilities ofexternal military assistance. Until 23 October, Nehru and his advisershad not approached any sources for external military assistance.

It could also be argued that the ideational basis of non-alignmentinterfered with the manner in which India’s political leaders chose toact.84 Rather than being culturally bound because of choice, theirdecisions were culturally bound because of the simple fact that thesituation would have to be much more dire for them to be shaken out oftheir culture comfort zone. However, as the rest of this article willshow, even when the situation on the borders worsened, the politicalelite’s decisions continued to be informed by cultural beliefs. India’sleaders, especially Nehru, were not looking for an excuse to ridthemselves of what might have been seen as the problems associated

82Waltz, Theory of International Politics, 111.83For details, see Alastair Iain Johnston, Cultural Realism: Strategic Culture and GrandStrategy in Chinese History (Princeton UP 1995), 1.84For a conceptual analysis of resistance, change and the Sino-Indian conflict, seeSteven Hoffman, India and the China Crisis (Berkeley and Los Angeles: Univ. ofCalifornia Press 1990), 198.

856 Rudra Chaudhuri

Dow

nloa

ded

by [

134.

117.

10.2

00]

at 2

3:20

22

Sept

embe

r 20

13

with cultural orientations. Their approach to non-alignment mighthave been significantly shaken because of the war on the frontier, buttheir decisions continued to be culturally bound.

Stage Two: 11 October – 20 November 1962

The next major clash between Chinese and Indian troops took place on20 October, when the Chinese offensive had begun in full strength.India had lost most of the important administrative posts in the frontierregions. In fact, on the first day of battle, the army had been silenced inKhinzemane, Dhola, and Tsangdhar, all very important defensive posts.The 7th Infantry Brigade that had been ordered to hold its positionsouth of the Namka-Chu River had virtually ceased to exist, and itscommander, Brigadier John Dalvi was taken prisoner.85 Towards theend of October, some 21 army posts were either overrun by the PLA orabandoned by a retreating Indian army.86

On 23 October, Menon and Nehru visited Kaul at his residence inDelhi to ask him what might be done to remove Chinese forces fromIndian territory. Kaul had been brought back to Delhi for five daysowing to chest pains caused by the high altitudes of the NEFA.According to Kaul’s account of this conversation, he made only threesuggestions. Kaul stated that India needed to ‘seek military aid fromsome foreign powers or power’, re-organise the command and controlof the Indian Army and raise force levels. Even at this time of crisis,Kaul mentions that ‘Nehru and Menon did not appear . . . to beenamoured’ by the suggestion of foreign aid, although they agreed tothe immediate expansion of the Indian Army.87 According to otheraccounts however, Kaul had much more to say to the PM and hisdefence minister. Palit writes Kaul had suggested to Nehru that Indiaforge a military alliance with the United States and Taiwan ‘to create ajoint front against Communist China’. Kaul allegedly also told thePrime Minister that India should seek US army or air force interventionin case of further Chinese attacks.88

In a follow-up visit to Kaul by S.S. Khera, the then Cabinet Secretary,Kaul stated that India might have to ‘persuade’ not only the Taiwanese,but also the South Koreans and the US in the west Pacific seaboard to‘invade Chinese mainland’.89 In desperation, breaking the usual chainof command, Kaul even met US Ambassador Kenneth Galbraith, and

85Palit, War in the High Himalayas, 242.86Sinha and Attale, History of the Conflict with China, 436–9.87Kaul, The Untold Story, 396–7.88Palit, War in the High Himalayas, 273.89S.S. Khera, India’s Defence Problem (New Delhi: Orient-Longman 1968), 230.

Why Culture Matters: Revisiting the 1962 Sino-Indian War 857

Dow

nloa

ded

by [

134.

117.

10.2

00]

at 2

3:20

22

Sept

embe

r 20

13

showed him this plan. According to Mullick, Kaul told Galbraith that‘foreign troops were to be invited to India to fight in NEFA’, and thatthe ‘American Air Force was to provide not only an air-umbrella for thevulnerable parts of North India but also launch massive attacks onChina from bases in India’.90 While the veracity of these accountswould ordinarily seem suspect, they have been corroborated by Indiansources and by Galbraith’s own accounts.91 In an entry made in hisdiary, Galbraith writes that he had met Kaul, who ‘spoke in the mosturgent terms of the need for arms’.92

On 26 October, Nehru wrote what was the first of three crucialletters regarding military assistance to President Kennedy. Handedpersonally by B.K. Nehru to Kennedy, the Prime Minister’s letter hadthe ‘appearance of circular communication to friendly heads of state’.93

The letter itself did not make any reference to arms aid, but simplystated that in the current hour of crisis India hoped that it would havethe US’ ‘sympathy and support’.94 The next day, on 29 October,Galbraith met the Indian Prime Minister. During this meeting, ‘Nehrumade a definite request for US military assistance.’95 By 3 November,US military equipment had been delivered to Calcutta’s Dum Dumairport. The equipment sent to India included 40,000 anti-personnelmines; 1,000,000 rounds of calibre .30 ammunition; 200 calibre .30machine guns with mounts and accessories; f 54r 81mm mortars withmounts and accessories; 100,000 rounds of 81mm ammunition; and500 ANGRC-10 radios.96 For the first time in India’s post-indepen-dence history, India had accepted foreign military assistance.

