Whites’ Attitudes toward Immigrants and Immigration Policy: Are Multiracial Individuals a Source...

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Whites’ Attitudes toward Immigrantsand Immigration Policy: Are MultiracialIndividuals a Source of Group Threat orIntergroup Contact?Justin Allen Berga

a University of North DakotaPublished online: 10 Jun 2014.

To cite this article: Justin Allen Berg (2014) Whites’ Attitudes toward Immigrants and ImmigrationPolicy: Are Multiracial Individuals a Source of Group Threat or Intergroup Contact?, Sociological Focus,47:3, 194-217, DOI: 10.1080/00380237.2014.916597

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Sociological Focus, 47: 194–217, 2014Copyright © North Central Sociological AssociationISSN: 0038-0237 print / 2162-1128 onlineDOI: 10.1080/00380237.2014.916597

Whites’ Attitudes toward Immigrants and ImmigrationPolicy: Are Multiracial Individuals a Source of Group

Threat or Intergroup Contact?

Justin Allen BergUniversity of North Dakota

This study uses multilevel modeling with data from the 2010 U.S. Census and the Pew ResearchCenter’s 2006 and 2011 surveys to examine the relationship between the relative size of themultiracial population, specifically mixed-race whites, in metropolitan areas and the immigration atti-tudes of native-born non-Hispanic whites. The results indicate that whites who live in metropolitanareas with higher percentages of mixed-race whites are more likely to hold comparatively immi-grant-friendly attitudes in general and specifically toward immigration levels, taxes, and employment,supporting contact theory. With increases in the multiracial population, whites are likely to adopt amore complex conception of race over time, leading to context-specific and topic-centered attitudestoward immigrants and immigration policy.

In the United States, there is considerable variation in the immigration attitudes of native-bornnon-Hispanic whites (Ceobanu and Escandell 2010; Pew Research Center 2012). Prior empiricalresearch documents significant differences in opinions regarding the characteristics of immi-grants, such as whether or not immigrants work hard (Fennelly and Federico 2008), commitcrime (Ha 2010), and hurt the economy (Rocha et al. 2011). At the same time, white Americansdiffer in their opinions about immigration policy. Some are content with the current immigrationlevels, while others want the government to decrease them (Hopkins 2010), especially illegalimmigration (Knoll 2009). White Americans also debate whether or not unauthorized immi-grants should be offered temporary work permits or amnesty (Ayers et al. 2009; Lee, Ottati,and Hussain 2001). Such immigration opinions reflect the extent to which the United States andits communities offer a welcoming environment, which is associated with foreigners’ intentionsto immigrate (Becerra 2012), as well as their prospects for assimilation (Waters and Jimenez2005), and their experiences of intergroup harmony once in the country (cf. Dixon 2006). WhiteAmericans’ immigration opinions are also influential in terms of affecting the voting decisionsof U.S. policy makers (Tichenor 2002), and immigration policies have an impact on all socialgroups because they change the likelihood of important social relationships, such as marriage(Lee and Bean 2004; Ono and Berg 2010), and the likelihood of social equality and economicgrowth (Keeton and Newton 2005; Waters and Eschbach 1995).

Correspondence should be addressed to Justin Allen Berg, Department of Sociology, University of North Dakota, 225Centennial Drive, Grand Forks, ND 58202-7136, USA. E-mail: [email protected]

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mailto:[email protected]

WHITES’ ATTITUDES TOWARD IMMIGRANTS AND IMMIGRATION POLICY 195

To explain the variation in whites’ racial and ethnic attitudes, and in particular their immigra-tion attitudes, there is a long history in the research literature that focuses on the relative size of theminority population (Blalock 1967; Ceobanu and Escandell 2010). As Taylor (1998:512) says,“numbers count.” Whites feel and act differently when they are surrounded by a large numberof individuals who share their own race or ethnicity compared to when they are surrounded bypeople who claim a different race or ethnicity. The demographic context of an area consequentlyaffects attitudinal development. Scholars have found an association between whites’ immigrationattitudes and the size of the minority population at the level of neighborhoods (Oliver and Wong2003), metropolitan areas (Ha 2010), counties (Hopkins 2010), regions (Berg 2009), and nations(McLaren 2003).

The two primary theoretical perspectives that incorporate the size of the minority populationin their explanations of attitudes are group threat and intergroup contact. The basic argumentof a group threat perspective is that a higher relative percentage of minorities in an area leadsmembers of the majority group to experience a heightened degree of fear that they will lose finiteresources, fear that leads to anti-minority and anti-immigrant attitudes (Blalock 1967; Ceobanuand Escandell 2010; Quillian 1995). The intergroup contact perspective argues that a greaterproportion of minorities in an area offers members of the majority group more opportunities tointeract with members of the minority group, and it is the interaction between the two groups thatdispels perceptions of threat and leads to pro-minority and pro-immigrant attitudes, assumingcertain interpersonal conditions are met (Allport 1954; Escandell and Ceobanu 2009; Pettigrew1998).

Although the two theoretical perspectives differ with respect to their predictions regardingthe presence of minorities in an area, they are similar in terms of group designation. There is amajority group and a minority group. Accordingly, scholars have investigated the impact of therelative size of black, Latino, Asian and foreign-born populations in various geographic units onwhites’ ethnoracial and immigration attitudes (e.g., Berg 2009; Burns and Gimpel 2000; Dixon2006; Ha 2010; Hood and Morris 1998; Oliver and Wong 2003; Rocha and Espino 2009; Stein,Post, and Rinden 2000; Taylor 1998).

Yet, at the same time, a large number of people do not fit easily into a single racial or eth-nic category (Bennett 2011; Telles and Sue 2009; Thompson 2012). The U.S. Census reportsthat 9 million people self-identified as multiracial in 2010 (Humes, Jones, and Ramirez 2011).In particular, nearly seven and a half million of them claimed to be white and at least one otherrace, accounting for 2.4 percent of the U.S. population (Hixson, Hepler, and Kim 2011). Thisspecific combination constitutes more than three-quarters of all multiracial individuals, makingit by far the largest multiracial group (Humes, Jones, and Ramirez 2011). In the last decadeit has increased in size substantially and it is expected to continue to grow over the next sev-eral decades (Hixson, Hepler, and Kim 2011; Lee and Bean 2004). Given that these particularmultiracial individuals claim a racial identity that is a part of the majority group and a part of theminority group simultaneously, their potential influence on single-race whites raises theoretical,political and social questions. Are they a source of group threat or intergroup contact for whitesin terms of developing a pro- or anti-immigrant attitude? Will they encourage a white/non-whiteconception of race, where the majority of immigrants fall into the non-white category and pose athreat to native-born whites? Or will they encourage a more complicated conception of the U.S.racial hierarchy and immigrants’ place in it? Furthermore, by implication, will their presence lead

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196 SOCIOLOGICAL FOCUS

to greater similarity between whites and immigrants with respect to policy opinions or will theyintensify political conflict between racial and ethnic groups?

In the next section, I describe the theories of group threat and intergroup contact in moredetail to examine the idea that the number of multiracial individuals in an area who claim to bewhite and at least one other race change the immigration attitudes of monoracial whites. Then,I outline the data and measures, which come from the 2010 U.S. Census and the Pew ResearchCenter’s 2006 and 2011 surveys. After this, I present the findings from generalized hierarchallinear models and discuss the implications.

