Who Is Aristotle's Citizen?

Who Is Aristotle's Citizen?Author(s): Curtis JohnsonSource: Phronesis, Vol. 29, No. 1 (1984), pp. 73-90Published by: BRILLStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/4182188 .

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Who is Aristotle's Citizen?

CURTIS JOHNSON

Introduction: The Nature of the Problem

When Aristotle confronted the task of defining "citizen" at the beginning of Book III of the Politics, the difficulties in doing so adequately must have seemed formidable. There was, first, the simple fact of constitutional diversity: states differ, and so too, therefore, do citizens in those states.' Further, there was diversity of usage: people do not always agree who is to be called a citizen.2 Then there are those anomalous cases of citizens who acquire or lose the title of citizenship in an "exceptional manner" such as citizens by adoption, or citizens who have been disfranchised.3 Anomalous also are those states in which either people not admitted into a share of office are nevertheless called citizens (the "subject citizen" of 1278a 16-17); or people who, while they do have access to certain offices, still are denied the title of citizen, as was the case, for example, of some of the officeholders at Marseilles (1321a3l).4 Finally there is a fundamental problem concern- ing what is right or just: regardless of who citizens are in any particular case, to whom injustice should the title of citizenship be given? Should it be given to all who are alike and equal, and therefore to the multitude in most states because in most states the people are equal in nature;5 or should it be reserved to the few who truly deserve to rule permanently because of their superior virtue?6

All of these factors present difficulties to the philosopher because the aim of defining is to find a common, unchanging essence in a world of enormous diversity. For Aristotle, moreover, since the essence of an object is to be found within the actual and existent, a good definition is not free to ignore the variation and diversity of the world; it must be so cast as to fit every case yet without itself becoming varied and diverse. A definition, in other words, must itself be one and yet be capable of covering many different and dissimilar cases. It must, further, be "correct". While it cannot ignore common usage, which varies from one state to another, it must nevertheless find whatever is best and universal in the way the title is used and conferred.7

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Who, then, is Aristotle's citizen? Does Aristotle succeed in overcoming the difficulties and providing a definition of citizenship that is everything that it should be? In particular, does his definition succeed, as he evidently believed it should, in identifying that "common nature" (to koinon)8 which enables it to describe who citizens are in all states alike? We believe that it comes close to realizing this goal, but falls a little short. The nature of the case, and particularly the different practices of different city-states in Greece, made complete success impossible.9 We also believe that Aristotle understood this problem, and accordingly devoted the first five chapters of Book III to showing the relation of anomalous cases to his own perfected definition. To understand Aristotle's definition of citizen, therefore, and to see how he arrived at it, is at the same time to illuminate a number of obscurities in Book III.

Part I: The Definition of Citizenship

First, let it be observed that Aristotle sets out to define the citizen "in the complete sense" (ton haplos politen: 1275al9), that is, he who lacks no qualification for sharing fully in all of the entitlements of citizenship. By thus limiting the scope of his enquiry Aristotle avoids having to deal with a number of difficult cases: those who are too young to share in citizenship, those who are too old, and citizens who have been exiled or disfranchised either rightly or wrongly (1275al5ff). He thereby is able to get directly at the question of who a citizen is "pure and simple". But even by excluding the difficult cases mentioned above, the task is still not free of problems. Aristotle has still to propose, and then reject, two preliminary definitions before arriving at the citizen "in the complete sense".

There are three definitions of citizen in Book III, chapter 1. The first is (III, 1,6 1275a23-24): "a man who shares in the administration of justice and in the holding of office" (metechein kriseos kai arches). The second is (III, 1.7-8 1275a33): "those who share in indeterminate office" (politas tous houto [aoristos arche] metechontas); by "indeterminate office" Aristotle means, specifically, the offices of judge in the courts and member of the assembly. The third, final definition is (III, 1.12 1275bl9-20): "he who enjoys the right of sharing in deliberative and judicial office" (arches bouleutikes kai kritikPs).10 These three definitions are the core of the chapter: everything else in it is an attempt to show why each of the earlier definitions is inadequate. Let us examine Aristotle's account of these in- adequacies.

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Inadequacy of the First Definition

The first definition had defined the citizen as one who shares in the administration of justice and holding of office. But in every state there are different kinds of offices.11 Citizenship requires not participation in all kinds of offices, but only in certain particular kinds. Those certain kinds, for want of a better term, Aristotle decides to call "indeterminate office" (aoristos arche). Hence, the first revised definition of citizen is "one who shares in indeterminate office".

This distinction between "offices" (archai) on the one hand, and "indeterminate offices" on the other, is of some importance to understanding the development of Aristotle's thought in this chapter. It is important especially to remember that, although he is not here writing a history of Greek politics, his distinctions are nevertheless often drawn from contemporary practice. Here in particular Aristotle is thinking of typical Greek democracies, as he himself says later.12 In democracies it was possible to identify, broadly speaking, two kinds of offices. On the one hand were offices properly so-called, the various magistracies to which the name arche was normally applied.13 On the other hand were the large popular bodies, the public juries and the public assemblies characteristic of democracies. Aristotle's aim, in revising his first definition, is to provide an easy means of distinguishing between these two kinds of offices. He wished to do this because he wished to show in his definition that citizenship (in democracies) depended not upon occupying (or being entitled to occupy) a magistracy but only upon occupying any type of office, including the office of assemblyman or juryman.