However, external military assistance did little to stem the tide. By17 November, the desperate situation on the frontiers led Kaul to onceagain appeal for foreign military intervention.97 By the evening of 17November, the PLA had overrun most of the Indian army posts in theEastern sector.98 Between the evening of the 17th and early morning onthe 18th, the Indian army in NEFA ceased to exist as an effectivefighting force. At 0645 hours on 18 November, the 4th Division, which

90Mullick, My Years with Nehru, 403–4.91See John Lall, Aksaichin and the Sino-Indian Conflict (New Delhi: Allied Publishers1989), 282.92Galbraith, Ambassador’s Journal, 443; Hoffman, India and the China Crisis, 165.93State, Washington DC, to Embassy in India, 27 Oct. 1962, FRUS, Vol. 19, 352.Note: Appeals were also made to other states, See Hoffman, India and the China Crisis,197.94State, Washington DC, to the Embassy in India, 27 Oct. 1962, FRUS, Vol. 19, 352.95Galbraith to State, New Delhi, 29 Oct. 1962, ibid., 361.96Memorandum from Kaysen to Kennedy, Washington DC, 3 Nov. 1962, ibid., 364–8.97Palit, War in the High Himalayas, 301–2.98Sinha and Athale, History of the Chinese Conflict, 439–40.

858 Rudra Chaudhuri

Dow

nloa

ded

by [

134.

117.

10.2

00]

at 2

3:20

22

Sept

embe

r 20

13

was supposed to have served as the last line of defence in NEFA,announced that it had closed its headquarters at Dhirang Dzong andhad begun its withdrawal.99 Soon after, Se La, Dirong Dzong, andBomdila had all fallen.100 Palit notes that ‘total silence had reignedwithin the wireless and telecommunications network of 4th InfantryDivision. There could be no doubt that everybody was on the run.’101

Maxwell comments that in the NEFA, Indians were on the retreat,‘artillery and stores left where they stood. Among these were theAmerican automatic rifles.’102 Back in Delhi, rumours started spreadingthat the Chinese were on the outskirts of Tezpur. Many had toldGalbraith that Kaul had been taken prisoner.103 Kux states that on 19November, New Delhi panicked and thought that Calcutta would soonbe taken: ‘The loss of the province of Assam and perhaps all of EasternIndia was dreaded.’104

On 19 November, in these dire circumstances, Nehru wrote hissecond and third letters to President Kennedy. The second letter askedfor further military assistance, but not direct US intervention.105 Thethird letter described the situation as ‘really desperate’. Nehru wrotethat ‘unless something is done immediately to stem the tide the whole ofAssam, Tripura, Manipur, and Nagaland would also pass into Chinesehands’.106 Nehru asked for 12 squadrons of supersonic all-weatherfighters. He requested that ‘US fighters and transport planes manned byUS personnel will be used for the present to protect our cities andinstallations from Chinese air attacks and to maintain our commu-nications’.107 In addition, Nehru also requested two B-47 bombersquadrons, to ‘neutralise’ Chinese ‘bases and airfields by striking fromthe air’.108 The only caveat in the letter was that the equipment, as wellas US military intervention, would be used only against the Chinese.109

99Note: The accounts of events on the 17/18 Nov. night remain contradictory. SeePalit, War in the High Himalayas, 315; Kaul, The Untold Story, 412–14; Maxwell,India’s China War, 402–4.100Kaul, The Untold Story, 416.101Palit, War in the High Himalayas, 321.102Maxwell, India’s China War, 405.103Galbraith, Ambassador’s Diary, 487.104Kux, India and the United States, 207.105B.K. Nehru, Nice Guys Finish Second, 404.106Boston, John F. Kennedy Presidential Library and Museum (JKPLN), NSC Papers,Correspondence between Nehru and Kennedy, 19 Nov. 1962, NSC Box 111.107Ibid.108Ibid.109Galbraith, New Delhi, to State, 19 Nov. 1962, FRUS, Vol. 19, 397. Note: Thecontents of this letter were revealed only in 1965. See Sudhir Ghosh, Gandhi’s Emissary(London: Cresset Press 1967), 309.

Why Culture Matters: Revisiting the 1962 Sino-Indian War 859

Dow

nloa

ded

by [

134.

117.

