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When Crime Pays Money and Muscle in Indian Politics Milan Vaishnav | April 7, 2015
Transcript of When Crime Pays - World Banksiteresources.worldbank.org/1818SOCIETY/Resources/... · When Crime...
When Crime Pays
Money and Muscle in Indian Politics
Milan Vaishnav | April 7, 2015
From jail to bailing out the government
An Indian political success story
Law-makers & law-breakers
24%
30%
34%
12%15%
21%
0%
5%
10%
15%
20%
25%
30%
35%
40%
2004 2009 2014
Pe
rce
nta
ge o
f Lo
k Sa
bh
a M
Ps
Lok Sabha Election Year
MPs with criminal cases MPs with serious cases
Source: ADR
A widespread phenomenon
Source: Vaishnav (2015)
Severity of charges is striking
Source: Sastry (2013)
A puzzling coexistence
Key questions
1. Why do criminal candidates enter the electoral sphere?
2. Why do parties nominate candidates with criminal records?
3. Why do voters vote for them?
4. What are the resulting policy implications?
5. What are the lessons for democracy and accountability?
Preview
• Vibrant marketplace for criminal politicians exists in India
• As with any market, there are underlying supply and demand factors at work
• Existence of market does not mean that policymakers must meekly accept the status quo
• Have to change incentives, not just information
1. Why do criminal candidates enter the electoral sphere?
Criminals in politics not novel
Supply of criminals into politics
Surge in political competition
0
50
100
150
200
250
300
350
400
450
500
19
52
19
57
19
62
19
67
19
71
19
77
19
80
19
84
19
89
19
91
19
96
19
98
19
99
20
04
20
09
20
14
Nu
mb
er
of
po
litic
al p
arti
es
Source: ECI
The end of hegemony
0.0%
10.0%
20.0%
30.0%
40.0%
50.0%
60.0%
0
50
100
150
200
250
300
350
400
450
500
19
52
19
57
19
62
19
67
19
71
19
77
19
80
19
84
19
89
19
91
19
96
19
98
19
99
20
04
20
09
20
14
Co
ngr
ess
vo
te s
har
e
Nu
mb
er
of
po
litic
al p
arti
es
Number of parties Congress vote share
Source: ECI
“Silent revolution”
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
19
52
19
57
19
62
19
67
19
71
19
77
19
80
19
84
19
89
19
91
19
96
19
98
19
99
20
04
Pe
rce
nt
of
Hin
di-
be
lt M
Ps
Year
Upper/Intermediate Caste Other Backward Classes/Scheduled Caste
Source: Jaffrelot and Kumar (2009)
Institutional decay
Source: NCRB
Collapse of election finance regime
Source: Indian Express
Vertical integration
Criminals in UP assembly
812
3135 36
51
35
45
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
1984 1989 1991 1993 1996 2002 2007 2012
Pe
rce
nt
of
MLA
s fa
cin
g cr
imin
al c
ase
s
Year
Source: India Today
2. Why do parties nominate candidates with criminal records?
A new dataset
Parties as vital gate-keepers
Source: Vaishnav (2015)
Crime does pay!
