What works best in NGO-ODA Agency Partnerships in Promoting Development Goals?

“The Case of U.S. NGOs”

Asia Foundation Seminar

Seoul, October 17-18, 2011

Opportunities and Challenges in Development Assistance: US NGO Perspective

Professor Victor W. C. Hsu

KDI School of Public Policy and Management

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ACRONYMS

ACT Action by Churches Together

CARE Concerned Americans for Relief Everywhere

CEO Chief Executive Officer

CRS Catholic Relief Services

CSO Civil Society Organizations

DAC Development Action Committee

DFID Department for International Development, United Kingdom DIME Design Implementation Monitoring and Evaluation

DME Design, Monitoring and Evaluation

IE Impact Evaluation

INTRAC International Non-Governmental Organization Training and Research Centre

FANTA Food and Nutrition Network Technical Assistance

M&E Monitoring and Evaluation

MCC Millennium Challenge Corporation

MDG Millennium Development Goals

NGOs Non-Governmental Organizations

ODA Official Development Assistance

OECD Organization of Economic Cooperation in Development

PME Programme, Management and Evaluation

ROK Republic of Korea

SIDA Swedish International Development Agency

UNDP United Nations Development Programme

USAID United States Agency for International Development

WB World Bank

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ABSTRACT

NGOs are key actors in development assistance-related project implementation, fulfilling critical roles on the frontline of combating abject poverty and world hunger, and promoting MDG. They are universally recognized as skilled and cost-effective stakeholders in the long chain of aid effectiveness in ODA. While a handful of NGOs are doing their best to bring their managerial and operational procedures into alignment with the current emphasis on aid effectiveness, the overall reality is that NGOs face a complex set of internal and external challenges that have to be addressed. Factors that affect the ability of NGOs include: the expertise deficit, impossible managerial scope and demands, financial constraints, the three-year project cycle, the CNN Factor, limited host or local partner participation, cultural sensitivity gaps, managing for results: one size fits all, and NGO political image considerations. Donors must take into account the challenges that NGOs face on a routine basis and take appropriate steps to address them. It is in the interest of all stakeholders to get this right as soon as possible.

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DONORS AND NGOs

The Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), the World Bank (WB), and the Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs Department of International Development Cooperation all speak glowingly of NGOs.1 The 2009 OECD review of aid practices of Development Assistance Committee (DAC) members states that

“Partnerships with local NGOs and community-based organizations enable donors to reach out to otherwise inaccessible regions and excluded communities, and to deliver humanitarian assistance. This is because NGOs tend to work effectively with highly vulnerable groups and because their staff in partner countries is largely local. In situations where donors are obliged to suspend their own development assistance operations, working through NGOs is often the only option.”2 It goes on to say that NGOs “Offer official donors operational alternatives…. they are skilled in mobilizing grassroots communities and poor or marginalized people. They…. deliver services and programmes, and build coalitions and networks to co-ordinate civil society and enhance its impact.”3 The WB4 explains the critical NGO role in its NGO Policy designed mainly to guide its staff:

NGO involvement can contribute to the sustainability and effectiveness of Bank-financed projects by introducing innovative approaches and promoting community participation. NGOs can help expand project uptake and reach, and can facilitate greater awareness of diverse stakeholder views5 However, no government or multilateral institution is as explicit as the Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs Development Cooperation web site6 in identifying the essential role of NGOs in development assistance:

“Much of the actual development work on the ground is done not by governments but by NGOs. They are an important channel for the Dutch government. NGOs can fight poverty in countries where the Netherlands does not wish to work with the government, either because there is no government to approach (as in Somalia), or because the government pursues extremely bad policies. Another advantage of working with NGOs is that they often collaborate with local                                                                                                                          1 These agencies use a variety of terms such as civil society organization, non-governmental sector, or private voluntary organizations. 2 DAC/OECD. Managing Aid: Practices of DAC Member Countries (2009 Better Aid Series). 66. 3 Ibid. 4Appendix A, Retrieved from http://www.gdrc.org/ngo/wb-ngos.html  5Appendix A 6From http://www.minbuza.nl/en/Key_Topics/Development_Cooperation/Partners_in_Development/Support_via _Non_Governmental_Organizations.

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partners, who know the needs of the local population and are familiar with their culture. This kind of expertise is essential if projects are to lead to a reduction in poverty in the long term.”

Despite these glowing words about the role of NGOs by governments and by multilateral institutions, NGO involvement in official development assistance (ODA) projects remains highly challenged by a complex set of factors.

USAID AND DONOR AID POLICY7

NGOs based in the United States receive their ODA8 funds primarily from the USAID whose funding policies and reporting requirements are consistent with their counterparts across the Atlantic. During the stewardship (2001-2004) of its Administrator, Andrew Natsios, USAID enunciated new policies forbidding the use of funds by organizations known to be working against US foreign policy interests or whose activities lend support to terrorist groups. In the main, US NGOs with their international reach still have to comply with the DME standards set by USAID.

Since its inception, USAID has always regarded development assistance to be part of its national security strategy. Within this framework, it identifies five ODA engagement priorities:

- supporting transformational development

- strengthening fragile states

- supporting US geostrategic interests

- addressing transnational problems

- providing humanitarian relief

For USAID, NGOs are crucial implementing partners and fund their field work via grants, cooperative agreements and contracts. Many are classified under 501(c) status and are tax-exempt. They include research institutes and faith-based private organizations. Those most US NGO’s do not bid on USAID contracts, those who do may obtain Indefinite Quality Contracts (IQCs) and subcontract for goods, works and services. The IQCs normally carry multi-year, multi-million dollar arrangements that lend themselves to joint partnerships with considerable opportunities for creative and productive activity. USAID regards this instrument as a convenient, flexible and quick mechanism for deploying expertise in projects

                                                                                                                         7 For a comparison of major agencies, see APPENDIX B 8  In 2008, US ODA was US$ 22 billion.  

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However, NGOs may seek funding through grants and cooperative agreements. Grants do not entail direct USAID participation in the project while cooperative agreements require some level of USAID involvement.

Most if not all DAC member countries include in their ODA budget, items to support NGOs’ development-related activities. Most of the funds go to national NGOs. Between 2005 and 2006, 5.2% of total bilateral ODA from all DAC member countries went to or through NGOs, ranging from 0.4% to 19.5% for individual donors.9

There are clearly stated objectives and expectations in government partnerships with NGOs. These include enhancing aid effectiveness and accountability through capacity building in DME, and increasing the breadth and depth of partnership within civil society at local and national levels and advocacy. The channel of support for NGOs is instructive. The Netherlands, Sweden and the United Kingdom all require that their NGO partners have similar goals and aspirations to those of the governments in development assistance. In that sense, to qualify for grants, NGOs must be what SIDA has defined as “framework organizations.”10 Australia’s Agency for International Development requires an accreditation process as well.

NGO GROUPS’ RESPONSE TO AID EFFECTIVENESS

The March 2, 2005 Paris Declaration on aid effectiveness called for harmonization, alignment and managing aid for results with a set of monitorable actions and indicators. Three and a half years later, donors and developing country governments and an unprecedented number of NGOs gathered in Accra for the Third High Level Forum to review progress in achieving the goals for aid reform. They called for joint progress toward enhanced aid effectiveness that, inter alia, emphasized:

1. Results and results based evaluation, and 2. Mutual accountability for development results by both donors and partners.

