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Accident Analysis and Prevention 50 (2013) 1135– 1139

Contents lists available at SciVerse ScienceDirect

Accident Analysis and Prevention

j ourna l h o mepage: www.elsev ier .com/ locate /aap

hen two motivations race: The effects of time-saving bias andensation-seeking on driving speed choices

yal Peera,∗, Tove Rosenbloomb

Hebrew University of Jerusalem, School of Education, Mount Scopus, Jerusalem, IsraelBar-Ilan University, Kiryat-Ono, Israel

r t i c l e i n f o

rticle history:eceived 23 January 2012eceived in revised form 28 August 2012ccepted 4 September 2012

a b s t r a c t

Time-saving bias—people’s biased judgments in estimating the time saved when increasing speed—hasbeen found to strongly impact driving speed choices. However, this bias may be relevant only when thedriver’s motivation for increasing speed is to arrive sooner. If, on the other hand, the driver is motivatedby the desire to experience thrill and sensation, a driver’s level of sensation-seeking might better explain

eywords:ime-saving biasensation seekingpeeding

choices of speed. In this study, participants were asked to estimate the journey time when increasingspeed and to estimate the speed required to arrive on time. They also indicated the speed they wouldpersonally choose in such a situation. Next, participants filled out Zuckerman’s (1994) Sensation SeekingScale. Results showed that both time-saving estimations and the Disinhibition scale of Sensation Seeking(as well as drivers’ gender) contributed independently and additively to drivers’ choice of speed and thattime-saving bias’ role was somewhat stronger than sensation-seeking.

. Introduction

Speed is one of the major factors in road safety. It not onlyffects the severity of a crash but is also related to the riskf being involved in a crash (Aarts & van Schagen, 2006; Elvikt al., 2004). Besides demographic variables, risky on-road behav-or may be influenced by cognitive, emotional, motivational andersonality elements (e.g. Lev et al., 2008). The present study isimed at revealing part of the relationship between cognitive andersonality-derived motives for speed choice. Here, we focusedn two main motivations for increasing speed: saving time andensation-seeking.

People generally are frustrated when they feel that their drivingpeed is too low, and therefore select routes and speeds that willhorten journey time as much as possible (Tarko, 2009). In someases, increasing driving speed in order to reduce journey timean lead to exceeding the legal speed limit. As several studies haveeported, speeding behavior is often related to time pressure or theesire to save time (Campbell & Stradling, 2003; Gabany et al., 1997;cKenna, 2005). For example, in one study, 33% of drivers that were

aught speeding indicated that they chose to speed because of timeressure (McKenna, 2005).

∗ Corresponding author.E-mail addresses: eyal.peer@mail.huji.ac.il (E. Peer), Rosenbt1@mail.biu.ac.il

T. Rosenbloom).

001-4575/$ – see front matter © 2012 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.ttp://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.aap.2012.09.002

© 2012 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.

1.1. Time-saving bias

Although increasing speed in order to shorten journey time isa common driving situation, research has shown that drivers typi-cally overestimate the time gained when increasing from an alreadyrelatively high speed while underestimating the time gained whenincreasing from a relatively low speed (Fuller et al., 2009; Peer,2010a, 2010b, 2011; Svenson, 1970, 1973, 2008, 2009). For exam-ple, when asked to estimate the time saved when increasing from aspeed of 40 kph to 50, 60 or 70 kph (for a distance of 20 km) driversunderestimated the time saved (on average) 15% below the actualtime that could be saved (Peer, 2010a). For instance, drivers esti-mated the time that could be saved when increasing from 40 to60 kph as 4.6 min on average instead of the 6 min that could actu-ally be saved. The correct formula for calculating time gained byincreasing speed is

t = cD (1/V1 − 1/V2) (1)

where c is conversion constant, t is the time gained, D is the dis-tance traveled and V1 and V2 are the original and increased speeds,respectively (Svenson, 2008).

