Columns What Is a "Good" U.S.-Soviet Relationship -And How Do We Build One? Roger Fisher

Few-if any-aspects of the interna­tional situation are more important to the world than the U.S.-Soviet rela­tionship. For better or worse, we have to deal with each other. In each capital, survival depends on decisions that are made ( o~ bette~ not made) in the other. Whether we like it or not, we have an ongoing relationship; we interact; we are bound to interact. The only ques­tion is what kind of relationship we will have. And that depends upon what kind we want, and how we pursue it.

Most people have only the vaguest idea of what we mean when we say that we want better relations between our two countries. And we will not find the answer in a dictionary. We want better relations for a purpose. We want the kind of relationship that will best serve our interests. What are the interests that a good relationship should serve?

Many substantive interests are in­volved in the relationship. They range from global security to economic well­being, from cultural exchanges to activ­ities in Third World nations, from human rights to ideology. What we want in a relationship is to have these interests well served. Each country would like to feel more secure. We would like our conflicting interests to be accommo­dated as well as possible and our shared interests to be advanced.

The fact is that those interests are being poorly handled. We have, for example, spent billions of rubles and billions of dollars on security and have made the world more dangerous. And if we were ever to use the expensive military hardware we have bought, we would be much worse off than we are today. Some people argue that Soviet and American nuclear weapons are not useless, because they deter the other from using its nuclear weapons. But if our two countries put their minds on it, I am sure that together we could be much better off. At least we could be equally badly off at far less cost.

Other interests are also being poorly handled. Consider Afghanistan, where resistance forces, with the help of arms provided by the United States and oth­ers, are fighting a war they cannot win. And the Soviet Union is fighting a war it does not want.

Why Do We Do So Badly? We can certainly do better in many ways. Trade, technology; scientific ex­change-across the board we are doing poorly. Why? Why do we handle our substantive interests SIJ badly?

Of many possible explanations, let me suggest four: · We focus on the substance we want,

not on the process we need;

Roger Fisher is Williston Professor of Law at Harvard Law School and Director of the Harvard Negotiation Project, 522 Pound Hall, Harvard Law School, Cambridge, Mass. 02138. He is co-author (with William L. Ury) of Getting to lli:S': Negotiating Agreement Without Giving In (Boston: Houghton Miffiin, 1981).

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• We focus on who is right, not on how to deal with our differences;

· We have no clear idea of our goal­what we mean by "better relations;" and

. We have no clear strategy in mind for getting there.

Not enough attention to process. We naturally tend to focus our attention on what we want not on what we need in order to obtain it. In this respect we are like a hungry man who talks about the meal he wants, not about how to cook it, or like a child who talks about a much-wanted toy he wants rather than about how to save money to buy it. We are concerned with the substance­arms control, security, trade, human rights-the various things that we want. We all but ignore the process that we will need in order to obtain them.

Compared to issues of ideology, hu­man rights, trade, and tens of thou­sands of nuclear warheads, matters of process-the way in which our two governments deal with each other-are certainly a minor part of the total rela­tionship. But the way we deal with each other and with our differences is cru­cial to the success and durability of the relationship. This is true for all kinds of relationships, personal and business as well as international. If we cannot deal with our differences, even such petty differences as what color to paint a kitchen can wreck a relationship. And if we can deal well with differences, then even fundamental issues of ideol­ogy, value, religion, and culture can be handled well and wisely.

We argue over who is right. One way to deal with differences is simply to quarrel over who is right and who is wrong. Telling somebody that they are wrong is rarely convincing. And on many matters, arguing about who is right is like arguing over whether the color blue is better than the color red.

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Better in whose eyes? For what pur­pose? And under what circumstances? More important than any judgment about which ideas are better is the process question of how best to deal with the fact that two parties-the United States and the Soviet Union­differ on many questions. To deal with all these differences, we want a good relationship. And yet we do not know what that means.

The two most serious theoretical problems lie in the fact that we lack an understanding of our goal and of how to get there. We will look at each of these in detail.

We have no clear idea of what a "good relationship" is. It is hard to do something well unless we know what we are trying to do. One reason we handle our interactions badly is that we have no clear idea of what a better relationship would look like. The field of international relations is large, and scholars have worked in that area for years. Yet if you ask an expert, "How do you measure a good relationship?" (for example, does Canada have better rela­tions with China than France does with Brazil?) you are unlikely to get a clear answer. Few have suggested how to think about that question.

Knowing where we want to go is not enough. A few months ago in Moscow; a Soviet colleague said that he agreed with much of what I said; that the real problem was how to implement such ideas. I recognize the seriousness of that problem, but it is even harder to do something if we don't know what we are trying to do. Let us consider more carefully just what we mean by the goal of a good relationship.

