What is Feasibility Study

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What is feasibility study?

A feasibility study is an evaluation and analysis of the potential of the proposed

project which is based on extensive investigation and research to support the

process of decision making. Feasibility studies aim to objectively and rationally

uncover the strengths and weaknesses of an existing business or proposed venture,

opportunities and threats present in the environment, the resources required to

carry through, and ultimately the prospects for success. [1][2] In its simplest terms,

the two criteria to judge feasibility are cost required and value to be attained.[3] As

such, a well-designed feasibility study should provide a historical background of the

business or project, description of the product or service, accounting statements,

details of the operations and management, marketing research and policies,

financial data, legal requirements and tax obligations. [1] Generally, feasibility studies

precede technical development and project implementation

Objective of feasibility study?

A feasibility study evaluates the project's potential for success; therefore, the

perceived objectivity is an important factor in the credibility to be placed on the

study by potential investors and lending institutions.[citation needed] It must therefore be

conducted with an objective, unbiased approach to provide information upon which

decisions can be based.[citation needed]

Technology and system feasibility

The assessment is based on an outline design of system requirements, to determine whether thecompany has the technical expertise to handle completion of the project. When writing afeasibility report, the following should be taken to consideration:

A brief description of the business to assess more possible factor/s which could affect the

study The part of the business being examined

The human and economic factor

The possible solutions to the problems

At this level, the concern is whether the proposal is both technically and legally feasible(assuming moderate cost).

Legal Feasibility
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Determines whether the proposed system conflicts with legal requirements, e.g. a data processingsystem must comply with the local Data Protection Acts.

Operational Feasibility

Operational feasibility is a measure of how well a proposed system solves the problems, andtakes advantage of the opportunities identified during scope definition and how it satisfies therequirements identified in the requirements analysis phase of system development.[4]

The operational feasibility assessment focuses on the degree to which the proposed developmentprojects fits in with the existing business environment and objectives with regard to developmentschedule, delivery date, corporate culture, and existing business processes.

Economic Feasibility

The purpose of the economic feasibility assessment is to determine the positive economicbenefits to the organization that the proposed system will provide. It includes quantification andidentification of all the benefits expected. This assessment typically involves a cost/ benefitsanalysis.

Technical Feasibility

The technical feasibility assessment is focused on gaining an understanding of the present

technical resources of the organization and their applicability to the expected needs of theproposed system. It is an evaluation of the hardware and software and how it meets the need ofthe proposed system[5]

Schedule Feasibility

A project will fail if it takes too long to be completed before it is useful. Typically this meansestimating how long the system will take to develop, and if it can be completed in a given timeperiod using some methods like payback period. Schedule feasibility is a measure of howreasonable the project timetable is. Given our technical expertise, are the project deadlinesreasonable? Some projects are initiated with specific deadlines. You need to determine whether

the deadlines are mandatory or desira


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Other feasibility factors

Market and real estate feasibility

Market feasibility studies typically involve testing geographic locations for a real estatedevelopment project, and usually involve parcels of real estate land. Developers often conductmarket studies to determine the best location within a jurisdiction, and to test alternative landuses for given parcels. Jurisdictions often require developers to complete feasibility studies

before they will approve a permit application for retail, commercial, industrial, manufacturing,housing, office or mixed-use project. Market Feasibility takes into account the importance of thebusiness in the selected area.

Resource feasibility

This involves questions such as how much time is available to build the new system, when it canbe built, whether it interferes with normal business operations, type and amount of resourcesrequired, dependencies,

Cultural feasibility

In this stage, the project's alternatives are evaluated for their impact on the local and generalculture. For example, environmental factors need to be considered and these factors are to bewell known. Further an enterprise's own culture can clash with the results of the project.

Financial feasibility

In case of a new project, financial viability can be judged on the following parameters:

Total estimated cost of the project

Financing of the project in terms of its capital structure, debt equity ratio and promoter's

share of total cost

Existing investment by the promoter in any other business

Projected cash flow and profitability
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The financial viability of a project should provide the following information:[citation needed]

Full details of the assets to be financed and how liquid those assets are.

Rate of conversion to cash-liquidity (i.e. how easily can the various assets be converted to

cash?).

Project's funding potential and repayment terms.

Sensitivity in the repayments capability to the following factors:

o

o Time delays.

o Mild slowing of sales.

o Acute reduction/slowing of sales.

o Small increase in cost.

o Large increase in cost.

o Adverse economic conditions.

Market research study and analysis

This is one of the most important sections of the feasibility study as it examines the marketabilityof the product or services and convinces readers that there is a potential market for the product orservices.[citation needed] If a significant market for the product or services cannot be established, thenthere is no project.

Typically, market studies will assess the potential sales of the product, absorption and marketcapture rates and the project's timing.[citation needed]
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BANDRA WARLI SEA LINK


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Introduction of Bandra warli sea link

The BandraWorli Sea Link, officially called Rajiv Gandhi Sea Link, is a cable-stayed bridgewith pre-stressed concrete-steel viaductson either side that links Bandra in the Western SuburbsofMumbai with Worli in South Mumbai.[1] The bridge is a part of the proposed WesternFreewaythat will link the Western Suburbs toNariman Pointin Mumbai's main business district.

The 16 billion (US$290 million) bridge was commissioned by theMaharashtra State RoadDevelopment Corporation (MSRDC), and built by the Hindustan Construction Company. Thefirst four of the eight lanes of the bridge were opened to the public on 30 June 2009.[8] All eightlanes were opened on 24 March 2010.

The sea-link reduces travel time between Bandra and Worli during peak hours from 6090minutes to 2030 minutes.[9] As of October 2009, BWSL had an average daily traffic of around37,500 vehicles.[10]

History

Mahim Causeway was the only road connecting the western suburbs to Mumbai's centralbusiness district. This north-southwestern corridor became a bottleneck and was highlycongested at peak hours. The West Island Freeway project was proposed to span the entirewestern coastline of Mumbai to ease congestion. The BandraWorli Sea-Link, a bridge over

Mahim Bay, was proposed as the first phase of this freeway system, offering an alternative routeto the Mahim Causeway.

The sea-link connects the intersection of the Western Express Highway and Swami VivekanandRoad in Bandra to the Khan Abdul Ghaffar Khan Road in Worli. From Worli Seaface, itconnects to Mumbai's arterial Annie Besant Road.

