Whose Summit? Whose Information Society? - APC · 2015-10-08 · Whose Summit? Whose Information...

Whose Summit? Whose Information Society?Developing countries and civil society at

the World Summit on the Information Society

Whose Summit? Whose Information Society?Whose Summit? Whose Information Society?Whose Summit? Whose Information Society?Whose Summit? Whose Information Society?Whose Summit? Whose Information Society?Developing countries and civil society atthe World Summit on the Information Society

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b y D A V I D S O U T E R

with additional research by ABIODUN JAGUN



AUTHOR: DAVID SOUTER

This report has been written for the Association forProgressive Communications (APC) by David Souter.

DAVID SOUTER is an independent expert on informationand communication technology (ICT) and informationand communications in development (ICD) issues. Hedirects the specialist consultancy ict DevelopmentAssociates ltd, which he formed in 2003. He has ledprojects on a wide range of issues involving information,communications and international development forclients including the World Bank, the United NationsDevelopment Programme, the European Commission,the UK Department for International Development (DFID)and a number of civil society and private sectororganisations. He is also Visiting Professor inCommunications Management at the University ofStrathclyde and a Visiting Research Associate of theDepartment of Media and Communications, LondonSchool of Economics. From 1995 to 2003, he was ChiefExecutive of the Commonwealth TelecommunicationsOrganisation. In 2002, he coordinated the research teamfor the “Louder Voices” enquiry, which researcheddeveloping country participation in international ICTdecision-making for DFID and the G8 DOT Force.

David Souter has worked with APC for a number ofyears, as a research partner and consultant on ICT andICD issues. He led APC’s analytical work on participationin the World Summit on the Information Society,reported in this study, and is currently working with APCon multistakeholder initiatives within the framework ofthe Internet Governance Forum.

RESEARCH PARTNER: ABIODUN JAGUN

Abiodun Jagun was the principal research partnerfor this report.

ABI JAGUN earned her Ph.D. from the University ofStrathclyde in 2006 with a thesis on the subject of“Telecommunications and the Structure of EconomicOrganisations”. As well as academic experience in Nigeriaand Britain, she has worked in the Nigerian office of theinternational consultancy Accenture, and has undertakenresearch projects with David Souter for the World Bankand the United Nations Development Programme. Shecurrently spends half her time working with APC as ICTPolicy Research Officer for the African region and herremaining time as Lecturer, Information Systems andDevelopment, in the Institute for Development PolicyManagement at the University of Manchester.

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY .......................................................................................................................7

SECTION A: BACKGROUND

1. Introduction .......................................................................................................................... 17

2. The “Louder Voices” report: a summary .............................................................................. 20

3. WSIS: an account ................................................................................................................ 22

SECTION B: ANALYSIS

4. WSIS organisation and structure ......................................................................................... 37

5. WSIS and its issues ............................................................................................................. 47

6. WSIS and developing countries ............................................................................................ 61

7. WSIS and civil society .......................................................................................................... 72

SECTION C: RECOMMENDATIONS

8. Conclusions and recommendations ...................................................................................... 91

ANNEXES

Annex 1: Participation in WSIS summits .................................................................................. 113

Annex 2: Participation in the TFFM and the WGIG .................................................................... 118

Annex 3: WSIS outcome document “commitments” ................................................................ 121

Annex 4: References ................................................................................................................ 124

TABLE OF CONTENTS

6 W h os e S u m m i t ? W h os e I n fo r m at i o n S oc i et y ?

7

The World Summit on the Information Society - WSIS -was the largest single activity in international discus-sion of information and communication technologies(ICTs) during the past ten years – at least in scale. Itabsorbed a great deal of time and other resources ofinternational organisations, governments, civil societyorganisations and businesses over a four-year period(2001-2005). It produced four documents setting outaspirations for the information society. It provided aframework for international debate on infrastructure fi-nance and Internet governance. But it received only lim-ited public attention and failed to bridge the paradigmgap between the worlds of information technology andinternational development.

This report summarises a study of developing country andcivil society participation and influence in WSIS that wascommissioned by the Association for Progressive Commu-nications (APC). As well as analysing participation, thestudy looked at the impact of WSIS on international ICT

Introduction

decision-making in general and makes recommendationsto all main actors about how future decision-making mightbecome more inclusive of developing countries, non-gov-ernmental actors and their concerns. In particular, it revis-its the conclusions of the “Louder Voices” report on de-veloping country involvement in decision-making, pub-lished at the G8 summit in 2002, which identified a seriesof weaknesses in both international organisations andnational policymaking processes which contributed topoor participation – and it asks how these have and havenot changed as a result of WSIS.

This study drew on five main sources of evidence:

• Participant observation of the WSIS process through-out its four-year period, by the principal author, DavidSouter, and research associate, Abiodun Jagun

• Desk research, particularly the documentation pro-duced within the WSIS process by all stakeholders,including developing countries and civil society

THIS EXECUTIVE SUMMARY OF THE REPORT IS ADAPTED FROM A SUMMARY PUBLISHED AS A SEPARATE

DOCUMENT DURING THE FIRST MEETING OF THE INTERNET GOVERNANCE FORUM IN OCTOBER/NOVEMBER

2006. IT PROVIDES AN INTRODUCTION TO THE MAIN REPORT ONLY, AND DOES NOT INCLUDE ALL OF THE

ISSUES RAISED IN THAT REPORT.

e x e c u t i v e S u m m a r y

E xc e c u t i ve S u m m a ry




• Questionnaires and interviews with many individualparticipants in WSIS preparatory committees(PrepComs) and in the two summit sessions (Geneva,2003; Tunis, 2005)

• Detailed interviews with forty key actors in the WSISprocess

• Case studies of experience in five developing coun-tries - Bangladesh, Ecuador, Ethiopia, India and Kenya.

This executive summary briefly summarises the main is-sues, conclusions and recommendations of the report. Itdoes not include all of the issues covered in the main re-port that follows.

The WSIS story

The origins of WSIS lay in a decision taken, without de-bate, at the International Telecommunication Union (ITU)’s1998 Plenipotentiary Conference, calling on the ITU to or-ganise a world summit on the information society. It isdoubtful if ITU delegates expected this to be a global sum-mit of the kind which the United Nations holds regularlyon different issues, but that is what WSIS became when itwon the backing of other UN agencies.

There is a standard process for the organisation of worldsummits. The summit meeting itself is the last stage of aprolonged process of negotiation, and is primarily an op-portunity for heads of state and government to make publicstatements and commit their countries to a formal decla-ration. The real work takes place in complex discussionsover the previous year or two, in a series of regional meet-ings and preparatory committees (or PrepComs). These arewhere the text that is eventually signed is hammered out,and in which disputes are either resolved or shelved.

WSIS mostly followed this standard structure, but its or-ganisation differed from the standard model in two mainways.

Firstly, it was organised in two phases - one two-year phaseleading to the first summit meeting in Geneva in Decem-ber 2003, another to the second summit meeting in Tunisin November 2005. This was justified as an opportunity todevote separate discussions to (firstly) principles and (sec-ondly) implementation - though the underlying reason wasfailure to choose between two willing hosts. There weretherefore five regional meetings during the first phase andfour during the second; as well as three full PrepComs anda number of additional meetings in each phase.

Secondly, WSIS was organised by a technical agency ofthe United Nations, the ITU, rather than by the UN’s cen-tral organisation. This was not uncontroversial. The “in-formation society” includes wide-ranging cultural and de-velopmental issues which many considered the responsi-bility of agencies like UNESCO and the United Nations

Development Programme (UNDP) rather than the techno-cratic ITU. An underlying tension between broader devel-opment goals and goals of the ICT sector lasted through-out WSIS. Some within the ITU also saw the summit as anopportunity for it to redesign itself and broaden its man-date from telecommunications to wider information tech-nology and information society issues. This was opposedby some ITU members, other international agencies andnon-governmental organisations (NGOs).

The first phase of WSIS, up to the Geneva summit in 2003,developed two general texts - a Declaration of Principlesand a Plan of Action. These texts were agreed in negotia-tions between governments, though other stakeholderssought to influence them with varying degrees of success.The Declaration sets out the summit’s (considerable) as-pirations for the role of ICTs in transforming social andeconomic life. The Plan of Action brings together manydifferent issues and identifies possible areas for interna-tional action, together with suggested actions on whichagreement could be reached. These included targets re-lated to the Millennium Development Goals.

A number of issues proved contentious during the firstphase, including the right of non-governmental stakehold-ers to take part in WSIS negotiations, and issues concern-ing information and communication rights (particularlytheir relationship to fundamental agreements such as theUniversal Declaration of Human Rights). Two issues, how-ever, proved intractable and were referred to separate foraestablished by the UN Secretary-General, which met be-tween the first and second WSIS phases.

• The Task Force on Financial Mechanisms (TFFM) wasinitially concerned with a proposal to establish a Dig-ital Solidarity Fund (DSF), supported by many Africangovernments, but opposed by donors. Its remit ex-tended, however, to ICT infrastructure finance in gen-eral, and its conclusions were mostly concerned withthis. The TFFM worked along conventional UN task forcelines, in which limited representatives of interested par-ties reviewed issues on the basis of consultants’ reports.

• The Working Group on Internet Governance (WGIG)was concerned with anxieties expressed, primarily bydeveloping countries, about the way the Internet op-erated – in particular, the perception that critical as-pects of the Internet (particularly the Internet Corpo-ration for Assigned Names and Numbers, ICANN),which governs domain identities, and the root serversystem) were ultimately controlled by the UnitedStates, rather than a conventional international or in-ter-governmental forum. It adopted innovative work-ing methods, in which a wide range of participants fromthe whole range of stakeholder groups worked to-gether to resolve differences and establish a commonframe of reference for further negotiations.

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The second phase of WSIS agreed not to reopen discussionof the first phase texts and so was almost entirely concernedwith these two deferred issues and with the question of fol-low-up activity. In practice, issues of infrastructure financewere resolved relatively quickly, and the final year of theWSIS process was overwhelmingly concerned with Internetgovernance. Both issues are described further below.

The final outputs of the WSIS process were two furtherdocuments, the Tunis Commitment, reiterating the firstsummit’s conclusions, and the Tunis Agenda, drawing outthe second summit’s conclusions on infrastructure financeand Internet governance and setting out follow-up proce-dures for implementation.

The following sections of this summary in turn review thefindings of the APC WSIS study concerning the organisa-tion of WSIS, the issues discussed, and the participationof developing country and civil society actors in them.

The organisation of WSIS

Global summits are expensive ways of doing internationalbusiness. They require large investments in time andmoney, especially for the governments of smaller coun-tries and for non-governmental actors, and they raise highexpectations. Because they rely on global consensus, how-ever, they often get bogged down in controversial detailand are less likely to innovate than more informal fora.They are usually thought to be best at forcing governmentsto confront intractable problems of fundamental impor-tance at the most senior level, but less good at develop-ing strategies to meet new opportunities.

Kofi Annan’s view, expressed at the opening of the Genevasummit, that “This summit is unique: where most globalconferences focus on global threats, this one will considerhow best to use a new global asset,” was, therefore, notseen by everyone as positive. Although little voiced in pub-lic at the time the UN General Assembly agreed to holdWSIS, there was a good deal of scepticism amongst inter-national officials and (particularly) industrial country gov-ernments about the merits of a world summit on the infor-mation society. Many others were concerned about thecost - both in general and to their own organisations.

Many different interests therefore came together in theWSIS process, and it was always going to be difficult forthe secretariat, managed by the ITU, and the summit proc-ess as a whole to meet the different aspirations and ex-pectations of different stakeholder groups. What implica-tions did these factors have on the way in which differentstakeholders behaved and the summit itself evolved? Thestudy draws conclusions around this in four main areas.

Firstly, the interaction between WSIS and other decision-making fora was poor. Although it did involve the ITU anddid address issues of Internet governance, it had very little

interaction with the actual decision-making work which theITU and Internet governance bodies engaged in during thefour years it took place, and it had even less interaction withother significant international fora of importance to com-munications (such as the World Trade Organisation (WTO)).Prior international discourse on information, communica-tions and development, such as the work of the G8 DigitalOpportunity Task Force (DOT Force) and a variety of UN agen-cies, did not greatly inform WSIS debates either. WSIS wasnot, overall, seen as a significant decision-making body byindustrial countries, which were, by and large, representedat a much lower level than developing countries in WSISprocesses and at the two summit meetings.

Secondly, the central role of the ITU had an important im-pact on the nature of participation and discussion in WSIS.The ITU is essentially a technical agency and had little ex-pertise in the wider rights, development and political ques-tions that profoundly affected discussions at WSIS. Al-though it sought to address these weaknesses, and al-though other UN agencies were also involved in overallWSIS management, the fact that the ITU led the processmeant that governments tended to give lead responsibil-ity for their own participation to ministries of communica-tions rather than to central or developmental ministries.WSIS therefore did very little to reduce the “paradigm gap”between ICT specialists and mainstream developmentcommunities which has become a significant concern forthe development community.

Thirdly, the two-phase approach failed to deliver. Rather thanenabling the discussion to move from principles in phaseone to implementation in phase two, agreement on the maindevelopment and societal issues in phase one stifled fur-ther discussion about them in phase two. Many importantdevelopments in ICTs and their application in developmentoccurred in the four-year WSIS period, but these are barelyreflected in its final outcome documents. Many in develop-ment agencies felt that these were already outdated as theywere agreed. Four years is, in any case, a long time to spenddiscussing a sector as fast-moving as ICTs. Those who ar-gue that the second phase was, in effect, a world summiton Internet governance are not far from the mark; and thelimited nature of that outcome leaves a big question markover the merits of a two-phase summit. While some partici-pants feel quite strongly that the two-phase approach fa-cilitated networking and understanding among participants,this was at high cost, and it is unlikely that the WSIS expe-rience will encourage the UN to repeat it in future.

Finally, a number of important organisational issues aroseconcerning the participation of non-governmental stake-holders (the private sector and civil society), in the sum-mit itself and in the two “interim fora”, the TFFM and theWGIG. Multistakeholder principles were adopted in theWSIS texts but contested in WSIS negotiations. The TFFMand the WGIG adopted very different ways of working with


1 0 W h os e S u m m i t ? W h os e I n fo r m at i o n S oc i et y ?

different stakeholders. The WGIG’s very open approach tonon-governmental actors has been seen as a potentialmodel for future dialogue in other international issues – apoint discussed further below.

WSIS issues

WSIS meant different things to different people. Primafacie, a World Summit on the Information Society mighthave been expected to address issues of importance inmany aspects of all societies. The concept, after all, im-plies a comprehensive transformation of society andeconomy, comparable to that following the Industrial Revo-lution. In practice, WSIS did not address the “InformationSociety” on this grand scale but focused on a much nar-rower range of issues - the relationship between ICTs andfundamental rights, that between ICTs and development,infrastructure finance and Internet governance. It paidmuch more attention to developing countries than to in-dustrial countries. At most, therefore, it might be called asummit on aspects of the information society rather thanon the information society per se.

The relationship between information and fundamentalhuman rights was contested from the start of the WSISprocess when some governments sought to exclude ex-plicit references to binding rights agreements from draftWSIS texts. Although references to fundamental rightswere eventually included, the underlying tensions be-tween freedom of expression and government authorityremained throughout the summit, and were put insharper focus by arguments over freedom of expressionin the second host country, Tunisia. The WSIS texts donot discuss rights issues in any substance, and do notaddress the potential which ICTs have for adjusting thebalance of rights and responsibilities between citizensand governments.

The WSIS texts on the role of ICTs in development are alsodisappointing. WSIS overall had a strongly pro-ICD (infor-mation and communications in development) ethos, butits texts do not reflect the fact that this ethos is not univer-sally shared within the development community. While theWSIS texts therefore emphasised the potential, as theysaw it, for ICTs to engender a step change in countries’ability to overcome development challenges, the Millen-nium Review Summit, held just a couple of months beforethe Tunis summit, had almost nothing to say about ICTs inits review of progress towards achieving the MillenniumDevelopment Goals.

Many who work at the interface of ICTs and developmentpolicy see this as an opportunity missed, and regret thefact that WSIS failed to create a genuine dialogue betweenICT and development communities, or between ICD enthu-siasts and sceptics. There are many reasons why this might

have happened. For reasons discussed above, WSIS wasattended by ICT professionals rather than developmentspecialists. Its overall ethos encouraged enthusiasts toparticipate, and sceptics to stay away. The process usedto gather input for inclusion in the outcome documentsmade it easier to construct lists of aspirations and desid-erata than to analyse the evidence and draw priorities.Summit statements often emphasise rhetoric over realism,and avoid addressing issues of contention. The result, inWSIS’ case, was text that reflected the views of ICD be-lievers without addressing the concerns of sceptics.

This is not to say that WSIS did not build awareness andunderstanding of the potential importance of ICTs in devel-opment. Many in developing country governments, in par-ticular, stress how much more familiar they became withthe issues as a result of exposure through WSIS and howmuch more importance is now attached to them by theirgovernments. At the same time, however, WSIS did nothingto convince multilateral agencies and bilateral donors of thecase for ICD. It has not led to widespread new commitmentsin the ICD field, and some agencies have made reductionson past engagement. It seems possible that WSIS may cometo be seen as the highpoint of ICD enthusiasm rather than astimulus to new development initiatives.

One exception to this conclusion is the area of infrastruc-ture finance. The proposal for a Digital Solidarity Fundduring the first phase of the summit posed a significantproblem for donors since it sought a reallocation of devel-opment finance outside the terms of the global develop-ment consensus represented by the Monterrey Conven-tion and the Millennium Development Goals. ICT infrastruc-ture, in this consensus, was considered adequately ad-dressed by the private sector, and to many in donor agen-cies support for the DSF looked like an attempt to securefunding for the ICT sector at the expense of other develop-ment priorities (such as power, water, health and educa-tion). The dispute here was almost enough to preventagreement on a draft text being reached before the firstphase summit opened its plenary session.

In this case, the Task Force on Financial Mechanisms de-veloped an approach which recognised that access in somegeographical areas and some types of ICT infrastructurecould not be financed by the private sector alone and thatinternational and/or public finance would also be required.

This was accompanied by a move to support African ICTinfrastructure by the World Bank and the European Union,and together these proved sufficient to enable globalagreement on the issue to be reached at an early stage inthe second phase of WSIS. The Digital Solidarity Fund pro-posal was transformed into a small voluntary organisation.A consensus, therefore, was quickly reached – with theresult that the significance of the shift in thinking aboutinfrastructure finance has been missed by many.

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No-one expected WSIS to be preoccupied by Internet gov-ernance when the summit was first mooted. Some arguethat it was an issue waiting in the wings for the right occa-sion to come along; others that its prominence was largelythe result of political factors concerning different coun-tries’ relations with the United States. A central aspect ofthe question is the fact that, almost uniquely in humanhistory, the Internet has become very important, veryquickly, with very little government or inter-governmentalinvolvement. For most governments, this was an anomalyin need of resolution (though for some governments andmuch of civil society and the private sector it was a posi-tive factor that should be preserved). Here, then, were twoprincipal contests of authority: between governments andnon-governmental agencies, and between those govern-ments perceived to have authority over the Internet world-wide (principally the United States) and those feeling theyhad none at home.

This issue remained highly politicised and contentious tothe very end of WSIS. Although substantial and consen-sual, the WGIG’s report did not secure the same consen-sus within WSIS as that of the TFFM. The final outcome –compromises on “enhanced cooperation” within existingInternet governance and the creation of an Internet Gov-ernance Forum with substantial scope but insignificantpowers – left the issues largely in the air. One way of look-ing at this suggests that it represents another step withinthe Internet’s long-term evolution – a step that continuesthe erosion of its original North American identity, ratherthan the revolutionary step that some desired; perhapsalso a step that tends to bring the Internet further withinthe ambit of government or inter-governmental oversight.But the arguments over Internet governance were in nosense resolved by WSIS and will continue in the future.

Developing country participation

Summits differ from conventional, permanent internationaldecision-making fora, such as the ITU and the WTO, inmany ways – not least because they are more politicisedand because their outcomes usually have less immediatepractical effect. Less expertise is needed to participateeffectively in summits, while the need for consensus(rather than majority vote) also gives more weight tosmaller and less powerful countries.

Nevertheless, developing country participation in WSISvaried markedly in scale. The Internet governance debatein particular provided a platform for a small number oflarger developing countries to assert their influence andauthority, in a way comparable with similar new alignmentsin (for example) WTO negotiations. Smaller countries andLDCs (Least Developed Countries), by contrast, tended tobe more concerned with specific development questions,such as infrastructure finance, and played a less politicised

role in Summit negotiations. It is important, in this con-text, not to confuse the increased influence of a few majordeveloping countries with any change in influence for thedeveloping world as a whole, particularly LDCs.

Across WSIS overall, national delegations were largelymade up of diplomats and telecommunications sector pro-fessionals. Geneva diplomatic missions and home-baseddiplomats tended to play the main role in formal negotia-tions, as in other international agreements regardless ofsector. National policy discourse was usually led by com-munications ministries and, diplomats aside, a lot of del-egations were made up mostly of people from the tradi-tional telecommunications establishment (the communi-cations ministry and regulator and the incumbent fixednetwork operator). Mobile networks, the Internet commu-nity and private sector operators were poorly represented,if at all, in most delegations, and there were also few par-ticipants from mainstream development ministries.Women were also under-represented.

A few, but only a few, developing countries included civilsociety representatives in their delegations, while somestrongly opposed the presence of civil society representa-tives, even as observers, in formal negotiations – which,in all summits, are inter-governmental in character. Na-tional case studies carried out for this report showed con-siderable variation, too, in the extent of consultation andparticipation in WSIS discourse at a national level. In manycountries, policymaking remained largely within the nar-row confines of government ICT officials; though in some,such as Kenya, civil society and private sector actors playeda significant part. Media attention to WSIS was minimal inmost cases.

The regional conferences did not play as great a part inthe WSIS process as the preparatory committees. The factthat they were continental in scale may have inhibited at-tention to detail, where sub-regional conferences mighthave made a bigger contribution. The African regional con-ferences were both vibrant events, with substantial civilsociety input and impact. Others were less dynamic, andEurope did not even bother with a regional conference inthe second phase.

WSIS was, ultimately, a one-off event, in which develop-ing country participation was more substantial and as-sertive than it is in permanent ICT decision-making forasuch as the ITU and the WTO. Partly, this was becausesummit dynamics make it easier for developing countriesto manage their participation; partly because industrialcountries did not see WSIS as a priority. Few interview-ees for the study, however, felt that WSIS had significantlychanged the balance of power in ongoing policy debatesin permanent decision-making fora, likely outcomes aris-ing from them, or their arrangements for participation,except where Internet governance is concerned. The ITUdiscussed some WSIS-related changes at its November



2006 Plenipotenary Conference, but it is not yet clear howthese – and the ITU’s own identity – will develop.

In practice, the report concludes that the institutional dy-namics of participation require much more substantialchanges in both international institutions and nationalpolicymaking processes if they are to enhance develop-ing country participation – a conclusion very much in linewith that of the “Louder Voices” report. While WSIS raisedawareness of ICT and ICD issues in many countries, at leastamongst government officials and some NGOs, it did notfacilitate capacity-building or change policymaking rela-tionships at a national level. Unless those weaknesses areaddressed, many developing countries will find it as diffi-cult to represent their priorities effectively in future in spe-cialist ICT decision-making fora as they did before WSIS,which might be considered another opportunity missed.

Civil society participation

One of the most important “Louder Voices” conclusionsconcerned the extent of private sector and civil societyparticipation in ICT policy. Because of the way ICTs andparticularly the Internet have evolved, much relevant ex-pertise resides in the private sector and civil society ratherthan in government.

Although some governments opposed this, the WSIS out-come texts make much of the importance of multistake-holder involvement – the principle, as the Geneva Plan ofAction puts it, that “the effective participation of govern-ments and all stakeholders is vital in developing the Infor-mation Society[,] requiring cooperation and partnershipsamong all of them.”1

Civil society involvement in summits has increased overthe years, sometimes including the holding of “alterna-tive” summits alongside the main event. No such alterna-tive happened in the case of WSIS, but the summit didrepresent a significant advance in civil society participa-tion. The ITU’s lack of experience with civil society mayhave fostered this, by giving more autonomy and respon-sibility to a civil society bureau within the secretariat, justas its extensive experience with the private sector mayhave opened spaces for that stakeholder group. Neverthe-less, the opening stages of the first summit phase weredominated by arguments about the rights of civil societyand the private sector to participate – arguments whichhelped the two non-governmental stakeholder groups tobuild more of a common understanding between them thanthey had contrived elsewhere. (This was also helped by veryeffective coordination of private sector participation.)

In the Geneva phase of WSIS, civil society had a widerrange of issues to discuss. The whole character of the “in-formation society” seemed up for grabs, and there werepoints of principle to argue on a wide range of issuesaround which civil society could coalesce. The hostility ofsome government delegations to civil society’s presencealso fostered a sense of community and solidarity. Civilsociety engagement focused on rights issues, and hadrelatively little impact on the text on development. Thesefactors were less apparent in the Tunis phase, which fo-cused much more narrowly on Internet governance. How-ever, this was an issue in which civil society found otherways of influencing outcomes – in the WGIG, for example,and through dialogue with those government delegateswho shared many of the Internet community’s objectives.The quality of civil society organisation was weaker in thesecond phase, but the Internet Governance Caucus pro-vided a powerful instrument to advance positions which itshared with the Internet community. On the whole, there-fore, the space for civil society participation in WSIS wassufficient to ensure that most civil society organisationsfelt there was more value in constructive engagement thanin opposition. Caucusing played an important role in de-veloping civil society overviews and in strategy and tac-tics, as it has at other recent summits.

Civil society participation in WSIS PrepComs and, to a lesserextent, the Geneva and Tunis summit sessions, was, likethat of governments, concentrated amongst those with par-ticular ICT/ICD interests. Few mainstream development orhuman rights NGOs attended any part of the process, andthis greatly weakened civil society’s capacity to contributeto the development agenda. Developing countries were alsodisproportionately under-represented in civil society par-ticipation – partly because of lack of resources, partly be-cause few civil society organisations in developing coun-tries had tracked information society issues in the past, andpartly because those which had were less likely to be in-cluded in their own national discourse on WSIS issues.

The costs and benefits of civil society participation in WSISare still debated. The financial cost and opportunity costin personnel time were very considerable for those organi-sations that took WSIS seriously. Policy gains, in terms ofWSIS outcomes, were limited. Where gains were made wasin extending organisations’ understanding of issues andin their building networks outside their own regions andspecialisms that would not otherwise have been availableto them. The value of this should not be underestimated,though it is questionable how well these networks cansurvive without the focus that WSIS PrepComs providedfor them.

1 Geneva Plan of Action, section C1, article 8.

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After WSIS

The final question to be asked of WSIS concerns its fol-low-up processes. These can be divided into three groups.

a. Some overview implementation processes were set inplace, reporting to the UN General Assembly, as withother summits.

b. In the case of Internet governance, ambiguous com-promises were reached to foster “enhanced coopera-tion” in order “to enable governments, on an equalfooting, to carry out their roles and responsibilities, ininternational public policy issues pertaining to theInternet,”2 and to establish a multistakeholderInternet Governance Forum with no substantive pow-ers but extensive scope.

c. A list of eleven “action lines” was established (with afurther eight subsidiary lines) to undertake otherwiseunspecified “multi-stakeholder implementation at theinternational level.”3

Internet governance developments have continued to at-tract the interest and attention of all stakeholder groups,principally because the issues remain unresolved. They willcontinue to do so, and Internet governance institutions willcontinue to change, as they have done throughout theInternet’s history. How they change is yet unclear, but theprofile of Internet governance has become and will remainmuch more substantial as a result of its politicisation inthe WSIS process. The breadth and quality of discourse atthe first meeting of the Internet Governance Forum metwith a very positive response from most participants.

The WSIS texts on wider information society issues are farfrom the cutting edge of development thinking, and are

proving of little interest to those who are seriously engagedin ICD. The first round of action line meetings held in May2006 was very poorly attended and produced little in theway of new initiatives. It seems unlikely that these will of-fer any significant legacy for WSIS, which is likely to re-main largely a stand-alone event in the history of ICT/ICD.

One significant question which is often asked is whetherthe WGIG experience of multistakeholder participation of-fers a model for use in other international fora. The reportconcludes that this is possible, but in limited contexts. TheWGIG was concerned with an area of international govern-ance in which governments and inter-governmental institu-tions were not predominant. Multistakeholder participationand processes were easier to instigate, therefore, becausethey did not challenge existing (inter-)governmental author-ity. The WGIG’s process – as a genuinely “working” groupof diverse individuals – was also particularly suited toan issue which was both complex and highly politicisedand where many disputants were largely ignorant of the

technical complexities involved. There are some other in-ternational issues which are similarly complex and politi-cised, and where issues are poorly understood, but rela-tively few. These would be much more susceptible to thisapproach than issues which do not share all these charac-teristics.

Conclusion

What lasting impact has WSIS had on the “informationsociety” and on developing country and civil society par-ticipation?

Almost a year on from the Tunis summit, it is difficult tosee that WSIS has had a lasting impact on the issues itdiscussed, with the exception of Internet governance. Thequality of its development texts was poor. Much more sig-nificant documents and initiatives in this context have beenwritten and undertaken outside the WSIS framework dur-ing the past five years than within it. WSIS does seem tohave drawn more attention to the lack of evidence and criti-cal evaluation available concerning ICT’s impact on devel-opment, and to the paradigm gap between ICT and devel-opment professionals. Some international agencies arenow seeking to address these. Many developing countrygovernments were made more aware of ICT issues by WSIS,and ICT and ICD are being included in more Poverty Re-duction Strategies. There has also been a shift, followingthe TFFM, in thinking about infrastructure finance. How-ever, these developments do not represent a revolution inthinking about the information society of the kind thatWSIS’ advocates had hoped to see.

At an institutional level, WSIS has not had a significantimpact on the deliberations or processes of most existingpermanent international ICT decision-making fora. WSISdid allow the ITU to push the boundaries of its mandatebeyond telecommunications towards the information so-ciety to some extent, but within limits. If anything, the WSISprocess probably increased hostility to the idea of it play-ing a major role in Internet governance, rather than ad-vancing the case for this. The scope for the ITU extendingits developmental role is constrained by both its own mem-bers’ wishes and those of other agencies within the UNsystem. The ambiguous compromise on Internet govern-ance reached in Tunis will be played out over some time tocome. The meaning of “enhanced cooperation” and therole of the Internet Governance Forum are yet unclear; butWSIS is likely to mark a stage in the evolution of Internetmanagement which itself is likely to see increased gov-ernment involvement alongside that of its historic stake-holders. The action lines on development issues set up aspart of WSIS follow-up do not seem likely to make a sig-nificant or lasting contribution.

2 Tunis Agenda for the Information Society, article 69.

3 ibid., article 108.



Developing country participation in WSIS was significantlyhigher than in other ICT decision-making fora, but WSISdid not in fact make significant decisions. The more asser-tive role played by some larger developing countries mayfollow through to other fora, notably in Internet govern-ance, but WSIS has not equipped smaller and less well-resourced developing countries to participate more effec-tively in permanent fora like the ITU and WTO, which willhave more lasting influence than WSIS. Institutionalchanges in the way those organisations manage their proc-esses and national changes to improve the quality, scopeand inclusiveness of national policy debates are still fun-damental to enabling developing countries to articulatetheir issues and concerns more effectively in permanentdecision-making fora. The dominance of WSIS delegationsby ICT professionals, and the very limited participation ofdevelopment specialists, meant that WSIS did little to ad-dress the paradigm gap between these communities in aswell as outside developing countries.

Civil society participation in WSIS was significant, andsome feel that it was both more cooperative and more as-sertive than in many previous summits. WSIS did illustrate,however, that civil society, like government, faces a para-digm gap between organisations interested in ICT/ICD(which participated in the summit) and mainstream de-velopment and rights agencies (which did not). Northerncivil society was also more strongly represented than itsSouthern counterparts. Civil society’s main gains lay inincreased understanding and networking, but these werebought at a high cost and their sustainability is uncertain.

In some countries, civil society organisations also im-proved relationships with national governments, on whichthey may be able to build in future.

Finally, the WSIS texts strongly emphasised the value ofmultistakeholder participation and, though many govern-ments remain uncomfortable about it, this will make fu-ture attempts to exclude civil society and the private sec-tor more contentious. Experience with the Internet Gov-ernance Forum will be telling here: a successful Forum willadvance the case for multistakeholder participation, butfailure will be used against the principle.

In the coming period, APC will work with its partners andother organisations to build on the WSIS experience, asdescribed in this report, in order to improve developingcountry and civil society participation in future interna-tional ICT decision-making. New fora like the Internet Gov-ernance Forum and long-standing institutions like the ITUwill both play an important part in this work. There is stilla great need for capacity-building which creates betterunderstanding and develops new resources; for betternetworking and experience-sharing, particularly amongand between developing countries; and for improved dia-logue between different stakeholder communities. TheWSIS experience has helped APC and other organisationsto think through their own objectives and priorities in thisarea and to develop new initiatives. If this leads to moreeffective and more inclusive participation in the future,then that will be a positive and lasting outcome from thisparticular World Summit. �

1 5

b y D A V I D S O U T E R

with additional research by ABIODUN JAGUN

m a i n r e p o r t

s e c t i o n a Background

s e c t i o n b Analysis

s e c t i o n c Recommendations



1 5

1 7

c h a p t e r 1 Introduction

c h a p t e r 2 The “Louder Voices” report: a summary

c h a p t e r 3 WSIS: an account

Introductionc h a p t e r 1

The World Summit on the Information Society - WSIS inbrief - was the major event in international discourse oninformation and communications technologies (ICTs) andtheir role in development during the first five years of the21st century. Held in two preparatory phases, from 2001to the first summit event in Geneva in December 2003, andfrom then until the second summit event in Tunis in No-vember 2005, it preoccupied much of the time and manyof the resources available for ICT and ICD (information andcommunications in development) issues in developmentagencies, government departments and civil society. Whilethe long-term impact of WSIS on actual decision-makingis as yet unclear, its final documents are likely to be citedfor many years as representing a critical point in that evo-lution - much as the report of the 1984/5 Maitland Com-mission (formally the Independent Commission for WorldWide Telecommunications Development), “The MissingLink”, was cited at WSIS itself.

This report considers the participation of developingcountries and non-governmental actors (principally civilsociety) in the WSIS experience - the Summit itself andits lengthy preparatory process - and in its two main sub-sidiary fora, the Task Force on Financial Mechanisms(TFFM) and the Working Group on Internet Governance(WGIG). It was commissioned by the Association for Pro-gressive Communications (APC), an international networkof civil society organisations, to assess the impact ofWSIS in the light of two earlier reports on developingcountry participation in international ICT decision-mak-ing: the “Louder Voices” report prepared for the G8 Dig-ital Opportunity Task Force (DOT Force) in 2002 (summa-rised in chapter 2), and an initial study of African partici-pation in the first phase of WSIS, commissioned by APCin 2004. The author of this report was closely involved inboth of these studies.

Background

s e c t i o n a

S e c t i o n A . B ac k g ro u n d


1 There is debate about whether the term “information society” shouldbe capitalised (“Information Society”) or not. Those who favourcapitalisation tend, on the whole, to grant more transforming power tothe concept than those who do not. In this report, capitals have beenused where the text explicitly refers to this grander vision (as it does inthe name of WSIS itself ); but not in the text as a whole.

This study is not intended as a comprehensive assessmentof WSIS, though substantial attention is paid to WSIS’ over-all impact and outcomes in chapters 3, 4 and 5. Its mainpurposes are:

1. To observe and comment on the nature, content andextent of developing country and civil society participa-tion in and impact on WSIS and its subsidiary fora.

2. To consider whether these are likely to have a lastingimpact on international ICT decision-making processes.

3. To make recommendations to the WSIS follow-up proc-ess, to international organisations themselves, to govern-ments, civil society and the private sector about ways inwhich international discourse can be made more inclusiveof developing countries and non-governmental actors.

It is also not intended as a comprehensive study of civilsociety participation in the WSIS process as a whole. Civilsociety engagement with WSIS was widespread and di-verse, and involved a variety of mechanisms, both tradi-tional and innovative. While the report does give civil so-ciety experience considerable assessment, particularly inChapter 7, the focus of this assessment is on the relation-ship between civil society and decision-making processesrather than the internal mechanisms of civil society en-gagement.

Research for the study was undertaken during the secondphase of WSIS (from January 2004 to November 2005),and particularly during the six month period following theTunis summit (November 2005 to May 2006). The reportwas drafted in May and June 2006, and published in March2007. A summary, included as the Executive Summary tothis report, was published at the first meeting of theInternet Governance Forum in November 2006.

Structure of the report

This report is organised as follows:

• SSSSSECTIONECTIONECTIONECTIONECTION A A A A A of the report sets the overall framework forthe study, as follows:

- CHAPTER 1 includes this introduction and an ac-count of the methodology used in the study.

- CHAPTER 2 summarises the findings of the “LouderVoices” report, which raised a series of questionsconcerning developing country and multistake-holder participation whose continued relevance istested by the research.

- CHAPTER 3 presents an overall account of theWSIS process, from the point at which a summitwas first proposed at the Plenipotentiary Confer-ence of the International Telecommunication Un-ion in 1998 to the publication of the final outcomedocuments of the Tunis summit session in No-vember 2005.

• SSSSSECTIONECTIONECTIONECTIONECTION B B B B B of the report analyses the WSIS experiencein the light of the research undertaken for the study.

- CHAPTER 4 presents an overview assessment ofWSIS and its associated fora from the perspectiveof organisational and institutional structure.

- CHAPTER 5 presents a comparable assessment ofthe Summit process’ impact on the four main the-matic issues which it considered with any sub-stance - the role of ICTs in development, the rela-tionship between the information society1 and hu-man rights, financing mechanisms for ICT deploy-ment, and Internet governance.

- CHAPTERS 4 and 5 both review participation in gen-eral, by different stakeholder groups, within theWSIS structure and WSIS debates.

- CHAPTER 6 looks in more depth at the involvement ofdeveloping countries in these discussions, in the lightof the observations of the “Louder Voices” report,and suggests conclusions from these for the future.

- CHAPTER 7 considers the involvement of non-gov-ernmental stakeholders, particularly civil society,and likewise suggests conclusions about their fu-ture engagement in international ICT issues.

• SSSSSECTIONECTIONECTIONECTIONECTION C C C C C (CHAPTER 8) of the report draws conclusionsfrom the study and presents recommendations to in-ter-governmental, governmental, civil society andother stakeholders concerning future ICT/ICD issuesand multistakeholder practice overall. It also puts for-ward specific recommendations concerning the WSISfollow-up process. These conclusions and recommen-dations, like the preceding analysis, are the responsi-bility of the author, and do not necessarily coincidewith those of APC or its member-organisations.

Methodology

This study is the result of a prolonged period of assess-ment and analysis. Five principal methodologies were usedduring this period.

Firstly, the study draws on the personal involvement of theauthor and research partner, as participant observers, inthe WSIS process, and that of APC personnel who playeda significant role in WSIS civil society fora. In line with theirresponsibilities to this study, the author and research part-ner did not play any direct role in seeking to influence anypart of the WSIS process, while the experience of APC per-sonnel was more interventionist.

1 9

2 www.itu.int/wsis

3 At rights.apc.org/documents/wsis_research

Secondly, the study’s desk research makes use of the ex-tensive WSIS literature, particularly that available throughthe WSIS website2 and documentation from other inter-national and civil society organisations.

Thirdly, questionnaire and interview research was under-taken by the project research partner and APC colleaguesduring two fora of the second WSIS phase - the Africa re-gional meeting in Accra, Ghana and the second global pre-paratory committee meeting in Geneva, both held duringFebruary 2005. The author and research partner also con-ducted short interviews and informally discussed the is-sues concerned in the report with a wide range of partici-pants during the third preparatory committee meeting ofthe second phase (in September 2005) and during theTunis summit in November 2005.

Fourthly, the author conducted approximately forty hour-long interviews with key figures in the WSIS process, fromall stakeholder groups, during the four month period af-ter the conclusion of the Tunis summit (December 2005 toMarch 2006). These interviews included personnel withinthe organisation and political leadership of WSIS and itsassociated fora, from relevant UN and other internationalorganisations, a number of bilateral national delegationsand development agencies, civil society organisations, theprivate sector and the Internet community.

Finally, the study draws on a series of five case studies ofexperience in individual countries which were undertakenfor the project by independent experts. These case stud-ies - of Bangladesh, Ecuador, Ethiopia, India and Kenya -are summarised in written reports, copies of which areavailable online3.

The terms “interviews” and “interviewees”, where usedin this report, refer to evidence derived from the whole ofthis diverse range of inputs – questionnaires and informalconversations, formal telephone interviews and contribu-tions to case study research. All interviews, whether inperson or by telephone, were conducted on the under-standing that no comments would be attributed to anyindividual. This led to a very rich resource of comment andopinion, on which the report draws extensively. Some in-terviewees asked that the fact that they were interviewedfor the project should not be made public. For this reason,a list of interviewees is not included in this report.

The author of the report would like to thank all those whohave contributed to the study. In particular, he would liketo thank Anriette Esterhuysen, Karen Banks and WillieCurrie at APC, who commissioned the work and providedexemplary support throughout; Abiodun Jagun, whose sup-porting research work including compilation of Annex 4added greatly to the enjoyability as well as the quality ofthe work; Lishan Adam, Valeria Betancourt, Rekha Jain andPartha Sarker, who undertook the country case studies;Alison Souter, who provided additional research support;and all of those who generously gave their time and theiropinions during an exceptionally rewarding series of tel-ephone and face-to-face interviews. As noted above, theconclusions and recommendations of the report - and anyerrors - are the responsibility of the author. �



The “Louder Voices” report: a summaryc h a p t e r 2

This investigation of developing country and civil societyparticipation in WSIS and associated processes follows the“Louder Voices” enquiry which was undertaken for the UKDepartment for International Development (DFID) and theG8 DOT Force in 2002.4 This chapter briefly summarisesthe conclusions of the “Louder Voices” report. These con-clusions raised important research questions which lay atthe heart of this project, and form the basis for part of theanalysis in chapters 6 and 7.

The “Louder Voices” enquiry had four main objectives:

• To map international decision-making issues, proc-esses and fora concerned with ICTs

• To assess the effectiveness of developing country par-ticipation in these fora

• To identify obstacles facing developing countries at thenational, regional and global levels

• To recommend actions that could be taken by devel-oping countries themselves, international organisa-tions and the DOT Force implementation network toovercome these obstacles.

It focused on three major international ICT decision-mak-ing fora (the International Telecommunication Union (ITU),the World Trade Organisation (WTO) and the Internet Cor-poration for Assigned Names and Numbers (ICANN)) andused a combination of interview evidence, case studies ofsix developing countries (Brazil, India, Nepal, South Af-rica, Tanzania and Zambia) and analysis of specific policyissues to draw conclusions about the state of developingcountry participation at that time.

The analysis set out in the “Louder Voices” report providesan important starting point for the present study. Although,like all international summits, WSIS represented a discon-tinuity in the normal pattern of international decision-mak-ing on the issues with which it was concerned, participants’engagement with it was predicated on their existing lev-els of involvement, expertise and priorities. This providesan opportunity for the present study to assess how thehistory of developing country and civil society participa-tion (assessed in the “Louder Voices” report) affected par-ticipation in the WSIS process and the course that WSISitself took; how WSIS adjusted to and altered constraintson participation, and what lasting impact WSIS may haveon international ICT decision-making in future.

The Executive Summary of the “Louder Voices” report issummarised in the following paragraphs, in which italicisedtext represents direct quotation from the text of the re-port. The issues raised here are key matters for consid-eration in this investigation, and are reviewed in depth laterin this report, particularly in Chapter 6.

1. Four key challenges were identified by the “LouderVoices” report:

I. First, most developing countries are members ofestablished international organisations with ICTresponsibilities, such as the ITU and WTO, and areusually represented at their meetings. However,there is not as yet an effective connection betweenthe agendas of these organisations, their deci-sions, and the international development goals setout in the UN Millennium Declaration. … In spiteof considerable effort, there is still a “missing link”between ICT and development at the internationalpolicy level.

II. Second, developing countries have very little pres-ence or influence in the many voluntary, private,and not-for-profit decision-making fora that havebeen set up in recent years to standardise andmanage the Internet and other new ICTs. They havenone at all in areas where standards are deter-mined de facto by market power. Although the re-sults of some of this work are fed into traditionalinternational fora … it is clear that developingcountries are increasingly excluded from interna-tional decision-making at the technical level.

III. Third, the experience of many developed and somedeveloping countries shows that technical andpolicy capacity go hand in hand, so that it is diffi-cult to develop one without the other. Givenpresent asymmetries in technical capacity, it isessential for developing countries to set prioritiesamong international ICT issues and concentratetheir limited resources on building technical andpolicy capacity in the areas that are most criticalto their development goals.

IV. Fourth, … effective participation is not limited to whathappens before and during meetings. The goal ofinclusion means that developing countries must as-sess the effect of decisions made by internationalICT fora on their own development objectives….4 Its report can be found at www.eldis.org/static/DOC10107.htm.

2 1

2. There was consensus among those consulted for the[“Louder Voices”] study that it is not possible tostrengthen participation by developing countries ininternational ICT decision-making fora without firststrengthening their capacity to make and implementICT policy at the national and regional levels. Threecritical aspects were identified within this national di-mension of under-representation and ineffective par-ticipation:

I. lack of policy awareness, at all levels of govern-ment and citizenship, of the potential role of ICTsin development;

II. lack of technical and policy capacity on ICT issues,particularly in respect of emerging technologiesand new policy areas - such as migration from cir-cuit-switched to IP networks and indeed Internetissues in general;

III. weaknesses in national and regional policymakingprocesses, including:

i. lack of political leadership;

ii. absence of national ICT strategies;

iii. ineffective coordination between differentgovernment departments and agencieswith ICT responsibilities;

iv. lack of private sector and civil societyparticipation in national decision-making;

v. inadequate preparation for internationalmeetings; and

vi. ineffective use of financial and humanresources.

3. There was also consensus among those consulted forthe [“Louder Voices”] study that action to strengthenthe ICT policy capacity of developing countries mustbe accompanied by action to level the policy playingfield so as to ensure that the needs of developing coun-tries are on the agenda of international ICT fora andthat they are included in decision-making processes.Three critical aspects were, likewise, identified withinthis international dimension of under-representationand ineffective participation:

I. lack of easy, affordable and timely access to infor-mation about ICT-related issues, decision-makingfora and processes;

II. logistical problems, including the frequency andlocation of international meetings and restrictionson participation (for example, by private sector andcivil society experts);

III. ineffective use of financial resources available tosupport participation.

4. A number of recommendations were made in the“Louder Voices” report aimed at addressing these de-ficiencies. In relation to the national dimension, de-veloping country governments were recommended to:

a. improve information flows and policy coordinationbetween different government departments andagencies with ICT responsibilities;

b. promote informed public discussion and debatethrough both general and specialised media;

c. include all relevant stakeholders in policy-makingon an issue-by-issue basis;

d. encourage participation of experts from the pri-vate sector and civil society in national delegationsto international decision-making fora;

e. share information, expertise and experience on aregional and sub-regional basis;

f. implement knowledge management techniques toensure that information gained through participa-tion in international ICT decision-making fora iscaptured, disseminated to relevant stakeholders,and made accessible to other interested partiesthrough the media; … and

g. review their current practices with respect to meet-ing preparation, delegate selection, participation,accountability and follow-up, with a view to en-suring that these … result in the most effective useof financial resources through the optimum de-ployment of technical and policy capacity.

5. International agencies, meanwhile, were recom-mended to:

a. promote awareness of the role that ICTs can (andcan not) play in development by providing com-prehensive, publicly-accessible, non-technical in-formation on … their activities; ...

b. provide independent, authoritative technical/policy research and analysis of the major issuesto be decided;

c. diversify the location of meetings and ensure thattheir procedures allow all sources of developingcountry policy and technical capacity to participatein decision-making, whether they come from gov-ernment, the private sector or not-for-profit organi-sations.

These issues - concerning both developing countries andmultistakeholder participation - are central to the investi-gation in this report. Chapters 6 and 7 review the conclu-sions of the “Louder Voices” report concerning develop-ing countries and civil society, respectively, in the light ofthe evidence uncovered by the current investigation intothe impact of the WSIS process. �



WSIS was a world summit within the UN tradition of worldsummits - though with some distinctive features of its own.This section of the report gives a narrative account of theWSIS process and provides the foundation for the analysis

that follows. It also summarises the content of the mainoutputs of the WSIS process, including WSIS’ two interimfora, the Task Force on Financial Mechanisms (TFFM) andthe Working Group on Internet Governance (WGIG).

WSIS: an accountc h a p t e r 3

WSIS TIMELINE 2001 – 2005

REGIONAL CONFERENCES

• African: Bamako (Mali), 25-30 May 2002• Pan European: Bucharest (Romania), 7-9

November 2002• Asia Pacific: Tokyo (Japan), 13-15 January

2003• Latin America and the Caribbean: Bávaro

(Dominican Rep.), 29-31 January 2003• Western Asia: Beirut (Lebanon), 4-6

February 2003

PREPARATORY CONFERENCES (PREPCOMS)

• PrepCom 1, Geneva 1-5 July 2002• PrepCom 2, Geneva 17-28 February 2003• Intersessional, Paris 15-18 July 2003• PrepCom 3, Geneva 15-26 September 2003• PrepCom 3A, Geneva 10-14 November

2003• PrepCom 3B, Geneva 5-6 and 9 December

2003

PREPARATORY CONFERENCES (PREPCOMS)

• PrepCom 1, Hammamet (Tunisia) 24-26June 2004

• PrepCom 2, Geneva 17-25 February 2005• PrepCom 3: Geneva 19-30 September 2005

and Tunis (Tunisia) 13-15 November 2005

FIRST PHASE OF WSIS

Geneva, 10-12 December 2003

REGIONAL CONFERENCES

• Western Asia: Damascus (Syria), 22-23November 2004

• Africa: Accra (Ghana), 2-4 February 2005• Asia-Pacific: Tehran (Iran), 31 May-2 June

2005• Latin America and the Caribbean: Rio de

Janeiro (Brazil), 8-10 June 2005

SUBREGIONAL CONFERENCES

• II Bishkek-Moscow Regional Conferenceon the Information Society: 16-18November 2004, Bishkek (Kyrgyzstan)

• Pan-Arab Conference on WSIS-Phase II: 8-10 May 2005, Cairo (Egypt)

SECOND PHASE OF WSIS

Tunis, 16-18 November 2005

2 3

The nature of WSIS

WSIS’ formal origins lie in a resolution, calling for “a worldsummit on the information society,” presented by the gov-ernment of Tunisia and passed without discussion duringthe final session of the International TelecommunicationUnion (ITU)’s 1998 Plenipotentiary Conference in Minnea-polis. The objectives of the proposed summit would in-clude:

• establishing an overall framework identifying, with thecontribution of all partners, a joint and harmonisedunderstanding of the information society;

• drawing up a strategic plan of action for concerteddevelopment of the information society by defining anagenda covering the objectives to be achieved and theresources to be mobilised;

• identifying the roles of the various partners to ensuresmooth coordination of the establishment in practiceof the information society in all Member States.5

This proposal was transmuted into an information societysummit along conventional UN summit lines – probablymuch grander and more elaborate than participants inMinneapolis had envisaged - by the UN AdministrativeCommittee on Coordination (now known as the UN ChiefExecutives Board), where it was enthusiastically receivedby a number of other UN agencies with wider developmentobjectives, notably UNESCO. The General Assembly finallyadopted a resolution endorsing WSIS as a formal summitin December 2001, by which time the Summit’s momen-tum was well underway.

These slightly-clouded origins of WSIS raised a number ofinstitutional issues which were to have implications for thefuture WSIS process, and which are discussed in Chapter 4.Potential rivalries between UN agencies over the manage-ment of WSIS were addressed by allocating responsibilityfor the organisation and administration of WSIS primarilyto the ITU, supported by a High-Level Summit OrganisingCommittee including the heads (in practice, the repre-sentatives) of some twenty United Nations agencies plusthe World Bank and World Trade Organisation. An Execu-tive Secretariat was established at the ITU in Geneva andstaffed substantially through ITU personnel.

Two factors, here, were of particular significance. Firstly,there was, initially in particular, a tension between the pri-marily technological approach to the Summit espoused bythe ITU, and the more developmental approach of UN agen-cies with wider developmental roles. Most interviewees whowere engaged in this process felt that the wider UN familyhad successfully shifted the emphasis in WSIS’ formal ob-jectives from “the development of telecommunications”

(the historic role of the ITU’s Telecommunication Develop-ment Bureau) to the role of a wider range of informationand communication technologies in social and economicdevelopment - or, to put it another way, from the “infor-mation society” as an outcome of telecommunications tothe “information society” as a transforming social phenom-enon.

Nevertheless, the fact that the ITU was the Summit’s leadagency meant that invitations to participate were handledby ministries of communications (which deal with nationalrelations with the ITU) rather than central planning minis-tries (as might have happened if the Summit had been ledby the UNDP or another part of the central United Nationsorganisation) or ministries of information (which mighthave followed a UNESCO lead). This had a significant im-pact on participation in national delegations, which is dis-cussed in Chapter 6. Though, as in most UN summits, ne-gotiations were led by diplomats - usually those based innational missions to the United Nations - those diplomatswere advised primarily by technical and technological spe-cialists from the telecoms sector, who understood the waysof the ITU, rather than by mainstream development spe-cialists. Many participants felt that this contributed to anemphasis on ICTs, particularly technologies, rather thanon the information society in its wider sense, in many ofWSIS’ deliberations, and to some of the difficulties whichWSIS advocates had in promoting its objectives within themainstream development community. There were also ten-sions between the ITU and some other UN agencies, gov-ernments and non-governmental stakeholders who sus-pected it of using the Summit to try and establish a cen-tral governance role for itself towards the information so-ciety or the Internet.

There were two other distinctive features of WSIS in com-parison with other UN summits.