THEORY

Although multiracial individuals have been a part of the United States since 1776, their socialstatus and freedoms have changed over time. In the nineteenth century and early twentieth cen-tury, white Americans constructed a binary racial order with a narrow category for whites and alarge category for non-whites (Bennett 2011). Multiracial individuals were typically placed in thenon-white category by law (Haney Lopez 2006), because the quantum of non-Caucasian bloodwas the determining factor rather than outward appearance, such as skin pigmentation. Theirability to acquire desirable resources was limited. However, this varied to some extent by state(Bennett 2011). Multiracial individuals in some cases may have had a legal designation of beingwhite but were still usually considered non-white in the social sphere. Later in the twentieth cen-tury, especially after World War II, scholars argue that the U.S. racial order moved to a ternarysystem, with whites at the top, honorary whites and mixed-race individuals in the middle, and acollectively of blacks at the bottom (Bonilla-Silva 2004). One reason for this change was becausegovernment organizations, particularly the U.S. Census, began to abandon biological racialism,such as the one-drop rule (Thompson 2012). After the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in favorof interracial marriage in the 1967 Loving v. Virginia case, and after the U.S. Census moved toself-administered surveys, and therefore self-identification in terms of race, a multiracial statusgained more social acceptance. Now, because of the social movements of the 1980s and 1990sthat pushed the government and society to recognize a multiracial status as a civil and democraticright, and because of the U.S. Census’s change in 2000 that allowed people to check as manyracial categories with which they identify (Thompson 2012), the number and prestige of peo-ple claiming a multiracial identity has increased significantly (Lee and Bean 2004). Currently,multiracial individuals are afforded more legal and social rewards than they were in the past. Oneimplication, however, is that racial boundaries in the United States are less clear (cf. Wimmer2008), and the location of multiracial individuals in the racial hierarchy is uncertain (Telles andSue 2009). Consequently, the effect that multiracial people may have on single-race individuals,specifically for the current research, on native-born non-Hispanic whites, is an open question.

A group threat perspective would suggest that the presence of multirarical individuals in acommunity will have a negative effect on whites in terms of developing a pro-immigrant atti-tude. It arguably uses a binary conception of race wherein the majority group competes with theminority group for finite resources (Blalock 1967). As the minority group grows in size in anarea, it may gain a relatively larger share of the area’s economic, political, cultural and socialopportunities, placing the two groups in a situation of direct competition (Bobo 1988), which

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results in anti-minority attitudes on the part of the majority group. Theoretically, this reflects theideas of a realistic group conflict approach. On the other hand, it is possible that the competitionfor finite resources is only the perception of the majority group. That is, minority group membersin actuality may not be consuming the resources to any significant extent, but their presence stim-ulates fear nonetheless. Scholars have found that the size of the minority population is positivelyassociated with perceived group threat, especially in areas that have many extreme right-wingpolitical groups (Semyonov, Raijman, and Gorodzeisky 2006), and areas that are economicallydepressed (Quillian 1995), or during times when the country is discussing the impact of theminority group (Hopkins 2010). In both cases, whether there is real competition between groupsor only perceived competition, the majority group is predicted to feel threatened by the minoritygroup (Alba, Rumbaut, and Marotz 2005). The threat may occur at the individual level, whereindividuals worry that they may lose personal resources, or the threat may center on the group,where individuals believe that their group is losing its advantaged position in the ethnoracialhierarchy (Blumer 1958; Ceobanu and Escandell 2010).

Although no study to my knowledge has combined a group threat perspective with the relativesize of the multiracial population, there is reason to predict that an increase in the multiracial pop-ulation would result in a greater sense of threat among whites and therefore more anti-immigrantattitudes. Alba and colleagues (2005) found that when whites perceive a rise in the general minor-ity population in their area they are more likely to desire lower levels of immigration from Asia,Latin America, and Europe. It is possible that whites view multiracial individuals, even ones whoclaim a white identity as one of their racial statuses, as ethnoracial minorities. Historical patternsof whiteness indicate that gaining acceptance into the white racial category can be a long pro-cess, even for ethnic groups that have relatively light skin tones (Bennett 2011; Roediger 2005).Consequently, whites may consider multiracial individuals to be racial minorities if it is diffi-cult to cognitively place them into a specific racial category. For instance, Chen and Hamilton(2012) found that people take longer to place a person into a racial category when the person isnot clearly white or black in terms of facial features, and Herman (2010) has shown that peo-ple correctly identify individuals who claim a multiracial status only around half of the time.The other half of the time, they place multiracial individuals into single-race categories, typi-cally into a non-white one, especially for part-black multiracial individuals. Burns and Gimpel(2000:219) suggested that whites may count many racial and ethnic minority groups “simply asoutsiders.” This overall argument implies that whites often rely on a white/non-white conceptionof race when developing their immigration attitudes. Consequently, whites may not know theactual population percentages of each group (Alba et al. 2005), but may perceive a change in theminority population. These ideas lead to the first hypothesis:

Hypothesis 1: Native-born non-Hispanic whites who live in areas with a higher proportionof multiracial individuals are likely to develop anti-immigrant attitudes, due toheightened fears of racial threat because they view multiracial individuals asracial minorities.

The intergroup contact perspective comes to a different conclusion regarding the effect ofmultiracial individuals on whites’ immigration attitudes. This approach assumes that a degreeof misunderstanding or prejudice exists between social groups (Allport 1954), and the methodto reduce these negative impressions would be through intergroup contact (McLaren 2003). Therelative size of the minority population in an area provides the demographic structure for this

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interaction to occur (Dixon and Rosenbaum 2004). Under certain social conditions, such as whenmembers from both groups have equal status, common goals, a need to cooperate, and supportfrom authorities, the members of the majority group take on friendlier attitudes toward membersof the minority group (Allport 1954; Dixon 2006). Yet, all of these conditions do not need tobe present in order for the intergroup contact to have a positive effect on the majority group(Pettigrew 1998).

Many studies find evidence for the tenets of contact theory. For instance, whites who residein counties with more Latinos actually do interact more frequently with Latinos (Stein, Post, andRinden 2000), and whites who know Latinos and Asians are significantly more likely to holdfavorable attitudes toward these groups (Dixon 2006). Other researchers have also found supportfor an intergroup contact perspective with respect to attitudes toward immigrants and immigrationpolicy (e.g., Berg 2009; Escandell and Ceobanu 2009; Ha 2010; Hood and Morris 1998; Rochaand Espino 2009). There is a foundation therefore that supports the idea that the relative numberof multiracial individuals in an area may also influence whites to develop pro-immigrant attitudes.In particular, Bennett (2011) has shown that, compared to single-race minorities, multiracialindividuals tend to live in neighborhoods that are filled with more whites, affording them com-paratively more exposure to whites. With a South African sample of whites and blacks, Du Toitand Quayle (2011) found that contact with multiracial families, and even contact with a personwho knows a multiracial family, reduces racial prejudice. These outcomes are to be expectedbecause multiracial individuals have a distinctive family background and a complex place in theethnoracial hierarchy (Telles and Sue 2009), which changes their experiences of socializationand consequently their worldviews (Brunsma 2005; Kerwin et al. 1993; Rockquemore 1999).In many instances, they are trained by parents to adopt a pluralistic ideology regarding differentsocial groups (Meintel 2002). They arguably learn to view racial boundaries and race relationsdifferently and more sympathetically than single-race groups (Kerwin et al. 1993; Meintel 2002;Rockquemore 1999).