Many people define a good relation­ship as having the other party do things our way. We may even hear a father say, "I've got a marvelous relationship with my son. He does everything that I want him to do." Some Americans obviously

have a similar goal for the U.S.-Soviet relationship. For them, good relations would require the Soviet Union to adopt a free market economy and a two-party political system.

When one of my students became engaged, he introduced me to his fian­cee. After she had left, he came back and said, "She's just marvelous. There are only three things she has to change, and then our relationship will be per­fect." I hope he has since learned that the best way to improve a relationship is not to try to change the other party, but to change ourselves.

Others think the goal of a good rela­tionship is friendship--Let's like each other a lot. Let's enjoy each other's companionship. Let's have champagne toasts and friendship. Let's smile and be pleasant. That will solve the rela­tionship problem.

We want friends, certainly. But friend­ship will not last if difficult problems cannot be resolved. And it is even more important to be able to deal effectively with those whom we treat today as adversaries. It is a mistake to limit to our friends an ability to deal with dif­ferences.

Some equate a good relationship with approval, and express disapproval by breaking relations. Others treat a good relationship as meaning an end of all differences. This, too, must be wrong. There is no chance of having all our differences come to an end. Our two countries have fundamental differences of values, perceptions, and interests. Further, the more deeply the United States and the Soviet Union interact, the more our differing interests will bump into each other. Whether it is trade and travel, or drugs and alcohol, movies and music, or students and emi­gration, we are bound to encounter more and more situations where our interests differ.

What Should Be Our Goal? The good relationship that the United States and the Soviet Union need in order to deal with their substantive interests is the kind of working relation­ship in which the process helps to pro­duce better substantive outcomes. An outcome that is better for one may be worse for the other. We want a process of interaction that will successfully pro­duce outcomes that are better for both, will do so at minimal cost, and will cope with the fact that our interests are often inconsistent. We would like the kind of relationship that helps us get outcomes that could not be better for one without being worse for the other.

That is the goal. What we need is better problem-solving at less cost. We want to be able to solve every puzzle that we have, whether it is in the field of trade, security, or "star wars" re­search. On star wars, for example, a solution would presumably permit sci­entists to engage in certain kinds of research to the extent that it could be done without stimulating another arms race, and without creating an increased risk of a first strike. In each substantive area our interests create a problem requiring joint problem-solving. What we need is to improve the problem­solving aspect of our relationship.

What does the problem-solving aspect of the relationship tum on? First, we need to recognize that a good work­ing relationship cannot be measured by the ease of having it. That would be like saying that a good road is a road across a meadow. It is easier to have a good working relationship with friends than with apparent adversaries, just as it is easier to build a road across a meadow than it is across mountains. But a road through mountains is likely to be even more important than a road across a meadow. We want to be able

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to deal with serious differences well. The more serious our differences, the more important it is to deal with them wisely. How do we measure our ability to deal with differences?

Let me suggest some hypotheses about the goal of a good relationship and then discuss each element:

Our ability to deal with differences depends upon the degree of: · rationality; • understanding; · communication; • honesty and trust; · noncoercive modes of influence; and · acceptance

Rationality. It is hard to solve a problem if our emotions are over­whelming our reason. Anger, fear, and hate disrupt rational problem-solving. Emotions are an important part of a relationship. But, when it comes to the problem-solving aspect of that relation­ship, the degree of rationality is crucial.

Understanding. We are unlikely to solve a problem unless we understand it. Often the very problem lies in the fact that we see a situation differently. In these circumstances, I need to under­stand, empathetically, how you perceive the situation, how you care about it, and what your interests and values are. Until we have that degree of under­standing, we do not know what the problem is that we are trying to solve. Our ability to deal with our differences will be enhanced to the extent that each of us fully understands the other side's image and view of the problem and of possible answers.

Communication. Understanding, in tum, depends on communication. We all recognize the importance of com­munication, but here I mean two-way communication. Unfortunately, both the United States and the Soviet Union

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frequently think of communication as one-way broadcasting. The quality of a relationship, however, is enhanced by the degree of two-way communication. Good communication involves both talking and listening: listening to what is said and listening to what is not said. Such communication is needed both to understand a situation, and also to develop mutually beneficial solutions.

Honesty and Jhtst. Communication is often worse than useless if it is dis­honest or deceptive. It is better not to know something than to mistakenly think that we do. Honesty need not require full disclosure. Often, one can properly disclose the fact that some things are being kept confidential. A police chief, for example, can wisely refrain from revealing how many plain­clothes detectives are working in the city, who they are, or where they are operating.

Closely related to honesty is the degree of well-founded trust. Well­founded trust will help any relation­ship, but trusting people whom we should not trust will interfere with problem-solving. A good relationship cannot be built by overloading trust. For instance, any store would soon be out ofbusiness if its proprietor put up a sign that read, "We trust everybody; credit always given; no questions asked." Trust is important, but it should be well founded.

