Whitley 1992
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Prehistory and Post-Positivist Science: A Prolegomenon to Cognitive ArchaeologyAuthor(s): David S. WhitleySource: Archaeological Method and Theory, Vol. 4 (1992), pp. 57-100Published by: SpringerStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/20170221.
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Prehistory
and
Post-Positivist Science
A
Prolegomenon
to
Cognitive
Archaeology
DAVID S.
WHITLEY
Science,
after
all,
is
a
branch
of
literature.
?Sir
Karl
Popper,
Objective
Knowledge,
p.
185
Archaeology
sits
at
an
interface.
Having
finally
evolved
through
(some
had
hoped
beyond)
the
growth
pangs
of
new
archaeol
ogy,
it
is
now
undergoing
a
second,
similar
period
of
debate,
with
issues
of
epistemology,
ontology,
and
metaphysics
once
again
in
the
fore.
That
is,
current
theoretical discourse
involves
a
reconsideration
of
the
"processualist"
positivism
of
new
archaeology
and the
evalua
tion of
"post-processual,"
"symbolic,"
or
"radical"
approaches (cf.
Hodder
1986;
Leone
1982;
Binford
1987;
Earle
and
Preucel
1987;
Shanks
and
Tilley
1987a;
Schiffer
1988).
Following
Huffman
(1986a;
cf.
Lewis-Williams
1989),
I
prefer
a
particular
brand
of
post-proces
sual
archaeology
labeled
"cognitive
archaeology,"
but the
appellative
is
not
so
important
as
the
substance.
Cognitive
archaeology
specifically
and
post-processual
archaeol
ogy
more
generally
are,
admittedly,
much
less
than
universally
or
even
widely
accepted
in
our
discipline.
Some
view
many
of the
con
tentions
raised
by
their
advocates
as
fundamentally inappropriate
to
science
(e.g.,
Binford
1987).
Others,
equally
strongly,
see
them
as
central
concerns
in
archaeology's
heuristic
(e.g.,
Hodder
1986),
even
while certain
critics
seem
to
question
the
ability
of
post-processual
approaches
to
contribute
to
our
understanding
of
the
prehistoric
past
(e.g., Earle
and
Preucel 1987). Yet
on
the empirical and practical
levels,
at
least,
there
are
two
substantive
areas
in
which
cognitive
archaeology,
that
is,
the
post-processual
approach
practiced
princi
2
57
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58 David
S.
Whitley
pally
by
archaeologists
associated
with
the
University
of the
Wit
water
srand,
specifically
is
making
great
inroads:
African
iron-age
studies
(e.g.,
Huffman
1981, 1982, 1984,
1986a,
1986b;
Thorp
1984a,
1984b;
Loubser
1985, 1988;
Evers
1989)
and
hunter-gatherer
research
(e.g.,
Lewis-Williams
1980,
1981,
1982,
1983, 1984,
etc.;
Lewis-Wil
liams and
Dowson
1988,
1989;
Lewis-Williams and
Loubser
1986;
Whitley
1982, 1988a, 1992;
Huffman
1983;
Wadley
1986,1987;
Camp
bell
1986, 1987;
Dowson
1988a,
1988b).
It is
the
purpose
of
this
essay
to
review these
cognitive archaeological
studies,
but
not
principally
in
terms
of
empirical
substance.
To do
so
without
attending
first
to
the theoretical
bases
of
cognitive
archaeology
would be
incautious.
Aside from
the
fact
that
many
processual
archaeologists
are
simply
unfamiliar
with this
literature,
it
is
apparent
that those that have
considered
it maintain certain
misconstrued
beliefs.
Further,
as
implied
above,
it is
also
true
that
there
is
more
than
one
brand of
post-processual
archaeology
and that distinctions be
tween
various strains
have been
little
explored
in
the
literature.
Thus,
a
consideration
of
cognitive archaeology's
substantive
ad
vances
can
only
be
predicated
on a
necessarily
antecedent
review
of
the
philosophical
and
methodological
issues
these entail.
I
begin
with
these,
before
turning
briefly
to two
case
studies of
the
approach
in
practice.
Intellectual
Bases
of
Cognitive
Archaeology
Critiques of the positivism (or,
more
correctly, logical
empiricism)
that
underpinned
new
archaeology
have
been
presented
by
a
number
of authors from
various
viewpoints
(e.g., Wylie
1981;
Flannery
1982;
Hodder
1986;
Shanks and
Tilley
1987b;
Kelley
and
Hanen
1988)
and need
not
be reiterated
here. Suffice
it
simply
to
note
that the
perception
of
a
scientific
archaeology
as
necessarily
part
of
Otto
Neurath's
"unified
science,"
following
a
formalized
(principally
Hempelian)
positivist
model,
is
now
widely
recognized
as
an
overly
narrow
characterization,
even
by
some
of the
original
proponents of the new archaeology program. Ironically, though, even
as
processual
archaeologists
are
reworking
their
philosophical
and
methodological
commitments
to
bring
them
in
line
with
recent
de
velopments
in
the
philosophy
of
science,
scientific
archaeology
is
being
caricatured
by
certain
post-processualists
(e.g.,
Hodder
1986;
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Prehistory
and
Post-Positivist
Science 59
Shanks and
Tilley
1987b)
in
exactly
the old-fashioned
positivist
mode that
many
new
archaeologists
are
moving beyond.
That
the
early
new
archaeological
treatises
and
some
of the
more
vocal
post-processualists
share
(or
shared)
the
same
flawed, positivist
perception
of
science
is,
however,
more
than
simply
anecdotal.
For
with this
misperception
on
the side of
certain
post-processualists,
there
is
an
equally
debilitating
and
parallel
misconstrual
on
the
part
of
most
processual
archaeologists,
which
is
that
any
opposition
to
their
processualist
goals
is,
somehow,
an
opposition
to
science and
necessarily
a
committment
to
relativism.
Just
as
narrow
positivism
has become
a
whipping
post
for
segments
of
the
post-processualist
persuasion,
in
other
words,
so too
has
an
extreme
relativism
been
taken
as
the hallmark of
post-processual archaeology.
But,
in
fact,
these
philosophical
and
methodological
commitments
do
not
necessarily
follow.
Anti-positivism
does
not
equate
with
anti
science,
or
at
least need
not
so,
and
neither
necessarily
does
an
anti
processualism imply
relativism.
Instead,
when
"post-positivist"
developments
in
the
philosophy
of
science
are
acknowledged,
an
archaeology
that
is
both scientific and
hermeneutic?cognitive
ar
chaeology?is
allowed.