10.2

00]

at 2

3:20

22

Sept

embe

r 20

13

In effect, Nehru had asked the US to fight the Chinese on India’s behalf.On 21 November, 24 hours after Nehru authored that fateful thirdletter, and before Kennedy could respond to Nehru’s appeal, Chinaannounced a unilateral ceasefire, ending the border war of 1962.110

Asking for and accepting military aid has been read by somecommentators as a reversal of non-alignment. Dennis Kux argued thatafter having asked for military assistance, ‘non-alignment seemed to bea thing of the past’. He claims that Nehru had ‘reversed policy 180degrees to seek military assistance’.111 Henry Bradsher, a commentatoron Indian affairs for the Washington Post argued that Nehru was no‘longer worried about compromising his long cherished non-alignmentpolicy in the Cold War’.112 As mentioned earlier, B. K. Nehru and Palitread India’s request for intervention as entering into an alliance withthe US. To some extent, these assessments were certainly justified. Onlya few weeks before, Nehru had stated that seeking arms aid amountedto becoming a part of ‘someone else’s block’. He had declaredthat ‘taking military help is basically and fundamentally opposed to anon-alignment policy, [it] means practically becoming aligned to thatcountry’.113

However, while requesting external military assistance was contraryto India’s policy of non-alignment, it did not mean the abandonment ofnon-alignment. By asking the US government to furnish Americantroops to fight India’s war, India did not enter into an alliance with theUS. Even now, India’s strategic decisions were culturally dependent.This is not to say that India’s approach to foreign policy had notchanged, it had. Contrary to some over-optimistic assessments of non-alignment in the post-1962 period, non-alignment did not emerge fromthe ‘fires of the Himalayan conflict basically intact’.114 Nehru himselfstated that India was ‘getting out of touch with realities in a modernworld’. He told his ministers that ‘[W]e are living in an artificialatmosphere of our own creation and we have been shaken out of it.’115

Writing in Foreign Affairs in 1963, in an article aptly titled ‘ChangingIndia’, Nehru once again admitted that there was a need to ‘adjust our[India’s] relations with friendly countries in the light of the changing

110The ceasefire was implemented on 21 Nov., Kavic, India’s Quest for Security, 182;Gopal, Jawaharlal Nehru, Vol. 3, 234–9.111Kux, India and the United States, 204.112Henry Bradsher, ‘Nehru agrees India needs American arms’, Washington Post, 29Oct. 1962.113Maxwell, India’s China War, 384–5.114Crabb, ‘The Testing of Non-Alignment’, 538.115‘Nehru Vows to Fight On: May Accept Arms Help’, Washington Post, 26 Oct.1962.

860 Rudra Chaudhuri

Dow

nloa

ded

by [

134.

117.

10.2

00]

at 2

3:20

22

Sept

embe

r 20

13

actualities of the international situation, and, above all, to preserve andconsolidate national unity’.116 Indeed, the shock of war, and moreimportantly, the shock of defeat, had made Indian decision-makersopen to the idea of ‘perceptual change’.117

Conversely, as also noted by Nehru, this did not mean that non-alignment was a policy of the past.118 Existing evidence suggests thatNehru’s assertions were merited. India had changed. Accepting militaryassistance was no longer considered a taboo. However, India’s strategicoutlook continued to be shaped by the policy of non-alignment, whichin turn was informed by India’s historical memory of colonial rule. Thisremained true both during the border war and after. Three points ofdetail substantiate this.

First, while commentators like B.K. Nehru and Kux have focusedtheir observations wholly on India’s appeal for military aid and directUS intervention, they have paid less attention to explaining why theIndian government resisted approaching the US to forge an allianceearlier in October. As the narrative above has shown, in the third weekof October, while Kaul was bedridden, he had told Menon, Nehru,Khera, and Galbraith that the only way India could survive the debaclewith the Chinese was by forging an alliance with the US. Yet, Nehruand his advisers did not so much as broach the topic of alliances withthe US ambassador in India, or any American official.119 This ispuzzling at best. Why would Nehru have ignored the advice given tohim by the man in charge of India’s defence in NEFA, and this for thesecond time in two weeks?120

Kaul was not just another military officer; he was Nehru’smost trusted general.121 Breaking army protocol, he was given theprivilege of having direct access to the Prime Minister. Kaul’s advice, nomatter how ridiculous it might have seemed, would not have beentaken lightly. Unlike the last time the General recommended asking forforeign military intervention (after the meeting on 11 October), by thethird week of October, more than 20 Indian army posts had beenoverrun by China. Evidently, even in this desperate time, the tensions

116Jawaharlal Nehru, ‘Changing India’, Foreign Affairs 41/3 (April 1963), 463.117Hoffman, India and the China Crisis, 165.118Ibid.119This has been confirmed in the following correspondence, Galbraith, New Delhi, toState, 24 Oct. 1962, FRUS, Vol. 19, 350; Galbraith, New Delhi, to State, 25 Oct. 1962,ibid.; Memorandum from Kaysen to Kennedy, Washington DC, 26 Oct. 1962, ibid.120The first was given on 11 Oct. at the PM’s house, and the second on 23 Oct. atKaul’s residence in New Delhi.121The fact that Kaul’s views were still ‘valued’ by Nehru has been adequatelyinvestigated by Hoffman, India and the China Crisis, 198.