The difficulty confronting him at this point, then, was how easily and efficiently to distinguish verbally between magistracies and the large public bodies. This task was more difficult than it may at first appear, since magistracies were not always obviously different from these bodies. Both types of official could be elected by vote or by sortition.'4 Both carried out many of the same political duties, including deliberation and judging.15 Nor were the functions of the magistrates necessarily more important than those of the other bodies, a point Aristotle makes expressly (Pol. 1275a29ff). In addition, magistracies could, like the larger public bodies, be composite bodies, consisting of many citizens16 (although often they would obviously be held by individual citizens). And for many (though not all) of the magistracies the requirements for eligibility would be identical to the requirements for eligibility for the popular bodies.17 So the question for Aristotle was, on what basis were the two types to be distinguished.

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Two routes lay open. The first was to attempt to distinguish magistracies from other bodies on the basis of the principle of "specialization", magistracies being, in general, individually limited to "the conscientious perfor- mance of a set task", with popular bodies, by contrast, having wider scope and more diverse duties.'8 This division, however, was imperfect; the judicial function in particular, even in democracies, had by Aristotle's day become as specialized as most of the magistracies;'9 and conversely, many of the magistracies (such as the council) had duties as broad and diverse as those of the assemblies (see note 15). The other principle of division was more promising: limitation in tenure for membership. In democracies especially, the magistracies were strictly limited in tenure, both with respect to the length of terms (commonly one year, but as short as one day in the case of the Athenian council president);20 and with respect to the number of times an office could be held (usually only once, although sometimes twice - not consecutively - and almost never more than twice).21

Such restrictions in point of tenure did not exist for membership in the large popular bodies, the assemblies and juries. In these bodies citizens could sit continuously, or at least as often as they were elected or chosen. And membership for one term did not, as a rule, disqualify one for membership a second, third, or fourth term.22 That is, while one could hold a magistracy only once, or, if twice, only after an interval had elapsed, one could hold membership on juries and assemblies as long as one continued to be selected; there was for the latter no time restriction.

The difference between the two types of offices thus for Aristotle hinged principally, at least to this stage of his argument, on the tenure qualification. This would undoubtedly have been quite obvious to a Greek citizen living in a large democratic state. Anyone could submit candidacy for jury duty at any time, and the payment for service (as at Athens) ensured that the poorer citizens frequently would do so. But candidacy for the magistracies would have been limited to those only who had not held those offices previously.23 Once one had served his term in office for the specified length of time, he would forfeit his eligibility for that office, either permanently or for some interval. Thus, while strictly speaking all offices - juries, assemblies, and magistracies - were of limited tenure, the latter were so in a particular sense. The juries and assemblies, whether convened on a regular basis or only as the need demanded, and no matter how they were constituted or what their length of tenure, both alike were open to all citizens regardless of whether or not they had already served. The magistracies, on the other hand, were more like those modern elective offices which have fixed tenures. They were held for regular fixed lengths of time,

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after which those who held them became ineligible for subsequent tenure of them. It was this distinction which led Aristotle to discriminate in his first revised definition of citizenship between "offlces" on the one hand, whose tenure was fixed in the way described, and "unlimited offices", membership in which was not restricted in this way.

To this point, then, Aristotle has attempted to define citizenship in democracies on the basis of holding office: in brief, citizens are those who hold office. But in democracies there are many offices, and it would be a mistake to think that one must hold, or be qualified to hold, all of these offices to qualify as a citizen. For if this were true, many people would fail to qualify as citizens because of their ineligibility for the magistracies, or at least for some of them. But many of these same people would be eligible for the offices of assemblyman orjuryman, and the definition of citizen should recognize that fact, for they too count as citizens. In other words, to count as a citizen in democracies one need not hold or be eligible for the magistracies (although to hold such offices obviously would not disqualify one as a citizen); one need only serve (or be eligible to serve) as assemblyman or juryman. To make this point clear, however, a distinction was needed between offices of the latter sort and magistracies. Such a distinction Aristotle found in the idea of "unrestricted (in point of tenure) office" (aoristos arche), jurymen and assemblymen being officials of this sort. Citizenship in democracy, accordingly, means holding (or eligibility to hold) unrestricted office.24

Inadequacy of the Second Definition

So much for the first revised definition. But we learn in the next section of the chapter (1275a 34-1275b 22) that this definition too is open to criticism. In particular, it is applicable only to democracies.25 But constitutions differ; and one who may be a citizen under one form, such as democracy, may not be a citizen under another form, such as oligarchy. What is needed, therefore, is a definition of citizen which is applicable to all forms of constitution alike.26

The problem, as Aristotle states it, is this: public juries and popular assemblies are regular features of democracies. But these institutions are not present everywhere; they are absent particularly in non-democratic states. In some states, Aristotle says, there are no popular assemblies, but only meetings specially summoned; the decision of cases is remitted to special bodies. Sparta is an illustration: there, the Ephors, the Council of Elders, or some other magistracy (arche) handles most decisions.27 Much

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the same is true of Carthage.28 But if citizenship is defined, as Aristotle had already claimed, in terms of membership in indeterminate office (i.e. membership in public juries and assemblies), then it would necessarily follow that there are no citizens in states like Sparta and Carthage, where these large popular bodies are not found. This position, obviously, is untenable. There are citizens in every state, regardless of whether one finds indeterminate offices in them. The definition advanced earlier applies particularly to democracies, where indeterminate offices are common. What is now needed is a broader definition which incorporates citizens of democracies and non-democracies alike.