To accelerate progress in these areas, Accra also outlined two key additional steps: donors will provide 3-5 year forward information on their planned aid, and use partner country systems rather than their own donor to deliver aid as the first option11. These are significant steps taken by the international community to improve the existing practice in ODA and other bilateral development assistance mechanisms. Whether they will generate a positive difference in NGO IE methodology and process is unclear. What they have done so far

                                                                                                                         9 DAC/OECD. Managing Aid. 181. 10  Ibid., SIDA. 11 According to the 2008 Report by Reality of Aid Organization, Aid Effectiveness and Democratic Human Rights, only 52% of donors are following these two recommendations.

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is to put NGOs on notice that their partnerships with governments and multilateral institutions oblige them to give IE their top priority.

With regard to how the NGOs are responding to the donor interest in aid effectiveness, accountability, two major NGO organizations are to be noted: InterAction12 in the USA and ACT Alliance13 in Geneva, Switzerland. Both have working groups on IE. The purpose of these groups is to encourage their members to be aware of the existing IE practice in the NGO community and to offer technical help to those interested in becoming engaged.

Among InterAction's mandates is to support member organizations’ capability to conduct programming that meets and exceeds internal self-certification standards for quality and effectiveness. This is done through working together to strengthen M&E capacities through experience and resource sharing, as well as opportunities to work with outside experts. The rationale for this endeavor is stated as:

When integrated deliberately into our work and conducted with appropriate rigor, M&E supports learning and quality improvement at an intervention, program or sector level, for a population or area, as well as for an organization itself. Tracking and assessing our work allows us to make crucial improvements to our performance and offers invaluable assurance to our partners that their collaboration with us produces positive change….. InterAction’s Evaluation and Program Effectiveness Working Group (EPEWG) is dedicated to building NGO monitoring and evaluation capacity, and is currently focused on NGO accountability, impact evaluation and advocacy evaluation. The working group also informs advocacy initiatives to influence the U.S. and global aid effectiveness discourse.14

InterAction member organizations share common commitments and standards that define their work and their InterAction engagement. They seek to

• Foster economic and social development • Provide relief to those affected by disaster and conflicts • Assist refugees and internally displaced • Press for more equitable, just and effective public policies • Support gender equity • Protect environment • Advance human rights • Address population concerns

                                                                                                                         12 Largest alliance of over 190 USA-based international NGOs. 13 It has more than 100 member organizations who work in 130 countries. 14 Retrieved from http://www.interaction.org

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InterAction members in 2009 enjoyed a total funding of about US$13 billion. They have begun to engage Busan’s aid effectiveness agenda in the Aid Effectiveness Working Group set up already in 2007. The AEWG agenda includes

• Evaluation and program effectiveness • Foreign assistance reform, and • Food security and agriculture.

InterAction is represented on Better Aid Coalition and DAC Working Party on Effectiveness. It is also organizing a US Open Forum consultation and is holding roundtable sessions with USAID and the Department of State in run-up to Busan on key issues. InterAction members base their consultation with the USAID and multilateral agencies on the following principles :

1) Strive for positive results and do no harm 2) Utilize a rights-based approach to development 3) Promote gender equality and women’s rights 4) Ensure full, fair and inclusive participation and ownership by primary stakeholders in

development initiatives 5) Foster and practice mutually respectful and equitable partnerships 6) Strengthen capacity for local ownership and leadership of development activities 7) Amplify voices of the poor and marginalized in the U.S. and globally 8) Innovate, adapt and learn 9) Be transparent 10) Be accountable 11) Promote ecological justice and environmental stewardship throughout all activities 12) Strive to achieve sustainable impact and results

US GOVERNMENT AGENCIES EVALUATED

As followup to the Third High Level Forum, US NGOs initiated a process of consultation and evaluation of the following agencies and Departments:

• US Agency for International Development • Department of State • Millennium Challenge Corporation • Department of Labor, Bureau for International Labor Affairs • Department of Agriculture • Department of Health and Human Services • Department of Treasury, Office of Technical Assistance

Among the main findings of this serious engagement, are that the Administration should

• Improve co-ordination among its more than two dozen government departments to promote coherence in its multibillion-dollar foreign aid program and avoid duplication;

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• Strengthen public support for the aid program through more targeted efforts to communicate results; and

• Engage more strategically with diverse civil society coalitions “both at the policy and implementation levels “ as “ these are instrumental both in advocating and raising public awareness for development and in implementing the aid program.”

The evaluation also noted progress in these areas:

• Leadership: Administration commitment to the Paris Declaration & Accra Agenda for Action; Presidential Directive on Development;

• Quadrennial Diplomacy and Development Review • USAID Forward (e.g. procurement reform & human resource capacity) • Transparency and Information sharing (Foreign Assistance Dashboard)

Among the challenges noted:

• Financial constraints and political context; • Access vs. Influence; • Risk of blurring lines between development, foreign policy and security; • Moving from ideas to action; • Leadership, communication and institutionalizing change; and • US policy implementation lags--lack of consultation on key initiatives

HEALTH SECTOR: PRIMARYFOCUS OF US NGO

Almost 80% of the US NGOs involvement are in the area of health. The following are three examples of the implementation methodology.

1. Tackling Children’s Health and Diseases in the Democratic Republic of Congo15 2. Maternal and Child Health Program in Nicaragua16 3. Meeting the Challenges of HIV/AIDS affected Orphans and Children in South Africa17

SYNERGY IN NGO-GOVERNMNT COLLABORATION

There are positive aspects of implementing a government funded-assistance program. First and foremost, the funding can be quite significant in size as well as stability. Government donors have much larger resources than private donors and can award grants quickly in large sums in the cases of emergencies – such as the tsunami of 2005. In natural disasters, government funds are quickly made available which allows the NGO to focus resources on meeting immediate needs, rather than on raising funds. For some programs, for example, Mercy Corps is awarded a grant to implement Multi-Year Assistance Program (MYAP) which helps it to focus on implementing an                                                                                                                          15 Retrieved from http://www.crs.org (APPENDIX C)  16  Ibid. (APPENDIX D)  17  Ibid. (APPENDIX E)

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effective program and not worry about the funding or budget as the donor-government commits the funds up front for the lifetime of the project. Mercy Corps is implementing a 5-year program worth $100 million in the Gaza Strip. With such a long term commitment by the USG for funding the NGO can insure locally hired staff as well as the beneficiaries that they can expect some stability in a very difficult environment.

Even with Single Year Assistance Programs (SYAPs) the NGO is able to insure funding, (just not for as long of a time) and the SYAPs are generally focused on a program that would not take more than a year to implement. 18

Moreover, there is great possibility of synergy in working with ODA as the resources of the donor nation can be tremendously empowering. A five year $100 million grant can propel an agency into making a tremendous social impact on the lives of thousands, if not millions of people AND such a large size grant can empower synergistic relationships amongst multiple NGOs, the donor and the beneficiary country. For example, in 2008 the USG awarded a one year grant to a group of 5 USNGOs to implement a food program in DPRK. Mercy Corps and World Vision co-lead the consortium of USNGOs and brought 16 full time staff into DPRK (many of whom spoke Korean). The synergy of these agencies working together made a huge impact on each organization, but most importantly on their ability to have an expanded reach into meeting the needs of the 895,000 people that received food on a monthly basis in North Pyongan and Chaggang Provinces under the aegis of these 5 agencies.