The project was commissioned by the Maharashtra State Road Development CorporationLimited (MSRDC). The contract for construction was awarded to the Hindustan ConstructionCompany (HCC), with project management led by the UK offices ofDar Al-Handasah, withsignificant technology transfer from China.[11]

The foundation stone was laid in 1999 by Bal Thackeray. The original plan estimated the cost at6.6 billion (US$120 million) to be completed in five years.[12]But the project was subject to

numerous public interest litigations, with the 5-year delay resulting in the cost escalating to16 billion (US$290 million),[13] with the additional interest cost alone accounting for 7 billion(US$130 million).[12]

BWSL was named in the memory of late prime ministerRajiv Gandhi.[4]
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PlanningThe overall project consisted of five parts, contracted separately to accelerate the overallschedule.

Package I: Construction of a flyoverover Love Grove junction in Worli

Package II: Construction of a cloverleaf interchange at the intersection of the WesternExpress Highway and S.V. Road in Bandra

Package III: Construction of solid approach road from the interchange to the Toll Plaza

on the Bandra side along with a publicpromenade

Package IV: Construction of the central cable-stayed spans with northern and southern

viaducts from Worli to the Toll Plaza at the Bandra end

Package V: Improvements to Khan Abdul Gaffar Khan Road

Package IV was the main phase, with the other packages providing supporting infrastructure.

Bridge management

Toll gates of Bandra-Worli sea link

Toll collection

The Bandra end of the toll plaza has 16 approach lanes. The toll plaza is equipped with an

electronic toll collection system.

At both ends, the toll collection options include:

Automatic electronic paymentsystem through On-board Units mounted on vehicles for

frequent-commuters that enable vehicles to pass without stopping[17]

Semi-automatic cash-less electronic payment via a smart card in unattended lanes
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Manual toll collection for payment by cash, to a toll attendant

VehicleToll

Single Journey Return Journey Day Pass

Car 55 (US$1.00) 82.50 (US$1.50) 137.50 (US$2.50)

Tempo/LCV 80 (US$1.50) 120 (US$2.20) 200 (US$3.70)

Truck/Bus 110 (US$2.00) 165 (US$3.00) 275 (US$5.00)

Monitoring

An intelligent bridge management system (IBS) provides traffic information,surveillance,monitoring and control systems. It comprises CCTVs, automatic traffic counters and vehicleclassification system, variable message signs, remote weather information system and emergencytelephones. The control centre is located near the toll plaza along with the electronic tollingcontrols. The control system uses fibre-optic cables running the entire span of the BWSL. Thetoll management system and advanced traffic management system was instal

For traffic enforcement, the bridge includes facilities for vehicles to pull over when stopped byenforcement officers or in the event of a breakdown.

Security

The bridge uses mobile explosive scanners[18]for vehicles travelling on the sea link.[19][20] Scanstake less than 20 seconds for each vehicle with sensors above and below the vehicles. Over 180cars can be scanned per hour by each scanner.

The pillars and the towers supporting the bridge are protected by buoys designed to withstandexplosions and collisions. These inflated buoys surround each pillar of the sea link to avoid anydamage.[21]

The bridge tower and the control centres feature lightning protection, designed to protect thebridge monitoring, communication and power equipment from possible surges.
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Power supply & lighting

The Bandra Worli Sea link, at night.

The bridge has a reliable and redundant power supply, backed up by diesel generators and automains failure panels for critical loads, such as monitoring, surveillance, emergency equipmentand communication services including aviation and obstruction indicators. BWSL exclusivelyuses energy saving illlumination systems.

Panorama View of Bandra Worli Sea Link

Criticisms

The Economic Times was critical of the BandraWorli Sea Link in every particular. First, thecost was not the projected 3 billion but actually cost 16 billion or about 430% cost overrun.Second, the project was 5-year behind schedule. Third, the supposedly reduction in commute
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time did not occur. Traffic bunched up at both ends of the Link causing nightmarish grid lock.The blame rest, as usual, on the notorious Indian corruption and political in-efficiencies.[22]


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Sea link finances cause concernChittaranjan Tembhekar, TNN Oct 2, 2009, 04.53am IST

Tags:

Mumbai

MUMBAI: The Bandra-Worli Sea Link may be Mumbai's soaring new landmark, but it's giving

some state officials a sinking feeling. Financial results for the first quarter (which ended onWednesday) after the commissioning of the Rs 1,634-crore bridge have raised fears that it's awhite elephant in waiting.

Mantralaya sources say the state government is falling Rs 4 lakh short of revenue projections perday. This shortfall adds up to Rs 1.2 crore per month and nearly Rs 4 crore over the first passingquarter (June 30 to September 30).

Sources in the Maharashtra State Road Development Corporation (MSRDC), which owns theSea Link, admitted that the estimate of 70,000 vehicles a day was far off the mark, with actualtraffic averaging only 37,500 vehicles a day.

So instead of the expected daily toll collection of Rs 21 lakh, the road was fetching just Rs 16.2lakh.

As per the agreement, Mumbai Entry Point Toll Ltd (MEPTL), which handles Sea Link tollcollection, is expected to raise Rs 1.44 crore a week. Since it can't do that due to awryprojections, sources say MEPTL may ask the state for compensation of Rs 4 crore every year,which the state may have to pay up.

"Companies pay Rs 21 lakh a day for events. If losses mount, the Sea Link may become more ofa venue for corporate events than for traffic," said a senior official.

MSRDC sources said that even allowing 120 BEST buses on the link wouldn't help. "They'llfetch only Rs 6 lakh per month, at a toll rate of Rs 5,000 per bus per month. But losses are Rs 4lakh per day," they said.

Moreover, security agencies charge substantial sums to keep the link safe.
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From 2012, using your car on the Bandra-Worli Sea Link may cost you Rs. 20 more. Abeleaguered Maharashtra State Road Development (MSRDC) Corporation, which is losing Rs15crore every year in toll collection on the Bandra-Worli Sea Link, is planning to increase the tollfor cars using the sea link from Rs. 50 to Rs. 70.

The MSRDC had been hoping that the sea link would attract around 90,000 vehicles every day.However, on a good day, barely 40,000 vehicles use it. We are losing close to Rs15 crore everyyear as revenue on the sea link.

The toll rate has remained unchanged at Rs. 50 since 2009. We will now request the stategovernment to allow us to increase it to Rs. 70, a senior MSRDC official said.

The state government had permitted MSRDC to charge a toll of Rs. 70 when the sea link wasopened in June 2009. However, in an attempt to attract more commuters, MSRDC had decided tokeep it at Rs. 50 initially.

The toll is being collected by a private operator, Mumbai Entry Point Ltd (MEPL), since thebridge was thrown open in June 2009. MEPL bagged the rights to do so after paying MSRDCRs74 crore. However, less-than-expected traffic on the sea link has meant that neither the tolloperator nor MSRDC are happy with the returns.

The contract, which was initially for one year, is now being renewed every three months, asMSRDCs hope that Reliance Infrastructure will take up toll collection has not materialised.