The first was the decision to hold it in two parts - the firstin Geneva in December 2003, the second in Tunis in No-vember 2005. Whatever justifications were offered after-wards, this resulted from unwillingness within the UN sys-tem to choose between two competing offers to host thesummit. Some advantages could be claimed for this ar-rangement - for example, a division of work betweenphases devoted to (a) principles and (b) implementation -and enthusiasts for WSIS made the most of these. Otherscited disadvantages - the scope for deferment of decisionsat the end of the first phase, a particular concern in such arapidly moving development sector, and the increased costfor the UN system and all summit participants.

The second distinctive feature, cited by UN Secretary-Gen-eral Kofi Annan in his opening speech to the Geneva sum-mit, was the topic under consideration: “This summit isunique,” he said. “Where most global conferences focus

5 Resolution 73 of the ITU Plenipotentiary Conference, 1998, availablefrom: www.itu.int/wsis/docs/background/resolutions/73.html.



on global threats, this one will consider how best to use anew global asset.”6

Although his speech actually dwelt on the “digital divide”(a problem) rather than on “digital opportunity”, this re-mark raises a significant question about the efficacy of UNsummits, in particular whether they are as useful in deal-ing with opportunities (particularly fast-moving ones orones that have developed outside the established param-eters of international governance) as they are in dealingwith problems. This question is considered in Chapter 4.

Certainly, much of the second phase of the summit wasconcerned with specific problems, rather than opportuni-ties – specifically, with the difficulty of financing ICT de-ployment and with the absence of traditional governancemechanisms for the Internet (the latter seen as a problemby many governments, but as a positive advantage bysome other participants). However, the public ethos ofWSIS was strongly positive about the perceived benefitsof ICTs for development. It marked a highpoint - and, itmay turn out (see Chapter 5), the beginning of a downturn- in the enthusiasm for ICTs as a, if not the, key instrumentfor economic and social development which had emergedwithin parts of the ICT professional and development com-munities during the preceding five years.7

Summit processes

World summits are complex and lengthy processes. Whilethe media often give the impression that key decisions aretaken at the actual summit meetings themselves, the finalsummit meetings are in reality little more than opportuni-ties for heads of government to make formal commitments,in speech and signature, to agreements that have beenreached during months of prior negotiations (though theyalso provide the opportunity to reach some form of con-sensus at the highest level on issues that have proved ut-terly intractable in negotiations). The WSIS process wasperhaps more elaborate than most because of its two-phase structure.

The first summit phase

The first summit phase began with the establishment of aWSIS Executive Secretariat, within the ITU, in 2001. Thissecretariat, including ITU and other personnel, developeda preparatory process aimed at negotiating the Summit’soutput documents through a process of engagement, con-sultation and negotiation.

Both phases of the Summit – those leading up to Genevain December 2003 and Tunis in November 2005 - were builtaround series of regional and global preparatory meetings.The first phase included five regional meetings, held asfollows:

• African region, held in Mali, May 2002

• Pan-European region, held in Romania, November2002

• Asia-Pacific region, held in Japan, January 2003

• Latin American and Caribbean region, held in the Do-minican Republic, January 2003

• Western Asia [Middle East] region, held in Lebanon,2003.

An assessment of the African regional conference is in-cluded in Chapter 6.

More important than these regional conferences, however,was the series of preparatory committees, or PrepComs,held in Geneva, which were the primary negotiating forafor the Summit texts: the space within which commitmentswere agreed and where contentious issues were disputed.Three PrepComs were scheduled: in July 2002, February2003 and September 2003, though the third PrepCom hadto be reconvened twice, in November 2003 and immedi-ately before the Geneva summit meeting in December2003, in order to deal with unresolved issues. An“intersessional meeting” and an “informal meeting oncontent and themes” were also held in Paris in July 2003and Geneva in September 2003 respectively, in an attemptto expedite agreement.8

Within the negotiating process, a system of formal andinformal caucuses brought together groups with commoninterests - whether governments (for example, in Africa),civil society advocates (for example, on gender issues) orloose issue-oriented associations (such as the InternetGovernance caucus). Caucuses discussed and promoteddraft text, seeking to incorporate their ideas and languageinto the documents under discussion at the inter-govern-mental level. They also coordinated lobbying on their is-sues of concern. Much of the effectiveness of participantsin the summit as a whole depended on the skills and re-sources available to them for this caucusing activity.

These PrepComs were the primary arenas in which WSISissues were contested. The first of them brought to thefore two critical issues which were to remain contentiousthroughout the first summit phase: the participation of non-governmental actors in the negotiating process, and therelationship between human rights, freedoms of informa-tion and expression and the information society. Indeed,

8 Records of the first phase preparatory meetings can be accessed atwww.itu.int/wsis/preparatory/index.html.

6 The Secretary-General’s speech is at www.itu.int/wsis/geneva/coverage/statements/opening/annan.html.

7 This enthusiasm might be dated from the Kananaskis OECD (Organisa-tion for Economic Cooperation and Development) summit in 2000,which launched the G8 Digital Opportunity Task Force or DOT Force.

2 5

much of the time of the first two PrepComs was taken upnot with issues of substance but with the question of whoshould have the right to take part in discussing them.

The key issue here was the nature of international deci-sion-making. The United Nations and its family of agen-cies are inter-governmental in character, set up to enablegovernments to coordinate activities and resolve disputesamongst themselves, not to engage in debate with non-governmental entities. This inter-governmental characterhas been jealously guarded by many governments, par-ticularly those of post-colonial countries which have seenequal participation in UN bodies as an important symbolof nationhood. Over the years, however, non-governmen-tal organisations have gained some space within UN sum-mit processes - initially through the UN’s formal mecha-nism for civil society representation, the Economic andSocial Council (ECOSOC); latterly, in some cases, throughmore innovative means. Some UN agencies have paid sub-stantial attention to civil society organisations in their ownwork, while others - including the ITU - have had to createincreasing space for the private sector as it has taken onroles previously considered provinces of government.

The dispute over non-governmental representation was acontinuous undercurrent throughout the WSIS process.Some governments, mostly from developing countries,were implacably opposed to any non-governmental agen-cies participating in or even being present during negotia-tions. Others, mostly industrialised countries, were eitherrelaxed or positive about private sector and civil societyinvolvement. Tensions frequently boiled over. Civil societyand the private sector shared a common set of interests inrepresentation, even though their views on content oftendiffered, and were able to secure limited speaking rights.However, their more effective participation lay behind thescenes, in liaising with sympathetic official delegates andseeking to nuance debate in the directions that they fa-voured. In the event, there was significantly more multi-stakeholder participation in WSIS than in previous UNsummits, and multistakeholder principles were supportedin both Geneva and Tunis outcome documents.

Human rights and freedoms of expression were also con-tentious throughout the summit process. It has becomeconventional for UN summit declarations to reaffirm coreprinciples derived from previous UN statements, includingthe freedom of expression principles set out in Article 19of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. Some gov-ernments have been unenthusiastic about this repetitionof human rights language and its implications for summitdeclarations. This issue was more than usually significantin WSIS because of the obvious relationship between theinformation society, ICTs and freedoms of expression, andbecause of earlier UN debates about the meaning of a“right to communicate”. A few governments (notably Chi-na’s) sought to omit or constrain references to human

rights and freedoms of expression in the proposed sum-mit texts while others (notably the European Union, theNordic countries and Canada) sought to maintain them. Inthe event, human rights language was included in the Ge-neva texts, with some limiting references to national cir-cumstances and cultures, while UN Secretary-General KofiAnnan emphasised in his opening speech that “the rightto freedom of opinion and expression is fundamental todevelopment, democracy and peace, and must remain atouchstone for our work ahead.”9

The main development text of the Geneva output docu-ments was formulated through an iterative process dur-ing the course of the first summit phase. The ITU invitedgovernments to submit ideas about the role of ICTs in de-velopment, and these were incorporated in a draft text,which was then refined in negotiation. This process hasits problems. Communications ministries were not neces-sarily the right agencies to put forward development is-sues, and not all of them discussed their input with devel-opment ministries. Geneva-based diplomats, too, lackedexpertise in development issues, however skilled theymight be at negotiating texts. While the texts that werenegotiated could be seen as comprehensive in scope andwere relatively uncontested in detail, they have been criti-cised, not least (in private) by many of those involved intheir negotiation, for the following reasons:

a. That they are aspirational in tone, unprioritised andover-optimistic about the potential for ICTs to trans-form society

b. That they are focused on the supply of technologyrather than demand-driven, grassroots developmentobjectives

c. That they are insufficiently integrated with the UN sys-tem’s key international development agreements - theMillennium Development Goals (which are referencedsignificantly in the Geneva texts) and the MonterreyConsensus on the overall development, trade and aidrelationship – and with the outcome documents ofother social summits.

While there was relatively little argument over aspirationaltext during the first summit negotiations, there was sub-stantial argument over its implications, in particular wherethe allocation of development funds was concerned. In-deed, disputes over financing mechanisms almost pre-vented agreement being reached on draft texts before theopening session of the Geneva summit in December 2003.

The critical point of dispute here was a proposal for a Dig-ital Solidarity Fund (DSF), a new UN fund specifically dedi-cated to financing ICT infrastructure and applications,which was put forward by the President of Senegal,Abdoulaye Wade. This attracted extensive African and

9 www.itu.int/wsis/geneva/coverage/statements/opening/annan.html.



some other developing country support, reinforced per-haps by the fact that participation in WSIS delegations andthe development of WSIS policies were led by communi-cations ministries rather than those with broad responsi-bility for the allocation of national development resources(such as ministries of finance and economic planning).

Donor countries, however, were almost unanimously op-posed to the DSF proposal. They were unconvinced that anew mechanism was either needed or desirable; indeed,it conflicted with their general view that ICTs should bemainstreamed within development (i.e. inserted intohealth, education, agriculture and other mainstream pro-grammes) rather than treated as a sector in itself. Theywere unconvinced that development funds should be di-verted into ICTs from other areas of development activity,particularly as demand for this was not coming from de-velopment ministries or apparent in either the MillenniumDevelopment Goals or the Poverty Reduction Strategiesbeing negotiated by many Least Developed Countries. Fi-nally, they were unconvinced that a new UN agency wouldspend resources in this area more effectively than the ex-isting mechanisms which they supported, including theirown bilateral programmes.

This dispute took the third PrepCom of the first summitphase to the brink, minutes from the close of negotiations.Only at the very last minute, at the insistence of the SwissPrepCom chair, did the proponents of the DSF back downand agree to the establishment of a Task Force to investi-gate the need for such a fund rather than force a dispute inthe summit itself over whether one should be established.

The other major dispute during the first summit phase -which became the major issue during the second phase -concerned the governance of the Internet.

The question of Internet governance has many facets, andwas the subject of much misunderstanding during the WSISperiod. One dimension of this was the fact that the Internet’semergence as a significant social and economic force hadoccurred outside the framework of traditional inter-govern-mental authority. Much of the Internet was and is un-governed; much of what it is today was developed by thosewho were suspicious of government and capable of usingInternet technologies to bypass any that might be imposedon it; much of the governance that does exist (managingresources such as domain names, developing protocols,etc.) is based on participative rather than inter-governmen-tal models, very different from those within the UN system.Many people - including many in the Internet communityitself, the private sector and industrial countries in par-ticular - believe the Internet’s dynamism to be dependenton this very lack of governance. Others, particularly de-veloping country governments, have been wary of some-thing highly unpredictable and uncontrolled and feel thatit should be brought within the conventional governance

processes established by the UN system - processes whichgive governments authority and which, at least in theory,give weak governments and governments of smaller statesan equal say with those that are more powerful or moresecure. Many participants in the WSIS process also as-sumed, wrongly, that one Internet governance body, theInternet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers(ICANN), had far more wide-ranging powers to govern theInternet than are actually within its remit.

These issues were complicated by the history of theInternet, in particular its origins in the United States’ mili-tary and academic community. As a result of this history,key Internet institutions (such as ICANN) and facilities(such as the root server system) were located in the USand, to many, appeared therefore to be subject to US con-trol - an impression that was strengthened rather thanweakened by US officials’ unwillingness to recognise thebasis for other governments’ concern. The Bush adminis-tration’s controversial interventions in international politi-cal and economic affairs – particularly, many intervieweesobserved, the Iraq war which began in March 2003 - helpedto politicise this issue, making it, for some countries andparticipants, as much about the United States as aboutthe Internet itself: it certainly provided a vehicle for anti-Americanism. As with financing mechanisms, Internet gov-ernance issues proved too intractable for resolution dur-ing the first phase of the summit and the final PrepComagreed to defer them to a working group that would meetbetween the first and second summit phases.

Geneva summit output documents

Having negotiated these last-minute crises, the Genevasummit was held, amid an air of some relief, in December2003. For many participants, particularly from civil soci-ety, the most important or useful dimension was the spacethat Geneva provided for networking, including a success-ful exhibition and meeting area known as the ICT for De-velopment Platform.10 This “summit fringe” is reviewed inChapter 7 of this report.

The first phase of the summit ended with the publicationof two core documents: the Geneva Declaration of Princi-ples and the Geneva Plan of Action. As implied above, thesedocuments were the outcome of protracted negotiationsduring the first phase PrepComs, and only finally agreed,at a specially reconvened PrepCom, with minutes to sparebefore midnight on the day before the summit opened.

The Declaration of PrinciplesDeclaration of PrinciplesDeclaration of PrinciplesDeclaration of PrinciplesDeclaration of Principles1111111111 is an aspirational text whichincorporates different, sometimes contradictory, visions

10 See www.ict-4d.org/about.htm.

11 The Declaration of Principles is available from: www.itu.int/wsis/documents/doc_multi.asp?lang=en&id=1161|0.

2 7

of the role of ICTs and the nature of an information soci-ety. Its oft-quoted opening words are these:

We, the representatives of the peoples of the world … de-clare our common desire and commitment to build a peo-ple-centred, inclusive and development-oriented Informa-tion Society, where everyone can create, access, utilize andshare information and knowledge, enabling individuals,communities and peoples to achieve their full potential inpromoting their sustainable development and improvingtheir quality of life.12

It places this aspirational vision - which does not refer di-rectly in this opening to technology - within the context ofestablished UN agreements, from the Universal Declara-tion of Human Rights to the Millennium Declaration (whichsets out the world community’s targets for poverty reduc-tion, the Millennium Development Goals or MDGs). Thelimits of ICTs’ potential are acknowledged but within ahighly positive endorsement of their role:

We are aware that ICTs should be regarded as tools andnot as an end in themselves. Under favourable conditions,these technologies can be a powerful instrument, increas-ing productivity, generating economic growth, job creationand employability and improving the quality of life of all.They can also promote dialogue among people, nationsand civilizations.13

The Declaration as a whole works through the implicationsof these aspirations in different areas of activity, each ofwhich is subsequently developed in the associated Planof Action.

Two significant operational or process principles were alsoadopted in the Declaration.

Firstly, the Declaration established a commitment to multi-stakeholder participation, which became known as theGeneva Principle:

We recognize that building an inclusive Information Soci-ety requires new forms of solidarity, partnership and co-operation among governments and other stakeholders, i.e.the private sector, civil society and international organiza-tions. Realizing that the ambitious goal of this Declara-tion - bridging the digital divide and ensuring harmonious,fair and equitable development for all - will require strongcommitment by all stakeholders, we call for digital soli-darity, both at national and international levels.14

Secondly, the Declaration included a commitment to coop-erative international action to achieve the principles con-tained within it, relate these to the Millennium Development

Goals (MDGs) agreed by the UN General Assembly in 2000,and establish coherent follow-up mechanisms for the sum-mit as a whole. This section of the Declaration included acompromise statement on the Digital Solidarity Fund issuewhich had almost broken the summit during its finalPrepCom meeting, and which referred back to the GenevaPrinciple described above.

… while appreciating ongoing ICT cooperation throughvarious mechanisms, we invite all stakeholders to committo the “Digital Solidarity Agenda” set forth in the Plan ofAction. We are convinced that the worldwide agreed ob-jective is to contribute to bridge the digital divide, pro-mote access to ICTs, create digital opportunities, and ben-efit from the potential offered by ICTs for development.15

The Declaration of Principles also invited the UN Secre-tary-General to set up a working group on Internet gov-ernance, one of the two key fora addressing highly con-troversial issues between the first and second phases ofthe summit.

The stated purpose of the Geneva Plan of ActionGeneva Plan of ActionGeneva Plan of ActionGeneva Plan of ActionGeneva Plan of Action1616161616 was to:

[translate] the common vision and guiding principles ofthe Declaration … into concrete action lines to advance theachievement of the internationally-agreed developmentgoals, including those in the Millennium Declaration, theMonterrey Consensus and the Johannesburg Declarationand Plan of Implementation, by promoting the use of ICT-based products, networks, services and applications, andto help countries overcome the digital divide.17

It is notable that this first paragraph of the Plan of Action,unlike that of the Declaration of Principles, has an explic-itly technological focus. Indeed, the Plan of Action as awhole refers predominantly to ICTs rather than the infor-mation society as its objective.

The Plan of Action sets out a number of “indicative targets[which] may serve as global references for improving con-nectivity and access in the use of ICTs, … to be achieved by2015,” the target date also set for the majority of the MDGs.These targets18 (listed in the box below) set both techno-logical and developmental goals, but these are less pre-cise than those set in the MDGs - there is, for example, nodefinition of what level or quality of “connectivity” is im-plied, or of what, precisely, “access” means.

12 Declaration of Principles, 2003, section A, article 1.

13 ibid., section A, article 9.


15 ibid., section B11, article 61.

16 The Plan of Action is available from: www.itu.int/wsis/documents/doc_multi.asp?lang=en&id=1160|0.

17 Geneva Plan of Action, 2003, section A, article 1.

18 ibid., section B, article 6.



GENEVA PLAN OF ACTION TARGETSFOR ACHIEVEMENT BY 2015

a. to connect villages with ICTs and establishcommunity access points;

b. to connect universities, colleges, secondaryschools and primary schools with ICTs;

c. to connect scientific and research centres withICTs;

d. to connect public libraries, cultural centres,museums, post offices and archives with ICTs;

e. to connect health centres and hospitals withICTs;

f. to connect all local and central government de-partments and establish websites and emailaddresses;

g. to adapt all primary and secondary school cur-ricula to meet the challenges of the Informa-tion Society, taking into account national cir-cumstances;

h. to ensure that all of the world’s populationhave access to television and radio services;

i. to encourage the development of content andto put in place technical conditions in order tofacilitate the presence and use of all world lan-guages on the Internet;

j. to ensure that more than half the world’s inhab-itants have access to ICTs within their reach.

The Plan of Action then describes a series of action linesin the following areas, each building on principles set outin the Declaration:

1. The role of governments and all stakeholders in thepromotion of ICTs for development

2. Information and communication infrastructure: an es-sential foundation for the Information Society

3. Access to information and knowledge

4. Capacity building

5. Building confidence and security in the use of ICTs (in-cluding such issues as privacy, information securityand spam)

6. The enabling environment (both that required for ef-fective deployment of ICTs and that potentially facili-tated by ICTs)

7. ICT applications: benefits in all aspects of life - withsections of text devoted to e-government, e-business,e-learning, e-health, e-employment, e-environment, e-agriculture and e-science

8. Cultural diversity and identity, linguistic diversity andlocal content

9. Media

10. Ethical dimensions of the Information Society

11. International and regional cooperation.19

These action lines eventually formed the basis for the WSISfollow-up process agreed two years later in Tunis.

The text of much of the Plan of Action derived initially fromsuggestions submitted by governments to the ITU, text re-lating to which was developed and agreed in negotiatingfora. The strength of this process is its inclusiveness, atleast where those invited to participate are concerned. Itsweakness is a lack of prioritisation and as a result (as isoften the case with such documents) these Plan of Actionsections tend to list aspirations rather than establishingthe basis for an implementation programme. The sectionon capacity-building, for example, contains sixteen item-ised points; that on the enabling environment eighteen.

In addition, much less attention was paid to the potentialdownsides of information technology, than to its opportu-nities: there are a few words only, for example, on spam;very little on the use of ICTs in cyber or conventional crime;nothing on the potential use of ICTs for government sur-veillance and control.

From the perspective of this study, two sections of the Planof Action are particularly important, those elaborating onthe multistakeholder process and on the international“solidarity”/policy development agenda.

The Plan of Action builds on the Declaration’s Geneva Prin-ciple by allocating roles to stakeholders, as follows:

a. Governments have a leading role in developing andimplementing comprehensive, forward looking andsustainable national e-strategies. The private sectorand civil society, in dialogue with governments, havean important consultative role to play in devising na-tional e-strategies.

b. The commitment of the private sector is important indeveloping and diffusing information and communi-cation technologies (ICTs), for infrastructure, contentand applications. The private sector is not only a mar-ket player but also plays a role in a wider sustainabledevelopment context.

c. The commitment and involvement of civil society isequally important in creating an equitable InformationSociety, and in implementing ICT-related initiatives fordevelopment.

d. International and regional institutions, including in-ternational financial institutions, have a key role in

19 ibid., section C.

2 9

integrating the use of ICTs in the development proc-ess and making available necessary resources forbuilding the Information Society and for the evalua-tion of the progress made.20

This statement of roles represents a compromise ratherthan a consensus - a form of words acceptable to thosewishing to promote and those preferring to restrict multi-stakeholder participation in decision-making. Its implica-tions are considered in Chapter 4.

The “Digital Solidarity Agenda” was also developed by thePlan of Action. Again, the text here represented a compro-mise between advocates of special funding for ICT/ICDactivities (the proponents of the Digital Solidarity Fund)and donors concerned to mainstream ICTs in developmentrather than to give them special status. It announced theestablishment of a Task Force on Financial Mechanisms,to work under the auspices of the UN Secretary-General;and set up procedures for the development of benchmarksof ICT activity, including “a composite ICT Development(Digital Opportunity) Index”.21

The second summit phase - from Geneva,December 2003 to Tunis, November 2005

The outcome of the first phase of the summit might besummarised, therefore, as follows:

a. Broad principles were agreed, which might be takenas defining an international consensus on the infor-mation society. This was ambitious and aspirationalin tone, with little implementation detail. With the ex-ception of the “digital divide”, it focused almost en-tirely on “digital opportunities” and paid little atten-tion to major problems arising in the information andICT sectors.

b. Compromise was reached on texts concerning conten-tious issues of human rights and freedoms of infor-mation and expression. However, these issues re-mained unresolved and continued to provide an un-dercurrent of dissension during the second phase,exacerbated by tensions over human rights and free-dom of expression within its host country, Tunisia.

c. The two major issues of controversy during the firstphase - financing mechanisms (and particularly theproposed Digital Solidarity Fund) and Internet govern-ance - were referred to interim fora under the auspicesof the UN Secretary-General, with a remit to reportback to the second phase of the summit through itspreparatory process.

The preparatory process for the second phase of the sum-mit followed the model set during the first. Once again, aseries of regional meetings was held to enable prior dis-cussion of issues at a “continental” level (though this timethe European region did not bother with a regionalevent):22

• Western Asia (Syria, November 2004)

• Africa (Ghana, February 2005)

• Asia-Pacific (Iran, May/June 2005)

• Latin America and the Caribbean (Brazil, June 2005).

With the agenda focused on a small number of specificissues, the organisers also encouraged thematic ratherthan regional discussion.

Substantive negotiations again took place through a se-ries of PrepComs, held in Hammamet, Tunisia in June 2004and in Geneva in February and September 2005. This time,however, the work of the PrepComs was more structured,being built around the work of three smaller-scale forawhich fed their work into the PrepCom system. These in-terim fora are described in the following sections.

Interim fora

The first and least known of these three fora was the GroupGroupGroupGroupGroupof Friends of the Chairof Friends of the Chairof Friends of the Chairof Friends of the Chairof Friends of the Chair. This Group, made up of govern-ment representatives from six countries in each region plusregional coordinators and representatives of the ITU, theUN Secretary-General and the two host countries, was setup by the first PrepCom of the second phase with the re-mit of developing the documentary basis for negotiationsduring that phase. Its critical role lay in developing whatwas known as the “political chapeau”, the basis of the ul-timately agreed Tunis Commitment which set out theagreed ethos and vision of the WSIS project. Importantissues of debate within this context included the statuswithin the second phase of the text agreed in Geneva andthe nature of the follow-up process to WSIS after Tunis.

Much more contentious, at least initially, were the two in-dependent fora established by the UN Secretary-General,at the request of the Geneva phase of the summit, to re-solve critical issues that could not be resolved in Geneva -the Task Force on Financial Mechanisms and the WorkingGroup on Internet Governance. These interim fora playedan important - in many ways crucial - role in the evolution ofWSIS overall. Both, significantly, addressed problems - ofinfrastructure finance and of Internet governance - ratherthan the opportunities that Secretary-General Annan hadrepresented as characterising the summit overall in hisopening address in Geneva. They were, however, substan-tially different in the means they adopted to address these.


21 ibid., section E, article 28.a.22 Records of the second phase preparatory meetings

can be accessed at www.itu.int/wsis/preparatory2/index.html.



The Task Force on Financial Mechanisms (TFFM)Task Force on Financial Mechanisms (TFFM)Task Force on Financial Mechanisms (TFFM)Task Force on Financial Mechanisms (TFFM)Task Force on Financial Mechanisms (TFFM) was theearlier of these independent fora to report. As noted above,intense argument had centred during the first phase of thesummit around a proposal to establish a Digital SolidarityFund which would focus international resources on the“digital divide”. Donor countries strongly resisted the ideaof establishing a new ICT-specific international fund, be-lieving that development resources should be allocatedwithin rather than outside the Monterrey Consensus, thatexisting resources for ICT investment were both sufficientand underutilised, and that a separate funding arrange-ment for ICTs was difficult to reconcile with their main-streaming approach to ICD.

The remit of the TFFM, agreed in Geneva, reflected thesepriorities: the Task Force was to review the adequacy ofexisting financial mechanisms, and to propose “improve-ments and innovations of financing mechanisms” in thelight of that review - including “the effectiveness, the fea-sibility and the creation of a voluntary Digital SolidarityFund.”23

The structure of the Task Force, unlike that of the parallelWorking Group on Internet Governance (see below) wascomparable with many similar UN task forces and workinggroups before it. Organised by the UNDP with support fromother multilateral agencies, it met only twice, relying sub-stantially on the work of consultants rather than engagingdirectly in analysis itself. Unlike WSIS, where delegationswere led by diplomats and telecoms sector specialists, theTask Force had substantial representation from mainstreamdevelopment sectors in both donor and developing coun-tries, and this difference is evident from a report which ismuch more reflective of mainstream development thinkingthan the Geneva Declaration and Plan of Action. Member-ship of the Task Force is listed in Annex 2.

Its report24 begins by noting both the innovation and thedynamism of the ICT sector, and its subsequent line of ar-gument can be summarised as follows. Enabling ICT infra-structure to be deployed and enabling it to support devel-opment activity both depend heavily on the environmentfor innovation, investment, business development andservice provision. In practice, infrastructure investment hasmoved from traditional public (government and multilat-eral agency) sources in the 1980s to the private sector inthe 1990s, benefiting from deregulation of telecoms mar-kets. Though Northern investment has fallen significantlysince 1999, there has been an increase in Southern invest-ment and in innovative multistakeholder partnerships -trends that should be encouraged as the investment re-quirements for broadband, in particular, greatly exceed the

capacity of governments and donors to invest. Less atten-tion has been paid to applications development and ca-pacity-building, and more investment is needed here - withmore donor involvement - if the benefits of ICTs are to befully realised.

Based on this analysis, the Task Force drew the followingconclusions:

1. It recommended governments to maximise the attrac-tiveness of their environments to private sector infra-structure investment, as the best way of securing re-sources to extend network access and service provision.

2. It recommended improvements to processes enablingICD applications and initiatives, including greater pool-ing of requirements and experience-sharing.

3. It called for innovative approaches to finance investmentin more difficult areas such as those which are geo-graphically remote, and to meet new, more expensivebut potentially productive challenges such as regionalinfrastructure and broadband network deployment.

4. It suggested a range of “improvements and innova-tions” to existing financing mechanisms, includingbetter coordination of institutional funds, multistake-holder partnerships and more effective use of domes-tic finance.

The downgraded Digital Solidarity Fund won the barest ofendorsements from a report which firmly emphasised “thecontext of available financing for the broader set of devel-opment agendas and goals,”25 including the MonterreyConsensus and the Millennium Declaration, and the im-portance at a national level of incorporating ICD within Pov-erty Reduction Strategies and similar national develop-ment programmes.

The Working Group on Internet Governance (WGIG)Working Group on Internet Governance (WGIG)Working Group on Internet Governance (WGIG)Working Group on Internet Governance (WGIG)Working Group on Internet Governance (WGIG) wasmore innovative in both membership and process than theTask Force on Financial Mechanisms. Chaired by the UNSecretary-General’s Special Adviser for WSIS, Nitin Desai,it brought together a wide range of people from govern-ment, private sector and civil society and included diverseInternet expertise. Civil society participants were chosenthrough a process of dialogue with civil society organisa-tions, which submitted a list of suggested members al-most all of whom were accepted. Membership (which islisted in Annex 2) was also geographically extensive andinclusive. However, WGIG members acted as individuals,not as representatives of any interest group, governmentor agency. They met four times in formal session, holdingpublic sessions open to participation by all-comers andso enabling much more extensive engagement with theirwork by the private sector, civil society and the Internetcommunity than is generally the case in comparable fora.23 Geneva Plan of Action, section D2, article 27.f.

24 The report of the Task Force on Financial Mechanisms is available from:www.itu.int/wsis/documents/doc_multi.asp?lang=en&id=1372|1376|1425|1377. 25 TFFM report, 2004, section C2, p. 10.

3 1

WGIG members focused in teams on issues of particularinterest to them, doing much of their work in online dia-logue, supported by an expert secretariat. Participants inthe WGIG interviewed for this report generally felt verypositive about its processes and about their ability to par-ticipate – as, indeed, did interviewees on the margins whowanted to get their point of view across through the pub-lic sessions organised by the WGIG.

The remit given to the WGIG in the Geneva Plan of Actionwas that it should:

i. develop a working definition of Internet governance;

ii. identify the public policy issues that are relevant toInternet governance;

iii. develop a common understanding of the respectiveroles and responsibilities of governments, existingintergovernmental and international organisations andother forums as well as the private sector and civil so-ciety from both developing and developed countries;

iv. prepare a report on the results of this activity … forthe second phase of WSIS in Tunis in 2005.26

The WGIG report,27 agreed in June 2005, succinctly re-sponds to the first three of these objectives, with the morecontentious material it might have contained relegated toa subsidiary “background report”.28 Internet governanceis defined as follows:

Internet governance is the development and applica-tion by Governments, the private sector and civil soci-ety, in their respective roles, of shared principles,norms, rules, decision-making procedures, and pro-grammes that shape the evolution and use of theInternet.29

This definition found its way into the Tunis Agenda, thefinal WSIS report.30

The WGIG divided public policy issues relevant to Internetgovernance into four categories:

a. Issues relating to infrastructure and the managementof critical Internet resources (such as the domain nameand root server systems)

b. Issues relating to the use of the Internet (such as spam,network security and cybercrime)

c. Issues that are relevant to the Internet but have animpact which is much wider … and for which existingorganisations are responsible (such as intellectualproperty and international trade)

d. Issues relating to the developmental aspects ofInternet governance, in particular capacity-building indeveloping countries.31

The report commented on issues in categories b., c. andd., but its most important work concerned issues relatingto infrastructure and the management of critical Internetresources - the issues that lay at the heart of the concernsraised during the first summit process, especially over theUnited States’ role and responsibilities.

Although it attempted to divide roles and responsibilitiesbetween different stakeholders, the WGIG’s lists of theseare less clear-cut than the text later adopted in Tunis (seebelow). At the heart of its report, however, lie three princi-ples derived from the Geneva Declaration of Principles,which formed the basis for much of the subsequent debate:

• No single Government should have a pre-eminent rolein relation to international Internet governance.

• The organizational form for the governance functionwill be multilateral, transparent and democratic, withthe full involvement of Governments, the private sec-tor, civil society and international organisations.

• The organizational form for the governance functionwill involve all stakeholders and relevant intergovern-mental and international organizations within theirrespective roles.32

Alongside these principles, the WGIG agreed that therewere “two overarching prerequisites to enhance the legiti-macy of Internet governance processes”:

• The effective and meaningful participation of all stake-holders, especially from developing countries.

• The building of sufficient capacity in developing coun-tries, in terms of knowledge and of human, financialand technical resources.33

The WGIG was not able to agree on a model for oversight ofthe Internet on this basis - the issue was too controversial -but it was able to put forward four alternative models asthe basis for future discussion in WSIS itself. These were:

1. A Global Internet Council, “anchored” in the UnitedNations, consisting of government representatives,which would take over the functions currently man-aged by ICANN, plus many of the policy and other re-sponsibilities in categories b., c. and d. above (a modelcharacterised in much media discussion as the UN tak-ing over the Internet).

2. No specific oversight organisation but perhaps an en-hanced Governmental Advisory Committee in ICANN.


27 Available from: www.wgig.org/docs/WGIGREPORT.doc.

28 Available from: www.wgig.org/docs/BackgroundReport.doc.

29 WGIG report, section II, para. 10.

30 Tunis Agenda for the Information Society, article 34.

31 WGIG report, section III, para. 13.

32 ibid., section V, para. 48.




3. An International Internet Council (independent of theUN) to perform the functions currently undertaken byICANN and perhaps any other public policy functionsthat did not fall within the remits of other intergovern-mental organisations.

4. A complex multiple governance model including a gov-ernment-led Global Internet Policy Council, a private-sector-led replacement for ICANN (WICANN), and aGlobal Internet Governance Forum involving govern-ments, the private sector and civil society on an equalfooting.34

Finally, whatever oversight arrangements might emergefrom WSIS, the WGIG proposed the creation of a “globalmulti-stakeholder forum to address Internet-related pub-lic policy issues.”35 As well as including non-governmen-tal stakeholders, this would be more inclusive of develop-ing countries. It would provide a space within which a widerange of Internet-related issues could be discussed anddeveloped, but would not have decision-making powers.This proposal forms the basis for the Internet GovernanceForum that was ultimately agreed in Tunis.

The second summit PrepComsand Tunis summit

The negotiating process for the second phase of the sum-mit closely resembled that for the first, at least in method-ology. Texts were negotiated in PrepComs by national del-egations in which diplomats, particularly those from Ge-neva missions, tended to play the leading role. Diplomatsaside, most national delegations continued to be domi-nated by communications ministries and telecoms sectorspecialists. Private sector and civil society representativeswere still only allocated a marginal role in formal negotia-tions (but did have limited speaking rights), though bothplayed significant roles in caucusing and developing textsoutside the formal process, and gained networking value,too, as a result. Some interviewees suggested that the pri-vate sector was significantly more apparent during phasetwo than it had been during phase one.

There were, however, substantial differences in the waythat the second phase was conducted. PrepCom 1, in June2004, set the scene for the overall process and establishedthe Group of Friends of the Chair. PrepCom 2, it was agreedin advance, would focus on financing mechanisms andPrepCom 3 on Internet governance. This sequencing of is-sues, built around the work of the three interim fora, hadsignificant implications for the nature of the second phasedebate. As the negotiating process continued, PrepComsdivided much of their energies into two subcommittees -Subcommittee A dealing with Internet governance and

Subcommittee B with everything else before the Summit.PrepCom 3 needed to be reconvened twice, as the date ofthe Tunis summit drew near, to consider the remaining con-tentious issues concerning Internet governance and fol-low-up activities and, as in Geneva, final resolution of thesewas not reached until the last evening before the summitwas due to begin.

One of the key issues at the start of the second phase wasthe determination of a number of countries that issuesdealt with in the text of the Geneva documents should notbe reopened - that the summit should move on, as the Eu-ropean Union put it, “from principles to action”, rather thanreverting to the disputes over rights, for example, that hadbeen “resolved” in 2003. Once that principle was estab-lished, the second phase could focus on three main issues:financing mechanisms, Internet governance and the fol-low-up and implementation of WSIS output documents.

The text on general principles of ICD, within the politicalchapeau, was not particularly contentious, and these over-all ICD issues were therefore relatively little discussed dur-ing the second phase. Among significant developments inthis area in the long term may be efforts to establish bench-marks for measuring ICD activities, including the ITU’s de-velopment of a (rather telecoms- and Internet-focused)Digital Opportunity Index. A stocktaking exercise, intendedto assess progress in ICD developments since the Genevameeting, provided little more than a list of initiatives re-ported to the WSIS secretariat, rather than a substantivebasis for measuring action in the round.

As it happened, the second phase of the summit coincidedwith a review of the Millennium Development Goals heldby the United Nations in September 2005, but thesynergies between the two were few. ICTs featured little inthe reviews of MDG issues by the Millennium Project andbarely at all in the review of progress towards achievingMDGs in the UNDP’s Human Development Report.36 Littlewas said at the Millennium review summit itself aboutthem, though a certain degree of interaction had beenestablished in the Geneva documents, for example in mak-ing the terminal dates for WSIS targets consistent with the2015 objectives of the Millennium Declaration.

The second PrepCom, in February 2005, focused on andeffectively resolved the issues concerning financingmechanisms, at least so far as the WSIS process was con-cerned. Issues which had proved deeply divisive at the endof the first phase were barely raised again after that point.In effect, the PrepCom agreed the conclusions of the TaskForce on Financial Mechanisms, and no new mechanismswere established to finance ICT or ICD activities. The Digital

34 ibid., section V, paras. 52-71.


36 See the reports of the Millennium Project atwww.unmillenniumproject.org/, and UNDP, Human DevelopmentReport 2005 - International cooperation at a crossroads:Aid, trade and security in an unequal world, at hdr.undp.org/reports/global/2005.

3 3

Solidarity Fund became a small, voluntary body - estab-lished enough to avoid embarrassment but in a form andon a scale unlikely to have much impact on overall devel-opment activity. Critical to this outcome was an agreementreached during the African regional meeting, just beforethe second PrepCom, in which key multilateral agencies,including the World Bank and the European Commission,agreed to support regional infrastructure development inAfrica - perhaps the first stage in a rethinking of the role ofmultilateral agencies in ICT infrastructure finance sincedonors and the international financial institutions effec-tively withdrew from this area in the early 1990s.

By far the most contested area of discussion during thesecond summit phase was that of Internet governance,which threatened - like the Digital Solidarity Fund duringthe Geneva phase - to prevent agreement being reachedon a final set of outcome documents. Given the amount oftime devoted to Internet governance, and the way in whichinternational media covered WSIS 2 when it finally tookplace, the Tunis event looked and felt at times more like aworld summit on Internet governance than on the infor-mation society.

The WGIG report was not received with the same air of con-sensus as that from the TFFM; indeed, some interviewees(who disagreed with the tone of the WGIG) questionedwhether it had any impact at all on the subsequent debate.The United States was adamant that the WGIG report shouldnot provide a basis for negotiation, though it was in prac-tice discussed substantially by Subcommittee A. Overall,most interviewees believed, the WGIG report did have a sig-nificant impact. It provided perhaps the first clear defini-tion of Internet governance and sorted some of the ques-tions arising from the Internet into a coherent order - notnecessarily one that everyone agreed with, but one thathelped develop a common understanding and a commonframework for negotiations. While its suggested models forInternet governance were not particularly influential, the po-liticised nature of the debate around oversight perhapsmeant that no recommendations on this theme would havewithstood negotiations. One of the most substantive out-comes of the summit on Internet governance, the creationof an Internet Governance Forum, can be seen as a directoutcome of a proposal made by the WGIG.

Negotiations in Subcommittee A of the remaining PrepComswere intense and fraught. A small number of large develop-ing countries - some acting as a “like-minded” bloc - led theattack on the status quo, particularly perceived UnitedStates control of ICANN and the root server system. TheUnited States and a group of supporting countries resisted.The European Union took a third line, widely seen as a breakwith the United States, built around “enhanced coopera-tion” of Internet governance processes. Civil society focusedresources, not unsuccessfully, on seeking to secure, andthen to broaden the remit and the scope for multistake-

holder participation in the proposed Internet GovernanceForum. It was difficult even for participants to see, at theend of the day, exactly who had won or lost what in thisparticular debate.

The final issue of contention was follow-up activity. Hereagain, industrial countries were anxious to avoid the crea-tion of elaborate new institutions. The compromise reachedwas one that involved many UN agencies but left the ques-tion of control - and the potential for turf battles within theUN system - unresolved. As with the Internet GovernanceForum, much will depend on what happens next.

The Tunis phase outputs

As with the Geneva phase of the summit, the Tunis phasegenerated two outcome documents, the Tunis Commit-ment and the Tunis Agenda for the Information Society.

The Tunis Commitment37 begins by reaffirming the con-tent and positions taken in the Geneva Declaration of Prin-ciples and Plan of Action, and restates the positive view ofICTs as an instrument of social and economic developmentof “progress”, its authors might have said - which is ar-ticulated at greater length in the Geneva Declaration ofPrinciples. Also reaffirmed were the special commitmentsmade to particular geopolitical and social groups (devel-oping countries, small island states, women, young peo-ple, indigenous communities, etc.).

Language here was not uncontested: there was reneweddiscussion, for example, about the roles of different stake-holders; continued discussion about the nature of refer-ences to terrorism, cybercrime and the relationship betweenproprietary and open source software; strengthened lan-guage concerning child abuse. The digital solidarity agendawas placed squarely in the context of debt relief and tradereform as well as financial assistance. But, in essence, theCommitment is a restatement of the values and principlesestablished in Geneva in briefer and more general terms.

The stated purpose of the Tunis Agenda38 was to movefrom principles to action. It concentrates on the three coreareas of focus for the summit’s second phase: financingmechanisms, Internet governance and the follow-up andimplementation of WSIS outcomes.

As noted above, the text on financing mechanisms wasagreed by the end of PrepCom 2 and discussion on this wasnot reopened later in the Tunis phase. The text concernedwas closely modelled on the conclusions of the Task Forceon Financial Mechanisms. It affirms the importance of ICTinvestment but in instrumental rather than aspirational

37 Available from: www.itu.int/wsis/documents/doc_multi.asp?lang=en&id=2266%7C0.

38 Available from: www.itu.int/wsis/documents/doc_multi.asp?lang=en&id=2267%7C0.



terms. It places this investment firmly within the contextof wider development investment and of agreed develop-ment instruments such as the Monterrey Consensus; sug-gests ways in which existing investment sources could bemore effectively coordinated and/or used; urges, encour-ages and supports ways of helping, facilitating or enhanc-ing outcomes rather than prescribing solutions. The Dig-ital Solidarity Fund, so contentious in the Geneva phase,is welcomed in its new, residual form as “an innovativefinancial mechanism of a voluntary nature open to inter-ested stakeholders.”39

The text on financing mechanisms is, therefore, what mightbe described as a reformist text, which represents a con-sensus built around improvements to the status quo ratherthan radical new initiatives - and lacks the sense of urgencyand priority for ICTs articulated in the Geneva Declarationand Tunis Commitment. Some key questions - in particu-lar, those around strategic investment in areas such asbroadband infrastructure - are raised but, effectively, re-ferred back to pre-existing institutional fora: matters forthe multilateral development banks, for bilateral and mul-tilateral donors, for private sector investment and public-private partnerships, etc., rather than for special interven-tion, specialist summits or special Funds.

The second main section of the Tunis Agenda is concernedwith Internet governance. It is less dependent on the WGIGthan is the financing section on the TFFM, though the is-sues and options as set out by the WGIG played a majorpart in its creation. Its development, as noted above, wasmuch the most contested area of discussion during thesecond summit phase; and the rather incoherent struc-ture of the final text reflects the last-minute nature of theconsensus that could be achieved.

It begins by adopting the WGIG definition of Internetgovernance:

A working definition of Internet governance is the de-velopment and application by governments, the pri-vate sector and civil society, in their respective roles,of shared principles, norms, rules, decision-makingprocedures, and programmes that shape the evolu-tion and use of the Internet.40

“The international management of the Internet,” it adds,

should be multilateral, transparent and democratic, withthe full involvement of governments, the private sector,civil society and international organizations. It shouldensure an equitable distribution of resources, facilitateaccess for all and ensure a stable and secure function-ing of the Internet, taking into account multilingualism.41

The inelegance of this second paragraph betrays its ori-gins in textual compromise. Parts of the text on Internetgovernance were fought over word by word and phrase byphrase. That which was finally agreed recognised:

that the existing arrangements for Internet governancehave worked effectively to make the Internet the highlyrobust, dynamic and geographically diverse mediumthat it is today, with the private sector taking the leadin day-to-day operations, and with innovation andvalue creation at the edges.42

It recognised, too, the complexities of Internet governance,but was unable to resolve the political contradictions be-tween key players in the PrepCom disputes. Signatoriesto the Agenda document, for example, were “convincedthat there is a need to initiate, and reinforce, as appropri-ate, a transparent, democratic and multilateral process,with the participation of governments, private sector, civilsociety and international organizations, in their respectiveroles” - a statement built around ambiguity (“as appropri-ate”, “in their respective roles”) rather than agreement.“This process,” it continued, “could envisage creation ofa suitable framework or mechanisms, where justified, thusspurring the ongoing and active evolution of the currentarrangements in order to synergise the efforts in this re-gard” (likewise note “where justified”, “in this regard”).43

The Agenda affirms that “Countries should not be involvedin decisions regarding another country’s country-code TopLevel Domain (ccTLD),”44 but does not resolve future ar-rangements for this. “Enhanced cooperation” is consid-ered essential, including cooperation on “the developmentof globally-applicable principles on public policy issues as-sociated with the coordination and management of criti-cal Internet resources,”45 but the mechanisms to developthis are deferred for consideration by those concerned, andby a forum to be established through the office of the UNSecretary-General (see below).

Although the section does not deal with the Internet in gen-eral or in principle, it does address some Internet policy is-sues outside the specific governance context. Developingcountry concern about high international connectivity costsis mentioned, for example, alongside a list of potentiallyameliorative measures. There is also text on public policyissues such as cybercrime, spam and “abusive uses of ICTs”.

From the perspective of this report, two issues are of cru-cial importance - the role and relationships of differentstakeholders, and the future structure for Internet-relateddialogue and decision-making.

39 Tunis Agenda, article 28.







3 5

The roles of different stakeholders in Internet governanceare defined as follows:

… the management of the Internet encompasses bothtechnical and public policy issues and should involveall stakeholders and relevant inter-governmental andinternational organizations. In this respect it is recog-nised that:

a. Policy authority for Internet-related public policyissues is the sovereign right of States. They haverights and responsibilities for internationalInternet-related public policy issues;

b. The private sector has had, and should continue tohave, an important role in the development of theInternet, both in the technical and economic fields;

c. Civil society has also played an important role onInternet matters, especially at community level,and should continue to play such a role;

d. Inter-governmental organizations have had, andshould continue to have, a facilitating role in thecoordination of Internet-related public policy is-sues;

e. International organizations have also had andshould continue to have an important role in thedevelopment of Internet-related technical stand-ards and relevant policies.46

Inter-governmental organisations (though not govern-ments) are explicitly encouraged “to ensure that all stake-holders, particularly from developing countries, have theopportunity to participate in policy decision-making relat-ing to Internet governance, and to promote and facilitatesuch participation”.47

Much of the argument about Internet governance duringthe latter stages of the second summit phase concernedthe possible establishment of an Internet Governance Fo-rum (IGF) and its potential remit. The final decision, asnoted earlier, was to ask the UN Secretary-General to con-vene the first meeting of a Forum, which would then:

Build on the existing structures of Internet governance,with special emphasis on the complementarity betweenall stakeholders involved in the process - governments,business entities, civil society and intergovernmentalorganizations.48

Given a wide remit, based on language some of which origi-nated with civil society, the Forum was to develop its ownprocesses and procedures, with a “lightweight and decen-tralised” management structure and an initial five-yearterm. However, it was to be a discussion forum:

The IGF would have no oversight function and wouldnot replace existing arrangements, mechanisms, in-stitutions or organizations, but would involve them andtake advantage of their expertise. It would be consti-tuted as a neutral, non-duplicative and non-bindingprocess. It would have no involvement in day-to-dayor technical operations of the Internet.49

In short, the nature, role and influence of the Forum wereleft up for grabs. Its implications for future internationalpolicymaking are discussed in Chapter 8.

Thirdly, the Agenda document considers implementationand follow-up arrangements for the rest of WSIS’ agendaissues. This area, too, was substantially debated and con-tested during second phase PrepComs, as different agen-cies jockeyed for position (or, in some cases, to avoid it).Much of the text in this section reaffirms the WSIS ap-proach to and objectives for ICTs in development, placingit within the context of mainstream development activityand reiterating the stated importance of multistakeholderparticipation.

It is worth, firstly, looking to identify just what “commit-ments” are actually made in the WSIS outcome texts. In prac-tice, even in the Tunis Commitment itself, use of the word“commitment” is relatively scarce. There are only a fewplaces, in any of the texts, in which the summiteers formallycommit themselves to undertake particular courses of ac-tion, rather than recognising perceived truths, affirming be-liefs, recommending particular approaches or calling ongovernments and others to action in line with broad objec-tives.50 The one place in which formal commitments do ap-pear at length, and might be considered summarised, comestowards the end of the Tunis Agenda, and is set out in An-nex 3. If the WSIS follow-up process is meant to monitorand encourage long-term outcomes, this comes as close aspossible to a definition of what those outcomes might be.

No “new operational bodies” are required by the Agendadocument for implementation or monitoring of WSIS out-comes, but there is significant jostling of institutional ar-rangements within the UN system. Instead of an overallWSIS review agency, the UN Secretary-General was askedto set up a UN Group on the Information Society withinthe framework of the UN Chief Executives Board (CEB),“with the mandate to facilitate the implementation of WSISoutcomes.” The CEB should take into account, in devel-oping this, “the experience of, and activities in the WSISprocess undertaken by” the three agencies that might belikely to contest its leadership, the ITU, UNESCO and theUNDP.51 ECOSOC was also asked to review WSIS outcomesin 2006, and consider possible changes to the Commis-sion on Science and Technology for Development. �





50 See list of commitments in Annex 3.



3 7

Analysis

s e c t i o n b

WSIS organisation and structurec h a p t e r 4

c h a p t e r 4 WSIS organisation and structure

c h a p t e r 5 WSIS and its issues

c h a p t e r 6 WSIS and developing countries

c h a p t e r 7 WSIS and civil society

1 The resolution is available from: www.itu.int/wsis/docs/background/resolutions/73.html.

Although in some ways not quite a conventional UN sum-mit, WSIS has generally been perceived as falling within thelong line of UN summits which have addressed major chal-lenges to the international community over many years. Thischapter of the report looks, firstly, at the structure of UNsummits in general, and their appropriateness for consid-eration of ICT issues; then at some specific issues concern-ing the organisation of WSIS, and how these affected rep-resentation and other issues; and finally, suggests someinterim conclusions about the implications of WSIS organi-sation and structure for future international ICT decision-making. It is not concerned with the participation of differ-ent actors, which is discussed in Chapters 5 and 6.

A summit for ICTs?

The possibility of a world summit on the information soci-ety was first proposed by the ITU Plenipotentiary Confer-ence (to insiders, the “Plenipot”) in 1998 and its organisa-tion was led, on behalf of the United Nations, by the ITU.

The genesis of the Summit, briefly mentioned at the startof Chapter 3, is an interesting story in itself and has beengenerally misunderstood. The summit was not approved,as most participants assumed, from substantial debatewithin the “Plenipot” but through the adoption, withoutdiscussion, on the last day of the conference, of one amonga number of proposals for which no time for debate hadbeen found earlier in the meeting and which were notdeemed contentious. The resolution itself was unclearabout both the scope of the “information society” and thenature of the “world summit” it proposed.1 However, thoseinvolved at the time say that they did not think it implied aUN-style summit of the kind that subsequently took place;one insider remembers most of those involved anticipat-ing a relatively small gathering of sectoral experts andselected heads of state which could look at the issues andmake recommendations, not least concerning the future

S e c t i o n B . A n a lys i s


2 The Maitland Commission was an “International Commission for WorldWide Telecommunications Development”, assembled by the ITU. Itsreport is available from: www.itu.int/osg/spu/sfo/missinglink/index.html.

of the ITU itself (a significant point of concern in the origi-nal resolution). Similar meetings had been organised byother UN specialist agencies on issues of concern to thembut also of wider interest to others in the UN family. TheITU’s experience with the Maitland Commission in 1984/5may also have been in some people’s minds as a prec-edent.2

However, the idea of a concentrated world dialogue onrapidly changing “information and communications” is-sues - which might take summit form - was not entirelynew. As early as 1996, the European Commission organ-ised a global Information Society and Development Con-ference in South Africa. A multistakeholder Global Knowl-edge Partnership was launched following internationalGlobal Knowledge Conferences in Toronto and KualaLumpur in 1997 and 2000, including UN agencies such asUNESCO and the UNDP. Other inter-governmental agen-cies, notably the World Bank, had begun revising their at-titudes to information and knowledge issues during thelate 1990s, developing strategies built around the conceptof a “knowledge society”. Within the UN family, UNESCOin particular was developing a proactive agenda on infor-mation and communication issues, though from a ratherdifferent - more developmental and cultural, less techno-cratic - perspective than the ITU. Information and commu-nication technology was undoubtedly changing very rap-idly, and the concepts of digital dividend and digital di-vide were increasingly debated in development as well astechnological circles. The dot.com boom was underway;the dot.com bust was yet to happen.

Interviewees describe how the ITU’s proposal for a “worldsummit”, therefore, met with significant enthusiasm inprinciple in parts of the UN system and, just as importantly,with relatively little opposition. First the UN’s Administra-tive Committee on Coordination, representing other UNagencies, endorsed the idea, and then the General Assem-bly, representing member-states, endorsed the proposalthat it should become a full-scale summit, with all the au-thority and all the paraphernalia of preparatory commit-tees and diplomatic negotiation that entails. Once the pro-posal for a summit of this kind emerges, it has momen-tum. Many interviewees from governments and interna-tional organisations described how, though they them-selves were unenthusiastic, it was difficult for them or theirgovernments/organisations to argue against a summitbecause that seemed to imply that the issue of the infor-mation society was unimportant. Nevertheless, they con-tinue to wonder whether a smaller scale initiative mighthave been more effective in dealing with many of the is-sues concerned or in generating more dynamic outcomes.