Synergy is the result of visionary leaders finding a way to leverage their resources into expanded capacity. Over the last 15 years, as NGOs have become partners with their donors, they are finding ways to maximize their impact to their beneficiaries, which usually means involving the strengths of others, who just might happen to work for other NGOs, organizations, agencies or governments.

For Samaritan’s Purse19, it said that in DPRK recent assessments had observed (and confirmed by the WFP) significant malnutrition in under 5 year-old children, putting the number of persons at risk for serious food insecurity at 6 million. Response at this level of magnitude can only be addressed by a state donor with the resources to contribution such large amounts of food and logistical expenses. Such a food program supported by ODA requires significant monitoring to insure the food is distributed to the targeted beneficiaries. This monitoring in turn no only verifies distribution but provides access to institutions, households, and systems to learn more about the food security situation. DPRK is extremely difficult to access and getting accurate nutritional and food security information is even harder to obtain. Only through the provision of large scale food assistance supported by ODA, either bilaterally or multilaterally, when used in conjunction with a thoughtful and mutually agreed upon monitoring regiment, can the scope of the need be addressed while also using the opportunity to better understand the widespread needs of the people happen. Consequently other subjects such as market research, livelihood systems, and approaches to domestic trade can be better understood in time.

                                                                                                                         18  Author’s email interview  19  Author’s email interview.  

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SUCCESSFUL CASE STUDY Myanmar - May 2009

For unknown reasons, few successful NGO projects are publicized. The reason may very well be that media do not focus or thrive on post-disaster rehabilitation coverage. The following case is one of those rare instances which exemplify NGO expertise, commitment and best practice. It demonstrates dramatic changes for the better in disaster preparedness for Myanmar in both the private and the public sector. The Disaster Response and Resilience Learning Project was developed by Save the Children to enhance humanitarian capacity following Cyclone Nargis. In the hours and days following Cyclone Nargis - which hit Myanmar on May 3rd, 2008 with 200km per hour winds and tidal surges of up to 4 meters high – thousands of Myanmar staff and volunteers from local and international NGOs and civil society organizations sprang to action, urgently addressing the immediate, life-saving needs among the estimated 2.4 million people affected by the disaster. Hampered by torrential rains, lack of communication technology, and limited or no prior experience working in an emergency, national staff and volunteers mounted a tremendous response effort, supporting people across the affected area, often in remote areas, accessible only by boat, motorbike or on foot. Developed as an inter-agency initiative, the project implementation phase from March to October 2009 targeted 480 staff working with humanitarian organizations - ranging from small and community-based to large and international – to increase learning of concepts and principles related to humanitarian work, including DRR, disaster response, accountability and international standards. The project was implemented in twelve cyclone-affected townships in Yangon and Ayeyarwady Divisions, selected for their spread across the cyclone-affected area and the proportion of both local and international organizations in operation. Funding for the project was been provided by the Danish International Development Agency (DANIDA) and the Disasters Emergency Committee (DEC) in the UK. However, the IA RTE also pointed out that, “many lessons learnt from earlier humanitarian responses were re-learned after the cyclone, something that could potentially have been reduced if more experienced emergency responders had been involved from the outset.” The project team is comprised of 1 international Project Manager, and 3 national staff in the roles of Learning & Development Manager, Learning Assessment Officer, and Project Assistant, with complementary skills and experience in project management, humanitarian work, HR and capacity building. A steering committee was formed with 10 members representing Myanmar NGOs (MNGOs), International NGOs (INGOs) and local capacity building and networking organizations to provide feedback, advice, direction, recommendations and support which increased the ability of the project staff to develop appropriate approaches and activities. IDENTIFYING NEEDS A learning needs assessment was carried out by project staff in order to identify the learning

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needs and preferences of field-level humanitarian staff working on the Cyclone Nargis response. Eighty-three (83) respondents from MNGOs and INGOs in 2 cyclone-affected townships completed a survey, providing important information which directly informed the objectives and approach of the project. From the survey it was evident that a great desire existed among the field-level humanitarian staff to increase their knowledge on a wide range of topics and to enhance their professional development. The challenge presented was therefore how to engage a large number of people from different organizations in a comprehensive learning process that would build upon their practical experience with minimal time away from their responsibilities on the response (thereby providing the opportunity for the interventions to be utilized in early response phases of future emergencies). The project’s innovative learning approach emphasized field-level focus and location. This met the specific needs of staff required during a response operation, ensuring immediate relevance and transferability to operational field work, and alleviating the time required to travel to HQ locations. Then the program included a self-directed, work-based learning process requiring commitment and self-discipline to link the resources and information provided to practical experience. Finally there was strong peer support to encourage staff to learn through their shared experiences and to utilize local networks for ongoing support. Save the Children and its donors can be justifiably proud of having successfully carried out a project that is specific, monitorable, aligned, realistic and time-bound. The people of Myanmar now enjoy a cadre of well-trained professionals for future disaster response. CHALLENGES TO NGO OPERATIONAL REALITY20

International NGOs engaged in development assistance face multiple challenges already. These are well documented in many studies.21 Among the top 10 international NGOs five are based in the United States, four in the United Kingdom and one in South Africa.22 Even with systems and structures in place, NGOs encounter issues which impinge on their performance and accountability. Therefore, to address the inadequacies in the NGO performance, it is important to understand the various internal and external factors which serve as obstacles to overcome if they are to integrate donor requirements into their activities. Anecdotal review of NGO’s representatives indicates that IE is rarely an integral part of the project reporting process of DME.

A. Expertise Deficit

                                                                                                                         20  Most of this section has been taken and modified from the author’s presentation to the 2010 KDI International Conference on Economic Development and Impact Evaluation, November 2010 in Seoul, South Korea. 21 Perhaps the most notable is John Degngol-Martinussen and Poul Engberg-Pedersen, Aid: Understanding International Development Cooperation. (London and New York: Zed Books, 2003.) 22  Based on a 2007 study by Homi Kharas, New Reality of Aid, Brookings Institution.

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If NGOs lack professional know-how, it does not mean that systems are not in place. In fact, NGOs have their own project manuals with detailed designing and monitoring tools23. There are also consulting firms such as American Evaluation Association and Food and Nutrition Technical Assistance (FANTA-2) which offer NGOs a variety of technical services. NGOs’ own associations such as InterAction and ACT Alliance in Geneva, Switzerland can also facilitate socializing and engagement in DME.

An indication of a general problem is that NGO handbooks have to include simple, detailed “how to” instructions. The level of expertise or understanding of the staff will determine whether they are given "How to set up M&E systems for beginners" or "How to tackle different M&E system issues for advanced staff." This is true today in such well-established “development” NGOs as World Vision, Mercy Corps, CARE or Oxfam. However, manuals from some agencies such as UNDP and USAID do provide detailed instructions which are helpful for their own experienced staff as well as trained NGO representatives in the use of the tools.

To meet aid effectiveness concerns by donors, there is now an increasing tendency among NGOs to send their own “professionals” from headquarters to train and upgrade their staff capacity in the field. They place emphasis on technical, operational and managerial know how. Development workers of yesteryears are now specialists in capacity building. However, they are not impact evaluation specialists, at least not yet and not until the organization makes IE an integral part of DIME.

