What Is Next for Mali? The Roots of Conflict and Challenges to Stability

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WHAT IS NEXT FOR MALI?THE ROOTS OF CONFLICT

AND CHALLENGES TO STABILITY

Dona J. Stewart

November 2013

The views expressed in this report are those of the author anddo not necessarily reect the ofcial policy or position of theDepartment of the Army, the Department of Defense, or the U.S.Government. Authors of Strategic Studies Institute (SSI) andU.S. Army War College (USAWC) Press publications enjoy fullacademic freedom, provided they do not disclose classiedinformation, jeopardize operations security, or misrepresent

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***** I would like to thank Dr. Andrew Terrill, Dr. J. Paul de B.Taillon (Colonel retired), Dr. William Knarr (Colonel retired) andCaptain Caleb Slayton, Director of the African Command TheaterCourse at the U.S. Air Force Special Operations School, HurlburtField, FL, for their comments and feedback on draft versions ofthis monograph. Responsibility for any errors or omissions restswith the author.

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FOREWORD

In January 2013, France launched military operationsin northern Mali. Backed by United Nations SecurityCouncil Resolution 2085 (December 2012) that autho-rized the deployment of an African-led InternationalSupport Mission in Mali, Operation SERVAL soughtto wrest control of northern Mali from al-Qaeda in theIslamic Maghreb (AQIM) and afliated groups. The re-establishment of security in the countrys north was a

necessary prerequisite for addressing other factors inMalis complex crisis, namely the coup that overthrewthe civilian government and the long-running Tuaregnationalist movement.

Dr. Dona J. Stewarts monograph explores the under-lying root causes of the complex crisis in Mali that createda safe haven for militants and criminals in the countrysremote and impoverished northern region. A series of

Tuareg rebellions, the latest fueled by the so-called Arabspring and the end of Muammar Gaddas regime, com-bined with increasing AQIM activity, severely strainedthe central governments ability to maintain security.AQIM quickly capitalized on the security vacuum cre-ated by the March 2012 military coup. Today, a signi-cant level of physical security has been reestablished inthe north and a new president has been elected; but Malimust overcome signicant challenges in order to achievelong-term stability. Dr. Stewart argues that long-termstability in Mali must address the economic and politicaldisparities that undermine effective national integration.

DOUGLAS C. LOVELACE, JR. Director Strategic Studies Institute and U.S. Army War College Press


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ABOUT THE AUTHOR

DONA J. STEWART is an External Research Associateof the Strategic Studies Institute (SSI) and a Professorof Homeland Security at Embry Riddle Aeronauti-cal University in Daytona Beach, Florida. She alsoholds an adjunct position at the Near East South AsiaCenter for Strategic Studies at the National DefenseUniversity in Washington, DC. Dr. Stewart contrib-utes extensively to initiatives focused on professionalmilitary education. She previously held the positionof Resident Senior Fellow at the Joint Special Opera-tions University. From 1997 to 2009, Dr. Stewart wason the faculty of Georgia State University, her nalposition was Professor of Geosciences and Directorof the Middle East Institute. Dr. Stewart is a formerFulbright Scholar to Jordan. Dr. Stewarts publishing

explores facets of the relationship between humansecurity and conict. Much of her publishing focuseson the Middle East and North Africa and the role ofsocio-economic, political and cultural factors in in-stability and conict. She is the author of The MiddleEast Today: Political, Geographical and Cultural Perspec-tives(Routledge, 2012, 2nd Ed.) and Good NeighbourlyRelations: Jordan, Israel and the 1994-2004 Peace Process(I. B. Tauris, 2012, Rev. Ed.). Her most recent articleincludes The Sinai Bedouin: Political and EconomicDiscontent Turns Increasingly Violent, Middle EastPolicy Council. Dr. Stewart holds a B.A. in inter-national relations from New College of Florida, anM.A. in political science, a certicate in African stud-ies, and a Ph.D. in geography from the University

of Florida.


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SUMMARY

In March 2012, the government of Mali, one of themost touted symbols of Africas democratic potentialfell in a military-executed coup. At the same time, a4-decade-old rebellion among Tuaregs seeking auton-omy or independence reached new heights, fueled byweapons from Muammar Gadafs fallen governmentand perhaps the belief that the Arab Spring could ex-tend to northern Mali. Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb(AQIM) and their allies were quick to capitalize on theincreasing chaos in a territory characterized by lack ofgovernment control and poverty and seized the majorcities in the north. The imposition of a severe form ofIslamic law and a growing food crisis sent the popu-lation eeing south across Malis international bor-ders. The French-led military intervention, Operation

SERVAL, ousted the militants from the main cities inthe north, but did not address the crisis underlyingissues including the grievances that feed the Tuaregnationalist movement, the establishment of a civilian-led government in Mali, and the near- and long-termthreats to food security. The eruption of this crisis alsodemands a critical look at the Sahels regional securityframework, and the U.S. role in it.

In Part I, Background to the Crisis, the author ex-plores the deeper background to the crisis and setsit within Malis historical and geographical context.Though it was a major world power in the MiddleAges the former Malian Empire had long lost its eco-nomic strength by the time the European countriescolonized Africa. To control their territory, the French

used military means to try to bring the pastoralists inthe Sahel, such as the Tuareg, under control. Indepen-dent since 1960, Mali struggled to develop political


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institutions and achieve economic growth. After yearsof dictatorial rule, Mali transitioned to democracy

in 1992. Despite considerable economic aid from theUnited States, it remained one of the poorest countriesin the region. Indeed, the neighborhood, the Sahelzone that runs east to west through the continent, is azone of poor, ungoverned spaces, sometimes referredto as the arc of instability.

In Part II: The Crisis Unfolds, the author examinesthe recent events that created the volatile conditionsleading to the crisis. The Tuareg nationalist movementhas existed for over 40 years; there have been at leastfour periods of rebellion, and military force has beenthe primary response from the central government.Gadaf had long been a supporter of the Tuareg, em-ploying them in trusted positions within his military.The fall of his regime sent many Tuaregs home, laden

with heavy weaponry, escalating the rebellion to newheights. Due to a steady expansion into the Sahel zoneover the last decade, AQIM was well poised to capital-ize on the anarchy and seize the norths major cities.

The fall of Gao, Timbuktu, and Kidal to AQIM il-lustrates the need for a critical examination of the U.S.-led regional security framework, which is the focusof Part III: The Regional Security Framework in theSahel. Numerous factors hindered the effectiveness ofthis framework, including the newness of the militarypartnerships with regional governments, their differ-ing strategic level interests, and the wide range of ca-pabilities among their armed forces. Building partnercounterterrorism capability to meet the transnationalal-Qaeda threat was the primary focus of the security

framework through programs such as the Pan SahelInitiative (PSI) and the Trans Sahel Counter TerrorismPartnership (TSCTP). However, it was ill-prepared

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for a complex crisis that included a largely secularnationalist rebellion, the overthrow of a civilian gov-

ernment by U.S.-trained soldiers, and a large-scalehumanitarian crisis.

Long-term stability in northern Mali will requirea more multidimensional approach that considersthreats beyond those posed by Islamist militants suchas AQIM. Physical security, secured through mili-tary and law enforcement efforts, is a prerequisite forthe development of institutions of good governance.Without such institutions, physical security is eeting,requiring constant intervention when a crisis erupts.


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WHAT IS NEXT FOR MALI?THE ROOTS OF CONFLICT

AND CHALLENGES TO STABILITY

The United States strongly condemns the violence ini-tiated by elements of the armed forces of Mali. We callfor the immediate restoration of constitutional rule inMali, including full civilian authority over the armedforces and respect for the countrys democratic institu-tions and traditions. . . .

The White House March 20121

What have you got to say my friendsAbout this painful time we are living through?

Lyrics from the song,Imidiwan Ma Tennam,

by the Tuareg-Berber band,Tinariwen, 20112

INTRODUCTION

At rst glance, the descent of Mali into chaos ap-pears swift and sudden. Mali had often been describedas a model of democracy and stability on the continent.