UN-style summits have become relatively common in re-cent years - some years have seen several, perhaps partlyas a result of this kind of “summit creep”. Some haveclearly been much more successful than others - the Rioconference on sustainable development in 1992 and theBeijing World Conference on Women of 1995 generallybeing cited as examples of success which other summitshope to emulate. The UN itself has developed consider-able experience in the management of summits and (lesssuccessfully) the expectations they arouse.

Summits are, of course, extremely expensive instrumentsof international decision-making. They require large invest-ments of money and, especially, time from governmentofficials and subject experts over an extended period,which represents a considerable opportunity cost, espe-cially for smaller governments and for non-governmentalactors like those in civil society. They raise high expecta-tions: if so much time and effort, and the political will ofso many senior people from so many countries, are con-centrated on a single decision-making forum, people ex-pect it to achieve great things and are correspondingly dis-appointed if it reveals more difference than agreementbetween the parties. As a result, cynics suggest, whatevertheir outcomes, summits must always be described as ei-ther “successes” or “great successes”.

However, summitry is merely one method of achieving (orat least seeking) international agreement. Most interna-tional policymaking is conducted in narrower, more for-mal, often rule-based organisations like the ITU and theWorld Trade Organisation; and is thought to be more ex-peditiously handled there because it takes place withingroups that have specialist expertise. Summits are, in otherwords, rather like referendums: it only really makes senseto have them on issues that are of fundamental importanceor that cannot be resolved through the conventional inter-national governance mechanisms that already exist.

Insiders say that this is how they are generally consideredwithin the UN system. What summits are best at doing isaddressing broad problems that are of fundamental im-portance to the whole world community, where progressis not being achieved through conventional inter-govern-mental mechanisms, and where it seems possible that thedramatic gesture of heads of state and government col-lectively signing an agreement will inject a new dynamicinto efforts to resolve that problem. Climate change is aclassic example of the sort of issue for which summits havebeen thought appropriate.

Historically, the justification for summits has generallybeen that a particular issue has become so important thatit requires the establishment of a new global consensus.The uniqueness of the summit format is that it can coerceworld leaders into such a consensus. If large numbers ofheads of state and government agree to gather togetherin one place to set out how they are going to resolve a

3 9

global problem, the theory goes, it is too embarrassingfor them to have nothing to sign at the end of their confer-ence. This puts unique pressure on them to achieve agree-ment, and the object of the whole multi-year preparatoryprocess is to refine issues to a point at which, often throughlast-minute crisis negotiations, an acceptable compromiseconsensus can be achieved. This may, in practice, be a low-est common denominator consensus, or it may be a sub-stantive agreement which genuinely advances global ac-tion on an issue, but there is rarely total failure in the sensethat there is no document to endorse. The trick at the heartof the summit exercise, as one insider described it, is toset a final date for signature where heads of state will betoo embarrassed to leave without agreement, and to ex-ploit the potential brinkmanship involved in this to makethe maximum amount of progress on issues that haveproved intractable.

Not everyone within the international system thought thatthe information society was susceptible to this kind ofapproach, for a number of reasons. One of these was infact suggested by UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan –though as a cause for celebration, not concern – in hisopening remarks to the Geneva summit in December 2003.“This summit is unique,” he said; “Where most global con-ferences focus on global threats, this one will consider howbest to use a new global asset.” But, the previous para-graph suggests, summits have been used for problemsrather than opportunities for a reason. Problems concen-trate minds on the choices between different ways of tack-ling them. Opportunities are far more open: there are farmore ways that opportunities can be seized than prob-lems can be tackled. When governments are asked howproblems might be tackled, they will respond by exclud-ing options, which makes it possible to narrow downchoices for action. When they are asked how opportuni-ties might be seized, they make lists which it is easiest forsummit officials to combine in ever bigger lists, rather thanto prioritise. Summits, in short, look less well suited todeal with opportunities than with problems, not least be-cause there is nothing urgent enough to forge consensusat a global level between heads of state and government.

Other stakeholders tend to behave differently as well.Faced with global problems, private sector businesses tendto emphasise the difficulties involved in the solutions prof-fered (consider climate change, for an example); presentedwith opportunities, they are more likely to promote theirproducts, as they did in WSIS’ exhibition space. Problemsfocus civil society attention on a narrow range of issues;opportunities give them scope to show the full range oftheir diversity of interest and approach.

Many participants in WSIS, from all stakeholder groups,were concerned about its cost and cost-effectiveness, andabout whether the global attention it achieved added asmuch value as could have been achieved through other

less expensive fora or existing channels. How manytelecentres, one interviewee put it, could you establishwith the money spent on WSIS?; how many anti-retroviralscould you supply to those living with HIV and AIDS?

Interviews and other evidence suggest that the implica-tions of this character of WSIS were seen in four ways dur-ing the event as a whole.

Firstly, WSIS was treated much more seriously by devel-oping countries than by industrial countries. The numberof heads of state and government attending the Genevaand Tunis sessions was relatively low, but delegations fromindustrial countries were particularly likely to be led byjunior ministers or even civil servants rather than by thehoped-for heads of state and government. This wouldseem to stem logically from the “opportunity” rather than“problem” focus of the event. Industrial countries saw lit-tle value for them in discussing the development of theinformation society at home, and had less interest in dis-cussing the information society in development than diddeveloping countries. They only really became engagedin it where it impinged on international decisions that didaffect them: for example, in the allocation of developmentfunding or the management of a resource (the Internet)that they considered critical to their economies. Develop-ing countries had a much stronger interest, at least withinthe plenaries where their representation was much moresenior.

Secondly, the summit received much less attention frompowerful centres within government than most other sum-mits have achieved. National delegations were generallybuilt around ministries of information and communication,supported by the Geneva UN missions of their countries.These were the obvious departments of government to dealwith issues being handled by the ITU. However, ministriesof information and communication are usually peripheralto the foci of power within governments: their ministersare not key ministers, their budgets are relatively small,their influence on presidents and ministers of finance ispretty weak. One presidential advisor interviewed for theproject put it this way: “the ministry of communication sawWSIS as a way of building its prestige, and we didn’t feelthe issues involved were important enough for us [at thecentre of government] to intervene, so we let them havetheir heads.” The impact of this on the representation ofdeveloping countries is discussed in Chapter 6.

Thirdly, the summit’s discussion of “digital opportunities”,and the way this is reflected in its outcome documents,was discursive and poorly focused. The ITU’s invitation togovernments - and regional WSIS meetings - to submit theirthoughts on opportunities which ICTs could address wasessentially a list-making exercise, and this set somethingof a tone for negotiations on the content of output docu-ments. The African WSIS bureau, the Bamako Bureau, for



3 Some in civil society have argued that this is because civil society waseffectively excluded from participation in the drafting of the Plan ofAction. Others, however, point out that the WSIS document was lesssubstantive than those emerging from other summits (from whosedrafting civil society organisations were also absent); and that theabsence of development-oriented civil society organisations from thesummit preparatory process would have made it difficult for civilsociety to reflect the consensus of development (rather than ICT-focused) NGOs.

4 Approximate data derived from www.itu.int/ITU-D/icteye/Indicators/Indicators.aspx#.

5 Approximate data derived from www.ucc.co.ug/marketInfo/marketstatistics.php.

example, set up after the Africa regional conference dur-ing the first summit phase, agreed 21 “priorities” for ac-tion. Debate about content of the output documents re-fined the texts proposed – debating points of disagreement(perhaps resolving them through ambiguity, perhaps de-leting any that were too contentious), adding special ref-erences to particular groups (women, young people, thedisabled, indigenous peoples) and particular issues. TheGeneva Plan of Action essentially compiles the contribu-tions received and discussed in this way, but does nothingto prioritise them - either by assessing their relative impor-tance or by sequencing them for maximum effectiveness;nor does it discuss the limitations, difficulties, costs orpotential conflicts between them. Certainly, it is hard tofind anyone experienced in ICD that thinks the Plan of Ac-tion pushed the boundaries of thinking on the role of ICTsin development or the role of ICTs in social change – what-ever it might have achieved in terms of awareness-raising.3

Fourthly, summit negotiations actually focused in practicenot on these opportunities but on what were seen as prob-lems - the issues of infrastructure finance and Internetgovernance; to a lesser extent, the conflict between na-tional sovereignty and information rights; and, underly-ing these, “the problem of the digital divide”. Thus, whilemuch of the text of the Geneva Plan of Action is concernedwith the potential role of ICTs in development, the negoti-ating process that accompanied it was preoccupied withthe much narrower question of the desirability of a DigitalSolidarity Fund to address disparities of investment re-sources for ICTs and ICD. The second summit phase sawalmost no discussion of development or wider “informa-tion society” issues in principle, but was preoccupied al-most in its entirety, first by resolution of the disagreementsover infrastructure finance (PrepCom 2), then by the issueof Internet governance and the question of follow-up proc-esses. Cynics in Tunis had a case for saying that the sec-ond phase was a summit not on the information society,but on Internet governance, and for questioning whetheragreement on that was sufficiently important to ensureso much attention from so many people for so many years.Nevertheless, it was the ability of the summit process toachieve a consensus on Internet governance that ulti-mately enables it to be labelled a “success” today.

One further point is worth making about the subject mat-ter for the summit. Four years is a long time for the interna-tional community to discuss any issue. It is a particularlylong time to spend within a single process on a subject

which is changing as rapidly as information and communi-cation technology. Within the four year WSIS timescale,the number of Internet users worldwide at least doubled,reaching perhaps one billion;4 teledensity in Uganda rosefrom 1% to 6%;5 major new technologies were developedwith the potential to transform future ICT deployment,while the cost of others plummeted. The ICT landscape of2005 differed markedly from that of 2001. Yet, while thesummit documents repeatedly refer to the dynamism ofICT markets, they themselves were remarkably undynamic.Where the “information society” itself and the role of ICTsin development are concerned, the texts agreed in 2005show no significant change from those of 2003, which werethemselves based on contributions put forward in 2001and 2002. Some interviewees have suggested that – again,regardless of what it may have done in terms of aware-ness-raising – WSIS may have actually slowed rather thanaccelerated thinking and decision-making about these is-sues by focusing it around perceptions from a particular,receding moment in time.

Summit organisation: the role of the ITU

Six more specific organisational and structural issues con-cerning WSIS were consistently raised by respondents ininterviews and questionnaires for this study. These were:

1. The role of the ITU as principal summit organiser, itsrelations with other UN agencies, and the implicationsof these for the summit as a whole

2. The division of WSIS into two phases

3. The role of regional meetings and preparatory com-mittees

4. The role of the two interim fora, the TFFM and the WGIG

5. The follow-up process instituted for WSIS in the TunisAgenda

6. The relationship between WSIS and other internationaldecision-making fora on both ICTs and development.

Some of these issues are discussed in depth in other chap-ters of this report. Representational issues concerning theTFFM and the WGIG, for example, are considered in Chap-ter 7 and the follow-up process is addressed in Chapter 8.The following sections of this chapter therefore focus onthe role of the ITU, the summit’s two-phase structure, therole of regional meetings and preparatory committees, andthe relationship of WSIS with other international decision-making fora. The first two of these distinguish the organi-sation of WSIS from other comparable summits, making itperhaps more appropriate to call it a “UN-style” summitthan a UN summit per se.

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6 ITU Plenipotentiary Conference 1998, resolution 73, available from:www.itu.int/wsis/docs/background/resolutions/73.html.

7 See UN General Assembly resolution 56/183, available from:www.itu.int/wsis/docs/background/resolutions/56_183_unga_2002.pdf.

The role of the ITU

Although it largely fitted into the standard summit format,WSIS was not, as indicated earlier, an entirely conventionalinternational summit and it is worth looking at some ofthe differences between it and other summits in this con-text. In particular, the organisation of WSIS was led by oneof the UN specialist agencies, the ITU, rather than by theUN’s central organisation.

The possibility of a world summit on the information soci-ety was, as noted earlier, proposed by the ITU Plenipoten-tiary Conference in 1998, though it had been raised earlierin the 1990s in discussion within the UN system and amongsome civil society organisations. This resolution describedthe ITU as “the organisation best able to seek appropriateways to provide for development of the telecommunica-tion sector geared to economic, social and cultural devel-opment,” and so to facilitate “the emergence of the con-cept of the information society in which telecommunica-tions play a central role.”6 The idea of a World Summitgrew through iterations with other parts of the UN familyinto an event of the type normally described as UN sum-mits. The UN General Assembly gave the job of organisingthis now-grander summit to the ITU in January 2002.7

The character of any summit is, of course, likely to be sub-stantially determined by its organisational structure. In-terviewees for the project suggest that the decision to givethe ITU the lead responsibility had five significant effectson the organisation of the Summit and thereby on its out-comes. Each of these has significance for this study.

Firstly, the lead role of the ITU implied a certain approachto the content of the Summit. The ITU is a technical agency,not just in the sense that it has a specialist issue to dealwith, but in the sense that this issue is technological. ITUconferences, staff and study groups deal with highly tech-nical issues like spectrum allocation, telecommunicationstandards and the regulation of interconnection rates. Eventhe ITU’s development arm, the Telecommunication Devel-opment Bureau, is primarily concerned with “the devel-opment of telecommunications” rather than with “tel-ecommunications in development”. With the best will inthe world, the ITU lacks expertise in wider policy areas suchas human rights and mainstream development, and itspersonnel tend to see ICTs as technologies (or new tech-nologies) rather than within the cultural framework of in-formation and communications (which preoccupiesUNESCO), the development policy framework (which con-cerns the UNDP and other UN specialist agencies) or therights agenda (which preoccupies many civil society or-ganisations). In practice, the ITU’s management of WSIS

was also undertaken by the central secretariat of the Un-ion, working to the Secretary-General. The ITU’s Develop-ment Bureau played only a marginal role in the organisa-tion and content of WSIS – something which seemed oddto outsiders, but less strange to those familiar with inter-nal ITU politics.

Secondly, as noted earlier, the ITU’s lead role in turn af-fected the composition of national delegations to WSIS.Because invitations to participate were issued by the ITU,they naturally found their way to the departments of gov-ernment responsible for relations with the ITU – predomi-nantly ministries of communications, information, infor-mation technology or (at their widest) commerce and in-dustry. Aside from diplomatic personnel, participation innational delegations – which is discussed further in Chap-ter 6 – came predominantly, in most countries, from thesedepartments of government, from the regulatory agenciesassociated with them, and from the telecommunicationsbusinesses owned or partly owned by them (mostly fixedtelecoms operators). Mainstream development ministrieswere poorly represented at WSIS for a number of reasons,discussed in Chapter 6, but one of them was that invita-tions from the ITU only reached them if they were passedon by the ministries that received them – and those minis-tries tended to see the information society as their con-cern, or perhaps their opportunity.

So, thirdly, many felt, did the ITU. The last three decadeshave seen the ITU’s role and authority over its traditionalmandate greatly diminished. Liberalisation of telecommu-nications leaves much less scope for governments to makebinding agreements; none, really, any longer for bindingagreements between state-owned monopolies. Astelecoms services have become openly traded andtelecoms infrastructure has become more open to foreigninvestment, the inter-governmental dimension of telecom-munications has become governed as much, in many ways,by the rules of the World Trade Organisation as by a spe-cialist sectoral body like the ITU. Standardisation of tech-nological development has also been dealt with more andmore in recent decades by the private sector – which nowleads work in this area within the ITU, since it extendedthe scope for private sector participation in the early 1990s.ITU pessimists recognise the risk of the Union diminish-ing to little more than a spectrum management agency –unless of course it finds a new and wider role.

For some within the ITU – member-states and permanentofficials – the organisation of WSIS undoubtedly repre-sented an opportunity to carve out that niche; to becomefor the information society, and perhaps the Internet, whatthe original International Telegraph Union was for the tel-egraph in 1865. For organisations to seek new fields ofactivity is, of course, entirely proper; whether they suc-ceed depends on how far their aspirations chime with theirexisting stakeholders and with potential partners already



8 The UN Non-Governmental Liaison Service also supports civil societyunderstanding of and engagement with the UN system.

involved in areas they wish to address. In this case, theITU’s potential role was highly contentious. Not everyonewithin the ITU itself – again member-states and permanentofficials - is convinced of the propriety of its extending itsmandate into wider areas. Industrial country governments,for example, have been far less sympathetic to the ITU’sevolving in this way than those of developing countries,for reasons discussed in Chapter 5. There is genuine andlongstanding debate within the ITU about this question.

More importantly for the nature of WSIS, however, the ITU’spotential expansion into areas of development and cul-tural policy was contested by the UN agencies most con-cerned with these areas. The nature of this contest wasdescribed by some of those involved as a “land grab” byone side or the other; and equally downplayed by others(on both sides). The key fact is that there were underlyingtensions about expertise, roles and responsibilities. Dur-ing the initial set-up period for the summit, there werecontinuing differences between the developmental visionsof UNESCO, the UNDP and other development agencieswithin the UN family and what they saw as the technologi-cal determinism of the ITU. The compromise reached wasthat the ITU organised WSIS in partnership with othermajor agencies, through a High Level Summit OrganisingCommittee able to advise the ITU on issues beyond itsmandate. Nevertheless, inter-agency tensions remainedevident throughout both phases of the summit right up tothe discussions concerning WSIS follow-up, where theyresulted in the unwieldy, multi-headed implementationstructure which is discussed in Chapter 8.

Fourthly, although WSIS operated in the manner of a UNsummit, it was never entirely one in the normal sense. Aswell as being managed by a specialist agency rather thanthe United Nations central organisation, it also receivedno funding from the central structure but had to raise itsown. Insiders suggest that this was the primary reason whyWSIS sessions were held over three days rather than five,putting more pressure on PrepComs to deliver a final textto the summit and allowing less scope for last-minute ad-justments to be made by heads of state themselves.

The ITU’s lead role also meant that the Summit was or-ganised from Geneva rather than New York, which hadtended to play the greater role in previous summits. UNinsiders suggest that there are marked differences of char-acter between the UN organisations in its two core homes– with New York emphasising the UN’s political characterand Geneva the role of specialist agencies; and with thepolitical centre in New York having, at best, doubts aboutthe organisational capacity of specialist agencies to han-dle what is a fundamentally political event. Cultural differ-ences within the UN, they suggest, may have exacerbatedtensions in the organisational process. Certainly, ITU in-siders acknowledge that they found some WSIS issues –such as human rights – difficult to handle because they

had no knowledge of them or their political nuances withintheir own experience. Input from the highly experiencedformer UN Under Secretary-General for economic and so-cial affairs Nitin Desai, key organiser of many past sum-mits, undoubtedly helped to facilitate organisational is-sues as the summit progressed.

One further point here is that, while all UN member-stateshave diplomatic missions in New York, a number of smallercountries do not have missions in Geneva. Their ability toplay a role in WSIS may have been diminished by this.Unlike for example in the UN’s political work and in theWTO, participation in ITU activities is usually led by coun-try-based rather than mission-based personnel, and thismay also have impacted on participation.

Fifthly, the ITU’s lead role created some additional chal-lenges in addressing the participation of non-governmen-tal organisations, particularly civil society. Over decades,UN summits had gradually opened up some space for non-governmental stakeholders within their formal processes,though always within a framework in which governmentsretained sole responsibility for drafting and agreeing texts.This partial and gradual opening had been overseen bythe UN’s political process in New York, particularlyECOSOC, the Economic and Social Council, which has for-mal responsibility for liaison between the UN system andnon-governmental actors.8

The ITU, however, has a different tradition. The changingnature of telecommunications in the 1980s and 1990s meantthat the ITU had to be much more accommodating to pri-vate sector interests than other UN specialist agencies, go-ing so far as to enable them to become “Sector Members”and to play a full (even a leading) role in some ITU activities(especially concerning standards), even if formal decision-making power remained with governments (as some gov-ernments remain determined to assert at every opportu-nity). On the other hand, the ITU established no compara-ble status to offer “civil society”. Civil society organisationscannot (at least easily) play any formal part in ITU activi-ties, such as study groups, or be accredited to ITU confer-ences. This exclusion was challenged with some, but notgreat, enthusiasm by some civil society NGOs in the later1990s, and remained in place when the management rolefor WSIS was formally handed to the ITU in January 2002.

Interviewees had different interpretations of how this af-fected the participation of civil society in WSIS. Some ar-gued that the ITU’s lack of understanding of civil societyorganisations and concerns made it harder for these togain ground, particularly when hardline anti-civil societynational delegations sought to maintain ITU-style puritywithin the WSIS structure. However, as Chapter 7 shows,

4 3

the fact is that civil society participation in WSIS was sig-nificantly greater than that in any previous summit. An al-ternative interpretation, therefore, is that the ITU’s inex-perience and lack of processes for handling civil societymay actually have facilitated the latter’s participation.Without arrangements of its own to handle civil societyinvolvement, the ITU, in this interpretation, needed to workthrough a specialist civil society bureau within the WSISsecretariat whose very existence normalised a muchgreater degree of civil society participation in WSIS thanmight otherwise have happened. Certainly, the ITU tendedto leave a good deal of the responsibility for developingcivil society input to this bureau. Chapter 7 explores thisquestion further.

A two-phase summit

The second organisational aspect of WSIS to be consid-ered at this point is its unique division into two summitphases, the first culminating in the Geneva Summit of De-cember 2003, the second in the Tunis Summit of Novem-ber 2005. Publicly, this two-phase structure was justifiedas enabling the first phase to concentrate on principlesand the second on implementation. In fact, as everyoneknew, it resulted from the UN’s failure to choose betweentwo competing bids to host the summit, one from the homeof the ITU, the other from the government which proposedthe original “Plenipot” resolution calling for a summit.

Few participants interviewed were convinced of the mer-its of the two-phase approach. Most – even those enthu-siastic about WSIS overall – were concerned about theadditional high cost of participation, both financially andin the time of expert personnel. They found it hard to per-suade themselves that a two-phase approach had suffi-cient value to justify doubling this expense. On the whole,in spite of rhetoric, it seems unlikely that the United Na-tions would choose to repeat this way of doing things.

The central question here is one of whether, whatever theorigins of the two-phase structure, its public justificationdid in fact occur: whether the principles developed duringthe first summit phase and outlined in the Geneva out-come documents were translated into action in the sec-ond phase. In fact, as described in Chapter 3, this did nothappen. The principles agreed in Geneva were not, in thefirst place, particularly incisive or coherent; they certainlydid not amount to a comprehensive, prioritised plan ofaction, nor did they have any structures through whichimplementation could be coordinated or monitored. Inspite of prior agreement not to do so, a few countries didtry, early in the second phase, to reopen points of princi-ple – for example concerning human rights – but withoutsuccess. Industrial countries, in particular, were adamantthat the second phase should not cover the same groundas the first. But, interviewees tended to agree, the estab-lishment of principles on rights and development issues

in phase one led not to debate about implementation inphase two but to the absence of debate about those is-sues. Disputes over the “WSIS follow-up” process were,in effect, debates about an implementation process whichshould happen after WSIS, not during its second phase.Language on development in the Tunis Agenda addednothing to that in the Geneva Plan of Action – and, indeed,the “action lines” listed in the Geneva Plan became thebasis for implementation planning after Tunis. A couple ofinitiatives by the ITU – a stocktaking exercise and the pub-lication of a Golden Book of WSIS-related initiatives – weremore concerned with advocacy for ICD than with imple-mentation planning.

What the second phase did, in practice, was provide aframework for the resolution of the two main outstandingissues from the first – i.e. infrastructure finance andInternet governance. However, few interviewees felt thatresolution of these issues necessitated a second summitphase, rather than alternative processes built around ei-ther new or existing spaces for debate. Similar unresolvedproblems from other summits have been handed on tosmaller, focused fora along the lines of the WGIG and theTFFM without being referred back to global summits. Formany participants from industrial countries, in particular,the second phase became a prolonged exercise in whatthey saw as damage limitation, ensuring that changes werenot made to the compromise principles established in thefirst phase, and seeking to avoid what would be, for them,unacceptable conclusions to negotiations on the two out-standing issues.

Regional meetingsand preparatory committees

The third structural issue worth considering is the role ofregional meetings and preparatory committees.

This structure forms part of the package of summit organi-sation. It is, essentially, how UN summits are done. Inputfrom regional gatherings – and perhaps thematic meetings– is assembled by the coordinating central organisation.Documents resulting from this input are put before pre-paratory committees, whose role it is to develop texts foragreement, ultimately, by heads of state and government.Debate focuses around the wording of texts: wording thatis unacceptable to some parties is gradually displaced,when those parties insist, by wording which is acceptableto all – either because it represents a genuine consensusor because, through ambiguity, it glosses over differences.Experts in drafting international agreements, from diplo-matic missions, play the key role in this process which usu-ally requires many iterations over the course of the pre-paratory period. Preparatory committees are there forethe locus for intense lobbying by interested stakeholders;though, when the final summit takes place, the media tend



9 Geneva Declaration of Principles, article 2.

10 See www.un.org/millenniumgoals/#.

to give and the general public to receive the impression thatthe whole agreement was put together by heads of stateand government in the course of a single week or less.

It is fairly obvious that the quality of any final agreementhere is going to depend on the quality of inputs (whetherfrom regional meetings or elsewhere), the quality of draft-ing expertise and the extent of political will to reach agree-ment. Few interviewees for this report had much experi-ence of summits other than WSIS but those that had didnot suggest that the experience in WSIS was very muchdifferent, in terms of quality, from that elsewhere. Inter-viewees experienced in ICT policymaking, however, didhave some concerns. Two points are, at least, worth con-sideration.

Firstly, regional meetings varied substantially in characterand outputs. Some involved extensive civil society partici-pation – as in Africa; others were much more formal andgovernment-focused, like those in the Asia/Pacific region.Some made substantive contributions; others had rela-tively little to offer (such as the European meeting duringthe first phase; none was held in Europe during the sec-ond). Their contributions to the central secretariat there-fore varied in content, style and quality; and there weresignificant clashes between inputs from different regionalmeetings which the central secretariat found it difficult toresolve. Some of those involved felt that this was not thebest way to begin writing texts which ought to be coher-ent and comprehensive approaches to the issues underconsideration.

As for preparatory committees, a great deal of time waswasted during those for WSIS on issues that were not sub-stantive in terms of content. The first PrepCom of the firstphase was almost entirely occupied with procedural mat-ters: in particular, who should be allowed to take part inwhat? When issues of substance were discussed, most ob-servers with ICT experience found debates frustrating –with a good deal of misinformation about issues and agood deal of political posturing getting in the way of themore substantive and better informed discussion theyexperienced at fora which had decisions of immediateimportance to take. (Those involved in both tended to com-ment that they found debates at ITU meetings and confer-ences frustrating, too, but less frustrating than they foundthose at WSIS.) PrepComs were much more dynamic andfocused when issues became politically contentious, asin the disputes over financing mechanisms and Internetgovernance. The quality of PrepCom management here,which is to some degree a matter of chance, could be ofgreat significance. Many interviewees, for example, feltthat a positive outcome to the discussions on Internet gov-ernance in Subcommittee A of the second phase PrepComshad been possible to a large degree as a result of the wayin which that subcommittee was chaired (by the Pakistaniambassador to the UN in Geneva, Masood Khan).

WSIS and the wider world

The final structural issue worth consideration here is therelationship between WSIS and other international deci-sion-making fora, both other international summits andmainstream international ICT decision-making bodies.

The year 2005 saw not just the second phase of WSIS butalso a United Nations summit session devoted to review-ing progress towards achievement of the Millennium De-velopment Goals. The outcome documents from the firstphase of WSIS were clear that ICTs had, potentially, a ma-jor role to play in facilitating achievement of the MDGs:“Our challenge,” in the words of the preamble to the Ge-neva Declaration of Principles, “is to harness the poten-tial of information and communication technology to pro-mote the development goals of the Millennium Declara-tion.”9 A good deal of discussion had been undertaken,within WSIS, the UN ICT Task Force and elsewhere, aboutthe contribution which ICTs could make to individualMDGs, while MDG target 18 itself calls on governmentsand inter-governmental organisations, “in cooperationwith the private sector, [to] make available the benefits ofnew technologies - especially information and communi-cations technologies.”10 Yet this input was barely visiblein the global development discourse that took place in theMillennium Review Summit.

This lack of relation between WSIS and mainstream de-velopment fora is discussed in more depth in Chapter 5. Itwas not just a problem of content, however, but of struc-ture. No significant structural links were established be-tween the two events, which would have enabled an inter-change of views or integration of proposals. The conjunc-tion of a global summit which emphasised the role of ICTsin development with a global summit which largely ignoredtheir relevance to development’s key goals suggests thatWSIS was never properly integrated with the internationalsystem as a whole and in particular that it failed to addressthe “paradigm gap” between ICTs and development whichis discussed in Chapter 5. It also raises questions aboutwhether the same lack of interaction would have been ex-perienced if WSIS had been organised by an agency at theheart, rather than on the periphery, of the UN system.

Much the same level of disconnection can be seen betweenWSIS and other international ICT decision-making fora,with the obvious exception of Internet governance. Cer-tainly where the Internet is concerned, WSIS debates andfollow-up fora are likely to have a lasting impact on thefuture – one which is discussed further in Chapter 5. Theymay also have some impact on the future structure of theITU. The 2006 World Telecommunication DevelopmentConference – which sets the ITU Development Bureau’s

4 5

programme for the next four years – discussed the WSISoutcomes in depth; and the opportunities presented byWSIS follow-up for the ITU were also a significant issue atits 2006 Plenipotentiary Conference. But there are many,many dimensions of international ICT decision-making thatWSIS barely touched. It is hard to see that it will have muchon the 2007 ITU World Radiocommunication Conference,which will deal with crucial questions of spectrum man-agement; or on the implementation of the WTO’s BasicTelecommunications Agreement, which sets the frameworkfor international investment and liberalisation in telecomsmarkets. As things stand, few interviewees could point tonon-Internet areas of international ICT decision-makinglike these in which they expected the WSIS outcomes tohave an influential impact.

Conclusions

What does this analysis of WSIS’ structure and its implica-tions imply for developing countries and for civil society? Itmay seem pointless, after the event, to consider whether aworld summit such as WSIS was the best way to address“information society” issues, but there is a point in lookingat whether the experience suggests any lessons for the fu-ture. Many of the implications are discussed in more detailin Chapters 5, 6 and 7, but a few suggested conclusionsabout structure are worth making here, particularly in re-gard to developing country and civil society participation.

Firstly, the WSIS experience raises questions about thevalue of summitry per se. As noted earlier, summits arehard to argue against. By their existence, they state thatthe international community views their subject as impor-tant, as a priority. Suggesting that a particular summit pro-posal should not be pursued is easily misrepresented asimplying that the issue it concerns is not important. In thecase of WSIS, lack of public dissent from the proposal forthe summit was accompanied by extensive private disquietabout its appropriateness and value amongst internationalofficials involved in its organisation, within the privatesector, in many governments (especially in industrial coun-tries) and in a good many civil society organisations. Thekey question, this suggests, should not be whether an is-sue is important enough to merit a summit, but whetherthe outcomes from a summit are likely to be sufficientlymore valuable than those that could be achieved other-wise to justify the high costs involved in time and money.It is, in other words, about “horses and courses”; the big-gest is not necessarily the best for the job in hand.

Secondly, the WSIS experience reminds us that summitsare highly political. This, in turn, means that the issuesthey discuss - often complex technical issues (such asInternet governance or global warming) – enter into anarena of political argument in which actors adopt positionswhich are determined not by the issues themselves but

by other issues of the moment. The merits of different ap-proaches to (say) Internet governance can be caught up inthe backwash of international conflicts (such as Israel/Palestine or the war in Iraq) or the brokering of deals inunrelated international negotiations (such as the Doharound of trade talks). While summits are therefore intendedfor use on critical issues that require common action towhich heads of state in general affirm consent, thispoliticisation means that such deals are not necessarilybased on the subject under discussion alone. Where thereis widespread misunderstanding or divergence of opinionabout the nature of the subject under discussion – as withInternet governance – that can be an alarming prospect.

The WSIS experience suggests, in other words, that sum-mits are not necessarily the most effective way of reach-ing agreement on international problems. Recourse tothem should not be automatic, particularly given the ex-pense involved. All stakeholders – governments, interna-tional organisations and civil society organisations amongthem – should assess the cost-effectiveness of summitrybefore commitment. The aims of a summit process shouldalso be clear in advance. In the case of WSIS, many par-ticipants felt that there was insufficient clarity about anumber of key factors: the scope and substance of the corequestion (the “information society”); the managementstructure for the summit (particularly the two-phase for-mat); the role and responsibilities of different stakehold-ers concerned. Clarification of these issues in advancemight have made WSIS more effective or more decisive;or it might have suggested that alternative forms of inter-national discourse would have been more fruitful. As itwas, in the words of one insider, the first phase of WSISspent a great deal of time circling issues whose meaningwas unclear rather than addressing real points on whichagreement might achieve results.

A key question here for the “information society” is thepace of change. Information and communication technolo-gies change rapidly. So does our understanding of theirimplications and applications. And so does our experienceof actual use (consider, for example, the unexpected butdynamic adoption of the World Wide Web, mobile te-lephony or SMS). Even a two-year summit process here isproblematic. What is known at the start of 2001 may bevery different from what is understood at the end of 2003,yet final texts tend to be based on early drafts. How muchmore is this a problem when summit processes extend forfour years?

For those who are primarily concerned with ICTs, fore, in-cluding civil society organisations, it is suggested that thekey question in determining methodologies for interna-tional decision-making should be outcome-focused. Whatwill be most likely to achieve agreement?; to achieve agree-ment which genuinely includes the concerns of a widerange of stakeholders?; to achieve agreement which is



likely to prove lasting and has the flexibility needed toallow continued development in an age of rapid and un-certain technological change? Alternative ways of reach-ing agreement to those currently established may be help-ful here or not. Existing channels have set precedents,often because they have proved effective, though thisdoes not mean to say that they remain so, or that theycould not be improved (for example, through greaterinclusiveness). New models, such as those developed inthe Internet community, may also have much to offer. Theimportant thing is what will work. In the case of WSIS,many organisations participated in it with low expecta-tions because it was the biggest show in town and theycould not afford to miss it; but the opportunity costs weresubstantial. It was a disruptive event but did not, for them,live up to its promise.

There is also the question of international representation.One of the reasons why summits are more favoured by de-veloping countries than industrial countries is that they go

some way towards redressing the balance of power withinthe international community. Developing countries feel thatthey have more influence in summits than in the UN’s orspecialist agencies’ normal decision-making processes.There may well be truth in this, at least at plenary stages,and the question is discussed in more depth in Chapter 6.However, the use of summits to bypass the balance ofpower in conventional decision-making does not reallyaddress the underlying problems that developing countrieshave concerning representation – their lack of influence inthose conventional decision-making processes them-selves. After all, it is these conventional processes that willhave responsibility for implementing summit decisions. Therelative degree of influence exercised by developing coun-tries in summits depends, of course, on a variety of factors– not least the degree of cohesion in developing countryparticipation. Nevertheless, the weaknesses in WSIS’ struc-ture and in its outcome documents do nothing to suggestthat less attention should be paid to the conclusions thatthe “Louder Voices” study reached in 2002. �

4 7

The World Summit on the Information Society meant dif-ferent things to different people. Prima facie, from its ti-tle, it might have been expected to address the broad rangeof changes taking place within society as a result of infor-mation technology. These are taking place in all societies,industrial as well as developing, albeit in different waysand to different degrees. In practice, the Summit focusedon a relatively narrow selection of issues - the relation-ship between ICTs and fundamental rights, that betweenICTs and development, infrastructure finance and Internetgovernance - and paid little or no attention to many oth-ers that it might have considered, such as the impact ofinformation technology on the relationship between stateand citizen (censorship, the “surveillance state”) or therole of ICTs in national and international conflict. Muchmore attention was paid to ICTs in developing countriesand to relations between industrial and developing coun-tries (infrastructure finance, Internet governance) than tothe social, economic and cultural changes resulting fromthe rapid evolution of ICTs and their deployment in indus-trial countries (whose governments were much less posi-tive about the value of a summit in the first place and sochose not to raise issues of domestic significance withinit). Far more attention was paid to the potential value ofICTs than to the challenges and risks they pose. At most,therefore, it would be fair to say that WSIS was a summiton aspects of the information society rather than on theinformation society as a whole.

The concept of an “information society” is itself conten-tious - and the “information society” as such is neverclearly defined within the WSIS outcome documents, be-yond the definition of “a people-centred, inclusive anddevelopment-oriented Information Society,” at the startof the Geneva Declaration, as one where everyone can cre-ate, access, utilize and share information and knowledge,enabling individuals, communities and peoples to achievetheir full potential in promoting their sustainable devel-opment and improving their quality of life, premised onthe purposes and principles of the Charter of the UnitedNations and respecting fully and upholding the UniversalDeclaration of Human Rights.11

WSIS and its issuesc h a p t e r 5

It would have been interesting to see what answers differ-ent stakeholders would have given if asked what theymeant by the term. The underlying concept might perhapsbe summarised as a society in which the exchange of in-formation (i.e. communication) becomes the primary ac-tivity that determines economic prosperity and governspeople’s lives. An information society, in this sense, canbe taken as implying the opening of a new phase in humandevelopment, one which is as important as the AgrarianRevolution that separated hunter-gatherer from agriculturalsocieties, and the Industrial Revolution that marked therapid growth of disparities between industrial and agricul-tural societies in the 18th and 19th centuries. The term wasused in this sense of “progress” by some interviewees,particularly advocates of ICT, i.e. those who see the infor-mation society as a positive development and, often, asan opportunity to overcome the social and internationaldisparities following industrialisation in a new economicparadigm. For others, its meaning was much narrower, re-ferring to specific changes within society rather than to thetransformation of society as a whole. Interviewees for thisproject therefore had widely different interpretations of theterm, and many recognised its uncertain nature. They alsohad different interpretations of its scope and that of ICTs –concerning the extent, for example, to which they includebroadcasting. The same degree of uncertainty was verylikely true of participants in WSIS as a whole.

In practice, four issues dominated discussion in the WSISprocess, each of them concerned with a different set ofinteractions between ICTs and other aspects of society andeconomy and each of particular concern to a different setof actors. These issues were:

1. The issue of information and communication rights andtheir relation to the fundamental rights expressed inother UN declarations

2. The relationship between ICTs and development

3. The financing requirements of ICT deployment (bothinfrastructure and applications)

4. The governance of one specific ICT, the Internet.

11 Geneva Declaration of Principles, article 1.



This chapter considers each of these in turn, reviewingparticipation in them by developing countries and civilsociety, and their impact on the longer-term developmentof international ICT decision-making.

Human rights and the information society

Issues concerning human rights differed significantly be-tween the first and second phases of WSIS. During the firstphase, they were principally concerned with the nature ofthe WSIS texts’ commitment to existing human rightsstandards, in particular reaffirmation of the Universal Dec-laration of Human Rights and of commitments to genderequity and other fundamental principles. During the sec-ond phase, the main human rights issues revolved aroundthe venue for the second summit meeting and conflicts –not least within civil society, as constituted within WSIS –about how this should be handled.

The first phase arguments about textual reaffirmation, atheart, concern what rights are accepted as fundamental bythe international community and what issues relating torights – or what nuances of those rights – need to be spelledout in more detail or with more specificity. This is not theplace for a substantial discussion of international humanrights agreements. It is, perhaps, though, worth noting acouple of points which had specific relevance to WSIS.

Firstly, the reaffirmation of certain core texts in new in-ter-governmental agreements, particularly the UniversalDeclaration, is essentially a question of the value andsignificance of maintaining a common global set of stand-ards or aspirations. The concept of universal humanrights, which sees them as inherent to all, has an am-biguous place in international discourse. Declarations ofuniversal rights and of equality are rarely challenged inprinciple, but commonly rejected or ignored in practice,either because they conflict with cultural norms or be-cause they conflict with the perceived authority or wishesof governments. While almost all governments wouldtherefore claim to endorse fundamental rights agree-ments such as the Universal Declaration, and the out-comes of subsequent inter-governmental processes likethe Beijing Declaration following the 1995 World Confer-ence on Women or the 1990 Convention on the Rights ofthe Child, implementation in practice is very far from uni-versal, and many governments feel uncomfortable withparts of these core documents. Not explicitly reaffirmingthem in new international agreements potentially dilutestheir significance, without overtly challenging the princi-ples that they contain.

In principle, this question of reaffirmation is no different forhuman rights declarations than it is for the documents spell-ing out the agreed international consensus (or compromise)on development policy – i.e. the Millennium DevelopmentGoals and the Monterrey Convention. However, in WSIS as

elsewhere, these statements of development principleshave not been subject to the same reaffirmation doubt.

In the case of WSIS, the reaffirmation question was com-plicated by the fact that the issue under discussion – theinformation society – potentially extends the impact whichfundamental rights may have on society and alters the re-lationship between the government and citizen. New ICTssuch as the Internet obviously have potential to givegreater reach to freedoms of expression than they hadbefore: more people can potentially communicate, shareideas and organise collectively than previously. This rep-resents an increase in freedom of association as well as ofexpression. Content which is restricted or forbidden withinnational jurisdictions becomes more readily accessible, in-cluding content which national governments (and perhapsalso majority opinion) considers morally or politically rep-rehensible. Rights to information and to communication,while implicit in established freedoms of expression, there-fore carry additional nuances. Governments which restrictfreedoms of expression in the first place are wary of theirextension, either in the form of rights to information andcommunication or through the impact of new technologies.

In practice, of course, new technologies also offer govern-ments new opportunities to observe and control citizens’behaviour, yet this potential was virtually unconsideredin any WSIS forum, including (with some exceptions) civilsociety. The long-term impact of information technologyon the balance of relations between the state and citizenremains unclear: will the “information society” be one thatempowers individuals or governments, the liberation ofknowledge or the surveillance state? Fifty years from now,it may well seem odd to those reflecting on it that a WorldSummit on the Information Society spent so much timediscussing the domain name and root server systems andso little on major transformations in the relationships be-tween people and their governments.

During the second phase of WSIS, the issue of informationand communication rights took on a more immediate andmore “real life” character because the second summit wasto be held in Tunisia, a country with what is generally con-sidered a poor human rights record, including a record ofobstructing access to Internet sites critical of the govern-ment and of suppressing free expression of dissent. Not allgovernments were happy about the choice of Tunisia, butthe issue had most impact on civil society. Some interna-tional civil society organisations (CSOs) took the opportu-nity to denounce the Tunisian authorities; most expressedsolidarity with Tunisian organisations that were harassedand excluded from participation in the WSIS process.

Their campaigns, however, were complicated by the pres-ence within WSIS, from the Geneva summit onwards, of Tu-nisian NGOs supportive of their government – organisationswhich were not regarded as “real” NGOs by most interna-tional civil society organisations, but which nevertheless had

4 9

rights to register and participate as such. They became par-ticularly active during the first PrepCom of the second phase,held in Hammamet (in Tunisia) in June 2004. Other civil so-ciety participants felt their involvement there was aimed atremoving critical references to Tunisia from civil society in-put and sought to exploit concerns about issues such astransparency and representativity in ways that fosteredNorth-South divisions within the civil society group. It waswell-organised and disruptive, both organisationally andpolitically. It dominated civil society discussion in theHammamet PrepCom, preventing strategisation aroundother issues, and continued to be problematic throughoutthe second phase. In particular, it hampered civil societyefforts to explore other human rights issues.

During the second summit itself, some international CSOsworked closely with excluded Tunisian NGOs, including at-tempts to organise alternative events outside the summitsite. These initiatives were largely prevented by the Tuni-sian authorities.

The impact of this “Tunisia factor” on civil society withinWSIS is considered further in Chapter 7. Interviews sug-gest that it was regarded as something of an embarrass-ment by WSIS organisers that the second summit was heldin a country where freedom of expression was substan-tially curtailed. To some extent, they suggest, this may re-flect naïveté on the part of the ITU, especially, at the timethat summit venues were selected. With no experience inhuman rights issues, the ITU simply did not anticipate thatthe summit would focus substantially on rights issues orthat the selection of Tunisia would prove problematic. Mostparticipants outside civil society, however, when asked,did not seem particularly aware of the problems beingfaced by Tunisian NGOs or the difficulties this posed forcivil society as a whole.

Issues to do with human rights and, in particular, freedomsof expression were an important part of the WSIS debate.However, the two principal areas in which they arose wereessentially ones in which human rights advocates de-fended established positions – the affirmation of funda-mental statements of human rights, and the rights of Tu-nisian civil society organisations to participate effectivelyin their own country and in WSIS itself. Many other rightsissues were raised to some extent within the context ofthe WSIS outcome texts. Much of the discussion aroundthese concerned the inclusion of specific references toparticular rights issues within the information society con-text - either reaffirmations of existing principles or clearstatements of their applicability in a new dimension ofsocial and economic life. It is difficult to find much in thetexts which can be seen as an extension of human rightsprinciples, but equally hard to find anything that mightdiminish them. As noted above, the global impact of newICTs and of an “information society” on the relationshipbetween the state and citizen received little attention in

the WSIS process as a whole. In the long term, this omis-sion is probably the most remarkable feature of WSIS’ at-tention to human rights.

ICTs and development

Most observers now seem to expect summits to focus ondevelopment issues, in particular to provide a forum forresolving differences between industrial and developingcountries. They expect them to interrogate developmentquestions, looking in particular at development which isnot occurring rather than developments which are. Thus,although the “information society” is not inherently eitherabout developing countries alone or about relations be-tween them and industrial countries (where the most rapidchanges associated with an information society are to befound), most interviewees for this project expected, fromthe start, that the summit would place development at theheart of its agenda. This expectation was increased by theinterventions of UNESCO and other development-focusedagencies during the initiation phase of WSIS, when theysought to dilute the technocratic emphasis they felt theITU was giving it, and to increase its social and economiccontent.

The WSIS outcome documents convey no sense that therole of ICTs in development is or has been any way contested.The Tunis Commitment, for example, refers to “a uniqueopportunity to raise awareness of the benefits that Infor-mation and Communication Technologies (ICTs) can bringto humanity and the manner in which they can transformpeople’s activities, interaction and lives, and thus increaseconfidence in the future.”12 In fact, however, the view thatICTs have a major part to play in development in general isneither old nor uncontested. This needs some context.

It is, first, relatively new. The much-cited Maitland Com-mission, which called for action to increase teledensity indeveloping countries in the mid-1980s, had little discern-able impact on international development thinking. Inter-national financial institutions (IFIs) withdrew from lend-ing for telecommunications infrastructure in the early1990s because they felt this could and should be fundedby the private sector. Until at least the mid-1990s, the con-sensus in development agencies was that ICTs, includingtelephony but perhaps excluding broadcast radio, wereluxuries of benefit to the wealthy and irrelevant to povertyreduction. This view only began to change in the late 1990s,notably around the time of the first Global Knowledge Con-ference in 1997. The idea that ICTs are powerful instru-ments of development is therefore recent.

Nor is it universally held. ICTs do not feature prominentlyin the key instruments of international development policy– the Monterrey Consensus, the Millennium Development

12 Tunis Commitment, article 5.



Goals (MDGs) and the Poverty Reduction Strategies (PRS)and other agreements reached between national govern-ments and donors. The MDGs focus on the reduction ofincome and non-income poverty, and set targets for im-provements in basic indicators of the quality of life (suchas health, education and gender equity) rather than theuse of particular assets (such as bicycles, radios orphones). Only MDG target 18 mentions ICTs, and does soin the context of a goal that gathers up a few other issuesrather than giving them priority.13 Neither the reports ofthe Millennium Project orchestrated by the UN nor theHuman Development Report published by the UNDP in2005 to review progress on the MDGs pays much atten-tion to ICTs; the latter almost none. PRS documents devel-oped by the governments of developing countries, in as-sociation with the World Bank and donor countries, alsopay little attention to them. As noted in Chapter 4, therewas little interaction between WSIS and the MillenniumReview Summit, also held in 2005, and WSIS’ debates andoutcomes had little impact on its conclusions.

This dichotomy reflects what is increasingly being seen asa significant paradigm gap between ICT/ICD advocates,on the one hand, and many mainstream development spe-cialists, on the other. Its roots lie in the fact that few main-stream development specialists have much experience ofthe potential and limitations of ICTs, and remain scepticalabout their viability within their spheres of action, certainlyin achieving the very substantial gains put forward by ad-vocates of new technology; while ICT specialists in gen-eral have limited understanding of poverty issues or theconstraints posed by limited human resources, intermit-tent electric power and conservative behaviour patternsin limiting the impact new technologies have on social andeconomic life. The former suspect what they regard as tech-nological determinism in the latter – the idea that tech-nologies necessarily imply progress and that, because atechnology can do something, it necessarily will. The lat-ter suspect the former of conservatism, in particular ofunwillingness to try new methods of doing things in theface of intractable problems. Most donors have respondedto this paradigm gap by mainstreaming ICTs, in effect sup-porting ICT use in development programmes only where itcontributes to established mainstream objectives (suchas the MDGs and the national development planning goalsset out in PRS).

Little of this paradigm gap is evident in the WSIS outcomedocuments. The Geneva Declaration does acknowledgethat ICTs should not be considered panaceas: “We areaware that ICTs should be regarded as tools and not as anend in themselves,” it says, adding that:

Under favourable conditions [emphasis added], thesetechnologies can be a powerful instrument, increas-ing productivity, generating economic growth, job crea-tion and employability and improving the quality oflife of all. They can also promote dialogue among peo-ple, nations and civilizations.14

However, the surrounding text reflects the conviction ofadvocates rather than the concerns of sceptics. Of course,WSIS did not set out to address this paradigm gap. It wasinitially convened, and then overwhelmingly attended, bythose already convinced of the merits of ICTs in develop-ment. Although they had different approaches to theirdevelopmental role (and to the importance of technologyper se), the different agencies contesting oversight of WSIS– the ITU, UNESCO, etc. – all did so from a pro-ICD per-spective. The overall ethos of WSIS from the start was onethat advocated ICD, which placed it firmly on one side ofthe gap and, some mainstream development sector inter-viewees suggested, undermined interest in it as an eventthat might also attract the interest of sceptics.

Some interviewees for this study whose experiencecrosses the boundaries between ICD and mainstream de-velopment – including people based in both ICD and main-stream agencies - feel that a major opportunity was losthere. They suggest, in effect, that by treating WSIS as anopportunity to assert that ICTs were the future for devel-opment, ICD advocates missed the opportunity to put theircase for this to mainstream development agencies; andalso missed the opportunity to learn sufficient about main-stream development concerns to make their own assess-ments more focused on these priorities. A world summiton the information society, their argument runs, shouldhave been an opportunity for different perceptions of therole of ICTs in development to be discussed in depth, andfor a closer common understanding of them to be reached.The fact that WSIS’ outcomes were largely ignored in theMillennium Review shows that it did little or nothing toenhance that common understanding. The lack of anymarked new enthusiasm for ICTs in development in multi-lateral and bilateral agencies since WSIS or for participa-tion in WSIS follow-up – and the reduction in interest ap-parent in some bilateral agencies – adds to this sense ofopportunity lost. If accurate, this is obviously a serious fail-ing in WSIS as an instrument of international policy, par-ticularly if, as discussed below, reduction of interest on thepart of donors was accompanied by greater awareness/in-terest on the part of developing country governments.

It is worth looking at this question from two particularangles: that of participation in the WSIS events, and thatof the Geneva and Tunis outcome documents.

13 Target 18 commits governments, “in cooperation with the privatesector, [to] make available the benefits of new technologies -especially information and communications technologies.” Seewww.un.org/millenniumgoals/#. 14 Geneva Declaration of Principles, article 9.

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Participation in WSIS varied, but focused strongly on thosewith a strong ICT background. This was particularly true inthe preparatory committees, while there was more diver-sity of participation (or at least attendance) in the plenarysummit sessions:

• Inter-governmental agencies within the UN family par-ticipated, more or less in accordance with the extentof their engagement in ICD: UNESCO, the UNDP, theWorld Bank and its associated infoDev having a largerpresence, but agencies such as the FAO and the WHOalso showing their ICD wares in exhibition spaces. En-thusiasm for participation varied here: many of thoseinterviewed within these agencies felt that it was nec-essary for them to be present, but that the primaryvalue from being there would be derived from network-ing rather than the conclusions of the summit itself.

• Industrial country delegations were led, mostly, by dip-lomats and by commercial and industrial departmentsof government responsible for the ICT sector. Repre-sentatives from donor agencies within these govern-ments tended to play a subordinate role, often (theyfelt) very subordinate – their prime objective being notto promote ICTs in development but to prevent com-mitments being made which went beyond their ownassessments of them. They were less visible duringthe second phase of WSIS than the first, at least afterits second PrepCom had effectively resolved the issueof infrastructure finance. Discussion with such donoragency representatives suggests that they were, onthe whole, less convinced of WSIS’ merits than theircolleagues from multilateral agencies.

• Developing country delegations were also generallyled by diplomats and by representatives of the tel-ecommunications establishment (ministries of com-munications, communications regulators, fixed net-work operators). With some exceptions, few govern-ments included mainstream development ministriesin their delegations. However, enthusiasm for WSISand for its role in promoting ICTs in development wasmuch stronger among these delegates than their peersfrom industrial countries. Their participation is ex-plored further in Chapter 6.

• Private sector engagement was primarily directedthrough the Coordinating Committee of Business In-terlocutors (CCBI), which brought together interna-tional business representative bodies under the lead-ership of the International Chamber of Commerce.Participation in private sector engagement with WSISfocused on businesses with particular interests in thesupply of ICTs (such as equipment manufacturers)rather than its users (such as the financial servicessector). ICT businesses also took the opportunity ofthe summit exhibition spaces to market their goodsand services. More comment on private sector engage-ment can be found in Chapter 7.

• Civil society participation also focused on agencieswith a particular interest in ICTs – whether from a rightsor an ICD perspective. Mainstream development NGOs– which are often particularly sceptical about the valueof ICTs for meeting grassroots needs - were mostlyabsent, and did not contribute to civil society inputinto WSIS. Mainstream rights CSOs were also not par-ticularly active. Civil society participation is the primaryfocus of Chapter 7.

In summary, the record of participation – as seen in list ofparticipants to PrepComs and summit meetings them-selves and as discussed with participants from allstakeholder groups – tends to confirm the view that WSISwas more a meeting of ICT specialists than a meeting ofminds between such specialists and the wider develop-ment community.