One reason for this time-saving bias is that drivers fail to takeinto account the impact of the initial speed on the overall timesaved when accelerating (Fuller et al., 2009). This neglect of initial

speed leads people to judge time saved mainly on the basis ofthe higher speed; they falsely believe that the higher the speedthey are attempting to reach, the greater the time that will besaved. However, the initial speed strongly affects the potential

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136 E. Peer, T. Rosenbloom / Accident Ana

ime-saving because a difference of 10 kph, for example, canean a greater saving of time at lower speeds than at a higher

peed.The faulty estimations resulting from this time-saving bias has

een found to affect drivers’ perception of the speed necessary forrriving at their destination on time (Peer, 2010a, 2011). This biasn the (mis)estimation of time saved generally leads drivers to favor

higher speed over a lower one. For example, if a driver needs toccelerate from a relatively slow speed (say, if she is running late),ime-saving bias predicts that she would underestimate the timehat could be saved by a relatively small increase in speed. Thisriver, accordingly, would probably prefer a greater speed increasehich she believes would be needed in order to arrive on time. In

ther words, drivers perceive a required speed to be overly high,nd thus choose a speed that is higher than necessary (Peer, 2010a,011). On the other hand, if a driver is going at a relatively highpeed and wishes to increase her speed in order to save time, theime-saving bias predicts she will overestimate the time gained byhe increase in speed, and thus underestimate the speed requiredo complete the journey.

Time-saving bias can predict speed choices better than conven-ional measures which are generally considered to be related topeeding, such as age, gender, driving experience and prior speed-ng violations (Peer, 2010a, 2011). As regression analyses showedn those studies, time-saving bias had a unique effect on the speedrivers estimated as the required speed for arriving on time as wells the speed drivers personally chose. However, those studies didot examine the potential effect of other causes of speeding thatre not related to saving time or arriving sooner.

.2. Sensation seeking and speeding

As mentioned before, in addition to the cognitive elementsnderlying speed choice are personality-related elements. Amonghe other motivations to drive fast that are not related to sav-ng time, is a driver’s desire to experience sensation and thrilly driving faster (Jonah, 1997). The term sensation seeking (SS)efers to individual differences in optimal levels of arousal andtimulation, manifested as a character dimension (Zuckerman,994) and regulated by neuroregulators, such as catecholamines,opamine and norepinephrine (Zuckerman, 1999). High sensation-eekers need more stimulation to maintain an optimal level ofrousal while low sensation-seekers manage themselves better inelatively less stimulating settings. The general trait of sensation-eeking is composed of four components: Thrill and Adventureeeking (TAS)—attraction to thrill and dread; Experience SeekingES)—aspiration to undergo a variety of novel and unconventionalxperiences; Disinhibition (Dis)—loss of self-control, and Boredomusceptibility (BS)—intolerance toward monotonous, repetitiousr predictable people and events (Zuckerman, 1994). Sensation-eekers differ from sensation-avoiders in genetic and biologicalharacteristics but also in their habits, preferences, and emotionalnd cognitive styles. They are involved in activities such as dan-erous sports, varied sexual activities and risky driving (for aeview, see Jonah, 1997). Most relevant to the current study, highensation-seeking road users have been found to be more dar-ng and commit more violations, such as speeding, than lowerensation-seeking road drivers (Rosenbloom, 2003a; Zuckerman,007).

High sensation-seekers search for thrills, and they ratehe thrills of risk behavior as highly beneficial. For example,rbán et al. (2008) found that positive expectancy mediates

etween sensation-seeking and alcohol use. The tendencyf sensation-seeking drivers to speed (as a feature of riskyehavior) is well-known (for example, Rosenbloom, 2003b).aslowsky et al. (2011) revealed that cognitive features, such as

nd Prevention 50 (2013) 1135– 1139

cost-benefit judgment, mediate between sensation-seeking andrisky behavior.