Why Culture Matters: Revisiting the 1962 Sino-Indian War 861

Dow

nloa

ded

by [

134.

117.

10.2

00]

at 2

3:20

22

Sept

embe

r 20

13

underlying military realities and cultural beliefs were simply notreconciled. Contrary to neo-realist analyses, India’s strategic behaviourwas shaped by cultural beliefs rather than changes in the ‘externalconditions’,122 such as the mounting Chinese attack on the frontier.

Second, another point of detail B.K. Nehru and Kux have ignored isthat prior to asking the US for military aid on 26 October, Indian officialshad received assurances to the effect that aid did not mean an alliance. On23 October, Foreign Secretary M.J. Desai had met Galbraith and told himthat ‘he hoped [the US] would not force them [Indians] into an alliance orimpose security inspection procedures for the arms they receive whichwould be inconsistent with their sovereignty’. Galbraith had reassuredDesai that this would not happen and that the US would respect India’ssentiments.123 Three days after Nehru had asked the US for military aid,he met Galbraith. Galbraith writes that the Prime Minister hadcategorically stated that ‘he hoped that this would not mean a militaryalliance between the United States and India’. To which Galbraithresponded that the US ‘insisted on no such thing’.124

As mentioned above, this was a time when Indian army posts wererapidly being lost to the Chinese, India’s defence establishment was indisarray and the urgent need for military equipment had beenhighlighted by Thapar,125 the COAS, and had become a topic ofpublic discussion among Delhi’s political elite.126 Yet, Indian leadersmade sure that military aid would not lead to an alliance. In fact,Galbraith complained that after having received assistance, Nehru hadbecome more and more ambivalent with regards to the US,127 thecountry India needed the most in this time of national security crisis.These details might not automatically mean that cultural beliefs play adetermining role in influencing policy, but they certainly indicate thateven in an hour of need, India’s aversion to alliance politics informedthe manner and method in which the state constructed its strategicpolicies. To some extent, Carl Kaysen, a member of Kennedy’sNational Security Staff (NSC), realised this. He argued that all thatcould be expected of India was that she would ‘re-define’ her non-alignment policy but not ‘abandon’ it.128

122Waltz, Structural Realism After the Cold War, 34.123Galbraith, Ambassador’s Journal, 431.124Ibid., 445–6.125NMML, TTK Paper, TTK to Nehru, ‘Meeting Minutes taken on the Meeting of 14Secretaries Called by the Minister Without Portfolio’, New Delhi, 6 Nov. 1962.126Romesh Thapar, ‘NEFA and all that’, Economic Weekly 14/42 (20 Oct. 1962),1650.127Galbraith, New Delhi, to Kennedy 13 Nov. 1962, FRUS, Vol. 19, 382.128Kaysen to Kennedy, Washington, 3 Nov. 1962, ibid., 367.

862 Rudra Chaudhuri

Dow

nloa

ded

by [

134.

117.

10.2

00]

at 2

3:20

22

Sept

embe

r 20

13

Last, and perhaps most importantly, the significance of culturalbeliefs becomes most clear in India’s strategic behaviour after the warhad ended. Rather than abandoning non-alignment, it became clear toKennedy and his advisers that India’s independent foreign policy couldnot be reversed. India’s approach to foreign affairs might have changed,but the policy of non-alignment had hardly been abandoned.

In the post-November 1962 period, T.T. Krishnamachari (TTK),Nehru’s close aide and Minister for Defence and Economic Coopera-tion, argued that substantive external military assistance was requiredto repel future Chinese attacks. This was especially true if a futurewar involved the use of airpower.129 Nehru had believed that Chinawould be an ‘adversary for considerable time to come’.130 The Indianshad realised that the only accessible means of defending India’sborders in this time was with the help of American equipment, and toa lesser extent, military supplies from Britain. In anticipation of futureChinese attacks, the Indians had requested Washington for air defenseand for US aircraft to be stationed in India, as well as US radarinstallations manned by American personnel to oversee the protectionof Delhi, Calcutta, and the North East.131 In response, Nehru hadbeen categorically told that long-term military assistance was directlydependent on a Kashmir settlement.132 As far Kennedy was con-cerned, the only plausible way of maintaining cordial relations withPakistan, a long-term ally, and at the same time providing India addi-tional military assistance, was to broker a settlement on the Kashmirdispute.133

Under the given circumstances, it would have been reasonable toexpect that the Indians would do everything possible to find a way tosettle the Kashmir dispute, or at least make it look like India was doingeverything possible to do so. Yet, in accordance with the policy of non-alignment, created to avoid Cold War blocs, and to preventencroachment on the state’s independent decision-making process,Nehru did little to convince the US and the UK that under pressure,India would settle the Kashmir dispute.