That view also tends to be confirmed by a review of theGeneva and Tunis outcome documents. Both of these, asnoted above, strongly endorse the role of ICTs in futuredevelopment. A key section of the Geneva Plan of Actionlists a number of application areas in which ICTs are ex-pected to play such a critical role, prefacing each with theletter “e” (which, incidentally, is significantly disliked –perhaps seen as appropriation - in mainstream develop-ment communities): “e-government”, “e-business”, “e-learning”, “e-health”, “e-employment”, “e-environment”,“e-agriculture”, “e-science”.15 The detail, however, that ac-companies these is poorly structured and has clearly beenagreed by negotiation rather than analysis, derived fromsubmissions by ICT rather than sectoral specialists. Thaton “e-agriculture” illustrates the point - here it is in full:

a. Ensure the systematic dissemination of informationusing ICTs on agriculture, animal husbandry, fisheries,forestry and food, in order to provide ready access tocomprehensive, up-to-date and detailed knowledgeand information, particularly in rural areas.

b. Public-private partnerships should seek to maximizethe use of ICTs as an instrument to improve produc-tion (quantity and quality).16

Much of the text is also written from a supply- or technol-ogy-led perspective, starting from what ICTs can do ratherthan from the development challenges (poverty, illiteracy,HIV/AIDS, lack of clean water, etc.) that are central to theMDGs and therefore all mainstream development activity.

Almost all those with a development background who wereinterviewed for this project felt that these texts were a poorreflection of the substantial thought which has gone intodefining the information society and its relation to devel-opment over the past decade, including the four years ofWSIS itself. Organisations as varied as the World Bank,

15 Geneva Plan of Action, section C7, articles 14-22.




the Canadian International Development Research Centre,the Global Knowledge Partnership and a variety of non-governmental organisations have generated far more so-phisticated and coherent analyses of the potential of ICTs,the “knowledge society” and related concepts than any-thing in the WSIS outcome documents.17 The latter, bycomparison, provide a poorly argued case; one that is onlyweakly rooted in the overarching development and pov-erty challenges, and which, today, many already think hasan outdated feel. There is a strong sense of disappoint-ment amongst development-oriented interviewees for thisstudy that the outcome of a global summit on these is-sues should be so much less substantial, developmentalor forward-looking than work which, it is felt, could haveinformed it much more effectively.

This WSIS text in fact betrays its origins. To populate theWSIS draft documents, the ITU asked governments, otherstakeholders and regional preparatory conferences for twokinds of input: for their views on issues for inclusion, andfor examples of success stories within their own territo-ries. The former found their way into the draft outcomedocuments, the latter into a “WSIS stocktaking” exercise.The quality and nature of input from regional meetings wasalso variable. Perhaps this approach stemmed from theperception that WSIS was about an opportunity rather thana problem. It failed, however, to raise questions and chal-lenges about the role of ICTs in development, or to encour-age debate about their potential and limitations, eitherwithin contributing governments/countries/organisationsor within the WSIS process.

How do participants feel that WSIS has affected percep-tions of ICT and development issues among the differentstakeholders? Opinion varies. As might be expected fromthe above analysis, while some delegates were support-ive of the advocacy approach to ICD within WSIS, otherswere concerned that it lacked depth and discouraged en-gagement with other, less committed stakeholder groups.Certainly, few felt that WSIS did anything to foster innova-tive thinking about ICTs in development. While innovativethinking was going on while WSIS took place – indeed,the four years concerned saw a burgeoning literature ofincreasing diversity and quality, much of it available in thesummit exhibition areas and/or presented in the informaldiscussion sessions surrounding the summit – hardly anyof this trickled through to PrepComs or to plenaries. TheWSIS outcome documents are not being displayed by ICDproponents as authoritative statements of the role of ICTsin development because they do not have sufficient cred-ibility to play this role, either within or outside the ICDcommunity.

There is, however, general agreement among interview-ees that WSIS did foster much greater awareness of thepotential of new technologies, particularly within devel-oping countries (or at least amongst ICT-related decision-makers). This, they feel, was not a result of the WSIS textsor the negotiating process around them, but of the oppor-tunity WSIS presented for people to meet, network andshare experience. For some, this value came from pro-longed engagement with particular issues during thePrepCom process. (Some civil society organisations, forexample, report increased interest in their ICD activitiesand advice from developing country governments.) Formore, particularly in civil society, it focused on the infor-mal summit that surrounded each of the two plenary ses-sions – the combination of exhibition space, including agreat deal of space devoted to development agency expe-rience (especially in Geneva), and a wide range of paneldiscussions and presentations, the quality and sophisti-cation of which greatly exceeded those in the summit’sformal space. Some delegates, as well as observers, alsoindulged extensively in the opportunities afforded by theinformal summit. While most participants would thereforehave gained little knowledge from the formal sessions,many gained a good deal from the informal summit, andreported that this would influence them in ongoing debateand policy development at home. They felt the same wouldbe true of colleagues.

It will be interesting to see how this increased level ofawareness might be built on in the future. On the whole,WSIS received scant attention in the media anywhere.Press interest in the first summit was limited, and journal-ists were more attentive there to press conferences byheads of state that promised news about issues other thanthe summit itself. In the second phase, press interest wasalmost entirely confined to Internet governance (very of-ten poorly understood, and sometimes along apocalypticlines (such as “24 hours to save the Internet”)). ICTs anddevelopment did not feature in the media, which did nottherefore generally provide a means for the awareness-raising experienced by delegates to trickle down to gen-eral populations (or indeed to many in the wider develop-ment community).

A separate impact may be seen in the decision-makingprocesses of developing countries themselves. Most in-terviewees agreed that the whole WSIS experience didraise awareness of ICTs within developing country gov-ernments. Many of those that had not participated in DOTForce-era enthusiasm for ICT/ICD caught a whiff of thatera’s sense of excitement about their potential. Many ofthose who had participated in it had their enthusiasm re-inforced by the pro-ICT/ICD ethos of WSIS. Although thequality and scope of their efforts varied, some develop-ing country governments did try to institute new multi-stakeholder fora or spaces in which the wider communitycould contribute to WSIS policymaking. This question is

17 The extensive literature on ICD issues can be accessed through suchportals as the Development Gateway (www.developmentgateway.org)and the Communication Initiative (www.comminit.com).

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discussed further in Chapter 6, which illustrates somecountry experiences from case studies undertaken for thisstudy, but it is worth noting now that increased interestand enthusiasm in developing countries may not bematched in multilateral and bilateral donors.

Some of the most intriguing, but as yet uncertain, impactsof WSIS may be on the inter-governmental agencies anddonor governments participating in the summit. Althoughdevelopment agencies had paid little attention to infor-mation and communication technologies for developmentin the early 1990s, by the time WSIS began the topic wasboth familiar and fashionable. The World Bank, UNESCOand other international agencies had developed substan-tial policies on ICD, while other specialist agencies werealso looking seriously at its relevance to their work. Manybilateral donors had initiated ICT/ICD programmes of theirown, from USAID’s Leland Initiative to DFID’s “BuildingDigital Opportunities” and the Acacia Programme of Cana-da’s International Development Research Centre (IDRC).

Some of these agencies had been involved in the G8 DOTForce and all played some part, in some cases reluctantly,in the subsequent UN ICT Task Force. None, however, ac-cording to interviewees, was likely to increase its activityin ICD as a specific result of WSIS taking place. WSIS wasnever really intended to raise their awareness but that ofothers, though it might have been expected to increasecoordination of agency activities (in line with general de-velopment policy thinking on the need for greater aid har-monisation).

Interviewees from such agencies were divided about theimpact which it has had on their agencies’ engagementwith the issues. Some felt that WSIS enhanced their abil-ity to engage with partners and perhaps raised conscious-ness of their work amongst their colleagues. Others con-sidered it a diversion from what might have been moreproductive ICD initiatives and suggested that it may evenhave reduced subsequent interest among their colleagues:“now that the summit is over”, said one, “they think theissue has been dealt with and that we should move on toother things.” This post-WSIS effect may be of particularinterest where bilateral donors are concerned. These typi-cally have very few staff engaged on ICT/ICD work. By thestart, let alone the end, of the Tunis phase, they were ex-hibiting “WSIS fatigue”. They were among those mostsceptical of the value of a second phase and most con-cerned at it diverting attention away from specific initia-tives being undertaken by their agencies.

In practice, since the end of WSIS, interviewees suggestthere has if anything been a falling away of interest in ICTsfrom bilateral, and perhaps also multilateral, agencies.Certainly, there have been few major new ICD initiativeslaunched since WSIS - the Africa infrastructure initiativedescribed in the following section being one exception.Fewer bilateral and multilateral agencies attended the ITU’s

2006 World Telecommunication Development Conferencethan did that in 2002 - only the World Bank and UNESCOparticipated from the UN family in 2006, for example, whilethe UN ICT Task Force and the FAO were also present fouryears earlier.18 Participation in the first meetings of WSISfollow-up action lines (discussed in Chapter 8) has beenpatchy, at best. Some bilateral agencies, notably DFID (UK),have downgraded the status of ICT/ICD work while few –the Swiss Development Corporation (SDC) is one example– have raised its status. Bilateral agencies are more firmlymainstreaming ICD activity, and some (notably DFID, whichhas established a substantial Government and Transpar-ency Fund including media support)19 seem to be payingmore attention now to more traditional information andcommunication roles in development (for example, to themedia) than to technology.

All of which looks, from WSIS’ point of view, rather coun-terproductive: the summit was meant to increase fundingand resources to ICD, not to diminish them. It is too earlyyet to reach any firm conclusions on this, but some inter-viewees suggest that it may well be that WSIS (perhapseven its first phase) represents the highpoint of develop-ment agencies’ interest in ICTs, rather than the start ofsomething big. Senior decision-makers in many bilateralagencies seem to be less convinced than they were in 2001of the potential of ICTs to achieve major impacts on theMDGs, at least in the short term, and to be more fearful ofdiverting resources from more tried and trusted ap-proaches at this stage. However, as previous paragraphssuggest, this trend may coincide with a contrary increaseof interest in ICTs within developing country governments,which may look more often to multilateral agencies forsupport where it is concerned. Time will tell how this turnsout - though the WSIS follow-up process as it stands lookspoorly equipped to monitor and evaluate on our behalf.

Infrastructure financeand Internet governance

Two issues were left unresolved by the Geneva phase ofWSIS, passed to interim fora (the Task Force on FinancialMechanisms and the Working Group on Internet Govern-ance), and these accounted for the majority of work un-dertaken during the second phase.

The two interim fora were crucially important to the wayin which WSIS dealt with these unresolved issues. Muchhas been made of their difference in form and style, par-ticularly the way in which they organised discussion of theirissues and the way in which they handled multistakeholder

18 See participation lists at www.itu.int/ITU-D/conferences/wtdc/2002/and www.itu.int/ITU-D/wtdc06/index.html.

19 See DFID White Paper, Making Governance Work for the Poor, 2006,available from: www.dfid.gov.uk/wp2006/default.asp.



participation. A word on this here will help to clarify someof the points made below and in Chapters 6 and 7.

The Task Force on Financial Mechanisms followed a con-ventional format for United Nations agencies in address-ing the issues before it. In the case of the TFFM, the UNDevelopment Programme led the task force process, inassociation with the World Bank and UNDESA (the UNDepartment of Economic and Social Affairs). Selected,regionally-balanced, representatives from key institu-tions concerned with infrastructure finance - includinggovernments, UN and other inter-governmental organi-sations, and the private sector - acted as members of theTask Force. These members were not engaged actively inresearch and analysis. Consultants were hired to do thisand to report to the Task Force, which then discussed theirconclusions from an essentially political perspective.Consultation with the private sector and civil society waslimited. The Task Force report was presented to the sec-ond PrepCom of WSIS’ second phase, where it was largelyagreed without dissent. None of this received much pub-lic attention.

The Working Group on Internet Governance, by contrast,was considerably more innovative in its structure and modusoperandi. Participants - much more diverse, including sig-nificant numbers from the private sector, civil society andthe Internet community - were selected through a processof mediated consultation managed by the UN and its ap-pointed agents (the Working Group chair and secretariat),with a view to inclusiveness. Working Group members acted(or at least were asked to act, and mostly did) as individu-als, not representatives of their institutions. They did theGroup’s work themselves, rather than hiring consultants;held open sessions to include the views of a wide range ofother stakeholders; and debated their way to a consensuson the various points within their remit (or, in one case, to aset of options). Their report was received with much lessconsensus but formed a vital part of ongoing argumentabout Internet governance when the issue reverted to WSISPrepComs. Their issue received more public attention thananything else in the whole Summit process.

Both fora were faced with the same problem: the under-representation of key stakeholders during negotiations ontheir issues during the first WSIS phase. In both cases, thecritical issue here was not what is normally understood bymultistakeholder participation - i.e. the involvement of theprivate sector and civil society, though these were (of course)excluded from formal negotiations in the WSIS process -but the absence of more specific groups whose expertisewas vital and whose interests were directly concerned. Inthe case of the TFFM, this was the donor community (main-stream development agencies and bilateral national donors)responsible for the allocation of development funding. Inthat of the WGIG, it was the Internet community, those re-sponsible for the provision and delivery of Internet services

and, indeed, for Internet governance itself. In both cases,the inclusion of expertise and knowledge from thesegroups was crucial to the outcome of WSIS negotiationson the issues. These representational questions are dis-cussed in Chapter 7.

Both fora were also crucial to the degree of success thatcould be attributed to WSIS. The first summit almost brokedown entirely on the question of infrastructure finance.Without a new forum to discuss this, there would havebeen no outcome document for heads of state to sign inGeneva. Internet governance was also a significant areaof dispute in Geneva, but it was not until the Tunis phasethat it reached the same degree of crisis as infrastructurefinance had caused before. Without a resolution of theseissues, WSIS today would be seen as a failure. The twoprocesses, and the issues associated with them, are con-sidered in turn below.

Infrastructure finance

The centrepiece of the problem posed to the Task Forceon Financial Mechanisms was the proposal for a DigitalSolidarity Fund made by President Wade of Senegal dur-ing the first WSIS phase and backed by a substantialnumber of other developing countries. This proposal, ifagreed, would have established a new, probably UN-led,fund specifically concerned with financing ICT infrastruc-ture and applications. It was opposed by donor countriesduring the first WSIS phase because they argued that itwould divert funds from other established priorities (suchas the MDGs), would be inconsistent with mainstream-ing, and was in any case not needed since existing financ-ing mechanisms were underused. The tussle between ad-vocates and opponents of the Digital Solidarity Fund al-most prevented the first summit from reaching agree-ment: only tough last-minute diplomacy by the SwissPrepCom president forced through the compromise of re-ferring the issue to an interim Task Force.

The Task Force on Financial Mechanisms has been quitewidely disparaged, not least by some civil society organi-sations because of the narrow limits of multistakeholderparticipation they experienced. In addition, it has beenquite widely suggested that the Task Force’s report hadnothing really new to say and that it had no real impacton the outcomes of WSIS. This criticism tends to come,however, from ICT/ICD-focused CSOs rather than frommainstream development agencies - which have been sig-nificantly absent from this debate. Discussions with thosewho are most closely involved in international ICT/ICDissues suggest that it is, however, a rather shallow as-sessment. The TFFM, they suggest, was presented withquite a complex problem, which underlay the remit it washanded. It is worth setting this problem out in some de-tail before looking further at the role of the TFFM and itsimplications.

5 5

International agencies and governments are alike commit-ted to a series of international instruments which providea framework for the allocation of development funds (fromboth multilateral agencies and bilateral donors). The mostimportant of these are:

1. The Monterrey Consensus (the outcome of the 2002United Nations International Conference on Financingfor Development), which determines the overall frame-work for development aid finance.

2. The Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness and its pred-ecessor documents, which establish principles for thedetermination of development spending, includingnational ownership of development strategies and in-ter-agency harmonisation amongst donors.

3. The Millennium Development Goals, which establishpriority targets - focused on poverty reduction - for theperiod up to 2015.

4. Poverty Reduction Strategies, i.e. national develop-ment plans formulated - at least in theory - throughconsultative processes, which provide the basis forHighly Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC) debt relief, forWorld Bank financing agreements and for much bilat-eral donor support.

None of these international agreements gives priority toICTs or envisages significant development (as opposed toprivate sector) funding for ICT infrastructure.

Orthodox development agency thinking on ICT infrastruc-ture investment since the early 1990s had been that thisshould be left to the private sector. IFI, multilateral donorand bilateral donor investment in this context have there-fore been largely confined to capacity-building: assistinggovernments to create the conditions for foreign direct in-vestment (FDI) by privatising incumbent telecoms monopo-lies, liberalising telecoms markets in general and estab-lishing independent regulatory authorities to promote com-petition. Private sector investment in telecoms infrastruc-ture since the 1990s has been spectacular – one of the mostsubstantial and successful areas of FDI yet experienced.This has in turn achieved very considerable growth in ac-cess to telecommunications. Teledensities (the number oftelephones per 100 citizens) had been stagnant at around0.5% in Least Developed Countries for many years, beforethe influx of FDI associated with liberalisation and the in-troduction of mobile technology boosted them from thelate 1980s. This, again, has led to one of the fastest growthrates recorded for adoption of any technology.

Within the development community, this strategy has beenregarded as successful, enabling available finance to be fo-cused instead on other, more intractable, core infrastructurerequirements such as water, power and transport. Only inthe ICT sector had a perception begun growing, by the timeWSIS began, that private sector investment might be insuffi-cient to meet the future access gap for communications,

particularly if this were interpreted to include higher valueICTs like the Internet (whose effective use is increasinglydependent on broadband infrastructure).

The original Digital Solidarity Fund proposal - to set up anew mechanism explicitly for ICT infrastructure and appli-cations - therefore lay outside both the core agreementson international development and the tenor of orthodoxdevelopment agency thinking. Its achievement would re-quire either reallocation of existing development funds(which would require, in effect, reinterpretation of the ex-isting development agreements) or the allocation of newfunding (which, were it available, donors would prefer tofocus on the established MDGs). As some intervieweesfrom the donor community saw it, the demand for the Dig-ital Solidarity Fund amounted to the demand for ICTs tobe treated as a new MDG – i.e. a new priority for develop-ment action - which would be inconsistent with theMonterrey and MDG agreements. Consenting to it wouldopen up those core agreements to demands from othervested interest groups.

While the DSF was supported by many developing countrydelegations within the WSIS negotiations, donors also notedthat these delegations were mostly led by officials from tel-ecommunications or ICT ministries, who, not surprisingly,supported additional resources for their own areas of re-sponsibility. They were unclear, however, if the DSF proposalalso had support from mainstream development ministriesor ministries of finance, whose priorities for funding lay intheir Poverty Reduction Strategies and other instrumentssetting out national development objectives. They sus-pected that, like themselves, many national developmentleaders would be reluctant to see new resources allocatedto sectors that did not fall within their PRS priorities. Pri-vately, some national development leaders have indicatedthat this was their view, but that expressing solidarity witha developing country proposal for change also played animportant part in determining their position on the DSF.

This series of observations suggests that two potentialcontests over resources were subsumed within the widerDSF debate: one between donors and aid beneficiary coun-tries, which was essentially about the scale of develop-ment resources; and one between ICT advocates/minis-tries and mainstream development managers within bothdonors and developing countries, which was essentiallyabout the desirability of allocating resources to ICTs.

The TFFM’s mandate, here, was crucial. Donor countriesensured that this required it to review the use made ofexisting sources of finance as well as the desirability ofsomething new. As the Geneva Plan of Action put it:

While all existing financial mechanisms should be fullyexploited, a thorough review of their adequacy in meet-ing the challenges of ICT for development should becompleted by the end of December 2004. … Based on



the conclusion of the review, improvements and inno-vations of financing mechanisms will be consideredincluding the effectiveness, the feasibility and the crea-tion of a voluntary Digital Solidarity Fund, as men-tioned in the Declaration of Principles.20

To place the DSF proposal in the context of overall devel-opment finance and existing finance instruments, the TFFMalso needed to bring mainstream development thinkinginto the debate about infrastructure finance, rather thanleaving this to ICT specialists. Its membership structure –drawing on the ranks of development as well as infrastruc-ture expertise – facilitated this. So did its methodology –using a consultancy report which focused on assessmentof existing financial instruments and considered new de-mands in the context of past practice, and which placedICT infrastructure investment itself within the context ofoverall development finance.

It is not surprising, therefore, that the Task Force report isgrounded in more mainstream development thinking thanis the Geneva Plan of Action.21 For this reason, the reporthas been considered conservative by many ICT-orientedobservers, particularly in civil society. Its approach to theDSF itself also put this on the back burner. As described inChapter 3, the Task Force took the view that existing financ-ing instruments were insufficiently used at present and thatthere was scope for making further use of these and foralternative new financing initiatives such as public-privatepartnerships. It did not, therefore, endorse the DSF pro-posal in the form that it had been promoted. Indeed, thereport dismissed the DSF proposal in very few words in-deed, though it did “welcome” an attenuated voluntaryfund.22 Some interviewees, from some developing coun-tries and from ICT-oriented civil society organisations inparticular, see this as a rebuff to a developing country pro-posal from the international development establishment.

Some interviewees from that development establishmentsuggest a different interpretation – that the apparent con-servatism of the Task Force report masks the starting pointfor a significant rethinking of the role of development fi-nance in relation to ICT infrastructure. The Task Force re-port, they say, did look seriously at the changing nature ofinfrastructure finance, especially concerning remote andrural areas and concerning higher specification networks,recognising that the world might have reached a point intime where private sector investment had peaked and newtechnologies presented the possibility of much higher lev-els of service becoming available through different typesof infrastructure. They argue that the alternative ap-proaches to infrastructure finance suggested by the report,including widened scope for public investment (whether

from governments or development agencies/IFIs) to sup-plement (but not replace) private sector-led investmentstrategies, mark as significant a change in overall thinkingabout ICT infrastructure finance as the original DSF pro-posal, and one that is more consistent with other develop-ment finance instruments. Joint public/private partnershipinvestment, in particular, is mentioned in this context. Whilecouched in conservative language, in other words, the TaskForce report includes quite a significant movement awayfrom the “private sector only” consensus that had domi-nated thinking on ICT infrastructure since the early 1990s.

One of the surprising features of the second phase of WSISis that the infrastructure finance issue - which had almostprevented agreement in Geneva - barely resurfaced againafter the Task Force report. The advocates of the DigitalSolidarity Fund played virtually no part in the Task Forcefor Financial Mechanisms itself, apparently by choice, andaccepted the almost total marginalisation of the DSF pro-posal in the TFFM report without demur when it was dis-cussed in the second PrepCom of the Tunis phase. A vol-untary DSF was established, but has failed to make a markand is generally considered unlikely to do so in future.Many interviewees considered this vestigial DSF no morethan a face-saving exercise (though one that was indeedeffective at saving face).

Why did the DSF, which had caused such a fuss in Geneva,raise so few hackles barely six months later? One sug-gested explanation is that the rethinking described abovewithin the Task Force report led shortly afterwards to asignificant change in actual practice. Keen to avoid the DSFand to show that alternatives were viable, the World Bankand the European Commission took the opportunity of theAfrica regional meeting for the second phase of WSIS, inAccra in February 2005, to put forward a new infrastruc-ture initiative for Africa: an initiative which they presentedas indicating a new, more active approach to ICT infrastruc-ture finance by development agencies, and which gave theproponents of the DSF sufficient value to call off the huntfor a better Fund within the main negotiations.

This interpretation suggests, in other words, that the in-frastructure finance issue has been more dynamic than thegeneral ICT and development debate described above. Itsuggests that the developing country-led proposal for aDigital Solidarity Fund was effectively bought off by theintroduction of alternatives which were more acceptableto donors (industrial countries) but met enough of the pri-orities of the DSF’s proponents (who also recognised thatthe strength of donor hostility was unlikely to be over-come). Subsequent publications by the World Bank andother international actors have consolidated an apparentshift in emphasis towards more proactive IFI investmentin ICT infrastructure, albeit within the same overall frame-work of private sector leadership and the promotion ofsector restructuring/liberalisation.

20 Geneva Plan of Action, section D2, article 27.f.

21 The report, Financing ICTD, is available from: www.itu.int/wsis/tffm/final-report.pdf.

22 See Financing ICTD, p. 94.

5 7

At the heart of this issue, perhaps, lay a difference of per-ception between developing and donor countries. Devel-oping countries pressed hard for a particular approach tobe agreed during the first phase of WSIS, with strong lead-ership at high level coming from the President of Senegal.Support for this position was widespread within the de-veloping world, coming not just from Africa but also fromcountries such as India. It was also backed by many civilsociety organisations, expressing solidarity with a devel-oping country demand – though it should be borne in mindthat few of the civil society organisations involved in WSISwere development NGOs. Developing country solidaritywas, however, weaker than it might have appeared to be.It was Francophone West African countries in particularthat supported President Wade; privately, delegates fromother parts of Africa expressed some concern about theoriginal DSF proposal, and interviews suggest that theseprivate doubts were shared by more powerful figures innon-ICT ministries. Ultimately, it was the developing coun-try bloc, not donors, that blinked in Geneva and allowedthe Task Force on Financial Mechanisms to be established.

The DSF’s supporters also failed to pursue their proposalvigorously during and after the TFFM, particularly after amore substantive proposal for African infrastructure wasput on the table. The most apparent gain from this issuebecoming so prominent in Geneva was obtained by thoseAfrican developing countries that will benefit from this ini-tiative, and it could be argued, therefore, that their con-certed effort and brinkmanship in the Geneva phase paidoff. Taking this issue to the wire did lead to a reward. TheDSF per se was not essential to its proponents, thoughthe establishment of a voluntary fund helped to save anyface that needed saving.23 What was important was somemoney on the table, and the switch in thinking on the partof donors that accompanied it. Time will tell whether thescope and scale of the African infrastructure initiative willlook substantial enough in years to come.

The switch in donor thinking involved here should not beexaggerated at this stage. Nevertheless, a good many inthe development sector think it was probably overdue.Stimulation of private sector investment proved very suc-cessful in promoting telecommunications access in the1990s, but has left a residual access gap that, it seems,can only be addressed by greater intervention. Interna-tional development agencies continue to take the view thatprivate sector investment, supported by restructuring andliberalisation, will account for most required investment,but not all.24 Private sector investment may also be insuf-ficient to stimulate higher bandwidth access in the future.

The relative priority to be accorded this form of infrastruc-ture remains unclear to most donors (and, if PRS processesare to be believed, to their development partners). How-ever, the DSF proposal was sufficient to push some into arethinking of their long-term strategy, initially as a way ofavoiding what they saw as a worse outcome (an independ-ent, UN-managed fund), latterly with more conviction. Thiscould be described as a victory, as readily as a defeat, fordeveloping country solidarity. Its implications are dis-cussed in Chapter 6.

Internet governance

When WSIS was first proposed, no-one expected Internetgovernance to be one of its priorities. In fact, there wasalmost no discussion of Internet governance in the firstphase preparatory process until the Western Asia (MiddleEast) regional meeting - the last to be held - in February2003. Yet, from that point on, issues to do with Internetgovernance became hugely important and highly divisive.Internet governance was one of two issues which almostcollapsed the first summit session. It predominated in thesecond phase so much that some have described Tunis asa world summit on Internet governance rather than on theinformation society.

Why did Internet governance become so important to theWSIS process? A number of suggestions were made aboutthis by interviewees:

Firstly, some suggest, it was an issue waiting in the wingsfor the right occasion to come along. Almost uniquely inhuman history, the Internet has become very importantwith very little government involvement. It was other stake-holders – at first individuals (computer experts, many withanti-authoritarian instincts) and cooperative fora that theyestablished (such as the Internet Engineering Task Force)– later joined by private sector actors, that took andmoulded the shape of the Internet (in spite of its origins inthe US military). The result was a global phenomenonlargely outside the control of governments or the remit ofinter-governmental organisations. However practical thismay have been in its own terms, it was a vacuum that theinstitutions of international governance were unlikely toleave alone for ever. Many governments wanted to takecharge of something that could undermine their own au-thority. Some felt it inherently wrong that any major socialforce should be so far outwith government control. In thissense, the Internet governance issue might be seen as oneof the authority of governments vis-à-vis their citizens.

Secondly, where governments were engaged, they werenot equitably so. Of course, inequity in government own-ership and engagement in international issues is nothingunusual in itself. In this case, however, the apparent ineq-uity was particularly marked, with the US government atleast appearing to have great potential powers over both

23 The DSF’s limited activity to date can be found at www.dsf-fsn.org/cms/content/view/43/77/lang,en.

24 The GSM Association has suggested that private investment willdeliver access to 95% of the world’s population – see its reportUniversal Access at www.gsmworld.com/universalaccess/index.shtml.



domains and root servers, control over which, if exercised,would impact strongly on national sovereignty. The extentto which such powers had been exercised was minimal andthe extent to which they could be exercised in practice wasuncertain, but the issue had obvious symbolic importance– not least as a symbol of American hegemony in a mono-polar world, and thereby also of the international balanceof power between industrial and developing countries. Thisdimension of the question might be seen as one of theauthority of governments versus other governments, par-ticularly less powerful versus more powerful governments.

Thirdly, a good many interviewees believe, rightly or not,that the dispute over Internet governance was driven byambitions within the ITU – not necessarily the ITU as awhole, but some officials and some member-states – forthe ITU to assume the role of overseer of the Internet. Inthis context, the question of Internet governance can beseen as part of the long process of restructuring commu-nications, in which the ITU had gradually lost much of itsauthority over telecoms and in which the Internet hademerged outside the control of established institutions andwith new institutions of its own, some of them with quitedifferent (and more multistakeholder) conceptions of au-thority. This aspect might be seen as a contest of older“international system” models of governance versus newer(to some, subversive) models of governance being pilotedby new (and equally, to some, subversive) pioneers –among them, ICANN.

Fourthly, some suggest, the dispute over Internet govern-ance was driven by a further coincidence of circumstances.Internet governance became important within WSIS aroundthe time of the Iraq war.25 Many of those countries that weremost hostile to the US position on Internet governance werealso those most hostile to US involvement in Iraq and USforeign policy in general. Internet governance, to them, mayhave been simply a proxy for a different foreign policy argu-ment: its critics versus the United States.

And finally, some interviewees suggest, more controver-sially, that the very lack of immediate crisis in Internet gov-ernance helped to make it a point of crisis within WSIS.There were issues of controversy in Internet governance,certainly, but there always had been and the system, in theold phrase, wasn’t “broke”. The Internet would continueto evolve without a revolution in its governance. Indeed,many – including most industrial country governments, pri-vate sector organisations and Internet pioneers – believethat the Internet’s dynamic growth has only been possiblebecause of the low level of government involvement therehas been. An argument about Internet governance wouldnot stop this dynamic growth. The price of arguing was

therefore low – lower than it might have been on other is-sues – and posed less risk to those engaged upon it (thoughthe impact of changes that might result could be profound).

As with infrastructure finance, Internet governance was anissue which divided developing from industrial countries.On the whole, industrial countries were satisfied with thelevel of Internet governance currently prevailing at the startof WSIS: they felt that more governance would slow downinnovation and opportunities for investment. Developingcountries in general were less comfortable that an increas-ingly important sector lacked inter-governmental oversightcomparable with the ITU’s historic role in telecommunica-tions and the Universal Postal Union (UPU)’s in postal serv-ices. Both groups of countries, however, had importantfractures within them. Much of Europe was uncomfortablewith what it saw as the United States’ aggressive defenceof its existing “powers” over ICANN and root servers; whiledifferences emerged between the assertiveness of a numberof large developing countries and the bulk of Least Devel-oped Countries on the issue (discussed in Chapter 6).

The private sector broadly shared industrial country gov-ernments’ perceptions of the issue here. Private sectorleadership, it felt, had done well by the Internet. Greatergovernment control, it felt, would stifle the innovationwhich drove it forward. Subjection to an ITU-style stand-ard-setting regime, rather than the fluid modus operandiof the Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF) and similarstructures, it felt, would be particularly damaging. Suspi-cion of ITU encroachment was particularly strong withinthe Internet community. As one interviewee put it, “if theITU had been in charge, we wouldn’t have the Internet to-day.” The consensus business view was set out in an In-ternational Chamber of Commerce issues paper releasedshortly after the Geneva summit:

The pace of change, the fast evolving state of theInternet and the creation of a global information soci-ety heighten the risks associated with premature orunnecessary government regulation.… Business hasa strong market incentive to foster the empowermentof users. But it will only make the necessary invest-ments if it can trust that governments will recognizeand reinforce the leadership of business in respond-ing to the highly dynamic nature of the Internet.26

Civil society’s view was more distinct and more divided.On the one hand, most civil society organisations sympa-thised with developing countries’ demand for more sayvis-à-vis industrial powers. At the same time, they werereluctant to concede more powers over the Internet togovernments of any stamp, fearing that this would lead togreater censorship and political control. As with human

25 The Western Asia (Middle East) regional meeting which initiatedInternet governance as a major issue took place in February 2003,during the international political crisis preceding the March 2003invasion of Iraq.

26 ICC, Issues Paper on Internet Governance, January 2004, p. 10,available from: www.iccwbo.org/home/e_business/policy/ICC%20issues%20paper%20on%20internet%20Governance.pdf.

5 9

rights, therefore, there was some conflict within civil soci-ety between support for a greater voice for developingcountries, on the one hand, and desire for a diminishedrole for governments, on the other. The consensus viewwas summarised in the independent civil society declara-tion issued at the end of the Geneva phase:

… the Internet cannot be governed effectively by any oneorganisation or set of interests. An exclusionary inter-governmental model would be especially ill suited toits unique characteristics; only a truly open, multi-stakeholder, and flexible approach can ensure theInternet’s continued growth and transition into a mul-tilingual medium.27

Like infrastructure finance, Internet governance proved in-tractable towards the end of the Geneva summit phase.Unlike infrastructure finance, it did not fade away duringthe second phase but became, if anything, even more con-tentious. Like infrastructure finance, the Geneva summitreferred this issue to an interim forum. Unlike infrastruc-ture finance, that forum – the Working Group on InternetGovernance – adopted an innovative, multistakeholderformat which probed creatively into the issues that it hadbefore it.

The WGIG had the remit to:

i. develop a working definition of Internet governance;

ii. identify the public policy issues that are relevant toInternet governance;

iii. develop a common understanding of the respectiveroles and responsibilities of governments, existingintergovernmental and international organisations andother forums as well as the private sector and civilsociety from both developing and developed coun-tries;

iv. prepare a report on the results of this activity to bepresented for consideration and appropriate action forthe second phase of WSIS in Tunis in 2005.28

Most interviewees – but with important exceptions – con-sidered the WGIG to have been effective in advancing thedebate on these issues by the time it reported in June 2005.Interviewees in general suggest that it was able to agree aworkable definition of Internet governance, and developa broad consensus on many of the issues before it. Excep-tions to the consensus about this among those interviewedtended to be those critical of the WGIG’s conclusions, inparticular those who wished to promote a more formalmodel of Internet governance than that which was finallysuggested by the Tunis outcome documents.

The methodology the WGIG used, as a working group, wascomparable in many ways to the commissions which in-formed many international policy issues in the 1980s – forexample, the Brandt Commission on international devel-opment, the Palme Commission on common security andthe Brundtland Commission on sustainable development.These commissions brought together a range of peoplewith different backgrounds, different expertise and differ-ent social or political outlooks; treated them as individu-als rather than as representatives of their respective or-ganisations or communities; and addressed a substantiveissue of international concern by achieving consensusamong themselves but not necessarily across the wholespectrum of international opinion (as, for example, a UNsummit must attempt to do). The nearest analogue to theWGIG in recent ICT experience was probably the G8 DOTForce of 2000-2002, composed of individuals from gov-ernment, private sector and civil society in each of the G8countries and eight selected developing countries.

The selection of WGIG personnel is described in Chapter 7.At this point, however, it is worth noting that the selectionprocess was much more inclusive than was normal for UNappointed fora. Private sector and civil society organisa-tions were invited to put forward nominations, and theirnominations were, by and large, approved. This style ofappointment was adopted deliberately by the WorkingGroup’s chair (the experienced former UN Under Secretary-General Nitin Desai, who had been responsible for organ-ising many previous summits) and secretary (the Swissdiplomat Markus Kummer) in response to the specific is-sue. Because of the nature of existing arrangements, theyfelt that Internet governance could not properly be ad-dressed by a standard UN-style task force of representa-tives from government and inter-governmental organisa-tions, which would have lacked both expertise and cred-ibility. The real experts had to be drawn into the debate.

Much the same applied to the WGIG’s working methods.One member described the key moment in determininghow the WGIG worked as being when the chairman toldmembers that they were expected to participate as indi-viduals rather than as representatives of particular organi-sations or vested interests, and specifically that theyshould use the singular personal pronoun (“I” not “we”)when making contributions. The issues facing the WGIGwere highly politicised. Many WGIG members had stronglyheld opinions, and had difficulty in understanding eachothers’ perspectives on the issues. Participants recalledthat requiring them to think as individuals rather than rep-resentatives, and to work together rather than respond-ing to consultants’ views, encouraged members to con-front some of their assumptions and question some of theirdifferences with colleagues. The outcome was not neces-sarily agreement, but did include greater understandingand some displacement of assumption and (in some cases)ignorance by flexibility and knowledge. A conventional

27 Shaping Information Societies for Human Needs, p.22, available from:www.itu.int/wsis/documents/doc_multi.asp?lang=en?&id=1179|1208.




UN-style task force, interviewed participants agreed, wasmore likely to have remained confrontational, and wouldhave been less likely to achieve (at least as substantive) aconsensus report.

Holding open sessions at which all-comers could contrib-ute to the WGIG’s deliberations was also innovative andconstructive. As discussed in Chapter 7, this enabled im-portant actors who had little other route into WSIS to par-ticipate in discussions of considerable importance to them.The quality of contributions made during open sessionswas generally high, and this increased confidence in theWGIG process among different stakeholder groups, par-ticularly the Internet community. WGIG members paid at-tention during open sessions and report making signifi-cant use of the evidence put forward in their closed dis-cussion and drafting sessions.

The WGIG was able, in this way, to produce something thatcould be described by its participants as a multistake-holder consensus. Though WGIG members participated asindividuals, they cohered sufficiently for the WGIG reportto have something in it for most and to be something whichthey felt they could promote when Internet governanceissues returned to the main WSIS PrepCom process. Bybuilding a common understanding within a group that com-prised the different perspectives on the issues, the WGIGset a perimeter around the debate that followed and helped

to focus discussion during the tense and difficult final ne-gotiating stages. While the report did not provide the for-mal framework for these negotiations, it could not be ig-nored and certainly influenced WSIS’ final outcome on thesubject. Whether this provides a model for other themes ofinternational discourse is discussed in Chapter 7.

The final negotiating stages on Internet governance were,nevertheless, as divisive as those of the first summitphase. They saw the opening of what was generally inter-preted as a split between the United States and EuropeanUnion; and saw a gap, discussed in Chapter 6, developbetween the positions of larger and more powerful devel-oping countries, on the one hand, and Least DevelopedCountries on the other. The final outcome – described inChapter 3 – could be and was seen as a victory by differ-ent groups of participants with widely different views, andleft much up for grabs in the post-WSIS world. All thoseinterviewed, however, stressed that the ability to achieveagreement of any sort during the final WSIS PrepComs wasgreatly influenced by skilful chairing of the PrepCom sub-committee assigned to this (by the Pakistani diplomatMasood Khan). Individuals, too, often play an importantpart in determining the outcomes of international nego-tiations, and discussions on Internet governance benefitedfrom three particularly skilful performers, without whomany kind of consensus might have been much more diffi-cult to achieve. �

6 1

WSIS and developing countriesc h a p t e r 6

29 Data from World Bank, web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/DATASTATISTICS/0,,contentMDK:20535285~menuPK:1390200~pagePK:64133150~piPK:64133175~theSitePK:239419,00.html.

International relations are built around power. Large coun-tries with powerful economies and military might have moreinfluence on what happens in the world than microstates orthe impoverished. Size matters; money talks.

Most inter-governmental organisations, by contrast - andUN summits - are structured around equality of sovereignstates. China, with 1,300,000,000 people, has one vote,the same as Kiribati (population around 90,000); theUnited States (GDP = USD 12,455 billion) the same asLesotho (GDP = USD 1.5 billion).29

In practice, the pressures and processes of inter-govern-mental organisations exercise some mitigating effect onthe exercise of military and financial power; but the politi-cal realities of population size and economic wealth, ofaccess to and control of scarce resources, of strategic andmilitary power, etc. predominate. Negotiating processessuch as those at international summits reflect and refinethe balances of power and authority between individualcountries whose status within them is made up of manydifferent factors - hard facts such as those already de-scribed, but also “softer” factors such as established inter-national partnerships, cultural and historic ties, the person-alities and authority of governments and individual person-alities, the quality of expertise and other input into the ne-gotiating processes concerned. Hard facts of size, wealth,resources etc. might be described as determining the “natu-ral” weight of a country in this context, but it can punchwell above or below this weight – have a louder or a softervoice - according to the impact of these softer factors.

The “Louder Voices” report, published in 2002, reviewedthe extent of developing country participation in interna-tional ICT decision-making bodies, and in particular the con-straints facing developing countries in respect of their par-ticipation. The report is briefly summarised in Chapter 2.Its insights formed one of the primary impulses behindthe present study, which has been concerned to seewhether the WSIS summit format enabled developingcountries to have more substantial impact – a louder voice -and whether WSIS may have lasting implications for devel-oping country participation in other ICT fora in the future.This chapter focuses on these particular issues, and bothbegins and ends with a specific look at the conclusions of

the “Louder Voices” report. These are quoted at somelength in Chapter 2 but, for convenience, are summarisedagain more briefly here:

1. Most developing countries are members of es-tablished international organisations with ICT re-sponsibilities, such as the ITU and WTO, and areusually represented at their meetings. However,there is not as yet an effective connection be-tween the agendas of these organisations, theirdecisions, and the international developmentgoals set out in the UN Millennium Declaration.[This point is considered in Chapter 5 above.]

2. Effective participation in decision-making is notlimited to what happens before and duringmeetings. It requires sustained engagementwith issues over an extended period of time,backed up by substantial technical, policymak-ing and negotiating capacity.

3. Action to strengthen the ICT policy capacity ofdeveloping countries must include action tolevel the policy playing field so as to ensure thatthe needs of developing countries are on theagenda of international ICT fora and that theyare included in decision-making processes.Three critical aspects of this concern:

a. Lack of easy, affordable and timely accessto information about ICT-related issues, de-cision-making fora and processes

b. Logistical problems, including the frequencyand location of international meetings andrestrictions on participation (for example, byprivate sector and civil society experts)

c. Ineffective use of financial resources avail-able to support participation.

4. Weaknesses in national policymaking are, how-ever, even more significant in leading to under-representation and ineffective participation.Three critical aspects of this are:

a. Lack of policy awareness, at all levels of gov-ernment and citizenship, of the potentialrole of ICTs.



As discussed in earlier chapters, summit processes suchas WSIS are different from normal international negotia-tions. They have a more general character than conven-tional decision-making processes, looking at a “big issue”rather than detail – which makes them more accessible tothose that are less fully informed about an issue. They haveless sectoral baggage, in the sense of issues and prec-edents, alliances and animosities, that influence work indecision-making fora such as ITU study groups or WTOcommittees and working groups. They are less rules-bound, which may create more space for creativity in ne-gotiation – though summits, too, have over the years de-veloped standard ways of proceeding, built around pre-paratory committees, regional meetings and the like. Theyare more political – with participation in the final summitevent often being at the level of head of state rather thanhead of mission or head of government department.

Three further differences, interviews suggested, may havethe biggest impact on different ways of behaving:

• Firstly, summits are one-off events rather than ongo-ing negotiations. They do not need to look back to whathas gone before or forward to what comes after in thesame way as continuous negotiating fora like those inthe ITU or WTO.

• Secondly, they do not have to reach firm conclusionsthat bind governments’ future behaviour. The outcomedocuments of summit meetings are often aspirational,urging courses of action rather than requiring them.Outcomes do not necessarily stick, as those who wel-comed the Kyoto Protocol on climate change havelearnt to their regret.

• Thirdly, however, as summits are global meetings rep-resenting the entire United Nations family, their del-egations feel obliged, at least, to reach consensus. Dia-logues in most international fora can be resolved, if itcomes to it, by votes. In summits, consensus is gener-ally expected, if not necessarily required. Outcomedocuments should be signed by every government, notjust by a majority – which means that, while summitsmay force recalcitrant governments to agree to some-thing that they would not otherwise have been pre-pared to sign (as at Kyoto?), they are just as likely tostick to the lowest common denominator of agreement.

This suggests, prima facie, that the disadvantages whichdeveloping countries face in international decision-mak-ing fora, as described in “Louder Voices”, may be less acutein summits. Summit work is less technical, and less tech-nical expertise is therefore required. Summit activity is fo-cused on fewer specific meetings, and there is much lessneed to cover simultaneous subsidiary meetings than inconventional decision-making fora – which makes lifeeasier for smaller delegations. The pressure on develop-ing countries to make concessions is weaker because “de-cisions” made by summits are less “decisive” than thosemade by (for example) ITU Radiocommunications Confer-ences (i.e. they have less immediate or certain impact onimportant stakeholders). Though votes are rarely taken,the principle behind “one nation: one vote” is much clearerat summits than it is elsewhere; and solidarity betweenblocs of countries may be easier to achieve.

The need for consensus may also give countries which arenormally weak in international governance more influencethan they might otherwise wield. A number of representa-tives of major countries in WSIS commented in interviewsthat their main objective at the summit was to prevent de-cisions they considered inappropriate from being takenrather than to secure positive objectives of their own –suggesting that the pressure to conform may be some-what reversed in summits, acting more upon the minorityindustrial countries than the (politically and economically)weaker developing countries taking part. The shift awayfrom the established relationships of conventional inter-national negotiations, the different power structure andthe higher degree of politicisation within them may makesummits particularly susceptible to “policy trading”, i.e.to agreements between countries or blocs of countriesthat, for example, country X will support a particular policyline of interest to country Y within the summit in return forcomparable concessions in entirely different negotiationsbeing conducted elsewhere.

On the other hand, the observations above also suggest,prima facie, that the outcomes of summits are likely tohave less immediate impact, and so to be less valuable todeveloping countries than those of more conventionaldecision-making processes. Politicisation also, obviously,

b. Lack of technical and policy capacity on ICTissues, particularly in respect of emergingtechnologies and new policy areas - such asmigration from circuit-switched to IP net-works and indeed Internet issues in general.

c. Weaknesses in national and regional policy-making processes, including:

i. Lack of political leadership

ii. Absence of national ICT strategies

iii. Ineffective coordination between differ-ent government departments and agen-cies with ICT responsibilities

iv. Lack of private sector and civil society par-ticipation in national decision-making

v. Inadequate preparation for internationalmeetings

vi. Ineffective use of financial and human re-sources.

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carries the risk that a summit will reach less optimal posi-tions on the issues with which it is ostensibly most con-cerned than might otherwise occur.

What does the experience of developing countries, as de-veloping country participants described it, have to sug-gest about these various hypotheses? The following sec-tions look at this from two perspectives: participation inthe international summit itself, and participation in na-tional policymaking processes related to the developmentof policies for WSIS. The latter discussion leads forwardto consideration of civil society and wider “multistake-holder” participation in Chapter 7.

Participation in the Summit

Chapter 4 briefly discussed the participation of differentdelegations in WSIS. Participation varied substantiallybetween countries, both in numbers of delegates and inthe composition of delegations.

Some countries paid much more attention to the WSISprocess than did others, both at plenary sessions and,more importantly, during the preparatory committees. Anearlier APC study looked in some detail at African partici-pation in the various meetings associated with the firstphase of the summit.30 This found, for example, that allbut five of fifty-four African countries were representedduring the initial Bamako consultation meeting in May2002, and all but six at the Geneva summit in December2003. Participation in PrepComs varied considerably. A fewAfrican countries – notably Cameroon, Mali, South Africa,Tanzania and Tunisia – were well-represented throughout,but between ten and fifteen African countries chose notto attend each PrepCom. Three African countries had del-egations over sixty strong at the Geneva summit while, asnoted, six were officially unrepresented. Similar variationsin the level and scope of country participation can be foundduring the second phase. Participation lists, illustratingthe numbers taking part from different countries in the twomain summit sessions and in one second phase PrepCom,can be found in Annex 1.

Of course, the size of delegations is no clear proxy for theirdegree of influence, but it probably tends to indicate theextent to which a government was taking WSIS seriouslyand saw it as an opportunity to further its own objectives,to learn from the experience and networking opportunitiesavailable, or to make sure that the “wrong” decisions wereless likely to be reached. In some cases, delegates sug-gested, delegation size and level were due to the personalpriorities of national leaders. President Wade of Senegal,for example, has sought to play a significant leadership role

within Africa so far as WSIS, and ICT/ICD in general, areconcerned. In other countries, political leaders saw muchless gain to be achieved from upgrading their national pro-file at this event.

As well as total numbers, as suggested in earlier chap-ters, the composition of national delegations was particu-larly interesting. The APC study of African participation inthe first summit phase found that, in most African coun-tries, delegations were predominantly made up of twogroups – diplomats, particularly from countries’ missionsin Geneva, who took the lead in actual negotiations dur-ing PrepComs; and representatives of the established tel-ecommunications sector, led by the communications min-istries who were their countries’ primary interfaces withthe ITU, but also including substantial numbers of person-nel from communications regulatory commissions andfrom the former incumbent fixed telecommunications op-erating companies. Participation in delegations from otherstakeholders was sparse. There was little representationfrom mainstream development ministries, for example,which might have contributed more effectively to discus-sion of the role of ICTs in development; little from the pri-vate sector or civil society; little or none from the broad-casting sector, which provides the most widely availableICT services in developing countries; little again from newICT markets such as mobile telephone companies and theInternet community.

Much the same pattern prevailed in the second summitphase. Under-representation of the Internet community innational delegations may have been particularly signifi-cant here given the amount of time that phase spent onInternet governance, and the limited understanding of itshown by many diplomats and conventional telecommu-nications specialists.

Many interviewees remarked that the domination of manydelegations by the national telecommunications establish-ment had an obvious effect on participation in negotiations,and especially on developing country input. Telecoms-leddelegations found it much easier to address telecoms is-sues than they did to focus on development questions.When the latter arose, they were poorly equipped to presentnational development priorities, or to position ICT issuesaccurately within these. Their contributions tended to fo-cus on the potential of technology rather than the problemsrequiring development attention. For many development-focused interviewees, this was an opportunity missed. WSIScould have offered scope for developing countries to chal-lenge the ICT sector to focus on their core developmentobjectives. In practice, it did not.

Women were also poorly represented in national delega-tions. Just 19% of official country delegates in the Tunissummit, on average, were women, the same figure as inGeneva. Industrial country delegations were more likelyto include women than those from developing countries

30 D. Souter, “African participation in WSIS: review and discussionpaper”, APC, 2004, available from: rights.apc.org/training/contents/ictpol_en/ictmodule.2006-05-18.6637944641/ictunit.2006-05-19.5882667093?set_language=en.



(72%, on average, of OECD country delegations were fe-male in Geneva, 73% in Tunis). This gender imbalance isby no means untypical of participation in international ICTdecision-making fora, but is at odds with the principles ofgender equality advanced in summit principles and texts.Participation lists illustrating these figures are included inAnnex 1. A more detailed analysis of gender participation,however, should also explore the relative status of menand women within delegations, which is not readily dis-cernible from the available participation lists.

As well as these general issues of participation, it is worthlooking at the participation of developing countries in thethree other key debates that took place during WSIS: oninformation and communication rights, on infrastructurefinance and on Internet governance. As noted in Chapter5, all three of these saw differences between countrieswhich, while by no means exclusively between industrialand developing countries, had significant overtones withinthem of this development divide.

The question of information and communication rights cutsto the heart of relations between governments and citi-zens. Participatory political structures place high value oninformation and communication rights – on freedoms ofexpression, on individual citizens’ rights to dissent, to or-ganise, to publish what they want. Few countries, how-ever, have fully open political cultures of this kind. Manygovernments see information and communication rightsas potential threats to their authority, particularly if thatgovernmental authority itself is weak or if it is ideologi-cally based on belief in government’s responsibility to rulein the perceived interest of the people rather than at theirbehest. The disjuncture between participatory and authori-tarian approaches to government, and so to informationand communication rights, is closely paralleled in attitudestowards the participation in decision-making of civil soci-ety and the private sector. (It also affected relationsamongst governments, for instance in the underlying ten-sions throughout the process that resulted from some gov-ernments questioning the appropriateness of holdingWSIS 2 in a country that significantly constrained freedomsof information and communication.)

The arguments between governments over informationand communication rights at WSIS should not be carica-tured as being between industrial and developing coun-tries but seen as lying between these different governmentapproaches. However, most of the leading countries whichchallenged information and communication rights andwhich most strongly objected to multistakeholder partici-pation were developing countries, while most of thosewhich championed these were from the North. In truth,interviewees suggest, the majority of governments on bothsides of the development divide were not particularly con-cerned about these issues – but those that were pursuedthem fiercely. (A couple of interviewees suggested that the

government of China argued so vociferously against infor-mation and communication rights during the first phasein order to lay the ground for later arguments about theInternet rather than because this was such a high priorityfor it per se; though clearly issues of information and com-munication rights have a high profile in China today.)

Differences of participation in the debate on infrastruc-ture finance have been considered in Chapter 5. The leadrole in this particular debate came from one country (Sen-egal), supported strongly by its neighbours in West Africa,less strongly by those in the rest of Africa, and less stronglyagain by other developing countries. Financing ICTs andICD was problematic for the countries concerned, espe-cially for LDCs. Those delegations that argued most forci-bly for a Digital Solidarity Fund tended to be countrieswhich had difficulty – mostly because of their developmentstatus – in securing foreign investment for ICT develop-ment. (It should be borne in mind, however, that telecomssector-led delegations may not always have reflected theviews of national governments as a whole on developmentfinance.) With some exceptions (e.g. India), larger andmore influential developing countries which did not havesuch financing problems did not play a prominent part inthe argument. The fact that it disappeared so comprehen-sively from the agenda for the second phase of WSIS afterAfrican LDCs had secured what they considered sufficientgains in February 2005 (see Chapter 5) suggests that thisreflected a division of interest among developing coun-tries as well as a division of opinion between developingand industrial blocs.