Specifically, two social processes may play a role in the intergroup contact between mixed-race whites and single-race whites. First, mixed-race whites are more likely than single-raceminorities to live near single-race whites (Bennett 2011), a situation that is therefore structurallyconducive for mixed-race whites and single-race whites to have comparatively cooperative inter-actions with common goals and support from authorities. Second, because mixed-race whitestend to hold a relatively open racial philosophy and because they share a racial status withsingle-race whites, making them closer in terms of equal status, they are likely to be more effec-tive as “goodwill contacts,” individuals who have goodwill toward outgroups and a desire forpositive intergroup contact (Allport 1954:278), compared to single-race minorities. As manyresearchers argue, homophily—the notion that similar people interact more frequently witheach other than with dissimilar people—powerfully predicts the adoption of social network ties(McPherson, Smith-Lovin, and Cook 2001). Thus, a social environment filled with greater num-bers of mixed-race whites is likely to transfer a greater amount of positive information aboutminorities, including immigrants, to single-race whites through intergroup contact compared toother social environments that are filled with single-race minorities (cf. Blau 1977). Thus, evenif the multiracial individual is white and black, the two groups with comparatively fewer immi-grants, and even if single-race whites are unaware of his or her multiracial racial status, themultiracial individual is likely to communicate a perspective that encourages more awareness ofthe inequities and virtues of different minority groups, resulting in relatively sympathetic attitudes

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toward immigrants and pro-immigrant policies on the part of single-race whites who interact withhim or her in occupational and residential settings. These ideas lead to the second hypothesis:

Hypothesis 2: Native-born non-Hispanic whites who live in areas with a higher proportionof multiracial individuals are likely to develop pro-immigrant attitudes due topositive intergroup contact, which encourages sympathetic viewpoints towardminority groups.

SAMPLE AND MEASURES

To test the hypotheses, I build two samples from three sources. For the individual level measures,I use data from the Pew Research Center’s 2006 Immigration Survey and the 2011 FebruaryPolitical Survey. For the 2006 survey, I use only the national portion and only questions thatare asked of all respondents. I constrain the data to native-born non-Hispanic whites who live inmetropolitan statistical areas, resulting in a sample of 1,095 respondents. For the 2011 survey,I constrain the sample to non-Hispanic whites who live in metropolitan statistical areas, leavinga sample of 758 respondents.1 The 2011 survey did not offer a question about nativity. Somerespondents therefore may be foreign-born non-Hispanic whites, yet the number of them in thesurvey is likely to be non-significant. This assumption is founded on the idea that approximately13 percent of foreign-born residents come from Europe and Northern America, the two regionsthat are most likely to have non-Hispanic whites (Grieco et al. 2012). Since the number of overallforeign-born residents from any country is typically small in probability surveys, often between5 and 10 percent, the number of non-Hispanic foreign-born white respondents in particular wouldbe substantially lower, potentially reaching only one percent of survey respondents. Therefore,the vast majority of non-Hispanic whites in the 2011 survey are probably native-born.

For the contextual measures, I use demographic data from the 2010 U.S. Census’s metropoli-tan statistical areas. Other scholars have used neighborhood level and county level data to testcontact theory and group threat theory (e.g., Hood and Morris 1998; Hopkins 2010; Oliver andWong 2003). The 2006 Pew Research Center survey has geo codes for metropolitan areas, coun-ties, and states, while the 2011 survey has geo codes for metropolitan areas and states but notcounties. Therefore, on the one hand, I focus on metropolitan areas to have consistency betweenthe two survey years. However, on the other hand, the majority of immigrants live in metropoli-tan areas (Singer 2010), and because native-born whites tend to identify with their city ratherthan their county when referring to their place of residence, I also focus on metropolitan areas.Scholars consider the metropolitan area to be a unit of analysis that represents a psychologicallyimportant and an economically functional region in the United States (e.g., see Taylor 1998),with many community building aspects, such as media and labor markets. Accordingly, numer-ous researchers have used this geographic unit to examine the effect of minority population sizeon racial and ethnic attitudes (e.g., see Dixon 2006; Dixon and Rosenbaum 2004; Ha 2010; Rochaand Espino 2009).

1Forty-six respondents did not answer the question that represented the primary dependent variable in the 2011 survey.They were subsequently dropped from the dataset, because the variable was nominal in nature. The missing data for theordinal level dependent variables in the 2006 survey were placed in the 0 category as neutral or undecided responses. Forthe nominal dependent variable in 2006, the missing data were deleted.

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Dependent Variable

To measure immigration attitudes in 2006, I create a scale of eleven questions (see Table 1).Each of the questions is coded 1 to represent the pro-immigrant response, −1 to represent theanti-immigrant response, and 0 to represent a neutral or undecided response. The scale thereforeranges from 11 to −11 and has a Cronbach’s alpha of .80. I also ran a factor analysis on the

TABLE 1Question Wording in the 2006 Pew Research Center Survey

Variable Question

Threat or strength I’m going to read you some pairs of statements that will help us understand howyou feel about a number of things. As I read each pair, tell me whether theFIRST statement or the SECOND statement comes closer to your ownviews—even if neither is exactly right: The growing number of newcomersfrom other countries threaten traditional American customs and values or thegrowing number of newcomers from other countries strengthens Americansociety, or neither/both equally.

Talent or burden I’m going to read you some pairs of statements that will help us understand howyou feel about a number of things. As I read each pair, tell me whether theFIRST statement or the SECOND statement comes closer to your ownviews—even if neither is exactly right: Immigrants today strengthen ourcountry because of their hard work and talents or immigrants today are aburden on our country because they take our jobs, housing and health care, orneither/both equally.

Adapt Compared to the immigrants of the early 1900s, are TODAY’S immigrants morewilling to adapt to the American way of life, less willing to adapt to theAmerican way of life, or are they about as willing to adapt to the Americanway of life?

Effect on government Thinking about all of the immigrants who have moved into your community inrecent years: What effect, if any, do you think these recent immigrants arehaving on the quality of your local government services? Are they makingthings better, making things worse, or not making much difference either way?

Lost job Do you believe that you or a family member has ever lost a job or not gotten a jobbecause an employer hired immigrant workers instead, or don’t you think so?

Immigration levels Should LEGAL immigration into the United States be kept at its present level,increased or decreased?

Take jobs Do you think the immigrants coming to this country today mostly take jobs awayfrom American citizens, or do they mostly take jobs Americans don’t want?Both?

Taxes Do you think most recent immigrants pay their fair share of taxes, or not?Protect American way of life Some people say that our American way of life needs to be protected against

foreign influence. Would you say you completely agree, mostly agree, mostlydisagree, or completely disagree with this?

Illegal immigration First, thinking about immigrants who are now living in the U.S. ILLEGALLY.Should illegal immigrants be required to go home, or should they be grantedsome kind of legal status that allows them to stay here?

Constitution Would you favor changing the Constitution so that the parents must be legalresidents of the U.S. in order for their newborn child to be a citizen, or shouldthe Constitution be left as it is?