Long recognized for its cultural richness embodied inancient cities such as Timbuktu, Mali is also a closeally of the United States and an important participantin Global War on Terror3 (GWOT) efforts to counterterrorism and improve security in the Sahel region. InFebruary 2012, Mali hosted the Atlas Accord, an an-nual joint U.S.-Mali military exercise that focused on

improved air drop capabilities to effectively delivermilitary resupply materials and humanitarian aid.4

Just a few weeks later, on March 22, members ofthe Malian military, led by a U.S.-trained soldier, Cap-


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tain Amadou Sanogo, overthrew Malis democratical-ly-led civilian government. At the time, northern Mali

was already deeply embroiled in a long-running con-ict between the Tuareg ethnic minority and the gov-ernment. Indeed, frustration at the lack of sufcientcentral government support in the military campaignagainst the Tuareg rebels was a major justication cit-ed by the coup leaders for their actions. The coup andthe ongoing Tuareg rebellion created a severe securityvacuum in Malis northern provinces. Al-Qaeda in theIslamic Maghreb (AQIM), which had been expandingits reach in the Sahel over the last decade, was quick tocapitalize on the void and occupied the norths majorcities. Waves of refugees ed; those who stayed facedlife under harsh interpretations of sharia, or Islamiclaw, imposed by AQIM and allied groups such asAnsar Dine.

With Malis democratically elected governmentoverthrown, French troops, under the auspices of aUnited Nations Security Council Resolution (UNSCR),initiated combat operations against Islamist militantsin the countrys remote northern region in Janu-ary 2013.5 In less than a month, Operation SERVALforced AQIM and allied groups out of the regions cit-ies, clearing the way for an African-led InternationalSupport Mission to Mali (AFISMA) organized by theEconomic Community of West African States (ECOW-AS) and the potential return of democratic rule to thecountry as a whole.

Though events in Mali have moved quickly overthe last year, and indeed continue to do so, the un-derlying causes of the current crisis are long-standing.

The dissatisfaction of the Tuaregs, the legacies of co-lonial rule, and geographic realities are by no meansnew developments. However, more recent events


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have served to catalyze simmering issues into activeconict. The political and security instability created

by the overthrow of Muammar Gaddas regime inLibya and the coup detat that ousted Malian presi-dent Amadou Toumani Tour, for example, embold-ened an array of actors, including Tuareg rebels withnationalist causes, criminals, and various groups ofIslamic militants.

The interrelated security challenges Mali faces to-day are complex, summed up by David Lewis as atoxic cocktail of rebels, weapons, refugees, drought,smugglers, and violent Islamic militants.6While thetransnational threat posed by AQIM and afliatedgroups is of deepest concern to the United States andits European allies, violent extremism is only one of anumber of issues destabilizing Malis security. Giventhe interconnected nature of these challenges, policies

and security frameworks that follow the French in-tervention must take a broad and comprehensive ap-proach to security and stability in Mali that goes wellbeyond the provision of physical security.

Legal restrictions prevented the United States fromproviding direct military aid to Mali after March 2012because that government seized power in a coup.7TheUnited States provided intelligence and air logisticalsupport to the French military operation. Three KC-135 tankers were used to refuel French jet ghtersand bombers, and the United States provided airliftto transport a French mechanized infantry to Mali.8Itseems likely the U.S. role in Mali, and in the regionoverall, will increase. In January 2013, the UnitedStates signed a status of forces agreement with neigh-

boring Niger, a move that could pave the way for apossible U.S. drone base. Niger is also the focus for thedevelopment of an intelligence hub by both the United


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States and the French.9The restoration of democraticrule, through elections scheduled for July 2013, will

also enable the United States to resume its foreign aidprograms for Mali, some of which were suspendedafter the March 2012 coup.10

With AQIM now rooted out of Malis northern cit-ies, the current dual challenge for the United States,France, and the broader international community is tocraft a policy that will bring long-term stability to akey ally in the ght against violent Islamic extremismin the Sahel and, at the same time, rebuild a regionalsecurity framework. While restoring physical securityis obviously central to this framework, the underlyingcomplex and overlapping socio-economic and politi-cal issues that impact security must also be addressed.This monograph attempts to contribute to the cur-rent discussions on the future U.S. policy for Mali by

exploring the deeper background to the crisis. Suchissues include the long-running grievances of the Tu-areg minority, the challenges of uneven development,regional instability wrought by the Arab Spring, and aworsening humanitarian crisis. This monograph willalso examine the weaknesses of the regional securityframework in place prior to the March 2012 coup andthe challenges a new regional security frameworkwill need to overcome to bring effective, long-termsecurity to this crucial region.

Why Mali Matters.

Mali is remote and distant from much of the globe.It is one of the poorest countries in the world. And yet,

the situation in Mali and the future of the country willhave signicant impact at the national, regional, andinternational levels.


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Geography is the key to much of Malis impor-tance. Nestled deep in the interior of West Africa, Mali

encompasses over 478,841 square miles (1,240,192square kilometers [km]),11 a large territory approxi-mately the size of France or twice the size of Texasin the United States. With only 15.84 million people,12Mali is sparsely populated. The north is either desertor semi-arid, and over 90 percent of the population isheavily concentrated in the countrys less arid south-ern half. The capital, Bamako, located on the NigerRiver, boasts over 1.6 million people and is one of thefastest growing cities in Africa.13In the north, thoughcities such as Gao and Timbuktu loom large in ancienthistory, they are a fraction of the size of Bamako andhost few economic opportunities.

Source: World Factbook, Washington, DC: Central Intelligence

Agency, August 13, 2013.

Map 1. Mali.


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Mali is landlocked and shares long and often per-meable borders with seven other states: Algeria (1,376-

km, 855 miles), Niger (821-km, 510 miles), BurkinaFaso (1,000-km, 621 miles), Cte dIvoire (532-km, 330miles), Guinea (858-km, 533 miles), Senegal (419-km,260 miles) and Mauritania (2,237-km, 1390 miles).14These borders are difcult to control, facilitating un-tracked movement across the Sahel, the semi-arid zonebetween the Sahara Desert and the more arable landsin the south. The Sahel zone (also known as the trans-Sahel) is vast, approximately 1,000-km (621 miles)wide, and stretches across the continent from the At-lantic Ocean to the Red Sea. This transition zone isnot true desert as areas of sparse seasonal vegetation,clay plains, and water holes can be found through-out the Sahel. Historically, pastoralists, such as theTuareg ethnic group, migrated seasonally through-

out this zone, maintaining a livelihood from camels,cattle, sheep, and goats, a practice long predating thecreation of the current state boundaries.15 In the erabefore long distance sea navigation, the trans-Saharantrade routes connected Africa to the Mediterraneanzone and further on to Europe. Though forebodingand arduous, the Sahara has never been impassable,for thousands of years people, ideas, and goods haveowed across its sands.

Today, this vast, undergoverned space within theregion has become a safe haven for Islamic militants,primarily AQIM and afliated groups, as well assmugglers of weapons and drugs. The states in thisregion lack the resources, both nancial and institu-tional capacity, to effectively meet the challenges of

organized militancy and criminality. In many coun-tries, this ungoverned space is in the hinterlands,physically and psychologically distant from the na-


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of criminals and militant groups, including AQIM.The freedom of movement found in an arc of insta-

bility that runs across the continent from the Atlan-tic coast of West Africa to the Horn of Africa on theRed Sea can be seen as a primary enabler for violentextremists in the region. Such freedom of movementcould facilitate cooperation between groups such asAQIM, Ansar Dine, the Movement for Unity and Ji-had in West Africa (MUJAO) in Mali, Boko Haram inNigeria, and al Shabaab in Somalia. The recent dis-covery of instructions on how to avoid drone strikesin a building abandoned by AQIM in Mali, authoredby Yemen-based al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula(AQAP), illustrates the types of operational and tech-nical cooperation across the network.18The documentcontained 22 tips, ranging from low technology ap-proachesattaching reective pieces of glass to cars

or the roofs of buildingsto the more sophisticateduse of a Russian-made sky grabber device to inl-trate the drones waves and the frequencies that canbe purchased for around $2,595.19

Common to the countries through which this arcpasses are poverty, underdevelopment, illiteracy,mass youth unemployment, misgovernance, authori-tarianism, corruption, suppression of womens rightsas well as human and civil rights in general.20Manyof these same characteristics could be found in theArab Spring countries that experienced a wave ofrevolutions in 2011 suggesting they help create a fer-tile ground for revolution. While such mass popularmovements may eventually lead to the developmentof a robust civil society and democratic institutions,

the political and social disruption also create a win-dow of opportunity for other actors, namely violentextremist organizations, to exercise control in the re-sulting security vacuum.