Developing country participation in the discussion aboutInternet governance is, perhaps, the most interesting ofthese debates. In this case, it was not LDCs that playedthe most prominent role, but a small group of larger de-veloping countries which adopted positions particularlyhostile to the United States. These countries – notableamong them China, Brazil, Pakistan, South Africa and Iran– share a number of common characteristics. These arerelatively large countries, with markets sufficiently largefor them to have few problems attracting external invest-ment in the ICT sector (and so not concerned to win con-cessions in other areas like financing mechanisms). Theycould support large delegations, including personnel withsubstantial expertise in the areas under discussion. Theyare also active in other international fora, on other issues,asserting their status as major players, sometimes in “like-minded” partnerships, sometimes independently. Thesecharacteristics distinguish them from the majority of de-veloping countries, particularly Least Developed Countries,for whom issues such as infrastructure investment aremuch more important. A number of interviewees from LDCs,particularly in Africa, expressed frustration that their effortsto secure gains they considered important to them throughthe Internet governance debate were frustrated by the

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politicisation of that debate by these larger and more pow-erful development countries – “the ultras”, as one suchdelegate described them. Other observers of the Internetgovernance debate also commented on this distinctionbetween LDC and more powerful countries’ participation.

It is, of course, always dangerous to think of “developingcountries” as a homogeneous bloc rather than a categorythat is sometimes useful, sometimes not. However, theemergence of a (relatively small) group of large and morepowerful developing countries, acting assertively, eitherindividually or as a “like-minded” group, and sometimesclaiming to speak on behalf of developing countries as awhole - has been a feature of a number of recent interna-tional negotiations. The Doha round of WTO negotiationsand the development agenda within WIPO (the World In-tellectual Property Organisation), for example, has seensimilar alliances. It is unclear whether this represents alasting trend or a passing phase in international discourse,and WSIS does not really provide evidence either way,other than to reaffirm the dangers of underestimating dif-ferences among developing countries.

As suggested in Chapter 5, it is difficult to determine win-ners and losers in the Internet governance debate. On thewhole, the difficult decisions involved have merely been de-ferred. That may represent, in a sense, a victory for thosecountries and stakeholders that considered them importantenough to raise the WSIS stakes, and so had most to losefrom losing. Few interviewees thought that LDCs and otherlow-income countries gained much, though they did sug-gest that a few – such as Ghana – raised their profile throughthe issues and gained respect from other participants.

Regional meetings

One final area of participation is worth exploring here. Aswell as global PrepComs, the preparatory process in bothWSIS summit phases included regional (in reality, more orless continental) preparatory conferences. These variedsubstantially in character. Those in Africa included quitesubstantial civil society participation, while those in Asia/Pacific, for example, were much more strongly led by gov-ernments. Some had a dramatic impact on the course ofWSIS – notably the Middle East regional event during thefirst phase, which introduced Internet governance as amajor summit theme; others were much less significant,for example the first phase European regional event, whoseoutcomes were so insubstantial that the experience wasnot repeated in the second phase. The two African regionalevents provide an interesting instance of how this tier ofsummit preparation could engage with WSIS.

During the first phase, Africa was home to the first regionalconference, held in Bamako, Mali in May 2002, even beforethe first PrepCom had begun to set the terms of reference

for the WSIS process as a whole. This was a mixed bless-ing. On the one hand, some participants suggested, itenabled African countries to set the tone: to put an Afri-can agenda on the table at the very beginning of the sum-mit process. On the other hand, others pointed out, itmeant that the main opportunity for African regional dis-cussion was over and done with before the PrepCom proc-ess had begun to define the issues that would really pre-occupy the summit. At a regional level, Africa thereforehad less opportunity to debate these issues than otherregions, and less scope to put forward a considered conti-nental point of view. (The emergence of Internet govern-ance as an issue from the last of the regional events madethis a significant problem for other regions, too.) TheBamako meeting raised a number of important African is-sues, including infrastructure investment, regulation andenabling environments, and multilingualism. It producedan outcome document which addressed requirements todifferent stakeholders, including African governments, in-ter-governmental organisations and the WSIS secretariat.It also demonstrated quite impressive multistakeholderparticipation, and its conclusions were substantially influ-enced by civil society.

The Bamako Bureau which it established to represent Af-rica collectively during the remainder of the preparatoryprocess, however, found it hard to sustain a comparablenetwork or represent such a comprehensive range of think-ing later in the summit phase. Its presentation of 21 “pri-orities” for Africa during the second PrepCom illustratedthe difficulty it had in focusing on Africa’s most importantissues rather than listing its concerns.31

The Africa regional conference during the second phasetook place shortly after the report of the Task Force on Fi-nancial Mechanisms was published, and proved an impor-tant stage in the resolution, within WSIS, of the crisis sur-rounding the proposed Digital Solidarity Fund. Non-re-gional donors present at this meeting had understood theneed to defuse argument about the DSF and begun to rec-ognise some of the new challenges for infrastructure fi-nance posed by the Task Force’s report. The regional con-ference in Accra was an opportunity for them to put for-ward an African infrastructure initiative which offered Af-rican countries some of what they had been seekingthrough the DSF. Together with endorsement of a limitedvoluntary DSF, this was sufficient to defuse that conflict.

Although this was not necessarily apparent to them at thetime, participants in both these African regional events feltsubsequently that they had had substantial value – theformer in enabling the continent, including civil society, todiscuss issues in some depth and set the basis for futurenetworking; the latter in drawing forward a new alignment

31 The 21 priorities are available from: africa.rights.apc.org/index.shtml?apc=ie_1&x=30659.



between donors and African regional institutions such asNEPAD (the New Partnership for Africa’s Development).This does not seem to have been complemented, however,by much discussion of WSIS within those regional institu-tions themselves. African input to WSIS took place at anational and a continental level, rather than that of conti-nental sub-regions. WSIS was not a major topic of inter-est, for example, in gatherings of the Southern AfricanDevelopment Community (SADC), the East African Com-munity, or the West African economic partnership ECOWAS.Some interviewees felt that this was an opportunitymissed, to develop a stronger sub-regional dimension toAfrica’s input and to focus on the continent’s diversityrather than its commonalities. This is not, however, a prob-lem that is unique to ICTs.

National policymaking processes

The “Louder Voices” study found that weaknesses in na-tional policymaking processes were more important inexplaining the limitations of developing country partici-pation in international ICT decision-making than deficien-cies in the structure of international decision-making bod-ies. Would the same be found in respect of WSIS? Coun-try case studies were undertaken for the present studyin five varying developing countries – in Bangladesh, Ec-uador, Ethiopia, India and Kenya – in order to addressthis question. With one exception, they found processesthat were comparably weak in terms of both national andinternational engagement. This section summarises theevidence from these case studies concerning participa-tion in international meetings, while evidence concern-ing the national policymaking process is summarised inChapter 7. Copies of the country case studies are avail-able online.32

The lead role for WSIS in all of the case study countrieswas taken by a government department which was tech-nologically oriented and usually within the telecommuni-cations establishment – the Department of Telecommuni-cations (DoT) in India; the Ministry of Science and Infor-mation Technology in Bangladesh; the National Telecom-munications Council (and Secretariat) in Ecuador; theEthiopian Telecommunications Authority (the nationaltelecoms regulator) in Ethiopia; and the Kenya Communi-cations Commission (ditto) and then the Ministry of Trans-port and Communications in Kenya.

It is clear from the case studies that different governmentshad different perceptions of the role and value of WSIS. TheIndian country case study, for example, makes clear thatIndia’s Department of Telecommunications saw the sum-mit primarily - at least during the first phase - as an oppor-tunity to showcase India’s considerable achievements in

ICTs, though the impact of this was disappointing. “Theperception among senior decision makers” from otherdepartments, the case study reports, however, “was thatthe agenda of WSIS was not very relevant and useful toIndia’s aspirations from the summit.” Development minis-tries ignored DoT’s invitation to participate, and only theMinistries of Information and Broadcasting and of Infor-mation Technology responded, their sectoral agendasclashing to some degree with DoT’s. Private businesseswere also relatively uninvolved in official delegations,though some of the large ICT businesses based in Indiaparticipated in their own right – as would be expected,given the country’s international reputation for softwaredevelopment and other ICT services. Nevertheless, Indianbusinesses had nothing like the presence that Chinesebusinesses had, for example in the exhibition area at theTunis summit.

Although Bangladesh starts from a much lower e-readi-ness base than India, its government, too, has adoptedan extremely ambitious national ICT strategy, which wasthe focus for considerable debate around the time thatWSIS was announced. It established national consulta-tion processes, which are described in Chapter 7, thoughthese may have caused as much confusion as enlighten-ment. During the second phase of the summit, however,the government of Bangladesh attained some promi-nence in WSIS as a whole - holding the PrepCom vice-presidency for Asia, presenting position papers for dis-cussion, trying to coordinate LDC inputs in some areas,and - towards the end of the Internet governance nego-tiations during the third PrepCom of the second phase -successfully introducing new text encouraging commer-cial negotiation of reduced interconnection rates for LDCsand other priority countries.

National participation from Ecuador varied substantiallybetween the two phases of the summit. During the first,the government made significant efforts to engage withdifferent stakeholders and use their input to contribute toa national policy agenda, though, the case study reports,“despite the efforts and the political will of the stakehold-ers, [this process] did not allow the basic consensusneeded for the formulation of a position and priorities ofthe country to be reached.” During the second phase, thegovernment of Ecuador was more preoccupied with its rolein information society politics in Latin America, which di-verted official time and resources and which also concen-trated the country’s approach on issues which the govern-ment felt would further its ambitions in its region.

The Ethiopian government did not attend the African re-gional meeting which kicked off the first phase of WSISin May 2002, though the country was represented thereby a substantial group of private sector and civil societyparticipants. Having missed that opportunity, the Ethio-pian Telecommunications Authority organised a national

32 Available from: www.apc.org/rights.apc.org/documents/wsis_research.

6 7

consultative workshop in early 2003, which led to the es-tablishment of a task force and to the development of asubstantial official response to the WSIS draft texts later inthe year. However, this was not proactive, and a compara-ble position paper developed by the government during thesecond phase also offered little dynamic content on eitherdevelopment issues or the two main issues being dealt within that phase.

According to the country case study, Ethiopia did not,therefore, play “any significant role in defining or drivingthe agenda and outcomes of global governance issues dis-cussed at the Summit.” Ethiopia currently gives greatprominence to ICTs within development policy, but thisemphasis is built around plans for improving public serv-ices rather than on issues such as affordability (which isof primary interest to civil society) or competition (whichis currently very limited, but which is of great interest tothe private sector). Since WSIS, the government has beenreviewing its approach to ICTs in order to incorporate theTunis agenda, but the country case study reports that thisis still very much a government-led agenda.

Kenya also had a large group of participants at the firstphase African meeting in Bamako in May 2002, mostly fromthe private sector and civil society though it also includedgovernment participants. Afterwards, Kenyan delegatesrecognised that they had been ill-prepared for the meet-ing and this recognition was crucial in the formation of aKenya Civil Society WSIS Caucus bringing together non-governmental groups with longstanding experience of ICTsin development (see Chapter 7).

The government of Kenya was represented by the coun-try’s telecoms regulator and Geneva mission in the firstWSIS phase, at least up to the final PrepCom when a civilsociety representative joined the team. Participation in theGeneva summit itself was much more substantial, a largemultistakeholder delegation led by the vice-president cre-ating what the country case study describes as a turningpoint in Kenya’s subsequent approach. Shortly before thefirst PrepCom of the second phase, Kenya’s Ministry ofTransport and Communications set up a National WSISPlan of Action Implementation Taskforce, led by the regu-latory commission, which aimed to:

• Initiate structured dialogue and lay down strategieson the implementation of the WSIS Plan of action [sic]

• Articulate national common positions on the issuesto be discussed in the PrepComs towards the TunisPhase of the Summit

• Develop and implement mechanisms for coordinatednational initiatives and multi-stakeholder partnerships

• Facilitate national workshops to sensitise policy mak-ers and stakeholders on their roles in the implemen-tation of the WSIS action plan

• Facilitate and coordinate the implementation of ICTshow case initiatives and encourage the mainstream-ing and integration of ICTs at the national developmentstrategy to achieve the UN Millennium DevelopmentGoals (MDGs).33

This was followed by the creation of a new alliance be-tween Kenyan civil society and private sector organisationswith an interest in ICT policy, the Kenya ICT Action Net-work (Kictanet). It added a new dynamic to lobbying onnational ICT issues and significantly contributed to nationalWSIS policy.

Kenyan participation in the second phase of WSIS wassubstantial and substantive. The combination of WSIS withdiscussions on a new national ICT policy stimulated par-ticipation in the Summit, including more senior leadershipthan in the first phase. Participation in the Summit, in turn,the country case study suggests, improved awareness ofICT and development issues in general and in detail, im-proved policy coordination within government, and builtsolidarity between groups that had previously contestedspace for policy influence. However, the case study con-tinues, limits to understanding and cohesion remained.“Careful review of the participation of public sector, civilsociety and private sector ... shows that the engagementwas not coherent and input to the WSIS issues tended tobe reactive rather than proactive.” Thinking about WSISremained focused on technology rather than the nationaldevelopment context, and debate in Kenya still exhibitedmany of the deficiencies discussed in Chapter 5. “Uncriti-cal acceptance of the WSIS process and its recommenda-tions in Kenya,” the case study concludes, “shows thatthere is a long way to go to influence a global debate on awider set of issues regarding ICTs and development.”

This brief summary of the evidence set out in the countrycase studies suggests that there was considerable vari-ance in the experience of different developing countriesin the WSIS context. Government engagement varied bothbetween countries and, within countries, over time. Somegovernments were able to have significant input at differ-ent stages of the overall negotiations, but none of the coun-try case studies reports a strongly proactive presence.WSIS was not used by any of the five countries studied asa way of pressing an important national agenda, thoughIndia’s DoT clearly hoped this might be possible in the ini-tial stages. Of the countries studied, only Kenya suggeststhat the impact of WSIS may result in significant changein the way that government engages with other stakehold-ers in policymaking or with other countries in internationalfora. Issues concerning multistakeholder participation inthe case study countries are discussed in Chapter 7.

33 Communications Commission of Kenya, “The World Summit forInformation Society Process”, www.cck.go.ke/wsis_process.



WSIS and conventionalICT decision-making

The experience of WSIS was, as discussed at the begin-ning of this chapter, different in many ways from that inconventional ICT decision-making fora. WSIS was a one-off event, with a wide remit (if rather narrow actual de-bate), in which the conventions of the ITU, the WTO, ICANNand other international ICT decision-making bodies did notapply. Did interviewees for this study think that these dif-ferences enabled developing countries to participate moreeffectively or not in the work of WSIS – and how much dif-ference, if any, did that make? Again, it is worth looking atthis question firstly from the point of view of participationin the international events themselves; secondly from thatof national policymaking; and thirdly in relation to overallWSIS outcomes.

In terms of participation, it would certainly seem that de-veloping countries played a more forceful role in WSIS thanthey play in most international ICT fora. Two reasons aresuggested for this:

• Firstly, the equal status afforded to all delegations gavethem a stronger sense of power within the forum – and,if they chose to exercise it, an inbuilt majority. Whilethis may also be true in theory at, for example, ITUstudy groups, it is rarely true in practice because fewdeveloping countries actually attend with sufficientexpertise or regularity. The summit was, in this respect,more like the ITU Plenipotentiary Conference, wheredeveloping country political authority can be more ef-fectively deployed.

• Secondly, industrial countries did not consider WSISparticularly important to them and substantially down-graded their participation compared with that in otherinternational ICT fora. The only areas in which this wasnot the case concerned the two major disputes duringthe WSIS process, on financing mechanisms andInternet governance, where industrial countries didparticipate more substantially in order to protect theirown interests.

As a result, some international observers described de-veloping countries as, in practice, leading much of the pre-paratory committee process. The voices of developingcountries in WSIS were “louder” than they were in moreconventional ICT fora. But were they more effective?

As with the more obviously sectoral inter-governmentalnegotiating fora considered in “Louder Voices”, develop-ing country participation in WSIS was led by ministries oftelecommunications or their successors (a number of coun-tries moved towards converged ministries of informationtechnology, or the like, during the summit period). Interac-tion between these ministries and those responsible forother departments, particularly mainstream development

activities, appears to have been weak in most cases, andcertainly in those assessed in country case studies under-taken for this project. Few countries included significantrepresentation from these ICT-user ministries in their WSISdelegations. This finding corresponds to the poor knowl-edge management – the lack of “joined-up government” -within international ICT decision-making processes whichwas described in “Louder Voices”.

Again as with the fora discussed in “Louder Voices”, inter-views suggested that the majority of developing countriesseem to have made little effort to engage civil society andprivate sector voices in national debate on WSIS propos-als and outcomes. While the Geneva outcome documentsadvocated a multistakeholder approach, this seems tohave been observed as much in breach as substance. Therewas, for instance, little formal or informal multistakeholderconsultation in four of the five countries of which case stud-ies were undertaken for this study. Even in some indus-trial countries, where multistakeholder participation ismore established, civil society organisations reported thatarrangements for multistakeholder dialogue were weak,and that what took place was more likely to be informaldialogue than a formal part of the decision-making proc-ess. However, some countries – such as Kenya, among thecase studies for this report - did experience substantialmultistakeholder involvement. This represents an advanceon the experience reported in “Louder Voices”. It will beimportant to monitor whether it sets a precedent in thesecountries for more conventional ICT fora in the future, bothnational and international. The future performance ofKictanet in Kenya will be particularly interesting to observe.

Interviewees, by and large, felt that the quality of exper-tise available to delegations improved where multistake-holder participation took place. This is likely to have beenparticularly so on issues such as the Internet where gov-ernments historically have little expertise. However, thepoor quality of the WSIS outcome documents, describedin Chapter 5, suggests that this did not have much impactat the level of text negotiations. In fact, most delegationsrelied on their Geneva missions – i.e. on diplomats experi-enced in diplomatic rather than sectoral nuance – to nego-tiate these texts. The format of more conventional ICT deci-sion-making fora is likely to be more susceptible to enhance-ments in the quality of inputs than summitry, and this expe-rience need not therefore be taken as indicating what mighthappen if delegations at these more conventional ICT foraalso took in more non-governmental expertise.

Few interviewees felt that developing countries made sig-nificant gains through WSIS, at least in terms of stated ob-jectives. The most obvious instance here is that of the Dig-ital Solidarity Fund. Whatever the merits of this proposal, ithad strong support from a large number of developing coun-tries during the first summit phase, and provided a signifi-cant focus for developing country solidarity. However, as

6 9

noted earlier, the DSF proposal in its initial form was simplynot pursued by its sponsors during the second phase. Somealternative gains were nevertheless made as a result of thepursuit of the DSF, as described in Chapter 5.

In terms of Internet governance, as in other contexts, it isdifficult to say. Developing country objectives here varied,and a distinction needs to be drawn between the majorityof developing countries, on the one hand, and the smallbut vocal group of countries that vigorously pursued thisissue. If the objective was to break United States powerover the Internet, they failed. Equally, they failed if theobjective was to draw the Internet more closely under thewing of an inter-governmental agency. But shifts have un-doubtedly occurred in the way the Internet will be gov-erned in the future, which are yet to be worked out (seeChapter 8). In that sense, therefore, changes might bethought to have been achieved, the extent of whose im-pact will only become apparent over time.

One final way of looking at this is to consider the list of 21priorities for Africa agreed by the Bamako Bureau for sub-mission to WSIS during the Geneva phase. These are setout in the box below.

For obvious reasons, it is not possible to act on 21 priori-ties. Priorities must be fewer in number if they are, mean-ingfully, to be priorities. The length of this list reflects afailure apparent in many WSIS contexts, to prioritise is-sues on which political attention could be concentrated.In practice, WSIS outcome texts do have something to sayon most of these issues, but in very few cases does thistext represent anything new or substantial. The DigitalSolidarity Fund could be regarded as, in the end, some-thing of a failure for African engagement in WSIS, thoughadvances were made on “infrastructure” and WSIS itselfhad an impact in “capacity building”. It would, in short, bepossible to tick boxes regarding content where many ofthese “priorities” were concerned, but not regarding prac-tical outcomes. It is a matter for debate whether this wasprimarily due to structural weaknesses with WSIS or withincontinental input to it – a debate which could valuably beundertaken within Africa by governments, regional organi-sations, local private sector businesses and civil societyorganisations.

Conclusion

As discussed earlier in this report, WSIS differed signifi-cantly from conventional ICT decision-making bodies in anumber of important ways. It had, for a start, a much widerremit, looking at the whole “information society” and (atleast ostensibly) at the relationship of the ICT sector withnon-sector-specific issues such as freedoms of expressionand development policy. Its engagement with these issues,as importantly, was less prescriptive than that of other in-ternational fora. Unlike the ITU-T (the ITU Telecommuni-cation \o “Standardization” Standardisation Sector) andICANN, for example, WSIS was never going to draw up pre-cise rules with lasting impact on government and business.Its decisions were at most likely to set the tone for futureinternational discourse and national policymaking - to af-fect the context in which conventional ICT agencies con-duct their business.

This combination of generalism and limited power had animpact on participation at a national level. Developingcountries in general, and many individual developing coun-tries in particular, participated more substantially in WSISthan they tend to do in more outcome-focused decision-making bodies. The equal status afforded all countrieswithin the summit format gave relatively weak countriesmore chance to put their point of view, and gave morepowerful developing countries a ready opportunity to en-hance their visibility and status within the developingworld and vis-à-vis industrial powers. At the same time,the generalism of much WSIS debate made it easier fordelegations short of substantive expertise to play a part.Industrial countries, on the other hand, by and large feltthat they had less to gain from WSIS. For them, the factthat WSIS was not able to make substantive decisions was

• Infrastructure and maintenance of infrastructureand equipment

• Human resource development and capacitybuilding

• Gender issues and women empowerment inICTs uses

• Partnership between public and private sectors

• Debt conversion (to back up ICTs development)

• Environmental protection

• Open and free software

• National information and communicationstrategies with special support to the AfricanInformation Society Initiative (AISI)

• Sectoral applications

• Support to NEPAD

• Digital Solidarity Fund

• Technology transfer, particularly South toSouth transfer

• Research and Development

• Investment strategies

• Content development

• Internet governance

• Relations between traditional media and new ICTs

• Legislative and regulatory framework

• Intellectual property rights

• Security

• Regional cooperation



grounds for downgrading their presence. Not a few inter-viewees from such countries, for example, felt that theirmain objective in participation was to “prevent harm”rather than to promote a positive agenda. As a result, itwould probably be true to say that developing countrypresence was more prominent, more visible and more sub-stantial in comparison with industrial countries than is typi-cally the case in ongoing negotiating fora such as the ITU- but that this resulted primarily from the lack of priorityafforded WSIS by industrial countries.

Amongst developing countries themselves, a clear distinc-tion can be drawn between the participation of develop-ing countries in general, on the one hand, and a categoryof more powerful and more assertive countries, on theother. Countries in this latter category - notably China, In-dia, Brazil and South Africa - tended to be larger, to haveless difficulty in attracting foreign investment than otherdeveloping countries, and to have well-established politi-cal agendas to pursue alongside WSIS-specific issues (of-ten to do with their relationship with the United States and/or industrial countries in general). They acted to somedegree in formal collusion but also in informal alliance orindependently. Although often observed as, and some-times presenting themselves as, articulating a generaldeveloping country perspective, their interests did notcoincide closely with those of the mass of developing coun-tries, particularly LDCs, which (for example) find it moredifficult to attract investment.

The appearance of this divergence amongst developingcountries - which might be characterised as one between“emerging powers” and “other developing countries, par-ticularly LDCs” - can be tracked in a number of recent in-ternational fora, not least the Doha round of WTO nego-tiations. Its implications for developing country participa-tion are not yet properly addressed, but are likely to besignificant in future. They reflect a growing diversity in theeconomic and political characteristics of what was oncecalled the “Third World”. A more assertive bloc of emerg-ing powers which is more powerfully engaged in interna-tional decision-making, on ICTs or other issues, does notimply any increase in the influence of LDCs, and analysisof participation will need to pay more attention to this dis-tinction in the future.

With the exception of Internet governance bodies, and tosome extent the ITU, WSIS does not appear to have had asignificant impact on other international decision-makingbodies concerned with ICTs, or indeed development. Mostinterviewees from such agencies felt that WSIS may haveraised awareness of some issues that they deal with, butthat it would not have a lasting effect on either their ac-tivities or their institutional structure. As noted earlier,WSIS did not break through the existing paradigm gapbetween ICT and development communities: it was prima-rily an ICT sector event, attended by ICT sector participants

and advocating an ICT sector perspective on developmentissues. While present, the participation of UN specialistdevelopment agencies was peripheral. Many mainstreamdevelopment specialists from such organisations say theyended WSIS as sceptical about ICTs in development as theybegan, and even many ICD specialists within them left Tu-nis cynical about the degree of hype they felt it had at-tached to ICTs. Mainstream development agencies were,by and large, insufficiently engaged with WSIS for it to havehad much impact on them institutionally.

Regional ICT institutions also had relatively little engage-ment with WSIS. The summit structure of regional (i.e. con-tinental) preparatory conferences did not encourage theirengagement. The European Union, as was to be expected,engaged with WSIS as a regional bloc, consistent with theUnion-level lead in trade issues and the principle favour-ing Union-wide cohesion in hybrid negotiations. Other re-gional economic blocs, however, such as SADC, did notsubstantially discuss WSIS issues, nor did they form amajor part of the agenda of regional sectoral bodies suchas the African Telecommunications Union or regional regu-latory associations. This was, perhaps, a weakness of theWSIS process – or of summit processes in general.

Finally, a word about the ITU – as begetter and managerof the Summit, did it also benefit in the end from playingthese roles?

In many ways, the ITU is in the throes of a prolonged crisisof identity. Its historic role as international regulator of tel-ecommunications and telecoms standards has been sub-stantially diminished during the past thirty years - as liber-alisation and globalisation have reduced the scope for in-ternational management of telecoms and the private sec-tor has taken over the development and also, in effect, theenforcement of standards. ITU Councils and Conferenceshave repeatedly addressed the implications of this for theUnion’s role, notably (for example) incorporating private“Sector Members”, but have tinkered around the edgesrather than radically reforming the Union’s structure. WSISrepresented a major opportunity for the Union to reposi-tion itself within the UN and international systems, one thatwas readily recognised by the Secretary-General and theCouncil. While some of the conspiracy theories advanced inother organisations about a concerted land grab by the ITUdo seem exaggerated (and underestimate the ITU’s inter-nal diversity and divisions), for some within the Union andfor some supporters among its member-countries, the op-portunity to become lead agency for the information soci-ety and/or the Internet looked like the promised land. Othermember-states, however (notably industrial countries), andprivate sector members, have been strongly opposed to anybroadening of the ITU’s role.

Institutionally, most interviewees felt, the ITU failed tomake substantial gains during the WSIS process. It did notacquire new roles where the Internet is concerned. In fact,

7 1

opposition to its doing so may have hardened within in-dustrial countries and civil society during WSIS, thoughsupport remains significant among some former commu-nist and developing countries. The nature of future Internetgovernance is not resolved, however, and the ITU will con-tinue to bid for a more substantial role. Overall, the WSISexperience might be considered an opportunity for the ITUto reposition itself which has left it still uncertain whereand how to reposition. Debate on this continued at theUnion’s 2006 Plenipotentiary Conference.

In assessing developing country participation in interna-tional organisations, especially where ICTs are concerned,it is important not to confuse two separate issues: the in-fluence of developing countries within ICT decision bod-ies; and the influence of ICT decision-making bodies overthe ICT sector. The latter is concerned with the scope ofinternational governance of ICTs; the former with the bal-ance between developing and industrial countries in deci-sion-making of whatever scope.

In practice, the two are often confused (not least by inter-viewees for this project). Developing countries tend towant to gain both more influence in decision-making bod-ies vis-à-vis industrial countries (a question of balance)and more influence for decision-making bodies over inter-national developments (a question of scope). This reflectstheir relative weakness both internationally and nation-ally: rebalancing would increase the weight of attentionpaid to their concerns, while increased scope would sup-port enhanced government authority and capacity to man-age domestic markets. Industrial countries and the privatesector tend to want a reduction in the decision-makingpowers of international bodies (global deregulation), but

are divided over rebalancing: some (or at least some partsof some) governments see rebalancing as a question ofinternational justice (of significance to smaller industrialcountries as much as developing ones); others are con-cerned about the risk of technical dilution or politicisationof decisions which should be taken on pragmatic or purelytechnical grounds. Civil society organisations, meanwhile,tend to favour rebalancing in favour of developing coun-tries (on grounds of international equity) but also a reduc-tion in the powers of inter-governmental organisations (dis-trusting organisations which are dominated by govern-ments and unexposed to multistakeholder participation).

On balance, few interviewees felt that WSIS had signifi-cantly changed the balance of power or likely outcomesof forthcoming negotiations in other ICT decision-makingfora, with the obvious exception of those concerned withInternet governance (which is discussed in Chapter 8). TheITU’s World Telecommunication Development Conferencein March 2006 spent a good deal of time discussing theimplications of WSIS and placed its Development Bureau’sworkplan for the coming four years firmly in its wake – butit has fewer, not more resources to devote to ICT for devel-opment (ICT4D). WSIS action line follow-up meetings haveattracted little interest (as described in Chapter 8). WSISis no longer on the tip of people’s tongues at internationalICT gatherings. The networks it created are dissipating(apart from those on Internet governance). Its outcomessimply do not have enough to say about what other ICTfora should be doing. The evidence from those who par-ticipated in this study suggests that WSIS is unlikely tohave a lasting impact on other international ICT fora, andthat the conclusions of the “Louder Voices” study remainas valid as they were four years ago. �



WSIS and civil societyc h a p t e r 7

Civil society participation in international summit proc-esses is always controversial. The United Nations systemis predicated on the unique authority of governments.Governments are understood, de facto and de iure, to rep-resent those they govern. Although they are highly vari-able in practice, the legitimacy and accountability of gov-ernments are assumed because for inter-governmental in-stitutions to challenge them, except in the most extremeand universally agreed of cases, would jeopardise the fab-ric of international discourse (and, many would say, thestability of international relations). Governments thereforespeak, within the UN system and most other internationalorganisations, for their nations and their citizens; andmany governments, throughout the period since 1945,have been very jealous of their unique authority to do so.(This differs, of course, from the situation in national gov-ernance, where national governments share decision-mak-ing authority with local government, with the judiciary, withparliamentary bodies, with a variety of semi-autonomousquasi-governmental organisations, and with a wide rangeof other social actors including civil society organisations.)

One United Nations agency, the International Labour Or-ganisation (ILO), has a different tradition. It inherited a multi-stakeholder character from its pre-1945 (League of Nations)structure, one in which representatives of governments, em-ployers and trade unions collectively negotiate and deter-mine ILO decisions. In a very formal sense, this representsa different way of looking at the state – seeing it more as apartnership between different interest groups with contest-ing perspectives out of which consensus may be reached.This reflects, at an international level, the balance of gov-ernance authority that pertains between different institu-tions - legal, social and economic, as well as political - withinnation-states. Similar “social partnership” arrangementsexist, though with limited effect, within the European Un-ion and some other international organisations.

It is difficult to envisage today’s nation-states agreeing asformal a multistakeholder arrangement as the ILO, but thestructural difference between it and other UN agenciespoints to the growing significance of stakeholder diversityin contemporary national and international discourse. TheILO structure sought to replicate at international level a na-tional division between the state and opposite sides of itsspecialist relationship, workers and employers. It assumedthree distinct relationships within this triangle: betweenthe state and employers, often but not quite the same as

private business; between the state and organised labour– trade unions, a component of what is now called civil so-ciety; and between the representatives of business and ofworkers (the private sector and trade unions).

Multistakeholderism is the concept of decision-makingwhich formally engages not just governments but also otherstakeholder groups within society. Typically, at a nationallevel, it implies the formal (as well as informal) engage-ment of the business community (the “private sector”) andof organisations representing groups within the commu-nity (“civil society”) as well as government. At an interna-tional level, inter-governmental organisations (IGOs) areadded to the mix. This is seen by many governments as achallenge to their authority and status as the legal repre-sentatives of their people; as a national sovereignty ques-tion concerning relations within the nation comparable with,say, the external national sovereignty questions raised bymembership of the European Union or by ICANN’s role inrespect of Internet domains. Some governments, however,see it as an opportunity to harness the support and exper-tise of the community as a whole to improve the respon-siveness of government, the quality of decision-making andthe implementation of government services. This interpre-tation recognises that neither appointed officials nor peri-odic elections are good at capturing the diversity of con-cerns and needs within society, and that incorporating theprivate sector and civil society in decision-making can im-prove the quality of government (and perhaps the likeli-hood of re-election). This “liberal” approach to multistake-holderism, within the country, is not surprisingly more of-ten found in democratic than authoritarian states.

Multistakeholderism at an international level adds anotherdimension to this question, which might be described as“governmental confidence”. Governments which are con-fident of their status with their citizens (which may meangovernmental systems rather than individual govern-ments) are more likely to choose to include a wider rangeof stakeholders in national representation abroad. Gov-ernments which are confident of their status both withintheir own countries and within the international commu-nity are more likely to welcome formal multistakeholderparticipation in international fora. Correspondingly, gov-ernments which feel insecure at home – because they lackdemocratic legitimacy, because the authority of govern-ment has been historically weak, because they representthe victors of civil conflict or particular vested interest

7 3

groups – or insecure abroad – because they are small,militarily or economically vulnerable, ideologically at oddswith mainstream opinion, emerging from internationalconflict: these governments are less likely to includestakeholder diversity in representing themselves to othernations, and less likely to welcome scrutiny from stake-holders other than their peers in international fora, espe-cially human rights activists and other civil society groups.

Nevertheless, the past thirty years or so have seen twotrends in the balance of relations between the three na-tional stakeholder categories (government, the privatesector and civil society). Firstly, the neoliberal consensusin economic policy – the preponderance of free marketeconomics, particularly since the fall of communism at thebeginning of the 1990s - has increased the economic powerand the role and influence of the private sector vis-à-visthe state, and particularly that of multinational and inter-national companies. Secondly, civil society organisationshave grown increasingly critical of the representativenessof government and more assertive about their capacity toarticulate alternative citizens’ perspectives - particularlythose of marginalised groups such as the poor, landless,indigenous peoples and, most significantly, women.

These processes have been important at both national andinternational levels. The influence of business has in-creased in most countries, particularly post-communistand developing countries, and that of multinational busi-nesses has also increased in international trade and in-vestment – especially in the telecommunications sector,where privatisation and liberalisation have led to the ap-pearance of major telecoms corporations investing in manycountries. Civil society organisations have increasinglyrepresented themselves as supplements to formal demo-cratic institutions in democratic states and as alternativeforms of democratic representation where formal democ-racy is weak. Their involvement has been highly diverse -coming from a wide variety of organisations and allianceswith a wide range of social and political perspectives andof representational scope.

The balance between the two principles represented here- of governmental sovereignty on the one hand, and of rep-resentational diversity on the other - has been debatedwithin the United Nations system for many years. The UNsystem is, of course, built around governments. It doesnot formally distinguish between categories of non-gov-ernmental actor - private sector and civil society organisa-tions have the same formal identity within the UN system.However, the UN Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC)provides a consultative process for accredited NGOs, ofwhich there are now over 2700 (though these obviouslyrepresent only a small proportion of civil society stake-holders). ECOSOC has in effect provided a limited safetyvalve for the growing pressure from civil society for moresubstantial participation in UN (and other international)

decision-making. However, many governments remainsuspicious of the representativeness, in particular, of civilsociety – in terms of both its social composition and po-litical ideology.

Summits have provided a particular focus for contentionover multistakeholder participation. Summits are inter-gov-ernmental events: it is governments that decide the con-tent of final texts, by which governments (if anyone) arebound. Access to discussion about texts - to participationin PrepComs and Summit meetings themselves - has beenjealously guarded by governments (though not all havebeen adamant about this), and very little space has beengiven to any non-governmental actors within formal sum-mit proceedings. This has not prevented non-governmen-tal actors from making themselves heard. After all, many ofthe issues discussed by summits – sustainable develop-ment, for one example; the “information society” for an-other – require action by the private sector and communi-ties as well as governments if change is going to come.

Some governments, particularly in the North, have beenprepared to include private sector and (sometimes) civilsociety participants in their official delegations (though thisusually means that these participants are bound by col-lective responsibility, i.e. tied to the official delegation linerather than pursuing that of their own CSO or CSOs in gen-eral). In the corridors, meeting rooms and coffee bars ofevery summit, unattached private sector and civil societyrepresentatives have also caucused, lobbied and inter-acted with official delegates willing to listen to or put acrosstheir point of view. At summit after summit, civil societyorganisations have organised alternative events, some-times called alternative summits or NGO fora, at which al-ternative viewpoints are expressed, debated and alterna-tive declarations agreed, which can be juxtaposed againstthe decisions reached in the formal summit process.

Summits, in other words, have had formally constrainedbut informally extensive non-governmental participationfor many years. Recent summits have also seen increas-ing space granted to civil society participation within theirformal proceedings, normally mediated via ECOSOC, asperception of the value of civil society engagement hasincreased within government delegations and the UN bu-reaucracy. The following paragraphs consider WSIS in thiscontext: firstly in terms of civil society experience in par-ticipation and organisation; then, in terms of content andthe key issues that preoccupied civil society participants.The chapter ends by reviewing the implications of the WSISexperience for future multistakeholder involvement.

Civil society participation

WSIS was, as has been noted repeatedly in this report,not an entirely normal summit – it was a UN-style summitrather than a UN summit per se; a summit organised by



the ITU with support from other UN agencies rather thanby officials from the United Nations itself. This may havecreated a different space for non-governmental actors tobe represented. In any event, almost all interviewees withexperience of other summits agreed that private sector andcivil society participation in the formal summit proceed-ings of WSIS substantially exceeded that in those previ-ous summits. A civil society bureau was established earlyin the preparatory stages of the first summit phase to in-corporate civil society participation, and was accommo-dated within the secretariat structure set up by the ITU. Itwas intended to parallel the inter-governmental bureau’srole in process (but not content) matters. In practice, thecivil society bureau was, by all accounts, substantially leftto its own devices to organise civil society participation,not least because the ITU lacked experience of civil soci-ety organisations and their ways of working. Meanwhile,civil society participants in WSIS set up their own coordi-nating structures, including a “Content and Themes Group”to coordinate the work of diverse caucuses, workinggroups and other content-oriented partnerships that wereestablished by civil society organisations.34

During the formal summit processes themselves - thoughthis was, at times, in the teeth of resistance from some gov-ernments - civil society and private sector representativeswere able to make formal presentations in PrepComs andplenary sessions. They undoubtedly influenced areas of thefinal texts agreed by WSIS, partly through this formal pres-ence, more substantially through lobbying and alliancesformed and pursued outside the formal meeting rooms.They had more impact on the Declaration of Principles inGeneva than on the Plan of Action; more in Tunis on Internetgovernance than on infrastructure investment - though, inthis latter case, some impact on both. Private sector andcivil society actors also played significant roles in influenc-ing some of the more specific content negotiated betweendelegations, on subjects such as child protection and gen-der equity. However, they had little involvement in discus-sion of texts concerning implementation of the developmentagenda. They also argued (not least amongst each other)on a number of topics (such as the relationship betweenproprietary and open source software).

Civil society organisation was – perhaps inevitably giventhe nature of the summit process – sometimes less thancoherent and often reactive rather than proactive. CONGO,the formal association of NGOs associated with the UNsystem, played more of a role in trying to achieve organi-sational coherence during the second phase than it hadplayed in the first, but, as noted elsewhere in this chapter,the limited thematic scope of the second phase made itless easy to bring the whole of civil society together be-hind a common agenda that mattered to all involved.

During PrepComs, civil society organisations met in ple-nary during the morning, while their Content and ThemesGroup met each evening. Much of the time of these dis-cussions was spent on administrative and political ques-tions, rather than debating substantive issues (which weremore substantially dealt with in caucuses and informal dis-cussion). Some participants complained that these regu-lar meetings were dominated by relatively few voices andthat they offered little scope for newcomers to get involved.The political tensions raised by the presence of Tunisianorganisations with questionable NGO credentials madecivil society organisation more difficult during the secondphase – especially around the time of the HammametPrepCom in early 2005 - to a degree that caused confu-sion and anger among many who had participated withincivil society during the earlier summit period.

There was, meanwhile, no large-scale alternative event or-ganised at WSIS in the sense that has occurred at other re-cent summits – for example, the 2002 Johannesburg EarthSummit. While some outside events did take place in Ge-neva and Tunis – there was, for example, some effort to or-ganise events in solidarity with excluded Tunisian civil soci-ety during the second summit – these were small, entirelyunlike the very substantial event in Johannesburg. In spiteof the problems, in short, non-governmental actors wereable to find more space to engage in the activities that mostinterested them within the perimeter of WSIS than in othersummits, and this was sufficient to retain them inside theWSIS tent rather than taking up a space without. Three ex-planations were put forward for this by civil society inter-viewees and others with experience of summits.

One explanation, discussed to some extent earlier in thisreport, is that the ITU simply did not know how to handlecivil society involvement, having no prior experience of itin its own events and no statutory provision of its own forincluding them comparable with the sector membershipavailable to businesses. While more liberal towards theprivate sector, therefore – at least to the ICT-oriented pri-vate sector – the ITU has been less liberal towards NGOs.When it came to organising WSIS, the ITU had far less ex-perience of handling relations with civil society organisa-tions than other UN agencies. This inexperience may haveled it to be more open, particularly given the pressuresput on it to make WSIS less technological and more devel-opmental, in the fear of being seen to be more restrictivethan others thought necessary.

The second explanation is simply that the greater spacewhich was offered to civil society by the WSIS Secretariatto (at least) explore participation sufficiently changed thebalance of advantage for many civil society organisationsbetween participating from within the tent and from with-out to make the latter option insufficiently attractive toenough organisations that might want to put an alternativetogether. If the tent was more welcoming, then maybe it34 See www.wsis-cs.org/cs-overview.html.

7 5

was worth a look inside. And once inside, the potential forachieving things there looked better than going out intothe rain. Many civil society participants put a lot of effortinto achieving this outcome.

The third view expressed by interviewees is that perhapsthe issue of the “information society” was insufficientlyattractive in itself to a wide enough range of civil societyorganisations for them to want to organise a big alterna-tive. WSIS just was not important enough for the majorsocial movements, in other words – and this may have beenparticularly so precisely because it was, in Kofi Annan’sterms, an opportunity rather than a problem. The “infor-mation society” did not inspire the same kind of antago-nism as global warming or women’s disenfranchisement.This interpretation is strengthened, perhaps, by the factthat WSIS also attracted no significant anti-globalisationprotests, not even protests like those that occurred whenthe G8 set up its Digital Opportunity Task Force in Okinawain 2000. Neither Geneva nor Tunis needed to protect them-selves against the kind of demonstrations seen in Seattlein 1999 or Genoa in 2001.

This is not to say that greater space for civil society inputmeant great space for it. The participation of non-govern-mental actors in the formal WSIS process was highly con-tested as soon as the first preparatory committee beganin May 2002. A number of governments - notably those ofChina and Pakistan - objected vehemently to any presenceof non-governmental actors in the PrepComs’ formalspaces. Arguments over representation took up a largeproportion of the time of the first PrepCom (and added tothe scepticism of some participants, for example in devel-opment agencies, about the value of the summit). The pres-ence of the private sector was just as strongly opposed byhostile governments as was that of civil society - and, in-deed, common cause over their exclusion helped to bringcivil society and private sector representatives into closerdialogue than, interviewees suggest, had been the caseat previous summits. The fact that ICT private sector busi-nesses were accustomed to participation in ITU discus-sions probably increased their dissatisfaction at attemptsto exclude them from comparable WSIS meetings.

The division of governmental opinion here, to a significantdegree, coincided with that on issues of freedom of ex-pression. Most of the governments which supported civilsociety participation were from industrial countries; mostof those that opposed it were from developing countries -though there were governments in both groups thatbucked this trend. In practice, however, the consensus thatwas reached did allow more space for non-governmentalpresentations within formal proceedings than was the caseat previous summits. The formal position was that:

Participants from accredited civil society entities (in-cluding NGOs in consultative status with ECOSOC) andfrom accredited business sector entities (including ITU

sector members) were allowed to sit as observers inpublic meetings (plenary and subcommittee meetingsin the preparatory process, Plenary and committeemeetings in the Summit). Upon the invitation of thepresiding officer of the body concerned, and subjectto the approval of that body, such observers were al-lowed to make oral statements on questions in whichthey had special competence. If the number of re-quests to speak was too large, the civil society andbusiness sector entities were requested to form them-selves into constituencies, which then spoke throughtheir respective spokespersons.35

A number of governments, including both industrial anddeveloping country governments, also made a point ofincluding private sector and civil society representativeswithin their formal delegations (although, as noted above,this did not mean that they could express positions con-trary to those of the delegations that included them, andsome such delegates expressed the feeling that their pres-ence in delegations was tokenistic, that they had little realsay in how their delegations behaved).

For all the caveats, this set of circumstances represented again in participatory space for non-governmental actorsbeyond what might have been expected from experience atprevious summits, and one of some symbolic importance.Civil society organisations had more opportunity to expressa view in formal sessions than beforehand. The extent towhich this might set a precedent for future multistakeholderparticipation is considered towards the end of this chapter.

Whether this participatory gain made a difference to ne-gotiations - either at the time or subsequently – depends,obviously, on the use made of it and the attention paid toit. Opinion among interviewees here is divided. The spaceand time allocated to civil society contributions was notgreat, and its allocation by the civil society plenary (onwhich, see below) could, therefore, be contentious. Therewas an obvious tendency for civil society speakers to tryto cover more issues than they had time available to saysomething substantive about. The attention paid to speak-ers during PrepCom and (especially) plenary sessions wasalso highly variable. At times, for example during the tensermoments of negotiations such as those on Internet govern-ance, most delegations (as in most summits) paid close at-tention to anything that was germane to these (and little toanything that was not). In plenary, however, and in much ofthe negotiation process, contributions from delegates areoften repetitious, and delegates in the audience pay scantattention to them, spending their time instead in conversa-tion, reading, preparing their own inputs or doing emails.The ambience of summits - very large conference arenas,distant speakers usually inaudible (in any language) with-out headphones, simultaneous interpretation, the ready

35 “The multi-stakeholder participation in WSIS and its written andunwritten rules”, at www.itu.int/wsis/basic/multistakeholder.html.



opportunity for one-to-one discussions outside the formalmeeting space - also discourages attention to what is be-ing said from the platform or the podium. It is critical, there-fore, for speakers to be able to attract attention if theywant notice to be taken of them; and this is as much amatter of demagogic style as it is of content. On the whole,interviewees felt that the diversity of civil society repre-sentation increased the attention paid to civil societyspeakers and that many of the points they made were, atleast, registered by delegations. Private sector speakingslots were less diversified, and interviewees suggestedthat, while the points made in them were well-argued, thislack of diversity meant that delegations paid less atten-tion to them as the summit process continued.

The availability of speaking slots is not, however, the mostimportant locus for civil society contributions to the de-velopment of summit outcomes. This depends much moreon the effectiveness of what amounts to lobbying activity:seeking to influence the thinking of national delegates whohave the power to commit their countries or to use theircountries’ influence within negotiations in pursuit of par-ticular objectives. Lobbying is a highly skilled activity inany context, and its effectiveness depends on a numberof factors, particularly:

• The saliency of issues to both “patron” (in this casenational delegation) and “client” (lobbyist) - and thelevel of risk to other objectives of the patron involvedin promoting a particular position on the issue con-cerned.

• The level of understanding of those issues in bothparties, especially the sophistication of understand-ing by lobbyists.

• The reliability (in terms of facts) and trustworthiness(in terms of honest and open dealing) in each party’sperception of the other.

• The political skills and capacity for political judgementof lobbyists, in particular at identifying effective pointsof entry into the debate, and at knowing when to holdback or retreat from exposed positions.

Most of these are at least as much personal as organisa-tional skills, and a great deal of the success or failure oflobbying depends on individual personalities being ableto forge alliances of common interest which are sustain-able over the period of time required to pursue an issue.The effectiveness of lobbying is greatest where these skillsare brought to bear by a coherent and skilful team of lob-byists on a coherent partnership of delegations which haveother common interests to pursue – though individualscan also make a significant difference.

Interviews for this project confirm the importance of allthese observations on the WSIS process. There were, tobegin with, a number of policy areas in which civil society

organisations were able to build substantive coalitions withimportant national delegations. During the first phase ofthe summit, for example, civil society organisations con-cerned with rights issues shared common objectives withthe European Union and its member-states in maintainingthe integrity of established human rights principles withinthe proposed outcome documents. During the secondphase, civil society input proved important in securingagreement on the Internet Governance Forum, and civil so-ciety language made up a good deal of that defining its re-mit. Some specialist civil society organisations also provedvery effective at focused lobbying on their particular issues,notably child protection agencies which significantly in-creased awareness and secured substantive language ad-dressing their concerns. While the ultimate value of this lan-guage depends on its impact on implementation, theseagencies will in future be able to point to this language asaffirmation of their cause by the international community.

WSIS illustrated an anomaly here which civil society findsin many international negotiations and which results fromdifferences in the objectives pursued by differentstakeholder groups. Civil society and private sector bod-ies are more able to achieve sustainable partnerships withgovernments that broadly endorse their presence in ne-gotiations. On the whole, industrial (donor) countries aremore positive towards participation of this kind, not leastbecause they are more experienced with it at home. How-ever, civil society’s objectives often involve promoting thepolicy positions of developing countries which are at oddswith those of industrial or donor governments – usuallyfrom a sense of ideological commitment, sometimesmerely from one of solidarity. In the first phase of WSIS,for example, civil society broadly supported the DigitalSolidarity Fund proposal. It was donor countries – whichopposed it – that were, in practice much more supportiveof civil society organisations’ participation in negotiationsthan the international community in general, however,while the most vociferous opponents of civil society in-volvement included important developing countries suchas China and Pakistan.

An alternative way of looking at this is in terms of the dif-ferent issues that are prioritised by different stakehold-ers. Opponents of civil society involvement in WSIS gen-erally opposed it from a viewpoint that emphasises gov-ernment authority over citizens’ rights. There is thereforea sense in which the anomaly can as readily be expressedin terms of civil society interests: in a juxtaposition be-tween civil society concern for development, for example(which tends to imply alliance with developing countriesand, not necessarily on the same basis, with the more de-velopment-oriented donors) and civil society concern withrights (where their objectives are generally closer to thoseof industrial country governments and may be vigorouslyopposed by some developing countries). Different civil

7 7

society organisations prioritise rights and developmentissues differently. Some interviewees suggested the cau-cus process and the general ethos of much civil societydebate discourage open discussion on these dichotomiesand their implications for how civil society organisationsfunction within decision-making fora.

While this distinction should certainly not be consideredanything so crude as a division between industrial and de-veloping countries, therefore, it does mean that civil soci-ety organisations find it easier organisationally to partnerwith individual industrial countries and with specific indus-trial country blocs (such as the European Union) than withcomparable blocs of developing countries, even wherethese countries and blocs are opposing important policypositions they espouse (such as the Digital Solidarity Fund).

Much civil society activity within and around summits takesplace through caucuses, i.e. semi-formal associations oforganisations and activists that have broadly common in-terests. These caucuses became prominent during theBeijing World Conference on Women in 1995, and havefeatured in many of its successors. Their purpose is to drawtogether diverse entities in a formation through which theycan develop common positions and promote these withgreater critical mass. Membership is generally open to allorganisations which are recognisably civil society in char-acter and which wish to take part in them. Caucuses alsohelp to build shared awareness and understanding withincivil society. The networks generated by this may havemore lasting value, though (at least before WSIS) caucusesthemselves were usually formed for individual summitsrather than as longer-term alliances.

Given this purpose, and their significance as foci for organi-sation, the representativeness and coherence of caucusesnot surprisingly have substantial impact on the effective-ness of the lobbying process described above. In principle,the caucus process could work in very different ways:

• It could help to build a relatively powerful consensus,increasing the commitment of civil society in generalto focus on causes promoted by groups within civil so-ciety (in the case of WSIS, for example, to support theinclusion of language concerning child protection).

• Alternatively, it could tend to reduce the range of is-sues covered and points made concerning them to alowest common denominator on which general agree-ment can be reached – like WSIS itself, therefore, avoid-ing areas of conflict in pursuit of greater consensus.

Interviewees reported the experience of WSIS as beingrather mixed. The caucus process was generally felt to haveworked well during the first summit phase, with civil soci-ety as a whole building up substantial esprit de corps asits right to participate was challenged. Some caucusesneeded time to create a working atmosphere – there were,

for example, tensions in the Internet Governance caucusbetween those with primarily Internet and those with pri-marily civil society backgrounds; and over the need to rep-resent the whole Internet-using community as well asthose with specialist expertise. Interviewees do suggest,however, that the regional and thematic caucus structuresnever really gelled, and that Northern and Southern CSOstended to maintain different priorities throughout.

During the second phase, the caucus system worked lesseffectively and civil society behaved in a much less cohe-sive way. Interviewees reported that a few specialist cau-cuses continued to have a powerful impact, for examplethe Internet Governance Caucus and that on child protec-tion. There was, however, much less cohesion at the over-all civil society level; and more divisions were apparentwithin civil society, for example over issues like the empha-sis that should be given to free and open source software.

One reason for this difference, interviewees agreed, wasthe disruptive impact of participation by a large numberof Tunisian organisations, the genuineness of whose civilsociety credentials was challenged by many that had beeninvolved during the first phase. More established interna-tional NGOs tended to regard these Tunisian organisationsas interlopers, suspiciously close to their government andcertainly remote from the “excluded” Tunisian rights or-ganisations and other NGOs that bore the brunt of gov-ernment suppression. Many civil society participants feltthat this “Tunisian factor” undermined the openness ofdiscussion during caucus meetings and made them lessproductive fora for deciding strategy, with the latter mi-grating from caucus room to coffee shop.