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scale. All of the items loaded onto one factor with an eigenvalue of 3.06 and with factor loadingsabove .40, further indicating that the combination of questions represents an acceptable scaleof immigration attitudes.2 I also analyze each of the variables in the scale separately. Lastly, Ianalyze a nominal level question that asks, “Now thinking about our country, which of these is abigger problem for the United States right now—LEGAL immigration, ILLEGAL immigration,both equally, or neither.” I did not include respondents who had missing data. Consequently,the sample size for this question is 1,073 rather than 1,095. From the 2011 survey, I use thequestion: “What, if anything, is your biggest concern about illegal immigration? Is it that . . . ithurts American jobs; it hurts American customs and its way of life; it’s a burden on governmentservices; it contributes to crime; other; or no concerns.”3

Independent Variable

The primary independent variable is a contextual measure that represents the percentage of peoplein the metropolitan statistical area that claim a racial identity that combines white and AmericanIndian or Alaskan Native, white and black or African American, white and Asian, and whiteand some other race. Using the proportion of a minority group in a specific geographic area is acommon practice among scholars who attempt to estimate the effect of demographic context onethnoracial attitudes (e.g., see Berg 2009; Burns and Gimpel 2000; Ceobanu and Escandell 2010;Cohrs and Stelzl 2010; Dixon 2006; Dixon and Rosenbaum 2004; Escandell and Ceobanu 2009;Ha 2010; Hood, Morris, and Shirkey 1997; Hopkins 2010; McLaren 2003; Pichler 2010; Quillian1995; Rocha and Espino 2009; Rocha et al. 2011; Schneider 2008; Taylor 1998). Additionally,the U.S. Census defines white as “a person having origins in any of the original peoples ofEurope, the Middle East, or North Africa. It includes people who indicate their race as ‘White’ orreport entries such as Irish, German, Italian, Lebanese, Arab, Moroccan, or Caucasian” (UnitedStates Bureau of the Census 2010: 6-3). Of the 7.5 million individuals who claimed a whiteracial status in combination with another racial status (black, Asian, American Indian, or someother race), 32 percent (or 2.4 million) also identified with the ethnicity of “Hispanic” (Hixson,Hepler, and Kim 2011:5). Although Latinos are diverse with respect to their immigration atti-tudes (Hood, Morris, and Shirkey 1997; Sanchez 2006), overall many studies find that Latinosare more immigrant-friendly than other racial and ethnic groups (Branton 2007; Ilias, Fennelly,and Federico 2008; Knoll 2009; Lee and Ottati 2002). The implication of this information isthat a population of multiracial individuals who self-identify as white and some other race are

2Given the level of measurements in the scale, I also ran polychoric correlations for the items and used the polychoriccorrelation matrix for a factor analysis with STATA 11 (Institute for Digital Research and Education 2013). All of theitems loaded onto one factor with an eigenvalue of 4.55 and had factor loadings above .47. I also generated these factorscores to use as a dependent variable. The percent-multiracial variable remained statistically significant (p = .046; two-tailed test) and in the same direction as the model presented here.

3The 2011 survey asked three more questions regarding opinions about unauthorized immigration (better bordersecurity, pathway to legalization, or both), the Arizona law that requires police to verify legal status in certain situations(approve or disapprove), and whether the constitution should be changed to deny children U.S. citizenship if they areborn in the United States to unauthorized immigrants (favor change or not). The percentage of multiracial individuals ina metropolitan area was non-significant in predicting these opinions, once other variables were held constant.

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likely—as a group—to be weighted toward a pro-immigrant attitude because of those who alsoclaim a Hispanic ethnicity.4

Level 2 Control Variables

To isolate the contextual effect of multiracial individuals on whites’ immigration attitudes, Icontrol for the percentage of Asians, Latinos, and blacks in the metropolitan statistical areas.5

The Asian category includes Asian Indian, Chinese, Filipino, Japanese, Korean, Vietnamese, andother Asian. The Latino category includes Mexican, Puerto Rican, Cuban and other Hispanic orLatino. The majority of current immigrants—81 percent—come from Asia and Latin America(Grieco et al. 2012), and scholars have used the aggregated numbers of both Asians and Latinosin various geographic units, including metropolitan statistical areas, to estimate contextual leveleffects (e.g., see Dixon 2006; Ha 2010; Rocha and Espino 2009). The black category includesblack or African American. Prior research has used the perception of the black population inan area to predict immigration attitudes (e.g., see Alba et al. 2005), and the relative size of theblack population is significantly related to whites’ feelings of threat in general (e.g., see Hopkins2010; Taylor 1998). Lastly, I include the logged population of each area to control for the effectsof population size, following prior research (e.g., Berg 2009; Ha 2010; Hopkins 2010; Taylor1998). See the appendix for a correlation matrix.

Level 1 Control Variables

A number of individual characteristics are significantly associated with immigration attitudes(Ceobanu and Escandell 2010). For each survey, I control for age (in years), sex (1 = male),education (less than a high school degree, high school degree, technical school or some college,college degree, and graduate degree), political party affiliation (dummy variables for Democrat,Independent, and no preference and other party as a combined category, with Republican as thereference group), political ideology (dummy variables for moderate and liberal, with conservativeas the reference group), family income (logged midpoints),6 perceptions of economic conditionsin the country and perceptions of personal finances (excellent, good, only fair, or poor), andemployment status (dummy variables for working full-time and part-time, with not employed asthe reference group). From the 2006 survey, I also include “contact with immigrants who speaklittle or no English” (never, rarely, sometimes, or often) and immigrant friends or relatives (yesor no). Lastly, I include a variable that measures perceived job availability in the community(jobs are difficult to find = 1, lots of some jobs, few of others = 0, plenty of jobs available =−1). These questions were not available in the 2011 survey. From the 2011 survey, I include

4The census data did have information on Hispanics who claimed more than one race. However, the racial categorieswere not designated. Consequently, it is unknown, for example, whether the Hispanic individual claimed white and blackor black and Asian as two racial identities.

5The number of foreign-born residents in metropolitan statistical areas is not available at this time from the U.S.Census.

6Approximately 10 and 11 percent of the respondents had missing data for the family income question in the 2006 and2011 surveys, respectively. Exploratory analyses revealed no statistically significant difference between these respondentsand other respondents in either year. I subsequently imputed the missing data based on age, sex, education, and politicalparty affiliation.

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perceptions of economic conditions in the state (excellent, good, only fair, or poor), which wasnot asked in the 2006 survey.

In both survey years, the number of multiracial individuals could be deduced to a certainextent. The 2006 survey combined the labels of “other” and “mixed race” into one category forthe race variable. Eighty-two respondents chose this combined category and it can be assumedthat some of them were multiracial. Yet, unfortunately, the combination confounds the ability toisolate the effect of a multiracial status. In the 2011 survey, people could choose as many racialcategories as desired. Only seven people chose more than one race. Therefore, due to data limi-tations, a multiracial status was non-significant at the individual level in predicting immigrationattitudes. Nonetheless, in this study, the focus is on predicting the immigration attitudes of native-born non-Hispanic whites, who constitute approximately 64 percent of the U.S. population andhave considerable influence on society (Hixson, Hepler, and Kim 2011; Waters and Eschbach1995).

Statistical Models

Because this study uses contextual measures, individuals are nested within the same geographicunit. This situation leads to the statistical problems of correlated errors and biased standarderrors (Garson 2013). The assumption of multivariate analysis is that the errors are indepen-dent and at random. If two people are measured in the same area, they are experiencing the samesocial dynamics of that area and therefore will not offer independent errors. The standard errorsare consequently biased and unable to facilitate satisfactory tests of significance, resulting inquestionable statistical outcomes (Rocha and Espino 2009).

To account for this situation, I use the statistical software program HLM 7. I leave dichoto-mous independent variables uncentered and make continuous independent variables grand-meancentered, following prior research (e.g., Dixon 2006; Escandell and Ceobanu 2009). In all themodels, I also use robust standard errors (e.g., see Ha 2010; McLaren 2003), since the 2006 datahave 261 level 2 units and the 2011 data have 241 level 2 units and “robust standard errors areappropriate for datasets having a moderate to large number of level 2 units” (Raudenbush et al.2011:140).