Indeed,
it
suggests
that
archaeology
funda
mentally
is
an
interpretive endeavor,
but
one
in
which
scientific
method
and
heuristic
play
their
part.
In
order
to
understand this
intellectual
position
adopted by
cogni
tive
archaeologists,
and
implicitly
how this differs from other
post
processualist
as
well
as
processualist
positions,
I
outline
two
impor
tant
intellectual
developments
that
have been
fundamental
to
its
appearance: changes in culture theory in anthropology, and the rise
of
post-positivist
philosophy
of science.
Archaeology,
Culture
Theory,
and
the
Cognitive
Paradigm
Although
recently
there
appear
to
have
been
some
dissenting
voices,
for
over
three decades North
American
archaeologists
have
by
and
large adopted
the
catch-phrase
"archaeology
as
anthropology"
as a
rallying
cry,
if
not
an
ideological
precept.
This
is ironic
because
just
as archaeologists were emphasizing their intellectual ties and al
legiance
to
their
"mother-discipline,"
they apparently
turned their
backs
on
certain
major
intellectual
transitions
then
occurring
within
anthropology. Specifically,
shortly
after
Phillip
Phillips published
the
oft-quoted
remark
"archaeology
is
anthropology,
or
it
is
nothing"
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60
David
S.
Whitley
(1955:246-47),
and
following
earlier
intellectual trends
in
psychol
ogy
and
linguistics, anthropologists
such
as
Ward
Goodenough,
An
thony
F.
C.
Wallace,
David
Schneider
and
others
began
the
move
to
wards
a
"cognitive
revolution,"
resulting
in
what
is
now
generally
referred
to
as
cognitive
or
symbolic
anthropology
(cf.
D'Andrade
1984:88).
Whether
or
not
this constituted
an
anthropological
"para
digm
shift"
(Kuhn
1962),
or an
alteration
in
the "theoretical hard
core"
(Lakatos 1969),
is
arguable,
but
it
certainly
changed
in
funda
mental
ways
the
manner
in
which
most
anthropologists
viewed the
world,
and their
intellectual
task
in
understanding
it.
This
is
apparent
when
it is
recognized
that, prior
to
the
mid-1950s,
anthropology
was
dominated
by
the
belief that
most
things
human,
including
personality,
language,
and
culture,
could
be
best
under
stood
in
terms
of
stimulus-response
relationships
(D'Andrade
1984;
Le Vine
1984).
For
the
anthropologist,
and
by
derivation the
archaeol
ogist,
this
"behaviorism"
was
most
manifest
in
the
then-existing
defi
nition
of culture.
Simply
stated,
culture
was
defined
in
reference
to
patterns of behavior,
with
explanations
of culture
change
or
cultural
differences
most
frequently
framed
in
terms
of human-environment
relationships.
But,
starting
about
1957,
the behaviorist
paradigm
was
rejected by
many
in
anthropology
(and
other
human
sciences)
in
favor of
a
cognitive
formulation.1
Here,
rather than
emphasizing
nor
mative
patterns
of
action,
concern
shifted
to
a
definition
of
culture
as a
system
of
values and
beliefs
or,
in
a
word,
a
worldview.
Although
this
change
in
culture
theory
has
not
been
adopted
by
processualist
archaeologists,
including
many
who consider them
selves "anthropological archaeologists," cognitive
culture
theory
is
fundamental
to
cognitive archaeology,
and
a
few
summary
points
concerning
its
ramifications
need be made.
The
first
of
these
is
that
this
change
in
culture
theory
implies
a
shift
in
the
emphasis
of
social
inquiry
from
the
purely
behavioral
realm
to
better include
the
cogni
tive.
I
discuss
this
in
more
detail
below,
but
here
I
wish
to
emphasize
one
implication
and what
it
suggests concerning
the
explanatory
capability
of
one
strain
of
processual
archaeology,
"behavioral
ar
chaeology"
as
espoused
specifically
by
Earle and
Preucel
(1987).
This
is that archaeologists employ remnants of prehistoric behavior,
whether
expressed
in
artifacts,
monuments,
sites,
associations,
or
contexts,
as
their
evidence.
Since the
results
of
behavior
are
funda
mentally
our
evidence,
it is then
a
logical
inversion
to
argue
that
our
goal
is
to
seek laws
to
explain
our
evidence,
as
Earle and
Preucel
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Prehistory
and
Post-Positivist
Science
61
claim.
"One
uses
human behavior
as
evidence
for the
operation
of
the
mind,"
John
Searle
(1982:2)
noted
in
a
parallel
vein,
"but
to
sup
pose
that the
laws
must
be laws of behavior
is
to
suppose
that the
evidence
must
be
the
subject
matter."
Indeed,
it
is
only
if
the
subject
of
inquiry
is
extended
beyond
the level of
behavior,
to
what
causes
behavior,
that
any
hope
can
be raised
of
achieving
explanatory
laws
(cf.
Jarvie 1972:18;
Farr
1983:171).
For
this
reason,
cognitive archaeologists
have
adopted
an
approach
roughly
akin
to
Popper's
(e.g.,
1972,
1976)
"situational
analysis."
In
situational
analysis Popper distinguishes
what
he calls "world-one"
physical
objects (which
include
behavior)
from
"world-two"
subjec
tive
experiences,
and
both of these from "world-three"
objects.
These
latter
are
the
product
of the human mind
[not
to
be conflated
with
human
emotions
or
psychological
states,
which
are
world
two)
and
include
art,
myths,
institutions, statements,
arguments,
etc.;
that
is,
the
cognitive
(but
not
psychological)
realm. "The
innermost
nucleus
of
world
three,"
he
states,
"is
the
world of
problems,
theo
ries
and criticism"
(1976:194).
For
Popper
and other
proponents
of
situational
analysis (e.g.,
Jarvie 1972;
Farr
1983)
it
is
situational
analysis,
which
explicitly
considers
world-three
objects,
that under
lies law-like
generalizations
and makes
explanation
possible
in
so
cial
inquiry
(cf.
Farr
1983:171;
see
also Gibbon
1984:388-92).
Now
while
Popper
allows the
narrow
applicability
of
microeco
nomic
theories of
rationality
in
situational
analysis
(cf.
Popper
1961
:
141),
he
contends these
are
oversimplified,
overschematicized,
and
therefore
largely
false.
Correspondingly, they
are
inappropriate
to
the kinds of social contexts and problems that, for example, archaeol
ogists
confront
(cf.