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Finally, the humanitarian impact of the Maliancrisis, addressed later in this monograph, is another

reason this crisis matters. Described by General CarterF. Ham, the former commander of U.S. Africa Com-mand (AFRICOM) as patently the most difcult toaddress,21 the humanitarian condition is one of thespectrum of issues that must be addressed followingthe French intervention.

PART I - MALI: BACKGROUND TO A CRISIS

Mali: Ancient Grandeur, Modern Challenges.

A detailed exploration of Malis history is wellbeyond the scope of this monograph, however, someaspects of Malis historical development, as well asMalis place in history provide essential context for

understanding the dynamics that have led to the cur-rent crisis. Mali became an independent country onlyin 1960, its modern state identity is recent and oftencontested, with internal divisions and conditions thatmake it vulnerable to nonstate actors such as AQIM.

The origins of the modern state of Mali can betraced to the Malian Empire which existed from 1230to 1600 CE. The Malian Empire began as a tribal con-federation of the Mandika people united under Sunid-iata Keita (c. 1217-55), who ruled under the name MariDjata.22The empire consolidated and grew under his25-year reign. The empire controlled a vast territory inWest Africa that stretched to the Atlantic Ocean, a farlarger area than that of the modern state.

Most of what the West knows of ancient Mali comes

from the writings of Muslim scholars such as the Mo-roccan explorer Ibn Battuta (1304-68). Ibn Battuta leftSijilmasa, Morocco, on the northern edge of the Sahara


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and travelled south by caravan, stopping at oases andsalt mines along the way. After 2 months, the caravan

reached the southern junction of the trans-Saharantrade route, Oualata.23Ibn Battuta continued his jour-ney on to Timbuktu, at the time a small provincialtown; from there he went by canoe to Gao, an impor-tant center of trade.24Ibn Battutas journey reects thesignicance Mali had in the Islamic world at the time.His contemporary, the sociologist and historian IbnKhaldun (1332-1406), recorded the royal genealogy ofthe Malian Empire, and captured some of the empiresoral history and traditions. Oral history was the normby which events were embedded into the collectivememory of the community.25Throughout West Africa,this oral history was preserved and passed down bygriots(or jeli), a tradition that continues today. Theseoral historians held a prominent position in society,

sometimes serving as advisors to the emperor.26

Gold was the main source of the empires wealth,indeed it was gold and control over the trans-Saharantrade, that gave the Malian Empire its global signi-cance. Gao and Timbuktu, on the edge of the Sahara,were vibrant trading centers and an economic cross-roads into the desert and on to the Levant and Europe.Gold travelled north, salt travelled south. The empireenjoyed great periods of prosperity, especially underthe famed ruler Mansa Musa.27 Though the founderof the Malian Empire, Sundiata Keita (d. 1255) wasnot Muslim, the Mali Empire contained a diverse mixof ethnic groups and religions. The later adoption ofIslam by Malis rulers facilitated the spread of Islaminto West Africa during the medieval period. A de-

vout Muslim, Mansa Musa undertook the pilgrimageto Mecca in 1324, and historical accounts speak of agrand and lavish procession. He was accompanied


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by approximately 60,000 men. At that time, the Ma-lian Empire controlled half of the worlds supply of

gold and salt. Eighty camels transported hundreds ofpounds of gold dust, while 12,000 slaves each carried4-pound bars of gold.28Musa spent so much gold inthe bazaars of Cairo that gold prices were depressedand ination rampant for a decade thereafter. Theextravagance of this journey caught the attention ofWestern scholars and mapmakers, and knowledge ofTimbuktu and Mali spread.

During the 15th century, Timbuktu grew into acenter of Islamic scholarship and learning, in addi-tion to trade. Mosques, libraries, and Koranic schools(madrasas) were constructed. By the 16th century, thecitys population had grown to 100,000. The globalcultural signicance of Timbuktus buildings, and therole of the city as a spiritual and intellectual center

for the spread of Islam in Africa, was recognized in1998 as a World Heritage Site by the United NationsEducational, Cultural and Scientic Organization(UNESCO). The site includes three earthen-brickmosques: Djingareyber, Sankore, and Sidi Yahia. Dat-ing to the 13th century, they are considered exception-al examples of a building technique found typically inarid environments.29Sixteen mausoleums are also in-cluded on the list. Indeed, Timbuktu is also known asthe city of 333 saints, a reference to the many mau-soleums of Su preachers and scholars constructed inthe city over the centuries.30

Imperial Malis leaders promoted Timbuktusscholarly and intellectual development. Leo Africanus(1494-1554), the Moorish diplomat and historian, de-

scribed the city in his geographical history of Africa:


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There are in Timbuktu numerous judges, teachers andpriests, all properly appointed by the king. He greatlyhonors learning. Many hand-written books importedfrom Barbary [North Africa] are also sold. There ismore prot made from this commerce than from allother merchandise.31

So strong was the demand for learning that a dis-tinct trans-Saharan book trade developed during the12th and 13th centuries. Two types of books dominat-

ed the trade: (1) illuminated copies of the Koran, richwith calligraphy, and (2) less expensive, more func-tional copies of instructional and reference works.32The many mosques and schools in Timbuktu droveup demand for these texts. The University of Sankore(Masjid Sankore) alone contained 180 madrasas and25,000 students.

Libraries, madrasas, scholars, and even families

amassed collections of manuscripts. Before Islam-ic militants seized the city in 2012, Timbuktu wasthought to contain as many as 300,000 antique man-uscripts. Many of them were housed at the modernAhmad Babu Institute, where they were restoredand preserved; still others lay in private hands. Thecollection was priceless, containing manuscripts in

Arabic as well as a few in African languages, suchas Songhai, Tamashek, and Bambara. There was evenone in Hebrew. They covered a diverse range of top-ics including astronomy, poetry, music, medicine, andwomens rights. The oldest dated from 1204.33

Timbuktus cultural patrimony, its shared historyof a multi-ethnic and multi-religious past, has comeunder severe attack, especially from the Tuareg Is-

lamist militant group Ansar Dine. Ansar Dine begandestroying the shrines in July 2012, taking pickaxesto them. Ansar Dine considers the Su shrines to be


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hundreds of books and articles on his various adven-tures.42At the same time, David Livingstone explored

south and central Africa and named the renownedwaterfall Victoria Falls in honor of the Queen ofEngland. All European contact with Livingstone waslost for 6 years and his death was rumored, a tale thatgripped the public. This fascination with Africa, andgeopolitical rivalry, was not limited to Europe. In 1869the anti-British editor of the New York Heraldorderedhis journalist, Henry Morton Stanley, to nd and res-cue the lost explorer. His successful search led to thepossibly apocryphalaccount of their meeting: Dr.Livingstone, I presume?43

Europe was now convinced of Africas strategicimportance, a result of both location and the numerousaccounts of the continents vast untapped resources.For Europes voracious imperial appetite, Africa was

the last frontier that could be exploited. In 1884-85,a conference was held in Berlin, Germany, to set theground rules among the European powers for colo-nization and trade activities. In reality, the CongoConference formalized the rules for the rapid expan-sion of European interests in Africa, also known asthe Scramble for Africa. The conference participantsaccepted the concept of effective occupation in de-termining which country could claim a geographicalarea. Means of establishing effective occupation in-cluded entering into treaties with local, indigenousleaders, establishing an administrative presence andmaintaining order with a police force.44 As soon asthe ground rules were laid down, European coun-tries raced against each other to claim a territory as

their own.


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Mali Under French Control.

The area that encompasses Mali today was origi-nally part of a French colonial territory known as theFrench Sudan formed in 1890.45 Though there wererumors of the regions great wealth, no doubt a legacyof the medieval accounts, Frances primary interest inthe area was to link their holdings in Senegal and Al-geria and provide access to the Congo and its richesthrough Lake Chad. France had seized Algeria againstgreat opposition in 1830. Algeria was a central com-ponent of Frances overseas empire; it was integratedinto metropolitan France as a department in 1848 andbecame part of French political life. Frances economicties with Algeria were deep, and tens of thousands ofEuropeans settled there.