RESULTS

Table 2 presents the descriptive statistics. In 2006, whites held a slight anti-immigrant attitude,averaging −.31 on a scale that ranges from −11 to 11. More specifically, on average, theybelieved that recent immigrants are less willing to adapt to an American way of life than immi-grants from the early 1900s. They also believed that recent immigrants fail to pay a fair share oftaxes and have a negative effect on the government. Unsurprisingly, they preferred to decreaselegal immigration levels and require unauthorized immigrants to return to their country of ori-gin. At the same time, however, whites on average did not think that immigrants take jobs awayfrom Americans, likely because the majority of them did not experience losing a job or know-ing someone who lost a job to an immigrant, and they did not think that the constitution shouldbe changed to deny citizenship to children born in the United States to unauthorized immigrants.

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TABLE 2Descriptive Statistics of Variables of Interest

2006 2011

Mean S.D. Mean S.D.

Dependent variablesPro-immigrant scale .310 5.403Threat or strength −.001 .970Talent or burden −.092 .956Adapt −.404 .681Effect on government −.234 .534Lost job .722 .672Immigration levels −.258 .685Take jobs .457 .834Taxes −.268 .901Protect American way of life −.068 .984Illegal immigration −.209 .935Constitution .046 .985Problem 2.339 .671Concern 3.703 1.451Hurt American jobs .227 —Hurt American culture .050 —Burdens government .518 —Increase crime .104 —Other concerns .042 —No concerns .058 —

Independent variablesPercent multiracial 2.789 1.053 2.836 1.059Percent Latino 12.985 12.832 13.696 13.363Percent Asian 4.252 3.792 4.293 3.978Percent black 12.806 9.577 12.558 9.086Population 3227717 4465725 3293955 4578709Age 50.878 15.806 53.449 16.932Education 3.256 1.154 3.393 1.114Male .472 .672 .458 —Democrat .282 — .277 —Independent .363 — .369 —No preference/other party .034 — .018 —Moderate .420 — .385 —Liberal .176 — .187 —Employed full-time .529 — .431 —Employed part-time .125 — .133 —Income 69584 54629 68862 54331National economy 2.708 .792 3.296 .681State economy — — 3.017 .760Personal finances 2.394 .814 2.517 .847Local job market −.006 .956 — —Contact with immigrants 3.162 .894 — —Immigrant relative/friend .212 — — —

Note. Level 2 data come from the 2010 U.S. Census’s metropolitan statistical areas. Level 1 data come from the PewResearch Center’s 2006 Immigration survey and 2011 February Political Survey. N = 1,095 native-born non-Hispanicwhites in 2006. N = 758 non-Hispanic whites in 2011. The reference categories are Republican, Conservative, andunemployed.

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In 2011, 52 percent of whites believed that unauthorized immigration is a burden on the U.S. gov-ernment, while 23 percent believed that it hurts American jobs, 10 percent believed that it leadsto a higher crime rate, 5 percent believed that it hurts American culture, and 4 percent believedthat it causes other problems. Only 6 percent had no concerns about unauthorized immigration.

The primary objective of this study, however, is to compare a group threat perspective to anintergroup contact perspective with respect to whether or not the percentage of multiracial indi-viduals in a metropolitan area significantly influences whites’ immigration attitudes, independentof other demographic structures and individual characteristics. As Table 2 shows, whites in thisstudy lived in metropolitan areas that had an average of approximately 2.8 percent mixed-racewhites in 2010. The range is from 1 percent to 7.6 percent (not shown). Table 3 presents the find-ings for the 2006 immigration attitudinal scale. The null model or intercept only model, whichis not shown, is statistically significant (p = .052), indicating that immigration attitudes vary bymetropolitan areas and multilevel modeling is appropriate, and it has a baseline deviance valueof 6799.994. The intraclass correlation coefficient is .025 (.74439/.74439 + 28.46003 = .025).This indicates that approximately two and a half percent of the variation in immigration attitudesis accounted for by differences between metropolitan areas. It is a small but significant amount.Model 1 incorporates the level 2 variable for percent-multiracial in the metropolitan areas. Thevariance component decreases from .74439 in the null model to .35165 in this model, indicatingthat the percent-multiracial accounts for 53 percent of the variation in metropolitan areas withrespect to explaining immigration attitudes (.74439 – .35165/.74439 = .53), or a little over onepercent of the two and a half percent, which is higher than each of the other contextual variables(models not shown). Moreover, the coefficient of the constant is −.392, predicting that when thereare no multiracial individuals in the metropolitan area whites will be slightly anti-immigrant onaverage. Since the slope coefficient for percent-multiracial is statistically significant and in a pos-itive direction (b = .541), a greater number of multiracial individuals in the metropolitan area isassociated with whites holding comparatively immigrant-friendly attitudes. Model 2 is the fullmodel. The relative size of the multiracial population remains an important factor in predictingwhites’ immigration attitudes. This outcome offers support to the contact hypothesis. It is likelythat whites interact with mixed-race whites, who tend to hold a comparatively pro-minority phi-losophy, and thereby develop pro-immigrant attitudes. More specifically, in 2006, whites wholived in metropolitan areas with comparatively more multiracial individuals were more likely tobelieve that immigrants take jobs that Americans do not want rather than take jobs away fromAmericans (Model 3), had greater odds of believing that immigrants pay a fair share of taxes(Model 4), and were more likely to feel comfortable with, or desire an increase in, the currentlevel of legal immigration (Model 5).7

The percentage of blacks or African Americans in the metropolitan area, however, had theopposite effect, all else equal (see Model 2 in Table 3). Whites who lived in metropolitan areaswith relatively more blacks or African Americans were predicted to hold comparatively anti-immigrant attitudes. This outcome adds to the research by Alba and colleagues (2005), whofound similar results with respect to Americans’ perceptions of minorities in the community.Additionally, whites who interacted with immigrants who speak little to no English were alsomore likely to hold negative attitudes toward immigrants. This unexpected outcome is likely due

7In the models for the other dependent measures in the immigration attitudinal scale, percent multiracial is notstatistically significant when controlling for other variables.

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TABLE 3Hierarchal Linear Models Predicting Pro-Immigrant Attitudes

Standard Multinomial Logit Ordinal

Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5

Fixed effect Scale Scale Take jobs Both/DK Pay tax Imm. level

Level 2Intercept −.392 −2.692 −.887 −2.167 −1.335 −.261

(.171) (.400) (.239) (.344) (.192) (.167)% Multiracial .541∗∗∗ .401∗ −.300∗ −.173 .200∗ .241∗∗

(.163) (.191) (.139) (.141) (.082) (.083)% Latino −.022 −.002 −.008 −.009 −.002

(.015) (.007) (.011) (.008) (.005)% Asian .023 .027 .046 .031 −.042

(.054) (.043) (.046) (.027) (.022)% black −.036∗ .0004 .003 −.002 −.010

(.017) (.010) (.013) (.008) (.006)Logged pop. .116 .019 −.015 −.027 .042

(.138) (.099) (.118) (.068) (.057)Level 1

Age .013 −.009 .004 .0003 .002(.012) (.006) (.009) (.005) (.005)

Education 1.061∗∗∗ −.360∗∗∗ −.158 .160∗ .287∗∗∗(.165) (.075) (.100) (.079) (.050)

Male −.247 .099 −.010 .055 .199(.332) (.171) (.198) (.156) (.124)

Democrat 1.079∗∗ −.405 −.100 .281 .136(.413) (.215) (.308) (.189) (.167)