B. Impossible Managerial Scope and Demands

In an attempt to be thorough and comprehensive, the donor manuals for DIME tend to be overwhelming for NGOs who have, as noted, few dedicated staff in this role. A big NGO like World Vision does try to encourage its programme staff to develop expertise in using the appropriate tools through orientation and training sessions. Still, it is not mandated for administrative and financial reasons, so the performance across its offices in over one hundred countries is uneven. As for Mercy Corps, which developed its DME Manual in 2005, it still does not have the required resources to ensure that all its offices around the world fulfill this expectation as a matter of priority or on a routine basis. In fact, most NGOs do not have any DME manuals and have not viewed producing them to be a necessity. To add IE to the NGO routine would require that NGOs make it a top priority as part of their programme, systems and structures.

Additionally, in order to work with government donors, any NGO must be willing to deal with an incredible amount of bureaucracy and paperwork. There are strict rules about accounting, financial records, reporting, auditing, that accompany any “donation” from the USG, EU, etc. It                                                                                                                          23  See especially World Vision International websites.  

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can take years for an NGO to become certified to receive funds from the USG as these rules are so bureaucratic. For some NGOs they have decided the paperwork and restrictions that accompany government funds are not worth it. Others, like Mercy Corps, have found a way to make a partnership mutually beneficial.

C. Financial Constraint

The most serious contributing factor is the lack of funds, due in large part to donor reluctance to provide for such administrative costs. This is ironic. In recent years, donors have opted for NGO implementation of programmes because they are “cheap” in comparison to other alternatives. NGOs too pride themselves in low overhead costs and use this as a fundraising edge. In the United States, there is a volunteer watchdog that annually ranks non-profit organizations and NGOs according to their overhead spending.24 All donor agencies also set a percentage ceiling for the amount that an NGO can allocate for project implementation personnel.25 This reality hits donor requirements in several ways:

• Limited staff are assigned to monitor the organization’s performance in meeting donor requirements in programme implementation and reporting.

• Capacity training funds to equip staff are insufficient or unavailable. • IE that is performed is inadequate and of limited use. • IE becomes deemphasized in the DIME chain.

When financial constraint limits impact evaluation of government funded activities and projects, it goes without saying that the NGOs’ privately supported projects tend to suffer an even more severe fate in terms of IE. When NGOs operate on a restricted budget and fail to include an IE component, it can be a serious and costly omission. Having adequate funds will go a long way towards redressing the current performance deficit on the part of NGOs. This can be accomplished either by specifically IE designated funds in the grant or by allowing NGOs to take IE expenses out of the project grant as part of the project cost. It is highly unlikely that NGOs will be able to obtain private donor contributions to IE activities.

D. The Three-Year Project Cycle

The normal duration for a donor funded project is three years. The three-year period coincides with the tenure of assignment of Foreign Service officials in many countries including those with responsibilities for overseeing their countries’ relationships with NGOs or civil society. NGOs without a national office in the country in which the project is being implemented are also

                                                                                                                         24 This ranking is publicized in various national magazines such as Money and is available on the Internet. 25 The acceptable percentage is about 25% of the total cost of the programme.    

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subject to a time-consuming process of startup which easily cuts into the project period. The three-year project cycle presents several challenges in meeting donor demands.

• Often there is no provision for post project evaluation. • In development assistance sometimes three years is too short a period because it takes

time to set up the project with the donor and the requisite administrative infrastructure with the recipient country.

• It also may take more time for the project to create a real impact. • The integrity of IE is affected by donor or NGO staff turnover. Since the oversight staff

tends to be small, any staffing change easily affects the planning for DIME or the IE process already underway.

E. The CNN Factor

It is well known that in a dire situation of need, NGOs tend to become overly enthusiastic about becoming involved, without doing the requisite planning and feasibility study for their intervention. While established NGOs tend to avoid such an operational trap, it has not been successfully resisted in many cases. The most glaring recent example of such excessive enthusiasm was the Haiti intervention following the devastating earthquake of January 2010. Almost without exception, NGOs “promised the moon” to their donors about their disaster relief program in Haiti. Today, some 10 months later, few are able to operate effectively according to the plans and time lines they laid out at the outset of the crisis26. While NGOs will defend their modus operandi of taking advantage of the so-called CNN factor, i.e. raising funds when the media are covering the crisis, the critical issue of their accountability to the Haitian people remains. This accountability cannot be “excused” by the problems on the ground, which should have been foreseen. Moreover, years of experience should have warned the NGOs that this poorest country in the Western Hemisphere, with inadequate transportation infrastructure, would not be able to accommodate large-scale intervention by land, air, or sea.

Rushing into relief operations can result in poorly negotiated contracts with local stakeholders. Given the trend that relief operations often turn into development assistance, a bad contract that lacks safeguards can be costly in terms of resources and time. Conflict with local stakeholders and partners can ensue, leading to accusations of bad faith and ultimately exit from the community if not the country.

                                                                                                                         26 CNN and the New York Times did a special 6-month review in July. They documented that few NGOs or multilateral agencies were able to carry out their relief activities and that most of the funds promised by governments were still not received by the Haiti Recovery Commission.

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No credible IE can result from poorly planned interventions. Special attention must be given to this factor by donors, given the number of emergencies which occur every year and the enormous amount of NGO interventions generated.

F. Limited Host or Local Partner Participation

Another set of operational constraints is the limited participation of the indigenous or local community in project implementation. Without the full involvement of the hosts, or if the latter are involved in project implementation alone, it is hard to imagine an IE process that can proceed effectively. This is especially true in situations where the NGO is not an established presence known to the local population. In determining whether a particular project has had a profound impact on the population, a wide sampling of the community is often required. In a remote area this task may not be accomplished without cultural sensitivity and knowledge of the local language. A NGO is usually perceived as a foreign organization which has entered the community to do good work. In other situations, after a prolonged presence, when the NGO staff still do not speak the local language and the senior staff are all expats, they perpetuate the notion that the local hosts are not qualified or to be trusted. Such a perception will impede the involvement of local hosts or partners and can create misunderstanding about how the evaluation is to be conducted. To minimize such a possibility, local partners should be involved in DME.

Julie Fisher’s book, The Road from Rio: Sustainable Development and the Non-governmental Movement in the Third World, documented the disastrous failures of development projects (and therefore wasted resources) that ignored local participation. These failures had been cited in the WB’s own reports. The reasons for limiting or excluding local participation are usually two-fold: on one hand, the lack of “expertise,” and the high cost to the implementation agency on the other.

I would note that no development project can be sustainable without local ownership of the initiative. Ownership is hard to achieve without involvement. Furthermore, this ownership cannot be limited only to national government leadership or national ministries. The local communities most affected by development policies must have ownership over them, by being consulted not only about such policies but also about how they should be implemented and evaluated. In linking aid to national development strategies, based on Accra’s recommendations, donors must help ensure that recipient countries develop strategies that will encourage local ownership.

G. Cultural Sensitivity Gap

Closely related to the local participation issue is that of cultural sensitivity. It is instructive in this regard to note the relatively successful international intervention to manage the HIV/AIDS crisis. The Global Fund has demonstrated in several African countries that international efforts

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in dealing with this pandemic would not have been as successful without the combined dedication of local, national, and international NGOs.

Local NGOs are critical in ensuring that government and civil society factor into their intervention the local population’s cultural practices. The extent to which information and efforts to change behavior are tailored to the cultural beliefs of the local population can make or break a development project. Development programmes with focus on knowledge, attitude and behavior, cannot have fundamental impact if psychological components of attitude development and change within a given cultural context are ignored at the design stage. International NGOs with national and local counterparts have the advantage of input and feedback from their local affiliates in designing culturally appropriate programs. This input must form an essential component of IE.

