When One Talks About the Revolutionary OppLC_Russia_1
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When one talks about the revolutionary opposition to the degeneration of the revolution in Russia,
or of the Communist International, it is generally assumed that one is referring to the Left
Opposition led by Trotsky and other Bolshevik leaders. The wholly inadequate criticisms of the
degeneration made after much delay by those who had played an active part in that degeneration
are taken to be the be all and end all of communist opposition inside Russia or the International.
The much deeper and more consistent critique elaborated by the ‘left wing communists' long
before the Left Opposition came into existence in 1923 is either ignored or dismissed as the ravings
of sectarian lunatics cut off from the ‘real world'. This distortion of the past is simply an expression
of the long ascendancy of the counter-revolution since the years of the revolutionary struggle ended
in the 1920s. It is always in the interests of the capitalist counter-revolution to hide or distort the
genuinely revolutionary history of the working class and its communist minorities, because only in
this way can the bourgeoisie hope to obscure the historic nature of the proletariat as the class that
is destined to lead mankind into the reign of freedom.
Against this distortion of the past revolutionaries must reaffirm and re-examine the historic
struggles of the proletariat; not out of an archivist's interest in history, but because the past
experience of the class forms and unbreakable chain with its present and future experience, and
only by understanding the past can the present and the future also be understood and outlined. We
hope that this study of the communist left in Russia will help to reclaim an important chapter in the
history of the communist movement from the distortions of bourgeois history, whether academic or
leftist. But more important we hope that it will serve to clarify some of the lessons that emerge out
of the struggles, failures and victories of the Russian left, lessons that have a vital role to play in
the reconstitution of the communist movement today.
"In Russia the problem could only be posed. It could not be solved in Russia". (Rosa Luxemburg, in
The Russian Revolution.)
In the wake of the counter-revolution which inundated the world after the revolutionary years of1917-23, a myth grew up around Bolshevism, portraying it as a specific product of Russian
‘backwardness' and Asiatic barbarism. Remnants of the German and Dutch left communists,
profoundly demoralised by the degeneration and death of the revolution in Russia, regressed to the
semi-Menshevik position that the bourgeois development of Russia in the twenties and thirties was
inevitable, because Russia had been unripe for communism; and Bolshevism was defined as an
ideology of the ‘intelligentsia' who had sought only the capitalist modernisation of Russia and who
had thus carried through a ‘bourgeois' or ‘state-capitalist' revolution in place of an impotent
bourgeoisie, basing itself on an immature proletariat.
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This whole theory was a total revision of the genuinely proletariat character of the Russian
Revolution and of Bolshevism, and a repudiation by many left communists of their own participation
in the heroic events that began in October 1917. But like all myths, it contained a grain of truth.
While fundamentally a product of international conditions, the workers' movement also contains
certain specificities arising out of particular national-historic conditions. Today, for example, it is
not by accident that the re-emerging communist movement is strongest in the countries of Western
Europe and far weaker, indeed almost non-existent, in the countries of the Eastern bloc. This is a
product of the specific manner in which the historic events of the last fifty years have unfolded, in
particular the way in which the capitalist counter-revolution has organised itself in different
countries. Similarly, when we examine the revolutionary movement in Russia prior to and following
the October insurrection: while its essence can only be grasped by considering it in the context of
the international workers' movement, certain of its strengths and weaknesses can be linked to the
particular conditions then prevailing in Russia.
In many ways, the weaknesses of the Russian revolutionary movement were simply the other side of
the coin of its strengths. The ability of the Russian proletariat to move very quickly towards a
revolutionary solution to its problems was largely determined by the nature of the Tsarist regime.
Authoritarian, decrepit, incapable of erecting any stable ‘buffers' between itself and the proletarian
menace, the Tsarist system ensured that any attempt of the proletariat to defend itself would
immediately bring itself up against the repressive forces of the state. The Russian proletariat, young
but highly combative and concentrated, was neither given the time nor the political space to
develop a reformist mentality which could lead it to identify the defence of its immediate material
interests with the survival of its ‘motherland'. It was thus far easier for the Russian proletariat to
refuse all identification with the Tsarist war-effort after 1914, and to see the destruction of the
Tsarist political apparatus as a precondition for its advance in 1917. Very broadly, and without
trying to make too mechanical a connection between the Russian proletariat and its revolutionary
minorities, these strengths of the Russian class were one of the factors which allowed the Bolsheviks
to stand at the head of the world revolutionary movement both in 1914 and in 1917, with their
ringing denunciation of the war and their uncompromising advocacy of the need to smash the
machinery of the bourgeois state.
But as we have said, these strengths were also weaknesses: the immaturity of the Russian
proletariat, its lack of organisational traditions, the suddenness with which it was propelled into a
revolutionary situation, tended to leave important lacunae in the theoretical arsenal of its
revolutionary minorities. It is significant, for example, that most of the pertinent critiques of the
reformist practices of social democracy and trade unionism began to be elaborated precisely in
those countries where these practices were most firmly established, in particular, Holland and
Germany. It was here, rather than in Russia where the proletariat was still struggling forparliamentary and trade union rights, that the pernicious dangers of reformist habits were first
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understood by revolutionaries. For example, the work of Anton Pannekoek and the Dutch Tribune
group in the years preceding World War 1 helped to prepare the ground for the radical break that
the German and Dutch revolutionaries made with the old reformist tactics after the war. The same
applies to Bordiga's Abstentionist Fraction in Italy. In contrast to this, the Bolsheviks never really
understood that the period of reformist ‘tactics' had ended once and for all with the entry of
capitalism into its death throes in 1914; or at least they never fully understood all the implications
of the new epoch for revolutionary strategy. The conflicts over trade union and parliamentary
tactics which rent the Communist International after 1920 resulted to a large extent from the
failure of the Russian party to thoroughly grasp the needs of the new epoch; and this failure was not
entirely restricted to the Bolshevik leadership: it was also reflected in the fact that the critique of
unionism, parliamentarism, substitutionism and other social democratic hangovers which the
Russian left communists made never achieved the same level of clarity as that of their Dutch,
German and Italian counterparts.