Farr
1983:172).
In
other
words,
the
application
of
problematic
assumptions concerning industrialized,
Western
eco
nomic
behavior?economic
rationality,
maximization,
optimiza
tion,
minimization,
etc.?to
non-Western,
nonindustrialized
cul
tures
amounts
to
implicit analogical
reasoning
founded
on
vague
notions of
universalities
in
human
nature.
Thus,
although
I
recog
nize
that
many
processualists
set
their
sights
on
the
decision
making
behind
prehistoric
behavior,
my
contention is
that
the
way
they
con
ceptualize decision making is fundamentally faulty. That is, while
their
concern
with
decision
making
may
in
certain
cases
supersede
the
world-one
realm of
behavior,
at
best
it
leads
to
the
psychologisms
of
world-two
or,
in
other
cases
(e.g.,
optimal
foraging theory),
reduces
explanation
to
a
sociobiological
focus
on
the behavior of the
gene.
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62
David
S.
Whitley
Situational
analysis,
by
contrast,
is
"not
based
on
any
psychological
assumptions
concerning
the
rationality (or
otherwise)
of
'human
na
ture'"
(Popper
1966:97).
Therefore,
many
processualists'
recourse
to
immanent
psychological
motives
(e.g.,
maximization)
as
explana
tions
for
behavior
devolves
rapidly
to
a
kind of
hermeneutics
con
cerned with
psychologistic
world-two
objects.
And
such
simply
can
not
lead
to
satisfactory
explanation.
Second,
many
anthropologists
have chosen
to
ally
this
change
in
culture theory with the humanistically based, generally relativist in
tone,
idealist
critique.
Hodder
(e.g.,
1986)
has
apparently
adopted
a
similar relativist
stance
(cf.
1984:30),
although
without
any
explicit
consideration of culture
theory.
But,
in
fact,
the
cognitive
paradigm
does
not
imply
or
require
such
a
position.
That
is,
nowhere
does
interest
in
cognition,
symbolism,
or
belief
necessarily
imply
a
rela
tivist
or
nonscientific
approach
or
method
(cf.
Rudner
1966:74;
Huff
1981,
1982;
Farr
1983;
see
below);
instead,
such
is
simply
a
debatable
metaphysical
commitment.
Perhaps
most
importantly,
the
retention
of a scientific
approach
even within an
interpretive
program,
such as
is
suggested by
cognitive
culture
theory,
is
implied
by
a
number of
researchers
(cf.
Sch?lte
1986:8;
Alexander
1982:138).
Third,
it is
also
important
to
emphasize
that
new
archaeology
ef
fectively
enshrined
the
behaviorist definition
of
culture.
This
is
ironic
on
a
number
of
counts,
but
particularly
because
one
of
the
central
tenets
of
new
archaeology
was
a
rejection
of the "normative"
approach
of
traditional
archaeology.
Yet
the
behaviorist
paradigm
and
its
resulting
culture
theory
are
paramountly
normative.
By
con
trast,
as David Schneider has demonstrated a number of times
(e.g.,
1972:38),
it is
only
with
the
cognitive paradigm
that the
"normative
problem"
is
finally
overcome.
Here
the distinction
turns
on
the
con
ceptual
difference
between culture
as
"constitutive rules"
(i.e.,
guidelines)
in
the
cognitive
paradigm
and
as
"regulative
rules"
(or
norms)
in
behaviorism.
Post-processual
archaeology
and
the
cogni
tive
paradigm,
therefore,
do
not
necessarily
imply
a concern
with
"mental
templates,"
as
both
Binford
(1987)
and Earle and
Preucel
(1987)
seem
to
believe. Mental
templates,
instead,
simply
represent
an
aspect
of
the
normative
and one-dimensional
model
of
cognition
inherent
in behaviorism.
The
normative contradiction
of
new
archaeology,
of
course,
has
not
gone
unrecognized
by
processualists.
Culture
has
been
widely
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Prehistory
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Science 63
perceived
as
problematic,
because
the
concept
has
not
been
viewed
as
"operational."
But,
instead
of
coming
to terms
with the
concep
tual
contradiction,
new
archaeologists simply
eliminated the
con
cept
of
culture
from their
vocabulary
(e.g.,
Hill
1977:103;
Trigger
1984:283-84). This,
of
course,
was
no
new
strategy.
British
social
anthropologists
had
taken
the
same
tactic
in
downplaying
culture
and
favoring
social
structure
(cf.
Radcliffe-Brown
1952:192),
and
with the
same
result: "social
anthropologists
in
fact
had all
the
theoretical problems created for cultural anthropologists by the cul
ture
concept,
and also the
added
problem
of
not
realizing
that
they
had
the
problems"
(Sapire
n.d.).
For
a
number of
reasons,
consequently,
the
appearance
of
cogni
tive/symbolic anthropology
is
an
important
intellectual
develop
ment
in
understanding
the
post-processual
debate.
Arguably
it
repre
sents
a
larger "paradigmatic
shift"
from
a
behaviorist
to
a
cognitive
view
of
human culture and
society,
with
cognitive
archaeology
repre
senting
a
manifestation
of
this
change.
It
also
obviates the
normative
problem
which has
plagued archaeology
for
decades,
and does this
by
revitalizing
the central
concept
of
any
anthropological
(and
any
an
thropological archaeological)
research: culture.
Equally
importantly,
however,
it
implies
no
turn to
an
extreme
relativist,
anti-scientific
approach
to
research.
Post-Positivist
Philosophy
of
Science
In
addition
to
an
explicit
recognition
and
adoption
of
cognitive
cul
ture
theory
now current in
anthropology, specifically
of
culture
as
worldview,
cognitive
archaeologists
have
expressed
a
commitment
to
scientific method and
heuristic
(e.g.,
Lewis-Williams
1983;
Lewis
Williams
and Loubser
1986;
Lewis-Williams
and Dowson
1988;
Huff
man
1986a). This,
perhaps
more
than
anything
else,
sets
the
cognitive
archaeologists
apart
from
other
post-processualist
strains.
However,
this reflects
no
adoption
of
doctrinaire
positivist
scientific methodol
ogy,
toward
which other
post-processualists
and
even now some
pro
cessualists look
with disfavor.2
Instead,
it
represents
a
recognition
of
post-positivist
developments
in
the
philosophy
of
science,
and
it
is
to
these
that
I
now
turn.
Post-positivist
philosophy
of
science is
an
intellectual
movement
that
has
appeared
during
the
last
two
decades,-
that
is,
since
the
initial
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64
David
S.
