Which Rationality For Pragmatics6

Which rationality for pragmatics?

IPrA 2007 – Göteborg, 12 July 2007 – Panel on ‘Pragmatic Interfaces'

Didier Maillat, University of FribourgLouis de Saussure, University of Neuchâtel

Pragmatic Interfaces 2IPrA 07

Introduction: interfaces for pragmatic processing

Interfaces are traditionally elaborated between separate levels of information processing: syntax/semantics; semantics/pragmatics Level’s autonomy + input-output schemes

Look at interfaces differently: bring together hypotheses on the same general topic by different a) trends

Within the sciences of language b) scientific domains

Linguistics – neurology – cognitive science – philosophy of mind


Rationality as the central problem requiring interfaces Rationality

1) as a psychological problem grounding language processing

as a central fodorian system; as a set of specialized interconnected modules without central system (Sperber); as a set of modules with softer specialization (Jaszczolt)…

Partly automatic-unconscious, partly reflexive-conscious Different or identical for meaning-recovery and other

automatic mental tasks

2) as a philosophical issue explaining a goal-oriented mental activity governed by a set of principles

As automatic inferential procedures for uncovering intentions (Grice and after); as automatic stimulus-response schemes for mutual adaptation (post-Austinian interactionnism, radical behaviourism...)


Grice and rationality

"[T]he philosophical foundations on which Grice's theory of conversational implicature rests is a general theory of rational action. (Kasher 1991: 577)


Reasoning with Grice

Frege’s claim Components of meaning are not addressable by

propositional logic Formal logic vs natural (cognitive) logic?

Grice’s claim Standard propositional logic can serve as a logic of

conversation with conventional premises involved Conventional rules and patterns of reasoning Aim: generating hypotheses about speaker intentional

meaning Questions raised: Type of reasoning? Type of premises

involved? Criticisms by RT: number of maxims, ad infinitum

regression What can count now as validated by further research?


Reasoning after Grice There’s more than said and implicated:

explicatures, implicitures, unarticulated (but explicit) constituents, free and constrained enrichments, weak implicatures (manifest but not conscious)…

No consensus on the boundary between primary and secondary unarticulated meaning constituents.

Raises the question on the possibility of several levels of reasoning and of enrichment procedures

Debate on early or late context-dependency, and early or late implicature derivation (sequential vs parallel procedures) Influence of psycholinguistics


Implicitures, standardization and default heuristics

Bach / Harnish / Garrett Multiple truth-conditional semantic meanings (and no

conventional implicatures) Debate with RT on the propositional nature of semantic

primary elements of meaning (implicitures) / Thoughts are expressible by linguistic material

Intention recovery involves a game of coordination in a strategic interaction and not an ordinary cognitive process (Bach)

Implicitures are built-up through standardized schemes of inference (standardization) or through general background knowledge (default heuristics)


Truth-conditional pragmatics

All enrichments are not dependent upon the linguistic material but some are due to pragmatic principles of enrichment / adjustment (shared by RT)

But secondary enrichments presuppose full identification of primary enrichments (context-independant salient parts of meaning) (shared by many)


Relevance Theory

Sperber & Wilson / Carston and the RT trend Early context-dependency and parallel « mutual »

adjustment linguistic material resemble thoughts (vs. Bach, vs.

canonical Searle) Heuristic risky principle (relevance-searching)

based on an innate ability Strong cognitive assumptions on a standard least-

effort path, on natural reasoning. Understanding linguistic stimuli is not qualitatively different from other types of information processing.


Reasoning: cognitive and formal models

RT Sperber (modularité massive) Jaszczolt (modularité décloisonnée) DRT AI (quality R) Asher / Lascarides (SDRT)


Recurrent issues for pragmatic rationality the rationality principles governing this inferential machine must

address some specific problems as shown in the AI literature (as discussed in Cummings 2005):

properties of the input domain of rational inferencing (database):

inconsistent incomplete potentially infinite encapsulated information

properties of the output: cancellability detachability

properties of the interface: compositionality

properties of the inferential engine/principle how do you stop it? in AI’s terms, what is the goal?