But here again we must temper this observation with an understanding of the international context
of the revolution. The theoretical weaknesses of the Bolshevik party were not absolutes, precisely
because this was a genuinely proletarian party, and therefore open to all new developments and
understandings that come from the proletarian struggle when it is on an ascendant path. Had the
revolution of October extended itself internationally, these weaknesses could have been overcome;
the social democratic deformations in Bolshevism only hardened into a fundamental obstacle to the
revolutionary movement when the world revolution entered into a reflux and the proletarian
bastion in Russia became cripplingly isolated. The rapid slide of the Communist International into
opportunism, largely under the influence of the Russian party, was, amongst other things, the result
of the Bolsheviks' attempt to balance the survival needs of the Soviet state with the international
needs of the revolution, an attempt which became increasingly contradictory the more the tide of
revolution receded, and which was finally abandoned with the triumph of ‘socialism in one country',
which signified the death of the Communist International and crowned the victory of the counter-
revolution in Russia.
If the extreme isolation of the Russian bastion was to ultimately prevent the Bolshevik party from
going beyond its initial errors, it also severely hampered the theoretical development of the left
communist fractions who detached themselves from the degenerating Russian party. Cut off from
the discussion and debate which was still being maintained by the left fractions in Europe,
subjected to a ruthless repression by an increasingly totalitarian state, the Russian left tended to
restrict itself to a formal critique of the degeneration of the Russian counter-revolution, and rarely
penetrated to the roots of the degeneration. The sheer novelty and rapidity of the Russian
experience were to leave an entire generation of revolutionaries utterly confused as to what had
happened there; not until the thirties and forties did a coherent understanding began to emerge outof the remaining communist fractions. But this understanding came above all from revolutionaries in
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Europe and America; the Russian left was too close, too caught up in the whole experience to
elaborate an objective, global analysis of the phenomenon. We can therefore only endorse the
assessment of the Russian left made by the comrades of Internationalism:
"The enduring contribution of these small groups trying to come to grips with the new situation, is
not that they could have possibly understood the entire process of state capitalism at its beginnings
nor that they expressed a totally coherent programme, but that they sounded the alarm and were
among the first to prophetically denounce the establishment of a state capitalist regime; their
legacy in the workers' movement is to have provided the political proof that the Russian proletariat
did not go down to defeat in silence". (J. Allen, ‘A Contribution on the Question of State
Capitalism', Internationalism n°6)
What is the communist left?
An aspect of the myth of ‘backward' or ‘bourgeois' Bolshevism is the idea that there is an impassable
gulf between the Bolsheviks, who are presented as partisans of state capitalism and party
dictatorship, and the left communists who are painted as the real defenders of workers' power and
the communist transformation of society. This idea has a particular appeal to councilists and
libertarians who want to identify only with what pleases them in the past workers' movement and
reject the real experience of the class as soon as they discover its blemishes. In the real world
however there is a direct and irreplaceable continuity between what Bolshevism originally was and
what the left communists were in the 1920s and after.
The Bolsheviks were themselves on the extreme left of the pre-war social democratic movement,
especially because of their resolute defence of organisational coherence and the need for a
revolutionary party independent of all reformist and confusionist tendencies of the workers'
movement.[1] Their position on the 1914-18 war (or rather the position of Lenin and his supporters
in the party) was again the most radical of all the anti-war stances in the socialist movement: "turn
the imperialist war into a civil war"; and their call for the revolutionary liquidation of the bourgeois
state in 1917 made them the rallying point for all the intransigent revolutionary minorities in theworld. The ‘left radicals' of Germany - who were to provide the main nucleus of the KAPD (German
Workers' Communist Party) in 1920 - were directly inspired by the example of the Bolsheviks,
especially when they began to call for the constitution of a new revolutionary party in total
opposition to the social-patriots of the SPD (Social Democratic Party).[2]
Thus, up to a certain point the Bolsheviks and the Communist International, which was largely set
up on their initiative, represented the pre-war ‘left'; they became the communist movement. Left
communism only has a meaning as a reaction against the degeneration of this original communist
vanguard, against the betrayal of what the vanguard has stood for at the beginning. Left
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communism thus emerged organically out of the original communist movement led by the Bolsheviks
and the CI.