7%
22%
0%
5%
10%
15%
20%
25%
No Cases At Least One Case
Pro
bab
ility
of
Win
nin
g El
ect
ion
Source: Vaishnav (2015)
Serious crime seriously pays
7%
19%
25%
0%
5%
10%
15%
20%
25%
30%
No cases At least 1 case At least 1 serious case
Pro
bab
ility
of
Win
nin
g El
ect
ion
Source: Vaishnav (2015)
Growing electorate
0
200000
400000
600000
800000
1000000
1200000
1400000
1600000
18000001
95
2
19
57
19
62
19
67
19
71
19
77
19
80
19
84
19
89
19
91
19
96
19
98
19
99
20
04
20
09
20
14
Ave
rage
nu
mb
er
of
ele
cto
rs
Year
Source: ECI
Increasing competitiveness
14.813.7
23.926.1
18.219.5
15.414.1
11.910.0 10.0
12.2
9.7
15.2
0
5
10
15
20
25
30
19
62
19
67
19
71
19
77
19
80
19
84
19
89
19
91
19
96
19
98
19
99
20
04
20
09
20
14
Ave
rage
Mar
gin
of
Vic
tory
(%
)
Year
Source: ECI
Rising expectations
Growing competition
Increasingly costly elections
Finite party coffers
Parties motivated by
“rents”
Parties want “self-
financing” candidates
The costs of democracy
Money talks
1% 1%
4%
12%
26%
0%
5%
10%
15%
20%
25%
30%
Bottomquintile
2nd 3rd 4th Top quintile
Pro
bab
ility
of
Win
nin
g El
ect
ion
Source: Vaishnav (2015)
Increasingly costly
elections
Finite party coffers
Parties motivated by
“rents”
Party elites prioritize “self-
financing” candidates
Criminal candidates
have access to finance
From money to “muscle”
The merits of money & “muscle”
6%7%
9%
13%
19%
0%
2%
4%
6%
8%
10%
12%
14%
16%
18%
20%
Bottomquintile
2nd 3rd 4th Top quintile
Pro
po
rtio
n w
ith
Cri
min
al C
ase
s
Candidate wealth quintileSource: Vaishnav (2015)
Moving beyond money
1% 0%4%
11%
24%
2%5%
11%
26%
42%
0%
5%
10%
15%
20%
25%
30%
35%
40%
45%
Bottom quintile 2nd 3rd 4th Top quintile
Pro
bab
ility
of
Win
nin
g El
ect
ion
(%
)
Candidate wealth quintile
Not facing serious cases Facing serious cases
Source: Vaishnav (2015)
3. Why do voters vote for criminal candidates?
Why is this man a success story?
Anant Singh, three-time member of the Bihar state assembly from Mokamaconstituency and well-known strongman
Criminality as credibility
The Bihar case
Source: Vaishnav (2015)
“Chhote Sarkar”
Mechanisms of credibility
• Redistribution– Willingness and ability to bend rules to skew
benefits to co-ethnic base
• Coercion– Ability to use reputation to coerce rivals in
context of multi-ethnic competition
• Social insurance– Capability to act as de facto social safety net
• Dispute resolution– Enhanced capacity to adjudicate disputes
Politics of dignity
Credibility grounded in politics of dignity and self-respect
Criminality as credibility
- “Anant Singh is not a murderer. He merely manages murder” (Interview with JD(U) party worker)
Source: Vaishnav (2015)
Uncovering support for criminal candidates
• “Would you vote for a candidate who delivers benefits to you even if s/he faces serious criminal cases?”
– 26% responded “Yes”
Source: Lok Foundation
Detecting social biases
• “Would you be troubled if a [Upper Caste/OBC/SC/other social group] candidate wins the election in your constituency?”
– 38% responded “Yes”
Source: Lok Foundation
Criminality & credibility
Source: Sircar and Vaishnav (2015)