Nehru’s reluctance to follow the US-UK line was communicated toKennedy and Prime Minister Harold Macmillan’s envoys at the end of

129NMML, TTK Papers, Correspondence with Nehru, TTK to Nehru, New Delhi, 16Dec. 1962; NMML, TTK to Nehru, New Delhi, 26 Dec. 1962.130Ibid.131Memorandum of Conversation from Robert Komer to President Kennedy,Washington DC, 16 Dec. 1962, FRUS, Vol. 19, 435–7.132Y.D. Gundevia, Outside the Archives (London: Sangam Books 1984), 248–310.133Memorandum of Conversation, Sino-Indian Dispute, Nassau, 20 Dec. 1962, FRUS,Vol. 19, 448–50.

Why Culture Matters: Revisiting the 1962 Sino-Indian War 863

Dow

nloa

ded

by [

134.

117.

10.2

00]

at 2

3:20

22

Sept

embe

r 20

13

November. A series of meetings were held between Nehru, USAmbassador-at-large Averell Harriman and UK Secretary of State forCommonwealth Relations Duncan Sandys, the chief American andBritish representatives who had arrived in India to create a long-termdefence plan, as also to oversee a settlement on Kashmir. In thesemeetings, not only could Harriman not get Nehru to commit on anyplan for the settlement of Kashmir, but did not even get the Indianleader to directly approach Field Marshal Ayub Khan, the Pakistanipresident. Harriman’s attempts at discussing the partition of Kashmiror the possibilities of an independent status for Kashmir wereimmediately shot down by Nehru.134 All that Nehru agreed to wasministerial-level talks between India and Pakistan.

Between December 1962 and the summer of 1963, six rounds oftalks failed to bring about a settlement. Disagreements over bordermodifications, and ultimately Pakistan’s demand for handing overthe entire valley to Pakistani control were rejected outright. Inthe meantime, during a visit to America, T.T. Krishnamachari andM.J. Desai impressed upon the US administration the importance Indiacontinued to place on its policy of non-alignment. During meetingswith the White House policy staff Desai had ‘argued convincingly’ thatIndia had no desire to give up on non-alignment.135 Somewhat takenaback by India’s strong position on non-alignment, Kennedy wroteto Macmillan that the Indian leaders were bent upon negotiatinglong-term military assistance ‘within the framework of formal non-alignment’.136

By the beginning of June 1963, Kennedy realised that the US and theUK’s mission to settle the Kashmir dispute was a lost cause. Havingthought long and hard about providing India with military assistanceeven though India, according to Kennedy, had done little to earn it, theUS agreed to provide India limited long-term military assistance. It washence decided that US manned planes would be provided for ‘air exer-cises’, intended to serve as a deterrent for further Chinese attacks.137

The US had also committed herself to providing India with smallerinvestments to modernise the Indian Army. According to a generalunderstanding with T.T. Krishnamachari, US contributions on thebasis of military aid included additional air transport ($2.7 million) androad construction assistance ($5.6 million).138 In the end, by the summer

134Galbraith, New Delhi, to Rusk, 30 Nov. 1962, FRUS, Vol. 19, 414–17.135London, The National Archives, FO 371/170637, Message from Kennedy toMacmillan, Washington DC, 23 May 1963.136Ibid.137Gopal, Jawaharlal Nehru, Vol. 3, 251–3.138State, Washington DC, to Embassy in India, 18 June 1963, FRUS Vol. 19, 612–13.

864 Rudra Chaudhuri

Dow

nloa

ded

by [

134.

117.

10.2

00]

at 2

3:20

22

Sept

embe

r 20

13

of 1963, there was no indication of India having allied with the US.Interactions between Indian and US/UK officials had established thatIndia would not be coerced into settling the Kashmir dispute.

By the end of the summer in 1963, the US had reconciled herself tothe fact that India would not enter into military alliances. Galbraith,who at one point thought that the Sino-Indian Border War providedthe ‘liberal West’ with ‘remarkable opportunities in the realignment’going on in India,139 later accepted that non-alignment would not beeasily abandoned. India’s request for air cover in the post-border warperiod, which the ambassador had initially interpreted as a ‘semi-military’ alliance, was simply, as he later recounted, expensivemilitary aid.140