1.3. The current study

The aim of the current study is to better understand the cognitiveprocesses that might play a role in explaining the high-speed choiceof high sensation-seekers. Presumably, sensation-seeking driversoverestimate the benefit of time-saving by faster driving (highertime-saving bias) compared to sensation-avoiding drivers. The pur-pose of the current study was to compare these two motivationsfor increasing speed: the desire to save time and the tendency forsensation- seeking and compare them with each other: the desire tosave time and the tendency for sensation seeking. It is possible thatthe previously found relationship between time-saving bias andspeed choice (Peer, 2010a, 2011) may be mediated by individualdifferences in sensation-seeking. High sensation-seeking driversmay be more averse to driving slowly than lower sensation-seekers,which, in turn, may lead them to choose more extreme speedsand to speeding. Alternatively, high sensation-seekers may not beany different from low sensation-seekers in their misestimations ofthe time saved when increasing speed, and thus, exhibit the samedegrees of time-saving bias as their counterparts. If so, perhaps it ispossible that the two motivations in choosing higher speeds—theillusion that it would save more time and the expectancy that itwould cause thrill and excitement—might add up to the choiceof even higher speeds. The aim of this study is to put these twomotivations to test side-by-side, probably for the first time ever.

To measure drivers’ time-saving bias, this study used a simi-lar design to the one in Peer (2010a), only with a higher initialspeed. Participants were presented with a situation where a driveraccelerates in order to get to a specific destination on time. Theparticipants were asked to estimate the time saved at the higherspeed. Then, participants estimated the speed required for arrivingon time at the given destination and the speed they would per-sonally choose in such a situation. The purpose of this design wasto reveal the relationship between a driver’s time-saving bias andhis or her choice of speed with reference to the level of sensation-seeking. Since the situation deals with increasing from a relativelyhigh speed (where people usually overestimate the time savedwhen increasing speed), the expectation was that the correlationsbetween time-saving bias and estimations of required speed toarrive on time and speed choice would be negative. Such negativecorrelations would indicate that the greater the driver’s bias, thelower the speed the driver would deem necessary to arrive on timeand the lower the speed the driver would personally choose. Fur-thermore, following the literature on sensation-seeking reviewedabove, we predicted that the negative correlations between time-saving bias and estimations of required speed to arrive on time andspeed choice would typify low sensation-seekers more comparedto high sensation seekers.

2. Method

2.1. Participants

One hundred and fifty-five licensed car drivers (86 males and69 females) participated in the study with ages ranging from 20to 60 years with an average age of 32.3 years (SD = 11). About halfof the participants (52.6%) were high school graduates or had theequivalent of a high school diploma. The remaining participants had

an undergraduate (35.7%) or a graduate (11.7%) degree. More thanhalf of the drivers reported to have a lower than average incomelevel (64%), one-sixth (16.7%) reported average income and the rest(19.3%) reported a higher than average income. Participants held a

E. Peer, T. Rosenbloom / Accident Analysis and Prevention 50 (2013) 1135– 1139 1137

Table 1Actual and mean perceived time saved as a result of speed increase from an initial speed of 100 kph (N = 155).

Speed increase (kph) Actual timesaved (min)

Perceived timesaved mean (SD)

Mean difference (%) t 90% confidence intervalof the difference

Lower Upper

10 2.73 4.4 (2.7) 1.67 (61%) 7.09* 1.2 2.1320 5 8.1 (3.5) 3.1 (62%) 10.4* 2.51 3.69

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car)driver’s license from one to 40 years with a mean of 14.4 yearsSD = 10.1). The average reported kilometers per month was 548.8SD = 210.5). Most of the drivers (65.8%) stated they had had no traf-c citations in the previous five years while some (18.1%) reportedaving had one or more speeding tickets. The remaining 15.8%tated they had been ticketed for other traffic offenses. Twenty-ne (13.8%) of the drivers declared that they were responsible for

car crash during the previous five years and another three (1.9%)aid they were responsible for more than one car crash.

.2. Materials

All the participants filled out the questionnaires that measuredime-saving bias as well as drivers’ tendency for sensation-seeking.irst, the participants were presented with a driving situation andere asked to answer several questions regarding this situation.espondents read about a driver who needed to get to his destina-ion at a specific time and considered increasing his speed from

relatively high speed. The story that respondents read was asollows:

“Imagine you are driving your car to an important job interviewn a distant city. You are now driving at a speed of 100 kph. For theemaining 50 km of the journey, the legal speed limit is 110 kph.f you maintain your speed of 100 kph, it will take you 30 min torrive. The job interview is scheduled to start in 20 min. You wanto arrive exactly on time and not be late.”