Reliance Infrastructure has bagged the contract for building the Worli-Haji Ali Sea Link. As perthe terms of the contract it also had to take over the Bandra-Worli Sea Link and would get therights to collect the toll on the project. There is however a stalemate between MSRDC andReliance Infrastructre over building of the Worli-Haji Ali Sea Link. MSRDC has given thecompany a January deadline to take over the Bandra-Worli Sea Link and start construction onthe Worli Haji Ali link.

There are, however, indications that both parties may call off the contract.

MSRDC has now decided that rather than wait for someone to take over the project, a betteroption would be to increase the toll.

As per MSRDCs plans, by early 2012, the toll for cars will increase from Rs50 to Rs70, LCVs(Light Commercial Vehicles) from Rs. 75 to Rs. 105 and HCVs (Heavy Commercial Vehicles)from Rs. 100 to Rs. 140.


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However, the proposal will have to be approved by the state government. MSRDC vice chairmanand managing director Bipin Shrimali did not respond to calls or messages.

Bandra-Worli- Haji Ali Sea links status

Panel clears plan to extend sea link to Versova

Source: http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/cow/9499378.cms

MUMBAI: The Cabinet sub-committee on infrastructure has cleared the proposal for extendingthe Bandra-Worli sea link to Versova.

Government officials said the proposal, which was cleared on Wednesday, comes as a boost for

the 10-km link plan, which is expected to cost Rs 4,000 crore.

Officials said at present, two connectors-at Otters Club on Carter Road, Bandra (West) and atJuhu Koliwada-have been planned. However, when the plan was first announced, citizensgroups had objected to these connectors. Planners had been considering a coastal road for partof the link, however, they are now in favour of a link over the sea, said officials.

The sea link may ultimately be extended from Versova to Vasai-Virar in the future. Though theBandra-Versova plan has been talked about for several years, it has remained on the drawingboard. The reason was that it took long to build the Bandra-Worli sea link itself, the officialssaid.

City planners has first proposed using a cut-and-cover tunnel at Juhu beach so as not to affect thearea but the residents had objected to it.

2 yrs on, Bandra-Worli sea link fails to attract motorists

Zeeshan Shaikh, Hindustan TimesMumbai, June 13, 2011

The Bandra-Worli sea link was touted as the solution to the citys traffic woes with the stategovernment claiming 1.2 lakh vehicles would use the road by 2011. However, as per figuresreleased by the Maharashtra State Road Development Corporation (MSRDC), less than 28,000

vehicles ply on the sea link daily.

A report by Dar Consultants, private consultants appointed for the project in 2006, had claimedthat after completion, the sea link would attract 79,335 vehicles in 2009.

It also said the number would increase to 1.2 lakh by 2012 if the sea link was extended to HajiAli.
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However, these traffic estimates are less by around 90,000 vehicles.

This raises doubts over the feasibility of sea links built for the convenience of 2.4% of the citysvehicle-owning population.

Transport expert Ashok Datar criticised the state governments resolve in creating capital-intensive sea links instead of improving public transport systems.

The government plans to build three more sea links worth Rs11,000 crore, but is not willing tospend Rs1,300 crore for the Bus Rapid Transport Project, which will benefit an estimated 4.5million commuters.

The bureaucrats are running after big ticket projects and shelling out crores on sea links andbridges. Elementary systems to improve public transport are however neglected, Datar said.

A senior MSRDC official, on condition of anonymity, however, claimed that once the entire sea

link, stretching from Versova till Nariman Point, is completed, it will attract more traffic.

MSRDCs acting head Satish Gavai and minister Jaydutt Kshirsagar were unavailable forcomment.

Less than 50%targeted traffic, Bandra-Worli suffers shortfall of Rs4

lakh/day

Published: Sunday, May 29, 2011, 5:00 IST

By Kishore Rathod | Place: Mumbai | Agency: DNA

Its the perfect stretch to slide out of your sedans sunroof on a Sunday morning, a great setting

for fat bankers to push the envelope during their annual run-n-fun event, and a superb backdropfor an action sequence in a Bollywood flick. Ironically enough, this is what the Bandra WorliSea-Link, built at a cost of Rs1,634-crore, has been reduced to.

With the volume of vehicles plying on the 4.7-km long express-bypass not even adding up to50% of the targeted numbers, Mumbais big-ticket infrastructure project is emerging as itscostliest indulgence. For the record, the sea-link is suffering a revenue shortfall of Rs4 lakh a day Rs14.4 crore annually and each passing day is making things more difficult for Mumbaisflagship public-private partnership project. One reason for the low traffic could be the toll,which, at Rs50 one way and Rs75 for a return, is considered by many to be on the higher side.Another obviously is the traffic jams at either end of the sea link, which would nullify the entire

point of using the bridge.

The Bandra-Worli sea link has become symbolic of everything thats wrong with the way weexecute our public projects. From political interference and multiple delays to shoddyimplementation and cost escalations, its all gone into making the sea-link a white elephant thatwe can ill-afford, says urban development expert Chandrashekhar Prabhu, adding that wheninfrastructure projects become part of a political partys manifesto, its the common man whosuffers.


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The political interference has cost us dear, says Ramakant Jha, MSRDCs former executivedirector, who was part of then Chief Minister Manohar Joshis core team for infrastructuredevelopment during the Sena-BJP rule.

Jhas team had clearly defined the blue-print of the sea-link from Bandra to Nariman Point, work

on the first phase up to Worli had commenced, and tenders for the second stretch were to beannounced, when the change of guard at Mantralaya derailed the entire project. We had evensecured the environmental clearance for the Worli-Nariman Point stretch way back in 2002, butthe new government had a new look at the project and before long, the entire schedule wasthrown out of gear, says Jha, adding that had the sea-link project gone ahead as per the originalschedule, not only would the sea-link be up to Nariman Point today, it would also have also beena good example of cost-effective infrastructure management.

What should have taken three years, took ten years and we are just half way there, says Jha,adding that lack of political will and clarity are the biggest deterrents to infrastructural \

The Bandra-Worli sea link is not only a money-guzzling masterpiece, but also a nightmare fromthe traffic management perspective. The routine traffic jams at Worli, Haji Ali and Peddar Roadare a testimony to the sea-links inefficacy. Unless it goes all the way to Nariman Point, the sealink will be more of a problem than a solution, says former-DGP and traffic management expertDr PS Pasricha. Be it the western carriageway from Bandra to Nariman Point or the easterncarriageway from Sion to CST, there should be dedicated roads for the point-to-point trafficwithout passing it through the areas en route, he adds. The need of the hour is not only tocreate an effective, integrated transportation infrastructure thats a mesh of roads, railways,metros and mono-rails, but also to have a computerised traffic management system that willfactor in every part of the network.