This becomes startlingly clear when we look at the origins of the communist left in Russia itself. All
the Russian left fractions had their origins in the Bolshevik party. This is in itself proof of the
proletarian character of Bolshevism. Because it was a living expression of the working class, the
only class that can make a radical and continuous critique of its own practice, the Bolshevik party
perpetually generated revolutionary fractions out of its own body. At every step in its degeneration
voices were raised inside the party in protest, groupings were formed inside the party, or split from
it, to denounce the betrayals of Bolshevism's original programme. Only when the party had been
buried by its Stalinist gravediggers did these fractions no longer spring from it. The Russian left
communists were all Bolsheviks; it was they who defended a continuity with the Bolshevism of the
heroic years of the revolution, while those who calumniated, persecuted and exterminated them,no matter how exalted their names, were the ones who were breaking with the essence of
Bolshevism.
The Communist Left during the heroic years of the revolution, 1918-21
The first months
The Bolshevik party was actually the first party of the reconstituted workers' movement to give rise
to a ‘left'. This was precisely because it was the first party to lead a successful insurrection against
the bourgeois state. In the conception of the workers' movement of the time, the role of the party
was to organise the seizure of power and to assume governmental office in the new ‘proletarian
state'. Indeed the proletarian character of the state, according to this conception, was guaranteed
by the fact that it was in the hands of a proletarian party which sort to lead the working class
towards socialism. The fundamentally erroneous character of this dual or treble substitution (party-
state, state-class, party-class) was to be laid bare over the ensuing years of the revolution; but it
was the tragic destiny of the Bolshevik party to put the theoretical errors of the entire workers'
movement into practice, and thus to demonstrate through their own negative experience the
absolute falsity of this conception. All the shame and betrayals associated with Bolshevism derived
from the fact that the revolution was born and died in Russia, and that the Bolshevik party, by
identifying itself with the state that was to become the internal agent of the counter-revolution,
itself became an organiser of the revolution's decline. Had the revolution broken out and
degenerated in Germany and not Russia, the names of Luxemburg and Liebknecht might today cause
the same ambiguous and mixed reactions as do the names Lenin, Trotsky, Bukharin and Zinoviev. It
is only because of the great adventure that the Bolsheviks undertook that revolutionaries can assert
unambiguously today: the role of the party is not to take power on behalf of the class, and the
interests of the class are not identical to the interests of the post-revolutionary state. But it hastaken many years of painful reflection to be able to spell out these apparently simple lessons.
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As soon as it became a party ‘in charge of' the Soviet state in October 1917, the Bolshevik party
began to degenerate: not all at once, not in a completely unbroken downward course, and, as long
as the world revolution was on the agenda, not irreversibly. But nevertheless, the general process
of degeneration began immediately. Whereas formerly the party had been able to act freely as the
most resolute fraction of the class, always showing the way to deepen and extend the class
struggle, the Bolsheviks' assumption of state power put a growing brake on their ability to identify
with and participate in the proletarian class struggle. From now on the needs of the state were to
more and more take precedence over the needs of the class; and although this dichotomy was
hidden at first by the very intensity of the class struggle, it was nevertheless the expression of an
intrinsic and fundamental contradiction between the nature of the state and the nature of the
proletariat. The needs of the state are essentially concerned with holding society together, of
containing the class struggle within a framework acceptable to the maintenance of the social status
quo; the needs of the proletariat, and thus of its communist vanguard, can only be the extension
and deepening of its class struggle towards the overthrowing of all existing conditions. Now as long
as the revolutionary movement of the class was on the ascendant both in Russia and internationally,
the Soviet state could be used to guard the conquests of the revolution; it could be an instrument in
the hands of the revolutionary class. But as soon as the real movement of the class disappeared, the
status quo defended by the state could only be the status quo of capital. This was the general
tendency, but in fact the contradictions between the proletariat and the new state began to appear
immediately, because of the immaturity of the class and the Bolsheviks in their attitude to the
state, and above all because the consequences of the revolution remaining isolated in Russia beganto take their toll on the new proletarian bastion from the very beginning. Faced with a number of
problems which could only be solved on the international arena - the organisation of a war ravaged
economy, relations with huge peasant masses inside Russia, and with a hostile capitalist world
outside - the Bolsheviks lacked experience to take measures which could have at least diminished
the nefarious consequences of these problems; as it was the measures which they took tended to
compound the problems rather than relieve them. And the overwhelming majority of the errors they
made flowed from the fact that they had taken charge of the state, and thus felt justified in
identifying proletarian interests with the needs of the Soviet state, and indeed subordinating the
former to the latter.
Although no communist fraction in Russia at the time succeeded in making a fundamental critique
of these substitutionist errors - and this was to remain a failing on the part of the entire Russian left
- a revolutionary opposition to the Bolsheviks' early state early state policies crystallised only a few
months after the seizure of power. This opposition took the form of the Left Communist group
around Ossinski, Bukharin, Radek, Smirnov and others; organised mainly in the party's Moscow
Regional Bureau and expressing itself through the factional journal Kommunist. This opposition of
early 1918 was the first organised Bolshevik fraction to criticise the party's attempts to discipline
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the working class. But the original raison d'être of the Left Communist group was its opposition to
the signing of the Brest-Litovsk treaty with German imperialism.