Cultural sensitivity and cultural relevance are particularly important where matters of health and welfare are concerned. In fact, an ethnic group’s response to illness, tragedy, natural disaster, or up-rootedness is embedded in its cultural and religious beliefs and practices. Aid workers in Aceh, Indonesia re-discovered this phenomenon in the 2004 Indian Ocean tsunami. The Aceh population was not willing to be mass relocated beyond their ancestor homes, nor did they assent to large-scale reconstruction of their land, unless proper respect was accorded to their deities in the relocation process.

The NGO section in the Global Policy Forum website carries an instructive story about the importance of understanding local culture in Ghana during the mass exodus of Ghanaians from Nigeria in the l980s. International NGO personnel arriving on the scene to dispense humanitarian aid were surprised at the lack of relief camps at the border. They had brought in supplies and equipment generally found to be essential in such camps. They were unaware that the government had put in place a plan for transporting these incoming refugees immediately to their hometown or location of ethnic origin, given the existence of a strong extended family system in the country. The government’s plan thus avoided the hardship and squalor usually associated with emergency squatter arrangements, and placed the initial responsibility for resettlement on the returnees’ families and community.

The NGOs were forced to re-evaluate the role they needed to play in this cultural context.

Furthermore, in multiethnic societies, ethnic competition and rivalry may affect the operational environment. If the NGO is ignorant of the local context, it can be manipulated in terms of choice of location and local partners by a government agency whose staff may have invested self-interest in guiding the NGO in the choice of project location or project implementation personnel. Such a situation will inevitably affect the IE of that project.

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H. Managing for Results: One Size Fits All

The professionalization of NGOs and the emphasis on accountability and effectiveness are putting pressure on NGOs’ management. And in the interest of alignment and harmonization, NGO administrative and operational manuals give the strong impression that they operate on one set of managerial and implementation tools. This is enforced by the standardization of staff performance appraisal.27 NGO CEOs will acknowledge that they have a responsibility to ensure that the services provided are suitable to the population being served, and that no “one size fits all” approach is to be used as a model. Nevertheless, a serious adverse effect of harmonization as put forth by donor policy and practice is to reinforce the donor as the principal arbiter of aid policy. NGO CEOs will inevitably arrange and harmonize their operational model accordingly. To comply with such concerns by donors, there is an increasing tendency among NGOs to send their own “professionals” from headquarters to train their staff in the field to perform functions with a view to aid effectiveness. They place emphasis on technical managerial know how. Whether these managerial procedures are effective and actually lead to poverty reduction becomes a secondary concern.

Furthermore, it is almost irresistible to NGOs to replicate administrative and managerial models. To be sure, given the oft repeated criticism of NGOs’ laissez-faire attitude, there are indeed advantages for NGOs to become more professional and business-like in their management. In the main, the merits outweigh the disadvantages. However, the author contends that such an approach makes more sense in a national context and that it is fraught with pitfalls for international NGOs. Rationalization and organizational alignment do make sense, but DME and IE cannot be smooth, efficient or accountable if local realities and context are willfully ignored. This would be an inexcusable, costly mistake given the long experience of development assistance since World War II.

The expectation that NGOs should be in alignment with the bureaucratization and formalization that have taken place or are happening among donors means that NGOs have to abide by set procedures, or use specific formats starting with the grant application. These are so burdensome and require such particular expertise that NGOs tend to outsource these tasks, or employ former staff of governmental agencies for the onerous responsibilities.

The pressures of accountability and effectiveness have also created a climate in which national problems are broken down into small projects. This reality tends to prevent NGOs from working on a broad strategy of accomplishing maximum fundamental impact in poverty alleviation. The shifting donor priorities (e.g. moving to concentrate on climate change from the unfinished battle to conquer TB, malaria, or HIV/AIDS) not only add agenda but also divert efforts to root out

                                                                                                                         27 Pranov Gupta’s presentation in 2004 on “What Makes a Good NGO” had a profound impact on NGOs’ management of their partnerships with foreign aid. Gupta’s organization grades NGO performance according to its set of common indicators.

19      

poverty, the original purpose of ODA. This is true for the entire aid community and not just among NGOs. IE in such a context may be perceived to be superfluous.

In their comprehensive study on the role of NGOs in international development cooperation, John Degngol-Martinussen and Poul Engberg-Pedersen drew four important conclusions:28

1. When everything is taken into consideration— the size of the problems, the costs etc. – Danish NGOs have done a good job for the immediate benefits of poor target groups and strengthening of partner organizations.

2. NGOs’ own documentation of achieved results, however, is weak and too narrowly linked to immediate goals. The organizations have done too little to investigate and document things that have functioned well.

3. NGOs had often not been able to plan work strategically and innovatively. They were inclined to do things in the usual way.

4. Efforts were generally too modest to create visible change in society for the lasting benefit of target groups, but it is possible that the Danish organizations had actually contributed to such a development.29

Even though the study is based on Danish NGOs, it reconfirms previous studies by DAC in 1997. The conclusions ring true even today. The performance inadequacies in # 2-4 summarize the NGO realities that donors must take into account in setting the parameters and requirements.

I. NGO Political Image Considerations The final issue is NGO hesitation to participate in ODA or to enter into any agreement with donors for development assistance. Donors appreciate the role of NGOs because of their access, skills and the overall cost effectiveness of their operations. Yet the number of NGOs who enter into contractual agreements with governments or multilateral agencies to tackle MDGs is not as many as might be expected. This is extremely regrettable, given their ability to access and mobilize communities at the frontline of the MDG battle! Indeed if the MDG goals are to be met, to use a military metaphor, many more frontline troops are necessary to wage a successful war against poverty. Donors must play their part to facilitate. Nowhere is this facilitation more necessary than in addressing the perception that donors are biased in favor of established NGOs and are not sufficiently transparent in the grant award process. Donors tend to allow institutional inertia to set in rather than taking steps to partner with the increasing number of NGOs from Asia, Africa and Latin America which have organized themselves impressively to take on fairly large-scale projects nationally. International NGOs with national offices and branches in these regions may be aware of them but they may be reluctant to encourage these Southern NGOs to compete for a                                                                                                                          28 Aid: Understanding International Development Cooperation. (London and New York: Zed Books, 2003), 161. 29 The results of the study assessing the impact of DANIDA’s support to Danish NGOs are available from http://www.um.dk/danida/ngoimpact/synthese_eng.

20      

shrinking aid pie. These Southern NGOs may raise the issue of whether donors are interested in more progressive aid delivery that they believe they exemplify.

Donors must also be sensitive to the fact that the competition for aid money has led to ill will among new Southern NGOs. They feel they are not trusted by aid agencies due to outdated perceptions about their lack of expertise, poor management and bureaucratization. They strongly suspect, too, that in the course of routine interaction with donors, traditionally established NGOs tend to reinforce such donor perspectives about them. The climate of distrust and suspicion due largely to limited involvement or exclusion will harm the IE process and raise questions about the credibility of the evaluation outcome.