Conclusion

This article has tried to demonstrate that cultural beliefs provided arepertoire of habits and styles from which India’s political leadersconstructed strategies of action.141 India’s strategic preferences duringthe Sino-Indian Border War were motivated by cultural beliefsoperating at a domestic level. These beliefs informed the underlyingideational lens through which India’s leaders read the crisis. Theirreactions were similarly culturally dependent and the strategic decisionsmade were culturally bound. As mentioned earlier, in Western IRscholarship, the cultural argument has been firmly established. Theconnection between historical memory, institutionalised beliefs, and theimpact of those beliefs on behaviour has been well documented.Expanding the parameters of Indian strategic studies, this article hasattempted to demonstrate that the cultural argument is as relevant toIndian strategic history as it is to any other region of IR scholarship.This is not just a question of exemplifying why culture matters, butmore importantly, illustrating that rational approach to the study ofstrategic history is not always substantiated. State actions andbehaviour are shaped by independent variables that cannot beexplained without shedding light on what sometimes are believed tobe loose notions of beliefs and ideas.142

Intertwining theoretical debate with empirical evidence, this articlehas tried to show why the accounts of Indian strategic behaviour in the

139Galbraith, Ambassador’s Journal, 513.140Ibid., 505.141See Ann Swidler, ‘Culture in Action: Symbols and Strategies’, American SociologicalReview 51/2 (April 1986), 273.142Desch, Culture Clash.

Why Culture Matters: Revisiting the 1962 Sino-Indian War 865

Dow

nloa

ded

by [

134.

117.

10.2

00]

at 2

3:20

22

Sept

embe

r 20

13

existing literature are in fact unsubstantiated. In this revision lieconclusions that are relevant for Indian strategic studies and broaderpolicy formulation with regards to US-India relations. For scholars ofIndian strategic studies, the conclusion is simple: appreciate whyculture matters. As this article has demonstrated, having adopted arational approach of analysis, scholars and practitioners have simplymissed the debate. By concluding that India abandoned non-alignment and entered into an alliance with the US, the works ofthese authors have misrepresented history, leaving future students ofhistory with a disaccorded picture that does little to capture themotivations driving the Indian state. For decision-makers in the USand India, the study shows that it is imperative to take culturalfactors into account when creating policies. In the post-Indianindependence period, few Americans understood what non-alignmentstood for. Even fewer accepted such a policy, which was oftenlooked upon with suspicion.

In the current political milieu, although US-India relations have beentransformed,143 some scholars are confused by the tough stanceadopted by India in negotiating the so-called US-India nuclear deal.144

As this article has tried to stress, in understanding India, or any state forthat matter, it is imperative to first understand why culture matters.Such an approach will help solve some puzzles that seem to bemusecontemporary thinkers.

For instance, with regards to the nuclear deal, the cultural roots ofIndia’s overtly independent approach to international relations areworth investigating. The unrelenting attempts of Indian scientists andpolicy-makers to ensure complete strategic autonomy are not based onad hoc decisions made by the government of the day. The idea ofstrategic autonomy did not suddenly present itself to those currentlyin power. Indeed, India’s strategic behaviour is shaped by beliefsinstitutionalised over time. The cultural base of these beliefs mighthave changed, or been read differently, but tensions nonethelessexist. By understanding these tensions, policy gurus will be able tobetter understand India’s stance on contentious issues, which issimply not possible without at least accepting that culture matters.

143Paul Kapur and Sumit Ganguly, ‘The Transformation of US-India Relations: AnExplanation for the Rapprochement and Prospects for the Future’, Asian Survey 47/4(July/Aug. 2007), 642–56.144For details, see T.V. Paul and Mahesh Shankar, ‘Why the US-India Nuclear Accordis a Good Deal’, Survival 49/4 (2007), 111–22.

866 Rudra Chaudhuri

Dow

nloa

ded

by [

134.

117.

10.2

00]

at 2

3:20

22

Sept

embe

r 20

13

Acknowledgements

For valuable comments and suggestions I am grateful to the anonymousreviewer of this article, the editors of the Journal of Strategic Studies,Srinath Raghavan, Joshua Geltzer, Leena Chaudhuri, Aprajita Dhundiaand especially Theo Farrell.

Bibliography

Bajpai, K. Shankar, ‘Engaging with the World’, in A. Sinha, and M. Mohta (eds.), Indian ForeignPolicy: Challenges and Opportunities (New Delhi: Academic Foundation 2007).

Crabb, Cecil V., ‘The Testing of Non-Alignment’, Western Political Science Quarterly 17/3 (Sept.

1964).

Desch, Michael, ‘Culture Clash: Assessing the Importance of Ideas in Security Studies’,

International Security 23/1 (Summer 1998), 141–70.Duffield, John, Farrell, Theo, Price, Richard and Desch, Michael, ‘Isms and Schisms:

Culturalism Versus Realism in Security Studies’, International Security 24/1 (Summer 1999),

156–80.