Whitley
emergence
of
new
archaeology.
This
is
not
to
deny
that
it
has
earlier
intellectual
origins
but
simply
to
emphasize
that
it
has
experienced
a
sophisticated
development
in
the
recent
past.
Among
its
central
tenets
is
the
rejection
of
positivism's
narrow
emphasis
on
science
as
based
on
sense-data:
it
is
recognized
that there
are
many
phenomena
that
are
not
directly
observable
(e.g.,
neutrinos)
but
that,
nonethe
less,
have
a
material existence
that
is
indirectly
observable,
based
on
their influence
on
other
aspects
of
the material
realm.
That
is, post
positivist science has been marked by the rise of realism3 and its
linkage
with
a
rationalist
method
of
science
(discussed
below).
The fundamental
postulates
or
presuppositions
of
post-positivist
science
have been summarized
by
Toulmin
(1977:152)
and
Alexander
(1982:18-33;
1987:17-18;
cf.
Taylor
1971)
and
can
be
fruitfully
con
sidered
in
contrast
to
those
of
positivism:
1.
The
relationship
of
theory
and
fact
and
the
nature
of scientific
discourse.
Positivism
presupposed
a
radical break between fact and
theory,
with
empirical
observations held to be
specific
and concrete
and
nonempirical
statements
thought
to
be
general
and abstract.
In
contrast,
post-positivist
science
maintains
that
all data
are
theoreti
cally-informed.
That
is,
a
distinction
in
kind
between
theoretical
and
observational
terms?what
Nietzsche condemned
a
century ago
as
the
"dogma
of immaculate
perception"?is
now
widely
consid
ered
neither
ontologically
nor
epistemologically
supportable.
In
stead,
as
Lakatos
(1969:156)
has
argued,
to
call
some
things
"observa
tions"
and
others
"statements"
is
simply
an
analytical
convenience
based on a useful manner of
speech
(cf.
Hesse
1974;
Toulmin 1977:
152;
Newton-Smith
1981:19-27;
Kaplan
1984:34-35;
Giddens and
Turner
1987:2-3).
However,
that
we
recognize
that
these do
not
dif
fer
in
kind
does
not
imply
that
we
cannot
identify
a
distinction
in
degree
between
them;
simply
put,
they
are a
useful
manner
of
speech,
and
one
which
we
should
maintain.
This allows rational
con
fidence
(including,
in
some
low-level
cases,
inter
subjective
invari
ance)
in
scientific
observations.
Further,
this
postulate
implies
that scientific
formulations
have
implicit
or
explicit
commitments
to
metaphysical
and
empirical
concerns;
therefore
science
is
not
simply
an
activity
that
can
be
con
ceptualized
methodologically
or
empirically,
for
it
necessarily
incor
porates
the
general
and
presuppositional.
This
is
in
contradistinction
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Prehistory
and Post-Positivist
Science 65
to
hard-line
positivism,
which held that
more
general
and abstract
concerns
had little
significance
for
an
empirically
oriented disci
pline.
To
ignore
the
philosophical
side,
however,
runs
the
risk
of
implicit
and
unrecognized
theoretical
problems
or
misconstruals.
As
Alexander
notes,
"Reason
can
only
be
preserved
by making
presup
positions
explicit
and
subjecting
them
to
disciplined
debate"
(1987:
52),
and Reed
contends
that
"attempts
to'remove
all
philosophizing
from
a
domain
are
likely
to
remove
only explicit, potentially improv
able ideas at the expense of embedding tacit, potentially damaging,
ideas
into
the fabric of
a
field"
(1981:477).
This
fact
emphasizes
the
necessity
of
including
general,
theoretical
discourse
in
archaeology,
without
awaiting
the
final
resolution of
archaeology's
observation
language,
for
example,
as
some seem
wont to
do.
2.
The
nature
of scientific
method.
Scientific
commitments
are
no
longer
made
solely
on
empirical
evidence
or
crucial,
singular
tests
(cf.
Polanyi
1958:92),
as
positivism
maintained. That
is,
the
search
for some final
falsifying
or
verifying
evidence is considered inconclu
sive,
if
not
somewhat
simplistic.
Archaeology's
regular
controversies
over
the
acceptance
or
rejection
of
certain
key
radiocarbon
dates il
lustrate this
point
in
an
inductivist
way.
Further,
according
to
Lakatos
(1969),
it
is
often
not
clear what
even
constitutes
a
crucial
test
for
a
particular
theory
anyway,
save
in
hindsight.
Thus,
Salmon
(1982:37-38)
states,
"there
exists
both
confirming
and
disconfirm
ing
evidence for
many
important
hypotheses,"
while
Kelley
and
Hanen
(1988:241)
note
that
"acceptance
in
science is
always
tenta
tive. We
adopt
the
hypothesis
that has
best
survived
testing,
always
ready
to
abandon
it if
additional
research
shows that
another
is
more
probable."
This
implicates
a
scientific
method,
which
is
to
say
a
means
of
validation,
not
wedded
to
singular
criteria,
such
as
naive
falsification,
but instead
more
concerned with
"inference
to
the
best
hypothesis,"
to
employ Kelley
and
Hanen's
phrase.
3.
Theoretical
change.
Finally,
"paradigm
shifts"
or
transitions
in
a
"theoretical hard-core"
only
occur
when
a
match exists
between
em
pirical
evidence
and
convincing
theoretical
alternatives.
But,
be
cause
theoretical
disputes
are
often
implicit
(cf.
Holton
1973:26),
they
may
go
unrecognized
in
debates
perceived
as
principally
empir
ical
and
methodological
in nature.
Just
such
a
failure
to
recognize
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66
David
S.
Whitley
the
fundamental
theoretical
changes implied by
post-processual
ar
chaeology
is
illustrated
by
Earle
and
Preucel
(1987),
who
concluded
that
this
simply
represents
a
"critique"
of
new
archaeology.
These
postulates
are
important
for
a
number of
reasons.
First,
and
most
significantly,
they
effectively
undermine
the
foundation of
positivism.
As
Alexander has shown
in
great
detail
(
1982:18-33),
the
last
two
decades
in
the
philosophy
of
science
can
be said
to
have
unsettled
the
metaphysical, ontological,
and
epistemological
posi
tions
upon
which
positivism
was
based.
This,
of
course,
justifies
many
of
the
criticisms
of
new
archaeology
that
have been
raised
by
the
post-processualists,
but of
course
similar
criticisms
have been
raised
by
those
more
allied
with
processual
archaeology
as
well
(e.g.,
Kelley
and
Hanen
1988).