As much as it is an example of how things can go wrong, the sea link is also a case-study forMumbais future infrastructure projects. Ideally, politicians from all parties should cometogether and arrive at a consensus on what needs to be done for Mumbai. They should not revieweach others decisions and derail the development work, says Prabhu, who feels that thebureaucrats should leave the drawing of the blueprint and planning of the project to experts fromthe respective fields.Citing the example of the still-upcoming Mumbai Trans-Harbour Sea link (MTHS) from Sewrito Nhava Sheva, Jha says that a good 16 alternatives with all the pros and cons were exploredway backin2000, before the final plan for the sea link was zeroed in on. Instead of reinventingthe wheel, they should just set it rolling. Delays can derail projects and the political bossesshould know that, remarks Jha.

Meanwhile, the elected representatives have their own reasons to justify their involvement inexecution of public projects. MLA Krishna Hegde, whose Vile Parle constituency is seeing astring of government projects being executed cites the case of the Sahar elevated road project, inwhich 1,400 families are being rehabilitated, Infrastructure doesnt happen in isolation, itinvolves people. And the electedrepresentatives are the voice of the people. I am not opposed tothe expansion of the airport, but if poor people who have been staying here for 40 years aregoing to make way for five-star hotels and malls, then I have to oppose such plans, he says,


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adding that politicians bring in the necessary checks-and-balances to any public work and theirinputs can help the implementing agencies execute a project better.

http://www.dnaindia.com/mumbai/report_less-than-50pcttargeted-traffic-bandra-worli-suffers-shortfall-of-rs4-lakh-day_1548700

Update 11 Feb 2011

End of the road for Worli-Haji Ali sea link?

MUMBAI: Many Mumbaiites with fast cars have been dreaming of more sea links to indulgetheir need for speed in the city of eternal snarl-ups. But less fortunate fellow citizens have beencrying hoarse over the massive cost of such bridges and steep toll, instead demanding lessspectacular but more utilitarian infrastructure.

Lending them an ear, the government is mulling over scrapping the Worli-Haji Ali sea link

project, work on which is scheduled to start on April 1. The proposed alternative is a coastal roadalong the stretch, which can be built with just Rs 500 crore compared to the sea links Rs 4,500crore. The road may extend till Priyadarshini Park.

We will study the technical and financial feasibility of the coastal road before April, said BipinShrimali, MD and vice chairman, Maharashtra State Road Development Corporation (MSRDC).We are looking into the legal aspect of whether the road can be built on reclaimed land. Thenew Coastal Regulation Zone (CRZ) rules specify that coastal roads should be built on stilts ifthere are mangroves. But the trees are not present along the Worli-Haji Ali stretch.

Jaidutt Kshirsagar, minister for public works and chairman of the MSRDC, said the coastal road

is being considered because of strong public opposition to the sea link project. A meeting withenvironment department officials and experts is slated soon.

The contract for the sea link project is with Reliance Infrastructure (RInfra), which has alreadymade a preliminary investment of Rs 200 crore. If the government decides in favour of thecoastal road, it may either ask RInfra to lay it or invite tenders afresh.

An RInfra official greeted the news sceptically, calling it a figment of imagination. Talk thatour sea link project will be scrapped is baseless. The contract is in place; we do not wish tocomment further.

State environment secretary Valsa Nair Singh said that seeking clearances for the coastal roadwill be easy, since the new CRZ rules permit such roads, albeit with the stipulation that they bebuilt on stilts to avoid damage to mangroves; clearance from the Union environment ministrywill not be necessary. The CRZ panel and the state environment committee can clear the projectafter examining it.

Welcoming the news, a transport expert and social activist, who lobbied against the Worli-HajiAli sea link, said: Sea links do not ease life for the ordinary citizen. The companies building


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them recover costs through steep toll. Who can afford to pay Rs 200 as toll? The sum is a likelyrate.

Read more: End of the road for Worli-Haji Ali sea link? The Times of Indiahttp://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/city/mumbai/End-of-the-road-for-Worli-Haji-Ali-sea-

link/articleshow/7472194.cms#ixzz1Dd5ScwLe

State wants coastal road, not sea links

Zeeshan Shaikh, Hindustan TimesMumbai, February 11, 2011

Encouraged by the recent easing of Coastal Regulation Zone (CRZ) norms for Mumbai, the stategovernment is considering scrapping the entire Versova-to-Nariman Point sea link project andbuilding a coastal road along the stretch instead by reclaiming land. A coastal road, the statethinks, can be

built at just one-third the cost of the sea link project, estimated at Rs 10,000 crore. The Bandra-Worli sea link was opened in 2009. The state had initially planned two more links Worli toHaji Ali and Haji Ali to Nariman Point but later decided to extend the link to Versova.

But the new CRZ regulations, which allow construction of coastal roads by land reclamation oruse of stilts, has made the state rethink because sea links are capital-intensive.

At a meeting held on Monday, chief minister Prithviraj Chavan asked the Maharashtra StateRoad Development Corporation (MSRDC) to check the feasibility of building a coastal road.

We are evaluating the option of constructing a coastal road instead of capital-intensive sealinks, MSRDC vice-chairman and managing director Bipin Shrimali said.

MSRDC has now asked the environment department about the projects feasibility, he added.

http://www.hindustantimes.com/State-wants-coastal-road-not-sea-links/Article1-660969.aspx
http://www.hindustantimes.com/Search/search.aspx?q=Zeeshan%20Shaikh&op=Storyhttp://www.hindustantimes.com/Search/search.aspx?q=Zeeshan%20Shaikh&op=Storyhttp://www.hindustantimes.com/Search/search.aspx?q=Zeeshan%20Shaikh&op=Story


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Pay more to drive on Bandra-Worli Sea Link from April 1

TNN, Jan 13, 2011, 01.54am IST

MUMBAI: Motorists will have to shell out Rs 65 for a one-way journey on the Bandra-WorliSea Link (BWSL) from April 1. The toll for a mini bus (12-seater) or goods vehicle will be Rs100, Rs 25 more than the current charges, while for a truck or a bus the one-way toll will be Rs130 as against the existing Rs 100.

The hike has been mandated in a government notification, which states that the toll can berevised by the link operator, an official said. Reliance Infrastructure (RInfra), the new tollcollector from April 1, will operate the link for the next 40 years. The company will offer 25%

discount to regular commuters on monthly, daily or night passes.

The new toll rates are implemented after every three years across all toll posts in the state thoughthey increase by 3 per cent every year as the per governments notification. The contract of theexisting toll collector__the Mumbai Entry Point Toll__ will end the moment Reliance achievesfinancial closure for building the next link between Worli and Haji Ali and starts the constructionwork.