This is not the place to undertake a detailed study of the whole Brest-Litovsk issue. In brief the
main debate was between Lenin and the Left Communists (led on this issue by Bukharin) who were
in favour of a revolutionary war against Germany and denounced the peace treaty as a ‘betrayal' of
the world revolution. Lenin defended the signing of the treaty as a way of obtaining a ‘breathing
space' while reorganising the military capacities of the Soviet state. The Lefts insisted that:
"The adoption of the conditions dictated by the German imperialists would be an act going
contrary to our whole policy of revolutionary socialism; it would lead to the abandonment of the
proper line of international socialism, in domestic as well as foreign policy, and could lead to one
of the worse kinds of opportunism." (R. Daniels, The Conscience of the Revolution, 1960, p.73)
Acknowledging the technical inability of the Soviet state to wage a conventional war against
German imperialism, they advocated a strategy of tying the German army down with guerrilla
tactics by flying detachments of Red partisans. The waging of the "holy war against German
imperialism", they hoped, would serve as an example to the world proletariat and inspire it to join
in the fight.
We do not wish to enter into a retrospective debate about the strategic possibilities open to the
Soviet power in 1918. We should make it clear that both Lenin and the Left Communists recognised
that the only ultimate hope of the Russian proletariat lay in the world extension of the revolution;
both of their motivations and actions were placed within a framework of internationalism and both
presented their arguments in full view of the Russian proletariat organised in the Soviets. We
therefore consider it inadmissible to define the signing of the treaty as a ‘betrayal' of
internationalism. Nor as it turned out, did it mean the collapse of the revolution in Russia or
Germany, as Bukharin had feared. In any case, these strategic considerations are imponderable to
some extent; one of the most important political questions deriving from the Brest-Litovsk debate is
the following: is ‘revolutionary war' the principal means for extending the revolution? Does theproletariat in power in one region have the task of exporting revolution at bayonet point to the
world proletariat? The comments of the Italian Left on the Brest-Litovsk question are significant in
this regard:
"Of the two tendencies in the Bolshevik party who confronted each other at the time of Brest-
Litovsk, Lenin's and Bukharin's, we think that it was the former who was more in line with the
needs of the world revolution. The positions of the fraction led by Bukharin, according to which
the function of the proletarian state was to liberate the workers of other countries through a
‘revolutionary war', are in contradiction with the very nature of the proletarian revolution and the
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historic role of the proletariat." (‘Parti-Etat-Internationale: L'Etat Proletarien', Bilan n°18, April-
May, 1935)
In contrast to the bourgeois revolution, which could indeed be exported by military conquest, the
proletarian revolution depends on the conscious struggle of the proletariat of each country against
its own bourgeoisie: "The victory of a proletarian state against a capitalist state (in the territorial
sense of the word) in no way means the victory of the revolution". (ibid). The Red Army's advance
into Poland in 1920, which only succeeded in driving the Polish workers into the arms of their own
bourgeoisie, is proof that military victories by a proletarian bastion cannot substitute for the
conscious political action of the world proletariat, and therefore the extension of the revolution is
first and foremost a political task. The foundation of the Communist International in 1919 was thus
a far greater contribution to the world revolution than any ‘revolutionary war' could have been.
The actual signing of the Brest-Litovsk treaty, its ratification by the party and the Soviets, coupled
with the Left's earnest desire to avoid a split within the party over the issue, ended the first stage
of the Left Communists' agitation. Now that the Soviet state had acquired its ‘breathing space',
many of the immediate problems facing the party were centred around the organisation of the war-
torn economy within Russia. And it was on this question that the Left Communist group contributed
its most valuable insights into the dangers facing the revolutionary bastion. Bukharin, the fervent
partisan of revolutionary war, was less interested in formulating a critique of majority Bolshevik
policy on the internal organisation of the regime; from now on many of the most pertinent
criticisms of the leadership's domestic policies were to come from the pen of Ossinsky, who was to
prove himself to be a much more consistent oppositional figure than Bukharin.
In the early months of 1918 the Bolshevik leadership attempted to deal with Russia's economic
turmoil in a perfunctorily ‘pragmatic' manner. In a speech given to the Bolshevik Central Committee
and published as The Immediate tasks of the Soviet Regime, Lenin advocated the formation of state
trusts in which the existing bourgeois experts and owners were to be retained, though under the
supervision of the ‘proletarian' state. The workers in turn would have to accept the Taylor system of
‘scientific management' (once denounced by Lenin himself as the enslavement of man by themachine), and one-man management in the factories: "The revolution demands... precisely in the
interests of socialism that the masses unquestionably obey the single will of the leaders of the
labour process". All of this meant that the factory committee movement, which had spread like
wildfire ever since February 1917, was to be curbed; expropriations carried out by such committees
were to be discouraged, their growing authority in the factories was to be reduced to a mere
‘checking' function, and they were to be made into appendages of the trade unions, which were
much more manageable institutions, already incorporated into the new state apparatus.
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The leadership presented these policies as the best way for the revolutionary regime to overcome
the threat of economic chaos and to rationalise the economy towards an eventual social
construction, when the world revolution extended itself. Lenin frankly called this system "state-
capitalism", by which he understood the proletarian state's control of the capitalist economy in the
interests of the revolution. In a polemic against the Left Communists (Left-wing Childishness and
the Petty Bourgeois Mentality ) Lenin argued that such a system of state capitalism would be a
definite advance in a backward country like Russia, where the main danger of counter-revolution
was the fragmented, archaic petty bourgeois mass of the peasantry. This conception remained a
tenet of creed to the Bolsheviks and blinded them to the fact that the internal counter-revolution
was expressing itself first and foremost through the state, not through the peasants. The Left
Communists too were worried about the possibility of the revolution degenerating into a system of
"petty bourgeois economic relations" (‘Theses on the Present Situation', Kommunist, n°1, April 1918,
available in English in Daniels, A Documentary History of the Revolution), and they also shared the
leadership's conviction that nationalisation by the ‘proletarian' state was indeed a socialist measure,
and in fact they demanded its extension to the whole economy. Clearly they could not have been
fully aware of what the danger of "state capitalism" actually meant, but basing themselves on a
strong class instinct, they quickly saw the dangers inherent in a system which claimed to organise
the exploitation of the workers in the interests of ‘socialism'. Ossinsky's prophetic warning is now
well known:
"We do not stand for the point of view of ‘construction of socialism under the direction of the
trusts'. We stand for the point of view of the construction of the proletarian society by the class
creativity of the workers themselves, not by ukases of ‘captains of industry'...We proceed from
trust for the class instinct, to the active class initiative of the proletariat. It cannot be otherwise.