Aristotle now finds himself in an interesting dilemma. In order to describe citizens in non-democracies in such a way as to include all "holders of office" and no one else, he would seem to be forced to abandon the idea of "unlimited office", the democratic definition. The reason for this is simply that "unlimited offices", viz. jurymen and assemblymen, are not always found in non-democracies. But if a retreat from the democratic definition is necessary, a retreat to where? If he returns to the idea of "office holder" pure and simple, he runs the risk of excluding from his definition those people in democracies who, while ineligible for offlices properly so-called (the magistracies),29 could still serve as jurors or assemblymen. But precisely to include this group as citizens was the whole point of the first revised definition. So, it seems, whether he chooses to define citizens as "holders of office" or "holders of indeterminate office", Aristotle will exclude from citizenship some people in some states who nevertheless ought to be called citizens.

Aristotle eschews the obvious way out of this dilemma, which would have been to define citizens as those who share in offices of either a limited or an unlimited tenure.30 We shall shortly speculate as to why this is so. Instead, he moves to a new position altogether, one scarcely anticipated in his previous discussion. To find a truly comprehensive definition he now introduces the idea of "an official determined (or limited) by his sphere of authority".3' Different officials, he now suggests, have different spheres of authority. Magistrates (in all states) handle a range of affairs, jurors typically deal with others, and assemblymen (where they are found) are responsible for still others. The relevant question, thus, in determining the nature of citizenship, is not essentially one of the actual offices held by citizens (since offices vary from state to state; in some non-democracies there are no popular juries or assemblies at all). Rather, what counts for citizenship is the sphere of authority occupied by office-holders. Certain kinds of authority are more important than others in determining citizen

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status. In particular, citizens are those who exercise authority in "deliberation" and in "judging".32 In democracies authority of this sort would be exercised by "unlimited officials", that is, by assemblymen and jurymen. But in non-democracies, where these officials are sometimes not found, this kind of authority would often be exercised by other officials (archai), such as specially convened councils, or the Ephors at Sparta, or some other body.33 It does not really matter which kind of official or officials dis- charges the authority; what matters is the type of authority being discharged. And for citizenship it is the deliberative and judicial authority that is decisive. So, Aristotle concludes, "what constitutes a citizen is therefore clear from these considerations: we now say that one who shares in deliberative and judicial authority is a citizen of the state in which he holds that authority" (1 275b 12-20).

This definition is obviously superior to the earlier ones, for it succeeds, as they do not, in making citizenship dependent upon a universal element in constitutions, a certain kind of authority rather than a certain kind of office. For deliberation and judging are found everywhere, whereas assemblies, juries, and other particular political bodies are not. Thus, it does not matter (for citizenship) if one does not sit on a jury court or participate in an assembly; there are states, i.e. non-democracies, where to do so is impossible in any case, since these offices do not even exist. But it does matter whether one judges and deliberates, for these functions occur in every state. And these are the functions that make one a citizen "in the complete sense".

One may well wonder why Aristotle opted to define citizenship in terms of the possession of a certain kind of authority, rather than to fasten upon the seemingly simpler expedient of making it depend upon the possession of office of either unlimited or limited tenure. I believe two considerations may have influenced his choice here, one of a narrow, technical nature, the other of a broader, more philosophical kind. The first, technical reason has to do with his intention in employing the phrase "unlimited office" in the first place. One may recall that he invoked this term not because of the intrinsic importance of certain kinds of tenure qualifications for holding certain types of office. Instead he invoked it only as a kind of convenient shorthand: what the office ofjuror and assemblyman happened to have in common (distinguishing them from magistracies) was the absence of tenure qualifications. But this was merely a convenient circumstance; it permitted one easily to fasten a common title to both offices on the basis of a shared characteristic. The characteristic itself, however, i.e. the absence of a tenure qualification, was not the important point. The important point

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was the offices themselves. And the offices themselves were important not because there were no tenure restrictions, but because of the duties per- formed by them, viz. deliberating and judging (as we learn later).34 Thus, when Aristotle turned to non-democracies, what he found difficult was not centrally that there were no "unlimited offices" in them - this was "only the question of a name" in the first place.35 What was difficult was that in them there were no popular juries and assemblies. By this time the tenure issue had probably dropped from his mind. In other words, tenure considerations are absent from the final definition of citizen because they had never been central to that definition in its earlier stages.