European states, especially France, Netherlands,

and Portugal, had long competed for trade along theSenegalese coastline. In 1444, Portugal established amajor center for slave trading on the Island of Gore;Britain seized control of it as a result of the Napole-onic Wars (1803-15) and abolished slavery. Francesinvolvement in West Africa began in 1637, when theybuilt a fort at the mouth of the Senegal River and be-gan to explore the interior. By the 1850s, France wasworking to establish control further inland in order toconsolidate its colonial empire.46

The French Sudan was part of a set of colonies thatmade up the Federation of West Africa (existed from1865 to 1960), which included Senegal, French Guin-ea, Cote dIvoire, Upper Volta (Burkina Faso), Niger,Mauritania, and Dahomey (Benin today). French West

Africa encompassed an area of approximately 1.8 mil-lion square miles (4,689,000 square kilometers [km])and a diverse population composed of a great many


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ethnic groups who spoke many languages. Within thefederation, French was the common language. France

also established a common currency, the French WestAfrican Franc.47 Each colony of French West Africawas administered by a Lieutenant Governor, respon-sible to the Governor General in Dakar, Senegal. Onlythe Governor General received orders from Paris.France also held colonies in adjacent North Africa, aswell as a few in equatorial Africa and East Africa, andnumerous island possessions.

The Pacication of the Sahel.

French penetration and control of the interior ofthe French Sudan was met with signicant resistance.There was little French presence in the interior priorto the 1850s. French explorer Ren Calli was the rst

European to visit Timbuktu (1827) and return alive; aBritish ofcer, Major Gordon Laign, had preceded hisarrival in the city but was killed shortly after he de-parted. Calli published his account of his journey inJournal dun voyage Temboctou et Jenn dans lAfriqueCentrale.48

Calli was eager to reach Timbuktu, which he de-scribed as an object of curiosity and research to thecivilised nations of Europe. What he found, however,was a disappointment:

I looked around and found that the sight before me,did not answer my expectations. I had formed a totallydifferent idea of the grandeur and wealth of Timbuc-too. The city presented, at rst view, nothing but amass of ill-looking houses, built of earth.49

Indeed, in the centuries since historians had record-ed accounts of the Mali Empire at its height, much had


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changed. By the mid-1600s, the empire had broken upinto three parts, following a succession dispute. This

left the empire vulnerable to attack by others, namelythe Bamana people of nearby Djenne. The TimbuktuCalli found was greatly diminished from that de-scribed during the reign of strong emperors such asMansa Musa. The social and political fragmentationthat characterized the 19th century western Sahelboth aided and hindered French expansion. While theFrench did not have to overcome a strong and well-organized empire, the fragmentation meant dealingwith a great many, often competing, ethnic groupsand even kinship groups in an effort to establish con-trol. Local inhabitants offered much resistance; therewas no real effective French control until 1899.

European colonialism was based on the desire tobring Christianity, civilization, and commerce to

Africa. Callis account of the death of Major Laingreinforced the justication for European colonialism.According to Callis published account, Major Laingwas killed after refusing to convert to Islam:

When the major had once been discovered to be aChristian and a European, death was a thousand timespreferable to even a temporary change of religion,

since he must have renounced all hope of again visit-ing Europe.50

Calli described many of the ethnic groups he en-countered during his journey such as the Moors andFulani. The Tuaregs (Tooariks), who he calls maurad-ers and savages receive the most negative descrip-tion. Remarking on their control of the desert, he notes

that The trade of Timbuctoo is considerably crampedby the Tooariks, a warlike nation who render the in-habitants of the town their tributaries.51This nega-


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tive image of the Tuareg was further reinforced inlater encounters with the French military as they tried

to pacify the Sahel and improve the value of theircolonies through construction of roads and railroads.

In 1880-81, an expedition led by French ColonelPaul Flatters set out to survey a route for a railroadthat would cross the Sahara. Composed of 300 cam-els, 10 French soldiers, and 78 native guides andporters, the expedition sought to cross the territorycontrolled by one of the tribes that made up the con-federation of Tuaregs in the Sahel. The leader of theTuaregs denied them permission to cross his terri-tory; likely realizing construction of a railroad wouldmean an end to his economic livelihood, the caravantrade. Colonel Flatters continued into the territory andfound himself drawn into an ambush. Lack of foodand water led to further casualties. None of the French

survived, causing a furor in France with demands thatthe Tuaregs be punished. However, it would be an-other 17 years before the French attempted to establishcontrol again.52

In 1899, France launched three military missionsfrom Senegal, Algeria, and the Congo to consolidatetheir holdings and to bring them under French con-trol. The Voulet-Chanoine Mission, which set outfrom Dakar, Senegal, ended in scandal following thedeath of the commanding ofcers at the hands of theirown soldiers.

Captain Paul Voulet and Adjutant Lieutenant Ju-lien Chanoine led the mission; the other Europeansincluded nine ofcers, a doctor, and three noncom-missioned ofcers. The mission was accompanied by

approximately 100 guides and interpreters, as well asover 1,000 porters and others that were conscripted tosupport the heavily armed mission. Their goal was to


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move through the French Sudan, the interior still hadnot submitted to French rule, and reach Lake Chad.

The mission carried few supplies; they were expectedto live off the land:

To get the porters and food they needed, Voulet andChanoine burned villages, enslaved populations andmassacred those they did not need. By the time theywere stopped by another French column, their rankshad swollen to about 3,000, mostly slave women. His-

torians have often treated Voulet and Chanoine asmen who went mad in the tropical sun, but Fuglestadargues that the atrocities were simply an extravagantversion of what the French military did elsewhere.53

When French authorities learned of the atrocitiesbeing committed, they sent a column of troops ledby Lieutenant Colonel Jean-Franois Klobb to relieve

Voulet of his command. Voulet killed Klobb, furtherheightening the scandal. The Voulet-Chanoine affair,the high cost of maintaining the military presence inthe French Sudan, and internal French political tur-moil, including the Dreyfus Affair, all led to a reas-sessment of the military-led pacication strategy forthe Sudan. Control over the Sudan was shifted to thecivilian colonial government, and military opera-

tions were restricted.54 Resistance to French controlin the Sahara continued well into the 1930s, whenairplanes allowed greater ability to track the Sahelspopulation.55

Even outside the areas that faced military pacica-tion, colonial policies affected the indigenous Africanpopulation. To improve the colony, Africans were

forced to work without pay on public works such asroad building. They could be imprisoned without trialand could not engage in political activity. They were


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subject to military draft.56 Indeed, thousands of Afri-can soldiers fought and died in World Wars I and II,

where they played a pivotal role in the liberation ofFrance from Nazi Germany:

On Aug. 15, 1944, two months after the Allied land-ings in Normandy, a French force of 200,000, with anestimated 65 percent of them from former colonies,landed in Provence with the U.S. Seventh Army. Theyfought through the suburbs of Toulon and Marseille,

moving on to help repel the Germans from the east-ern Vosges Mountains and Alsace before crossing theRhine. Historians estimate that about 40,000 troops ofAfrican origin died liberating the country.57

When French troops entered in Malis northern cit-ies in 2013, some Malians held signs recalling the roleof Mali in liberating France.

Malian Independence.

The movement toward decolonization in Africagrew very quickly after World War II. Many Africancountries experienced a growing wave of national-ism and a desire for independence. For the Europeanimperial states, their economies shattered by war, far

ung overseas colonies were expensive to keep. Inten-sifying violent nationalist movements among the co-lonial subjects made the price even steeper. In Kenya,for example, the Mau Mau Rebellion against Britishcontrol broke out in 1952. Shortly thereafter, Francefound themselves engaged in an increasingly bloodyguerrilla war in Algeria.58

The Algerian War for Independence (or AlgerianRevolution) lasted from 1954 to 1962. It was extremelycostly, both nancially and in loss of life. The war wascharacterized by the use of insurgent tactics in an urban


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environment, famously depicted in the lm, The Battleof Algiers. By 1956, over 400,000 French troops were

committed to Algeria.59

Backlash over the handling ofthe Algerian war led to fall of the French Fourth Re-public and the return of General Charles de Gaulle topower. In 1959, he declared that self-determinationwould be the preferred solution to the Algerian con-ict.60 Following referendums in France and Algeriaas well as long negotiations, Algerian independencewas granted on July 3, 1962. Death tolls for the conictrange from 400,000 to 1.5 million.61

The French Sudan received independence fromFrance in 1960, in the midst of the crisis over Algeria.In the post-World War II period, relations betweenFrance and its territories in West Africa were markedby debate over the nature of the relationship betweenFrance and the colonies. Among the African elite, who

had assimilated much of French culture and on whomthe French depended to administer the colonies, slo-gans such as federalism and independence tookcenter stage. At the same time, the French authoritiesbegan to allow indigenous political activity and theformation of political parties. Britains announcementthat the Gold Coast (present day Ghana) would be-come independent in 1957 further drove the move-ment toward independence in French Sudan. Frenchcontrol over West Africa was dealt a steep blow in 1958when Guinea voted no on a referendum to continuean association with France, and relations between thetwo countries were cut. Shortly thereafter, the Suda-nese Republic (Mali) and Senegal joined a federation,while other colonies sought independent statehood.