If the proletariat does not know how to create the necessary prerequisites for socialist
organisation of labour, no-one can do this for it and no-one can compel it to do this. The stick, if
raised against the workers, will find itself in the hands of a social force which is either under the
influence of another social class or is in the hands of the soviet power; then the soviet power will
be forced to seek support against the proletariat from another class (e.g. the peasantry), and by
this it will destroy itself as the dictatorship of the proletariat. Socialism and socialist organisation
must be set up by the proletariat itself, or they will not be set up at all; something else will be set
up - state capitalism." (‘On the Building of Socialism', Kommunist n°2, April 1918, in Daniels, The
Conscience of the Revolution, p. 85).
Against this threat the Left Communists advocated workers' control of industry through a system of
factory committees and ‘economic councils'. They defined their role as that of a "responsible
proletarian opposition" constituted within the party to prevent the party and the soviet regime
"deviating" towards the "ruinous path of petty bourgeois policies" (‘Theses on the Present Situation',Kommunist no. 1, in Daniels, A Documentary History etc).
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echelons of the state machine allowed the military struggle to be prosecuted in a ruthless and
effective manner, but it further undermined the real bastions of the revolution: the mass unitary
organs of the class. The bureaucratisation of the Soviet regime that occurred during this period was
to become irreversible with the reflux of the world revolution after 1921.
With the outbreak of hostilities in 1918, there was a general closing of ranks within the Bolshevik
party, as everybody recognised the need for unity in action against the external danger. The
Kommunist group, whose publication had ceased to appear after being severely hounded by the
party leadership, ceased to exist, and its original nucleus went in two directions in response to the
Civil War.
One tendency, exemplified by Radek and Bukharin, greeted the economic measure imposed by Civil
War with unabashed enthusiasm. For them, the wholesale nationalisations, suppression of trade and
monetary forms, and requisitioning of the peasantry, the so-called ‘War Communism' measures,
represented a real break with the previous "state capitalist" phase and constituted a major advance
towards communist relations of production. Bukharin even wrote a book, The Economics of the
Transition Period , explaining how economic disintegration and even forced labour were inevitable
preliminary stages in the transition to communism; he was clearly trying to demonstrate
‘theoretically' that Russia under War Communism, which had been adopted simply as a series of
emergency measures to deal with a desperate situation, was a society in transition to communism.
Former Left Communists like Bukharin were quite prepared to abandon their previous criticisms of
one-man management and labour discipline, because for them the Soviet state was no longer trying
to compromise with domestic capital, but was acting resolutely as an organ of communist
transformation. In his Economics of the Transition Period , Bukharin argued that the strengthening
of the Soviet state, its increasing absorption of social and economic life, represented a decisive
advance towards communism:
"The ‘governmentalisation' of the trade unions and in practice all mass organs of the proletariat
result from the inner logic of the transformation process itself. The smallest germ cell of the
labour apparatus must become a support for the general process of organisation, which is planfully
led and conducted by the collective reason of the working class, which has its material
embodiment in the highest, all-embracing organisation, its state power. Thus the system of state
capitalism is dialectically transformed into its own opposite, into the governmental form of
workers' socialism." (Bukharin, Economics of the Transition Period , quoted in A Documentary
History of Communism, edited by R. Daniels, 1960, p. 180).
With such ideas Bukharin ‘dialectically' reversed the marxist understanding that the movement
towards a communist society will be characterised by a progressive weakening, a "withering away"
of the state machine. Bukharin was still a revolutionary when he wrote the Economics; but between
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his theories of a statified ‘communism' entirely contained within one nation, and the Stalinist theory
of ‘socialism in one country' there is a definite continuity.
While Bukharin made his peace with War Communism, those Lefts who had been most consistent in
their advocacy of workers' democracy continued to defend this principle in the face of the growing
militarisation of the regime. In 1919 the Democratic Centralism group was formed around Ossinsky,
Sapranov and others. They continued to dispute the principle of one-man management in industry
and continued to advocate the collective or "collegial" principle as "The strongest weapon against
the growth of departmentalism and bureaucratic deadening of the soviet apparatus" (Theses on the
Collegial Principle and Individual Authority ). While accepting the need for the use of bourgeois
specialists in industry and the army, they also stressed the need for these specialists to be put
under the control of the rank and file. "No one disputes the necessity of using the spetsy - the
dispute is over how to use them" (Sapranov, quoted in Daniels, Conscience of the Revolution,p.109).