Does this mean, then, that citizens need not hold office of unlimited tenure? After all, Aristotle had earlier said that they must; and his failure to return to this point in the final definition, for whatever reasons, may be regarded as something of a loose end. Even granting that sphere of authority replaces office as the deciding factor, one is still justified in asking whether citizens are only those who discharge that authority on an "unlimited" basis, that is, without tenure restrictions on the offices they hold, whatever those offices might be. Clearly Aristotle would answer this question in the negative. Citizens are those who deliberate and judge whether for unlimited terms or limited ones. Again, the point is that the tenure question is not the important one for him. It served a convenient use at one stage of the argument, for one kind of constitution. But when the argument moves beyond this stage to incorporate all constitutions, the tenure issue falls out as irrelevant.36

There is a second reason, I believe, why Aristotle shifted his ground from "'office" to "authority" in the final definition, one determined by his general philosophical aim. His intention in defining things is one of comprehensiveness: to include the greatest number of cases within a single definition. This aim reveals the broad pattern of this chapter: each new attempt to define citizenship improves upon its predecessor by extending the comprehensiveness of the concept. "Judging and holding office" is too narrow because it excludes in certain cases members of juries and assemblies. "Sharing in unlimited office" (i.e. members of junres and assemblies) is too narrow because it excludes in some cases citizens in non-democracies (where such offices do not exist). "Sharing in deliberative and judicial authority" is the final improvement. Authority of this type is exercised in every state, and those discharging it can easily be identified. This is the citizen "in the complete sense" and this is what Aristotle wished to find.

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Remaining Difficulties Resolved

Important as this definition is for constitutional theory, certain difficulties remain. It is still necessary to account for divergences from the complete definition in the actual practices of existing states. By loose analogy one could say that Aristotle's definition bears the defects of Max Weber's "ideal types": both presuppose conditions that nowhere perfectly exist. In a world that is everything that it should be the definition of citizen as one who shares in deliberation and judging would be perfect. But the world is less than it should be. Different states have different constitutions, some nearer, some further removed from the best. And, as constitutions differ, so too do the citizens within them.37 One must, therefore, not only show who citizens are "in the absolute sense"; one must also take account of the variety of practices found in different states and show how the difficulties raised by these various practices can themselves be resolved by reference to the ideal definition.38

Four such difficulties are identified by Aristotle. The first concerns how, given the fact that citizenship in practice is usually determined by descent from citizen parents, the earliest ancestors (those whose parentage cannot be traced) will have themselves been citizens.39 The second difficulty concerns the status of those who are made citizens by means of a revo- lution.40 The third question is the famous one about the conditions under which the goodness of a good man is the same as that of a good citizen.41 A final difficulty centers on the issue of whether the working classes (banausoi) are ever to be counted citizens.42 All of these issues raise serious problems both for the student of politics, since fundamental principles of theory are at stake, and for the statesman, since correct answers to them could have a great impact upon policy. The "complete" definition of citizen is the means by which Aristotle is able to resolve them. Indeed, its usefulness helps explain why Aristotle pondered the question of the absolute definition at such length and with such care.

The question about lineage resolves itself quickly. The practice of states, according to which citizenship is determined by parentage, is really only a practical convenience. It stipulates certain concrete operations according to which admission to citizenship is determined. But it does not affect the question of who in any given case the citizens are (although obviously it does affect the question of who becomes a citizen). The definition settles the question of who citizens are, now or at any previous time, and so settles the question of who the original citizens were in remote historical times as well.

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Those are (and were) citizens who share (and shared) in the stipulated political functions.

What about those, though, who become citizens as a result of revo- lutions? Are they citizens too? This question is no more difficult than the first - they are, provided that they are admitted to deliberative and judicial functions - but it does raise a new issue of some importance. The real question being asked here is, are such people rightly citizens? Using the definition there is no difficulty in discerning who the citizens are. But does the definition afford any assistance in assessing the legitimacy of the claims of citizenship of any particular group?

This question is extremely complex and extremely important. It is complex because there is no simple answer to it; any answer must be qualified in certain ways. It is important because it is intimately connected to the central theme of the whole of Book III: what is a state? This is the question which opens the book, and which is immediately postponed because of the need first to define "citizen".43 "Citizen" has now been defined, so that it is now possible to return to the original question about the identity of the state. It is thus by means of this "difficulty" about the rightful claims of citizenship that Aristotle connects the discussion of citizenship with the rest of Book III.

On one level, it is obvious that a citizen who is not rightly a citizen is still a citizen, since citizenship is defined as sharing in certain offices. People who share in these offices are obviously citizens according to the definition, even if wrongly admitted to those offices (1276a5-7). But this is a rather superficial answer. The significant question here is not about a word, but is rather about what constitutes the rightful holding of office. And this is at bottom a question about the identity of the state. For there is an argument made by "some persons" that acts discharged by people who are wrongly citizens are not acts of the state, but acts only of a party (whether of one, a few, or many), and therefore are not binding. The identity of the state, in other words, is dependent upon the rightness of political rule by those who are citizens, or about the rightfulness of the claims to citizenship of those who rule. A state is only a state, therefore, at least according to this argument, when the people who are its citizens are rightfully so. In other cases, although one may speak loosely about actions of "the state", they are acts of the state only in the same sense as the public acts of a tyrant (1276a 17). And we know from other passages in the Politics that tyrannies are not properly called "states" (politeiai) at all.