Further,
although
the
above
points
constitute
the
framework of
post-positivist
philosophy
of
science,
they
do
not
imply
only
a
single
approach
to
research;
for the
archaeologist,
they
do
not
entail
a
specific
method
for
the
study
of
the
past.
In
fact,
there
is
considerable
room
for
variation
in
how
these postulates
are
interpreted, particu
larly
the
first,
and these
interpretations
have had
a
great
influence
on
the manifestation of
post-processual
and
cognitive
archaeology.
That
is,
and
contrary
to
what
certain
post-processualists
would
lead
us
to
believe,
the
postulates
of
post-positivism
do
not
only
imply
a
relativist
position.
This
is
best understood if
we
consider
the basis
for
a
realist rationalism.
Temperate
Rationalism
That scientific method and
a
rationalist
approach
are
not
antithetical
to
an
interest
in
interpretation
and the
cognitive
paradigm
is
demon
strated
by
the
philosopher
of
science
William
Newton-Smith
(1981),
who has
outlined
what
he calls
a
"temperate
rationalism" that illus
trates
the
realist
position
adopted
by
the
cognitive
archaeologists.
It
consists
of
two
components
that,
together,
specify
its
program:
a
goal
of
science,
and
a
principle
or
set
of
principles
for
comparing
rival
theories,-
that
is,
a
scientific
heuristic and method.
In
consider
ing the scientific goal, the temperate rationalist accepts a realist
view of science.
This includes
an
ontological
position
that holds
that
theories
are
true
or
false
by
virtue
of how the world
actually
is,
inde
pendent
of
ourselves
(this,
of
course,
being
a
cleaned-up
version of
the
"correspondance
theory
of
truth";
cf.
Davidson
1969;
Elkana
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Prehistory
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Post-Positivist
Science
67
1978:312-13).
It
also
includes
a
thesis of
verisimilitude,
in
which
it
is
held
that the
point
of
scientific
enterprise
is
to
discover
explana
tory
truths
about
the
world,
but
that
these
truths
are
verisimilar
and
inherently
corrigible
in
the
sense
of
only
progressively
approximat
ing
the
real
truth
per
se.
Indeed,
the
"pessimistic
induction"
sug
gests
that all
scientific
theories
will
be
disproven
within about
200
years'
time,
but that
they
will
be
replaced
by
better
theories,
achiev
ing increasing proximity
to
the
real
truth.
The
second
component
of
rationalism,
the
set
of
principles
by
which
theories
are
evaluated,
has
been elaborated
by
Newton-Smith
in
great
detail
(1981:226-30),
and similar
principles
have been
suggested
by
many
other
scholars
(e.g.,
Kuhn
1962;
Hempel
1966:33
46;
Popper
1966:268;
Lakatos
1969;
Copi
1982:470-75;
Farr
1983:
165;
Lewis-Williams
and Loubser
1986).
It
corresponds
in
its
com
mitments
and
essential
elements
to
Kelley
and
Hanen's
(1988)
con
tention that the validation
of
archaeological
hypotheses
should
be
based
on
inference
to
the best
hypothesis.
In
summary
form,
what
Newton-Smith calls
the
"good-making
features
of
theories"
are as
follows:
(1)
observational
nesting?the
ability
to
preserve,
while
increas
ing
and
improving
over,
the
observational
success
of
previous
theories,
(2)
fertility?the provision
of
a
scope
or
guidance
for future devel
opment;
(3)
track
record?the record of
success
that
an
existing theory
has
accumulated;
(4) inter-theory support?the ability to account for, or support,
other,
accepted
theories;
(5)
smoothness?the
ease
with
which
a
theory
accounts
for
obser
vational
anomalies
in
terms
of
auxiliary
hypotheses;
(6)
internal
consistency-,
(7)
compatability
with
well-grounded
metaphyscial
beliefs)
and
(8)
simplicity.
These
qualities
allow for
an
adjudication
between
competing
theo
ries
and
hypotheses.
Scientific
advancement,
therefore,
need
not
simply be a question of new theories triumphing only through the
death of
old
theoreticians,
as
Max
Planck
(1949)
once
argued,
nor
is
there
"no
external
objective
basis for
saying
that
any
one
theory,
well
argued
and
coherent
internally
and
'fitting'
the
data,
is
any
bet
ter
than
any
other"
(Hodder
1984:30).
Nor,
for
that
matter,
need
we
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68 David
S.
Whitley
naively
assume
that confirmation
or
falsification
through
a
singular
critical
test
can
occur.
Instead,
there
are
multiple
criteria
upon
which
scientific
evaluation
can
be
based,
and these
allow for
a
rational and
objective
process
of
verification,
even
if
it is
ultimately
tentative
and
provisional
in
nature.
Cognitive
Archaeology
There
is,
correspondingly,
a
rational
approach
available
to
us
that
can
be called
upon
to
obviate the
many
problems
of
positiv
ism.
However,
this leaves
some
unresolved
issues.
As
might
be
clear
from the
few illustrations
I
have cited
concerning post-positivist
philosophy
of
science,
it is
apparent
that
many
processual
archaeolo
gists
have,
on
a
practical
level,
already adopted
certain
of
the
pos
tulates
of this
move
beyond positivism.
This
simply
underscores
Laudan's
(1981:2)
contention
that the
philosophy
of
science
is
more
closely
tied to what has
already happened
in the sciences than the
reverse.
But
what,
then,
are
the
distinctions
between
cognitive
ar
chaeology
and the
archaeology practiced
by
many
processual
archae
ologists,
if
these
archaeologists
already
share
some
of the
same
realist
rationalist
commitments?
In
summarizing
these
I
emphasize
a
distinctive
brand of
post-processual
archaeology?cognitive
ar
chaeology?most
evident
in
the research
of the
archaeologists
at
the
University
of the Witwatersrand.
Fundamentally,
cognitive archaeologists
take the
position
that
so
cial
inquiry
must
necessarily
consider the
cognitive
and
symbolic
aspects
of
past
societies.
That
is,
fully
aware
of the
shift
from
the
behavioral
to
the
cognitive
doctrine,
they
maintain that the
remains
of
prehistoric
actions
are
evidential,
and the
point
of
inquiry
is
to
study
the
cognitive
systems
behind
the behavior
creating
the archae
ological
record.
This
does
not
deny
that
humans
adapt
to
their
envi
ronment,
or
that man-land
relationships
may
impose
constraints
on
cultures.