Together, they achieved independence in 1960 as theMali Federation.62Their union did not last, and, aftera few months, Senegal withdrew, and the SudaneseRepublic was renamed Mali.63


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PART II: THE CRISIS UNFOLDS

Mali: The Challenges of Development.

Like other newly independent countries in Africa,Mali faced enormous political, geographic, and eco-nomic challenges at independence, and many of thesepersist into the present, contributing to the underlyingcauses of the current crisis. Unsurprisingly, state levelinstitutions for governance and politics were under-developed or absent in the newly independent state.According to William Foltz, specic issues Mali facedincluded:

Separation of the political process and governmentalactivity from the lives of most people . . . Existence ofa small, relatively homogeneous political elite, lack ofstable internal political process permitting a peacefuland democratic replacement of elites and offering thepossibility of a return to political ofce once a personhas lost a political contest.64

Malis rst president, the nationalist leader Mod-ibo Keita, was elected to the presidency of the Mali

Federation in 1960; when the federation dissolved,he became president of Mali, a position he held until1968. In 1968, General Moussa Traor overthrew Keitain a coup dtat. Under Traors 2 decades of rule,Mali was a virtual police state in which political activ-ity was not tolerated. The repressive climate eventu-ally brought an end to Traors 23-year regime. RobertPringle, who served as U.S. ambassador to Mali be-

tween 1987 and 1990 observed:


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In March 1991, Malis military dictator made the fatalmistake of ordering his troops to re on students pro-testing in the capital, and several hundred were killed.In the wave of shocked public reaction that followed,a key military commander, Colonel Amadou ToumaniTour, joined the pro-democracy forces, and the dic-tatorship collapsed. Tour, better known as ATT,promised to hand over power to an elected govern-ment. Like Cincinnatus, the Roman farmer who tookup arms and then returned to his elds, Tour kept hisword, surprising many of his fellow Malians.65

Tours decision to relinquish power to the civiliangovernment launched a new political era in Mali,characterized by democratic processes rather thanviolent overthrow:

Until the 1992 presidential election Malians had neverexperienced a change of government by means other

than a coup dtat. A decade later the 2002 election ofATT to the presidency marked the rst time in Malishistory that power would be passed from one demo-cratically elected president to another.66

This success made Mali a symbol of Africas dem-ocratic potential. After the 1992 elections, Mali heldsuccessful, multiparty presidential elections again in1997, reelecting President Alpha Oumar Konar to asecond 5-year term.67In 2002, a eld of 24 candidatesvied for the presidency. After two rounds of voting,Tour returned to power, transformed from a militaryto a civilian leader. He was elected to a second term in2007. Mali was seen not only as an African successstory for democracy but also offered proof that Islam

and democracy were compatible.


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While radical Islam has inhibited the creation of dem-ocratic institutions in other parts of the Muslim world,Malians do not widely perceive such radicalism as athreat to their democracy. Indeed, radical Islam seemsto be growing slowlyif at allin Mali. Further, Ma-lians see the long-standing problem of unrest and nearanarchy in the desert north not as a democratizationproblem but rather as a security problemthat is, as athreat to national unity.68

Eventually, this conict in the north, fueled in part

by radical Islamists, felled Malian democracy whenTours civilian government was overthrown in acoup led by Captain Amadou Sanago in March 2012.President Tour went into hiding after the coup, butin April he resigned as part of a deal negotiated withthe coup leaders by the ECOWAS. Under the deal,parliamentary leader Dioncounda Traor, was sworn

in as interim president at the head of a transitionaladministration pending new presidential elections setfor July 2013.69Tour is now in exile in Senegal.

Mali, like many young states in Africa, has a weaksense of national unity and national identity. Geogra-phy poses signicant challenges to Malis economicand political development and undermines nationalunity. Mali has no outlet to the sea, but West Africaslargest river, the Niger, which originates in the high-land of Guinea, ows through it. The river passesthrough many of the countrys important cities, suchas Bamako, Timbuktu, and Gao, before entering theocean along the coast of Niger. Mali is composed ofthree distinct regions, delineated primarily by theamount of rainfall, which ranges from 0 millimeters

(mm) of annual precipitation in the north to 1,550-mm in the extreme south. The Sudanese climate of thesouth allows considerable agricultural production,


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while grasslands are common in the semi-arid Sahelzone. In the north, the Saharan Desert dominates the

countryside.70

Economic opportunities, lifestyle, andpopulation characteristics differ dramatically acrossthese zones. Political and economic power is stronglycentered on the urban elites in south of the country.

Malis population is very diverse, containing manyethnic groups. The Manding (Mand) peoples accountfor half of Malis population and include the Bambaraand Malinka ethnic groups. These two groups, whichlive in southern Mali near the capital of Bamako, arethe largest and most politically dominant. They tendto make up the elite that beneted from French educa-tion during the colonial period.

The Peulh (also called Fula or Fulani) account forabout 11 percent of the population, and they farm orherd cattle in the Niger delta. The Seina (also called

Senoufo), make up 9.6 percent of the population. Theyare primarily farmers, though many have migrated tocities for work, and live in south-east Mali.

The Sonink who live in north-west Malis Sahe-lian zone make up 7 percent of Malis population.They trace their roots to the Ghana Empire, and tradeis a very important part of their economic life. TheSonghai are descendants of the people of the SoghaiEmpire that once existed around Gao. They compose7 percent of Malis population and engage in subsis-tence farming in southeastern Mali.

The Tuareg and the Maure (Moor) make up about5 percent of the population. Located in northern Mali,the Maure are Arab-Berbers that migrate with theirherds between Mali and Mauritiania. The Tuareg, or

Kel Tamasheq (Tamasheq-speaking people) as theyrefer to themselves, are nomadic pastoralists, ethnical-ly related to Berbers, who are among the indigenous


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inhabitants of the Sahel and Saharan region. Coun-tries with signicant Tuareg populations include Ni-

ger (1.7 million), Mali (1.4 million), Algeria (825,000),Libya (620,000), and Burkina Faso (330,000).71 TheTuareg are primarily Muslim, though they practice asyncretic form of Islam, which blends many forms ofpre-Islamic and indigenous practices.72 In Mali, theyare predominately located in the north of the country,including the main population centers of Gao, Kidal,and Timbuktu. The Tuaregs are also notable for theblue, indigo-dyed veils worn by males to protectthem from the desert sands while riding. Though theTuareg are Muslim, women traditionally do not wearthe veil.

Despite the diversity of Malian society, inter-eth-nic and inter-religious tolerance has been the norm.73This is, in part, attributed to the presence of syncretic

forms of Islam that blend Islam, including Su varia-tions, with traditional practices and beliefs. Until theinvolvement of radical Islamist groups in the Tuaregrebellion in the north, political and economic margin-alization, not religious beliefs and ethnicity, were thefoci of the conict. Today, however, there are new eth-nic and religious dimensions to the crisis.

Other minority groups include the Dogon (4 per-cent of population), Bozo (2.8 percent), Diawara (1percent), and Xaasongaxango (1 percent). Mali ispredominantly Muslim (90 percent), with a smallnumber of Christians (4 percent) as well as otherswho follow traditional religions. French is the of-cial language, Bambara is widely spoken. Otherwidely-spoken languages include Fulfulde (Peulh),

Songhai, and Tamasheq, however, a great many otherlanguages exist.74


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1998; droughts are longer and more common. Deserti-cation, where land is becoming increasingly arid, is

also a problem in Mali where the Sahara is movingsouthward at a rate of 48-km, about 30 miles, a year.80As a result of the Saharas southern movement, Mali isexperiencing climate zone shift. This shift will bringadditional negative consequences to Mali. Accord-ing to 22 global climate models that forecast to 2030,the most negative scenario could mean a decreasein rainfall by 10 percent and an increase in averagetemperatures by 1.8 degrees fahrenheit (1.4 degreescelsius). This scenario would result in a $300 millionagricultural loss for Mali. Even under the most opti-mistic climate models, annuals losses of $120 millionare forecast.81This anticipated climate change will puteven greater strains on the population and society innorthern Mali, and increase the potential for instabil-

ity that can be exploited by criminals and militants.