The identity of the state is thus really a question about the rightfulness of political rule. It follows from this that citizenship "in the complete sense" is

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more than simply a matter of sharing in certain political functions; it is also a matter of ruling by right, possessing the kind of virtue which entitles one to rule. This is the means by which Aristotle finally connects the discussion about citizenship with the discussion about constitution (state): not by showing simply that citizens are uniquely "parts" which constitute the whole (had there been no more to the problem than this, chapters 2-5 would not have been necessary); but rather by showing that the identity of the whole (state) is also ultimately a question about the rightness of those who are the parts. The identity of the state, in short, is a question about citizen virtue, about the rightness of the rule of those who discharge political functions of a certain type.

By this route Aristotle returns to the difficulties associated with his definition of citizen. Since the identity of the state hinges upon a question about citizen virtue, it is impossible to say what a state (polis orpoliteia)44 is

without an account of citizen virtue. This is the question which follows: is the goodness of a good man the same as that of a good citizen? This difficulty, like the others, depends for its solution upon a proper understanding of citizenship "in the complete sense". One may abbreviate considerably a complex subject by saying that the virtue of a good man is identical to the virtue of a good citizen only in the case of the complete citizen, that is, for the citizen who rightly shares in political office, and only when he is ruling (actually holding office) in a good (right) state. The complete citizen, in other words, entails the rightness of his holding office; and the rightness of his holding office, in turn, entails a "right" state. So, again, while it is possible to speak loosely about a "&citizen" or even a "good" citizen even in deviant states, such as democracies and oligarchies, to speak properly of citizenship "in the absolute sense", one must speak of those who deserve to rule, the good man who holds certain offices in a good state.

Of course one must not forget that the citizen "in the complete sense" is, like Weber's ideal types, a limiting case. It is that towards which citizenship tends without necessarily ever reaching that point in practice.45 To be sure, there are people in every state who discharge the political functions of deliberating and judging, and who therefore are pronounced citizens in those states. As Aristotle says himself, "it is clear that even persons wrongly admitted to citizenship are pronounced to be citizens" (1276a5-6). And further, since the goodness of a good man is one, whereas the goodness of the good citizen is relative to the constitution, "it is manifestly possible to be a good citizen without possessing the goodness that constitutes a good man" (1276b34). In short, variations in the meaning and quality of

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citizenship in different states do exist. On this point Aristotle could hardly be more clear than when he says "the citizen corresponding to each form of constitution will also necessarily be different" (1275b4-5).

But it must also be remembered that there is a "primary" and "secondary" nature of things. "Now we see", he writes, "that constitutions differ from one another in kind, and that some are subsequent and others prior; for erroneous and divergent forms are necessarily subsequent to correct forms" (1275a35-1275bl). It follows that the nature of citizenship, dependent as it is on the type of constitution, will also have a "prior" and a "subsequent" form. The "complete" definition is prior; it will have no defect, belonging to the best constitution. It, therefore, entails one who holds office "rightly", possessing the necessary wisdom and virtue. Aristotle is clear on this point also: "And although the goodness of one who rules and that of one who is ruled are different, the good citizen must have the knowledge and the ability to be ruled and to rule, and the merit of the good citizen consists in having a knowledge of the government of free men on both sides. And therefore both these virtues are characteristic of a good man" (1277bl3-18).

The question of citizenship is thus complex. On the one hand there is common practice and usage. One comes closest to capturing the universal practice of states by associating citizenship with the political functions of deliberating and judging. But on a different level one must not dissociate citizenship from questions about the rightness of political rule.46 When this factor is taken into account, citizenship is confined to those who are rightly admitted to office. The idea of citizenship from this point of view entails possessing the virtue requisite to ruling rightly. Not every state, obviously, will follow this model: indeed, few if any will. Yet all states will be said to be "states" and to have "citizens". And when these conditions are confronted by the student of politics, he will not refuse to call them "states" and "citizens", but will understand in doing so that they are "states" and "citizens" in a secondary and "divergent" sense from the "complete" sense. The true citizen is the man capable of governing rightly.47

There is only one remaining difficulty to be overcome: the question of whether the working classes (banausoi) are ever to be counted as citizens. This is a difficulty for the following reason. These people either share in offices or they do not. If they do not, then they are not properly called citizens, since citizens are those who share in offices of the state. The difficulty in this case is, if they are not in the class of citizens, in what class are they, since neither are they aliens (metoikoi) or foreigners (xenoi). This is not a serious difficulty for in this case it is really only a question of a

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proper name for them. Like children who are not yet complete citizens, this group too might conveniently be called "incomplete (atelks) citizens" (1278a 1 -6).

The other alternative presents greater difficulties: when the banausoi are admitted into political offices. This is a problem because in one sense they are citizens (those who share in certain political functions), but in another sense they are not, because citizens in the complete sense also possess the citizen's virtue, yet the banausoi (and hired laborers too, for that matter) do not possess this virtue. They cannot possess this virtue because they are occupied with menial occupations, and people living this kind of life "cannot practice the pursuits in which goodness is exercised" (1278a2 1-22). Yet the fact remains that in some states these classes are admitted into citizenship. In some oligarchies, for example, where holding office depends upon a high property assessment, rich artisans can and do become citizens (1278a25). And some democracies, owing to a lack of citizens, even admit foreigners (xenoi) into office (1278a28).