According Samaritan’s Purse, though humanitarian assistance is supposed to be “non-political,” it is in fact always linked to strategic and political overtones or issues. No one in governments likes to acknowledge this but the linkage in fact exists. ODA, while strongly needed in large scale situations which eclipse popular and immediate appeal, addresses more strategic problems. NGOs can raise money for emergencies or easily defined items, but development assistance takes significant resources and a longer term view. This requires a resource stream of ODA and that fact then bring into the picture the pre-existing political tensions and histories between the parties. If the ODA is administered through NGOs then those groups will often find themselves caught up in tensions they may or may not know to have existed. This then requires the NGO to act as a “front man” to each state player. The state players, both the ODA donor and recipient countries, can conveniently use the NGO as an agent to communicate and signal the other side when they would not engage directly on the same issues. It is impossible to delink ODA from political atmospherics in politically harsh environments.30

Finally, according to Mercy Corps, in some cases, working with government donors, NGOs must be careful not to become tools of a political agenda. For example there are several grants that we have refused to apply for when the donor-country has made it clear that the grant comes with strings attached which would affect the neutrality of our agency. In Yemen, Mercy Corps refused to apply for a very large grant because it would have required the NGO to coordinate some of its program activities in such a way that supports a military agenda, which is outside the boundaries of neutrality. As a humanitarian agency Mercy Corps seeks to meet the immediate needs of suffering people, and not necessarily implementing changes in the political environment which may have contributed to the suffering.31

Some western governments offer grants to organizations that will work for democratic change in Iran; however any NGO that accepts the award would immediately jeopardize its ability to work in Iran because it is now clearly working on behalf of a western government for democratic change.

BEST PRACTICE

                                                                                                                         30  Author’s email interview 31  Author’s email interview

21      

It is difficult to summarize the NGO best practice in fighting poverty or in implementing ODA. More and more NGOs have evolved from primarily service delivery organization to becoming concerned with the promotion and defense of human rights and are using a rights based approach to sustainable development. The range of development work carried out by NGOs, governments and multilateral organizations has a broad spectrum from large infrastructure projects such as building dams using World Bank funds to delivering emergency supplies such as food, water and medicines, and providing essential services such as education. Today more and more NGOs are involved in campaigning for national or international change on behalf of poor people, helping people to stand up for their own rights and demand local, national or international change, and increasing participation of poor and marginalized communities. The strategies include: 1. Giving a voice to all. Everyone has the same basic rights to potable water, food, education, shelter, healthcare, information and a life of dignity, but poor people are often disproportionately denied these rights. Provide people the goods, services, knowledge and abilities they need to improve their lives. Once the basics are in place it is then possible to build the skills, knowledge and organizational support that people need if lasting improvements are going to happen. 2. Networking and coalition building. Enable partnerships with local organizations because they know what communities really need. Linking together people and organizations with common goals allows shared learning and increases the impact of advocacy. 3. Influencing the corridors of power through national and international campaigning. Working in poor communities will not have much impact in the long-term unless the conditions that keep people poor can also be changed. There must be policy changes by governments from the national to the village levels, and from the national to the international stage. 4. Equal rights for women. It is well accepted that women are more likely to be poor than men due to their lower status and lack of power. Development work must ensure that women’s burdens are lightened.

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APPENDIX A

A Practical Guide to Operational Collaboration between the World Bank and Non-Governmental Organizations

I. INTRODUCTION

• NGO is a broad term encompassing a wide array of diverse organizations. • The World Bank defines NGOs as "private organizations that pursue activities to

relieve suffering, promote the interests of the poor, protect the environment, provide basic social services or undertake community development."

• The World Bank collaborates with CBOs, national and international NGOs in a variety of different ways.

• Achieving the full potential benefits of NGO involvement implies enhanced roles for NGOs earlier on in the project cycle.

II. WHY THE WORLD BANK WORKS WITH NGOS

• NGO involvement can contribute to the sustainability and effectiveness of Bank-financed projects by introducing innovative approaches and promoting community participation.

• NGOs can help expand project uptake and reach, and can facilitate greater awareness of diverse stakeholder views.

III. HOW THE WORLD BANK WORKS WITH NGOS

• NGOs are active contributors to the Bank's economic and sector work (ESW) and participate in lending activities from identification through to evaluation.

• Currently, NGO involvement is most frequent during implementation. Evidence shows, however, that NGOs can provide particularly valuable input during project identification and design.

• Where NGOs are expected to participate in implementation, they should also be consulted during design.

IV. KEY ISSUES IN WORKING WITH NGOS

A. Identifying an appropriate NGO partner

• Selecting an appropriate NGO partner involves: i) gathering information about the NGO sector; ii) establishing relevant selection criteria; and iii) choosing a suitable selection process.

• Clear selection criteria should be established based on specific project needs.

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• Organizational capacity should be assessed according to an NGO's proven track record, not its stated goals.

• It is important to identify "capacity-building" needs and strategies. • Maximum transparency should be ensured in the selection process.

B. Time issues

• Be prepared for possible extra staff/time needs early on in the project cycle. • Be aware of potential time lags/delays and the risk they pose to participatory

processes. • Ensure NGOs have an adequate understanding of project time-frame and

deadlines.

C. Flexibility issues

• Seek NGO/community input early on in the project cycle. • Establish clear mechanisms for responding to local views and needs. • Use mid-term review process to adapt project priorities/processes as necessary

according to local input. • In areas where NGOs have a recognized comparative advantage, take steps to

maximize their institutional autonomy.

D. Funding issues

• NGOs are generally cost-effective. They should not, however, be viewed as a "low-cost alternative" to other types of implementing agencies.

• NGOs should not be expected to provide services free of charge or at lower than market rates (unless according to a co-financing agreement).

• Clarify the expected status of NGO involvement (e.g. informal unpaid advisor, paid consultant, contractor, etc.) from the outset.

• Establish mutually acceptable fees and overhead costs.

E. Procurement and disbursement issues

• Use simplified bidding documents, where appropriate. • Consider the use of alternative procurement practices. • If necessary, make provisions for advance payments. • Provide training for NGOs in procurement and disbursement procedures.

F. NGO-government relations

• Consider conducting a state-NGO relations study. • Keep in mind that government-NGO collaboration is not possible/ desirable in all

cases.

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• Always seek government-NGO complementarity. • Understand how government policies influence the NGO sector and, where

possible, promote an enabling environment for NGOs.

G. Importance of clearly defined roles and responsibilities

• Share all relevant project documents with participating NGOs. • Consider the appointment of an NGO liaison officer. • Organize a government-Bank-NGO information-sharing workshop.

H. Contractual/legal issues

• Adapt standard contract agreements as necessary to meet specific needs of NGOs/community groups.

• Write contracts in simple language. • Consider using a Memorandum of Understanding or other alternative form of

contract.

I. Capacity-building

• Consult with NGOs on appropriate strategies to support their institutional development.

• Where appropriate, build a training component for NGOs into project design. • Encourage partnerships between international and local NGOs. • Promote networking and information-sharing among NGOs.

Source:

World Bank. Working with NGOs: A Practical Guide to Operational Collaboration between the World Bank and Non-Governmental Organizations. (Operations Policy Department, World Bank, 1995), 7-9.

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APPENDIX B

Netherlands

Ministry of Foreign Affairs32

Swedish International Development Agency33

UK Foreign Secretary Department for International Development34

World Bank35

Policy Much of the actual development work on the ground is done not by governments but by NGOs. They are an important channel for the Dutch government. NGOs can fight poverty in countries where the Netherlands does not wish to work with the government, either because there is no government to approach (as in Somalia), or because the government pursues extremely bad

SIDA's financial support for civil society organizations (CSOs) amounts to SEK 1.2 billion for 2010. It is channeled through Swedish framework organizations and their respective development partners.