Presumptive Meanings

Levinson (2000) three heuristics governing inferential calculation (see also

Horn 1984): Q: what isn’t said isn’t I: minimal specifications get maximally informative

stereotypical interpretations M: what is said in an abnormal way isn’t normal

links GCIs to default interpretations which can be overriden addresses cancellability alternative to a form of rationality which is goal-oriented

processes pre-propositional

escapes the derivational constraint


Default Semantics

Jaszczolt (2005) merger representations or acts of communication combine:

WS: derivational material CPI: inferential material (conscious) CD: cognitive defaults (unconscious) SCD: shared socio-cultural background knowledge

(unconscious defaults) avoids interface-related issues truly multi-domain

must assume an extended compositionality (metacompositionality)

addresses detachability overrides encapsulation

distinction between conscious and unconscious inferential processes

defaults dispense with goal-oriented rationality


Discourse Representations

DRT Kamp & Reyle (1993) and SDRT Asher & Lascarides (2003)

based on a context-change-potential approach retains the secondary nature of pragmatics

maintains strong compositionality domain is strongly constrained by the linguistic

input/derivation background knowledge is mentioned (K0)

procedural algorithms make predictions about online processing

SDRT introduces a non-monotonic logic addresses cancellability


RT again

Sperber & Wilson, Carston maximally encompassing domain (variety of

inputs) optimal relevance provides a qualitative upper-

bound to the inferential process few pragmatic (rational) principles are constrained

model assumes some level of neurological adequacy experimental testability


The massive modularity hypothesis Domain-specific mechanisms / modules

An important argument against Fodor’s central system: it’s implausible that some autonomous mental system has unrestricted access to all information.

Fodor: cognition is not computational because it is incompatible with mental problems that are not modular (in particular requiring abductive ability)

Sperber: cognition requires rather a deductive-non-demonstrative ability based on salience and relevance searching, which makes it compatible with a massive modularity evolutionnist view

Anything here related to language understanding? Yes: consequences for the economy of understanding

together with a module dedicated to intention detection


Rationality, MM, and RT

Sperber 2005 questions the very nature of pragmatic rationality

suggestion: the two founding principles of RT’s rationality (effort and

effect) are given a physiological explanation non-representational non-cognitive

principle of optimal relevance reflects an evolved faculty of the brain to optimise resource allocation based on neurological activation pattern recognition.

see Damasio’s analysis of intentionality as a property of brain cells (1999)


Impact of the experimental paradigm EXP PRAG Noveck Sperber … (scalar) Jaszczolt Harnish / Garrett Breheny – Katsos (scalar)

contestent la méthodologie de Noveck: certains temps de réponse sont non utilisables pour le « coût ».

Scalar Imp: le coût online n’est pas associé avec la SI mais avec les opération des discours générées une fois que la SI a été générée


Experimental paradigms provides a psychological grounding for models of pragmatic rationality measuring the cost of a rational inferential process raise some new questions:

what are the relevant variables? brain activation (MRI), reaction/reading time, eye-tracking, truth-value

judgments, sentence completion what are the factors?

debate on reaction time as an indicator of generation + cancellation vs. no generation

experimental designs can test the validity of predictions made by theoretical models Breheny, Katzos & Williams (2005), Noveck and colleagues

context dependence on scalar GCIs is inconsistent with default-based accounts; processing does not distinguish GCIs from PCIs

manipulating triggering conditions and licensing contexts: pragmatic or contextualist models are consistent with findings on SIs (vs. structural or derivational models)

evidence against re-analysis taken to be incompatible with encapsulated grammatical information


Experimental pragmatics in Relevance theory Noveck: scalar implicatures are derived successfully only

after the acquisition of general pragmatic / mindreading abilities (6-8 years)

Van der Henst: testing the principle of relevance The experiment of the numbered series Measuring reinterpretation (with or in exclusive and

inclusive readings) A background in cognitive psychology (notably works on

Autism by Baron-Cohen and the mindreading module) A picture of cognitive pragmatic abilities that is congruent

with RT’s prediction: fast but risky Using a specific mental mindreading module Pragmatic processing is not reducible to decoding


Harnish-Garrett

A neurological hypothesis: right-hemisphere specialization for pragmatic processes and / or complex information processing Pragmatic processing would not imply

precisely other mental devices than complex information processing in general

Pragmatics shows close to linguistics / decoding


Some relevant questions

“Natural reasoning often deviates from the norms of a correct reasoning (…)” Pragmatics require an account of the “wide range of ways of extending our knowledge that cannot be handled by formal logic alone” (Dascal 2005).

What’s logic with regard to natural problem-solving processes? Where is (and is there) the boundary between types of

contents? How can we account precisely for the procedurality of meaning

construction, so that precise linguistic phenomena can be enlightened by higher-level philosophical claims about cognition?

Is there a link, which could be expressed technically, between implicature derivation by a hearer and the generation of a new speech act?

Are the reasoning scheme we are talking about able to explain also at least some determination at the level of speech production / and pragmatic felicity (Allott)?

Which Rationality For Pragmatics6

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