Two solutions to these difficulties lie to hand, depending upon the situation. In those cases where artisans (and other classes) are actually admitted into office (such as, for example, in oligarchies where artisans succeed in fulfilling the property qualifications), one acknowledges that they are citizens, but in a deviant sense. They are citizens in a deviant sense because the constitution in which they are citizens is itself deviant. In the right forms of constitution these classes would not be admitted, and therefore they would not be citizens. For in the right forms "honors are bestowed according to goodness and merit" (1278a20-21); and these classes are incapable of goodness in the sense that qualifies one rightly to rule.

In those cases, on the other hand, where the working classes are allowed the title of citizen without being allowed to share in office, the solution is to count them as citizens, but only as "citizens who are ruled".48 Aristotle evidently has in mind here those states, like Athens before the Cleisthenic reforms, in which the classes of the lowest property assessment (the Athenian Thetes) were barred from political office but still had certain civic privileges which were not available to metics, foreigners, and slaves.49 These people were not citizens even in the imperfect sense of "holders of office in a deviant constitution", since they were not admitted to any offices. But they were, in terms of civic status, somewhat above the level of manual laborers and slaves. Because of their intermediate status, it would be inappropriate to exclude the name of citizen from them altogether; surely they were regarded in popular usage as citizens. But one must also

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qualify their description as citizens by saying that they are citizens only in the sense of those who are ruled. If the full citizen is one who rules and is ruled in turn, these partial citizens fill half of the equation (the less important half at that): they learn the virtue of being ruled but lack the ability to rule in turn. And, of course, they could not be fully virtuous even in being ruled in any but a right constitution. In a deviant state one could say that this class of citizen is at two removes from the complete citizen: he is incomplete in the sense of lacking access to political office, and he is incomplete in lacking the virtue appropriate to ruling and being ruled rightly.

Aristotle identifies no further difficulties associated with the definition of citizenship. It could be contested perhaps that other difficulties remain; for example, how is it possible that there are citizens even in monarchies and tyrannies (in which, by definition, offices are held by a single person)?50 But it is doubtful, in view of what has already been said, that any additional difficulties would present great problems.51 On the whole Aristotle's definition is as much as it can be. It provides a universal standard for identifying not only who in any given case actually is a citizen, but who rightfully deserves to be one. It is thus useful in resolving a number of theoretical disputes about the true nature of citizenship as well as a number of practical disputes arising from conflicting claims to citizenship. And, of course, the idea of citizen "in the complete sense" provides a significant clue, if not the key, to the central question of Book 111, and perhaps of the Politics as a whole: what is the state?

Lewis and Clark College, Portland

NOTES

Pol. 1275b4-5: "Hence the citizen corresponding to each form of constitution will also necessarily be different". 2 Pol. 1275a2-3: "For there is often a difference of opinion as to this: people do not all agree that the same person is a citizen". This difficulty may well have been connected to the first, the diversity among states being the factor responsible for the variety in usage, although either difficulty may have existed independently of the other. 3 Pol. 1275a6. 4 On the basis of 1278al6-17, Claude Mosse has distinguished between "le citoyen complet" (haplos poliits) and "le citoyen passif' (archomenos polites) in "La Conception du Citoyen dans la Politique d'Aristote", Eirene 6 (1967), pp. 16ff. Similar distinctions are found in E. Barker, Politics of Aristotle (Oxford, 1946), pp. 69-70 (for whom "active citizenship" means eligibility to elect magistrates, and "passive citizenship" means eligibility to hold magistracies); and in H. Kelsen, "Aristotle and Hellenic-Macedonian