After reading this scenario, participants were asked to estimateow long it would take them to arrive to their destination if they

ncreased their speed to higher speeds of 110, 120 and 130 kph.hese questions were used to calculate each driver’s time-savingias. Then, participants were asked to estimate the minimal speedequired to arrive on time and were asked to indicate the speedhat they would personally choose in such a situation.

Next, drivers filled out Zuckerman’s (1994) Sensation Seekingcale, using the Hebrew version that had been tested and had beensed in a previous study (Rosenbloom, 2003a). This scale presentedrivers with 40 pairs of statements describing various behaviors.articipants were asked to choose which of the pair best describedhem. They were instructed to choose one statement even if theygreed with both or none. The 40 items are classified as the follow-ng factors: Thrill and Adventure Seeking (TAS), Experience SeekingES), Disinhibition (Dis) and Boredom Susceptibility (BS). Confirma-ory factor analysis showed that all items loaded on their originalactors. The internal consistency (Cronbach’s alpha) of the factorsas .85 for TAS, .61 for ES, .66 for Dis and .42 for BS. Since BS

howed an extremely low internal consistency, it was omitted fromurther analyses. We decided to not omit the factors for ES andis, despite their relatively low reliability, because previous stud-

es have shown these factors have a high loading on the generalensation-seeking construct (e.g. Jonah, 1997).

Participants also reported their gender, age, type of driving

icense, years of having a driving license and how many kilome-ers they drive monthly. Lastly, participants were asked to indicatepeeding violations they had had in the previous five years andccidents they were responsible for in the previous 10 years.

4.8 (69%) 12.95* 4.06 5.53

2.3. Design and procedure

Participants were recruited for the study by ads distributed invarious public locations around the city of Jerusalem, Israel, includ-ing (but not limited to) the Hebrew University campuses. The studywas described as focusing on driving behavior and participantswere required to have a valid driving license at the time of the studyand to either own a car or report to be active daily drivers at the timeof the study. Participants filled out the questionnaires in the pres-ence of a research assistant and were paid 20 NIS (approximately 5USD) for participation.

3. Results

First, drivers’ responses to time-saving bias questions wereexamined. As Table 1 shows, drivers consistently and significantlyoverestimated the time by approximately 65% (on average) theycould save when increasing from a high speed. Since the overesti-mations were significant in all the three speed options and becausethe three options showed high internal reliability (Cronbach’salpha = .92), drivers’ responses to the three items were averaged.We compared this averaged perceived time-saving to the meanof the actual time-saving in the three speed increases (which was4.88 min) by computing a time-saving bias score which showed theproportion of over- or under-estimations compared to the actualtime-saving. For example, if a participant showed an averaged esti-mation of time-savings of 7.32 min, his time-saving bias score was.50, showing he overestimated the time saved by 50% (on average)compared to the actual 4.88 min that could have been saved onaverage for the three speed increases.

This time-saving bias score had a mean of .64 and a standarddeviation of .70. As predicted, drivers’ degree of time-saving biaswas negatively correlated with their choice of speed: the greaterthe driver’s bias, the lower the speed the driver indicated as thespeed required to arrive on time (r = −.37, p < .01) as well as thespeed he or she would personally choose (r = −.33, p < .01).

The main purpose of this study was to examine whether therelationship between time-saving bias and speed choice might beaffected by one or more of the factors of sensation-seeking andif so, by how much. Table 2 shows the correlation between thesub-scales of sensation-seeking, the time-saving bias measure anddrivers’ speed choices. As can be seen, time-saving bias showed thepredicted negative correlation with both estimations of requiredspeed and personal speed choices (r = −.37 and −.33, respectively,p < .01). In contrast, sensation-seeking showed positive correla-tions with both estimations of required speed and personal speedchoices (r = .18, .28, respectively, p < .05, .01, respectively). Amongthe sub-scales of sensation-seeking, Thrill and Adventure Seek-ing (TAS) was positively related only to the personal speed choice(r = .22, p < .01); Experience Seeking (ES) was positively related tothe required speed estimate and personal speed choice (r = .16,

p < .05, r = .22, p < .01) and Disinhibition (Dis) was related onlyto personal speed choice (r = .27, p < .01). The general score ofsensation-seeking showed a mild negative correlation with time-saving bias (r = −.17, p < .05) that originated from the correlations of

1138 E. Peer, T. Rosenbloom / Accident Analysis and Prevention 50 (2013) 1135– 1139

Table 2Correlation between time-saving bias, sensation-seeking scales and speed choices.