In 2010 SIDA is working with 15 framework organizations. About 500 Swedish NGOs and other groups were involved in development cooperation programs in more than 100 countries together with more than 2,000 organizations and

The Department for International Development (DFID) leads the British government’s fight against world poverty. We work with many partners in order to achieve this, including civil society organizations (CSOs).

DFID supports civil society organizations through our country offices and centrally-managed funds. The latter include the Partnership Programme Arrangements (PPAs), the Civil Society Challenge Fund (CSCF), the Governance and Transparency Fund (GTF) and the Development Awareness Fund (DAF).

PPAs were established in 2000 to improve

The World Bank collaborates with CBOs, national and international NGOs in a variety of different ways.

Achieving the full potential benefits of NGO involvement implies enhanced roles for NGOs earlier on in the project cycle.

NGO involvement can contribute to the sustainability and effectiveness of Bank-financed projects by introducing innovative approaches and promoting community participation.

NGOs can help                                                                                                                          32 Retrieved from http://www.minbuza.nl/en 33 Retrieved from http://www.sida.se/English/Partners/Civil-Society-/Civil-society-organisations/How-Sida-supports-civil-society-organisations/ 34 Retrieved from http://www.dfid.gov.uk/Working-with-DFID/Funding-opportunities/Not-for-profit-organisations/PPAs/ 35 Appendix A  

26      

policies.

The Netherlands works with both international NGOs (e.g. the mine clearance organization Halo Trust) and Dutch NGOs such as Novib and Cordaid (see co-financing).

associations.

funding arrangements with 10 large UK-based CSOs. They now provide unrestricted funding to civil society organizations (CSOs) with which DFID has a significant working relationship, a common ethos and vision and a strong match in priority areas. These include both UK and non-UK organizations. Total PPA funding amounts to some £90m a year.

PPA funding is linked to a set of strategic level indicators – which the organization is accountable for delivering over the 3-6 year time frame.

expand project uptake and reach, and can facilitate greater awareness of diverse stakeholder views.

Expectation Another advantage of working with NGOs is that they often collaborate with local partners, who know the needs of the local population and are familiar with their culture. This kind of expertise is essential if projects are to lead to a

Overall, Sweden aims to promote vibrant and democratic CSOs, based on their roles as the voice of poor and marginalized groups, and provider of services such as health and education. SIDA’s support of CSOs is focused on:

Activities that are aligned to the

Over the last 8 years, we have run 3 competitions for applications for new PPA partners. PPA partners must satisfy a range of criteria including:

• sufficient consistency between CSO and DFID priorities

• high standards of corporate governance

• extensive ‘reach’ in poor

NGOs are active contributors to the Bank's economic and sector work (ESW) and participate in lending activities from identification through to evaluation.

Currently, NGO involvement is most frequent during implementation. Evidence shows,

27      

reduction in poverty in the long term.

current development cooperation strategy.

The capacity of civil society organizations to be strengthened by focusing on the development of the organization’s decision-making structures and systems, internal and external communication, and actual performance.

Organizations and networks that strengthen the role of civil society as an arena for citizens’ engagement, and promoting transparency, cooperation and networking among organizations.

Opportunities that promote CSOs’ role to influence the design and implementation of poverty reduction strategies, in dialogue with the governments in

countries and/or in the UK for building public support for development

• significant engagement in policy formulation with DFID or similar organizations at international level

however, that NGOs can provide particularly valuable input during project identification and design.

Where NGOs are expected to participate in implementation, they should also be consulted during design.

Consult with NGOs on appropriate strategies to support their institutional development.

Where appropriate, build a training component for NGOs into project design.

Encourage partnerships between international and local NGOs.

Promote networking and information-sharing among NGOs.

28      

partner countries.

29      

APPENDIX C

Tackling Children’s Health and Diseases in the Democratic Republic of Congo Due to the poor quality of roads, limited transportation and insufficient resources to pay for public transportation, most people -- especially pregnant women and children -- are unable to access health services. Almost 40% of mothers aged 15 to 49 in the province of Eastern Kasai are unable to access health services because the nearest center is too far away.

Recognizing the barrier that distance was presenting to prompt care-seeking for sick children, the CRS team in the area decided to take the most essential curative services closer to these remote communities. In five of six health zones served by the project, a significant percent of the population lives further than 5km from the nearest health facility.

In these zones, the project team trained health facility staff as trainers in integrated Community Case Management (iCCM). The trainers in turn trained two selected village health agents from each site to manage cases of diarrhea, pneumonia and malaria. Working with local stakeholders including and members of affected communities to implement the iCCM involved 56 community care sites where children receive quality curative integrated management of childhood illness closer to home. After the village health agents were trained, the project equipped the community care sites with basic equipment such as guidance cards, reporting forms, salter scales and stopwatches to time breathing. A supply chain was also developed to provide the sites with supplies such as paracetamol, cotrimoxizole, Artemisinin-based combination therapies against malaria, oral rehydration salts (ORS), and zinc. The new care sites received regular supportive supervision from the health facility staff, the health zone leadership team and the project team. In this manner, local communities were empowered in ensuring that sick children gained access to life-saving health care.

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APPENDIX D

Maternal and Child Health Program in Nicaragua Childbirth can be particularly dangerous in Nicaragua. Unpaved roads and mountainous terrain make traveling during labor impractical. Even when health facilities are accessible, many women choose to give birth at home. Some fear that their cultural traditions will not be respected by the health staff. Still others do not have the money to travel to the nearest health facilities.

Moreover, Nicaragua’s health care system sometimes lacks coordination between health centers, hospitals, maternity waiting homes and community health volunteer groups, making it difficult for organizations to promote better health practices.

In 2008, CRS and Caritas Matagalpa launched an innovative project to create synergies between the main actors involved in health promotion. The project focused on Matiguas, Rio Blanco and Bocana de Paiwas—all municipalities where delivery rates were 40% lower than in other regions of the country and where travel time to a health facility was four to eight hours. Carried out in conjunction with the Nicaragua Ministry of Health, the project targeted 113,560 people in 125 communities, representing 66% of the population in those areas.

To help increase the number of women who choose institutional births over home births, the project:

• Introduced birth plans at the community level; • Promoted maternity waiting homes; • Humanized the care given to pregnant women during deliveries by paying particular

attention to regional cultural traditions; • Improve infrastructure; • Retrained health facility personnel; • Invested in new equipment; and • Promoted the World Health Organization’s best practices for safe delivery.

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APPENDIX E

Meeting the Challenges of HIV/AIDS affected Orphans and Children in South Africa

Despite the magnitude and negative consequences of the growing number of orphans and vulnerable children (OVC) in South Africa, there is insufficient documentation on “what works” to improve the well-being of these children affected by HIV/AIDS. In an attempt to fill these knowledge gaps, the US President’s Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief (emergency plan), and USAID funded 32 projects implemented by CARE, CRS Save the Children and WVI, among others, as Networks of Hope (NOH) in the South African provinces of Limpopo, Eastern Cape, and the Free State.