Interviewees also felt that the concentration of issues dur-ing the second summit also undermined the effectivenessof the caucus system. With Internet governance by far themost important item on the agenda, there was not a greatdeal other than Internet governance on which to caucus –at least where text was concerned (arrangements for WSISfollow-up were also of significant interest). The overall civilsociety caucus therefore lost focus on issues, becomingmore of an organisational tool and therefore of less inter-est to many potential participants. More differences, po-litical as much as ideological, were observable betweencomponents of individual caucuses – for example betweenAnglophone and Francophone members of the African civilsociety caucus.

A greater difference was also suggested during the sec-ond phase between those civil society organisationswhose instincts were to cooperate or work within the WSISprocess and those more keen to criticise its outcomes. Tosome extent, this could be observed in differences of viewbetween civil society actors concerning the Digital Soli-darity Fund and the report of the Task Force on FinancialMechanisms.



In a few cases, during the second phase, caucus organisa-tion also became more formal. The African civil societycaucus, for example, sought to establish an institutionalstructure of a kind more like that which might have beenexpected from African governments. Formalisation of thiskind, some suggested, turns a caucus into a committee, astructure of a different kind with, usually, a different kindof purpose: more of a permanent institution than a tem-porary alliance, something of which organisations mightseek to be members rather than simply to attend. The im-plications of this possible development of the caucus struc-ture are considered again towards the end of this chapter.

Participation in caucuses and PrepComs built one level ofnetworking between civil society organisations that wereparticularly concerned with WSIS issues – especially thoseconcerned with issues of information rights. A further di-mension of WSIS activity that was particularly importantto civil society was the exhibition space and informal sum-mit held at each WSIS summit session. The exhibitionspace and the very wide range of workshops, seminars,discussion fora and presentation sessions associated withit offered a wider range of networking opportunities to awider range of civil society organisations. This informalsummit drew in more development NGOs in particular –mostly those with specific ICD projects or programmes butalso some more mainstream organisations.

The exhibition space in Tunis was significantly differentfrom that in Geneva. In the first summit, the ICT4D Plat-form, sponsored by the Swiss Development Corporation,had a strongly developmental character, including bothdonor agencies and NGOs. Many NGOs with ICD pro-grammes saw it as an opportunity to showcase these.Spaces for semi-formal workshop sessions around theperiphery were oversubscribed, and these were comple-mented by further sessions held within the exhibition area,many of them by civil society NGOs. The atmosphere attimes was febrile, as interested visitors, without passes tothe (somewhat isolated) plenary itself, gorged themselveson the variety of inputs available - which often (though notalways) had a strong advocacy component. The exhibitionspace in Tunis was more like those associated with majorITU trade conferences, such as the “Telecom” events heldannually in different geographical regions. A higher pro-portion of stands were occupied by businesses promotingtechnological solutions (including, notably, a strong pres-ence from the Chinese business sector); a lower propor-tion from development agencies and NGOs. The semi-for-mal workshop programme, however, was still dynamic,with substantial coordinated programmes of sessions or-ganised by bodies such as the Global Knowledge Partner-ship. Although the atmosphere around these was less fran-tic, interviewees felt that the quality of many meetings wasvery high, and often more analytical than had been the casein Geneva. The understanding of ICT issues in these works-hops certainly exceeded that in the main WSIS process, and

many civil society delegates, particularly those not involvedin caucusing, found it the most useful part of the whole WSISexperience.

But we have not so far considered who was there. Civilsociety is immensely diverse. It is defined essentially bywhat it excludes - inter-governmental organisations, gov-ernments and private businesses – which implies that itincludes everything else – from peasants’ organisationsand trade unions; through women’s groups, faith groups,etcetera; perhaps to include political parties, academics,more amorphous “social movements”. “Civil society”, inother words, is arguably not defined by its objectives, likegovernments (“to rule”) or businesses (“to make profit forshareholders”), but bounded by the fact that it does notshare those objectives. It is therefore likely to be muchmore fractured than these other stakeholder groups - po-litically, socially, culturally, geographically, ideologically.While its fractures are obviously recognised by civil soci-ety actors, the ethos of civil society engagement in inter-national institutions, where the value of common objec-tives is self-evident, tends to obscure them. This has of-ten caused problems for civil society representation, andinstability in civil society coalitions.

So which parts of civil society were represented in thePrepComs, in Geneva and in Tunis? A paradigm gap simi-lar – but not identical – to that found in government del-egations can be found in civil society representation.

Firstly, civil society participation in WSIS was constrainedby a number of “access” factors. Even the best-funded in-ternational NGOs found it difficult to resource participa-tion in the paraphernalia of WSIS – PrepComs and regionalconferences requiring high travel and accommodationcosts, websites and listservs to coordinate activity, stafftime diverted from other work. These cost factors dispro-portionately affected developing country civil society or-ganisations, which are poor in comparison with their in-dustrial country peers. Some fellowship resources wereavailable for NGOs, but these were limited, and it was diffi-cult – as the “Louder Voices” study found with governmentrepresentatives – for organisations to achieve continuityof presence throughout the WSIS process. Wealthier North-ern CSOs were therefore more substantially representedat WSIS than poorer Southern CSOs; and Northern CSOsplayed a more prominent part in civil society caucusing thantheir Southern counterparts. While they were conscious ofthis and made considerable efforts to compensate for it,CSO activists were unable to prevent some hostile devel-oping country governments from claiming that civil societyrepresented a Northern, not a Southern perspective.

As well as being geographically unequal, the compositionof civil society representation also failed to reflect fully thediverse areas of interest of civil society organisations thatmight have played a part. There were perhaps three maintypes of civil society organisation whose presence might

7 9

have been expected and which might have substantialexpertise to contribute to the issues debated in the sum-mit: organisations primarily concerned with a) rights; b)ICT issues, including the Internet; and c) development. Inpractice, however, organisations concerned primarily withICTs were much more substantially and actively presentthan mainstream organisations concerned with eitherrights or development issues.36

Two reasons were suggested for this. Firstly, ICTs offer sub-stantial new space for the expression of opinion and fornetworking between individuals and civil society organi-sations. Control over this space is contested, particularlyin authoritarian states, by governments and citizens/dis-sidents/opponents. The fact that much early Internet de-velopment was led by people with an anti-establishmentperspective has contributed to this debate. As a result,the Internet and ICTs were already central to the concernsof a significant group of information rights CSOs whenWSIS was announced. A similar case obviously applies toICT-focused organisations, including those using ICTs indevelopment activity, since they have directly chosen towork within this area. But the second reason suggestedfor the disparity in representation by organisational typeis really the converse of the first. ICTs do not have the samepowerful resonance for mainstream rights and develop-ment NGOs that they have within the ICT/Internet com-munities. As with the official development community, inparticular, the value of ICTs in development is still conten-tious; in fact, wariness of ICTs is probably greater in devel-opment NGOs, which have an even stronger focus on pov-erty reduction than official donors. Few mainstream de-velopment sector NGOs, therefore, were present in Genevaor Tunis; and none played a significant part in WSIS’ dis-cussion of ICTs and development. The impact this had oncivil society’s contribution to this debate is discussed laterin this chapter.

Some countries, both Northern and Southern, includedcivil society representatives in their national delegations.Ecuador, among the country case studies for this report,was one example. Such representatives did not always findit easy. Some expressed the feeling that they were beingused as tokens. Others felt constrained by the principle ofcollective responsibility, which meant that they were un-able to express their organisation’s point of view, certainlyin WSIS sessions and sometimes even within delegationmeetings.

The likelihood of civil society participation in national del-egations reflected the likelihood of participation in nationalfora discussing WSIS issues. This varied substantially be-tween countries.

Within industrial countries, a reasonably high degree ofmultistakeholder participation in policy dialogue has be-come relatively common. Relevant private sector organi-sations, for example, are often routinely included in del-egations to the ITU. Discussion with civil society organi-sations involved in both development policy and rightsissues is part of normal practice. A routine culture of multi-stakeholder engagement obviously offered opportunitiesfor civil society organisations of all types to have an inputinto national policy development on WSIS-related issues.This did not always lead to substantial formal consulta-tion: in Britain, for example, formal consultation consistedof sparsely attended meetings organised by the BritishCouncil in the run-up to each WSIS summit. However, Brit-ish CSOs did not, by their own evidence, feel excluded fromWSIS discussions because they were able (and encour-aged) to make their input through the normal channelsthat they had available. Experience varied in different in-dustrial countries, but CSOs could usually make theirvoices heard.

Experience in developing countries was more diverse.Some national delegations to WSIS from developing coun-tries included CSOs, but this varied substantially. The ma-jority of delegations had no civil society representativesat all. A small number of countries, however – such asSouth Africa – made a point of including civil society par-ticipants, and some also included these in PrepComs.These countries, not surprisingly, were among those thathad implemented more extensive multistakeholder con-sultation as part of their WSIS preparations.

As discussed in Chapter 6, five country case studies con-cerning national WSIS policymaking processes were un-dertaken for this project – in Bangladesh, Ecuador, Ethio-pia, India and Kenya. In each of these countries, some ef-fort was made by government to engage with other stake-holders in preparing for WSIS, though only one case study– that in Kenya – suggests that this may lead to lastingchange in policymaking processes.

In India, the process of engagement in WSIS was led by theDepartment of Telecommunications (DoT), which initiallysaw the summit as an opportunity to promote Indian busi-ness interests. According to the case study, DoT “had a nar-row view of the scope and participants that could play aleading role,” initially restricting its invitations to contrib-ute to other government departments and the private sec-tor, and excluding NGOs, the media and other entities. Re-sponse to its invitations was insubstantial, even within gov-ernment. Though business associations did play some partin formal consultation, their contribution was never great.

The case study suggests that few Indian NGOs have beeninvolved in national policymaking on ICTs or have substan-tial expertise in this area. India’s history of statism, it issuggested, may be partly responsible for the weakness of

36 Though not entirely so: Amnesty International, Christian Aid and PlanInternational were among mainstream rights and development NGOsattending the Tunis summit.



civil society in this area. Nevertheless, a number of Indiancivil society organisations attended PrepCom and plenarysessions of the summit, though none were included in theofficial consultation processes - themselves pretty insub-stantial - that were held by DoT. Indian civil society re-spondents felt that they were able to contribute on someissues through civil society caucuses, including Internetgovernance and gender issues, and to some degree to raiseawareness of Indian civil society concerns withpolicymakers. However, as in other countries, they reportthat their participation was constrained by lack of finan-cial resources.37

Bangladesh’s participation in WSIS was led by the Minis-try of Science and Information Technology, which madesome efforts to engage with the private sector and civilsociety in policy development. In late 2002, the govern-ment set up a Working Group on WSIS with representa-tives from relevant ministries, the private sector, the me-dia and civil society, with a secretariat based in the coun-try’s telecommunications regulatory commission. How-ever, the country case study suggests that this WorkingGroup was insufficiently inclusive, with limited private sec-tor participation and no opportunity for non-invited NGOsto play a part. As a result, “some of the major NGOs suchas Grameen Bank or BRAC, who also have a stake in ICTareas, had little or no participation in the WSIS activitiesin the country.” A second, apparently overlapping, consul-tation and policy development process was set up by theMinistry of Science and Information Technology.

Civil society may have been more engaged in Bangladeshthan India, though it was likewise constrained by finan-cial difficulties. A number of civil society organisationsparticipated in official working groups and/or undertooktheir own initiatives. Along with APC and OneWorld SouthAsia, the Bangladesh Working Group on WSIS organised aSouth Asian regional consultation meeting in January2005. The input from this conference was submitted torelevant regional bodies. Unusually, one consultation fo-rum for civil society within Bangladesh was held outsidethe capital, in Khulna, though the country case study sug-gests that this was more of an awareness-raising exercisethan a truly consultative event.38

Efforts were also made by the government in Ecuador todraw the private sector and civil society into a multistake-holder dialogue. The National Telecommunications Coun-cil, responsible for coordination of the country’s WSIS par-ticipation, began to convene multistakeholder workshopsnationally and provincially from around the beginning of2003 with the aim of guiding national input into WSIS

issues. “These initiatives,” the case study reports, “openednew possibilities to tighten the government-civil societyrelationship, ... although not always with effective, spe-cific and efficient results.” The process faced multiple dif-ficulties - for example due to changes in the governmentteam responsible, varying quality of knowledge of ICT is-sues and uncertain financial resources to support involve-ment by Ecuador in regional and global WSIS meetings.“It was,” the study concludes, “an uneven, staggered proc-ess with random and poorly-timed calls for participationthat lacked clear coordinating roles and attempted to in-troduce participatory multisectoral working methodolo-gies. Despite the efforts and the political will of the stake-holders, it did not allow the basic consensus needed forthe formulation of a position and priorities of the countryto be reached.”

This national discourse vanished from the scene for twelvemonths after the Geneva summit and, when reactivated inJanuary 2005 to provide input to the second PrepCom ofthe second phase, it was more clearly dominated by gov-ernment officials. Government participation in the secondphase of WSIS was therefore better, while that of otherstakeholders was less substantial. Although civil societydelegates were included in Ecuador’s national delegationin Tunis, these reported finding that they were unable toplay a significant civil society role as delegation members.

Civil society organisations in Ecuador report feeling that,while WSIS opened space for multistakeholder participa-tion, including better access to government officials, “thebenefits of multistakeholder alliances were circumstantialand not always effective.” Relatively few civil society or-ganisations participated in the WSIS dialogue: “Some ac-tors only participated in the initial stage of the first phasein Geneva and experienced ... disenchantment; otherspersevered until Tunis, with certain periods of more intenseparticipation. Some limited their participation to nationaldynamics, others to regional and global ones, and a fewto both.” The picture, in other words, was mixed, but, over-all, relationships between civil society and other stake-holders were insufficiently developed to maximise thepotential WSIS offered. Lack of resources, as elsewhere,also hindered civil society involvement. Private sector en-gagement was, meanwhile, “sporadic, isolated and un-planned.” Media debate was conspicuous by its absence.39

As noted in Chapter 6, the government of Ethiopia did notattend the Bamako regional meeting which initiatedAfrican participation in the first phase of WSIS in 2002.However, this conference was attended by a substantialdelegation - thirteen in all - from the private sector andcivil society. Having missed its initial opportunity inBamako, the Ethiopian telecommunications regulator

39 Quotations and evidence from Valeria Betancourt, country case studyof Ecuador, available from: www.apc.org/rights.apc.org/documents/wsis_research.

37 Quotations and evidence from Rekha Jain, country case study of India,available from: www.apc.org/rights.apc.org/documents/wsis_research.

38 Quotations and evidence from Partha Sarker, country case study ofBangladesh, available from: www.apc.org/rights.apc.org/documents/wsis_research.

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(ETA) organised a national consultative workshop at thebeginning of 2003, involving about fifty delegates fromdifferent stakeholder communities. A task force resulted,headed by the regulatory body with a small (though multi-stakeholder) membership and the intent to establish aregular consultation process. In practice, however, accord-ing to the country case study, this regular dialogue did notemerge, and “discussion on the WSIS process was con-fined to ICT experts from key organisations,” reflectingsimilar concentration of the country’s overall ICT activity.In spite of this, the development of a substantial officialresponse to the draft WSIS texts in mid-2003 provided “anopportunity for stakeholders to reflect on WSIS issues andnational development challenges.” There was less consul-tation during the second phase of the summit, in which noformal multistakeholder consultation was arranged.

Ethiopia did not, according to the country case study, there-fore see much real multistakeholder involvement. Whatparticipation did take place “was centred around govern-ment’s agenda and influenced [more] by international de-velopment agencies than by strong contributions from civilsociety, private sector, academia and the media.” Civil so-ciety and the private sector were not well organised, ac-cording to the study, and tended to respond to what gov-ernment had to say rather than articulating their own con-cerns. To some extent, their inability to take advantage ofsuch formal consultative spaces as were created reflectsthe historic weakness of civil society resulting from thehostility or wariness of successive government regimeswithin the country. Although Ethiopia has a wide range ofcivil society organisations which could have something tooffer in terms of ICT policy, the case study concludes, WSISdid not generate an environment more conducive to multi-stakeholder participation. However, awareness was raised,in particular enabling government to explore experiencein comparable countries more fully, and this may contrib-ute positively to future ICT policy development.40

It was Kenya, among the five case study countries, thatexperienced a substantive and potentially lasting increasein multistakeholder participation.

A significant delegation from Kenya attended the 2002Bamako African conference - mostly from civil society andthe private sector – but quickly recognised that it was ill-prepared. A conference in Addis Ababa (co-organised byAPC and UNECA in November 2002) recommended thecreation of an East African Civil Society Organisations WSISCaucus. Responding to this, a Kenya Civil Society WSISCaucus was created, including ten organisations withlongstanding experience of ICTs in development. This es-tablished local legitimacy, secured international funding(from Canadian IDRC), and became a potent lobbyist within

the country, holding national civil society consultationworkshops in both phases of the WSIS process.

A further important development, after the first summitmeeting, was the creation of a new alliance, the Kenya ICTAction Network (Kictanet), established by Kenyan civil so-ciety and private sector organisations with an interest inICT policy. This highly unusual partnership, formed duringa meeting in October 2004 organised jointly by APC andthe local private sector and civil society partnerships, no-tably the Telecommunications Service Providers Associa-tion of Kenya, the Media Council of Kenya and the WSISCaucus, built on cross-stakeholder desire to have moreinfluential input in national ICT policy, and has been highlysuccessful in achieving this objective. Kictanet has addeda new dynamic to lobbying on national ICT policy and con-tributed significantly to national WSIS thinking. However,the country case study notes, it does not include main-stream development sector organisations, an importantomission from the perspective of building an holistic ap-proach to the role of ICTs in society and its development.

As noted in Chapter 6, Kenyan participation in the secondphase of WSIS was substantial and substantive. Partici-pation in the Summit, the country case study suggests,improved awareness of ICT and development issues ingeneral and in detail, improved policy coordination withingovernment, and built solidarity between groups that hadpreviously contested space for policy influence. However,to reiterate comments reported in Chapter 6, limits to un-derstanding and cohesion remained. “Careful review of theparticipation of public sector, civil society and private sec-tor ... shows that the engagement was not coherent andinput to the WSIS issues tended to be reactive rather thanproactive.” Thinking about WSIS remained focused ontechnology rather than the national development context,and debate in Kenya still exhibited many of the deficien-cies discussed in Chapter 5. “Uncritical acceptance of theWSIS process and its recommendations in Kenya,” the casestudy concludes, “shows that there is a long way to go toinfluence a global debate on a wider set of issues regard-ing ICTs and development” - and civil society organisationscould play an important part in developing this wider dis-cussion.41

The evidence from the country case studies suggests thatcivil society had to struggle to be heard in most cases.While many governments established some form of spacein which different stakeholders could contribute, the casestudies – and other experience reported by interviewees –suggest that these were usually low-key, sometimestokenistic, and rarely central to a policymaking agenda thatcontinued to be set by governments. Perhaps they createda precedent which could be built on in the future, but it is

40 Quotations and evidence from Lishan Adam, country case study ofEthiopia, available from: www.apc.org/rights.apc.org/documents/wsis_research.

41 Quotations and evidence from Lishan Adam, country case study ofKenya, available from: www.apc.org/rights.apc.org/documents/wsis_research.



not generally apparent that the processes they initiatedare also being used for more conventional policymakingpurposes. They usually seem to have been one-offs forWSIS, in other words. The exception to this pattern comesfrom Kenya, where the establishment of Kictanet, as anauthoritative non-governmental partnership, looks as if itmay have lasting impact. Democratic engagement, the roleof individual sector champions and systematic lobbyingare all potential features of continuing multistakeholderparticipation, and Kictanet’s success to date, both in re-spect of WSIS and in influencing other ICT decisions – forexample on telecommunications regulation - suggests apotential new direction for multistakeholder activity withinthe sector in other countries. The fact that it combines civilsociety and private sector participation seems to be animportant factor in building its authority with government.Inclusion of a wider range of civil society organisations,notably development NGOs, may add further to its potencyand its potential.

Civil society contributions

When it comes to the content of discussions during WSIS– as in any summit – interviewees identified five main ob-jectives for civil society:

a. To “get its message across”, whatever that messagemay be - in other words, to raise the profile of particu-lar issues that civil society (or any individual organi-sation) considers important: with delegations, othercivil society participants and (where possible) a wideraudience

b. To articulate voices of the poor and disenfranchised

c. To maintain (i.e. resist “backsliding” on) establishedUnited Nations agreements (for example on rights ordevelopment priorities) and, where possible

d. To improve language concerning these establishedrights and priorities

e. To introduce new language into international discoursethat will extend existing provisions – for example, bypromoting women’s rights or child protection, or byentrenching multistakeholder dialogue for the future.

Civil society’s ability to achieve these objectives depends,like that of any other interest group, on its ability to se-cure wider support for them, and therefore on its ability touse the resources available to it in order to secure thatsupport and its translation into text. This means reachingbeyond the core civil society constituency within meetings,partnering and reaching agreement with representativesof other stakeholder communities. For all civil societyorganisations, it therefore involves tensions between theirrole as representatives of a particular interest group (whichmay be “the poor or marginalised”) and their role as ac-tors in a process designed to achieve consensus. Critics

of one view or the other might describe this as a contestbetween collaboration and utopianism. Caucuses try toresolve this by achieving consensus within civil society,but do not always succeed in doing so; and the latterstages of the second phase of WSIS saw someantagonisms emerge between those civil society organi-sations that took a more pragmatic and those that took amore ideological view.

The ability of civil society to engage constructively withother stakeholders is partly political: marriages of conven-ience can sometimes – actually, it would seem, quite of-ten - be made which cut across differences of paradigm.Civil society and private sector groups, for example, sharea common interest in achieving greater input into decision-making. However, other stakeholders make clear, it is thequality of civil society input into any process that will de-termine how much civil society organisations are listenedto. How well do civil society proponents of any particularproposal understand the issues concerned, themotivations of different actors, the likely impact of widerpolicy? How far are proposals based on evidence ratherthan assumption or ideology? How amenable are organi-sations to reaching pragmatic consensus with other per-spectives? Oppositionalism sometimes plays well withincivil society, but other stakeholders say they find it veryoff-putting and that it makes it less likely that civil societyproposals will enter into the texts that are finally agreed.In the second WSIS phase, notably over Internet govern-ance, many government and private sector stakeholdersfelt that the “constructive engagement” offered by civilsociety helped smooth the way to final agreement, per-haps because it enabled them to discuss the politics ofInternet governance in a way that was less polarised be-tween international power blocs.

Text, however, is not – or at least should not be – theendgame here. International agreements are littered withtext that is honoured in the breach rather than observ-ance. Ambiguous texts, texts so bland as to be meaning-less, texts that no-one ever expects most of their signa-tories to comply with: all of these are commonplace ininternational agreements. Many interviewees recognisedthe way in which the momentum of negotiations drewthem into preoccupation with the text rather than itsmeaning: with achieving a form of words that securesagreement which approximates more with their own po-sition than with that of their disputants. Equally, theyrecognised that this could easily lead them into hollowvictories: into achieving text that lacked meaning orwould never be observed. With hindsight, a lot of par-ticipants in WSIS were critical of the WSIS final texts forprecisely these reasons, particularly lack of depth in thecase of the text on development, and ambiguity in thaton Internet governance (what, exactly, is “enhanced co-operation”?). The WSIS texts, as noted earlier, containvery few specific “commitments”.

8 3

In many previous summits, civil society organisations haveproduced alternative texts to that of the formal summititself. They did so in the first, Geneva, session of WSIS,producing a “declaration” which set out a consensus civilsociety view of what was needed to “[shape] informationsocieties for human needs.”42

Civil society did not produce a comparable statement in Tu-nis until a month after the end of the summit, by which timethe attention of other stakeholders had moved on. While itexpressed pleasure at some developments within WSIS –including increased, if precarious, participation by civil soci-ety in the summit process, and the establishment of theInternet Governance Forum - the tone of this final summitstatement was (as its title, “Much more could have beenachieved”, suggests) mostly one of resigned disappointment:

Overall, it is impossible not to conclude that WSIS hasfailed to live up to [its] expectations. The Tunis phasein particular, which was presented as the ‘summit ofsolutions’, did not provide concrete achievements tomeaningfully address development problems.43

During the first phase, civil society interest in WSIS coa-lesced, as it had in previous summits, as organisationswhich thought they might be interested declared them-selves, expressed their priorities and sought partners. Eachnew summit, interviewees suggested, starts with this sort-ing out of civil society interests. Civil society played a par-ticularly prominent role in the first regional meeting to beheld, in Africa in May 2002 and contributed substantiallyto its outcomes, mostly text related to ICTs and develop-ment. The first PrepCom then changed the emphasis, fo-cusing strongly on the issue of who should be representedwithin the WSIS process and requiring civil society to con-centrate too on defending its right to take part. Challengesto the inclusion of references to established human rightsinstruments also concentrated attention on that area ofcivil society interest. These, rather than development ques-tions, held the main attention of WSIS and its civil societyparticipants during the remainder of the first phase.

Civil society contributions to content in this period there-fore concentrated on the defence of established rights ofexpression and the relationship between ICTs and the over-all rights agenda, in which context they found themselvesin informal alliance with industrial country governments.During the first phase, civil society input was directed muchmore towards the Declaration of Principles than towardsthe Plan of Action, from whose negotiation they were ef-fectively excluded, and in which the major contributionscame from governments. Where it was expressed, civilsociety input was strongly in tune with the very positive

view of ICTs’ role in development expressed within this text,but – as noted earlier in this chapter – any such input camefrom those civil society organisations which were alreadystrongly committed to that role, and did not engage main-stream development NGOs which are more sceptical. Anopportunity to address this paradigm gap was missedwithin civil society as well as within governments.

Civil society engagement in the second phase was ratherdifferent. Rights-based organisations continued to defendthe relationship between ICTs and basic rights and to seekextensions to those rights within the text. Some niche CSOs,such as child protection and disability agencies, increasedtheir profile in the WSIS process and achieved significantgains in terms of their own objectives. ICD-oriented CSOshad less to do, because the development components ofthe text agreed in Geneva were not revisited in the secondphase. As we have noted repeatedly, this focused on twomain issues, financing mechanisms and Internet govern-ance. What input did civil society make into these?

During the first phase, when the Digital Solidarity Fund wasproposed by the President of Senegal, civil society’s instinctswere to support the proposal, seeing it as a significant pro-posal from the South (which therefore represented a po-tential shift in international influence) and as a challenge tothe established paradigms of development policy (whichmany CSOs consider, unsurprisingly, to be dominated bythe North and by multilateral institutions which are alsoNorthern-dominated). However, this amounted more to ex-pressions of solidarity than to contributions of significanceto the content of the debate. Privately, a good number ofcivil society representatives were sceptical of the DSF forreasons shared by (for example) liberal European donors.Civil society did not play as significant a part in the work ofthe Task Force on Financial Mechanisms as in the WGIG,though some civil society organisations (including APC) weredirectly involved, arguing, inter alia, for greater mutual en-gagement between the financing and policy agendas. Manycivil society organisations were critical of what they saw asits conservatism – in particular, its reaffirmation of the pri-mary role of private sector investment in extending connec-tivity and its rejection of a development instrument (the DSF)that might be Southern-owned/led. Civil society actors didlobby for new approaches to infrastructure investment dur-ing the Africa regional preparatory meeting of the secondphase and the subsequent second PrepCom, though therewere divisions amongst them over the DSF and the reportof the TFFM. The fact that the proponents of the DSF did notpursue the matter after the second PrepCom of the secondphase, for reasons discussed in Chapter 5, meant that therewas little scope for further civil society engagement with it,beyond a general sense of frustration that the “develop-ment establishment” had “won”.

Internet governance was another matter. Financing mecha-nisms were historically largely matters for government;

42 The Geneva civil society declaration is available from: www.itu.int/wsis/documents/doc_multi.asp?lang=en?&id=1179|1208.

43 “Much more could have been achieved”, p. 4, available from:www.worldsummit2003.de/download_en/WSIS-CS-summit-statement-rev1-23-12-2005-en.pdf.



many in civil society saw the Internet as part of their ownworld, a creation of individuals and non-governmentalpartnerships rather than of governments (or, come tothat, the private sector). There were many intellectual andideological cross-currents between information rights-based civil society organisations and Internet pioneers.Many information rights-based organisations saw theInternet as a crucial opportunity to extend freedom ofexpression (with some, though less, attention to thethreat of Internet censorship).

The Internet, in other words, corresponded closely to thenon-governmental or anti-governmental tendencieswithin civil society. CSOs might be expected to defendfree-spirited, multilateral alternative models of interna-tional governance like the Internet Engineering TaskForce. At the same time, however, many in civil societyshared the resentment of developing countries at theapparent authority over the Internet held by the UnitedStates. This included its apparent authority over ICANN(in spite of the fact that ICANN’s governance model wasmore open to non-governmental stakeholders than, say,the ITU or its postal equivalent, the UPU). In general, civilsociety opinion here wanted to see both a reduction inUnited States influence (which was in line with develop-ing countries’ objectives) and a reduction (or at least noincrease) in government influence over the Internet(which was not), and certainly no increase in influencefor the (CSO-unfriendly) ITU (which some countries sawas the natural home for Internet governance, as it hadhistorically been for telecommunications).

This was quite a complex web. Interviewees suggested thattwo things were crucial to civil society’s effectivenesswithin the Internet governance debate.

One was the structure adopted for the WGIG, which is de-scribed in Chapter 6. This was a much more CSO-friendlystructure than the TFFM: one in which civil society was in-vited to select representatives, most of whom were ap-proved; where those representatives were given space tocontribute fully, on equal terms with representatives ofother stakeholder groups; and where civil society languagecontributed substantially to the final report. The WGIG wastherefore seen as a major advance for civil society influ-ence in an important international negotiation. This mayonly have been possible because governments alreadylacked authority over the Internet and so were more will-ing to concede space on it to other stakeholders – a pointdiscussed in Chapter 8 – but it had real value for civil soci-ety. In particular, it gave civil society advocates a muchstronger position of authority from which to lobby for theirlanguage during the final PrepComs of the second phase.

The second factor cited as crucial was the Internet Gov-ernance Caucus, which brought together civil society andother Internet specialists in common cause to argue in

favour of the broad objective of an Internet more free fromUS authority yet not subject to more governmental or in-ter-governmental control. This caucus had three advan-tages. Firstly, it contained a very high level of expertiseon the issues that it dealt with, coming from members ofthe Internet community. Secondly, many of its Internet-focused participants were used to working with eachother in other contexts. Thirdly, it benefited from the rela-tively similar views on the roles of governments and non-governmental actors which were shared by many in theInternet community with many within civil society organi-sations, especially those concerned with informationrights. The result was a powerful and authoritative cau-cus, which was well-equipped by its knowledge and rangeof skills to lobby effectively within what became an in-tensely political debate. Civil society engagement un-doubtedly helped to see off, at least within WSIS, pro-posals for a more authoritarian governance regime (whichwas also opposed by most industrial country govern-ments and the private sector); it helped secure agree-ment on the Internet Governance Forum as part of thepost-WSIS approach; it also contributed a significantamount of language to the final WSIS text on Internetgovernance, including the mandate of that Forum.

With hindsight, participants in this debate could argue quitestrongly for the benefits of constructive engagement in com-parison with, say, those of developing and issuing an alter-native civil society statement from the summit’s margins.

In the Geneva phase, civil society had a wider range ofissues to discuss. The whole character of the “informa-tion society” seemed up for grabs, and there were pointsof principle to argue on a wide range of issues aroundwhich civil society could coalesce. The hostility of manygovernment delegations to civil society presence also fos-tered a sense of community and solidarity. Civil societyinput focused on rights issues, and had relatively littleimpact on the text on development. These factors wereless apparent in the Tunis phase, which focused muchmore narrowly on Internet governance – an issue in whichcivil society found other ways of influencing outcomes(in the WGIG and through dialogue with government del-egates sharing many Internet community objectives). Themajority of civil society organisation and caucusing werealso weaker in the second phase, but the Internet Gov-ernance Caucus provided a powerful instrument whichcould be used, with significant success, to advance posi-tions commonly held within civil society.

The private sector

Before considering the lessons for civil society organisationsemerging from this experience, it is worth looking briefly atthe comparable experience of the private sector. As notedearlier, while the UN system makes little distinction between

8 5

the private sector and civil society, this is not the case withthe ITU, which has had private sector “Sector Members”closely involved in much of its work since the early 1990s.While not entirely uncontroversial within the ITU – somegovernments are very clear about the limits to private sec-tor involvement when final decisions are reached – thismight have been expected to give the business communityan inside track on representation. The hostility which ICTbusinesses actually experienced during the first PrepComof the first phase may have taken both business representa-tives and the ITU aback, and certainly did much to foster a“common cause of the excluded” with civil society.

Private sector participation in WSIS was dominated by theCoordinating Committee of Business Interlocutors (CCBI)which was made up of the International Chamber of Com-merce (ICC) and ten or more other international businessorganisations and individual firms. It was set up by itsmembers to act as “a vehicle through which to mobiliseand coordinate the involvement of the worldwide businesscommunity in the processes leading to and culminating inthe Summit.”44

Interviewees for this report from all sectors agree that theCCBI was highly effective at representing its members,though there was some criticism of lack of diversity in thecontent and presentation of business views when thesecould be formally put to PrepCom and plenary sessions. Oneadvantage of representation through the CCBI was that,because the membership of the ICC and its other member-organisations included non-ICT as well as ICT businesses, itwas able to put forward perspectives that reflected busi-ness interests across the board. However, in practice, it wasICT businesses that participated in the CCBI as in wider de-bate around WSIS. Some interviewees also questionedwhether the CCBI was able effectively to represent the viewsof a wider business community, in particular whether it hadsufficient understanding of the interests of small and me-dium sized businesses, and businesses based in develop-ing countries, as well as those of large international con-cerns. Business observers feel that it became more repre-sentative, in both passive and active senses, as the WSISprocess went on, though it was always disadvantaged bythe different rhythms of business and summit proceedings.

In terms of participation outside the CCBI, there were cleardistinctions between sections of the private sector thatwere and were not well represented – much as there werewith civil society. Not surprisingly, it was ICT businessesthat participated in lobbying and in exhibiting. Businessusers of ICTs, including major user groups like the financialservices sector, were poorly represented other than throughtheir membership of the CCBI and its constituent organisa-tions, in spite of the fact that they might be expected to beconsiderable beneficiaries of the “information society”.

Outside formal CCBI contributions, therefore, businessinput had a supplier rather than a consumer perspective.This added to the similar supply-led emphasis in WSISoverall, which resulted from the ITU’s management roleand the skewed nature of participation in national delega-tions. Even within the ICT sector, there was a marked dis-tinction between manufacturing businesses, which werewell represented, and service providers, which were lesslikely to be present, either in the exhibition areas or in thenegotiating space.

The exception, where service providers were concerned,was the presence of former national telecoms monopo-lies, particularly in developing country delegations. Manyof these are only partly private sector today if they are pri-vate sector at all. A consequence of this was that the busi-ness component present within developing country nego-tiating fora was primarily made up of the most conserva-tive and traditional part of the ICT sector – those busi-nesses holding fixed network telephony licences, many stillholding monopolies and/or controlled by state bureauc-racies. Few developing countries included significant rep-resentation from the mobile telecoms sector or from theInternet community within their delegations. Industrialcountries, however, were likely to have more such repre-sentatives, who usually shared perspectives on issues likemarket liberalisation and Internet governance with thegovernments in whose delegations they participated.

One section of the business community that was relativelypoorly represented, ironically, was the Internet community,especially Internet service providers (particularly from de-veloping countries) and those parts of the Internet commu-nity which do not fit straightforwardly into either businessor civil society categories - organisations such as Internetregistries, for example, which operate as, in effect, non-profitbusinesses. These latter organisations are intensely affectedby debates on Internet governance, and their under-repre-sentation was a potential weakness of the Internet govern-ance debate within WSIS. Those that did take part suggestedthat their peers failed to understand the potential signifi-cance for them, in the unregulated Internet, of an inter-gov-ernmental summit. If so, they were dangerously naïve. Inpractice, the relative openness of the WGIG, particularly itspublic sessions, did allow such Internet organisations tohave significant informal input, but even so the number ofparticipants from this community was small. As is often thecase, those who wish to promote multistakeholder par-ticipation need to take care to encourage the engagementof significant stakeholders with narrow interests whichmay not form part of broader discussions but which arefundamentally affected when these broad discussionstackle narrow questions.

CCBI and wider business input into WSIS focused on a smallrange of common objectives. Large businesses did not wantto see greater regulation, by and large, particularly44 From www.iccwbo.org/policy/ebitt/id2343/index.html.



over the Internet which they felt had delivered the goodsfor business because of the openness with which it hasdeveloped. In this, they have common cause with civil soci-ety and industrial country governments. They are stronglyin favour of private sector-led investment and of its facilita-tion through the privatisation and liberalisation of ICT mar-kets. They want light rather than intrusive regulation – regu-lation that will foster competition rather than imposing pub-lic policy obligations on them. They see themselves as con-tributing to development by their investment and pursuitof business objectives, not as instruments to be used bygovernments to deliver development outcomes. These views– confined to a much smaller range of WSIS issues thanthose expressed by civil society - were consistently articu-lated through the CCBI.

The relationship between civil society and the private sec-tor within WSIS was an interesting one. The early part ofthe first phase saw sustained attacks on the participationof both civil society and the private sector from a numberof governments, which led to the exclusion of both frommeetings at which they felt they had a right to be present.This common exclusion, interviewees from both campsobserved, built bonds of solidarity between civil societyand private sector groups, supported by a number of posi-tive personal relationships across the stakeholder divide.Although there was always going to be a distance betweencivil society and the private sector – both in the range ofissues they were interested in addressing and the perspec-tive from which these might be addressed – a significantdegree of partnership continued throughout the summit.Internet governance was another area in which civil soci-ety and the private sector had some common cause againstthe risk, as they saw it, of greater government control. Theimplications of this for the relationship between civil soci-ety and the private sector are discussed further in the fi-nal section of this chapter.

WSIS and multistakeholderism

The costs and benefits of participation in WSIS are stilldebated within civil society.

• Some participants from civil society feel that signifi-cant gains were made: some in terms of holding theline on information rights or inching towards a moreopen future for Internet governance; some in terms ofraising issues and advocacy of ICT rights and ICTs indevelopment; some in terms of building their own ca-pacity and understanding of ICT issues (and of sum-mit-style negotiations); some in terms of networking,in particular the building of bonds between civil soci-ety organisations that will be useful in the future.

• Others are more critical of the high costs involved inparticipation, in terms of both money and humanresources - the actual cost of being part of summit

processes, and the opportunity cost in other workwhich could not be undertaken as a result.

It is probably easiest just to say that the experience var-ied. Some organisations invested relatively little andgained a good deal; others feel the opposite was true. Onbalance, few think that the summit as a whole was thebest way of spending that amount of money, either in prin-ciple or in the specific context of the “information soci-ety”. A lot of money, many feel, was spent on pretty lim-ited outcomes. On the other hand, once a summit is de-clared, it is very difficult for many CSOs to opt out. Thosethat prioritise the issues under discussion see it either asan opportunity to press their cause or as a process fromwhich they cannot afford to be absent (though those whoseinterest is more marginal might so choose). While almostevery government will attend, therefore, civil society par-ticipation tends to be more skewed in favour of the alreadycommitted, and so less representative of civil society as awhole. (The relative absence of mainstream developmentNGOs has already been noted as a problem here.) Busi-ness organisations tend to take a more hard-headed view,based on the potential contribution of participation to thebottom line.

The desirability of multistakeholder participation in deci-sion-making is one of the more important structural issueswithin current thinking about international discourse. Anxi-ety about the representativeness of governments andabout their ability to cover all facets of any question hasled to significantly more widespread support for the viewthat other major stakeholders – essentially the businesscommunity and civil society – need to participate in na-tional decision-making and that their participation will sig-nificantly enhance its quality. In practice, governmentsshare authority with other social actors within nationaldecision-making spaces: with very rare exceptions, theydo not claim the monopoly on representation or authoritythat many governments claim at an international level.Some governments and inter-governmental organisations,however, also see value in incorporating the business com-munity and civil society alongside governments and inter-governmental organisations in international decision-mak-ing spaces, although their ability to advance this is con-strained by the hostility of governments which do not con-cede multistakeholder space at home or do not see thisas transferable into the international sphere.Other governments remain adamantly opposed to this di-lution of the exclusiveness of their authority.

WSIS has been cited, however, as a significant point withinthe longstanding debate about multistakeholderism withininternational decision-making. Certainly, the WSIS outcomedocuments strongly endorsed the principle of multistake-holderism. The Geneva Declaration of Principles includedwhat became known as the Geneva Principle on this:

8 7

We recognize that building an inclusive InformationSociety requires new forms of solidarity, partnershipand cooperation among governments and other stake-holders, i.e. the private sector, civil society and inter-national organizations. Realising that the ambitiousgoal of this Declaration - bridging the digital divide andensuring harmonious, fair and equitable developmentfor all - will require strong commitment by all stake-holders, we call for digital solidarity, both at nationaland international levels.45

The Tunis Agenda reiterated this principle, and incorpo-rated it in its proposals for following-up both Internet gov-ernance and general post-WSIS activities:

We are convinced that there is a need to initiate, andreinforce, as appropriate, a transparent, democratic,and multilateral process [concerning Internet govern-ance], with the participation of governments, privatesector, civil society and international organizations, intheir respective roles.46 …

We encourage the development of multi-stakeholderprocesses at the national, regional and internationallevels to discuss and collaborate on the expansion anddiffusion of the Internet as a means to support devel-opment efforts to achieve internationally agreed de-velopment goals and objectives, including the Millen-nium Development Goals.47 …

Building an inclusive development-oriented Informa-tion Society will require unremitting multi-stakeholdereffort. … Taking into account the multifaceted nature ofbuilding the Information Society, effective cooperationamong governments, private sector, civil society andthe United Nations and other international organiza-tions, according to their different roles and responsi-bilities and leveraging on their expertise, is essential.48

These statements went further than might have been ex-pected from other summits, though rhetoric did not nec-essarily imply implementation. Some civil society observ-ers were initially critical of the extent of multistakeholderparticipation governments accepted in the Multistake-holder Advisory Group set up to establish the InternetGovernance Forum – though the IGF itself, when it met inAthens in late 2006, paid exemplary attention to multi-stakeholder principles.

The rhetoric of the WSIS outcome documents does, how-ever, reflect what interviewees from all sectors recognisedas significantly greater multistakeholder participation inWSIS than in previous summits. The civil society bureaufor WSIS had significant responsibility for facilitating civil

society participation in PrepCom and summit sessions, per-haps more than it would otherwise have had because theITU lacked experience in handling civil society and its ways,while civil society’s own structures determined how andby whom the space available should be used. Civil societyand private sector speakers had more space in which tomake formal contributions in PrepComs and plenary ses-sions. More national delegations were more interested inliaising with other stakeholders over the issues, and non-governmental stakeholders themselves may have beenmore willing to lobby and to reach consensus – perhapsbecause this looked more possible – than to argue and tostate their opposition. At any rate, no-one thought thatWSIS set back the cause of multistakeholder participation.

The locus of greatest multistakeholder involvement sug-gests one of the reasons why this might be so. Much hasbeen made of the multistakeholder character of the WGIG,in particular the opportunity given to civil society to nomi-nate its own representatives and the openness createdwithin the WGIG’s internal debates by focusing these onindividual rather than representative participation. Every-one interviewed about their part in the WGIG felt thatstakeholder differences became less important as theGroup worked more intensively together and were not assignificant to the final outcome as would have been thecase if the WGIG had been conducted more traditionally.The question is not so much what was the effect of thismodus operandi, but why it happened and whether it setsa precedent for future summits or negotiations.

A couple of observations made by some of those involvedare important here.

• One is that governments may have been more willingto cede ground to other stakeholders in the case ofInternet governance because they had less to lose; infact, they did not actually hold the ground concernedin the first place, and they may have actually neededthe participation of other stakeholders in order torefashion an area of governance that was outside theircontrol. They would not, therefore, by implication, haveconsidered allowing so much multistakeholder partici-pation in an area of policy that was more traditionallyunder the control of governments and inter-govern-mental organisations, such as infrastructure finance.

• The other is that the WGIG methodology is particularlywell attuned to a particular set of problems. As an is-sue, Internet governance is both highly technical andhighly politicised. Many of those involved in the Internetgovernance debate combined entrenched views onwhat should happen with real ignorance of the techni-cal structures whose governance they discussed. Theinformal modus operandi adopted by chairman Desaiand secretary Kummer in these circumstances allowedpeople with strongly divergent views to learn from one


45 Geneva Declaration of Principles, section A, article 17.





another in a way that more formal proceedings (or con-sultants’ reports) would not have done, and so facili-tated coming together in both knowledge and under-standing of different perspectives. The implication hereis that other international issues which share this com-bination of technical complexity and politicisation maybe susceptible to similar ways of working – climatechange and genetically-modified foods spring to mind– but that these ways of working would have less im-pact on issues where technicalities are simpler and/orideological divisions are less profound.

Some of the particularities of Internet governance heremight apply more widely to information and communica-tion issues in general. WSIS may, in other words, offer moreof a precedent in how future ICT decisions are made with-out setting any precedent for other areas of internationaldiscourse.

Within the ICT sector, much is likely to depend on how themultistakeholder principles in the WSIS outcome docu-ments are translated into practice by, for example, theInternet Governance Forum and the action-line follow-upprocesses established by the Tunis Agenda. The GlobalAlliance, which follows on the work of the UN ICT TaskForce, has also inherited similar multistakeholder princi-ples. However, this does not necessarily have much im-pact on other international ICT decision-making fora.

The evidence reported in Chapters 5 and 6 suggests that,with the obvious exception of Internet governance bod-ies, the content of the WSIS outcome documents has nothad much impact on the issues being discussed withinthese pre-existing decision-making agencies: that WSISis, in practice, a one-off event; and that it had too little tosay with too little depth about the issues with which theyare concerned. There is little evidence to date, either, ofany of the multistakeholder principles adumbrated in theWSIS documents affecting the working methods of main-stream ICT agencies. For the present, the “Louder Voices”conclusions seem again to be maintained.

One inter-governmental agency that did find itself explor-ing its own representative structures as a result of WSIS,however, was the ITU. Although, when charged with run-ning WSIS, it had considerable experience of private sectorinvolvement in decision-making, it had little understandingof civil society. The ITU discussed a number of possible re-forms to its structure at its quadrennial Plenipotentiary Con-ference, held towards the end of 2006 in Antalya, Turkey,including the possibility of greater civil society involvement.Somewhat cautiously, the Antalya “Plenipot” resolved toinitiate a “study on the participation of all relevant stake-holders in the activities of the Union related to the WorldSummit on the Information Society.” This may or may notlead to greater space for meaningful civil society participa-tion; time will tell.49

At a national level, the evidence of most of the countrycase studies undertaken for this report does not show anysubstantial changes taking place within the WSIS perioditself. However, one of those case studies – that of Kenya– does show significantly greater engagement by civil so-ciety organisations in policymaking; and it is clear (e.g.from their WSIS delegations) that similar broadening didtake place in at least a few other countries. Many civil so-ciety participants do in fact feel that WSIS may have a sub-stantial impact on their ability to engage in national poli-cymaking debates, resulting from a combination of fac-tors – notably the experience they have had of engagingduring the WSIS process itself (in those countries wheresome multistakeholder participation did occur); the pos-sibility that national government officials will respond morepositively in future, given the emphasis on multistakehol-derism in the WSIS outcome documents; greater knowl-edge of the range of ICT issues which they have gainedthrough WSIS; and better networking with other civil soci-ety organisations and the Internet community within theircountries (as in Kenya). These observations relate to theICT sector rather than to civil society interaction with gov-ernment more generally.

As for international civil society networking, it is still earlyto say how extensively that may be affected by WSIS inthe long term. The first phase of WSIS undoubtedly sawthe building of many new partnerships and of consider-able esprit de corps among civil society participants. Withthe exception of those working on Internet governance,this tended to dissipate somewhat during the secondphase. Since WSIS ended, interviewees report, it has beenhard to maintain networks that were set up during WSIS,again with the exception of relationships around Internetgovernance where there is still a good deal of momentumto events. The implications of all of the findings in thischapter for future civil society engagement with the issuesare discussed in Chapter 8. �

49 The “Plenipot” resolution is at www.itu.int/council/groups/pp06-plen7.html. A review of the ITU’s activity post-WSIS can be foundin the chapter by D. MacLean in Global Information Society Watch,first report, APC, forthcoming.

8 9

¬ E-government

¬ E-business

¬ E-learning

¬ E-health

¬ E-employment

¬ E-environment

¬ E-agriculture

¬ E-science

¬ UNDP/ITU

¬ WTO/UNCTAD/ITU/UPU

¬ UNESCO/ITU/UNIDO

¬ WHO/ITU

¬ ILO/ITU

¬ WHO/WMO/UNEP/UN-Habitat/ITU/ICAO

¬ FAO/ITU

¬ UNESCO/ITU/UNCTAD

Action LineAction LineAction LineAction LineAction Line Possible moderators / facilitarosPossible moderators / facilitarosPossible moderators / facilitarosPossible moderators / facilitarosPossible moderators / facilitaros

C1. The role of public governance authorities ECOSOC/UN Regional Commissions/ITUand all stakeholders in the promotionof ICTs for development

C2. Information and communication ITUinfrastructure

C3. Access to information and knowledge ITU/UNESCO

C4. Capacity building UNDP/UNESCO/ITU/UNCTAD

C5. Building confidence and security ITUin the use of ICTs

C6. Enabling environment ITU/UNDP/UN REGIONAL COMMISSIONS/UNCTAD

C7. ICT Applications

C8. Cultural diversity and identity, linguistic UNESCOdiversity and local content

C9. Media UNESCO

C10. Ethical dimensions of the Information UNESCO/ECOSOCSociety

C11. International and regional cooperation UN regional commissions/UNDP/ITU/UNESCO/ECOSOC

RESPONSIBILITY FOR WSIS ACTION LINES, AS ALLOCATED BY THE TUNIS AGENDA


9 1

Recommendations

s e c t i o n c

Conclusions and recommendationsc h a p t e r 8

This final chapter is divided as follows:

• It begins with a summary of the findings set out in theearlier chapters and a brief set of conclusions aboutthe overall impact of WSIS on developing countries andcivil society.

• It then raises a number of issues and challenges fac-ing different stakeholders, particularly in developingcountries and in civil society.

• Finally, it makes a series of recommendations aboutactions which might be taken to enhance participa-tion by these stakeholders. These recommendationsare comparable in purpose to those in the 2002“Louder Voices” report.

While the content of this entire report is the responsibilityof its author, this is even more true of these conclusionsand recommendations, which are intended as much fordiscussion within APC as beyond it.

Conclusions

From 2001 to the end of 2005, WSIS dominated interna-tional discussion of some important ICT issues. While itdid not cover the full range of questions that might be

considered part of the “information society”, by anymeans, it did bring a large number of people together todiscuss some important aspects of this, particularly – itssecretariat would suggest – the role of ICTs in develop-ment. What did it achieve?

It was suggested in Chapter 4 that summits are almostalways described as “successes” or “great successes”. Tobe considered “failures”, they have to fail most abjectly:people are reluctant to accept that they have invested somuch time and money to achieve little or nothing. WSIS isnot widely regarded as a failure, nor as a “great success”.Opinion varies about just how much was achieved, but thenearest approximation to an average of opinion amonginterviewees for this project would be, perhaps, that it was“modestly successful”. How and where might this be so?

It is important, first, to recognise how narrowly WSISavoided failure. The first summit preparatory process wasminutes away from collapse over the issue of the DigitalSolidarity Fund at the end of its final reconvened PrepCom.For much of the final stages of negotiations during thesecond phase, many participants did not expect sufficientcompromise to be achieved on Internet governance. Ei-ther of these circumstances could have gone the otherway, and, if they had, WSIS would have been considered

S e c t i o n C . R e com m e n dat i o n s


a failure indeed. Of course, brinkmanship like this is notunusual in challenging international fora, and many fac-tors affect each forum’s ability to progress beyond differ-ences to some form of consensus. Much of the responsi-bility for the compromise reached on each occasion withinWSIS seems to have been due to the high degree of pres-sure to avoid failure; some to the skill of individuals (in-cluding meeting chairs) in securing compromise.

So, to some degree, the “success” of WSIS could be saidprimarily to lie in avoiding failure. Significant, if not over-whelming, change could be said to have occurred in thetwo major areas of dispute whose resolution preoccupiedthe second phase – infrastructure finance and Internetgovernance.

In the case of infrastructure finance, although this wasprobably underestimated at the time, the report of the TaskForce on Financial Mechanisms and the pressure whichdeveloping countries applied over the Digital SolidarityFund led to movement in the focus of debate on ICT infra-structure finance. For the first time in a decade, the devel-opment establishment began to review the relationshipbetween public and private finance in this sector, includ-ing the potential role of IFI and donor funds. This is begin-ning to mesh with reconsideration of the legal and regula-tory frameworks required for ICT infrastructure develop-ment in a new phase of ICT restructuring (built around thedeployment of new wireless and broadband networksrather than the privatisation and liberalisation of fixed linetelecoms). In years to come, WSIS and the TFFM may beseen as playing a pivotal role here; perhaps as being atipping point. “Modest success” may, in due course, de-velop into something more. On the other hand, it may not.

In the case of Internet governance, different observers havedifferent views. Some think that WSIS took a significantstep in shifting the balance of power within the Internet,though with little immediate effect. Others think that noth-ing changed. Most people on both sides (all sides) of theargument left Tunis fairly happy with the outcome – whichimplied that the argument would continue in the new forathat the summit established: the Internet Governance Fo-rum and whatever mechanisms define “enhanced coop-eration”. Experience in the year following WSIS was mixed.The meaning of “enhanced cooperation” remained unclear,while the first meeting of the Internet Governance Forumlargely eschewed this controversy in favour of developingbroader understanding of Internet issues and differencesof opinion on them (in which it was notably successful).WSIS therefore did not transform Internet governance, butit has created more space for debate. How that space willbe used is yet open to question.