Early Indicators of a Crisis in Northern Mali.

The building crisis in northern Mali went unno-ticed by most people in the West. In hindsight, therewere numerous, though perhaps unconventional,indicators of increasing instability. Essakane, an oa-sis settlement located 50 miles west of Timbuktu, iswell-known to world music fans. Long a trading loca-tion for the Tuareg, it is home to a deep musical tradi-tion, whose sounds evoke comparison with Americanblues music.

Since 2001, Essakane had hosted the Festival auDesert, drawing international stars, such as Robert

Plant, musicians from throughout Africa, and thou-sands of Western spectators every year. Just a fewshort years ago, a journalist described this scene:


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In a normal December, the streets of Timbuktu arecrawling with Western tourists. They take tours of thelocal libraries full of 12th-century manuscripts, ridecamels into the desert to spend the night under thestars, and in early January, attend the Festival au Des-ert, a kind of Saharan Woodstock, where Tuareg andMalian guitarists trade blues riffs.82

By 2010, in response to the rising number of kid-nappings of Westerners in the region by AQIM, the

Malian authorities moved the festival closer in, to theoutskirts of Timbuktu. In November 2011, three Euro-pean tourists were kidnapped and a German touristkilled in Timbuktu.83These attacks, the rst in the cityitself, clearly sought to undermine the tourism indus-try. The attacks, part of a increasingly bold strategy ofkidnappings used by AQIM since 2008, brought ad-ditional security to the 2012 Festival au Desert.

In 2013, the organizers announced the festivalwould be moved south to Burkina Faso. Not only hadthe festival site been destroyed, but speaking fromthe city of Gao in August 2012, a spokesman for theMUJAO, a splinter group of AQIM, issued a ban on allWestern music. In their press release, the organizersnoted, It is an attack on our collective memory, on

all that unites the many ethnic groups of Timbuktu.

84

In northern Mali, AQIM applied a classic al-Qa-eda strategy to gain control of territory from whichthey could operate. AQIM capitalized on the lack ofeffective Malian central government presence in theregion, while leveraging the existing conict betweenthe Tuareg and the central government to their bene-t. External factors, such as the Arab Spring and fall of

Gadafs regime, also worked to AQIMs advantage,as it helped drive a new phase of the Tuareg rebellionand contributed to the conditions that led to the mili-


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tary coup. Though the United States and its partnershad created a regional security framework to meet the

threat posed by al-Qaeda, this framework was fragile,contained many weaknesses, and could not withstandthe set of events that led to AQIMs control over thecountrys north.

The Tuareg Rebellions.

An ethnic minority, geographically remote fromMalis capital, the Tuareg have long felt politically andeconomically marginalized. During both the Frenchcolonial period and after Malian independence, theintegration of the highly independent Tuaregs into thestate has been a much contested issue. The Tuaregshave a long history of conict with the central govern-ment. Historically, these conicts, which tend to cen-

ter on the administrative region of Kidal, have beenmotivated by politics and economics, not religiousextremism:

The most important single element in recent north-ern unrest has been political disaffection among onegroup of Tuareg inhabiting the region around Kidal,northeast of Timbuktu. This disaffection is well docu-

mented and has had little to do with religion; rather, ithas been a classic case of conict between nomads andcentral authority.85

Tuareg aspirations traditionally focus on indepen-dence or autonomy, not the creation of a religious stateor caliphate. As a result, the Tuareg separatist move-ment, led by the National Movement for the Libera-

tion of Azawad (MNLA), raises a potential challengeto Malis territorial integrity and internal stability.From the Malian central government perspective, theTuareg actions are a rebellion or insurgency.


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The idea of a Tuareg homeland, Azawad, com-prised of Tuareg populated areas in northern Mali,

northern Niger, and southern Algeria came into beingin the 1950s. In Mali, Azawad would include the prov-inces of Gao, Kidal, and Timbuktu in the north; consti-tuting about half of Malis total territory. The Frenchbriey considered the idea of creating an independentstate for the Tuareg, which met with great resistanceby Mali and other countries with a Tuareg population.Also at that time, the Tuaregs identity and loyaltywas primarily focused on their local communities, notnationalist aspirations.86 Indeed, even today, it is notclear how much of the Tuareg community supportsan independent state, and political identity remainshighly localized.

The current Tuareg rebellion in Mali, which startedJanuary 17, 2012, is the fourth wave in a long-standing

series of conicts between some members of the Tu-areg population and the Malian government. The rstrebellion occurred in 1963, and involved the KidalTuareg who resented the governments attempts toreduce their autonomy.87 The Tuareg attacked gov-ernment targets in quick raids. Armed with Sovietweaponry, the Malian army conducted a vigorouscounterinsurgency campaign and easily defeated theTuaregs, who were equipped with camels and outdat-ed small arms. The rebellion was crushed by 1964, andthe northern Tuareg areas placed under repressivemilitary administration. During the conict, many ofMalis Tuaregs ed into neighboring countries. Lieu-tenant Colonel Kalifa Keita of the Malian Army noted:


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While the government had succeeded in ending the re-bellion, its coercive measures alienated many Tuaregswho had not supported the insurgents. Atrocities andhuman rights abuses on both sides contributed to aclimate of fear and distrust in the north. And whilethe government subsequently announced a numberof programs to improve local infrastructure and eco-nomic opportunity, it lacked the resources to followthrough on most of them. As a result, Tuareg griev-ances remained largely unaddressed, and a seethingresentment continued in many Tuareg communities

after 1964. Clearly the problem of instability had beendeferred, not resolved.88

The tactics used by the Malian military includedmassacres, poisoning of wells, and destruction ofocks, all actions that violate Muslim principles ofwarfare. Indeed, the governmental response to the1963 rebellion still resonates in Tuareg popular cul-ture. In 2012, the Tuareg desert blues band, Tinariwen,recorded the song, Soixante-Trois(63):

63 has gone, but will return.Those days have left their traces.They murdered the old folk and a child just born.They swooped down to the pastures and wiped outthe cattle . . .

63 has gone, but will return.89

The Malian counterinsurgency campaign cre-ated a long-standing bitterness that would be fueledby growing perceptions of economic and politicalmarginalization.

Periods of devastating drought in the Sahel be-

tween 1968 and 1974 and again from 1980 to 1985 de-stroyed much of the regions livestock. Without theseeconomic assets, many Tuaregs became refugees in


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neighboring countries or were forced to work as daylaborers in southern Mali to survive. The loss of their

traditional livelihoods deeply undermined the fabricof Tuareg society and added to social instability.90In the late-1980s, large numbers of Tuaregs who hadbeen working in Libya lost their jobs after the collapseof world oil prices. Gadda had courted the Tuareg,using radio broadcasts to urge them to join his mili-tary. When Libyas attempt to militarily annex Chadin 1986 failed, many of these Tuaregs, who had servedas front line troops while Libyans were more pro-tected in the rear, returned to Mali.91These events, inaddition to the long-standing and unresolved griev-ance from the 1963 rebellion, fueled a second rebellionin 1990.

The 1990 rebellion was led by the Popular Move-ment for the Liberation of Azawad (MPLA:Mouvement

Populaire de Libration de lAzawad), formed by Tuaregexiles living in Algeria, including Iyad ag Ghali.92The1990 rebellion began with a MPLA attack conductedon a police post by a small group of Tuareg soldiers re-cently returned from Libyan army camps killing 18.93The Traor government, under increasing pressure toallow more political participation, used the rebellionas an excuse to cancel multiparty elections. He fueledtensions between the north and south of the countryby portraying the Tuareg as white-dominated feudalsociety that relied on black slavery to preserve theirtraditional way of life.94

An Algerian-brokered peace treaty, signed April11, 1992, between the Unied Movements and Frontsof Azawad and the Malian government (really a tran-

sitional government following a military coup thatended Moussa Traors 23-year rule in April 1991)ended the second rebellion. Known as the Tamanras-


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set Accord for the city in Algeria where it was signed,it contained provisions for a cease-re, subsequent

integration of former combatants into special units ofMalian armed forces, a repatriation program for peo-ple displaced by the conict, and acknowledgementof the special status of Northern Mali.95Northern Maliwas to have increased autonomy and greater controlover its own governance.