1 2 3 4 5 6

1 Time-saving bias2 Sensation seeking −.17*

3 Thrill and adventure seeking −.2* .88**

4 Experience seeking −.17* .81** .6**

5 Disinhibition −.05 .77** .49** .51**

6 Required speed −.37** .18* .12 .16* .167 Personal speed −.33** .28** ** ** ** **

* p < .05.** p < .01

Table 3Differences in personal speed choices between high and low sensation-seeking par-ticipants and participants who showed high or low time-saving bias.

Low sensation-seeking High sensation-seeking

Low bias High bias Low bias High bias

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ime-saving bias with TAS and ES (r = −.2, −.17, respectively, p < .05)hile Dis showed no correlation with time-saving bias (r = −.05,

> .05).To examine the differences in personal speed choice as a func-

ion of both sensation-seeking and time-saving bias, we dividedhe sample into four sub-groups of high or low sensation-seekingabove and below SS median) and high- or low-biased (abovend below time-saving bias median). Table 3 shows that, in total,igh sensation-seeking participants chose higher personal speedsompared to low sensation-seeking participants. An ANOVA onersonal speed choices as the dependent variable, with the time-aving bias group (high vs. low) and the sensation-seeking grouphigh vs. low) as independent variables, showed that the effect ofensation-seeking on personal speed choice was statistically signif-cant (F(1,153) = 5.79, p < .05) Also, the effect of time-saving bias waslso statistically significant (F(1,153) = 6.59, p < .05), as participantsith high time-saving bias chose lower speeds than participantsith low time-saving bias. However, no statistically significant

nteraction between the factors was found ((F(1,153) = 1.09, p > .05).s Table 3 shows, the highest speeds were chosen among partic-

pants who had low bias and high sensation-seeking. The lowestpeeds were chosen among participants with the higher bias andow sensation-seeking.

Additionally, we conducted a hierarchical linear regressionnalysis in order to further examine the relationship between time-

aving bias, sensation-seeking and speed choice, while controllingor other factors. As can be seen in Table 4, we started the analysisy introducing only age and gender into the model and discoveredhat both were significant predictors of speed choice (the nega-

able 4eta coefficients for the hierarchic linear regression of personal speed choices.

Variable Step

1 2 3 4

Gender −.33** −3.18** −.29** −.30**

Age −.14** −1.95* −.06 −.07Time-saving bias −3.52** −.26** −.43*

TAS −.05 −.09ES .08 .05Dis .23* .21*

SS × bias interaction .19R2 .10 .18 .23 .24

* p < .05.** p < .01.

.22 .22 .27 .63

tive gender correlation indicates that men chose higher speedsthan women). These two variables were related to 10% of the totalvariance. The second step included the time-saving bias measureand that added an additional 8% to the total variance with thetime-saving bias measure showing the expected negative corre-lation. The third step included the Sensation-Seeking sub-scalesand showed that only disinhibition was significantly and posi-tively correlated with speed choice. This step added 5% more tothe total variance and showed that the contribution of age to themodel became insignificant. The last step included the interactionbetween the general sensation-seeking scale and time-saving bias,which did not have a significant contribution.

4. Discussion

As was shown in previous studies (Fuller et al., 2009; Peer,2010a, 2010b, 2011; Svenson, 2008, 2009), drivers overestimatedthe time that could be saved when increasing from a relativelyhigh speed. As predicted, this bias was negatively correlated todrivers’ estimations of the speed required to arrive on time and thespeed they would personally choose. Drivers who strongly overes-timated the time that could be saved when increasing speed alsoindicated that a lower speed was required to arrive on time andthat they personally preferred lower speeds. A possible explana-tion behind this phenomenon is that because drivers overestimatethe time to be saved, they presumably assign unduly high val-ues to relatively small increases in travel speed. This may leaddrivers to believe that driving faster will result in a relatively largertime gain, when, in fact, less time would be saved. This also leddrivers to estimate the speed required for arriving on time as lowerthan the actual speed required. Additionally, this resulted in high-biased drivers choosing lower speeds as their personal choice ofspeed.