4. What are the resulting policy implications?
Paradoxical Indian state
Over-bureaucratized
43
62
90
120
142
0
20
40
60
80
100
120
140
160
South Africa Russia China Brazil India
Ease
of
Do
ing
Bu
sin
ess
ran
kin
g
Source: World Bank
Under-manned
0
200
400
600
800
1000
1200
1400
1600
Ru
ssia
n F
eder
atio
n
Can
ada
Fran
ce
Un
ited
Kin
gdo
m
Ger
man
y
Un
ited
Sta
tes
Ital
y
Bra
zil
Ch
ina
Au
stra
lia
Arg
enti
na
Turk
ey
Mex
ico
Jap
an
Sau
di A
rab
ia
Sou
th A
fric
a
Ind
on
esia
Ind
ia
Pu
blic
em
plo
yee
s p
er
10
,00
0 r
esi
de
nts
Source: Vaishnav and Swanson (2013)
Rule of law “supply chain”
PoliceProsecutorsJudgesLaws
Rule of law “supply chain”
Laws
Outmoded laws
Apprentices Act, 1961; Beedi and Cigar Workers (Conditions of Employment) Act, 1966; Beedi Workers Welfare Cess Act, 1976; Beedi Workers Welfare Fund Act, 1976; Bonded Labour System (Abolition) Act, 1976; Child Labour (Prohibition and Regulation) Act, 1986; Children (Pledging of Labour) Act, 1933; Cine-Workers and Cinema Theatre Workers (Regulation of Employment) Act, 1981; Cine-Workers Welfare Cess Act, 1981; Cine-Workers Welfare Fund Act, 1981; Coal Mines Provident Fund and Miscellaneous Provisions Act, 1948; Contract Labour (Regulation and Abolition) Act, 1970; Dock Workers (Regulation of Employment) Act, 1948; Dock Workers (Safety, Health and Welfare) Act, 1986; Employees' Provident Funds and Miscellaneous Provisions Act, 1952; Employees' State Insurance Act, 1948; Employers' Liability Act, 1938; Employment Exchanges (Compulsory Notification of Vacancies) Act,1959; Equal Remuneration Act, 1976; Factories Act, 1948; Fatal Accidents Act, 1855; Industrial Disputes Act, 1947; Industrial Employment (Standing Orders) Act, 1946; Inter-State Migrant Workmen (Regulation of Employment and Conditions of Service) Act, 1979; Iron Ore Mines, Manganese Ore Mines and Chrome Ore Mines Labour Welfare Cess Act, 1976; Iron Ore Mines, Manganese Ore Mines and Chrome Ore Mines Labour Welfare Fund Act, 1976; Labour Laws (Exemption from Furnishing Returns and Maintaining Registers by Certain Establishments) Act, 1988; Limestone and Dolomite Mines Labour Welfare Fund Act, 1972; Maternity Benefit Act, 1961; Mica Mines Labour Welfare Fund Act, 1946; Mines Act, 1952; Minimum Wages Act, 1948; Motor Transport Workers Act, 1961; Payment of Bonus Act, 1965; Payment of Gratuity Act, 1972; Payment of Wages Act, 1936; Personal Injuries (Compensation Insurance) Act, 1963; Plantations Labour Act, 1951; Public Liability Insurance Act, 1991; Sales Promotion Employees (Conditions of Service) Act, 1976; Trade Unions Act, 1926; Weekly Holidays Act, 1942; Working Journalists and Other Newspaper Employees (Conditions of Service) and Miscellaneous Provisions Act, 1955; Working Journalists (Fixation of Rates of Wages) Act, 1958; Workmen's Compensation Act, 1923
Source: Bibek Debroy (n.d.)
Rule of law “supply chain”
JudgesLaws
Slow wheels of justice
27,000,000
28,000,000
29,000,000
30,000,000
31,000,000
32,000,000
33,000,000
2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013
Pe
nd
ing
Cas
es
(Su
pre
me
, Hig
h, a
nd
D
istr
ict/
Sub
ord
inat
e C
ou
rts)
Source: Supreme Court of India
Rule of law “supply chain”
ProsecutorsJudgesLaws
Politicized prosecutors
March 2007: CBI files
corruption case
July 2008: SP provides
support to UPA
December 2008: CBI withdraws
case
Spring 2011: seat-sharing spat for UP elections
March 2011: CBI reverses withdrawal
December 2012: SP
allows FDI retail bill
September 2013: CBI
closes case
?????
Rule of law “supply chain”
PoliceProsecutorsJudgesLaws
Police shortfalls
Source: Vaishnav and Swanson (2013)
Opaque political finance
534.99
1082.58
4368.75
Income from knowndonors
Income from otherknown sources
Income fromunknown sources
Source: ADR
Weeding out the rascals
• Criminal candidates make mockery of rule of law
• Proposals to disqualify candidates with serious cases
• Restricting candidate entry could violate the rule of law
• Hindering democracy to save it?
5. What are the lessons for democracy & accountability?
Bad politicians & accountability
Access to information
Ability to punish "bad" politicians
Democratic accountability
preserved
Voters armed with information
Provide support for "bad" politicians
Success of "partial"
accountability
The “governance” election
Is sunlight the best disinfectant?
Source: ADR
The “Robin Hood” phenomenon
http://www.carnegieendowment.org/vaishnav
Thank you!
@MilanV