Further,
it
does
not
imply
that such
are
unworthy
of
analy
sis.
And,
parting
company
with
post-processualists
such
as
Hodder
and Shanks
and
Tilly,
it
does
not
insist
that
archaeological
research
need
be
anti-scientific
or
that,
somehow,
concern
with
cognition
im
plies
interest
in emotions
or
psychological
states
(contrary
to
what
both
Sabloff
et
al.
[1987]
and
Hodder
[1986]
seem
to
believe).
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Instead,
while
maintaining
an
allegiance
to
scientific
method
per
se,
and
to
the
inherent
rationality
this
implies,
cognitive
archaeolo
gists
insist
that
explanation
and
interpretation
of
prehistoric
human
societies
and
culture
must
look
beyond
the evidential
level,
past
the
behavior
that
created
our
archaeological
record,
to
the
cognitive
sys
tems
that
underlie
it. In
this
avowedly anthropological
approach
to
archaeology,
three related
issues,
then,
require
clarification:
the
focus of social
inquiry;
the
inescapability
of
interpretation
in
social
research; and the means by which the cognitive systems of the past
may
be
accessed.
I
discuss these
in
turn.
The
Focus
of
Social
Inquiry
Adopting
a
committment
loosely
related
to
Popper's
"situational
analysis" (Popper
1961,
1966, 1972,
1976),4
cognitive archaeologists
maintain
that the
prehistoric
past
was
socially
and
culturally
consti
tuted, and,
therefore,
that
prehistoric
societies
and cultures
cannot
simply
be reduced to one-to-one
analogues
with
ecological
or
cyber
netic
metaphors.
Nor,
for that
matter,
do
they
think
that the
explana
tion of the
past
can
proceed
simply
with
a
consideration
of
the
overt,
behavioral
realm
or
the
relationship
of humankind
to
the
environ
ment.
Rather,
they
take the
concept
of culture
to
be central
to
ar
chaeological
analysis.
But
"culture"
here
is
not
what
is
meant
by
the
term
in
traditional
and
new
archaeology:
culture
as
regulative
rules,
governed
by
mental
templates,
evidenced
in
behavioral
patterns,
and
resulting
from
stimulus-response relationships
with the
environ
ment.
Instead,
culture
is
defined
as a
system
of
beliefs,
symbols,
and
values
or,
in
a
word,
as
worldview,
with these
"cognitive
objects"
comprising
constitutive
rules
within
which human
action
and
be
havior
unfold.
In
this
sense,
culture
is
determinative
for human
so
cial
behavior,
but this
does
not
imply
full
predictability
(Sapire
n.d.;
cf.
Weber
1975:122-23);
culture
provides
a
system
of beliefs
that
guides
behavior,
just
like the rules for
a
game
of
chess,
but culture
does
not
fully prescribe
behavior,
like the
algorithm
that
uniquely
specifies
the
course
of
a
computer
program
(cf. D'Agostino
1986).
At
this
point
a
few words
are
needed
in
reference
to
Popper's
situa
tional
analysis.
In
summary
form,
it
has
two
components:
a
situa
tional
model,
which
is
a
description
of what
Popper
terms
the
social
environment
within which human behavior
occurs;
and
a
rationality
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principle.
The
latter
(which
is
not
to
be
taken
as
a
law;
while
it is
a
major
premise
of the
thesis,
it
is
more
rightly
a
definition,
therefore
it is
not
nomological;
cf.
Farr
1983:169)
points
to
the
need
to
recon
struct
the
context
or
situation
within
which
action
occurs,
to
make
the
actions
that result
rationally
understandable
or
appropriate
to
the
context
within
which
they
unfold.
By
this
is
implied
a
ideologi
cal
analysis
that
begins
with
the
definition of
the
situation
and
pro
ceeds
to
the
rationality
of
subsequent
action,
as
specified
by
this
context.
Here
the
situational
environment
in
a
general
way
is
recon
cilable with the
cognitive
definition of
culture,
and
interpretation
therefore
must
consider the
cognitive
realm.
Culture, then,
is
a
central
concern,
but
it
is
not
simply
an
explana
tory
metaphor
for
the
cognitive
archaeologist
(such
as
"diffusion"
was
for the
traditional
archaeologist,
or
"evolution"
is in
certain
pro
cessual
studies).
That
is,
it is
the
purpose
of
cognitive
archaeological
research
to
elucidate the
system
of
beliefs that
constitute
a
culture,
thereby defining
the cultural
logic
or
situational
rationality
within
which decisions
were
made, institutions
were
constituted, and
ac
tions
performed.
In
reference
to
Popper's
situational
analysis, then,
cognitive
archaeology
aims
to
identify
the
realm
of
"cognitive
ob
jects" and,
through
the
exegesis
of
these,
explain,
interpret,
and
un
derstand the
prehistoric
past.
It is
important
to
emphasize
a
few
issues
here.
First,
as
noted
above,
concern
with
prehistoric cognition
does
not
imply
interest in
mental
states
or
other
psychologistic
concepts.
It
is,
therefore,
not
the realm of human
emotions,
which
has constituted the focus
of
"classical" hermeneutics and
now seems
the point of Hodder's con
textual
archaeology. Simply
stated,
understanding
the
past
cannot
be attained
by "getting
into"
the
psyche
of
our
ancestors,
or
by
con
cern
with
the
subjective
experiences
of
prehistoric
actors,
or
by
re
course
to
a
sensationalist
epistemology.
As
Farr
(1983:161)
notes,
"the limitations
of this
subjective
method overwhelm
its
utility
and
suggestiveness."
In
this
manner
cognitive
archaeology
parts
ways
with idealism and
its
recent
post-processual
manifestations.
Second,
explanation
of
the
past
(or
of
any
social
phenomena)
can
only be achieved by recourse to the cognitive realm. It cannot be
attained
simply
by
examination of
behavior
(Popper's
"world-one")
nor
through
consideration
of
human
psychological
motives
and
emo
tions
(Popper's "world-two").
Instead,
explanation
of
social
phenom
ena
requires
recourse
to
understanding
(cf.
Weber
1977:109)
and,
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David S.
Whitley
archaeology.
For
example,
as
Evans-Pritchard
noted
long
ago
in
com
menting
on
Radcliffe-Brown's social
anthropology,
social
structure
is
every
bit
as
abstract
as
culture,
or,
at
least,
one
is
no
more
concrete
than the other.