Sensation-seeking also played a considerable role in affect-ing drivers’ choice of speed. As predicted, high sensation-seekerschose significantly higher speeds than their low sensation-seekingcounterparts. This finding corroborates previous research thatshowed that high sensation-seekers choose higher speeds andengage in speeding behavior more often than low sensation-seekers (Rosenbloom, 2003a). In line with McKenna and Horswill(2006), the benefits of choosing a higher speed for high sensation-seekers may be both the thrill and the perceived superiority theygain. Furthermore, fast driving can induce sensation but also anillusion of control that results in a feeling of superiority (Cestacet al., 2011). It may indicate that cognitive processes may differin people with different personality traits. Further research mightinvestigate time-saving bias among people with high and low trait-anxiety since this personality feature might also be associated tospeeding (Shahar, 2009).

The main factor of the sensation-seeking scale that was corre-lated to higher speed choices was drivers’ level of disinhibition.Although the other factors of experience- seeking and thrill andadventure-seeking also showed a significant positive correlation

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o higher speed choices, the regression analysis showed that theyid not have a unique contribution to the prediction of the choicef higher speed when controlling for the other variables. Disin-ibition refers to loss of self-control and impulsiveness that was

ound to be related to higher levels of dysfunctional cognitionsMobini et al., 2011). Furthermore, it has been found that measuresf irrational beliefs were moderately correlated with impulsive-ess (Hutchinson et al., 1998). In the future, it should be examinedo what extent it is possible to minimize time-saving bias in driversith high scores of Disinhibition by, for example, arithmetic exer-

ises.The fact that no interaction was found between time-saving bias

nd sensation-seeking confirmed the hypothesis that these twootivations contribute independently and additively to speed esti-ations and choices. These results suggest that the integration of

oth cognitive factors and motivational/personality-related factorsould produce interesting findings which could promote the scien-ific exploration of the antecedents of speeding behavior. This alsooints to an interesting and important line of research that has notet been explored sufficiently in the context of speeding or drivingehavior. This line of research combines judgment and decision-aking tasks related to driving such as time-saving bias questions

oupled with people’s prior tendencies, attitudes and traits as indi-idual differences.

Some methodological issues relating to the current study areorth mentioning. First, this study did not use any behavioraleasures and assessed only participants’ intentions to speed.lthough examining drivers’ actual behavior on the road is impor-

ant, it would have been hard to disentangle the various factorshat contribute to the actual driving behavior to assess the actualmpact of time-saving bias or sensation-seeking on driving behav-or. Second, some of the findings might be attributed to the fact thathe questions of time-saving and speed choices were united in theame form. Second, the fact that Boredom Susceptibility showedow reliability prevented the reaching of any conclusions about thatpecific factor of sensation-seeking. Although this trait, referring tontolerance toward monotonous, repetitious or predictable peoplend events may be theoretically strongly associated to speeding,t is known that the subscale that represents this trait (BS) is the

eakest of all the four that make up the SSS and that it is less inter-ally reliable than the other three subscales (e.g. Zuckerman, 2007).astly, the results of this study are limited due to its relatively smallample size and to the fact that some of the factors (e.g., time-savingias) are naturally skewed.

From a practical point of view, among all of the factors exam-ned in this study, time-saving bias is probably a more modifiableactor in drivers’ perception and behavior than other individualifferences. However, it is important to understand that faultystimations of time saved when increasing from a low or a highpeed can have both positive and negative consequences. On thene hand, if drivers realize that increasing from a low speed saveshem more time than they need, they may choose a lower speed.n the other hand, if drivers know they can save more time by

ncreasing speed, they may do so more often. The same holds true

hen increasing from a high speed: if drivers know that a speed

ncrease will save them less time than they estimate, they may benclined to drive even faster. On the other hand, they may chooseo avoid the higher risk of an accident and not speed at all. Practical

nd Prevention 50 (2013) 1135– 1139 1139

interventions aimed at reducing drivers’ speeding behavior shouldconsider these ideas and devise interventions carefully.

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