Independent .369 −.372 −.134 .119 .013(.398) (.205) (.308) (.193) (.153)

No pref./other .066 .062 1.067∗ .392 −.100(.844) (.452) (.541) (.391) (.375)

Moderate 1.575∗∗∗ −.313 .017 .186 .276∗(.349) (.187) (.240) (.160) (.138)

Liberal 3.690∗∗∗ −.307 −.012 .625∗∗ .834∗∗∗(.455) (.286) (.309) (.192) (.191)

Full-time .781∗ −.082 .290 .062 .370∗(.393) (.214) (.301) (.178) (.161)

Part-time .391 −.189 .324 −.009 .169(.526) (.275) (.409) (.227) (.184)

Income .071 −.229∗ −.455∗∗ .030 −.156(.231) (.110) (.153) (.118) (.090)

Nat. econ. −.898∗∗∗ .537∗∗∗ .222 −.254∗ −.166(.238) (.114) (.159) (.108) (.097)

Finances −.132 −.031 −.033 −.011 −.189∗(.227) (.109) (.174) (.106) (.089)

Job market −.494∗∗ .275∗∗ .007 −.055 .006(.155) (.088) (.118) (.080) (.078)

Contact −1.005∗∗∗ .330∗∗∗ .125 −.289∗∗∗ −.215∗∗(.190) (.093) (.134) (.086) (.070)

(Continued)

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TABLE 3(Continued)

Standard Multinomial Logit Ordinal

Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5

Fixed effect Scale Scale Take jobs Both/DK Pay tax Imm. level

Imm. Friend .951∗ .041 −.140 .473∗ .481∗∗(.413) (.213) (.267) (.191) (.147)

Random effect variance cmptIntercept, μ0 .352 .043Deviance score 6789.33 6564.06

Reliability est.Intercept, B0 (Take jobs) .077Intercept, B0 (Both/DK) .056Intercept, B0 (Pay tax) .051

Threshold (2), δ0 2.436∗∗∗(.090)

Note. DK = don’t know, nat. econ. = national economy, cmpt. = component.Pew Research Center 2006 Immigration survey. N = 1,095 native-born non-Hispanic whites. All models were run

with HLM 7. Models 3 and 4 are compared to the belief that immigrants take jobs that Americans do not want. Robuststandard errors are in parentheses. The reference categories are Republican, Conservative, and unemployed.

∗p < .05; ∗∗ p < .01; ∗∗∗ p < .001 (two-tailed tests).

to the focus on immigrants who are constrained by the English language, which reflects anintergroup contact situation that has unconstructive conditions. Whites, however, who have afriend or relative who is an immigrant are significantly more likely to hold a pro-immigrantattitude, as expected.

With respect to the relationship between a multiracial context and attitudes toward unau-thorized immigration, the results present a more complicated picture. In 2006, whites living inmetropolitan areas with a relatively higher percentage of multiracial individuals were less likelyto prefer a policy that forces unauthorized immigrants to return to the their country of originover one that grants them a pathway to legalization (Table 4, Model 1). Additionally, Model2 shows that whites in these metropolitan areas were much less likely to consider legal andunauthorized immigration to be problems for the United States—that is, they were more likelyto say that neither type of immigration is a problem. These results also support the intergroupcontact hypothesis. However, the models in Table 5, which use 2011 data, indicate that themultiracial population may have a different effect. In preliminary analyses, I ran the multinomialmodel with the pro-immigrant base of having no concerns with unauthorized immigration. Thepercent-multiracial predictor was non-significant in this model, suggesting that whites who livein metropolitan areas with comparatively more multiracial individuals may not have any greaterodds of holding a pro-immigrant attitude toward unauthorized immigration than whites who livein other areas. Then, I ran multinomial models with different bases. As the model in Table 5suggests, multiracial individuals likely influence the way whites perceive the negative aspects ofunauthorized immigration rather than encouraging a sympathetic attitude toward unauthorizedimmigrants. For example, the models indicate that whites who live in metropolitan areas with

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TABLE 4Hierarchal Multinomial Models Predicting the Likelihood of Favoring Deportation over a Pathway toLegalization and Believing One Form of Immigration Is More Problematic Compared to Neither Are

Problematic

Model 1 Model 2

Fixed Effect Deport DK/ref. Legal Illegal Both

Level 2Intercept 1.080 −1.990 −.670 3.244 1.754

(.201) (.378) (.792) (.421) (.446)% Multiracial −.194∗ −.488∗ −.775∗ −.311∗ −.392∗

(.091) (.195) (.368) (.161) (.165)% Latino .002 .004 .012 −.002 −.001

(.007) (.014) (.015) (.010) (.010)% Asian .011 .079 .028 .046 .075∗

(.021) (.058) (.093) (.042) (.039)% black .003 −.012 .008 .011 .023

(.009) (.015) (.024) (.016) (.166)Logged pop. .014 .150 .014 −.102 −.159

(.072) (.123) (.248) (.126) (.129)Level 1

Age −.013∗ .008 .018 .010 −.018(.005) (.009) (.015) (.008) (.009)

Education −.248∗∗∗ −.190 −.752∗∗∗ −.289∗∗ −.419∗∗∗(.071) (.119) (.209) (.106) (.116)

Male .235 −.161 −.223 −.219 −.764∗∗(.139) (.276) (.451) (.240) (.264)

Democrat −.340 .309 −.189 −.603 −.041(.193) (.341) (.559) (.359) (.437)

Independent −.063 .389 −.024 −.050 .597(.175) (.296) (.605) (.380) (.402)

No pref./other .567 .977 .309 .388 1.378(.483) (.756) (1.451) (1.003) (1.015)

Moderate −.624∗∗∗ −.569 .196 −.086 −.567(.163) (.296) (.628) (.317) (.342)

Liberal −1.234∗∗∗ −.809 −.931 −1.126∗∗ −1.469∗∗∗(.203) (.431) (.730) (.344) (.398)

Full-time −.154 .527 −.632 −.612 −.479(.189) (.364) (.652) (.350) (.393)

Part-time .010 1.003∗ −.302 −.287 .160(.264) (.424) (.826) (.395) (.445)

Income .170 −.041 .334 .239 .107(.114) (.218) (.378) (.195) (.213)

Nat. econ. .250∗ .321 .159 −.237 −.134(.099) (.169) (.301) (.167) (.199)

Finances .181 .113 .127 −.157 −.163(.095) (.181) (.289) (.181) (.209)

Job market −.061 −.390∗∗ −.469 −.116 −.003(.077) (.149) (.270) (.143) (.148)

Contact .124 −.359∗∗ .317 .231 .366∗(.095) (.134) (.284) (.139) (.154)

(Continued)

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TABLE 4(Continued)

Model 1 Model 2

Fixed Effect Deport DK/ref. Legal Illegal Both

Imm. friend −.191 −.069 .059 −.138 −.104(.183) (.333) (.558) (.283) (.308)

Random effect variance componentsIntercept, μ0 (Deport) .071Intercept, μ0 (DK/ref) .592Intercept, μ0 (Legal) .539Intercept, μ0 (Illegal) .235Intercept, μ0 (Both) .154

Reliability est.Intercept, B0 (Deport) .051Intercept, B0 (DK/ref) .106Intercept, B0 (Legal) .034Intercept, B0 (Illegal) .056Intercept, B0 (Both) .029

Note. DK/ref. = don’t know/refused, nat. econ. = national economy.Pew Research Center 2006 Immigration survey. N = 1,095 native-born non-Hispanic whites. All models were run

with HLM 7. Level 2 data come from the 2010 U.S. Census’s metropolitan statistical areas. Robust standard errors arein parentheses. The reference categories are Republican, Conservative, and unemployed.