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Policy" in J. Barnes et al., Articles on Aristotle, vol. 2 (London, 1977), p. 176, whose view is the same as that of Mosse. 5 Pol. 1261a38ff., where the scheme of Plato's Republic of one class holding office permanently is criticized as being unjust; and often. 6 Pol. 1332bl7ff. 7 W. L. Newman, The Politics of Aristotle (Oxford, 1887-1902), Vol. 3, p. xxxiv, writes: "His wish evidently is not to deny the names of citizen and constitution to any type of citizen and constitution to which these names were given in the ordinary use of language, and yet to point to the type of citizen and constitution which best deserve the name". In his note to 1275a5 Newman adds that the contrast in Book III ch. I is between citizens "in the proper sense (kurios)" and those who are called citizens "in some other sense than the proper one". 8 Pol. 1275a38. 9 The first five chapters of Book III afford the student of political theory an excellent opportunity to make use of the knowledge of the historian to shed light on a number of theoretical difficulties. The nature of the question, as well as Aristotle's own continual reference to contemporary Greek practice, make the insights of the historian indispens- able to sorting out the difficulties confronting the theorist. 10 In Athens in the fourth century B.C. there were a large number of magistrates. Aristotle gives a full account of the archai at 1299a2ff., and again at 132 1b 1ff. I The council (boule) and precouncil (proboule) in democracies, though the former often and the latter sometimes existed, were considered magistracies. Cf. below, n. 16. 12 Pol. 1275b6. 13 In Book IV (1297b35ff.) where Aristotle classifies states according to the three parts or sections (moria) constituting the political offices, he reserves the term archai to designate the magistracies. For the other offices he refers only to "the deliberative function" (to bouleuomenon) and "the judicial function" (to dikazon or to dikastikon) without using the word office (arche). In his note to 1275a26ff (vol. 3, p. 136) Newman notes that assemblymen in democracies would be unlikely to claim to be magistrates, and that jurors and magistrates would also often be distinguished. Ehrenberg notes that in democracies, "the member of a court of law was not an official; he was no archon.. ." (The Greek State [London, 19691, p. 72). 14 At Athens, for example, all magistracies except those of strategoi and treasurers were elected by sortition, as were jurymen and assemblymen. Cf. V. Ehrenberg, op. cit., pp. 65-71; and C. Hignett, A History of the Athenian Constitution (Oxford, 1952), pp. 221ff. 15 Aristotle's own description of the functions of the magistrates (1299a25ff) shows that they were not, like our modern executive, legislative, and judicial institutions, easily distinguishable in purely functional terms. For the magistrates, in addition to "issuing orders" (their "most characteristic authority") were also responsible for "deliberating" and "judging" (as were, obviously, the "deliberative" and "judicial" parts of the constitution). 16 The boule (council) in democratic states was often called an arche, for example, and hence was only quantitatively different in composition from the assembly. Cf. Ehrenberg, op. cit., pp. 53, 65. Aristotle himself lists the boul in certain constitutions as an arche (e.g., 1299b30ff.). 17 Well before Aristotle's own time many of the magistracies had been open to all property classes, including the lowest (Hignett, op. cit., p. 157, where Thetes are said to have not been excluded even from the Council under Cleisthenes; and p. 224).

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18 Ehrenberg, op. cit., p. 65. 19 R. J. Bonner, Aspects of Athenian Democracy (New York, 1933), chapter II; and Hignett, op. cit., pp. 216-2 1. 20 In addition to the discussions in Bonner, Ehrenberg, and Hignett, see also A. H. M. Jones, Athenian Democracy (Oxford, 1957), pp. 100ff. 21 Such, at least, was the case at Athens (Hignett, p. 152, etc.). Other democracies were similar (cf. R. Sealey, A. History ofthe Greek City States ca. 700-338 B. C. (Berkeley, 1976], pp. 155-156; and Ehrenberg, op. cit., pp. 65-66 and pp. 72-3; and Aristotle Ath. Pot., ch. 62). 22 Hignett, op. cit., pp. 232ff; Ehrenberg, op. cit., pp. 55ff. In a sense, of course, these large popular bodies, especially the juries, did have limited tenures, since any given juror would have been unlikely to serve on a particular jury beyond the time required to try the case for which he was selected. The lottery would determine the set of jurors for the next case, and, considering the size of the citizen pool from which jurors were selected, the chances would have been remote for the same juror to be selected twice. But the point is that citizens were not prohibited by law from serving consecutive terms, as was the case with the magistracies. And in the case of the assemblies, one assumes regular repeated attendance by the same citizens. Cf. Aristotle, Ath. Pot., chs. 63-69. 23 There were, to be sure, certain exceptions to this rule. At Athens, for example, the more important military magistracies could be (and often were) held more than once, undoubtedly because of the strategic importance of these offices. But Aristotle was here thinking of the regular magistrates, such as the archons, and these all had limited tenures. 24 We have a case here of a definition being selected for its comprehensiveness. Those eligible for the magistracies would have also been eligible for the assemblies and juries, since the requirements for membership in the former were either greater than or equal to requirements for membership in the latter. The reverse was not necessarily true: there were some magistracies which were not open to all classes. Thus, while every magistrate could have been a juror or assemblyman, not every juror or assemblyman could have been any magistrate. And since Aristotle wants to define citizen as broadly as possible he naturally chose juror and assemblyman ("unlimited office") as the standard. 25 pol. 1II, 1. 10 1275b5ff. "We may thus conclude that the citizen of our definition is particularly and especially the citizen of a democracy. Citizens living under other kinds of constitution may possibly, but do not necessarily, correspond to the definition". 26 Here Aristotle encounters a major obstacle: as constitutions differ in form, so too do definitions of citizen, each constitution having its own definition. This problem is taken up below. 27 Pol. Ili, 1. 10 1275b9-1 1. 28 Pol. III, 1. 11 1275bl2-13. 29 Recall that arche generally connotes magistracies in Aristotle (and generally in Greek usage). See above, n. 13. 30 E. Barker, in his translation of the Politics (The Politics ofA ristolle, Oxford, 1946) tries to accomodate just this reading in his translation; but in doing so, he is forced to supply words that Aristotle did not print, and most other translators do not follow the substance of Barker's reading. 31 Pol. 1275b 16: "ho archbn . . . ho kata ten archen horismenos". My reading of this whole sentence is: "For in the other [viz., non-democratic] constitutions the unlimited oflicial is not the juryman and assemblyman [since these officials are often not present in non-

democracies); but rather these officials [i.e. the ones in non-democracies corresponding to