Interestingly, RInfra is all set to make an upfront payment of Rs 1,634 crore to MSRDC forbuying the BWSL for a period of 40 years. During first 32 months of this period, RInfra has toconstruct the new sea link between Worli and Haji Ali (WHSL), with connectors at Worli and

Haji Ali, and recover the total cost of maintaining the BWSL as well as constructing andmaintaining the WHSL for 40 years by charging toll from commuters as stipulated in thegovernment policy.

According to MSRDC minister Jaidutta Kshirsagar, after the financial closure in March, RInfrawill immediately start the construction work for WHSL and will take over the toll collection.

Even though we have granted 32 months for construction work, the new link will ready beforethat, said a government official. Even RInfra sources were confident of completing the workbefore time. We will use advanced technologies to build the 3.8 km link with connectors.RInfra and its foreign collaboration have almost completed the survey and soil testing for the

link,a source said.

However, once the WHSL is completed, the one-way toll rate for each vehicle will go up byanother minimum Rs 32 to Rs 50. This means by 2015, the one-way sea link toll could beminimum Rs 90 for a car, Rs 130 for a minibus and Rs 160 for a bus.


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Read more: Pay more to drive on Bandra-Worli Sea Link from April 1 The Times of Indiahttp://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/city/mumbai/Pay-more-to-drive-on-Bandra-Worli-Sea-Link-from-April-1/articleshow/7271970.cms#ixzz1AvZP0iXD

All clear for Worli-Haji Ali Sea Link

TNN, Jan 13, 2011,

MUMBAI: The Union environment ministry on Wednesday sanctioned the construction of theWorli-Haji Ali Sea Link. If everything goes according to plans, work on the project will start byMarch and is expected to finish by 2014.

Clearing the decks for the crucial link, the ministry gave the long-awaited green nod to the newlydesigned alignment of the sea links Haji Ali connector that will now land on Dr Annie BesantRoad, 400 metres ahead of the dargah square. According to the initial plan, it was to land veryclose to the Haji Ali chowk. Significantly, the MoEF has also endorsed the location of the

controversial Pratiksha building connector on Dr Abdul Gaffar Khan Road in Worli.

The Centres nod will facilitate the state and Reliance Infrastructure to kick off work on theproject as soon as possible. We expect RInfra to wrap up the work in 32 months as specifiedduring awarding the project, said MSRDC Minister Jaidutta Kshirsagar.

Clearance for the (Haji Ali) connector was a major hurdle in starting the construction work. Theapplication was pending with the MoEF for more than a year now. Incidentally, the MoEF hasalready accorded environmental clearance to the entire western freeway sea link from Bandra toNariman Point, an official said. The approved link will cost Rs 4,000 crore and the MSRDCwill stand to make a profit of over Rs 240 crore, the official added.

Now after taking the sea link from Bandra or Worli, the traffic will be able land ahead of LoveGrove junction near Rajani Patel square on Dr Annie Besant road. As per government sourcesRInfra has promised the state to achieve the financial closure to start the construction work byMarch. During the closure RInfra is supposed to buy Bandra-Worli sea link (BWSL) by payingupfront Rs 1634 crore to the MSRDC. Similarly MSRDC has to pay Rs 1392 crore in three equalinstallments in the next three years as its share towards building Worli-Haji Ali Sea link(WHSL). So the net gain for MSRDC is around Rs 242 crore. The total cost of the new link isestimated to be around Rs 4000 crore. After the financial closure in March Reliance will alsotake over the toll collection which is set to increase from April 1 this year.

Even though MSRDC had earlier planned to build the connector near Worli Dairy, the existingWorli connector near Pratiksha building is as per the original plan, the clearance stated.

Read more: All clear for Worli-Haji Ali Sea Link The Times of Indiahttp://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/city/mumbai/All-clear-for-Worli-Haji-Ali-Sea-Link/articleshow/7271969.cms#ixzz1AvZeEusw


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Update 28 Dec 10

Bandra-Worli sea link promenade (walkway) may be ready by March 2011

If the officials of the Maharashtra State Road Development Corporation (MSRDC) are to be

believed, the Bandra-Worli Sea Link will soon see a world-class promenade. However, sourcessaid that DB Realty, the contractor for the work,has been facing problems during its constructionin the Bandra reclamation area.

Till about two years back the corporation was maintaining the garden in the reclamation alongthe approach way to the sea link.

But it decided to outsource this area to a private player who could develop it into a promenade.Through tendering the contract was awarded to DB Realty.

While the contractor struggled for over a year to take the work ahead, after much deliberation,

the corporation decided to go ahead with the project. Subsequently, the work began a fewmonths back; however, according to sources in the corporation, the contractor faced trouble dueto poor quality of concrete which was used during the construction.

A senior MSRDC official confirmed that the contractor had to re-dig the concreted area on morethan one occasions.

However, it should not bother the progress of the project. The contractor will be maintaining thepromenade for a period of 15 years. So, he has his own commitment to follow. We have beenassured that the entire 1.25km stretch will be ready by March-April next year. We are hopefulthat the contractor would meet his deadline, said the official. Top officials of DB reality were

not available for comment despite repeated attempts.

The promenade promises to add to the beauty of the sea link.

Among other things, an open air theatre, the seven island columns or the Saptdeep Stambh,Bollywood Celebrity Walk and Board Walk, Tower of Destiny or Sheesh Minar and an area formeditation as well as sitouts are parts of the promenade.

The total area to be developed is 1.25km long and 40m wide. The corporation will get a lumpsum amount of Rs7.8 crore for the contract. The contractor will also put up 25 plaques across thearea as corporate social responsibility (CSR).

Source: http://www.dnaindia.com/mumbai/report_bandra-worli-sea-link-promenade-may-be-ready-by-march-2011_1487021

Update 24 Dec 10


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The 4.7-km stretch of Bandra-Worli Sea Link may be providing some respite to thousands ofmotorists plying on it. But even before the laying of a single brick, it seems like the next stretchof the sea link, taking it up to Haji Ali, is in for delays.

While the official version seems to be that the delays are mainly due to the environmental

clearance to the connector in Haji Ali, sources have told DNA that the consortium constructingthe sea link has not been able to close in on their financial needs.

The next phase of the sea link from Worli to Haji Ali is to be constructed on a private-publicpartnership basis and the Maharashtra State Road Development Corporation (MSRDC) hadawarded the contract to the consortium of Reliance Infrastructure and Hyundai Engineering morethan two years back.

A senior official of the corporation confirmed that the consortium is likely to ask for anextension of three months to declare their financial preparedness.