One way of looking at this is to see WSIS not as a revolu-tionary moment in Internet development but as a step inthe long-term evolution of the Internet. The Internet was,after all, originally, designed in and for the United States

military. Governance and authority over its developmenthave expanded outwards from that narrow origin to include- successively - academics, geeks and commercial busi-nesses. The “Internet community” resulting from this hasdeveloped organically rather than by the fiat of any gov-ernment authority, national or international. Decisionsabout the development of Internet standards are madecollectively by groups, often made up of individuals ratherthan representatives, on a basis of mutual tolerance andintolerance: attention is paid to the competent while theincompetent speak to themselves alone. Where more for-mal governance is required, as with domain names, com-promises were reached between this essentially non-gov-ernmental structure and the statutory authority requiredfor enforcement.

All evolving governance processes build on legacies; theyretain vestiges of what was present in the past. Like con-stitutional monarchy in Western Europe, these vestiges cansimultaneously be symbolic and retain significant roles orinfluence. They can be displaced either by revolution orevolution. The last twenty-five years of Internet develop-ment can be seen as the gradual evolution of the Internetfrom an instrument of US polity to a global resource - andthe same can be said of Internet governance. Authorityhas gradually moved away from the United States as theInternet has developed, and can be expected to continuemoving further away as the Internet becomes more trulyglobal in character (in infrastructure, content and userbase). Nevertheless, features of Internet governance re-sulting from its legacy remain, and ICANN’s status, andthat of the root server system, vis-à-vis the US governmentare among these. At present, they are both symbolic and(potentially) significant. Over time, evolution of theInternet, particularly its globalisation, are likely to makethem more wholly symbolic and less truly significant; how-ever, at present they are certainly considered both in manycountries, particularly developing countries - and there-fore a threat to national sovereignty.

It seems important, looking at this from the perspective ofthose countries, not to confuse two separate issues whichare often confused in this debate: the authority of the UnitedStates vis-à-vis other countries in respect of Internet gov-ernance (an issue of sovereignty and international relations);and the authority of governments over the Internet (an is-sue of national governance, particularly the balance ofpower between the citizen and the state). Many govern-ments in WSIS pursued both an increase in governmentalauthority and a decrease or removal of the perceived legacypowers of the United States. Industrial countries and theprivate sector were much less concerned about the US’legacy powers, but more concerned to avoid increased regu-lation of the Internet, national or international. Civil societyorganisations tended to favour diminution of US legacy pow-ers and avoidance of increased regulation (though, in theircase, on grounds of citizens’ rather than business rights).

9 3

There were, therefore, a lot of different objectives cuttingacross these two central (national and international) dimen-sions of Internet governance.

The argument during WSIS over Internet governance - andparticularly over ICANN and root servers - can be seen asan attempt to remove the remaining US powers over theInternet, and so globalise Internet regulation at a stroke.This would have been a revolutionary moment in the de-velopment of Internet - the equivalent, say, of the cometlandfall that ended the Cretaceous era or the end of theancien régime in France in 1789. The difficulty with it forindustrial countries and the private sector was not that itwould have diminished US authority (though that was anissue in the United States) but that it would have increasedregulatory intervention in the Internet, since it implied re-locating authority over aspects of the Internet from placeswhere they were merely potentially subject to governmentintervention (by the US) to places where they would beactively subject to regulation by either new or existingbodies (such as the ITU). Industrial countries and the pri-vate sector were particularly averse to the possibility ofITU-style regulation and standard-setting being imposedon the Internet, where they thought it would constrainrather than facilitate the dynamic innovation that has madeit so successful.

The “enhanced cooperation” approach advocated by theEuropean Union and adopted in the Tunis final documentscan be seen in this context as an endorsement of evolu-tionary change. This perhaps explains why so many par-ties to this dispute could consider themselves to be victo-rious (or at least not to be defeated). It allowed Internetgovernance conservatives in the United States to retain asense of US leadership; radicals in developing countriesto retain the prospect of building a new, more inter-gov-ernmental (and more interventionist) model of Internetgovernance; and proponents of gradual change to envis-age a continuation of the laissez-faire “governance-lite”approach which they prefer. The likelihood is that “en-hanced cooperation”, if it means anything, will mean thecontinued gradual diminution of the United States’ effec-tive superior power over the Internet which has been tak-ing place for the past twenty-five years, without its beingreplaced by an inter-governmental agency along the linesof the UN model; but this will continue to be a process ofgradual evolution.

This suggests, then, that WSIS may seem, with hindsight,to have a lasting legacy in both infrastructure finance andInternet governance. Would the developments concernedhave happened anyway without WSIS intervening? Opin-ion on this, too, is divided, but the consensus is probablythat the status quo in both cases was becoming unsustain-able anyway and that it would therefore need to be ad-dressed; i.e. that the existing mechanisms for infrastruc-ture finance would be stretched too far by the potential of

new networks and that the pressures for change in Internetgovernance arrangements were building up to a point wherethey could ultimately erupt. In both cases, this suggests,WSIS may have brought forward changes that were likelyto come about, one way or another, within the medium term.It may not, however, have been the most cost-effective wayof doing so, or more likely to achieve outcomes as good asthose that might be achievable through other fora.

As for development, the content of the WSIS outcome docu-ments – as discussed in Chapter 5 – is thin. Far more ar-ticulate, incisive, memorable and useful statements of thepotential (and limitations) of ICTs in development were pro-duced during the WSIS period by individual multilateral or-ganisations (the World Bank, the UNDP, UNESCO, GKP etc.),donor governments (DFID, SDC, etc.) and developing coun-try governments (a succession of ICT strategies which,though sometimes criticised for being over-ambitious, gen-erally had a much more analytical and cohesive feel thanthe Geneva Plan of Action). ICD specialists interviewed forthis project were generally disparaging of the content ofthe WSIS outcome documents, thought these alreadylooked substantially outdated, and did not think them use-ful in persuading mainstream development sector col-leagues of the merits of ICTs. In the twenty years beforeWSIS, the Maitland Commission’s 1984/5 report “The Miss-ing Link” was increasingly often cited in discussion aboutthe evolution of thinking on ICD, though it would seem morerarely read by those that cited it.1 The WSIS outcome docu-ments may come to share this fate.

WSIS does not seem to have changed much, therefore, inthe content of the ICD debate, though this has clearlymoved on in other areas. The World Bank and others arerethinking some of the policy and regulatory issues asso-ciated with enabling frameworks. The UNDP and othersare focusing on building more effective approaches tomainstreaming, built around better understanding be-tween ICT and mainstream professionals. Donor countriesare reviewing – and in some cases reducing – their com-mitment to ICD. Developing countries are beginning to in-tegrate ICTs more substantively into Poverty ReductionStrategies and similar documents. However, these havenot been WSIS-driven processes so much as processesdriven by the same enthusiasm for ICD which led to WSISin the first place. They would, most development special-ists seem to think, have happened anyway; and some thinkthat WSIS may have slowed down their development byfocusing debate on a rather limited range of perceptionsthat were pulled together during its first year.

Where WSIS does seem to have had an effect on the ICDdebate, according to interviewees, is in awareness and innetworking. Developing country interviewees, in particular,


1 It was virtually impossible, before WSIS, to find a copy online,and there were few print copies available.


felt that WSIS had increased substantially the informationand knowledge available to them, to their colleagues andfellow participants, and thereby to decision-makers in gen-eral within their countries. They felt this better understand-ing would improve the quality of decision-making and thatthe wider range of engagement in ICTs resulting from WSIS,which varied in scale from country to country, would alsohelp to make decision-making more inclusive. This view issupported by evidence from some, but not all, of the coun-try case studies undertaken for this report. In terms ofnetworking, participants undoubtedly gained considerablyfrom greater access to a wider range of experience andexpertise, and this helped to build a broader base for net-working support in future. Civil society, in particular, gainedfrom this aspect of the summit. However, networks requiremaintenance if weak as well as strong relationships are tosurvive the end of summits. WSIS does not have self-sus-taining networks extending beyond its own life, with theexception (in a sense) of the Internet Governance Forum,and the value of this networking will tend to dissipate un-less other networks can build upon it. There are candidatesfor this role; whether they succeed in taking up the oppor-tunity is to be seen.

The above paragraphs suggest that WSIS had a limited butsignificant impact in certain policy areas. What it did not dowas substantially address many other areas of what couldbe considered the “information society”. It tended to as-sume that there were powerful links between ICT invest-ment and economic growth, but did not explore this rela-tionship, where it was most likely or how it might be fos-tered, in the sense that these issues have been consideredby the OECD. It described a range of positive potential so-cial impacts of ICTs but had little to say about the risks, inparticular where relations between the state and citizen areconcerned. Discussion about rights was largely basedaround the defence of established freedoms of expression,rather than changes and potential conflicts which may ariseas a result of widespread use of new technologies. WSISwas, in other words, seen by most of its participants as anopportunity to advocate the use of ICTs rather than to ex-plore their implications for the future; to propose an infor-mation society than to try and understand one.

Which, in a sense, takes the discussion back to the originsof WSIS itself. As pointed out in Chapters 3 and 4, the origi-nal resolution of the ITU “Plenipot” was not necessarilythought to mean a summit of the kind that eventually tran-spired. At the time, many thought it meant a smaller scaleevent involving heads of state and experts, drawing up areport for consultation. Summits, historically, have beenlarge scale events which address big problems for whichbroad and universal agreements are required on the bestways to move forward. They are not good at developing un-derstanding in depth, particularly of complex issues whichpose new challenges. Smaller fora are better at that, some-thing which the WGIG demonstrated. It is interesting to

speculate, in hindsight, whether a more sophisticated andmore lasting outcome might have been achieved by a com-bination of the summit with an international commissionthat investigated the issues with depth and rigour.

To summarise the views of interviewees on WSIS as a whole(insofar as this is possible). It had limited achievements,but was not a failure. It advanced some debates, but didnot address others. It cost a great deal of money, and thecosts of future summits to their participants should be morecarefully considered before they are agreed. (In particular,a two-stage summit was unnecessary. The difficult issuesof infrastructure finance and Internet governance mighthave been resolved during the first summit if the secondhad not opened up the opportunity for delay. The secondsummit added nothing to the first except a resolution ofthese issues.) On balance, there were gains, but they couldalmost certainly have been achieved at lesser cost.

Challenges and recommendations:developing countries

Developing country participation in WSIS is discussed inChapter 6. This analysis suggests that developing coun-tries played a more prominent part in WSIS than indus-trial countries, though primarily because the latter lackedincentives to prioritise the summit. Developing country par-ticipation, however, was led by what might be describedas the telecommunications establishment – ministries ofcommunications, telecommunications regulators and fixednetwork operators – in cooperation with the diplomats nor-mally involved in inter-governmental drafting. Little partwas played in most developing country participation by newICT sectors (mobile businesses and the Internet commu-nity), broadcasters, mainstream development ministries orcivil society. A distinction was also apparent between asmall number of larger and economically more powerfuldeveloping countries, possessed of substantial ICT exper-tise and able to exert significant influence either alone orin partnership with one another; and smaller, weaker de-veloping countries, particularly LDCs, who found it moredifficult to press their agenda. Aside from the overall de-velopment text, which was largely bland and insubstan-tial, developing countries pressed for two objectives, nei-ther of which was fully achieved though each had partialoutcomes in the direction sought: the Digital SolidarityFund, which generated some new approaches to infrastruc-ture finance; and the removal of US authority over ICANNand the root-server system, which led to some movementin the evolution of Internet governance.

Developing country delegates did agree, however, thatthey and their countries gained substantially in network-ing, information and awareness from the WSIS experience,and that this would have lasting implications for nationaldecision-making.

9 5

The “Louder Voices” report listed a number of reasons whydeveloping countries lacked influence in international ICTdecision-making. These included, in particular, those setout in the box below.

As a summit, WSIS was of course very different from thenormal run of international decision-making fora; it dealtin generalities, not specifics; was of less critical interestto industrial countries; tended to politicise issues ratherthan to focus on technical solutions. It seems therefore,this report suggests, to have had relatively little impacton permanent ICT decision-making fora – though increasedawareness of the issues may encourage greater develop-ing country participation in those fora in the future.

At the international level:At the international level:At the international level:At the international level:At the international level:

a. Lack of easy, affordable and timely access toinformation about ICT-related issues, deci-sion-making fora and processes.

b. Logistical problems, including the frequencyand location of international meetings and re-strictions on participation (for example, byprivate sector and civil society experts).

c. Ineffective use of financial resources availableto support participation.

At the national level:At the national level:At the national level:At the national level:At the national level:

a. Lack of policy awareness, at all levels of gov-ernment and citizenship, of the potential roleof ICTs in development.

b. Lack of technical and policy capacity on ICT is-sues, particularly in respect of emerging tech-nologies and new policy areas - such as mi-gration from circuit-switched to IP networksand indeed Internet issues in general.

c. Weaknesses in national and regional policy-making processes, including:

i. Lack of political leadership

ii. Absence of national ICT strategies

iii. Ineffective coordination between differ-ent government departments and agen-cies with ICT responsibilities

iv. Lack of private sector and civil society par-ticipation in national decision-making

v. Inadequate preparation for internationalmeetings

vi. Ineffective use of financial and humanresources.

Developing countries had less challenge participating inWSIS than they do in the wider range of ICT negotiations.Summits are, self-evidently, important. Presidents andheads of government expect their countries to be repre-sented. UN agencies invite broad participation. All coun-tries have missions in New York to facilitate their repre-sentation in other UN summits; most countries (thoughnot all) had missions in Geneva which could facilitatetheirs in WSIS. Although expensive, developing countriesalmost universally, therefore, attended WSIS and playedsome part in it: speaking in plenary sessions, participat-ing in caucuses, etc. Very few countries did not attendthe plenary summit events (174 out of the UN’s 192 mem-ber-states had official delegations in Geneva, 168 in Tu-nis). Participation in PrepComs was a little sparser (143national delegations attended the first PrepCom of thefirst phase, for example; 149 the second PrepCom of thesecond phase), and delegations were considerablysmaller, but nevertheless a considerable majority of gov-ernments took part. Although it was expensive, themoney for participation was found; the logistics chal-lenges were overcome.

If the international factors described in the box above werenot so prominent in WSIS, many of the national factorsconcerned were apparent. What impact did the WSIS ex-perience have on these?

Firstly, WSIS did, by all accounts, increase awareness ofthe potential of ICTs in development amongst governmentofficials and, to a lesser extent, other parts of the com-munity. Government officials were directly involved inWSIS, and required to demonstrate that governmentswere taking WSIS issues seriously; and demonstrate thisthey therefore sought to do. Almost all developing coun-try interviewees for this report felt that greater aware-ness had been achieved and would have an impact in thefuture. However, this did not reach far down the decision-making ladder. Media attention to WSIS, in most coun-tries, was minimal. The absence of multistakeholder en-gagement in WSIS policymaking, in many countries,meant that the breadth of awareness and informationtransfer was less than it might have been. In a fast-mov-ing sector such as ICTs, too, knowledge rapidly falls outof date.

Secondly, while WSIS was not primarily concerned with tech-nical detail, it did provide spaces in which greater policyand technical expertise could be acquired by developingcountry representatives. This was partly a result of WSISdiscussions – it would be difficult to engage seriously inthe Internet governance debate without acquiring somegreater understanding of Internet governance issues – andpartly of the opportunity to network with regional expertsfrom other countries. However, the overall policy focus andthe politicisation of WSIS debate probably meant that lesscapacity was built than might have been.



Developing countries were stronger and better repre-sented in WSIS than they were in the other ICT decision-making fora assessed in “Louder Voices”. Nevertheless,interviews and country case studies for this report sug-gest, many of the same weaknesses were to be found innational and regional policymaking processes.

• While political leadership in some countries was strong– Senegal is a good example – in many countries WSISwas left in the hands of the telecommunications es-tablishment rather than those of central government.While ministers may have been involved, these werenot usually powerful ministers; and the attention paidto WSIS by the most important centres of government,such as ministries of finance, was weak.

• National ICT strategies have been developed in manycountries in the years since the “Louder Voices” re-port was published. However, as noted in Chapter 5,they are often poorly integrated into Poverty Reduc-tion Strategies and other national development plans.The predominance of the telecommunications estab-lishment in participation at WSIS meant that relativelylittle of the development debate there fed back intomainstream development activity in-country; and, inmany countries, mainstream development concernswere poorly articulated in policy debate concerningWSIS.

• Both interviews and country case studies suggestthat ineffective coordination between government de-partments continued during WSIS. As well as havinglittle or no mainstream development participation inWSIS meetings, many countries appear to have un-dertaken little in the way of policy coordination onWSIS issues at a national level. With some notableexceptions, country presentations at WSIS offeredthe perspective from the communications ministryrather than an holistic view of ICTs and developmentacross the board.

• Some developing countries – including Kenya, amongthe country case studies for this report – opened upnew spaces for participation by the private sector andcivil society in national decision-making. However,this experience does not appear to have been verywidely shared, in spite of significant efforts to secureparticipation by civil society in quite a number ofcountries.

The challenges for developing countries in future interna-tional ICT decision-making are therefore likely to remainmuch as they were at the time of the “Louder Voices” re-port:

• Lack of awareness of the potential (and limitations) ofICTs in much of the political establishment and in so-ciety more generally

• Lack of technical and policy capacity, particularly inareas of emerging technology, and lack of capacity toassess the likely impact and cost-effectiveness of ICTreforms and ICD interventions

• Lack of integration between national ICT strategies andnational development plans such as Poverty Reduc-tion Strategies

• Poor knowledge management, in particular inad-equate coordination between government depart-ments responsible for the ICT sector and for main-stream development objectives

• Lack of private sector and civil society (multistake-holder) input into decision-making – a result both oftheir absence from official decision-making processesand of their own limited capacity

• Inadequate preparation for international meetings,including the lack of coordination with regional part-ners

• Ineffective use of financial and human resources.

Effective participation in international decision-makingfora is a highly complex matter, illustrated by the follow-ing graphic derived from the “Louder Voices” report:2

The illustration might be summarised as follows. Effectivedelegations benefit from powerful and coherent nationaland regional policy formulation processes which identifypriority issues, coordinate and synthesise the views of dif-ferent stakeholders and establish a position which can besustained through lobbying and negotiation over theweeks and months preceding a decision as well as at thedecision-making meeting itself. These policy formulationprocesses are in turn underpinned by deep policy struc-tures – the analytical capabilities that allow policymakersto understand the implications of different options andchoose the most effective strategies for their countries.Without this comprehensive range of tools, participationin international fora will be weak.

It will always be difficult for developing countries to securethis degree of complexity and comprehensiveness in poli-cymaking, not least because expert human resources arein short supply, but this does not mean that much cannotbe done to improve the quality of representation. One keyissue is prioritisation. Major industrial countries need thislevel of policymaking across the board because they havedeep interests in many different areas of ICT policy. Devel-oping countries, by and large, have fewer interests. Theycan afford to prioritise – to identify the limited range ofissues on which decisions are sufficiently significant for

2 The following paragraphs draw on an article entitled “Louder Voicesand the International Debate on Developing Country Participation inICT Decision-Making”, to be published in William J. Drake & Ernest J.Wilson III, eds. Governing Global Electronic Networks: InternationalPerspectives on Policy and Power. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press,forthcoming in 2007.

9 7

Decision-making processes

Policy formulation and implementation

Deep policy structures

Policy assessment Policy research & analysis

Issue identification Formulation of options Coordination Implementation

Evaluation

Agenda Setting Proposals Decisions

them to invest substantial resources, and to focus explic-itly on those issues: developing the policy capacity re-quired to have an impact, involving the full range of stake-holders in national policymaking. They can also seek tosecure the support of regional peers and wider develop-ing country groupings which can have more impact if theyact collectively in informal as well as formal decision-mak-ing gatherings, and provide fuller support to the delegateor delegates attending all of the fora involved.

Interviewees for the “Louder Voices” study believed thatit was more valuable for a developing country to have realinfluence in two or three areas of real significance to itthan to have an ineffective presence in a larger number ofdecision-making processes – particularly if the lead roleon different issues of importance could be shared betweencountries within a region, with each developing appropri-ate expertise on behalf of the regional group as a whole.They were also clear, however, that far too littleprioritisation along these lines took place, and that avail-able expertise was currently spread too thinly and too in-discriminately to have the impact that their governmentsdesired. WSIS may have helped developing country del-egations to improve their understanding of issues and theirnetworks, but this analysis was not disputed by interview-ees for this study.

The cost of participation remains, of course, a major factorinhibiting developing country participation in internationalfora. It was among the factors identified by intervieweesfor the “Louder Voices” report, although a number madeclear their feeling that resources could and would be foundto support participation, at least within governments, if the

issues involved were considered sufficiently important.Many also expressed concern about the poor utilisationof funds made available to support participation by inter-governmental organisations (IGOs) concerned about de-veloping countries’ under-representation. Some fellow-ships – i.e. funding for travel and participation costs – wereavailable to some developing countries to facilitate par-ticipation in WSIS (as they are, for example, within the ITU).However, the attendance lists for WSIS show that somedeveloping country governments sent very large delega-tions irrespective of cost.3 Civil society participation fromdeveloping countries was more substantially inhibited bycost than government delegations.

Overall, then, it is suggested that the “Louder Voices” rec-ommendations concerning developing country participa-tion in permanent ICT decision-making fora stand todaymuch as they did in 2002. These include recommendationsto both international fora themselves and developing coun-tries participating in them. In particular (quotations fromthe earlier report in italics; amended text and additionsunitalicised):

1. International ICT fora should

¬ promote awareness of the potential and limi-tations which ICTs have by providing compre-hensive, publicly-accessible, non-technical in-formation on the relevance of their activitiesto the development agenda;

3 See Annex 1.



¬ provide independent, authoritative technical/policy research and analysis of major issuesto be decided;

¬ hold meetings in developing regions in a waythat minimises travel costs for developingcountry participants;

¬ avoid simultaneous scheduling of importantevents;

¬ ensure that their procedures allow all sourcesof developing country policy and technical ca-pacity to participate in decision-making,whether they come from government, the pri-vate sector or not-for-profit organisations.

• Developing country governments:

¬ should take action to:

> improve information flows and policy co-ordination between different governmentdepartments and agencies with ICT respon-sibilities and those with mainstream devel-opment roles;

> promote informed public discussion anddebate through both general and special-ised media;

> include all relevant stakeholders in policy-making on an issue-by-issue basis andthrough permanent consultation fora;

> encourage participation of experts from theprivate sector and civil society in nationaldelegations to international decision-mak-ing fora;

¬ and should review their current practices withrespect to meeting preparation, delegate se-lection, participation, accountability and fol-low-up with a view to ensuring that these prac-tices result in the most effective use of finan-cial resources through the optimum deploy-ment and development of technical and policycapacity.

Capacity-building is, of course, crucial to success in thisarea, and a specific recommendation concerning capac-ity-building, related to both developing countries and civilsociety, is included towards the end of this chapter.

Challenges and recommendations:civil society

Civil society participation in WSIS is discussed in Chapter7. It was, in many ways, substantially more effective thanin comparable previous summits because more space wasmade available for it within the summit’s formal structure.

Being more engaged in the formal processes, civil societyorganisations were able to make more gains, notably inthe inclusion of some text in the final outcome documents.There was less oppositionalism from civil society than seenat many summits, and civil society did not issue a collec-tive critique of the WSIS experience until a month afterthe event. Civil society organisations also gained substan-tially through opportunities for networking (during theextended, four-year, preparatory process) and for informa-tion sharing and improving understanding (through theexhibitions and “informal summits” accompanying eachmain summit session). However, civil society participationwas uneven: Southern CSOs were under-represented com-pared with Northern CSOs, especially during PrepComs;and mainstream development NGOs were conspicuous bytheir absence, undermining the credibility of much civilsociety input on development questions.

Issues concerning civil society participation at the nationallevel have been considered in the previous chapter. At theinternational level, the challenges raised for civil societyby the summit – and by comparable future events – seemto fall into two main categories: concerning whether to par-ticipate, and how to do so.

The former relates largely to the cost and cost-effectivenessof participation. The cost of taking part in international de-cision-making processes is high – as described for devel-oping countries in the previous section. Participation inWSIS involved not merely a presence at two plenary sum-mit sessions – that alone was expensive, but would havegained no influence on its own – but involvement in a four-year process, including a substantial number of internationalmeetings and all of the interaction required with other civilsociety organisations in order to make participation worth-while. The diagram derived from “Louder Voices”, which isincluded in the previous section, is as relevant to civil soci-ety participation as it is to that of developing countries.

No civil society organisation can afford to take a decisionto spend so many resources on one activity with ease. Fewdeveloping country civil society organisations, in particu-lar, can afford to do so, unless they are sponsored by do-nors. The costs alone therefore dictate that only the best-endowed and the most determined civil society organisa-tions will play a full part in a summit like WSIS (especiallyif, as in WSIS, a two-phase approach effectively doublesthe cost). Civil society participation is therefore alwayslikely to be skewed as described above. Assessments ofcost-effectiveness also come into play. In practice, in WSIS,civil society organisations focusing on information rightsand ICD were more likely to see engagement in WSIS asmore cost-effective for them than civil society organisa-tions primarily concerned with mainstream rights or de-velopment issues. Mainstream development organisationsalso had another, bigger priority: the Millennium ReviewSummit, which also took place in 2005.

9 9

The first challenge for civil society, therefore, concerns whatit collectively can do to correct the distortions in civil societyparticipation arising from this skewed representation. Thischallenge has two dimensions (in addition to issues concern-ing the social representation of participation, e.g. by gender):

• Firstly, at an international level, there is the dimensionof geography. Civil society participation in WSIS wasless representative of the South than participation inofficial delegations. This under-representation of theSouth was more marked in PrepComs - and so in inputto negotiations - than at the summits themselves. It wasreinforced by the greater likelihood that Northern gov-ernments undertook formal or informal consultationprocesses than that Southern governments did so, andby the higher technical and negotiating skill levels inNorthern than in Southern civil society. It is even moremarked in WSIS follow-up processes. This underminescivil society’s claim to speak on behalf of the disadvan-taged within negotiations. (At national level, it is paral-leled by the over-representation of metropolitan andthe under-representation of provincial civil society innational decision-making processes.)

• Secondly, at both national and international levels,there is the dimension of thematic diversity. Discus-sions at WSIS potentially affected a wide range of civilsociety organisations - in particular, those involveddirectly in ICTs, those concerned with rights issues,those working in mainstream development. In prac-tice, at both national and international levels, main-stream development NGOs had very little involvementin civil society engagement with WSIS. This was as trueof industrial as of developing countries. The result wasthat civil society input into WSIS’ discussions on theapplication of ICTs in mainstream development lackedmainstream development NGO participation.

One response to this challenge has been to appeal for ex-ternal funding of civil society participants, but this includesthe risks discussed above in respect of developing coun-try participation. Also, while it addresses the question ofcost, it does not address that of cost-effectiveness. If anorganisation does not consider it cost-effective to use itsperson-time to attend a meeting, paying for it to do so doesnot make it cost-effective.

Turning next to a second challenge. The central questionconcerning how to participate, in past summits, has tendedto be a choice between participation within the mainstream of discussion and declamation from without. Ex-clusion from the main decision-making forum in past sum-mits has encouraged the latter, but WSIS offered more par-ticipation space “within the tent” than its predecessorshad done. Civil society’s demand for multistakeholder in-volvement in decision-making – not just in summits, butalso in permanent decision-making fora like the ITU or WTO– implies that civil society as a whole wishes to move from

outside the tent to inside, from a position of opposition toa position of constructive engagement. This in turn raisesa number of challenges for civil society, in particular con-cerning unity of purpose and representational character.It is worth looking in more detail at the implications ofmultistakeholderism in order to address these.

Multistakeholder participation in decision-making mightbe said to do three things:

• To supplement democratic input

• To improve the quality of understanding of particularissues and the concerns of particular groups, whichare otherwise marginal to decision-making processes

• To improve the quality of decision-making and the con-sent of citizens to decisions made.

These advantages of multistakeholder engagement in de-cision-making are recognised within the shared decision-making structures in most national contexts, but less rec-ognised in international decision-making.

Civil society advocacy of multistakeholder processes,within WSIS and elsewhere, has been built around thedemand for a voice - to supplement the democratic articu-lation of public opinion in more democratic societies; tosubstitute for it in societies that are less democratic; toensure the articulation of minority as well as majority,marginalised as well as advantaged, concerns and views,etc. The absence of a voice is the immediate issue; lessattention has (naturally enough) been paid to the use thatcould be made of it if and when multistakeholder proc-esses are put in place.

The purpose of a voice, however, is not simply to articu-late an alternative perspective to that held by government,business or any other stakeholder, but to engage in politi-cal debate with them and seek to achieve shifts in policyand practice which are consistent with civil society’s broadobjectives. Multistakeholderism, in other words, is not asynonym for the more effective articulation of opposition.Like democracy, it implies engagement and compromisewith alternative points of view, at least in building areasof common understanding or perimeters of consensuswithin which future policy options can be developed. TheWGIG illustrated this meaning of multistakeholderism ef-fectively in the way that it developed mutual understand-ing between people with different stakeholder perspec-tives and thereby shaped subsequent debate.

In practice, multistakeholder engagement requires con-sent to a set of rules within which multistakeholder partici-pation takes place. These may be formal (who votes) or in-formal (how people treat each other), but a functioningmultistakeholder forum must have an ethos which em-braces diversity of opinion and a multistakeholder decision-making forum must have formal mechanisms and the in-formal consent of its participants for making decisions.



WSIS experience suggests that civil society as a whole hasnot yet sufficiently debated its engagement in this proc-ess. As an umbrella, the term civil society covers both or-ganisations that are strongly positive about engagementwith other stakeholders and those that are more hostileto both or either governments and businesses. Activemultistakeholder processes are likely to throw this differ-ence of approach into much higher relief. They are stillhighly controversial among governments, and many gov-ernments will be happy to see them fail. Unless there iseffective engagement with new steps towards multistake-holder engagement then the trend towards it could re-verse. The willingness of (at least most members of) allstakeholder groups to engage constructively with one an-other, which was notably demonstrated at the first meet-ing of the Internet Governance Forum in late 2006, couldhave importance well beyond the ICT sector.

The second challenge for civil society is how it handlesthis transition in ethos in moving into multistakeholder en-vironments; how, in other words, it understands “construc-tive engagement”. Divisions of opinion on this were notterribly apparent during the majority of WSIS, but did be-come more evident towards the end as compromise wasbeing reached in Internet governance. Now that they arebeginning to have a voice, civil society organisations withinthe ICT sector need to think about how to handle differ-ences of view about how to use it most constructively. Thiscould be important, for example, if the review of the na-ture of stakeholder roles initiated by the 2006 ITU Pleni-potentiary Conference opens up new spaces for civil soci-ety participation in its decision-making processes.

Many governments, as noted above, remain suspiciousof civil society participation in decision-making. For some,this is because they fear that civil society will expose theirunrepresentativeness or breach barriers to popular par-ticipation and freedom of expression in their own territo-ries. Interviews with government and IGO participants inWSIS, however, make clear that the reasons for suspicionof civil society are more complex than this, and these needto be understood by civil society organisations as theycampaign for and enter into stronger decision-makingroles.

The nature and meaning of “civil society” differs mark-edly between countries. In many, civil society organisa-tions are considered hostile by governments: either be-cause they are (in practice) opposition organisations, orbecause they represent social groups which are excludedfrom power or considered hostile by government (tradeunions, women’s groups, ethnic minorities, religious en-tities), or because they articulate policies or demandrights (such as freedoms of expression, association andbehaviour) which are not granted within the society inquestion. These are essentially political issues relatingcivil society to governments and inter-governmental

agencies, and exist in many ways because civil society isdoing its job. However, the term “civil society” has alsobeen used by organisations which seek themselves tosuppress social freedoms, or which have abused theirposition to exploit the communities they claim to repre-sent. And civil society is often regarded as suspect be-cause of problems of uncertainty about the quality ofrepresentation. Civil society organisations often repre-sent particular social groups - women, workers, youngpeople, consumers, etc. - which are, by definition, notrepresentative of society as a whole. Collectively, a coa-lition of all civil society actors within a country may bebroadly representative of society as a whole, but equallyit may not: it may, for example, be disproportionately rep-resentative of the powerful or (conversely) of themarginalised, of particular ethnic or religious groups, ofmen or women, of the landed not the landless, the em-ployed rather than the unemployed. Civil society’s po-litical character, collectively, may be broadly consistentwith that of society as a whole, or it may not; in whichcase it may be either pro- or anti-government. In somesocieties, civil society organisations may even be surro-gates for the state - an issue that arose concerning localNGOs during the Tunis phase of WSIS.

These criticisms are similar to those made of private sec-tor representation: that, for example, the CCBI and its part-ners in the WSIS process represented bigger internationalbusinesses rather the private sector as a whole. How rep-resentation is perceived is as important here as how it isactually constructed. The third challenge for civil society,therefore, is to recognise and address concerns withinother stakeholder groups about the quality of representa-tion that it, collectively, offers, in order to build confidencein it as a player within multistakeholder processes and sotake advantage of the opportunities they represent. A keyissue here is the need for individual civil society organisa-tions to recognise that civil society’s credibility dependson its diversity; that there is, in fact, no single civil societyperspective on a particular issue (such as intellectual prop-erty rights); and in particular that attempts to appropriatethe authority of civil society to individual agency objec-tives undermine both credibility and civil society’s abilityto act collectively.

Fourthly, most of the debate about multistakeholderismwithin civil society has concerned the relationship betweencivil society and government (or inter-governmental organi-sations). Much less attention has been paid to the rela-tionship between civil society and the private sector. Thisis natural: it is governments and IGOs that are felt to denycivil society a voice. In addition, many civil society organi-sations are ideologically hostile to private business. The UNsystem, however, regards both groups as effectively one –“non-government” as opposed to “government”. The firstphase of WSIS showed strong antipathy by some govern-ment delegations to both civil society and private sector

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participation; and led to substantial cooperation betweencivil society and private sector representatives in jointlydemanding a voice. Partly as a result, there was much moreconstructive dialogue between civil society and the pri-vate sector during the remainder of WSIS than had beenthe case in previous summits.

This is something that offers some scope for the future.Debates at WSIS showed that there were a number of ar-eas in which civil society and the private sector had com-mon cause, notably but not exclusively in terms of partici-pation in decision-making itself. These included issuessuch as openness to innovation, liberalisation of state-con-trolled infrastructure and government control over content,developing better understanding of the way ICT marketswork and the interrelationship between policy, service pro-vision and consumer behaviour. There is scope, largelyunexplored, for cooperation in the future in these and otherareas. Formal mechanisms for building on this are weak,though good personal relationships do exist, as a resultof WSIS, across this stakeholder divide. However, manycivil society organisations have ideological reservationsabout the private sector. The fourth challenge is, there-fore, whether and how civil society and the private sectorbuild their relationship within an increasingly multistake-holder environment.

A fifth challenge concerns the quality of civil society in-put. Most of the issues discussed in international ICT foraare highly complex technical questions. Detailed and so-phisticated understanding of them is necessary to achievecredibility. Most debates are dominated by articulate peo-ple, highly informed about these issues and supported bystrong research and analytical teams. It is difficult to breakinto this inner circle of ICT policymaking – as new delegatesto ITU study groups are quick to find – and easy for domi-nant decision-makers to dismiss new participants as ig-norant or misinformed.

If the struggle for the right to participate is won, how civilsociety announces its arrival will have a major impact onits influence in the medium and longer term. Other stake-holders will look for a positive approach and for substan-tial understanding of the issues. This is much more impor-tant in permanent decision-making fora, which deal indetail, than in summits, which deal in broad principles.For civil society to be effective, therefore, its first prioritywill have to be identification of those aspects of ICT policywhich merit concentrated attention and the resourcesneeded to address these effectively. A scattergun ap-proach, built around assumptions rather than knowledge,or principles rather than pragmatism, is unlikely to buildinfluence. Criteria for the selection of priority issues needto be developed. These might include:

• Issues where outcomes are of high significance to citi-zens (such as access, connectivity and informationrights)

• Issues where civil society has a common shared per-spective (i.e. few internal disagreements) and a dis-tinctive point of view

• Issues which are currently being handled in a highlytechnocratic manner but in which broader social andenvironmental issues, for example, could enhance theoutcomes of decisions reached.

Capacity-building obviously lies at the heart of this chal-lenge.

Finally, WSIS suggests a number of challenges concern-ing the modalities of civil society participation.

The diversity of civil society makes coherent participationmore difficult for it than it is for a relatively homogeneousstakeholder group like the private sector. No intervieweefrom civil society for this project thought it feasible for civilsociety to operate in WSIS through an umbrella group likethe Coordinating Committee of Business Interlocutors(CCBI). CONGO – the Conference of NGOs in ConsultativeRelationship with the United Nations – sought to encour-age CSO participation in WSIS, but has no policy coordi-nating role. The civil society caucus structure provided thenearest equivalent to CCBI’s coordination but its role wasmore to reflect the diversity of civil society interests andto broker support within the wider civil society commu-nity for the articulation of particular points than it was todevelop a common set of ideas and principles. It was onlyin smaller and relatively narrow specialist caucuses – onchild welfare or disability, for example - that civil societycould achieve comparable unity of purpose to that exhib-ited by the private sector.

The more diverse civil society is, in short, the more diffi-culty it is likely to have in establishing a common positionon issues of controversy within it, except where these areconcerned directly with the representation of civil societyitself. And where common positions are established, theyare less likely to be the result of considered and informeddebate: there is more risk than there is in more homoge-neous groupings that agreed positions will be either low-est common denominators or uncritical endorsements ofthe (perhaps controversial) views of particular civil soci-ety entities participating in a particular forum.

The second phase of WSIS also saw differences of viewemerge about the permanence of caucuses. Previously, cau-cuses have been specific to the summit concerned. Conti-nuity was required, however, for a two-phase summit, andthis gave the caucus structure more of an air of perma-nence. At least one regional caucus sought to developstructures such as an executive committee which are moreappropriate to permanent organisations than to time-lim-ited groupings. Similarly, the Internet Governance caucuscontinued to function after WSIS, as a preliminary to theInternet Governance Forum.



The fact that WSIS was held in two phases inevitably in-creased the continuity of those caucuses that were es-tablished. They did not simply need to maintain continu-ity through a series of preparatory committees, but alsoover two plenary sessions: a four-year process which isvery long in terms of civil society activity. Intervieweesare agreed that this helped substantially to increase net-working among civil society organisations and certainlyestablished some new bilateral relationships and work-ing associations which may have considerable longevity.However, there is disagreement about whether WSIS cau-cuses themselves should be maintained post-WSIS. TheInternet Governance caucus is a case in point. This has,in effect, continued working in relation to the WSIS suc-cessor body, the Internet Governance Forum, and it seemslikely that some comparable caucus to that establishedduring WSIS will be necessary for civil society coordina-tion in relation to the IGF. However, this need not be con-tinuous with its predecessor. The potential constituencyfor the IGF is different from that for WSIS – perhaps morenarrowly confined to Internet governance issues, poten-tially more widely inclusive among Internet-orientedagencies. If the existing caucus does continue into theIGF, it is difficult to see that it will not become more for-malised and permanent in character – perhaps a kind ofcivil society bureau rather than a caucus in the sense thatit has been to date.

The sixth and final challenge for civil society therefore con-cerns how it develops and maintains continuity of think-ing and strategisation in international organisations, es-pecially if it does gain greater space for participation. In-terviewees have, for example, reported that it has proveddifficult for civil society organisations to maintain net-works and relationships established during WSIS in thepost-WSIS period without the framework of WSIS meet-ings in which to operate – with the exception of theInternet governance arena. It may be that civil societyneeds to look for more permanent ways of sharing exper-tise and in particular sharing experience between partici-pants in different ICT fora, in order to maximise the valuethat can be obtained from such multistakeholder partici-pation that evolves.

Recommendations on capacity-building

Capacity-building, as noted earlier, is crucial to multistake-holder participation. If a multistakeholder forum is to func-tion effectively, its participants need to have confidencein the capacity of that forum to reach conclusions whichare built on informed understanding of the issues withwhich it is concerned; that the quality of decision-making,in other words, should be based on the knowledge that isavailable within the forum rather than the ignorance of itsleast-informed participant. Lack of expertise constrains theparticipation of those who are poorly-informed, but it also

reduces the quality of decision-making, in particular thelikelihood that consensus can be reached on more inno-vative approaches. The challenge here is to ensure thatmultistakeholder fora are both inclusive and informed.

In fact, two capacity challenges are involved here – oneconcerning information and knowledge per se; the otherconcerning the multistakeholder participation processesthemselves. Participants in multistakeholder processesneed to understand what they are talking about; but theyalso need to understand why other stakeholders have dif-ferent perspectives and different priorities from them-selves, and how to work with those other stakeholders inorder to identify viable destinations and viable ways ofreaching them.

The first of these challenges – basic information andknowledge – was identified strongly in the “LouderVoices” report. Developing country participants havefound themselves disadvantaged in many internationalfora because they lack basic technical or policy under-standing of the issues that are being discussed. They sim-ply are not able to keep track of all of the issues involved,or to engage in discussion about them with the depth ofexpertise of key actors in industrial country or privatesector delegations. These difficulties are compounded byinsufficient presence in discussions (for example, partici-pation in plenaries but not in side meetings at which thereal action takes place); by limited coordination withother developing country delegations facing similar prob-lems; and by poor knowledge management within the na-tional decision-making environment (for example, differ-ent personnel attending different meetings in the samedecision-making chain; lack of dialogue between govern-ment departments). Civil society participants face manyof these same problems (though they may have betternetworking than can be found between official delega-tions from different countries), as do others seeking toenter decision-making spaces from which they have pre-viously been absent or excluded.

A number of initiatives are needed to address these de-ficiencies, several of which are discussed in the “LouderVoices” report. Critical among them is the need for newparticipants to access reliable, up-to-date informationon issues under discussion in decision-making proc-esses and on the progress that has been made withinthose processes towards resolving them. Inter-govern-mental organisations are often much better at explainingthemselves and their concerns to insiders than to outsid-ers. Both formally and informally, they tend to push new-comers to the margins rather than welcoming them into thefold. Key actors often look to newcomers more as votingfodder for their propositions than as potential contributorsto more diverse discourse. Overcoming these problems re-quires a lot of effort on the part of “newbies”. It would bevery much easier for them, however, if they had available

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information sources on whose accuracy, timeliness andimpartiality they could rely. The “Louder Voices” reportsaw this as a crucial element in any effort to extend par-ticipation in technical and policy decision-making, andAPC has initiated discussion with other stakeholdergroups on such information sources within the contextof the Internet Governance Forum.

But knowing the issues is never sufficient on its own. It isalso important to understand the processes through whichdecisions are made. The processes of international dis-course are often arcane, and capacity-building is neededfor newcomers on these, too, as well as on the issues them-selves. Just as important as the formal processes, how-ever, can be the ethos of decision-making within particu-lar institutions. New actors, particularly those who havebeen excluded from processes in the past, often have anegative perception of the processes in which they havenot previously participated. To function effectively withinthese processes, even if continuing to reject them, it isimportant for newcomers to understand their ethos, thereasons why they are considered effective by existing par-ticipants, and ways of maximising effectiveness withinthem. Moving from exclusion to participation can demandquite a substantial re-evaluation of process issues andattitudes to process.

Finally, it should be recognised that the objective of secur-ing multistakeholder engagement in decision-making isto gain the opportunity not for a fight to the death betweencompeting perspectives but for joint participation in thesearch for a way forward that is acceptable to all, or atleast has the consent of at least the large majority – a wayforward that can be shared between perspectives. Multi-stakeholder decision-making fora are not natural environ-ments for ideologues, but for pragmatists. This can beuncomfortable for new participants with a strongly ideo-logical bent. The opportunity to learn about and under-stand others’ perspectives is, however, crucial to their en-gagement in such fora. One of the WGIG’s strengths wasthat it provided this opportunity. Much the same experi-ence was repeated for many participants in the first meet-ing of the Internet Governance Forum in October/Novem-ber 2006, an event which many participants left saying thatthey now understood more clearly why those who had dif-ferent perspectives from themselves held those differentpoints of view.

WSIS follow-up

As noted in Chapter 3, the WSIS outcome documents makerelatively few formal “commitments”, although a substan-tial summary of specific commitments could be drawn fromarticle 90 of the Tunis Agenda. This set of commitmentscan be found in Annex 3. The Tunis Agenda also commitssummit signatories:

to review and follow up progress in bridging the dig-ital divide, taking into account the different levels ofdevelopment among nations, so as to achieve the in-ternationally agreed development goals and objec-tives, including the Millennium Development Goals, as-sessing the effectiveness of investment and interna-tional cooperation efforts in building the InformationSociety, identifying gaps as well as deficits in invest-ment and devising strategies to address them.4

The Tunis Agenda initiated three main follow-up processesfor WSIS:

• A formal reporting mechanism was established, to becoordinated by a UN Group on the Information Soci-ety, reporting to the Chief Executives Board, andECOSOC, reporting to the General Assembly

• The UN Secretary-General was asked to facilitate theestablishment of an Internet Governance Forum, toconsider a range of Internet issues

• A series of action line initiatives led by different inter-national agencies was agreed as the basis for imple-menting the other WSIS outcomes.

Both the Internet Governance Forum and the action-linefollow-up process were described in the WSIS outcomedocuments as “multistakeholder” initiatives, though nei-ther was formulated beyond this in much detail. This finalsection of the report looks at these two areas of WSIS fol-low-up that were agreed in Tunis, and considers how theyfit into a wider post-WSIS scenario for both developingcountries and non-governmental actors.

The Internet Governance Forum

Internet governance was the most contested policy areawithin WSIS. Given the intensity of disagreement aboutwhat should happen after WSIS, it is hardly surprising thatthe follow-up processes were themselves controversial.They consisted, on the one hand, of a commitment to “en-hanced cooperation” which would “enable governments,on an equal footing, to carry out their roles and responsi-bilities, in international public policy issues pertaining tothe Internet”5 and, on the other, to the creation of anInternet Governance Forum which could discuss Internetissues but without decision-making powers. This Forumwas given the mandate to:

a. Discuss public policy issues related to key elementsof Internet governance in order to foster the sustain-ability, robustness, security, stability and developmentof the Internet.





b. Facilitate discourse between bodies dealing with dif-ferent cross-cutting international public policies re-garding the Internet and discuss issues that do notfall within the scope of any existing body.

c. Interface with appropriate intergovernmental organi-zations and other institutions on matters under theirpurview.

d. Facilitate the exchange of information and best prac-tices, and in this regard make full use of the expertiseof the academic, scientific and technical communities.

e. Advise all stakeholders in proposing ways and meansto accelerate the availability and affordability of theInternet in the developing world.

f. Strengthen and enhance the engagement of stakehold-ers in existing and/or future Internet governance mecha-nisms, particularly those from developing countries.

g. Identify emerging issues, bring them to the attentionof the relevant bodies and the general public, and,where appropriate, make recommendations.

h. Contribute to capacity building for Internet governancein developing countries, drawing fully on local sourcesof knowledge and expertise.

i. Promote and assess, on an ongoing basis, the embodi-ment of WSIS principles in Internet governance proc-esses.

j. Discuss, inter alia, issues relating to critical Internetresources.

k. Help to find solutions to the issues arising from theuse and misuse of the Internet, of particular concernto everyday users.

l. Publish its proceedings.6

This mandate, which derives largely from civil society text,left a good deal to be settled. It contained, potentially, agreat deal of work, though the IGF lacked the resources tocover these in detail, and most participants in WSIS werereluctant to see it acquiring too great a degree of author-ity, at least before they knew what it would do.

The IGF, therefore, was not intended to be a governanceagency itself, but rather an agency that could consider is-sues of governance. It “will”, the Tunis Agenda declared“be multilateral, multi-stakeholder, democratic and trans-parent. To that end,” it “could” (note the change of verb):

a) Build on the existing structures of Internet governance,with special emphasis on the complementarity be-tween all stakeholders involved in this process - gov-ernments, business entities, civil society and intergov-ernmental organizations.

b) Have a lightweight and decentralised structure thatwould be subject to periodic review.

c) Meet periodically, as required, [perhaps in parallel withother UN conferences].7

There was a lot here that was contested. Some wanted toconfine the IGF’s role narrowly to issues that are univer-sally thought of as Internet governance. Some saw it asan opportunity to continue the arguments about the fu-ture of ICANN, and about the potential for other organisa-tions – such as the ITU – to oversee the Internet as a whole(even though this was outside the terms of the Tunis con-sensus). Others wanted the IGF to exploit the breadth ofits mandate, to discuss wider issues which are not gener-ally thought of as Internet governance per se but cut intothe mandates of other WSIS follow-up processes and thoseof other inter-governmental bodies – issues such as infra-structure, applications and content, privacy and security.

The initial format for the IGF was hammered out at a cou-ple of preparatory meetings, led by the same top manage-ment team (Nitin Desai and Markus Kummer) that coordi-nated the WGIG, now reappointed to this role by the UNSecretary-General. The IGF Advisory Group met in May2006 and agreed an overall theme – “Internet Governancefor Development” – and four subsidiary themes – open-ness, security, diversity and access – for the first meetingof the Forum, scheduled for the end of October 2006. “Ca-pacity-building,” they agreed, would be “a cross-cuttingpriority.”8

In practice, the first meeting of the Internet GovernanceForum is generally considered a considerable success.About 1500 people attended the three-day meeting in Ath-ens in October/November 2006, from the whole range ofstakeholder communities, including very senior figures inInternet affairs past and present. Perhaps uniquely in anevent held under UN auspices, no distinctions were drawnbetween government officials and IGO personnel, privatesector and civil society participants. Everyone was treatedequally, and this equality was essentially an equality ofindividuals at least as much as of stakeholder groups. Dis-cussion centred not on formal propositions but on panelsof experts drawn from across the stakeholder spectrum,facilitated by journalists who raised with them controver-sial issues of concern to members of the audience. As aresult, as one very experienced IGO official put it to theauthor, hardly anyone spoke in the kind of code that maskscontroversy which is so common in other UN fora (not leastamong them WSIS). Discussion was also very broad, rang-ing across the whole range of Internet questions, certainlynot restricted to those falling readily within what is nor-mally understood as “governance”.

In many ways, this reflected the ethos of the WGIG; notsurprisingly, perhaps, as the same top management teamthat led the WGIG was responsible for leading the IGF.



8 www.intgovforum.org/meeting.htm.

105

Multistakeholderism was central to how it worked, and insome cases rather formally so. Panels were always madeup of multistakeholder groups, and multistakeholder or-ganisation was also a prerequisite for sanctioning works-hops on the forum fringe. This had considerable impacton the overall atmosphere at the meeting, and the fact thatmost participants felt that they left Athens knowing moreabout issues that were often very controversial than theyhad known when they arrived – and, in particular, know-ing more about why others thought the way they did. TheIGF, in short, made it easier to explore others’ paradigms,less easy to demand agreement with one’s own.

Of course, a fundamental factor in this was the fact thatthe IGF had no decision-making powers. It is much easierto explore ideas if you are not asked to vote for them atthe end of the week; much easier, too, to form collabora-tions (or “dynamic coalitions”) across stakeholder divides,though how successful those that were formed prove tobe in practice remains to be seen. The basic concept of anon-decision-making forum will remain, and this gives theIGF capacity to act as a global capacity-building forum onthe Internet (particularly in the sense of sharing perspec-tives and ideas), though the format will need to developyear-on-year if it is not to become stale.

Action line implementation

Follow-up activity for the remainder of the WSIS agendawas spelt out in paragraphs 99 to 122 of the Tunis Agenda.These include a number of different tiers and types ofactivity, described together as “a mechanism for imple-mentation and follow-up at national, regional and inter-national levels.” The overall framework for this was sum-marised as follows:

a. At the national level, the Agenda encourages govern-ments to incorporate national e-strategies within na-tional development plans, and to include commen-tary on ICD within relevant country assessment re-ports.

b. At the regional level, the Agenda recognises the po-tential for regional IGOs and UN regional commis-sions to organise follow-up activities in conjunctionwith governments, and the desirability of these in-cluding all stakeholders.

c. At the international/global level, the Agenda requestsUN agencies and other IGOs to “facilitate activitiesamong different stakeholders, including civil societyand the business sector, to help national govern-ments in their implementation efforts.”

It was agreed that WSIS follow-up “should not requirethe creation of any new operational bodies.” This wasconsistent with donor countries’ perception of the impor-tance of mainstreaming ICT/ICD, and with their earlier

rejection of a UN-managed Digital Solidarity Fund. How-ever, specific follow-up activities were agreed, includingthe following:

1. The UN Secretary-General and Chief Executives Boardwere asked to set up a UN Group on the InformationSociety, made up of UN family entities, “to facilitatethe implementation of WSIS outcomes,” with leader-ship of this Group to come from amongst the ITU, theUNDP and UNESCO.

2. The Secretary-General was also asked to reportthrough ECOSOC to the General Assembly by June2006 on “the modalities of the interagency coordina-tion of the implementation of WSIS outcomes.”

3. ECOSOC was asked to review the mandate and com-position of the UN Commission on Science and Tech-nology in the light of WSIS’ outcomes, “taking intoaccount the multistakeholder approach.”

4. The ITU’s ICT Opportunity Index and Digital Opportu-nity Index were endorsed alongside other sets of indi-cators on ICT performance.

Finally, the Agenda said the following about broader multi-stakeholder follow-up of particular activities:

The experience of, and the activities undertaken by,UN agencies in the WSIS process - notably the ITU,UNESCO and the UNDP - should continue to be usedto their fullest extent. These three agencies should playleading facilitating roles in the implementation of thePlan of Action and organize a meeting of moderators/facilitators of action lines [i.e. the action lines includedin the Geneva Plan of Action]….

The coordination of multi-stakeholder implementationactivities would help to avoid duplication of activities.This should include, inter alia, information exchange,creation of knowledge, sharing of best practices, andassistance in developing multi-stakeholder and pub-lic/private partnerships.9

Responsibility for action lines was allocated between agen-cies as set out in the box below.

The initial allocation of responsibility for action line leader-ship appears to have originated in discussions during 2004.It is not clear if, at that time, this was expected to form theframework for a follow-up process in due course. It certainlyreflected inter-agency rivalries within the UN system, andthese surfaced again during the final negotiations and inthe aftermath of WSIS as, firstly, approximate equality wasrequired between the three main UN agencies concerned(the ITU, the UNDP and UNESCO) and, secondly, non-ICT-specialist agencies (such as the WHO and the FAO) as-serted their primacy over the ITU in follow-up processesconcerned with their specialist areas. The ITU downgraded

9 Tunis Agenda, articles 109-110.



its role, particularly in respect of action lines C7, followingan inter-agency meeting in February 2006, with the result setout in column three of the table in the box above.