Dutt, Subimal, With Nehru in the Foreign Office (Delhi: Minerva Associates 1977).Farrell, Theo, ‘Professionalization and Suicidal Defence Planning by the Irish Army, 1921–1941’,

Journal of Strategic Studies 21/3 (Sept. 1998), 67–85.

Farrell, Theo, ‘Culture and Military Power’, Review of International Studies 24 (1998), 407–16.Farrell, Theo, ‘Memory, Imagination, and War’, History 87/285 (Jan. 2002), 61–73.

Farrell, Theo, ‘Constructivist Security Studies: Portrait of a Research Programme’, InternationalStudies Review 4/1 (Spring 2002), 49–72.

Farrell, Theo, ‘Strategic Culture and American Empire’, SAIS Review of International Studies 35/2(Summer–Fall 2005), 3–18.

Farrell, Theo, The Norms of War: Cultural Beliefs and Modern Conflict (London: Lynne Rienner

2005).

Foreign Relations of the United States (FRUS), Vol. 19 (Washington, DC: US Government PrintingOffice 2005).

Galbraith, Kenneth, Ambassador’s Journal: A Personal Accounts of the Kennedy Years (London:

Hamish Hamilton 1969).Gentry, John, ‘Norms and Military Power: NATO’s War Against Yugoslavia’, Security Studies 15/

2 (April–June 2006), 187–224.

Ghosh, Sudhir, Gandhi’s Emissary (London: Cresset Press 1967).

Gopal, Sarvepali, Jawaharlal Nehru: A Biography, Vol. 3 1956–1964 (New Delhi: OUP 1984).Gray, Colin, ‘National Style in Strategy: The American Example’, International Security 6/2

(Autumn 1981).

Guha, Ramachandra, ‘The Challenge of Contemporary History’, Economic and Political Weekly(28 June 2008).

Gundevia, Y.D., Outside the Archives (London: Sangam Books 1984).

Hoffman, Steven, India and the China Crisis (Berkeley and Los Angeles: Univ. of California Press

1990).

Jain, B.M., India and the United States 1961–1963 (New Delhi: Radiant Publishers 1987).Jian, Chen, ‘The Tibetan Rebellion of 1959 and China’s Changing Relations with India and the

Soviet Union’, Journal of Cold War Studies 8/3 (Summer 2006), 80–9.

Johnston, Alastair Iain, Cultural Realism: Strategic Culture and Grand Strategy in Chinese History(Princeton UP 1995).

Johnston, Alastair, ‘Thinking About Strategic Culture’, International Security 19/4 (Spring 1995),

32–64.

Why Culture Matters: Revisiting the 1962 Sino-Indian War 867

Dow

nloa

ded

by [

134.

117.

10.2

00]

at 2

3:20

22

Sept

embe

r 20

13

Jun, Niu, ‘1962: The Eve of the Left Turn in China’s Foreign Policy’, Cold War History InternationalProject, Working Paper No. 48 (Woodrow Wilson International Centre for Scholars 2005).

Kapur, Paul and Ganguly, Sumit, ‘The Transformation of US-India Relations: An Explanation forthe Rapprochement and Prospects for the Future’, Asian Survey 47/4 (July/Aug. 2007), 642–56.

Katzenstein, Peter, The Culture of National Security: Norms and Identity in World Politics (New

York: Columbia UP 1996).Kaul, B.N., The Untold Story (New Delhi: Allied Publishers 1967).

Kavic, Lorne, India’s Quest for Security (Berkeley and Los Angeles: Univ. of California Press

1967).

Keenleyside, T.N., ‘Prelude to Power: The Meaning of Non-Alignment before IndianIndependence’, Pacific Affairs 53/3 (Autumn 1980), 461–83.

Khera, S.S., India’s Defence Problem (New Delhi: Orient-Longman 1968).

Kier, Elizabeth, Imagining War: French and British Military Doctrine Between the Wars(Princeton UP 1997).

Kundu, Apurba, Militarism in India: The Army and Civil Society (New York: Taurus Academic

Studies 1998).

Kux, Dennis, India and the United States: Estranged Democracies (Washington, DC: NationalDefense UP 1992).

Lall, John, Aksaichin and the Sino-Indian Conflict (New Delhi: Allied Publishers 1989).

Lamb, Alastair, The China-India Border: The Origins of the Disputed Boundaries (London: OUP

1964).Legro, Jeffery, ‘Military Culture and Inadvertent Escalation of World War II’, International

Security 18/4 (Spring 1994), 66–107.

Legro, Jeffery, Cooperation under Fire: Anglo-German Restraint during World War II (New

York: Cornell UP 1995).Legro, Jeffery and Moravcsik, Andrew, ‘Is Anyone Still a Realist?’ International Security 24/2

(Autumn 1999), 5–55.

Levi, Werner, ‘Indian Neutralism Reconsidered’, Pacific Affairs 37/2 (Summer 1964).