The banks which are to lend money to the consortium have been asking for all the clearances onpaper. However, we are yet to get the final nod for the Worli connector from the centralgovernment (Ministry of Environment and Forests). Since this is going to take some time, theconsortium is likely to be given an extension of three months for declaring financialpreparedness, said the official.

However, sources in the corporation have toldDNA that though, on the face of it, theenvironmental clearance has been given as a reason, the real cause of delay is because theconsortium has not been able to raise the required funds.

There has been no progress over the final designs. This can only be done after the financial

soundness is declared. It is ironic that it is going to cause delays, said a source.

When asked about the development, a Reliance Infrastructure spokesperson confirmed that anextension has been asked for.

There are various project prerequisites being worked out between MSRDC and Reliance. Theproject prerequisites are extremely critical for commencement of the project as well as for itssuccessful implementation. RInfra has completed all necessary activities with the project lendersand they are ready to fund the project in its entirety. The extension of time has been sought inconsultation with MSRDC, said the spokesperson.

The consortium needs to pay Rs1,634 crore to MSRDC and buy out the existing sea link. Oncethat is done, the consortium will construct and maintain the stretch between Bandra and Haji Alifor a period of minimum 40 years.

Source: http://www.dnaindia.com/mumbai/report_bandra-worli-sea-link-s-2nd-stretch-may-face-delay_1485366


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Source:http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Bandra%E2%80%93Worli_Sea_Link

Bandra-Worli Sealinks

The BandraWorli Sea Link (BWSL) , officially the Rajiv Gandhi Sea Link, is a cable-stayed bridge with pre-stressed concrete viaduct approaches, which links Bandra and the westernsuburbs of Mumbai with Worli and central Mumbai, and is the first phase of the proposed WestIsland Freeway system.

The 1,600 crore (US$353.6 million) project of Maharashtra State Road DevelopmentCorporation (MSRDC) was executed by Hindustan Construction Company, with design andproject management by DAR Consultants. The bridge was dedicated to the public on 30 June2009 by Congress President and UPA Chairperson Sonia Gandhi, although only 4 of 8 laneswere opened to service. All the 8 lanes were opened to traffic on 24 March 2010.

The Sea Link reduces travel time between Bandra and Worli from 4560 minutes to 7 minutes.The link has an average daily traffic of around 37,500 vehicles per day, about half the pre-opening estimate of 70,000.

The BWSL project is a part of the Western Freeway Sea Project, which, in turn, is a part of a

larger proposal to upgrade the road transportation network of greater Mumbai. It is primarilymeant to provide an alternative to the Mahim Causeway route that is presently the onlyconnection between South Mumbai and the Western and Central suburbs. The project starts fromthe intersection of Western Express Highway and SV Road at the Bandra end, and connects it toKhan Abdul Gaffar Khan Road (Worli Seaface) at the Worli end which in turn connects toMumbais arterial Annie Besant Road at the Narayan Pujari Nagar corner. The MSRDC isplanning to open the remaining four lanes of the sea link by March 2010.
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Indian_rupeehttp://mumbai-flats.com/2010/01/worli-haji-ali-sea-links-may-face-delay/bandra-worli_sea_link_map/


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The project has been commissioned by the Maharashtra State Road Development CorporationLtd (MSRDC), designed by DAR Consultants and is being built by Hindustan ConstructionCompany (HCC).

Pic Source: http://bandraworlisealink.com/map.html
http://www.statcounter.com/http://mumbai-flats.com/2010/01/worli-haji-ali-sea-links-may-face-delay/bandra-worli-sealink-alignment-plan/


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Maharashtra State Road Development Corporation LimitedHighlights

The cost of the Bandra-Worli Sea Link Project originally (July 1999) estimated atRs.665.8 crore was revised (August 2004) toRs.1,306.25 crore. Though Packages-I, IIand III

i.e

. flyover at Worli,Mahim Intersection, Solid approach road up to the start of toll plazaanda public promenade were completed (February 2003), the crucialPackage-IVi.e.

the main cable stayed bridge across the sea was delayed.The increase in project costwas mainly due to payments of escalation(Rs.213 crore) to Contractors on account ofinordinate delay incompletion (61 months), introduction of new technical changes inthebridge at the behest of the new Consultant (Rs.70 crore), provision foradditionalclaims made by the Contractor for delay in award of worketc.(Rs.125 crore) and increase in interest liability due to delayed completion(Rs.230crore).(Paragraphs 2.1.8 and 2.1.14)Though the project was originally expected to be completed byMarch 2003, theexpected date of completion is now stated to beApril 2008. Expenditure of Rs.683.75

crore had been incurred on theproject as on 30 June 2007. The delay was mainly due totechnicalchanges brought in by new Consultants during execution.(Paragraphs 2.1.8 and 2.1.13)

Against a commitment of Rs.580 crore by way of grants, the StateGovernment hadprovided only Rs.100 crore till June 2007. This forcedthe Company to borrow fundsresulting in additional annual financialburden of Rs.37.05 crore on the project.(Paragraph 2.1.10)Chapter-II2. Performance reviews relating to Government companies2.1 Bandra-Worli Sea Link ProjectChapter-II-Performance reviews relating to Government companies

19The Company is headed by the Chairman who is the Ex-officio Minister for Public WorksDepartment (Special projects). The day to day management ishandled by the Vice Chairman andManaging Director who is assisted by theJoint Managing Directors, Chief Engineers and theSecretary and FinancialAdvisor.2.1.2The performance audit review, conducted during January-March 2007,covers the performance ofthe Company pertaining to project planning andfinancing, award of consultancy contracts,


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construction contracts andexecution of works in all the four packages of the BWSL project uptoMarch 2007. The project is in progress and the projected date of completion isApril 2008.Someof the Audit observations relating to this project noticed earlier duringaudit are contained inAudit Reports (Commercial) for the years 2003-04 and2005-06.2.1.3

The audit objectives of the performance review were to ascertainwhether the:project was identified after detailed study as regards necessity/economicviability;management took up the work after detailed planning of the project;consultant/contractors selected were technically competent and the processof selection wastransparent and fair;

project was executed keeping in view the principles of efficiency, economyand effectiveness;andmonitoring of the project was adequate and effective.2.1.4The following audit criteria were adopted:Traffic and feasibility study including the necessity and viability of the project as conducted bythe Company;Requirements of necessary statutory approvals/permissions, project design, project estimates;Scope of AuditAudit objectiveAudit criteria

Audit Report (Commercial) for the year ended 31 March 200724Company itself has been charging higher rates#towards interest duringconstruction (IDC) in its books of accounts.The State Government had guaranteed the loans raised by the Company for the project at acommission of 0.25per centper annum in the year 2000,which was, however, subsequently increased to oneper cent