One of the most signicant results of the Taman-rasset Accord was the formation of temporary securi-ty forces to garrison the north. These forces containeda xed percentage of Malian Army and rebel com-batants. The program was both a condence build-ing measure, as well as an employment generatingmechanism directed at unemployed, armed Tuaregyouths. By early 1998, some 3000 Tuaregs combat-antsprobably more than ever were in the eld as

rebels at any one timehave been integrated into thevarious Malian security forces and civil service.96However, from the Tuareg perspective, many of themain components of the Tamanrasset Accord werenever honored.97Also, the decision to sign an agree-ment with the government of Mali was not unanimouswithin the MPLA, the agreement encouraged splinter-ing within the group. As a result, though the MPLAformally disbanded in 1996, other groups, sometimesincluding members from the former MPLA, formed,and resentment continued to simmer.

In May 2006, violence again erupted; this so-calledthird rebellion lasted until 2009 and was focused pri-marily in the Kidal region. The perception of discrimi-nation was again at the core of Tuareg complaints.

A newly formed group, The May 23 Democratic Al-liance for Change (ADC, Alliance Democratique du 23mai pour le Changement) was active in this rebellion.98


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Included in the movement was Ibrahim Ag Bahanga,a former MPLA member and former rebel who had

been integrated into the Malian armed forces underthe Tamanrasset Accord. The complaints of the sol-diers centered on the slow pace of promotion throughthe military ranks and the nature of their assignments.As in previous rebellions, attacks focused on gov-ernment targets, including the military garrisons atKidal and Menaka.99 Algeria again helped to brokeran agreement between the government of Mali ledby President Tour and the Tuareg. The Algiers Ac-cords (July 2006) included greater autonomy for theKidal region, economic development measures, and alarger role for local Tuareg in security forces. Despitethe accord, conict continued as a new faction of theADC emerged led by Ibrahim Ag Bahanga. The ADCcontinued attacks, taking 23 Malian soldiers hostage

in August 2007. These attacks were denounced bythe former leadership of the ADC, including Iyad AgGhali who had since run for ofce and was integratedinto politics.

The most recent Tuareg rebellion took place inOctober 2011. As Gaddas regime crumbled, lead-ers of the various Tuareg factions met and formed theMNLA. Its membership drew former soldiers fromGaddas army, including its leader, Colonel Ag Mo-hamed Najem, and deserters from the Malian mili-tary.100The October meeting at a desert oasis was anattempt to ward off the splintering that had long un-dermined the Tuareg armed movements. An MNLAstatement released at the time declared, Weve over-come our differences and will now present common

political demands which reect the profound aspira-tions of our population. Demands included immedi-ate negotiations with the Malian government.101 The


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most recent outbreak of the rebellion in January 2012followed failed attempts at dialog between the Malian

government and the MNLA.102

On January 17, 2012, MNLA forces attacked and

captured the northern town of Menaka, near the bor-der with Niger. In the weeks that followed, Tuaregrebels established control over much of northern Mali,including Gao, which contains the largest militarybase in northern Mali and a strategically signicantmilitary base at Tessalit. Shortly after the March 21coup in which members of the Malian military over-threw the government of President Tour, the MNLAestablished control over Timbuktu.103 Outrage bysome members of the Mali military over the govern-ments failure to properly equip troops to ght theheavily armed Tuareg force was a factor in the coupled by Captain Amadou Sanogo.104The coup members

accused President Tour of incompetence in the ghtagainst Islamic terror.105 The coup, and the subse-quent collapse of Malis military presence in the north,benetted the MNLA and enabled consolidation oftheir gains. However, the secular MNLA eventuallyfound itself pushed aside by AQIM and its afliate,Ansar Dine.

The Impact of the Libyan Revolution.

Though many of the underlying causes of Maliscomplex security challenge have existed for decades,the overthrow of Gaddas regime and the return ofheavily armed Tuareg ghters from Libya upset theprecarious balance of power in northern Mali.106The

wave of change, often referred to as the Arab Spring,which swept through North Africa also reenergizedthe Tuaregs long-standing quest for greater autono-


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my, or perhaps independence, in a geographic areathat includes much of northern Mali.

Libyan leader Muammar Gadda had long em-ployed Tuaregs in his military, utilizing them in con-icts both in Libya and Chad, and further aeld inAfghanistan and Lebanon. In 1980, he declared Libyathe natural homeland of all Tuaregs and offered themLibyan nationality.107When Gadda lost power in Oc-tober 2011, an estimated 2,000 to 4,000 Malian Tuaregghters returned home.108These ghters were heavilyarmed; the looting and sale of weapons from the Lib-yan governments arsenal created a sudden inux ofheavy weaponry in the region.109Of specic concernwere the 20,000 man operated portable air defensesystems (MANPAD) the Libyan government had inits arsenal prior to the revolution. Of these, 5,000 havebeen secured by a multinational team under imple-

mentation of a UN disarmament, demobilization,and reintegration program. An unknown numberare thought to have been destroyed during conict,but fears remain that some of the weapons have beentransported outside of Libya and may be in the handsof armed groups.110The operational condition of theseweapons is not known, as weaponry were often poor-ly maintained by Gaddas forces, but operationalMANPADs pose a signicant threat to aircraft.

The MLNA claimed to have 1,000 well-armedghters;111while government forces, prior to the 2012coup, were estimated at 7,350.112The level of militaryexperience and weaponry possessed by the currentrebels may distinguish it from previous, less well-armed and organized rebellions. The MNLA leaders,

Ag Mohamed Najem and Bilal Ag Acherif, held therank of colonel in Gaddas army. Also, other mem-bers obtained signicant military experience in earlier


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rebellions and the Libyan civil war.113Some high rank-ing ofcers from the Malian army, such as Lieutenant

Colonel Ag Mbarek Kay and Colonel Ag Bamoussa,also bring signicant experience to the group.114TheMNLA had assembled an impressive arsenal, accu-mulated over a number of years of planning and forti-ed by heavy weaponry brought by ghters returnedfrom Libya. They also had experience implementinglong-range guerrilla tactics over distances of hundredsof miles.115

AQIM in North Africa.

There is no doubt that the Tuareg rebellion, coup,and the end of Gaddas regime created new oppor-tunities for AQIM to expand its inuence in the Sa-hel and West Africa. AQIM traces its roots to Alge-

ria. Formerly known as the Salast for Preaching andCombat group (GSPC, Salast pour la Predication et leCombat), they are a splinter group from the ArmedIslamic Group (GIA) that fought a civil war againstAlgerias secular government in the late-1990s. Theyaligned themselves with al-Qaeda in the early 2000s,and changed their name to AQIM in 2006 after theirpledge of loyalty was accepted by the al-Qaeda lead-ership.116However, the extent that AQIM is controlledor inuenced by the al-Qaeda leadership in Afghani-stan and Pakistan is not clear.117

Successful Algerian counterterrorism measuresdrove AQIM from Algiers and the surrounding area,pushing them deeper into southern Algeria andneighboring countries. AQIMs increasing presence in

the Sahel is marked by a campaign of kidnappings forransom and attempted kidnappings, focused on bothtourists as well as UN and U.S. diplomats and aid


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workers, the killing of a number of hostages and anassassination of a Malian military ofcial.118Kidnap-

ping for ransom has proven to be very lucrative forAQIM; between 2006 and 2011, they are believed tohave received an estimated $70 million.119Their over-all strategy, according to Modibo Goita, is to createsanctuaries in which to operate, as part of the Afgha-nization of the entire Sahel region.120

Common al-Qaeda themes and narratives charac-terize AQIMs messaging:

The bulk of AQIMs messages, the speeches and state-ments, consist of the broad strands of Sala-jihadirhetoric, with frequent references to tna (disorder),jahiliyya (pre-Islamic ignorance), fasad (corruption),and the importance of ghting for the return of theproper way of life. Like other countries al-Qaeda hastargeted, AQIM argues that the governments of Alge-

ria, Libya, Mali, Mauritania, Morocco, and Tunisia arecomposed of unbelievers and need to be replaced bygovernments that adhere to a strict interpretation ofIslamic law (Sharia).121

An additional goal is to rid the region of foreigninuences, namely the United States and France. Inmid-2010, following the death of a French hostage and

AQIM calls for attacks on France, French governmentofcials rebutted, saying that they were at war withal-Qaeda.122

The extent of the relationship and cooperation be-tween AQIM and various factions of Tuareg rebels isa matter of debate; it is clear that the security vacuumbeneted them both.