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juryman and assemblyman in democracies] are ones determined by their spheres of authority". In other words, one can find the official in non-democracies corresponding to the citizen in democracies by first determining the sphere of authority occupied by the latter (viz. deliberating and judging), and then finding those discharging this same authority in the former. 32 Pol. 1275b19: arches bouleutikes e (or kai) kritikes. 33 Pol. 1275b9-12. Cf. also Sealey, op. cit., pp. 73-78. 34 That Aristotle is here thinking primarily of the duties (powers) and not of the absence of tenure qualifications of these two bodies is shown by the fact that he refers to them as holding "the greatest power in the state" (1275a29). And it scarcely requires saying that "deliberation" and "judging" are not names of certain kinds of offices but of certain types of authority. 35 Pol. 1275a30. 36 A related question is whether the final definition restricts citizens to those who actually hold deliberative and judicial authority, or whether it extends to those who, while not actually holding power today, are nevertheless eligible to hold it on a future occasion. Does Aristotle, in short, distinguish between eligibility and actual possession? I believe that he does not. His aim is one of comprehensiveness (see below), and so his mind is always on the eligible as well as the actual citizen. Though this may be a distinction of some importance in political theory, there is nothing in his language in this chapter to suggest that his mind was concerned with this question in defining citizenship. 37 "People do not all agree that the same person is a citizen; often somebody who would be a citizen in a democracy is not a citizen under an oligarchy" (1275a2-3). Also, "Hence the citizen corresponding to each form of constitution will also necessarily be different" (1275b4-5). 38 Indeed, it is no exaggeration, I think, to suggest that the reason Aristotle begins with the complete definition is precisely to show how many common difficulties can be resolved by reference to it. 39 Pot. 1275b23-26. Cf. especially Ehrenberg, op. cit., pp. 38-43, for a discussion of admission to civic rights in the polis and restrictions upon it. Hignett describes the processes used for checking lineage in the Athenian case, especially pp. 280-97. Under the radical democracy, with the admission of the Thetes to office, birth became less important than wealth in determining political rights (cf. pp. 394-95). 40 Pol. 1275b34ff. Aristotle has here in mind the admission of the Thetes to citizenship carried out by Cleisthenes after the expulsion of the tyrants, and similar cases. 41 Pol. 1276b 17ff. For a full discussion of this vexing (if not vexed) issue, see R. Develin, "The Good Man and the Good Citizen in Aristotle's Politics", Phronesis, 18 (1973), pp. 71-79. 42 Pol. 1277b33ff. 43 Pol. 1274b35; returned to at 1276a7ff. 44 Although these terms sometimes are distinguishable, Aristotle sometimes (as here) uses them almost synonymously, much as one might do with the terms "state" and "constitution". 4 The comments of Ehrenberg (op. cit., esp. pp. 88ff.) about the nature of the polis are very illuminating in this connection. He shows conclusively, I think, that the polis tended by the nature of polis society to be a partnership among all adult males in rule and equality, and that, therefore, its rational extension (and perfection) was pure democracy. This, of course, did not guarantee that actual states fulfilled this ideal, nor that in

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democracies all people governed equally well. But these were nevertheless the ideal ends of typical polis society. 46 Newman's note is very useful (vol. 1, pp. 569-70): Aristotle's aim here is to distinguish a narrower view of citizen (those capable of ruling well, those equipped with phronesis) and a wider one (all citizens including neo5teroi and those not fit to rule). 47 Pol. 1277b37. The basic point being made here, that the complete citizen is one who has the virtue to govern, remains the same whether one reads polites as subject ("the citizen is the one with the capacity to govern") orpolitPs as predicate and houtos as subject ("not all the citizens will have the capacity to govern"). In the latter case the meaning would be that since the banausoi are admitted to office, and thus are called citizens, not all citizens will possess the capacity to govern because the banausoi lack this capacity. See Rackham, p. 275 n. 2. 48 This is Mosse's so-called "passive citizen", discussed above (note 4). 49 See the discussion in Hignett, op. cit., pp. 281ff., of the distinction in the radical democracy at Athens between those who enjoyed "full citizen rights" and those who, for various reasons, were limited to "partial" rights. This distinction recalls an earlier time when access to political office was restricted to those who fulfilled a property require- ment, but when citizenship in a more limited sense was still open to the Thetes (pp. 117-119, where Hignett uses the term "half-citizens"). In describing the constitution of the five thousand in Athens Aristotle distinguished between the astoi and Four Hundred politai, possibly on the grounds that "unlike politai, [astoil does not necessarily imply active participation in the administration of the state" (A th. Pol. ch. 31; and the note in K. von Fritz and E. Kapp, Aristotle's Constitution of Athens and Related Texts [New York, 1950], p. 179). 50 Cf. Pol. 1311a6-7; 1314bl2; 1315a40; and Newman's notes on 1275blO-20 and 1285a26-7. 51 We have already noted the "citizen in a subject position", and this idea may easily extend to monarchies.

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Who Is Aristotle's Citizen?

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