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per annum in2004. The increased rate of guarantee commission, which has been provided for bythe Company has an impact of Rs.3.69 crore per annum inrespect of guarantee commissionpayable by the Company for bonds of Rs.492 crore raised for the project. This resulted in furtherescalation in the project cost.The Management stated (August 2007) that it has not been makingpayment of guarantee commission at one

per centand that the provision is being made inthe accounts as an abundant caution. The reply is nottenable, as there is aspecific provision in the GR (August 2004) for payment ofguaranteecommission, which has not been waived so far (August 2007).The projection that the bridge will be self-earningi.e.toll collection bySeptember 2007 is also not attainable, as the completion would beatleaststretched to 2011 as assessed (May 2006) by the engineer/consultantconsidering the slowrate of progress of work. Thus, the project has alreadylost potential toll revenue of Rs.80 crore

per annum. This postponement of the toll revenue is bound to extend the projected debt serviceperiod well beyond 2019 with reduced IRR.The Management stated (August 2007) that given theGovernment support andconsidering a concession period of 30 years the project could be viable.Thereply is, however, not based on facts, as the inordinate delay in completion of project,additional interest burden and postponement of the revenue, therepayment period will extendbeyond 2019 and unless there is a substantialhike in toll rates the IRR is also likely to be lowerthan projected. The replywas silent about the future increase in cost of repair and maintenanceandother overhead costs.The Western Freeway between Bandra and Nariman Point is an importantlink of this project.The additional traffic assumed by 2010 is not likely to be achieved as the preliminary work offinalising tenders for WesternFreeway was taken up only in 2007 and hence the likelycompletion dates by 2010 are visibly unachievable. All these developments would upset thetollrevenue projected between 2010 and 2019 and further extend the periodof repayment beyond2019, thus, rendering the project financially unviable.#For the year 2002-03 14.49per cent; 2003-04 13.53per cent; 2004-05 11.64per centand 2005-06 12.42per cent.Increase in theguaranteecommission byStateGovernmentresulted inadditionalexpenditureof Rs.3.69 crore perannum.


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Audit Report (Commercial) for the year ended 31 March 200724Company itself has been charging higher rates#towards interest duringconstruction (IDC) in its books of accounts.

The State Government had guaranteed the loans raised by the Company for the project at acommission of 0.25per centper annum in the year 2000,which was, however, subsequently increased to oneper cent

per annum in2004. The increased rate of guarantee commission, which has been provided for bythe Company has an impact of Rs.3.69 crore per annum inrespect of guarantee commissionpayable by the Company for bonds of Rs.492 crore raised for the project. This resulted in furtherescalation in the project cost.The Management stated (August 2007) that it has not been making

payment of guarantee commission at oneper centand that the provision is being made inthe accounts as an abundant caution. The reply is nottenable, as there is aspecific provision in the GR (August 2004) for payment ofguaranteecommission, which has not been waived so far (August 2007).The projection that the bridge will be self-earningi.e.toll collection bySeptember 2007 is also not attainable, as the completion would beatleaststretched to 2011 as assessed (May 2006) by the engineer/consultantconsidering the slowrate of progress of work. Thus, the project has alreadylost potential toll revenue of Rs.80 croreper annum. This postponement of the toll revenue is bound to extend the projected debt serviceperiod well beyond 2019 with reduced IRR.The Management stated (August 2007) that given theGovernment support andconsidering a concession period of 30 years the project could be viable.Thereply is, however, not based on facts, as the inordinate delay in completion of project,additional interest burden and postponement of the revenue, therepayment period will extendbeyond 2019 and unless there is a substantialhike in toll rates the IRR is also likely to be lowerthan projected. The replywas silent about the future increase in cost of repair and maintenanceandother overhead costs.The Western Freeway between Bandra and Nariman Point is an importantlink of this project.The additional traffic assumed by 2010 is not likely to be achieved as the preliminary work offinalising tenders for WesternFreeway was taken up only in 2007 and hence the likelycompletion dates by 2010 are visibly unachievable. All these developments would upset thetollrevenue projected between 2010 and 2019 and further extend the periodof repayment beyond2019, thus, rendering the project financially unviable.#For the year 2002-03 14.49


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per cent; 2003-04 13.53per cent; 2004-05 11.64per cent

and 2005-06 12.42per cent.Increase in theguaranteecommission byStateGovernmentresulted inadditionalexpenditureof Rs.3.69 crore perannum.

Chapter-II-Performance reviews relating to Government companies252.1.11The BWSLP is an ecologically sensitive project and involvesreclamation of land. The Companyobtained (January 1999) the firstenvironmental clearance of the project from the Union Ministryof Environment and Forest (MoEF), whichinter aliastated that reclamationshould be kept to bare minimumi.e.not exceeding 4.7 hectare. The Companyresorted to further reclamation of land without ensuringthat there were validenvironmental approvals. The MoEF sought (December 1999)explanationfrom the Company construing the same as violation of Coastal RegulationZonenotification. On filing a fresh request (March 2000), approval(April 2000) for reclamation oftotal land of 27 hectare was given by MoEF. Itwas observed that, the Company made noprovision in the project cost for contingencies, which may arise due to environmentaldisturbances.As per the opinion of some experts,$the reclamation of land at project areawould upset the flow of effluents andfloodwaters into the Arabian Sea due to pressure exerted at the mouth of the Mahim creek. Thiswould also result in blocking up of Mithi River and cause inordinate flooding in adjacent areas.Itwas observed that the Company had not addressed these environmental issuesas well as thelikely financial implications.2.1.12

The entire project was originally conceived as one large project withdifferent componentscombined together but in order to accelerate the overallconstruction schedule, the project wasdivided into five construction packages.Package-I: Construction of flyover over Love GroveJunction at Worli(commissioned in March 2002).Package-II: Construction of cloverleafinterchange at Mahim intersection(commissioned in February 2003);Package- III: Construction of solid approach road from the Mahim intersectionup to the start ofthe Toll Plaza on the Bandra side and a public promenade(commissioned in February


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2003);Package-IV: Construction of cable stayed Bridges at Bandra and Worlitogether withviaduct approaches extending from Worli up to Toll Plaza,Intelligent Bridge System(estimated to be commissioned by April 2008); andPackage-V: Improvement to KAGK Road hasnot been taken up by theCompany (August 2007). It is informed that this work is being shifted

toPhase II.i.e. WFSLP.$Indian Peoples Tribunal on Environment and Human Rights in their report (July 2001) onAnEnquiry into Bandra-Worli Sea Link Project.Environmental clearanceProject overview