∗p ≤ .05; ∗∗ p ≤ .01; ∗∗∗ p ≤ .001 (two-tailed tests).

proportionally higher numbers of multiracial individuals are more likely to think that unautho-rized immigration hurts American culture, burdens the government, contributes to crime, andcauses other problems rather than thinking that unauthorized immigration hurts American jobs,which tends to be the main arguments against unauthorized immigration. There is a similar ques-tion in the 2006 data. However, the multiracial population had no statistical effect on whites inthose models (not shown).

The difference between the two survey years may be a function of the 2007 to 2009 recession,after which whites may have begun to focus their frustrations on unauthorized immigrants. Sincethe pro-immigrant base in the multinomial model was non-significant, an intergroup contact per-spective is not supported. Yet it is also difficult to know whether a group threat perspective issupported. That is, due to the lack of clear findings, whites may or may not view multiracialindividuals as racial minorities and thereby decide to hold unsympathetic attitudes toward autho-rized immigrants. Rather, the main conclusion from the model is that the multiracial populationchanges whites’ opinion about the negative effects of unauthorized immigration from a focus onemployment to one that is more likely to focus on social problems, such as culture and crime.Ultimately, after the recession, multiracial individuals may also view unauthorized immigrationadversely, only in a different way from the typical monoracial white individual. Consequently,intergroup contact may indeed be occurring, just not having the predicted pro-immigranteffect.

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TABLE 5Hierarchal Multinomial Regression Predicting the Belief that Unauthorized Immigration Hurts American

Jobs Compared to Different Concerns

Fixed effect No concerns Hurts culture Burdens gov. Increases crime Other concerns

Level 2Intercept −1.859 −1.170 1.444 −.265 −1.810

(.643) (.445) (.281) (.385) (.558)% Multiracial .095 .351∗ .267∗ .334∗ .440∗

(.195) (.186) (.120) (.162) (.239)% Latino −.018 −.022 −.008 .004 .018

(.022) (.101) (.008) (.011) (.011)% Asian .097∗∗ −.066 −.007 .015 −.036

(.041) (.101) (.038) (.035) (.064)% black −.027 −.052∗ −.028∗ .010 .041∗

(.030) (.027) (.014) (.016) (.024)Logged pop. .052 .421∗ .085 −.088 −.108

(.188) (.217) (.099) (.115) (.195)Level 1

Age −.013 .008 −.002 −.001 .012(.011) (.010) (.007) (.010) (.015)

Education .389∗ .271 .311∗∗ .292∗ .589∗∗(.214) (.195) (.115) (.149) (.220)

Male −.289 −.110 −.380∗ .012 −.247(.373) (.388) (.210) (.293) (.426)

Democrat .529 −.218 .183 −.639 −.465(.628) (.532) (.311) (.487) (.717)

Independent .921 .184 .496∗ .188 .272(.587) (.511) (.268) (.396) (.524)

No pref./other 1.810∗ 1.037 −2.183∗ .399 1.856∗(1.061) (.900) (1.051) (.849) (.979)

Moderate −.681 −.781∗ −.646∗∗ −.753∗ −.277(.588) (.393) (.243) (.387) (.495)

Liberal .870∗ −.742 −.963∗∗ −.201 −.069(.465) (.598) (.366) (.489) (.648)

Full-time −.208 −.157 −.161 .024 .439(.523) (.461) (.279) (.351) (.588)

Part-time −.680 −.698 −.442 −.034 −.458(.639) (.544) (.298) (.392) (.654)

Income .196 −.032 .495∗∗ .105 −.325(.268) (.271) (.156) (.210) (.301)

Nat. econ. −.502∗ −.299 −.162 −.079 −.174(.281) (.286) (.163) (.243) (.297)

Finances −.557∗∗ .025 −.268∗ −.183 −.476∗(.219) (.280) (.137) (.204) (.225)

State econ. .036 .138 .186 −.032 .752∗∗(.280) (.258) (.160) (.179) (.280)

Random effect variancecomponentsIntercept, μ0 (No concerns) .227∗Intercept, μ0 (Hurts culture) .192Intercept, μ0 (Burdens gov.) .168

(Continued)

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TABLE 5(Continued)

Fixed effect No concerns Hurts culture Burdens gov. Increases crime Other concerns

Intercept, μ0 (Increases crime) .034Intercept, μ0 (Other concerns) .155

Reliability est.Intercept, B0 (No concerns) .025Intercept, B0 (Hurts culture) .022Intercept, B0 (Burdens gov.) .063Intercept, B0 (Increases crime) .007Intercept, B0 (Other concerns) .015

Note. nat. econ. = national economy, pop. = population, state econ. = state economy.Pew Research Center 2011 survey. N = 758 non-Hispanic whites. The model was run with HLM 7. Level 2

data come from the 2010 U.S. Census’s metropolitan statistical areas. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. Thereference categories are Republican, Conservative, and unemployed.

∗p < .05; ∗∗ p < .01; ∗∗∗ p < .001 (one-tailed tests).

DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION

Immigration to the United States is projected to continue at a significant rate for decades (Passeland Cohn 2008), leading scholars to debate the social and economic impact on Americans(Espenshade 1995; Keeton and Newton 2005). One possibility is that as the percentage of thepopulace tips from majority white to majority ethnoracial minority, whites will experience evengreater amounts of threat, especially from immigrants. Much of the prior research literature onimmigration attitudes documents a threat effect in geographic areas that are increasingly filledwith minorities and immigrants (e.g., Alba et al. 2005; Ceobanu and Escandell 2010; Hopkins2010). On the other hand, some scholars predict that this demographic change will force moreintergroup contact and result in friendlier interpersonal interactions and positive perceptionsbetween groups (e.g., Dixon 2006; Escandell and Ceobanu 2009).

There is nothing new about investigating the effect of a minority population on the attitudes ofthe majority group. Scholars have examined this relationship for over fifty years (e.g., see Blalock1967; Blumer 1958), and they continue to do so today. Recent research has concentrated on thepopulation size of Latinos (Ayers et al. 2009; Rocha and Espino 2009), Asians (Ha 2010; Dixon2006), blacks (Alba et al. 2005; Oliver and Wong 2003), and legal and unauthorized immigrantsin the United States (Berg 2009; Hood and Morris 1998). While prior research has added greatlyto the foundation of knowledge that explains when and why minority populations influence whiteethnoracial attitudes, they have followed a traditional conception of minority groups.

Currently, as other scholars have noted (e.g., Wimmer 2008), racial identities and racial bound-aries are not consistently distinct or singular. This study attempts to take a small step in thatdirection by recognizing that a growing number of individuals claim a multiracial identity (Leeand Bean 2004). They have an ambiguous place in the ethnoracial hierarchy (Telles and Sue2009), making their influence on whites’ attitudes unclear. In particular, persons who claim awhite identity in combination with a minority racial status may set up a social environment thathas either a negative or positive influence on whites’ feelings toward minorities because theymay add to the perception that an area is being filled with a greater number of minorities who

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want a share of the finite resources that whites enjoy or because they may communicate theirpro-minority philosophy to whites during intergroup interaction.