Kinship,
in
other
words?just
like
economic
and
sub
sistence
systems?is
as
much
in
people's
minds
as are
beliefs and
values
(Sapire
n.d.).
All of these
are
at
least
in
part
cognitive
con
structs,-
strictly,
none are
observable
on
the
ground;
therefore
there
is
no
logic
to
the
argument
that
one can
be
accessed
by prehistorians
while the others
cannot
(Lewis-Williams
1986a;
cf.
Wylie
1982a).
Nor,
for
that
matter,
is
there
reason
to
assume
that the
investigation
of
one
need
necessarily
be
methodologically
different from the
study
of the other.
Indeed,
to
presuppose
that
some
of these
phenomena
can
be
identified
and studied
archaeologically
while
others
cannot
is sim
ply
to
allow
perceived
inductive limits of the
archaeological
record
to
determine
our
research,
as
Wadley (1987)
has
rightly pointed
out.
But
this
is
only
part
of
the
problem
in
positing
a
distinction
in
kind
between
culture and
the
social,
economic,
and
subsistence
sys
tems
of
the
new
archaeologist.
As
Sapire (n.d.) contends,
the
analysis
of social
structure
simply
cannot
be
separated
from beliefs and
values:
the
relationships
that
constitute
distinctions
in
social
organi
zation
(like
commoner
and
elite)
lie
exactly
in
culturally-specific
values and beliefs. Therefore
it
cannot
be
presumed
that
one
can
be
considered
without the other.
Sapire
points
out
that
"the
prompts
for these social
roles
[constituting
social
structure]
are
not
in
the
genes;
they
are
in
the
conceptions
distilled
from
stories, theories,
jokes,
lies,
customs,
and other
educative
experiences
since
childhood
. . .
social
structure
presupposes culture" (Sapire n.d.; emphasis
added).
And,
as
Max
Weber has
argued
in
a
frequently
cited
passage
(1977:109),
the
same
holds for
economy
as
well.
Consequently,
con
tentions
that the
processual archaeologists'
focus
of social
inquiry
is
somehow
more
concrete,
less
abstract,
and
not
part
of the
cognitive
realm
but,
in
fact,
separable
from
it,
are
simply wrong-headed,
and
represent
a
logical
fallacy
of
the
gravest
order.
Archaeology
and
Interpretation
That
social
structure, economy,
and
subsistence
are
as
abstract
a
form
of
the
cognitive
realm
as
beliefs
and values
is
one
thing;
that
we
need
understanding
to
study
them
may
be
viewed
by
some
as a
slightly
different
matter.
Traditional
positivist
natural
science
denied
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the need
for
Verstehen,
or
understanding,
based
on
the
argument
that
the
objects
that the
physical
sciences
study
("stars,"
for
example)
have
an
existence
independent
of
anything
we
make of them. With
new
archaeology's original
adoption
of
positivism
and
its
metaphysi
cal belief
in
a
unified
science,
moreover,
it
was
presumed
that archae
ology
could
fully
be
a
naturalistic
science
and
that
recourse to
Verste
hen
was
unnecessary.
Further,
it
appears
that
certain
archaeologists
continue
to
view
any
concern
with
understanding
or
interpretation
with
suspicion.
Therefore the
interpretive
nature
of
archaeology
re
quires
comment.
First,
to
allay
certain
initial
fears,
it
is
important
to
emphasize
that
there
is
nothing
about
interpretation
that
is
inherently
"less
objec
tive"
or
"more
subjective,"
or
"more
scientific"
or
"less
scientific,"
than there
is
about
"explanation."
To
presume
such
is
to
commit
a
fallacy
of
equivocation
in
which
the
concepts
"objective"
and "sub
jective"
are
conflated
respectively
with "unbiased" and
"biased,"
"cognitive"
and
"noncognitive,"
"observational"
and
"nonobserva
tional,"
"rational"
and
"irrational,"
and
ultimately,
"scientific" and
"nonscientific."
But this is
simply
an
epistemological doctrine,
yet
to
be
supported.
Processual
archaeologists,
for
example,
have
never
illustrated
that their
explanations
are
somehow
more
scientific
or
more
objective
than
cognitive
archaeologists'
interpretations
(cf.
Feleppa
1981:62-63;
Lewis-Williams
1983;
Lewis-Williams and
Loubser
1986).
In
a
parallel
vein,
similarly,
Rudner
has
noted that
"no
one
has
ever
demonstrated
that the
psychological,
per
se,
is
iden
tical
with the
biased;
nor
is
it
easy
to
imagine
how
a
cogent
demon
stration of this could possibly proceed. (The fact that metaphysical
positions
have assumed this
position
without demonstration
is
scarcely
recommendation
for its
adoption)"
(1966:74;
emphasis
in
original).
Indeed,
Max
Weber
(1975:125)
has
argued
that
it
is
exactly
because
interpretations
of
human
actions
can
situate
such
actions
within
their
own
frames
of
reference that
such
interpretations
are
inherently
more
rational
than scientific
explanations
of
individual
natural
events,
which
may
simply
constitute
statistical
predictions.
Thus,
at
the
outset
it is
clear
that
certain
archaeologists'
reactions
against interpretation and understanding are emotional reactions,
based
on
embedded
metaphysical
and
epistemological
beliefs that
have
been little
thought-through
or
critically
evaluated.
Fundamen
tally,
there
is
little
justification
for
the
argument
that
understanding
and
interpretation
are,
somehow,
less
objective
than
explanation.
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David
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But
this embedded
reactionary position
aside,
there
are
other
sub
stantial
arguments
against
the
notion
that
archaeology
can
ignore
understanding.
According
to
Max
Weber
(1975),
for
example,
the
dis
covery
of
"meaning"
and
"interpreting"
are
neither
logically
nor
epistemologically
different than
the
discovery
of laws
or
causes
in
the natural
world;
fundamentally
both
rely
on
the
use
of
hypotheses
and
"instruments
of
concept
formation"
(Huff
1981:469).
For
Weber,
in
fact, interpretation
and
understanding
are
necessary
activities
in
all
domains of scientific
inquiry (Huff 1982:91). Similarly, Popper
argues
that all
science
is
performed
within
a
"horizon of
expecta
tions"
and that this "confers
meaning
on our
experiences,
actions
and observations"
(1972:345).
By
this,
both
contend that
understand
ing
is
a
necessary,
indeed
unavoidable,
component
of research.
And,
on
an
empirical
level
at
least,
Knorr-Cetina
(1981)
has
demonstrated
that
the
situational
logic
of
the
physical
sciences
results
in
natural
and
technological
scientists
employing
understanding
and
interpre
tation
as
much
as,
and
in
the
same
manner
as,
social
scientists.