At the same time the Democratic Centralists, or ‘Decists' as they were known, protested against the
loss of initiative by local soviets, and they suggested a series of reforms aimed at restoring them as
effective organs of workers' democracy; it was policies of this sort which led critics to remark that
the Decists were more interested in democracy than in centralism. Finally the Decists called for the
restoration of democratic practices in the party. At the Ninth Congress of the RCP in 1920 they
attacked the bureaucratisation of the party, the increasing concentration of power in the hands of a
tiny minority. It is indicative of the influence that these criticisms could still have in the party that
the congress ended up voting a manifesto vigorously calling for "broader criticism of the central as
well as the local party institutions", and the rejection of "any kind of repression against comrades
because they have different ideas". (Resolution of the Ninth Party Congress, ‘On the Next Tasks of
Building the Party'.)
In general the Decists' attitude to the tasks of the Soviet regime in a period of Civil War can be
summed up in Ossinsky's words to that same Congress:
"The basic slogan which we should proclaim at the present time is the unification of military work,
military forms of organisation and methods of administration, with the creative initiative of the
conscious workers. If, under the banner of military work, you in fact begin to implant
bureaucratism, we will disperse our own forces and fail to fulfil our tasks." (Quoted in Daniels, A
Documentary History of the Revolution)
Some years later the left communist Miasnikov had this to say about the Democratic Centralism
group:
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"This group did not have a platform of any real theoretical value. The only point which attracted
the attention of all the groups and of the party was its struggle against excessive centralisation. It
is only now that one can see in this struggle a still imprecise attempt of the proletariat to dislodge
the bureaucracy from the positions it had just conquered in the economy. The group died a natural
death, without any violence being used against it..." (L'Ouvrier Communiste, 1929, a French journal
close to the KAPD.)
The Decists' criticisms were inevitably "imprecise" because they were a tendency born at a time
when the Bolshevik party and the revolution were still very much alive, so that any criticisms of the
party were bound to take the form of appeals for the party to be more democratic, more equitable
etc... in other words, to restrict criticisms to the level of organisational practice rather than of
fundamental political positions.
Many of the Democratic Centralism group were also involved in the Military Opposition, which was
formed for a brief period in 1919. The requirements of the Civil War had impelled the Bolsheviks to
set up a centralised fighting force, the Red Army, composed not only of workers but of recruits from
the peasantry and other strata. Very quickly this army began to conform to the hierarchical pattern
that was being established in the rest of the state apparatus. Election of officers was soon
dispensed with as "politically pointless and technically inexpedient" (Trotsky, ‘Work, Discipline,
Order', 1918, quoted in Daniels, Conscience of the Revolution, p. 104); the death penalty for
disobedience under fire, saluting and special forms of address to officers were restored, and
differences between ranks solidified, especially with the appointment of former Tsarist officers to
high command posts in the army.
The Military Opposition, whose main spokesman was Vladimir Smirnov, was formed to fight against
the tendency to model the Red Army along the lines of a typical bourgeois army. They did not
oppose the establishment of the Red Army as such, nor the use of military spetsy , but they were
against excessive hierarchy and discipline, and wanted to ensure that the army was guided by an
overall political orientation which did not depart from Bolshevik principle. The party leadership
falsely accused them of wanting to disband the army in favour of a system of partisan detachmentsmore suited to peasant warfare; as on many other occasions, the only alternative that the Bolshevik
leadership could see to what they termed "proletarian state organisation" was petty bourgeois,
anarchist decentralisation; in fact very often the Bolsheviks confused bourgeois forms of
hierarchical centralisation with the self discipline and centralisation produced from below which is
the hall mark of the proletariat. In any case the demands of the Military Opposition were rejected
and the grouping soon fell apart. But the hierarchical structure of the Red Army - in conjunction
with the disbanding of the factory militias - were to make it more amenable to be used as a
repressive force against the proletariat from 1921 onwards.
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Despite the persistence of oppositional tendencies within the party throughout the Civil War period,
the need for unity against the attack of the counter-revolution tended to act as a cohesive force
within the party and among all the classes and social strata who supported the Soviet regime
against the Whites. The innate tensions within the regime were held down during this period, only
to burst up to the surface when the hostilities ceased and the regime was faced with the task of
reconstructing a ruined country. Dissension over the next step for the Soviet regime expressed itself
in 1920-21 in peasant revolts, discontent in the navy, workers' strikes in Moscow and Petrograd, to
culminate in the Kronstadt workers' uprising in March 1921. These antagonisms inevitably expressed
themselves within the party itself, and in the traumatic years 1920-21, it fell to the Workers'
Opposition group to provide the main focus for political dissent inside the Bolshevik party.
The Workers' Opposition
The tenth Party Congress in March 1921was the arena for a controversy within the Bolshevik party
which had been getting sharper and sharper since the end of the Civil War: the trade union
question. On the surface this was a debate about the role of trade unions under the proletarian
dictatorship, but it in fact expressed far deeper problems about the whole future of the Soviet
regime and its relationship to the working class. Broadly speaking there were three positions within
the party: that of Trotsky, who stood for the total integration of the unions into the ‘Workers' state'
where they would have the task of stimulating labour productivity; that of Lenin, who argued that
the unions still had to act as defensive organs of the class, which, he pointed out, was actually a
"workers' and peasants' state" which suffered from "bureaucratic deformations"; and finally the
position of the Workers' Opposition group who stood for the management of production by industrial
unions independent of the Soviet state. Although the entire framework of this debate was
profoundly inadequate, The Workers' Opposition expressed in a confused and faltering way the
proletariat's antipathy to the bureaucratic and military methods which had more and more become
the trademark of the regime, and the hope of the class that things would improve now that the
rigours of the Civil War were over.