Meyer, Christoph, The Quest for a European Strategic Culture: A Comprehensive Study ofStrategic Norms and Ideas on the European Union? (London: Palgrave 2007).

McMahon, Robert, ‘United States Cold War Strategy in South Asia: Making a Military

Commitment to Pakistan, 1947–1954’, Journal of American History 75/3 (Dec. 1988), 812–40.McMahon, Robert, The Cold War on the Periphery: The United States, India, and Pakistan (New

York: Columbia UP 1994).

Mankekar, D.R., The Guilty Men of 1962 (Bombay: Tulsi Shah Enterprises 1968).

Maxwell, Neville, India’s China War (London: Jonathan Cape 1970).Mearsheimer, John J., ‘The False Promise of International Institutions’, International Security 19/3

(Winter 1994–95), 9–11.

Mullick, B.N., My Years with Nehru: The Chinese Betrayal (New Delhi: Allied Publishers 1971).

Nehru, B.K., Nice Guys Finish Second (New Delhi: Viking 1997).Nehru, Jawaharlal, ‘Changing India’, Foreign Affairs 41/3 (April 1963), 453–65.

Nehru, Jawaharlal, Letters to Chief Ministers 1947–64, Vol. 3 1958–64 (New Delhi: Jawaharlal

Nehru Memorial Fund 1988).Nehru, Jawaharlal, Selected Works of Jawaharlal Nehru Second Series, Vol. 1 (New Delhi:

Jawaharlal Nehru Memorial Fund and OUP 1999).

Pandit, Vijay Lakshmi, The Scope of Happiness (London: Weidenfeld 1979).

Paul, T.V. and Shankar, Mahesh, ‘Why the US-India Nuclear Accord is a Good Deal’, Survival 49/4 (Winter 2007), 111–22.

Raghavan, Srinath, ‘Sino-Indian Border Dispute, 1948–1960, A Reappraisal’, Economic &Political Weekly (September 2006).

Rajagopalan, Swarna (ed.), Security and South Asia: Ideas, Institutions, and Initiatives (NewDelhi: Routledge 2006).

868 Rudra Chaudhuri

Dow

nloa

ded

by [

134.

117.

10.2

00]

at 2

3:20

22

Sept

embe

r 20

13

Rosen, Stephen, ‘Military Effectiveness: Why Society Matters’, International Security 19/4 (Spring

1995), 5–31.

Rosen, Stephen, Societies and Military Power: India and its Armies (New York: Cornell UP 1996).Scalapino, Robert, ‘‘‘Neutralism’’ in Asia’, American Political Science Review 48/1 (March 1954),

49–62.

Sharma, Chattar Singh, ‘Panchsheela and After: Sino-India Relations in the Context of the TibetanInsurrection’, Asian Survey 21/3 (May 1962), 426–8.

Shean, Vincent, ‘The Case for India’, Foreign Affairs 30 (1951–52).

Singh, Jaswant, Call to Honour (New Delhi: Rupa 2006).

Sinha, A. and Mohta, M. (eds.), Indian Foreign Policy: Challenges and Opportunities (New Delhi:Academic Foundation 2007).

Sinha, P.B. and Athale, A.A., History of the Conflict with China, 1962 (New Delhi: History

Division, Government of India 1992).

Snyder, Jack, The Soviet Strategic Culture: Implications for Limited Nuclear Operations (RANDCorp. 1977).

Subramanyam, K., Shedding Shibboleths: India’s Evolving Strategic Outlook (Delhi: Wordsmith

2005).Swidler, Ann, ‘Culture in Action: Symbols and Strategies’, American Sociological Review 51/2

(April 1986), 273–86.

Tanham, George, Indian Strategic Thought: An Interpretive Essay (Santa Monica, CA: RAND

Corp. 1992).Tanham, George, ‘Indian Strategic Culture’, Washington Quarterly 15/1 (Winter 1992), 129–42.

Telhami, Shibley, ‘Kenneth Waltz, Neo-Realism and Foreign Policy’, Security Studies 11/3 (Spring

2002), 158–70.

Thapar, Romesh, ‘Handling the Chinese’, Economic Weekly 14/41 (13 Oct. 1962), 1611–12.Thapar, Romesh, ‘NEFA and all that’, Economic Weekly 14/42 (20 Oct. 1962).

Varadarajan, Latha, ‘Constructivism, Identity, and Neoliberal (In)Security’, Review of Interna-tional Studies 30/3 (2004), 319–41.

Waltz, Kenneth, Theory of International Politics (London: McGraw-Hill 1979).Waltz, Kenneth, ‘Structural Realism After the Cold War’, International Security 25/1 (Summer

2000), 5–41.

Why Culture Matters: Revisiting the 1962 Sino-Indian War 869

Dow

nloa

ded

by [

134.

117.

10.2

00]

at 2

3:20

22

Sept

embe

r 20

13