This somewhat amorphous collection of activities hasbeen slower than the Internet Governance Forum to getunderway. A meeting of UN agencies in Geneva in Febru-ary 2006 refined the list of lead agencies for these actionlines (see above) and suggested procedures, principallyfor information exchange between lead agencies. Thiswas followed (not, it may be noted, preceded) by a multi-stakeholder consultation meeting, also in Geneva,

¬ E-government

¬ E-business

¬ E-learning

¬ E-health

¬ E-employment

¬ E-environment

¬ E-agriculture

¬ E-science

¬ UNDP/ITU

¬ WTO/UNCTAD/ITU/UPU

¬ UNESCO/ITU/UNIDO

¬ WHO/ITU

¬ ILO/ITU

¬ WHO/WMO/UNEP/UN-Habitat/ITU/ICAO

¬ FAO/ITU

¬ UNESCO/ITU/UNCTAD

• UNDESA

• UNCTAD

• UNESCO

• WHO

• ILO

• WMO

• FAO

• UNESCO

Action LineAction LineAction LineAction LineAction Line Initial proposedInitial proposedInitial proposedInitial proposedInitial proposed moderators/facilitatorsmoderators/facilitatorsmoderators/facilitatorsmoderators/facilitatorsmoderators/facilitatorsModerators/facilitatorsModerators/facilitatorsModerators/facilitatorsModerators/facilitatorsModerators/facilitators agreed in February 2006agreed in February 2006agreed in February 2006agreed in February 2006agreed in February 2006

C1. The role of public governance authorities ECOSOC/UN Regional UNDESAand all stakeholders in the promotion Commissions/ITUof ICTs for development

C2. Information and communication ITU ITUinfrastructure

C3. Access to information and knowledge ITU/UNESCO UNESCO

C4. Capacity building UNDP/UNESCO/ITU/UNCTAD UNDP

C5. Building confidence and security ITU ITUin the use of ICTs

C6. Enabling environment ITU/UNDP/UN REGIONAL UNDPCOMMISSIONS/UNCTAD

C7. ICT Applications

C8. Cultural diversity and identity, linguistic UNESCO UNESCOdiversity and local content

C9. Media UNESCO UNESCO

C10. Ethical dimensions of the Information UNESCO/ECOSOC/WHO UNESCOSociety

C11. International and regional cooperation UN regional commissions/ UNDESAUNDP/ITU/UNESCO/ECOSOC

RESPONSIBILITY FOR WSIS ACTION LINES

attended by around 50 participants - mostly from the leadUN agencies with some participants from Geneva mis-sions, civil society and the private sector. Substantialconcerns were expressed at this meeting by both civilsociety and private sector participants concerning thedifficulty which they would face in participating effec-tively in such a disparate process, and recommending re-structuring of the action lines into clusters. Civil societyand private sector participants were also concernedabout the mechanistic character of the procedures agreedbetween UN agencies; the weakness of modalities formultistakeholder participation; and the apparent focus

107

society should have mandated a follow-up process thatis structured so incohesively. Many of the issues fordiscussion within action lines are cross-cutting, andrequire interaction between them. Civil society sug-gestions for clustering have been welcomed by some,but not all, senior figures in action line leadership, andclustering will be challenging to achieve, especiallywhere action lines have different UN lead agencies.

3) The large number of action lines makes it very difficultfor many stakeholders to participate effectively. Nocivil society organisation has the resources to partici-pate effectively in more than a few such action lines.Few, if any, developing country governments will doso - though some may participate in meetings held inGeneva through their Geneva missions, these missionswill not provide the continuity of specialist input re-quired for any proactive work. The private sector, too,is likely to be largely absent. Narrowly defined actionlines, in other words, are unlikely to attract substantialmultistakeholder involvement, especially if they seemto add less value than other activities which are cur-rently underway. Participation at the initial meetings inGeneva during 2006 was numerically sparse, with suf-ficiently little representation from developing countries,civil society and the private sector for meeting chairsto express concern about the capacity of meetings tomake decisions on future action line activity.

4) The value added by action lines will be limited if theyare confined to activities such as “information ex-change” and “sharing of best practices”, as suggestedin the Tunis Agenda and by some UN agencies andgovernments in action line meetings. There are threeprincipal reasons for this:

• Like all summits, WSIS’ outcome documents fo-cus on issues where there was agreement. Whilethere is value in monitoring the implementationof agreed approaches, there is more value, for po-tential participants, in addressing challenges andareas of disagreement which did not form part ofWSIS’ overall consensus. These are not suscepti-ble to a “stocktaking” approach.

• WSIS is over. In a fast-moving area such as ICT/ICD, potential participants in the action lines needand want to look forward to 2008 rather than backto 2003 (when the text within individual actionlines was agreed). Focusing on the WSIS outcomeswill look increasingly unattractive if it means di-verting resources from more important and moreimmediate new issues.

• To be worthwhile, stocktaking must be based on criti-cal evaluation. Listing activities has relatively littlevalue, particularly where it consists of inviting gov-ernments (and other stakeholders) to contribute

of lead agencies on “stocktaking” rather than proactiveapproaches to implementation.

The first “facilitation meeting” of any action line (C2 – “In-frastructure”) was held in Doha during the ITU’s World Tel-ecommunication Development Conference (WTDC). Thiswas attended by about 40 people, including some nationaldelegations, but had almost no representation from civilsociety or development agencies, and none from other UNfamily IGOs, which were not present in Doha.10 Most otheraction line processes held their first meetings in Genevaduring the fortnight surrounding the first “World Informa-tion Society Day” (an extended World TelecommunicationDay, 17 May 2006). These were also sparsely attended.The last few action lines did not meet until October 2006.

Participants in these May meetings felt they were a mixedbag. Some saw quite spirited discussion between a vari-ety of stakeholders and generated some interesting ideasabout future activity. Others struggled to keep the conver-sation going. None looked like the beating heart of a dy-namic process that would prove a substantial legacy forWSIS. Follow up for most has been minimal, thoughUNESCO has established online facilities for those actionlines where it holds the lead. Future meetings were notscheduled on the WSIS website (still maintained by theITU), at the end of January 2007, though it is expectedthese will be held in May 2007.11

Many participants felt that the May 2006 meetings illus-trated a number of weaknesses in the action line struc-ture, which are likely to determine whether or not thesewill form an effective follow-up process. Key points madein this context include the following:

1) The purpose of the action line process is unclear. For-mally, it is billed as being to do with “implementation”.However, the action lines themselves cannot imple-ment anything - they have neither the mandate to doso from participating agencies nor the resources re-quired. In practice, implementation is a matter for IGOs,governments and other actors who may participate inaction line meetings; while the action lines themselvesare, at best, mechanisms for information exchange,monitoring and interchange of ideas. There is little en-thusiasm for such activity among some important ac-tors, notably bilateral development agencies.

2) The number of action lines - nine or sixteen dependingon how they are counted - and their diverse leadershiparrangements make it difficult for them to address theissues concerned cohesively. It is ironic that a summitwhich emphasised the holistic nature of the information

10 The World Bank was represented in Doha but did not attend thismeeting.

11 See www.itu.int/wsis/implementation/events_calendar.asp?year=2007&month=0.



their “success stories”. Information exchange isunlikely to be comprehensive and can too easilybecome mutual self-congratulation, adding noth-ing to real understanding of the complex questionsthat need to be addressed.

In addition, it is difficult to see how action line meet-ings can match other established meetings and onlinespaces as fora for “information exchange” and “shar-ing of best practice”.

5) The present structure for the action lines does not ad-dress the paradigm gap between ICT and mainstreamdevelopment issues. The action line meetings in May2006 were dominated by ICT/ICD professionals. Whilemainstream sector professionals may participate insectoral applications sub-line activities (which wereslowest to get underway), their presence is neededthroughout the follow-up process if that is to addressinformation society issues from a development ratherthan an ICT sectoral perspective. The ITU’s original roleas sole lead in the C2 (Infrastructure) action line is acase in point: as the Task Force on Financial Mechanismsdemonstrated, infrastructure is a matter of finance andof socio-economic development (from demand to ap-plication) as much as of technology.

6) The action lines have no resources. No funding is avail-able from the UN to make them work, and WSIS im-plementation is not likely to be seen as sufficient of apriority in itself for any other agencies to fund it, evenfor an individual action line.

With hindsight, in short, it would seem that too much at-tention was paid during the WSIS PrepCom discussionsabout follow-up to resolving potential conflict betweenagencies, and too little was paid to the effectiveness ofthe structure agreed - especially to its cohesion andinclusiveness. By the time of the first group of action linefacilitation meetings in May 2006, it was clear that con-siderable change had already occurred in a number of ar-eas - for example, in IGO approaches to infrastructure fi-nance - and that implementing WSIS was already begin-ning to look to many participants like last year’s rather thannext year’s agenda. “Real” WSIS follow-up, in other words,was already taking place - internationally in contexts suchas the World Bank and European Union African infrastruc-ture initiatives, and in national programmes such as the“e-Lanka” initiative in Sri Lanka.

In addition, an international multistakeholder communitywas already in process of establishing the Global Allianceon ICT and Development, as a successor to the UN ICTTask Force, with a mandate to facilitate and promote theintegration of information and communication technologyinto development activities through a “multi-stakeholdercross-sectoral platform and forum that will bring togetherall stakeholders representing relevant constituencies.”12

While opinions are divided about how useful or effective

the Global Alliance will be, it looks more like a post-WSISmultistakeholder forum, addressing ICT/ICD issuesholistically and on the basis of an evolving agenda, thanthe follow-up process designated by the WSIS outcomedocuments. Certainly, it looks more comparable with theInternet Governance Forum than do the action lines. If itsecures the participation at a senior level of many whomay otherwise have been prepared to put time into indi-vidual (or, more likely, clustered) action lines, then therehas to be a likelihood that it - rather than the mechanismsestablished by the Tunis Agenda - will play the substan-tive WSIS follow-up role (if that role is taken up at all). Onthe other hand, civil society has significant reservationsabout the extent to which the Global Alliance will prove tobe inclusive.

Potential actors in the action line follow-up process there-fore have serious questions to ask about participation - inparticular: “is this likely to prove effective?” and “is thislikely to distract us from other, potentially more produc-tive activities?” This applies across the stakeholder spec-trum - to governments (including both developing countryand donor governments), IGOs, the private sector and civilsociety organisations. At the very least, civil society andother actors should carefully monitor the Global Allianceand ensure that they generate effective input into it pro-portionate to its apparent likely effectiveness, as thatemerges during the coming year.

At the same time, however, some actors have felt obligedto make an effort to see what will emerge from the actionline process and may continue to do so in the short term.This was, after all, set up as a multistakeholder initiative,and it would be difficult for civil society simply to opt outof it. The action lines, it is clear, are unlikely to be able toundertake any comprehensive monitoring of WSIS out-comes. However, they did potentially provide a space formultistakeholder discussion of issues, and it initiallyseemed possible that they could generate worthwhile dia-logue if they focused more narrowly, and more proactively,on target issues. This at least seemed worth exploring dur-ing the May 2006 meetings, perhaps through small multi-stakeholder partnerships – a civil society grouping, a pri-vate sector partner and an IGO, for example, jointly explor-ing an area of ICT policy which has real importance for thefuture. As things stand, most action lines are unlikely tomeet again in formal session until May 2007. In these cir-cumstances, it should not be difficult to determine whetherany action lines have the capacity in practice to generateworthwhile activity. If none has generated substantive workduring the intervening year, then it is unlikely that theseaction lines will have much life left in them.

12 www.un-gaid.org/about.

109

Conclusion

Attitudes to WSIS follow-up vary considerably accordingto the perceptions which actors have of WSIS as a whole.Supporters of the summit see its follow-up process as apotential springboard for future activity. Those who regardWSIS as a distraction - including many in the donor com-munity - are unprepared to commit further time and re-sources to it. Their lack of commitment to follow-up is re-inforced by the amorphous character and disparate organi-sation of the action lines. From the perspective of January2007, certainly, the follow-up process looks weak, exceptwhere the Internet Governance Forum is concerned.

In the light of earlier chapters of this report, this is per-haps unsurprising. WSIS did not have a major impact interms of new thinking on either rights or development. Itmay have begun new processes on Internet governanceand infrastructure finance, but these are being pursuedelsewhere. New ICT issues are constantly emerging. Inthis context, the most important thing about WSIS is prob-ably that it is in the past. Future action – whether by de-veloping countries, civil society or any other actor – needsto be forward-looking. Time will tell whether WSIS is seenas a reference point (like the Maitland Commission), a turn-ing point or largely an irrelevance; but whichever of thesehindsight eventually prefers, the conclusion of this reportis that it is not the best starting point for new action onICTs or ICD today. �


111

Annexes

a n n e x 1 Participation in WSIS summits

a n n e x 2 Participation in the TFFM and the WGIG

a n n e x 3 WSIS outcome document “commitments”

a n n e x 4 References

111

113

Afghanistan 6 100 0 1 100 0 4 100 0

Albania 3 67 33 1 100 0 3 100 0

Algeria 8 100 0 3 100 0 71 86 14

Andorra 10 80 20 4 75 25 3 67 33

Angola 13 100 0 3 100 0 68 87 13

Antigua and Barbuda

Argentina 27 70 30 4 50 50 52 77 23

Armenia 24 88 12 5 100 0 32 81 19

Australia 14 64 36 6 67 33 16 81 19

Austria 39 62 38 12 75 25 46 74 26

Azerbaijan 36 92 8 11 100 0 64 94 6

Bahamas

Bahrain 6 100 0 4 100 0 15 93 7

Bangladesh 54 93 7 7 100 0 10 100 0

Barbados 10 50 50 5 60 40 5 60 40

Belarus 27 89 11 4 100 0 2 100 0

Belgium 20 65 35 6 67 33 20 95 5

Belize 3 67 33

Benin 16 81 19 3 100 0 13 85 15

Bhutan 5 60 40 4 75 25

Bolivia 30 57 43 1 0 100 5 100 0

Bosnia and Herzegovina 10 90 10 2 100 0 22 82 18

Botswana 30 57 43 8 100 0 16 88 12

Brazil 47 89 11 25 92 8 37 76 24

Brunei Darussalam 14 93 7 2 50 50 6 100 0

Bulgaria 23 78 22 3 67 33 18 83 17

Burkina Faso 9 89 11 6 100 0 11 100 0

Burundi 6 83 17 4 100 0 6 100 0

Cambodia 7 100 0 4 100 0 5 100 0

Cameroon 10 100 0 11 100 0 20 90 10

Canada 95 69 31 16 69 31 61 59 41

Cape Verde 10 100 0 3 67 33

Central African Republic 2 100 0 13 92 8

Chad 5 100 0 9 100 0 11 82 18

Chile 11 82 18 5 80 20 12 75 25

China 21 62 38 7 57 43 59 75 25

ANNEX 1:

Participation in WSIS summits

CountryCountryCountryCountryCountry Geneva SummitGeneva SummitGeneva SummitGeneva SummitGeneva Summit Phase 2 PrepCom 2Phase 2 PrepCom 2Phase 2 PrepCom 2Phase 2 PrepCom 2Phase 2 PrepCom 2 Tunis SummitTunis SummitTunis SummitTunis SummitTunis Summit

Total Male Fem. Total Male Fem. Total Male Fem.

% % % % % %

A n n e xe s


Colombia 10 40 60 1 100 0 5 60 40

Comoros 13 77 23 4 50 50 15 93 7

Congo 23 96 4 5 100 0 37 89 11

Costa Rica 7 86 14 1 0 100 3 100 0

Côte d’Ivoire 19 95 5 5 100 0 27 89 11

Croatia 20 65 35 4 25 75 28 71 29

Cuba 86 72 28 6 100 0 32 75 25

Cyprus 5 60 40 1 100 0

Czech Republic 20 85 15 6 83 17 42 69 31

Democratic People’s Republic of Korea 7 100 0 3 100 0

Democratic Republic of Congo 6 83 17 9 78 22 13 85 15

Denmark 16 50 50 9 44 56 17 59 41

Djibouti 6 100 0 1 100 0 15 100 0

Dominica

Dominican Republic 10 40 60 5 20 80 51 55 45

Ecuador 9 67 33 7 86 14 10 70 30

Egypt 44 80 20 9 67 33 78 62 38

El Salvador 13 62 38 3 67 33 8 75 25

Equatorial Guinea 2 100 0 15 100 0

Eritrea 1 100 0 1 100 0 4 100 0

Estonia 13 85 15 4 50 50 6 83 17

Ethiopia 4 75 25 3 33 67 9 89 11

Fiji 2 50 50

Finland 51 51 49 8 88 12 46 50 50

France 112 71 29 17 71 29 146 75 25

Gabon 67 76 24 6 100 0 29 90 10

Gambia 13 92 8 2 100 0 6 83 17

Georgia 11 91 9 4 75 25

Germany 59 71 29 12 67 33 69 64 36

Ghana 36 78 22 12 83 17 38 68 32

Greece 34 71 29 2 100 0 18 72 28

Grenada

Guatemala 9 67 33 5 80 20 8 88 12

Guinea 3 67 33 13 92 8 34 91 9

Guinea-Bissau

Guyana

Haiti 4 100 0 4 100 0 10 90 10

Honduras 6 50 50 3 100 0 2 50 50

Hungary 9 78 22 4 100 0 15 80 20

Iceland 16 56 44 2 50 50 9 67 33

India 16 94 6 6 100 0 63 92 8

Indonesia 31 90 10 9 89 11 34 94 6



% % % % % %

115

Iran 62 95 5 10 70 30 100 94 6

Iraq 7 100 0 6 67 33 6 67 33

Ireland 60 72 28 6 83 17 18 61 39

Israel 29 66 34 5 100 0 68 72 28

Italy 47 68 32 9 100 0 146 68 32

Jamaica 7 43 57 2 0 100 8 63 37

Japan 53 79 21 8 100 0 37 84 16

Jordan 16 69 31 4 50 50 19 42 58

Kazakhstan 5 100 0 3 100 0

Kenya 35 83 17 8 89 11 44 52 48

Kiribati

Kuwait 16 94 6 3 100 0 44 70 30

Kyrgyzstan 26 85 15 1 100 0 1 100 0

Lao People’s Democratic Republic 2 100 0 2 100 0

Latvia 18 56 44 5 60 40 18 61 39

Lebanon 14 86 14 3 100 0 63 81 19

Lesotho 19 74 26 5 40 60 19 74 26

Liberia

Libyan Arab Jamahiriya 9 89 11 8 100 0 12 92 8

Liechtenstein 4 100 0 3 67 33

Lithuania 16 69 31 6 50 50 12 75 25

Luxembourg 9 78 22 6 50 50 13 69 31

Madagascar 15 73 27 13 85 15

Malawi 6 83 27 4 100 0 9 89 11

Malaysia 125 61 39 11 73 27 38 66 44

Maldives 2 100 0 1 0 100 4 75 25

Mali 42 86 14 11 91 9 35 77 23

Malta 9 89 11 4 100 0 8 88 12

Marshall Islands 3 67 33

Mauritania 20 90 10 3 67 33 64 84 16

Mauritius 11 100 0 5 80 20 5 100 0

Mexico 20 85 15 4 100 0 15 93 7

Micronesia, (Federated States of ) 2 100 0 1 100 0 4 100 0

Monaco 7 71 29 2 100 0 3 100 0

Mongolia 11 82 18 2 100 0

Montenegro - see Republic of Montenegro

Morocco 22 86 14 8 75 25 108 94 6

Mozambique 34 65 35 2 100 0 40 75 25

Myanmar 6 83 17 3 67 33 3 100 0

Namibia 10 70 30 4 50 50 12 58 42

Nauru

Nepal 9 100 0 3 100 0 39 82 18



% % % % % %

A n n e xe s


Netherlands 22 64 36 5 80 20 23 74 26

New Zealand 6 83 17 2 50 50 6 83 17

Nicaragua 17 59 41 6 83 17 8 100 0

Niger 7 86 14 2 50 50 30 77 23

Nigeria 64 81 19 6 83 17 50 82 18

Niue 2 100 0

Norway 33 64 36 7 71 29 18 61 39

Oman 15 73 27 9 67 33 51 82 18

Pakistan 47 96 4 4 75 25 12 92 8

Palau 1 100 0

Panama 7 57 43 1 100 0 2 100 0

Papua New Guinea 1 100 0 1 0 100

Paraguay 5 60 40 3 33 67 2 100 0

Peru 14 86 14 5 40 60 3 67 33

Philippines 16 69 31 3 67 33 10 100 0

Poland 14 86 14 7 71 29 12 75 25

Portugal 21 86 14 7 71 29 31 71 29

Qatar 21 95 5 5 60 40 69 93 7

Republic of Korea 38 84 16 9 100 0 42 88 12

Republic of Moldova 6 83 17 4 100 0 9 78 22

Republic of Montenegro

Republic of Serbia

Romania 102 78 22 12 75 25 67 64 36

Russian Federation 69 96 4 12 67 33 69 83 17

Rwanda 26 85 15 4 75 25 52 77 23

Saint Kitts and Nevis 3 100 0

Saint Lucia 1 100 0

Saint Vincent and The Grenadines

Samoa 21 52 48 2 50 50 7 71 29

San Marino 1 0 100

São Tomé and Príncipe 1 100 0

Saudi Arabia 27 100 0 10 100 0 19 100 0

Senegal 39 90 10 19 95 5 60 77 23

Serbia and Montenegro 21 67 33 9 56 44 15 67 33

Seychelles 1 100 0

Sierra Leone 4 100 0 3 100 0

Singapore 10 70 30 4 50 50 7 71 29

Slovakia 19 79 21 10 80 20 17 88 12

Slovenia 11 73 27 4 75 25 4 100 0

Solomon Islands

Somalia

South Africa 79 67 33 16 25 75 95 74 26



% % % % % %

117

Spain 33 61 39 7 43 57 61 59 41

Sri Lanka 11 100 0 3 67 33 3 67 33

Sudan 25 80 20 4 75 25 78 90 10

Suriname 2 100 0

Swaziland 10 70 30 21 90 10

Sweden 36 50 50 6 67 33 42 52 48

Switzerland 49 76 24 20 75 25 52 67 33

Syrian Arab Republic 9 89 11 7 29 71 15 73 27

Tajikistan 43 100 0

Thailand 72 67 33 9 44 56 25 56 44

The FYR of Macedonia 20 80 20 6 83 17

Timor-Leste 1 100 0 2 100 0

Togo 7 100 0 1 100 0 43 98 2

Tonga 3 100 0 5 60 40

Trinidad and Tobago 6 83 17 3 100 0 5 40 60

Tunisia 29 86 14 21 100 0 54 83 17

Turkey 16 100 0 5 80 20 39 95 5

Turkmenistan

Tuvalu

Uganda 13 100 0 2 100 0 18 78 22

Ukraine 35 80 20 2 100 0 54 81 19

United Arab Emirates 14 100 0 12 92 8 31 97 3

United Kingdom 30 94 6 12 67 33 33 76 24

United Republic of Tanzania 32 84 16 6 100 0 50 78 22

United States of America 66 59 41 20 45 55 130 69 31

Uruguay 9 78 22 2 100 0 7 86 14

Uzbekistan 5 100 0 3 67 33 4 100 0

Vanuatu

Vatican 4 100 0 3 100 0 5 100 0

Venezuela 14 64 36 4 50 50 11 45 55

Vietnam 10 100 0 7 100 0 11 100 0

Yemen 11 100 0 4 100 0 22 95 5

Zambia 13 62 38 13 85 15 20 85 15

Zimbabwe 31 84 16 5 80 20 43 88 12

TOTALTOTALTOTALTOTALTOTAL 36763676367636763676 901901901901901 44504450445044504450

AVERAGEAVERAGEAVERAGEAVERAGEAVERAGE 8181818181 1919191919 7777777777 2323232323 8181818181 1919191919



% % % % % %

A n n e xe s


ANNEX 2:

Participation in the TFFM and the WGIG

TASK FORCE ON FINANCIAL MECHANISMSMEMBERSHIP LIST

Task Force Chair:

Mark Malloch Brown, UNDP Administrator (Alternate: ShojiNishimoto, Assistant Administrator and Director, Bureaufor Development Policy)

Members

Ali Abbasov, Minister of Communication and InformationTechnologies of Azerbaijan

Sérgio Amadeu da Silveira, Director-President, InstitutoNacional de Tecnologia da Informação, (ITI), Brazil (Alter-nate: Mauricio Augusto Coelho, Chief of Cabinet, ITI)

Owen Barder, Representative, European Union on behalfof the Netherlands EU-Presidency

Michel Chertok, Representative, Global Knowledge Part-nership

Jim Crowe, Deputy Director, Foreign Affairs/United Nationsand Commonwealth Division, Canada

Ahmed Darwish, Minister of State for Administrative De-velopment, Egypt

Mamadou Diop Decroix, Minister of Communications ofSenegal (Alternate: Mr. Amadou Top, Deputy Manager, Dig-ital Solidarity Fund)

Alar Ehandi, Chief Executive Officer, Look@World Founda-tion, Estonia

Anriette Esterhuysen, Executive Director, Association for Pro-gressive Communications (Alternate: Willie Currie, Commu-nications and Information Policy Programme Manager)

Nissim Ezekiel, former Executive Director, Commission onPrivate Sector and Development

Jonathan Fiske, Senior Manager, Group Public Policy,Vodafone Group Services Ltd

Ayesha Hassan, Senior Policy Manager, InternationalChamber of Commerce (ICC) (Alternate: Bill Stribravy,ICCPermanent Representative c/o US Council for InternationalBusiness)

Mohsen Khalil, Director, Global Information and Commu-nication Technologies, the World Bank (Alternate: PierreGuislain Manager, Policy Division (CITPO), Global Informa-tion & Communication Technologies Department, theWorld Bank Group)

Sarbuland Khan, Director, Office of ECOSOC Support andCoordination, United Nations Department of Economic andSocial Affairs

Ayisi Makatiani, Chairman, Gallium Venture Capital andCEO, African Management Services Company

Zouhair Masmoudi, Director-General, Ministry of Communi-cation Technologies and Transport (Alternate: HE Ali Hachani,Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary, PermanentMission of Tunisia to the United Nations, Tunisia)

Rajendra Pawar, CEO, NIIT, India

Gisa Fuatai Purcell, Secretary/ICT Advisor, Samoa NationalICT Committee, Ministry of Communications and Informa-tion Technology, Samoa

Daniel Stauffacher, Representative, Switzerland, SwissExecutive Secretariat for WSIS

Ichiro Tambo, Development Co-operation Directorate, Or-ganisation for Economic Co-operation and Development(OECD)

Hamadoun Toure, Director, Telecommunication Develop-ment Bureau, ITU (Alternate: Pape-Gorgui Toure, Chief,Policies, Strategies, and Financing Department, ITU)

Pedro Urra González, Director, Infomed, Cuba; * unable toparticipate in the TF meetings

Yoichiro Yamada, Director, Specialized Agencies Division,Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Japan

Mohamed Yunus, Managing Director, Grameen Bank,Bangladesh *unable to participate in TF meetings

Observers

José Antonio Ocampo, Under-Secretary-General for Eco-nomic and Social Affairs, Department of Economic andSocial Affairs

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Charles Geiger, Assistant Executive Director, WSIS Secre-tariat, WSIS

Janis Karklins, President of the WSIS Preparatory Commit-tee for the Tunis Phase

Rik Panganiban, Communications Coordinator, Conferenceof NGOs in Consultative Relationship with the United Na-tions (CONGO) (29 November TF meeting)

Pietro Sicuro, Directeur, INTIF, Gestionnaire du Fondsfrancophone des inforoutes, Organisation internationalede la Francophonie (4 October TF meeting)

WORKING GROUP ON INTERNET GOVERNANCEMEMBERSHIP LIST

ChairChairChairChairChair

Nitin Desai, Special Adviser to the Secretary-General forthe World Summit on the Information Society, Delhi/Mumbai

MembersMembersMembersMembersMembers

Abdullah Al-Darrab, Deputy Governor of Technical Affairs,Communications and Information Technology Commissionof Saudi Arabia, Riyadh

Carlos A. Afonso, Director of Planning, Information Net-work for the Third Sector; Member, Brazil’s Internet Steer-ing Committee; Member, Non-Commercial Users Constitu-ency (Rio de Janeiro)

Peng Hwa Ang, Dean, School of Communication and Infor-mation, Nanyang Technological University, Singapore

Karen Banks, Networking and Advocacy Coordinator, As-sociation for Progressive Communications; Director,GreenNet, London

Faryel Beji, President and CEO, Tunisian Internet Agency,Tunis

Vittorio Bertola, Chairman, ICANN At-large Advisory Com-mittee; President and CTO, Dynamic Fun, Turin

José Alexandre Bicalho, Member, Brazilian Internet Steer-ing Committee; Advisor to the Board of Directors of theNational Telecommunications Agency (Brasília)

Kangsik Cheon, Chief Operating Officer, International Busi-ness Development, Netpia, Seoul

Trevor Clarke, Permanent Representative of Barbados tothe United Nations Office in Geneva

Avri Doria, Research Consultant, Providence, Rhode Island

William Drake, President, Computer Professionals for So-cial Responsibility; Senior Associate, International Centrefor Trade and Sustainable Development, Geneva

Raúl Echeberría, Executive Director/CEO, Latin Americaand Caribbean Internet Addresses Registry, Montevideo

Dev Erriah, Chairman, ICT Authority of Mauritius, Port Louis

Baher Esmat, Telecom Planning Manager, Ministry of Com-munications and Information Technology of Egypt, Cairo

Mark Esseboom, Director of Strategy and InternationalAffairs, Directorate General for Telecom and Post, Minis-try of Economic Affairs of the Netherlands, The Hague

Juan Fernandez, Coordinator of the Commission of Elec-tronic Commerce of Cuba, Havana

Ayesha Hassan, Senior Policy Manager for E-Business, ITand Telecommunications, International Chamber of Com-merce, Paris

David Hendon, Director of Business Relations, UK Depart-ment of Trade and Industry, London

Qiheng Hu, Adviser to the Science and Technology Com-mission of the Ministry of Information Industry of China;Former Vice-President of the Chinese Academy of Sci-ences, Beijing

Willy Jensen, Director General, Norwegian Post andTelecom Authority, Oslo

Wolfgang Kleinwächter, Professor, International Commu-nication Policy and Regulation, University of Aarhus

Jovan Kurbalija, Director, DiploFoundation, Geneva/LaValetta

Iosif Charles Legrand, Senior Scientist, California Instituteof Technology, Pasadena, California

Donald MacLean, Director, MacLean Consulting, Ottawa

Allen Miller, Executive Director, World Information Tech-nology and Services Alliance, Arlington, Virginia

Jacqueline A. Morris, Consultant, Port of Spain

Olivier Nana Nzépa, Coordinator, Africa Civil Society,Yaoundé

Alejandro Pisanty, Director of Computing Academic Serv-ices, Universidad Autónoma de México; Vice-Chairmanof the Board of ICANN, Mexico City

Khalilullah Qazi, Counsellor, Permanent Mission of Paki-stan to the United Nations Office in Geneva

Rajashekar Ramaraj, Managing Director, Sify Limited,Chennai (formerly Madras)

Masaaki Sakamaki, Director, Computer CommunicationsDivision, Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communications,Tokyo

Joseph Sarr, President, NTIC Commission, Dakar RegionalCouncil, Dakar

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Peiman Seadat, Counsellor, Permanent Mission of the Is-lamic Republic of Iran to the United Nations Office in Ge-neva

Charles Sha’ban, Executive Director, Talal Abu-GhazalehIntellectual Property, Amman

Lyndall Shope-Mafole, Chairperson, Presidential NationalCommission on Information Society and Development ofSouth Africa, Pretoria

Waudo Siganga, Chairman, Computer Society of Kenya,Nairobi

Juan Carlos Solines Moreno, Executive Director, GobiernoDigital, Quito

Mikhail Vladimirovich Yakushev, Director of Legal SupportDepartment, Ministry of Information Technology & Com-munications, Russian Federation, Moscow

Peter Zangl, Deputy Director-General, Information Societyand Media Directorate General, European Commission,Brussels

Jean-Paul Zens, First Counsellor, Director of the Media andTelecom Department, Ministry of State of Luxembourg,Luxembourg City

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ANNEX 3:

WSIS outcome document “commitments”

Geneva Declaration of Principles

A number of articles reaffirm commitments to MDGs, Uni-versal Declaration of Human Rights etc.

10.10.10.10.10.We are fully committed We are fully committed We are fully committed We are fully committed We are fully committed to turning this digital divide into adigital opportunity for all, particularly for those who riskbeing left behind and being further marginalized.

11.We are committedWe are committedWe are committedWe are committedWe are committed to realizing our common vision of theInformation Society for ourselves and for futuregenerations. … We are also committed to ensuring thatthe development of ICT applications and operation ofservices respects the rights of children as well as theirprotection and well-being.

12.We are committed toWe are committed toWe are committed toWe are committed toWe are committed to ensuring that the Information Soci-ety enables women’s empowerment and their full partici-pation on the basis on [sic] equality in all spheres of soci-ety and in all decision-making processes.

65.We commit ourselvesWe commit ourselvesWe commit ourselvesWe commit ourselvesWe commit ourselves to strengthening cooperation to seekcommon responses to the challenges and to the imple-mentation of the Plan of Action, which will realize the vi-sion of an inclusive Information Society based on the KeyPrinciples incorporated in this Declaration.

66.We further commit ourselvesWe further commit ourselvesWe further commit ourselvesWe further commit ourselvesWe further commit ourselves to evaluate and follow-upprogress in bridging the digital divide, taking into accountdifferent levels of development, so as to reach internation-ally agreed development goals, including those containedin the Millennium Declaration, and to assess the effective-ness of investment and international cooperation effortsin building the Information Society.

Geneva Plan of Action

27.D2refers to “above commitments” but preceding text con-tains no use of the word “commit”.

Tunis Commitment

Article 7 reaffirms Geneva commitments.

Article 23 reaffirms commitment to gender equity; article25 to inclusion of young people.

16.We further commit ourselves We further commit ourselves We further commit ourselves We further commit ourselves We further commit ourselves to evaluate and follow upprogress in bridging the digital divide, taking into accountdifferent levels of development, so as to reach internation-ally agreed development goals and objectives, includingthe Millennium Development Goals, and to assess the ef-fectiveness of investment and international cooperationefforts in building the Information Society.

24.We will strengthen action We will strengthen action We will strengthen action We will strengthen action We will strengthen action to protect children from abuseand defend their rights in the context of ICTs.

30.Recognizing that disaster mitigation can significantly sup-port efforts to bring about sustainable development andhelp in poverty reduction, we reaffirm our commitment we reaffirm our commitment we reaffirm our commitment we reaffirm our commitment we reaffirm our commitment toleveraging ICT capabilities and potential through foster-ing and strengthening cooperation at the national, re-gional, and international levels.

31.We commit ourselves tWe commit ourselves tWe commit ourselves tWe commit ourselves tWe commit ourselves to work together towards the im-plementation of the Digital Solidarity Agenda, as agreedin paragraph 27 of the Geneva Plan of Action.

32.We further commit We further commit We further commit We further commit We further commit ourselves to promote the inclusion of allpeoples in the Information Society through the developmentand use of local and/or indigenous languages in ICTs.

Tunis Agenda

42.We reaffirm our commitment We reaffirm our commitment We reaffirm our commitment We reaffirm our commitment We reaffirm our commitment to the freedom to seek,receive, impart and use information, in particular, for thecreation, accumulation and dissemination of knowledge.

43.We reiterate We reiterate We reiterate We reiterate We reiterate our commitments to the positive uses of theInternet and other ICTs and to take appropriate actions andpreventive measures, as determined by law, against abu-sive uses of ICTs as mentioned under the Ethical Dimen-sions of the Information Society of the Geneva Declara-tion of Principles and Plan of Action.

49.We reaffirm our commitment We reaffirm our commitment We reaffirm our commitment We reaffirm our commitment We reaffirm our commitment to turning the digital divideinto digital opportunity, and we commit we commit we commit we commit we commit to ensuring har-monious and equitable development for all. We commitWe commitWe commitWe commitWe committo foster and provide guidance on development areas inthe broader Internet governance arrangements, and to

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include, amongst other issues, international interconnec-tion costs, capacity building and technology/know-howtransfer.

53.We commit to working earnestly We commit to working earnestly We commit to working earnestly We commit to working earnestly We commit to working earnestly towards multilingualizationof the Internet, as part of a multilateral, transparent anddemocratic process, involving governments and all stake-holders, in their respective roles.

83.Building an inclusive development-oriented InformationSociety will require unremitting multistakeholder effort.We thus commit ourselves We thus commit ourselves We thus commit ourselves We thus commit ourselves We thus commit ourselves to remain fully engaged—na-tionally, regionally and internationally—to ensure sustain-able implementation and follow-up of the outcomes andcommitments reached during the WSIS process and itsGeneva and Tunis phases of the Summit.

90.We are committed We are committed We are committed We are committed We are committed to working towards achieving the in-dicative targets, set out in the Geneva Plan of Action, thatserve as global references for improving connectivity anduniversal, ubiquitous, equitable, non-discriminatory andaffordable access to, and use of, ICTs, considering differ-ent national circumstances, to be achieved by 2015, andto using ICTs, as a tool to achieve the internationally agreeddevelopment goals and objectives, including the Millen-nium Development Goals, by:

a. mainstreaming and aligning national e-strategies, acrosslocal, national, and regional action plans, as appropriateand in accordance with local and national developmentpriorities, with in-built time-bound measures.

b. developing and implementing enabling policies thatreflect national realities and that promote a support-ive international environment, foreign direct invest-ment as well as the mobilization of domestic resources,in order to promote and foster entrepreneurship, par-ticularly Small, Medium and Micro Enterprises(SMMEs), taking into account the relevant market andcultural contexts. These policies should be reflectedin a transparent, equitable regulatory framework tocreate a competitive environment to support thesegoals and strengthen economic growth.

c. building ICT capacity for all and confidence in the useof ICTs by all - including youth, older persons, women,indigenous peoples, people with disabilities, and re-mote and rural communities - through the improve-ment and delivery of relevant education and trainingprogrammes and systems including lifelong and dis-tance learning.

d. implementing effective training and education, par-ticularly in ICT science and technology, that motivatesand promotes participation and active involvement ofgirls and women in the decision-making process ofbuilding the Information Society.

e. paying special attention to the formulation of univer-sal design concepts and the use of assistive technolo-gies that promote access for all persons, includingthose with disabilities.

f. promoting public policies aimed at providing afford-able access at all levels, including community-level,to hardware as well as software and connectivitythrough an increasingly converging technological en-vironment, capacity building and local content.

g. improving access to the world’s health knowledge andtelemedicine services, in particular in areas such asglobal cooperation in emergency response, access toand networking among health professionals to helpimprove quality of life and environmental conditions.

h. building ICT capacities to improve access and use ofpostal networks and services.

i. using ICTs to improve access to agricultural knowl-edge, combat poverty, and support production of andaccess to locally relevant agriculture-related content.

j. developing and implementing e-government applica-tions based on open standards in order to enhancethe growth and interoperability of e-government sys-tems, at all levels, thereby furthering access to gov-ernment information and services, and contributing tobuilding ICT networks and developing services that areavailable anywhere and anytime, to anyone and on anydevice.

k. supporting educational, scientific, and cultural insti-tutions, including libraries, archives and museums, intheir role of developing, providing equitable, open andaffordable access to, and preserving diverse and var-ied content, including in digital form, to support infor-mal and formal education, research and innovation;and in particular supporting libraries in their public-service role of providing free and equitable access toinformation and of improving ICT literacy and commu-nity connectivity, particularly in underserved commu-nities.

l. enhancing the capacity of communities in all regionsto develop content in local and/or indigenous lan-guages.

m. strengthening the creation of quality e-content, onnational, regional and international levels.

n. promoting the use of traditional and new media in or-der to foster universal access to information, cultureand knowledge for all people, especially vulnerablepopulations and populations in developing countriesand using, inter alia, radio and television as educa-tional and learning tools.

o. reaffirming the independence, pluralism and diversityof media, and freedom of information includingthrough, as appropriate, the development of domestic

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legislation, we reiterate our call for the responsible useand treatment of information by the media in accord-ance with the highest ethical and professional stand-ards. We reaffirm the necessity of reducing interna-tional imbalances affecting the media, particularly asregards infrastructure, technical resources and the de-velopment of human skills. These reaffirmations aremade with reference to Geneva Declaration of Princi-ples paragraphs 55 to 59.

p. strongly encouraging ICT enterprises and entrepre-neurs to develop and use environment-friendly pro-duction processes in order to minimize the negativeimpacts of the use and manufacture of ICTs and dis-posal of ICT waste on people and the environment. Inthis context, it is important to give particular atten-tion to the specific needs of the developing countries.

q. incorporating regulatory, self-regulatory, and other ef-fective policies and frameworks to protect children andyoung people from abuse and exploitation through ICTsinto national plans of action and e-strategies.

r. promoting the development of advanced researchnetworks, at national, regional and international lev-els, in order to improve collaboration in science, tech-nology and higher education.

s. promoting voluntary service, at the community level,to help maximize the developmental impact of ICTs.

t. promoting the use of ICTs to enhance flexible ways ofworking, including teleworking, leading to greater pro-ductivity and job creation.

119.We commit ourselves We commit ourselves We commit ourselves We commit ourselves We commit ourselves to review and follow up progress inbridging the digital divide, taking into account the differ-ent levels of development among nations, so as to achievethe internationally agreed development goals and objec-tives, including the Millennium Development Goals, as-sessing the effectiveness of investment and internationalcooperation efforts in building the Information Society,identifying gaps as well as deficits in investment and de-vising strategies to address them.

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ANNEX 4:

References

The main WSIS documents are available from the WSISwebsite, which is maintained by the ITU. The overall URLis www.itu.int/wsis. Different sections of this website pro-vide access to:

• The four WSIS output documents

• The reports of the Task Force on Financial Mechanismsand the Working Group on Internet Governance (on thelatter, see also www.wgig.org)

• The proceedings of the two full Summit sessions

• The proceedings of the preparatory process, includingthe PrepComs and the regional preparatory meetings

• Participant lists in all summit fora

• A variety of other summit-related material.

The site also provides access to materials generated bythe follow-up processes to WSIS, including the post-WSISaction lines. The Internet Governance Forum maintains asite at www.intgovforum.org, while the first IGF meetingis also recorded at www.igfgreece2006.gr.

The following list notes the URLs for a number of organi-sations’ work on WSIS, where this has significant bearingon the report above.

Association for Progressive Communications (APC)Association for Progressive Communications (APC)Association for Progressive Communications (APC)Association for Progressive Communications (APC)Association for Progressive Communications (APC)www.apc.org/english/wsis.

CONGOCONGOCONGOCONGOCONGOwww.ngocongo.orgindex.php?what=resources&g=12

Coordinating Committee of Business InterlocutorsCoordinating Committee of Business InterlocutorsCoordinating Committee of Business InterlocutorsCoordinating Committee of Business InterlocutorsCoordinating Committee of Business Interlocutorswww.iccwbo.org/basis/id8215/index.html.

International Telecommunication UnionInternational Telecommunication UnionInternational Telecommunication UnionInternational Telecommunication UnionInternational Telecommunication Unionwww.itu.int/wsis.

United Nations Development ProgrammeUnited Nations Development ProgrammeUnited Nations Development ProgrammeUnited Nations Development ProgrammeUnited Nations Development Programmewww.undp.org/wsis.

UNESCOUNESCOUNESCOUNESCOUNESCOwww.unesco.org/wsis.

World BankWorld BankWorld BankWorld BankWorld Bankwww.worldbank.org/wsis.

The following list draws attention to a number of otherreports and documents which are either cited in the textor offer interesting insights into WSIS and/or the issuesdiscussed above. It is not intended to provide a compre-hensive list of references to WSIS resources.

Annan, K. (2003). Address by UN Secretary-General to theWorld Summit on the Information Society, 10 Decem-ber 2003 [online]. Available from: www.itu.int/wsis/geneva/coverage/statements/opening/annan.html.

Berry, J.W. (2006). “The World Summit on the InformationSociety (WSIS): a Global Challenge in the New Millen-nium”. Libri, 56 (1), March 2006, pp. 1-15.

Cammaerts, B. (2005). “Through the Looking Glass: CivilSociety Participation in the WSIS and the Dynamicsbetween Online/Offline Interaction”. Communicationsand Strategies, November 2005, pp.151-174.

Chacko, J. G. (2005). “Paradise lost? Reinstating the hu-man development agenda in ICT policies and strate-gies”. Information Technology for Development, 11 (1),pp. 97-99. ISSN: 0268-1102.

Chakravartty, P. (2006). “Who Speaks for the Governed?”Economic and Political Weekly, 41 (3), pp. 250-257.

Cogburn, D. (2005). “Partners or Pawns?: The Impact ofElite Decision-Making and Epistemic Communities inGlobal Information Policy on Developing Countries andTransnational Civil Society”. Knowledge, Technology,and Policy, 18 (2), pp. 52-82.

Communications Commission of Kenya. [n.d.]. The World Sum-mit on the Information Society (WSIS) Process [online].Available from: www.cck.go.ke wsis_process.

DSF Foundation. (2005). Background of the Digital Soli-darity Fund. Digital Solidarity Fund Foundation (n.p.).

Dwiggins, D. (2004). “WSIS Essay”. Computer, 37 (3),March 2004, p. 7.

Electronic Privacy Information Center. (2004). The PublicVoice WSIS Sourcebook: Perspectives on the WorldSummit on the Information Society. Washington DC:Electronic Privacy Information Center.

European Union. (2004). World Summit on the Informa-tion Society: Preliminary EU Views on the PreparatoryProcess for the Tunis Phase of the Summit, 28 May2004. Brussels: European Union.

Group of Friends of the Chair. (2005). Report on the Workof the Group of Friends of the Chair (GFC) - Originalversions of the Political Chapeau and the OperationalPart. United Nations. Document WSIS-II/PC-2/DOC/03, 20 January 2005.

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Hoff, J. and Bjerke, F. (2005). “Fences and Gates inCyberspace: is the Internet becoming a threat to de-mocracy?”. Information Polity, 10 (1-2), pp. 141-151.ISSN: 1570-1255.

Holmes, N. (2004). “WSIS Essay – Response”. Computer,37 (3), March 2004, p. 7.

Information Society and Development Conference. (1996).“Chair’s Conclusions”. Information Society and Devel-opment; May 1996.

International Chamber of Commerce. (2004). Issues Paperon Internet Governance [online]. Paris: InternationalChamber of Commerce. Available from: www.iccwbo.org/home/e_business/policy/ICC%20issues%20paper%20on%20internet%20Governance.pdf.

International Telecommunication Union. [n.d.]. ICT Statis-tics Database [online]. Available from: www.itu.int/ITU-D/icteye/Indicators/Indicators.aspx#.

International Telecommunication Union. (1998). Resolu-tion 73 of the ITU Plenipotentiary Conference,Minneapolis, 1998 [online]. Geneva: International Tel-ecommunication Union, 2 August 1998. Availablefrom: www.itu.int/wsis/docs/background/resolu-tions/73.html.

International Telecommunication Union. (2005). WSISGolden Book. Geneva: International Telecommunica-tion Union.

International Telecommunication Union. (2006). RESOLU-TION GT-PLEN/7: Study on the participation of all rel-evant stakeholders in the activities of the Union re-lated to the World Summit on the Information Society[online]. November 2006. Available from: www.itu.int/council/groups/pp06-plen7.html.

Klein, H. (2004). “Understanding WSIS: An InstitutionalAnalysis of the UN World Summit on the InformationSociety”. Information Technology for Development, 1(3-4), pp. 3-14.

Kleinwächter, W. (2004). “Beyond ICANN vs ITU? How WSIStries to enter the new territory of Internet governance”.Gazette: The International Journal for CommunicationStudies, 66 (3-4), pp. 233-251.

Kummer, M. (2004). “The Results of the WSIS Negotiationson Internet Governance”. In UN ICT Task Force, InternetGovernance: a Grand Collaboration (pp. 53-57). NewYork: United Nations. (ICT Task Force Series 5). ISBN:92-1-104534-7.

MacLean, D. (1999). “Open Doors and Open Questions:interpreting the results of the 1998 ITU MinneapolisPlenipotentiary Conference”. TelecommunicationsPolicy, 23 (2), pp. 147-158.

MacLean, D. (2003). “The quest for inclusive governanceof global ICTs: Lessons from the ITU in the limits ofnational sovereignty”. Information Technologies andInternational Development, 1 (1), pp. 1-18.

MacLean, D., Souter, D., Dean, J. and Lilley, S. (2002).Louder Voices: Strengthening developing countryparticipation in international ICT decision-making.London: Commonwealth Telecommunications Or-ganisation/Panos London.

Maitland, D. (1984). The Missing Link: Report of the In-dependent Commission for World Wide Telecommu-nications Development. Geneva: International Tel-ecommunication Union.

Martin, B. (2005). “Information Society Revisited: fromvision to reality”. Journal of Information Science, 31(1), February 2005, pp. 4-12.

Moll, M. and Shade, L. R. (2004). “Vision impossible?The World Summit on the Information Society”. InMoll, M. and Shade, L. R. (Eds.), Seeking Conver-gence in Policy and Practice: Communications in thePublic Interest (pp. 45-80). Ottawa: Canadian Cen-tre for Policy Alternatives.

Mouria-Beji, F. (2004). “Preparations for the Tunis Phaseof WSIS”. In UN ICT Task Force, Internet Governance:a Grand Collaboration (pp. 365-368). New York:United Nations. (ICT Task Force Series 5). ISBN: 92-1-104534-7.

O’Siochru, S. (2004). “Civil Society Participation in theWSIS Process: Promises and Reality”. Continuum:Journal of Media & Cultural Studies, 18 (3), pp. 330-344. ISSN: 1030-4312.

Opoku-Mensah, A. (2004). “Twin Peaks: WSIS from Ge-neva to Tunis”. Gazette: The International Journal forCommunication Studies, 66 (3-4), pp. 253-273.

Padovani, C. and Tuzzi, A. (2004). “The WSIS as a Worldof Words: Building a Common Vision of the Informa-tion Society?”. Continuum: Journal of Media & Cul-tural Studies, 18 (3), pp. 360, 379. ISSN: 1030-4312.

Prada, F. (2005). “Mechanisms for Financing the Infor-mation Society from a Global Public Goods Perspec-tive”. WSISPapers [online]. Choike.org, January2005. Available from: www.choike.org/documentos/financing _is_gpgs.pdf.

Pyati, A. K. (2005). “WSIS: whose vision of an informa-tion society”. First Monday, [online] 10 (5). ISSN:1396-0466. Available from: www.firstmonday.org/issues/issue10_5/pyati/index.html.

Raboy, M. (2004). “The WSIS as a Political Space in Glo-bal Media Governance”. Continuum: Journal of Me-dia & Cultural Studies, 18 (3), pp. 345-359.


Ruddy, T. F. (2003). “Regime Conflicts at the World Sum-mit on the Information Society (WSIS)”. In Interna-tional Conference on Politics and Information Systems:Technologies and Applications, Proceedings (pp. 137-142). Orlando: International Institute of Informatics &Systemics. ISBN: 980-6560-04-3.

Selian, A. N. (2002). ICTs in Support of Human Rights, De-mocracy and Good Governance. Geneva: InternationalTelecommunication Union, August 2002.

Selian, A.N. (2004). “The World Summit on the Informa-tion Society and Civil Society Participation”. Informa-tion Society, 20 (3), July-31 August 2004, pp. 201-215.

Souter, D. (2004). “The view from the summit: a report onthe outcomes of the World Summit on the Informa-tion Society”. Info: the Journal of Policy, Regulationand Strategy for Telecommunications Information andMedia. 6 (1), February 2004, pp. 6-11.

Souter, D. (2004a). African Participation in WSIS: reviewand discussion paper [online]. Association for Progres-sive Communications. Available from: rights.apc.org/training/contents/ictpol_en/ictmodule.2006-05-18.6637944641/ictunit.2006-05-19.5882667093?set_language=en.

Sreberny, A. (2004). “WSIS: Articulating Information at theSummit”. Gazette: The International Journal for Com-munication Studies, 66 (3-4), pp. 193-201.

Sreberny, A. (2005). “Gender, Empowerment, and Commu-nication: Looking Backwards and Forwards”. Interna-tional Social Science Journal, 57 (2), June 2005, pp.285-+.

Task Force on Financial Mechanisms. (2004). FinancingICTD: The Report of the Task Force on Financial Mecha-nisms for ICT for Development [online]. United Nations,22 December 2004. Available from: www.itu.int/wsis/tffm/final-report.pdf.

Uganda Communications Commission. [n.d.]. Communica-tions Sector Comparative Figures for the period Decem-ber 1996 to September 2006 [online]. Available from:www.ucc.co.ug/marketInfo/marketstatistics. php.

United Nations. (1948). Resolution adopted by the Gen-eral Assembly. 217 A (III). Universal Declaration of Hu-man Rights. UN Doc A/810, United Nations, 10 Decem-ber 1948.

United Nations. (2002). Resolution adopted by the Gen-eral Assembly. 56/183. World Summit on the Informa-tion Society [online]. United Nations, 31 January 2002.Available from: www.itu.int/wsis/docs/background/resolutions/56_183_unga_2002.pdf.

United Nations Development Programme. (2005). HumanDevelopment Report 2005: International cooperationat a crossroads: Aid, trade and security in an unequalworld [online]. Available from: hdr.undp.org/reports/global/2005.

Williams, Howard. (2005). “Internet Governance: Explor-ing the Development Link”. Communications and Strat-egies, pp. 81-103.

Working Group on Internet Governance. (2005). Back-ground Report: Working Group on Internet Governance[online]. United Nations, June 2005. Available from:www.wgig.org/docs/BackgroundReport.doc.

Working Group on Internet Governance. (2005). Report ofthe Working Group on Internet Governance [online].United Nations, June 2005. Available from:www.wgig.org/docs/WGIGREPORT.doc.

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Whose Summit? Whose Information Society? - APC · 2015-10-08 · Whose Summit? Whose Information...

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