The leaders of the Workers' Opposition group came mainly from the trade union apparatus, but itappears to have had considerable working class support in South Eastern parts of European Russia
and in Moscow, especially among metal workers - Shliapnikov and Medvedev, two of the groups
leading members, were both metal workers. But the most famous of its leaders was Alexandra
Kollontai, who wrote the programmatic text The Workers' Opposition as an elaboration on the
‘Theses on the Trade Union Question' submitted by the group to the Tenth Congress. All the
strengths and weaknesses of the group can be gauged from this text which begins by affirming that:
"The Workers' Opposition sprang from the depths of the industrial proletariat of Soviet Russia. It is
an outgrowth not only of the unbearable conditions of life and labour in which seven million
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industrial workers find themselves, but it is also a product of vacillations, inconsistencies and
outright deviations of our Soviet policy from the early expressed class-consistent principles of the
Communist programme." (Kollontai, The Workers' Opposition, Solidarity pamphlet n°7, p. 1).
Kollontai then goes on to outline the appalling economic conditions facing the Soviet regime after
the Civil War, and draws attention to the growth of a bureaucratic stratum whose origins lie outside
the working class - in the intelligentsia, the peasantry, remnants of the old bourgeoisie, etc. This
strata had more and more come to dominate the Soviet apparatus and even the party itself, infusing
both with a careerism and a blind disregard for proletarian interests. For the Workers' Opposition
the Soviet state itself was not a pure proletarian organ but a heterogeneous institution forced to
balance between the different classes and strata in Russian society. They insisted that the way that
the revolution remained loyal to its original goals was not by entrusting its direction to non-
proletarian technocrats and the socially ambiguous organs of the state, but by relying on the self-activity and creative powers of the working masses themselves:
"This consideration, which should be very simple and clear to every practical man, is lost sight of
by our party leaders: it is impossible to decree Communism. It can be created only in the process
of practical research, through mistakes, perhaps, but only through the creative powers of the
working class itself ." (Kollontai, ibid, p. 33).
These general insights of the Workers' Opposition were very profound in many ways, but the group
was unable to contribute much of lasting value beyond these generalities. The concrete proposals
they put forward as a solution to the crisis the revolution was passing through were based on a
series of fundamental misconceptions, all of which expressed the magnitude of the impasse the
Russian proletariat faced at this juncture.
For the Workers' Opposition, the organs which expressed the pure class interests of the proletariat
were none other than the trade unions, or rather the industrial unions. The task of creating
communism should therefore be entrusted to the unions: "The Workers' Opposition sees in the
unions the mangers and creators of the communist economy..." (Kollontai, ibid, p. 28).
Thus while the left communists of Germany, Holland and elsewhere were denouncing the trade
unions as one of the main obstacles to the proletarian revolution, the left in Russia was extolling
them as potential organs of communist transformation! Revolutionaries in Russia seemed to have
had great difficulty grasping the fact that the trade unions could no longer have any role to plat for
the proletariat in the epoch of capitalist decadence: although the appearance of factory
committees and soviets in 1917 signified that the unions were dead as organs of working class
struggle, none of the left groupings in Russia really understood this, either before or after the
Workers' Opposition. By 1921, when the Workers' Opposition was portraying the unions as the
backbone of the revolution, the real organs of revolutionary struggle - the factory committees and
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the workers' soviets - had already been emasculated. Indeed in the case of the factory committees,
it was their integration into the unions after 1918 which effectively killed them as organs of the
class. The transfer of decision making power into the hands of the unions, despite the good
intentions of its advocates, would in no way have restored power to the proletariat in Russia, even
if such a project had been possible, it would simply have been a transfer of power from one branch
of the state to another.
The Workers' Opposition programme for the regeneration of the party was also flawed at its roots.
They explained the growing opportunism of the party purely in terms of the influx of a non-
proletarian membership. For them the party could be put back on a proletarian path if an ouvrièrist
purge was carried out against non-worker members. If the party was overwhelmingly composed of
‘pure', rough-handed proletarians, all would be well. This ‘answer' to the degeneration of the party
completely missed the point. The opportunism of the party was not a question of its personnel butwas a response to the pressure and tensions of holding state power in an increasingly unfavourable
situation. Given the reigns of state in a period of reflux in the revolution, anyone would became an
‘opportunist', no matter how ‘pure' his proletarian ‘pedigree'. Bordiga once remarked that ex-
workers often became the worst bureaucrats. But the Workers' Opposition never challenged the
notion that the party had to control the state in order to guarantee that it remained an instrument
of the proletariat:
"The Central Committee of our party must become the supreme directing centre of our class
policy, the organ of class thought and control over the practical policy of the Soviets, and the
spiritual personification of our basic programme." (Kollontai, ibid , p.42).