In
short,
not
only
is it
impossible
for the
archaeologist
to
avoid under
standing
in
studying
the
past,
it is
highly
unlikely
that the natural
scientist
is
any
more
privileged
in
this
regard
as
well.
Again,
however,
this
is
not to
imply
that
interpretation
or
under
standing
can
be
reduced
epistemologically
to
"experiencing
some
thing"
(Weber 1975:159).
Weber
was
careful
to
emphasize
the need
to
objectify
interpretation (cf.
Cooper
1981:82;
Huff
1981,
1982),
and
this
concern
has been
considered
in
detail
by Popper.
In
fact,
Popper's
"critical
rationality"
is
effectively
an
objective
theory
of understand
ing (cf. Popper 1972). With this Popper defines what he calls "scien
tific
understanding,"
which
is
a
"systematically
critical
version
of
the kind
of
understanding
we
have
in
everyday
life"
(Farr
1983:159).
It
is
through
situational
analysis,
in
fact,
that such
objective
under
standing
can
be achieved. That
is,
for the
archaeologist
it
can
be
through
the related
approach
termed
cognitive
archaeology
that
we
can
understand
and
interpret
the
past,
but
in
a
manner
that obviates
the relativism
of other
post-processualist
approaches.
But
there
is
one
final
subtlety
in
the
interpretation
of "understand
ing" itself that warrants mention. This pertains directly to many
processual
archaeologists'
apparent
fear of the
interpretive,
and
is
that,
since
Verstehen
is
not
a
method
of
acquiring
knowledge
(as
Binford
[1987]
seems to
imply),
it
cannot
be
a
suspicious
method
at
all.
Instead,
it
is
a
mode
of
knowledge
(Sapire
n.d.),
and
exactly
that
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mode
of
knowledge
appropriate
when
concern
lies with
values,
be
liefs,
meanings,
and
so
on.
And
this,
of
course,
is
the
specific
kind of
knowledge
required
to
understand human
actions and
behavior.
Archaeology, consequently,
is
fundamentally
an
interpretive
exer
cise.
Simply
put,
we
interpret
the
past,
regardless
of
whether
or
not
we
do
so
with
explanatory
laws,
symbolic
interpretations,
or em
pathie
understanding.
This does
not
necessarily
relegate
it
to
non
science,
nor
does
it
implicate
relativism.
Instead,
as
Max
Weber,
Karl
Popper,
and others
have
taken
pains
to
show,
it
can
include
rational,
scientific
study.
Accessing
the
Cognitive
Systems
of
the
Past
"Well and
good,"
I'm
sure some
will
say,
"but how does he
figure
he
can
determine
what
they
were
thinking
in
the
past?"
This,
then,
is
the
next
order
of
business,
and,
although
my
concern
is
not
the
thought
patterns
of
prehistory,
it
ultimately
reduces
to
empirical
and technical
problems.
To
begin,
it is
necessary
to
identify
the
ar
chaeological
locus of
the
cognitive
realm.
Where,
in
short,
can we
look
within the
archaeological
record
to
find
evidence
of
prehistoric
cognitive
systems?
As
implied
above,
prehistoric
culture,
which
is
to
say
beliefs,
val
ues,
or
worldview,
is
inseparable
from other
cognitive
abstractions,
such
as
economy,
subsistence,
and social
organization.
Huffman
(1981,
1984,
1986a),
for
example,
has shown how
beliefs and world
view
were
expressed symbolically
in
the internal
arrangements
of
African Iron Age settlements, while Evers (1989) has illustrated the
expression
of
contrasting cognitive
systems
in
the
material
culture
of
a
variety
of
modern and
prehistoric
Bantu
groups.
It
follows,
then,
that
cognitive
systems
are
expressed
at some
level
in
effectively
all
aspects
of material
culture.
Thus,
beliefs
are
visible
archaeologically,
and
they
are even
commonly
and
regularly
expressed
in
everyday
material culture
(cf.
Welbourn
1984:23)
as
well
as
in
"ceremonial
objects."
That the
cognitive
side of
the
archaeological
record has
been
somewhat overlooked
in
favor
of
techno-environmental considera
tions, and that archaeologists may be unaccustomed to looking for
it,
then,
is
no
argument
in
support
of
the
putative
difficulty
of
access
ing prehistoric cognitive
systems
in
the
material record of the
past.
This
fact,
however,
is
bound
to
lead
to
other
objections.
For
exam
ple,
on
many
occassions I
have
heard
incredulity expressed
over
the
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21/45
76
David
S.
Whitley
idea that
beliefs and
values
can
be
ascertained
without
talking
to
informants.
But
this
simply
represents
misconceptions
concerning
the
nature
of
anthropological
research,
in
a
specific
sense,
and,
more
generally,
concerning
how
interpretations
are
made,
as
well
as
the
distinction
between
"signs"
and
"symbols"
(Whitley
n.d.a).
As far
back
as
his
writings
on
the Andaman
Islanders,
Radcliffe-Brown
(1922)
argued
that
"native
explanations"
are
not
explanations
at
all
in
the
sense
of final
exegesis
or
interpretation.
Instead,
as
has
been
emphasized
by
numerous
anthropologists (e.g., Sperber
1975;
Hugh
Jones
1979),
such
oral
accounts
themselves
are
simply
the
raw
data
from which the
anthropologist
develops
his
own
interpretation
of
a
particular
culture.
Ask
a
"native"
why
a
particular
ritual
is
per
formed,
or
what
bearing
his worldview has
on
his
architecture,
and
chances
are
quite
good
that the
response
will
be
on
the
order
of
"Be
cause we
have
always
done
it
this
way,"
or
"It is
our
tradition,"
or
simply
"I
don't know."
For
that
matter,
ask the
man on
the
street
similar
questions
about
the
symbols
and beliefs of
our
own
culture
and the average response will probably be equally unenlightening.
Beliefs
and
values,
as
expressed
in
symbols,
myths,
and
rituals,
often
not
only
are
not
widely
understood within
a
culture but
are
fre
quently
misunderstood
(Jung
1949:601;
Grimes
1976:45;
Elster
1982).
In
a
word,
then,
oral
informants
are not
the end-all and do-all
of
cognitive
research,
be
it in
anthropology
or
archaeology.
It is
exactly
for
this
reason
that
Clifford
Geertz
argues
that
"whatever,
or
wherever,
symbol
system