The results from this study offer support to the intergroup contact perspective. Whites wholived in relatively high multiracial areas were more likely to hold pro-immigrant attitudes.Consequently, whites do not need to interact with any of the traditional minority groups—immigrants, Latinos, Asians, or blacks—to experience the positive benefits of intergroup contact.Specifically, mixed-race whites are closer to single-race whites in terms of having equal statusalong the lines of racial identity and, in combination with their relatively open racial philosophyand having similar goals in occupational and residential settings to single-race whites, mixed-racewhites compared to monoracial minorities are more likely to be what Allport (1954:278) calls“goodwill contacts” for single-race whites. Since these two groups share in part the whiteracial status, they predictably interact more frequently compared to the frequency of interactionbetween whites and monoracial minorities because of how the United States is socially organizedby race in a number of social settings (cf. Blau 1977), from residential neighborhoods to theworkplace (Bennett 2011; Hellerstein and Neumark 2008). This contact is also likely more pos-itive than otherwise because the social settings require cooperative behavior and common goalsand typically have support from authorities, the important conditions for developing friendshipsand making goodwill contacts effective in reducing prejudice (Allport 1954; Pettigrew 1998).Because multiracial individuals tend to hold a comparatively open social ideology regarding dif-ferent social groups (Kerwin et al. 1993; Meintel 2002; Rockquemore 1999), whites who interactwith them are likely to develop a pro-immigrant attitude (cf. Du Toit and Quayle 2011).

The one discrepancy of this line of thought, however, involves unauthorized immigration.After the 2007 to 2009 recession, multiracial individuals probably also focused some of theirfrustration on unauthorized immigrants. Thus, the intergroup contact may not have had any pro-immigrant influence on whites in this particular case. Rather, the interaction may have onlychanged whites’ views on why unauthorized immigration is problematic. During times of aneconomic boom, however, as in 2006, the multiracial context appears to have a positive influenceon whites regarding the development of a sympathetic attitude toward unauthorized immigrants.Other research also recognizes distinctions between general immigration attitudes and attitudestoward unauthorized immigrants and immigration policy opinions and recognizes the impact ofeconomic context (e.g., see Ceobanu and Escandell 2010 for a review).

Although the results are significant, they are not large, especially when considering the smallintraclass correlation coefficient. On the one hand, this may be a measurement issue. Oliver andWong (2003) suggested that the neighborhood level is more conducive for measuring intergroupcontact effects while larger areas are better for measuring group threat because people are morelikely to interact in neighborhood settings, from actually being neighbors to the neighborhoodinstitutions, such as schools, while people are more likely to only see other people in a largerspace without actually interacting, or as Hopkins (2010) highlighted, people seem to explaintheir racial attitudes with antidotes about seeing different racial groups while out shopping.Nonetheless, many scholars have found contact effects in large areas, such as counties (e.g.,Hood and Morris 1998) and nations (e.g., McLaren 2003). Since the metropolitan area is typi-cally bigger than neighborhoods yet smaller than counties and nations, it likely facilitates boththeoretical dynamics to a certain extent and makes it a fruitful geographic unit for investigatingthe interplay between group threat and intergroup contact (e.g., Dixon 2006; Ha 2010).

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On the other hand, the relatively small impact of the multiracial population may be due totheir small group size in the nation. Even though there are millions of multiracial individuals,they do not constitute a large percentage in any one metropolitan area. Their effect therefore isexpected to be minor. However, the current study shows that the effect is statistically significant.Thus, given that scholars project substantial growth for the multiracial population in the comingdecades (e.g., Lee and Bean 2004), there are empirical implications. Over time whites are likelyto become more pro-immigrant, independent of any contact with immigrants, because the numberof multiracial individuals is predicted to increase to as high as one in five Americans by 2050,due to the trends in interracial marriage and societal tolerance for claiming a multiracial identity(Fryer 2007; Lee and Bean 2004). Consequently, more metropolitan areas will undergo a changein demographic structure, one that will be better configured to reduce whites’ levels of fear fromminorities because they will have more opportunities to interact with the growing populationof multiracial individuals. All of this implies that a change in whites’ immigration attitudes islikely to occur from genuine attitudinal change in addition to cohort replacement. Along with thischange, another implication is a transformation in political discussions about immigration—onethat is likely to be more pro-immigrant.

These implications, however, are based on at least two assumptions. First, because this studywas unable to measure interpersonal contact between whites and multiracial individuals, the anal-ysis assumes that whites actually do see and interact with multiracial individuals in metropolitanareas. This assumption is supported by prior research (e.g., Bennett 2011; Du Toit and Quayle2011; Herman 2010). Second, the most consequential assumption of this study regards the pro-cess of self-selection. Since the data are cross-sectional rather than longitudinal, it is possible thatwhites who already have a pro-minority attitude move into comparatively diverse metropolitanareas and are willing to interact with non-white individuals. If this is the case, it would suggestthat the relationship between the percentage of multiracial individuals and white immigrationattitudes is spurious. However, this scenario seems less likely. Although whites have changedtheir racial attitudes over time, there is plenty of evidence that indicates that many of them remainthreatened by and prejudiced toward racial and ethnic minorities (e.g., see Ceobanu and Escandell2010; Sears et al. 2000 for reviews). Consequently, the more likely social process is that whitesmove to metropolitan areas for other reasons than minority-friendly attitudes, such as employ-ment and housing opportunities. This means that some whites who live in comparatively diversemetropolitan areas probably hold pro-minority attitudes while others probably hold anti-minorityattitudes. Furthermore, given whites’ historical behavior in facilitating residential segregation(Massey and Denton 1993), it is more likely that multiracial individuals are moving into areasdominated by whites rather than vice-versa and whites are comparatively more accepting of thisnew group because of their similar social statuses compared to single-race minorities, as Bennett(2011) has found. Overall, therefore, the logical social processes are that whites move to areasfor non-racial reasons and that multiracial individuals also move into these areas where whiteslive and work, leading to opportunities for intergroup contact. Then, the dynamics of intergroupcontact result in attitudinal changes. Moreover, many other researchers have found that the self-selection process is an unlikely driver of contact effects (e.g., Dixon 2006; Ha 2010; McLaren2003; Pettigrew 1998).

In the end, this study adds to the literature on immigration attitudes by documenting asignificant relationship between native-born non-Hispanic whites’ immigration attitudes andthe percentage of multiracial individuals in a metropolitan area. In particular, the results

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suggest that mixed-race whites foster a pro-immigrant attitude among single-race whites, likelythrough intergroup interaction in occupational and residential settings. Considering the pro-jected growth of the multiracial population over the next several decades, a greater presenceof mixed-race whites may have important implications for intergroup harmony and immigrationpolicies.

ABOUT THE AUTHOR

Justin Allen Berg is an Assistant Professor of Sociology at the University of North Dakota. Hisprimary research focuses on understanding the formation of immigration attitudes. He is currentlyexamining the interaction between the demographic composition of different geographic unitsand individual level characteristics with respect to predicting immigration policy opinions.

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

I appreciate the valuable comments from Elizabeth Legerski, Robert Stupnisky, Megan Berg, andthe anonymous reviewers on earlier versions of this article.

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Appendix: Correlation Matrix

1 2 3 4 5

2006 Sample% Multiracial 1.00% Latino .526 1.00% Asian .629 .392 1.00% black −.287 −.182 .004 1.00Logged pop .245 .335 .582 .311 1.00

2011 sample% Multiracial 1.00% Latino .450 1.00% Asian .592 .341 1.00% black −.298 −.182 −.015 1.00Logged pop .245 .325 .553 .308 1.00

Note. For the 2006 sample, N = 1,095. For the 2011 sample, N = 758.

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