The Workers' Opposition's inability to conceive of the dictatorship of the proletariat as anything else
but the dictatorship of the party led them to make frantic pledges of loyalty to the party when, in
the middle of the Tenth Congress, the Kronstadt revolt broke out. Prominent leaders of the Workers'
Opposition even backed up these pledges by putting themselves in the front line of the assault on
the Kronstadt garrison. Like all the other left fractions in Russia, they completely failed to
understand the importance of the Kronstadt rising as the last mass struggle of the Russian workersfor the restoration of soviet power. But assisting in the suppression of the revolt did not save the
Workers' Opposition from being condemned as a "petty bourgeois anarchist deviation", as an
"objectively" counter-revolutionary element at the conclusion of the Congress. The banning of
"factions" in the party at the Tenth Congress dealt a stunning blow to the Workers' Opposition.
Faced with the prospect of illegal, underground work, they proved unable to maintain their
opposition to the regime. A few of its members fought on throughout the twenties in association
with other illegal fractions; others simply capitulated to the status quo. Kollontai herself ended up
as a loyal servant of the Stalinist regime. In 1922 the left communist paper, the Workers'
Dreadnought referred to the "unprincipled and backboneless leaders of the so-called ‘Workers'
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Opposition'" (Workers' Dreadnought, July 29, 1922), and certainly there was a real lack of resolution
in the group's programme. This was not a question of the courage or lack of courage of the group's
members, but resulted from the extreme difficulty Russian revolutionaries faced in trying to oppose
or break from a party which had been the moving spirit of the revolution. For many communists, to
challenge the very premises of the party was sheer folly; outside the party was nothing but the
void. This deep attachment to the party - so deep that it became a barrier against the defence of
revolutionary principles - was to be even more pronounced in the Left Opposition later on.
Another reason for the weakness of the Workers' Opposition's criticisms of the regime was their
almost total lack of an international perspective. While the most determined left fractions in Russia
drew their strength from an understanding that the only true ally of the Russian proletariat and its
revolutionary minority was the world working class, the Workers' Opposition's programme was based
on a search for solutions entirely within the framework of the Russian state.
The central concern of the Workers' Opposition was this: "Who shall develop the creative powers in
the sphere of economic construction? " (Kollontai, ibid , p. 4). The primordial task which she ascribed
to the Russian working class was the construction of a "communist economy" in Russia. Their
preoccupation with the problem of the management of production, with creating so-called
‘communist relations' of production in Russia show a complete misunderstanding of a fundamental
point: communism could not be built in an isolated bastion. The main problem facing the Russian
working class was the extension of the world revolution, not the "economic reconstruction" of
Russia. Although the Kollontai text criticises " foreign trade with the capitalist states... [that is]
carried on over the heads of the Russian as well as the foreign organised workers " (ibid, p. 10), the
Workers' Opposition shared the growing tendency of the Bolshevik leadership at the time to put the
domestic problems of the Russian economy above the problem of the international extension of the
revolution. That the two tendencies had a different vision of this economic reconstruction is less
important than the fact that they both tended to agree that Russia could turn in on itself for an
indefinite period without betraying the interests of the world revolution.
This exclusively Russian perspective of the Workers' Opposition was also reflected in the group'sfailure to establish any firm ties with the left communist opposition outside Russia. Although
Kollontai's text was smuggled out of Russia by a member of the KAPD and published both by the
KAPD and the Workers' Dreadnought, Kollontai soon regretted this and tried to get the document
back! The Workers' Opposition offered no real criticisms of the opportunist policies being adopted
by the Communist International, endorsed the 21 Conditions, and did not seek to ally itself with the
‘foreign' oppositions within the CI, despite the obvious sympathy accorded them by the KAPD and
others. In 1922 they made a last-ditch appeal to the Fourth World Congress of the CI, but restricted
their protest entirely to the bureaucratisation of the regime and the lack of free expression for
dissident communist groupings within Russia. In any case, they received scant echo from an
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International which had already expelled many of its best elements and was about to endorse the
infamous United Front policy. Shortly after this appeal was made a special Bolshevik commission
was set up to investigate the activities of the Workers' Opposition; it came to the conclusion that
the group consisted an "illegal factional organisation", and the ensuing repression soon put an end to
most of the group's activities.[4] The Workers' Opposition had the misfortune of being thrust into
the political limelight at a time when the party was going through profound convulsions which would
soon make legal oppositional activity. In trying to balance between the two stools of legal intra-
party faction work and underground opposition to the regime the Workers' Opposition fell into the
void; henceforward the torch of proletarian resistance would have to be carried on by more resolute
and intransigent fighters.
[1] The Bolsheviks themselves produced extreme left tendencies in the pre-war period, notably the
so-called ‘Ultamists' and ‘Recallists' who criticised the parliamentary tactics of the Bolshevik
organisation after the 1905 Revolution. But since this debate took place in the twilight period
between capitalism's ascent and decline, this is not the place to discuss these issues. The
Communist Left is a specific product of the workers' movement in the epoch of decadence, since it
originated in a critique of the ‘official' communist strategy concerning the revolutionary tasks of the
proletariat in the new epoch.
[2] See ‘Lessons of the German Revolution' in the ICC's International Review n°2.
[3] See ‘The Degeneration of the Russian Revolution' and ‘The Lessons of Kronstadt' in International
Review n°3.
[4] Although the Workers' Opposition effectively ceased to function after 1922, its name, like that of
the Democratic Centralists, crops up over and over again in connection with illegal underground
activities until the beginning of the 1930s, which implies that elements of both groups fought on till
the bitter end.
‹ International Review no.8 - 1st quarter 1977up International Review no.9 - 2nd quarter 1977 ›