However, the MNLA had been very adamant aboutits relationship to AQIM, denying in strong termsany possible link to al-Qaeda,123 and claimed it would


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stand as a buffer against it.124 Though not ideologi-cally aligned, there are shared interests, and perhaps

a pragmatic alliance, between AQIM and membersof the Tuaregs, including tribal ties and smugglingof an array of items including cigarettes, migrants,and weapons.125Such illegal activities are even moreimportant today in a region that has seen its primaryform of legitimate economic activity, tourism, disap-pear amid AQIM violence, raising the prospect thatpeople may turn to AQIM, or at least tolerate them,for economic reasons. Misery has made the Sahelsthousands of unemployed an easy target for recruitersfrom extremist groups.126

AQIM has pursued an integration strategy in Mali;marriage with locals has proven effective in devel-oping strong local ties. For example, Mokthar Bel-mokhtar, an Algerian AQIM leader, married a Tuareg

woman, the daughter of one of the chiefs of the ArabBarabicha tribe in northern Mali.127AQIM has cast it-self as an ally and protector of the local community.Regardless, the marriage of convenience or joint of-fensive that existed between AQIM and the MNLAin late 2011 and early 2012 seems to have soured in theaftermath of the coup. Each group had a starkly dif-ferentand incompatiblevision for northern Mali.

Sala Islam was imposed by force, through AQIMand its allies, Ansar Dine and MUJAO, during thecampaign for control over the northern cities. By June2012, Islamist forces had seized control of the regionsthree major cities: Kidal, Gao, and Timbuktu. In Gao,for example, Ansar Dine imposed dress regulationson women, including female doctors in the hospi-

tal, part of their enforcement of a strict version of Is-lamic law.128There appeared to be very close ties be-tween Ansar Dine and AQIM, the AQIM presence in


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tary intervention in the north, offering support on theground, declaring: We can do the job on the ground.

Weve got men, arms and, above all, the desire to ridAzawad of terrorism.135

AQIM, itself, was not immune to splintering. In2011, some younger members of AQIM broke off toform the MUJAO. There may also be an ethnic dimen-sion to the split as MUJOAs leadership is made up ofblack Africans, leading to speculation they resenteddomination by AQIMs Arab leadership. Still othershave suggested the split was a result of suspicionsthat AQIM had been inltrated by Algerian securityservices. Sharing the same goals as AQIM, MUJAOhas been very active in kidnapping for ransom.136 InNovember 2012, MUJAO claimed to have ousted theMNLA rebels from Menaka.137

The speed at which Islamist forces were able to

consolidate their hold over the cities in the north andbegin to push into other areas factored into Francesdecision to take action rather than awaiting the arrivalof regional force. In December 2012, the UN autho-rized deployment of an African-led security force toMali, providing a legal international mandate for theuse of force in Mali. The AFISMA was to be composedof forces, drawn primarily from ECOWAS countries,with a 1-year mandate.138 However, creation of theforce would take time and their level of capability wasa concern. According to the French foreign minister,France had little choice but to intervene urgently orIslamist forces might have made it to Bamako. . . .139

On January 11, 2013, French air strikes on Malilaunched Operation SERVAL. France deployed nearly

4,000 troops to Mali, including Special Forces. Work-ing alongside Malian troops, they quickly forced theIslamists out of the regions major cities. Troops from


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neighboring Chad also deployed, taking heaving ca-sualties in the ght for Kidal.140The cost of Operation

SERVAL as of April 16, 2013, had reached 205 million.The total included 91 million for strategic transport,55 million for personnel and 59 million in miscel-laneous costs.141The United States provided logistical,technical, and intelligence support to Operation SER-VAL, including air tankers to refuel French jets andtransport planes.142Though the Barack Obama admin-istration had initially declared they would not pro-vide any ground troops in support of the French April2013 operation, they conrmed they had deployed asmall number of troops (approximately 22) in non-combat liaison roles to French and African troops.143In addition, the United States provided air tanker re-fuelers and transport planes.144Deciding interventionwas in its national interests, Canada provided a C-17

aircraft, 25 percent of Operation SERVALs strategiclift, to transport French armored vehicles, trucks,and troops.145

France began to withdraw its force in April 2013and plans to have no more than 1,000 troops in thecountry by the end of 2013. Their duties are transi-tioning to the regional African force, AFISMA, whichnumbered approximately 6,300 in late April.146 Thesize of the force, following the approval of a revisedconcept of operations by the African Unions (AU)Peace and Security Council, will be 9,620 personnel,including 171 civilians, 590 police ofcers, and 8,859military personnel.147However, it will take some timefor AFISMA to reach full deployment. Discussionsover the size and status of the force are ongoing. Mali,

with the support of ECOWAS and the African Union,requested the UN transition the force to a peacekeep-ing operation when possible. A subsequent report by


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PART III: THE SAHEL REGIONAL SECURITYFRAMEWORK

With the exception of Nigeria, a signicant sourceof U.S. oil, the United States had little strategic inter-est in West Africa, and the Sahel in general, beforeSeptember 11, 2001 (9/11). The U.S. regional securityframework in the North African Sahel was born out ofpost-9/11 concerns that the region could be a possiblehaven for members of the transnational al-Qaeda net-work. Under the Global War on Terror paradigm, Af-rica, with its poor governance, ethnic conict, extremepoverty, and the availability of ungoverned spacescould become fertile breeding grounds for transna-tional Islamist terror.149

In 2002, the U.S. State Department launched thePan Sahel Initiative (PSI), which later evolved into the

Trans Sahara Counter Terrorism Partnership (TSCTP)program. In its rst year, the Pan Sahel Initiativespent $6.25 million to conduct training and capacitybuilding in Niger, Mali, Chad, and Mauritania. Thesepartner military forces received training from the U.S.Marines and Army Special Forces and were providedtactical equipment such as night vision goggles.150

A dening moment that reinforced the need for awell-planned and coordinated regional effort againstcounterterrorism in the Sahel was the response to the2003 kidnapping of 32 European hostages by AQIMspredecessor, the GSPC. The ensuing transnational gunbattle went from Mali to Niger to Chad. The hunt forthe GSPC leader, the Algerian paratrooper Amari Saiknown as El Para, involved troops from Mali, Ni-

ger, Algeria, and Chad, with support from the UnitedStates European Command (EUCOM).151


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The creation of the TSCTP in 2005 further expand-ed the extent of the regional security framework, while

increasing focus on the underlying socioeconomic andpolitical issues that drive violence and instability. Acollaboration between the U.S. State Department andU.S. Department of Defense (DoD), the TSCTP:

supports African states efforts to improve bordersecurity and counterterrorism capacity while also fa-cilitating regional cooperation, promoting democratic

governance, and improving relations with the US.152

The regional framework was expanded to includeAlgeria, Nigeria, Morocco, Tunisia, and Senegal. Withan anticipated budget of $100 million for 2007-13, theTSCTP is more heavily funded than the PSI, thoughthe resources pale in comparison with the vastness ofthe continent. The TSCTP also reects a shift, at leastrhetorically, to a more comprehensive or whole-of-government approach toward terrorism that includesdevelopment initiatives. While military operationswere still to be a major focus, emphasis was placed onincreasing collaboration above the tactical level. Othergovernment agencies, such as the U.S. Agency forInternational Development (USAID) and the Depart-

ment of Treasury were to address underlying issuesranging from educational opportunities to money-handling controls, caused the program to be renamedthe Trans Saharan Counter Terrorism Initiative.153

The military training exercise Flintlock launchedthe TSCTP in 2005. Flintlock is directed by the Chair-man of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, sponsored by AF-RICOM and the Joint Special Operations Task Force,and conducted by the TSCTP and Special OperationsForces. This multinational exercise regularly draws


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participants from 16 countries, including those fromthe Sahel region as well as Canada and European states.

Flintlock 2012, scheduled for February 27-March 18 inMali, was to emphasize military support to humani-tarian assistance operation. It was cancelled February10 due to ongoing clashes between government forcesand

What Is Next for Mali? The Roots of Conflict and Challenges to Stability

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