Chapter-II-Performance reviews relating to Government companies25

2.1.11The BWSLP is an ecologically sensitive project and involvesreclamation of land. The Companyobtained (January 1999) the firstenvironmental clearance of the project from the Union Ministryof Environment and Forest (MoEF), whichinter aliastated that reclamationshould be kept to bare minimumi.e.not exceeding 4.7 hectare. The Companyresorted to further reclamation of land without ensuringthat there were validenvironmental approvals. The MoEF sought (December 1999)explanationfrom the Company construing the same as violation of Coastal RegulationZonenotification. On filing a fresh request (March 2000), approval(April 2000) for reclamation oftotal land of 27 hectare was given by MoEF. Itwas observed that, the Company made noprovision in the project cost for contingencies, which may arise due to environmentaldisturbances.As per the opinion of some experts,$the reclamation of land at project areawould upset the flow of effluents andfloodwaters into the Arabian Sea due to pressure exerted at the mouth of the Mahim creek. Thiswould also result in blocking up of Mithi River and cause inordinate flooding in adjacent areas.Itwas observed that the Company had not addressed these environmental issuesas well as thelikely financial implications.2.1.12The entire project was originally conceived as one large project withdifferent componentscombined together but in order to accelerate the overallconstruction schedule, the project wasdivided into five construction packages.Package-I: Construction of flyover over Love GroveJunction at Worli(commissioned in March 2002).Package-II: Construction of cloverleafinterchange at Mahim intersection(commissioned in February 2003);


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Package- III: Construction of solid approach road from the Mahim intersectionup to the start ofthe Toll Plaza on the Bandra side and a public promenade(commissioned in February2003);Package-IV: Construction of cable stayed Bridges at Bandra and Worlitogether withviaduct approaches extending from Worli up to Toll Plaza,Intelligent Bridge System

(estimated to be commissioned by April 2008); andPackage-V: Improvement to KAGK Road hasnot been taken up by theCompany (August 2007). It is informed that this work is being shiftedtoPhase II.i.e. WFSLP.$Indian Peoples Tribunal on Environment and Human Rights in their report (July 2001) onAnEnquiry into Bandra-Worli Sea Link Project.Environmental clearanceProject.. overview

Audit Report (Commercial) for the year ended 31 March 200726The operation and execution of these packages are discussed in the succeeding paras:2.1.13The project was originally slated to start in October 2000 for completion by March 2003. Due totechnical changes made in Package-IV, thecompletion date was however revised to April 2008.Considering the slow progress of Package-IV work (38.35per centcompleted as on June 2007), the project is not likely to be completed before 2011 as assessed(May 2006) bythe Consultant/Engineer. The delays were noticed earlier too in executionof Packages-I to III but they were completed before the construction of crucialmain bridge(Package-IV). The various reasons for such inordinate delay incompletion of Package-IV wereanalysed in audit and the deficiencies noticedare discussed below:As per condition of Notice Inviting Tender (NIT) (July 1999), theresponsibility for setting up ofthe casting yard on identified land and jettyrested entirely with the Contractor. Though the landwas made available(September 2000) to the Contractors for casting yard, the Contractors,incontravention of NIT chose an alternative site for casting yard elsewhere,which could be madeavailable to them only after five months, thus,adversely contributing towards delaying thecompletion of Package-IVworks.The

Management stated (August 2007) that it was necessary for thecontractors to locate the castingyard close to the jetty. The reply shows that project report and NIT was not framed with care andresulted in avoidabledelay in completion of project on this account by five months.As against the projected requirement of 27 hectares of land reclamation for approach road, theoriginal approval obtained by the Company(January 1999) from the MoEF was for 4.7 hectaresonly. However, theCompany went ahead with the reclamation of land in excess without


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anexpress approval of MoEF. Due to protests from the environmental groups,the StateGovernment stayed (January 2000) the execution of work till suchtime the Company obtainedMoEF approval. The approval could, however, be obtained only in April 2000. This resulted instoppage of work for 105 days for which extension was given to the Contractor.The Managementstated (August 2007) that it was constrained to take up the burden of filling low lying areas in the

interest of environmental preservation.The reply is not tenable. As per codal provisions clear titleto land is necessary before award of work so as to avoid delays.Dar Consultants (second Consultant) proposal (January 2003) of twintowers with two four-laneseach and conversion of the approved ArchTime overrun of the projectAbsence of MoEF clearance,frequenttechnical changesand impropermonitoring of theworkbyconsultantsresulted in delay.

Audit Report (Commercial) for the year ended 31 March 200726The operation and execution of these packages are discussed in the succeeding paras:2.1.13The project was originally slated to start in October 2000 for completion by March 2003. Due totechnical changes made in Package-IV, thecompletion date was however revised to April 2008.Considering the slow progress of Package-IV work (38.35per centcompleted as on June 2007), the project is not likely to be completed before 2011 as assessed(May 2006) bythe Consultant/Engineer. The delays were noticed earlier too in executionof Packages-I to III but they were completed before the construction of crucialmain bridge(Package-IV). The various reasons for such inordinate delay incompletion of Package-IV wereanalysed in audit and the deficiencies noticedare discussed below:As per condition of Notice Inviting Tender (NIT) (July 1999), theresponsibility for setting up ofthe casting yard on identified land and jettyrested entirely with the Contractor. Though the landwas made available(September 2000) to the Contractors for casting yard, the Contractors,incontravention of NIT chose an alternative site for casting yard elsewhere,which could be madeavailable to them only after five months, thus,adversely contributing towards delaying thecompletion of Package-IVworks.The Management stated (August 2007) that it was necessary forthecontractors to locate the casting yard close to the jetty. The reply shows that project report andNIT was not framed with care and resulted in avoidabledelay in completion of project on thisaccount by five months.As against the projected requirement of 27 hectares of land reclamation for approach road, theoriginal approval obtained by the Company(January 1999) from the MoEF was for 4.7 hectaresonly. However, theCompany went ahead with the reclamation of land in excess withoutanexpress approval of MoEF. Due to protests from the environmental groups,the StateGovernment stayed (January 2000) the execution of work till suchtime the Company obtained


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MoEF approval. The approval could, however, be obtained only in April 2000. This resulted instoppage of work for 105 days for which extension was given to the Contractor.The Managementstated (August 2007) that it was constrained to take up the burden of filling low lying areas in theinterest of environmental preservation.The reply is not tenable. As per codal provisions clear titleto land is necessary before award of work so as to avoid delays.

Dar Consultants (second Consultant) proposal (January 2003) of twintowers with two four-laneseach and conversion of the approved ArchTime overrun of the projectAbsence of MoEF clearance,frequenttechnical changesand impropermonitoring of theworkbyconsultantsresulted in delay.


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WHAT WERE CHALLENGES FACE DURING THE

CONSTRUCTION OF BANDRA WARLI SEA LINK?


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What is Feasibility Study

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