Specifically geared towards improving the resilience and quality of life among OVC the project is child focused and predominantly community driven. A unique methodology known as appreciative inquiry (AI) was used to gather information. Data were collected through key informant interviews, observations of activities and services, and a full day’s AI workshop. Participants of the workshop included staff, beneficiaries, volunteers, community members, and other stakeholders. The workshop was divided into two groups —beneficiaries and community members, and staff and volunteers. Each group was questioned about their positive experiences with regard to the project. The project is child-focused and community-driven in that it focuses on

(i) mobilizing and enhancing community led responses to protect and care for OVC; (ii) strengthening the capacity of OVC and household members to care of themselves;

and (iii) creating an enabling environment for OVC through Community Care Coalitions

(CCCs), community-based groups that have banded together to help improve the lives of OVC in whatever ways they are capable of.

A community-based approach to helping OVC enables large numbers of children to access the numerous services being offered by the project:

(i) food and nutritional support; (ii) child protection interventions; (iii) shelter interventions; (iv) general health care services, including support for antiretroviral treatment; (v) psychosocial support; (vi) HIV prevention education; (vii) economic strengthening; (viii) general education; and (ix) vocational training.

The provision of services is made possible by a strong component of project staff and volunteers. These individuals deliver services to beneficiaries via several key activities:

(i) comprise home visits, (ii) capacity building, (iii) community care coalitions, and

32      

(iv) drop-in and resource centers. Despite several successes there were challenges:

(i) large volunteer turnover, (ii) jealously among communities of service provision, (iii) stigma and discrimination of OVC, and (iv) lack of transportation for home visitors.

The Networks of Hope is an extraordinary project of improving the resilience and quality of life among OVC.

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REFERENCES

1. Adams, J. 2000. The Development of a Methodology to Assess the Impact of Tearfund on its Partners and Through Them on the Poor. A Paper Outlining the Process and Lessons Learned. 2. Adams, J., S. Batchelor, K. McKemey and I. Wallace. 1999. Developing a Methodology for Measuring the Impact of an International NGO and Its Local Partners. Reading: AERDD. 3. Alkire, S. 1997. Impact Assessment: Oxfam Versus Poverty. Oxford: Oxfam. 4. Bebbington, Anthony J., Samuel Hickey and Diana C. Mitlin, Editors. 2008. Can NGOs Make a Difference? 5. Degngol-Martinussen, John and Poul Engberg-Pedersen. 2003. Aid: Understanding International Development Cooperation. London and New York: Zed Books. 6. Edwards, M., and D. Hulme. 1995. Non-Governmental Organisations: Performance and Accountability Beyond the Magic Bullet. London: Earthscan. 7. Edwards, Michael and Alan Fowler. 2002. NGO Management. London: Earthscan. 8. Feurstein, M.T. 1986. Partners in Evaluation: Evaluating Development and Community Programmes with Participants. London: Macmillan. 9. Fisher, Julie. 1993. The Road from Rio: Sustainable Development and the Nongovernmental Movement in the Third World. Praeger. 10. Fowler, A. 1997. Striking a Balance: A Guide to Making NGOs Effective in International Development. London: Earthscan/INTRAC. 11. Hallam, H. 1998. Evaluating Humanitarian Assistance Programmes in Complex Emergencies. London: ODI (RRN Good Practice Review No. 7). 12. Howell, Jude. 2001. Civil Society & Development: A Critical Exploration. Boulder, CO: Lynne Reiner. 13. James, Eric. 2008. Managing Humanitarian Relief: An operational guide for NGOs. Practical Action Publishing. 14. Kharas, Homi. 2007. “The New Reality of Aid.” Brookings Institution. 15. Minear, Larry and Hazel Smith, Eds. 2007. Humanitarian Diplomacy: Practitioners and Their Craft. United Nations University Press. 16. NGO Committee on UNICEF. Statement to UNICEF Executive Board, June 2002. 17. NGO Steering Group of NGO Committee on UNICEF. Report of NGO Activities at the United Nations General Assembly Special Session on Children, 2002. 18. Oakley, P. and A. Clayton. 2000. The Monitoring and Evaluation of Empowerment: A Resource Document. Oxford: INTRAC. 19. Reality of Aid Network. The only major North/South international non-governmental initiative focusing exclusively on analysis and lobbying for poverty eradication policies and practices in the international aid regime. It brings together 172 member organizations, including civil society regional and global networks. It has a seventeen-year track record of independent assessment of aid policies and practices, and engages in constructive dialogue with policy

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makers at national and international levels. Retrieved from http://www.realityofaid.org 20. Report of the 7th meeting of the DAC Network on Development Evaluation, 20 – 21 February 2008, prepared by the Independent Evaluation Group (IEG) of the World Bank, Impact Evaluation: its Status and its Future. 21. Riddell, R. 1990. Judging Success: Evaluating NGO Approaches to Alleviating Poverty in Developing Countries. London: ODI. (ODI Working Paper 37.) 22. Roche, C. 1999. Impact Assessment for Development Agencies. Oxford: Oxfam/NOVIB. 23. Weiss, Thomas G. and Leon Gordenker. 1996. NGOs, the UN and Global Governance. Boulder, Colorado: Lynne Rienner Publishers.

WEBSITE RESOURCES

1.ACT Alliance, available from http://www.actalliance.org 2.Africa Evaluation Association. Available from http://www.afrea.org 3.American Evaluation Association, available from www.eval.org Up to date on the latest thinking on monitoring and evaluation with excellent combination of practical issues and theoretical backgrounds. 4.CARE International's Impact Guidelines, available from http://portals.wi.wur.nl/files/docs/ppme/CAREImpactGuidelines.pdf 5.FANTA-2 Publications on Assessments, Monitoring and Evaluation. FANTA works with USAID and with food programming in particular, and has developed various DME guides. Monitoring and evaluation skills, such as design, data collection and data analysis, are core to organizations from both a performance and management standpoint. Available from http://www.fantaproject.org/focus/monitoring.shtml 6.InterAction International Evaluation Resources, available from http://www.interaction.org/monitoring-evaluation 7.INTRAC. 1999. ‘Evaluating Impact: the Search for Appropriate Methods and Instruments.’ In Ontrac, No.12. 8.Save the Children Fund UK. 1994. Toolkits: A Practical Guide to Monitoring, Assessment, Review and Evaluation. London: SCF. Development Manual 5. 9.Sphere Project. 2010. Humanitarian Charter and Minimum Standards in Disaster Response. London: Oxfam. 10.United Nations Development Programme. 2009. Handbook on Planning, Monitoring and Evaluating for Development Results. Available from http://www.undp.org/evaluation/handbook/ This is a reference throughout the programme cycle. The Handbook is about planning, monitoring and evaluating results, not for programme or project management. 11.United Nations Evaluation Group, available from http://www.uneval.org/ First stop for evaluation resources related to United Nations programming. 12.United Way Outcome Measurement Resource Network. Available from http://www.unitedway.org/outcomes 13.World Vision International DME resources. Available from http://www.transformationaldevelopment.org/Ministry/TransDev2.nsf/maindocs/60871459C58610B588256F860053D9DD?opendocument

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This website includes the framework for DME and the tools (processes) for project management phases. Some tools may be useful for context adaptation. 14.World Vision International list of programming resources (quite extensive, listed by sector, and provides links to other organizations and resources.) Available from http://www.transformationaldevelopment.org/Ministry/TransDev2.nsf/maindocs/81712E8937293E1E88256F270074C2B6?opendocument 15.World Vision International Integrated Programming Model. Available from http://www.transformationaldevelopment.org/ministry/transdev2.nsf/IPM%20layout%2001d.html This site combines DME with development theories and promising practices derived from different NGOs. Useful for implementing projects in the field.