Noncoercive Modes of Influence. One measure of the joint problem­solving ability of two parties is the extent to which they deal with each other by noncoercive modes of influ­ence-by persuasion, example, inspi­ration, and creative ideas--rather than by threats. Solutions to problems will be acceptable to both parties only if they are the result of noncoercive modes of influence.

Acceptance. The final element is acceptance. If you and I are going to deal successfully with our differences, I must accept you as someone with whom it is worth dealing. I need not accept you as an equal in all areas. It is certainly possible to have a good work­ing relationship between people and between countries that are far differ­ent in resources, knowledge, and au­thority. What matters is that each party accepts the other as someone whose interests and views deserve to be taken into account. I accept you as someone from whom I might learn something right now. Knowing your views and your concerns may help me make a wise decision.

No matter how right I think I am, no matter how wrong I think you are, I should be open at every moment to the possibility that maybe I am wrong and maybe you are right. If a four-year-old child comes running out of the kitchen, screaming, I should do more than say "be quiet." I should bear in mind the possibility that the child may know something that I don't-perhaps that

the kitchen is on fire. This means remaining open. I like to

think that some of the openness now going on in Moscow is not just reveal­ing and disclosing things. I hope that there is also openness in the sense that people are open to new idea5---{)pen to learning. Mr. Gorbachev wants offi­cials to be open to correcting their views. We all should be open to exam­ining new possibilities. A problem­solving relationship-the ability to deal well with our differences--requires us to keep learning. We should be open to the idea that I may know more later than I know now. Deciding in advance that nothing the other may say will be worth considering is offensive conduct in any relationship.

In summary form (See Table 1), we can compare the present U.S.-Soviet poor working relationship with the goal of a good working relationship. If this analysis is correct, then however seri­ous our substantive differences, our goal is to achieve a pattern of interac­tive behavior like that summarized in the right hand column of Table 1.

TABLE I

A poor working relatWnsbip

reactive

irrational

misunderstanding

not listening

deception

coercion

rejection

A good working relationship

purposive

rational

understanding

effective communication

honesty

persuasion

acceptance

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We Have No Clear Strategy How do we get there? Four different possible strategies illustrate the diffi­cult choice each government faces.

1. Try to buy a good relationship? One technique is to try to buy a good rela­tionship. The Soviet Union over the last year has apparently tried to buy better ~elations with the United States by mak­mg substantive concessions: 'We will unilaterally stop testing." At Geneva and at Reykjavik, Soviet negotiators have apparently yielded on one substantive point after another, hoping that each substantive concession would improve the working relationship.

It doesn't work. When the Soviet Union rewards bellicose U.S. conduct toward them by yielding on matters of substance, many Americans see Soviet reasonableness as the consequence of President Reagan's tough language and high military expenditures. The argu­ment in the United States is, "See. It works. It pays to have a high military budget."

B.~ Skinner has told us that by re­wardmg bad conduct, we will get more of the conduct we reward. If I have a bad relationship, I will not improve it by unilaterally making substantive con­cessions.

2. Hold out good relations as are­ward? A reverse strategy is to try to extort a substantive concession by hold­ing out the prospect of a good relation­ship once the concession has been made. The United States (which is unwilling to try to "appease" the Soviet Union) apparently has no difficulty in suggesting that the Soviet Union might ?e able to buy better relations by mak­mg substantive concessions: "If you will only get out of Afghanistan, that will help the relationship. If you will re­lease more dissidents, that will help the relationship. If you will adopt our substantive views, that will help the relationship."

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To indicate that we don't care about relations unless the other side backs down to us causes immediate damage to the relationship. The attempted ex­tortion may or may not achieve a sub­stantive concession. But the relation­ship is not likely to get better.

Both of the above strategies-ap­peasement and extortion-suffer from a common failing: they mix the rela­tionship with substance. They entangle the substantive content of U.S. and Soviet interests with the process for dealing with them. One country or the other says, "The process will depend upon substantive agreement."

Another approach, which is equally bad, is to base a "process strategy" -a strategy for how to deal with people­on reciprocity.

To avoid the risk of being misunder­stood, let me be quite clear. Reciproc­ity is often a highly desirable principle of fairness on substantive matters: "We will reduce our missiles by 50 percent if you will reduce yours by 50 per­cent." It is also true that as a goal we would like a working relationship that is reciprocal. Our ability to deal well with differences will be greater if there is mutual understanding, mutual trust, two-way communication, and so forth. But the fact that reciprocity is good on substantive matters, and the fact that we would like to achieve a process that it reciprocal, does not mean that the strategy needed to build such a rela­tionship can be based on the principle of recip~ocity._ In fact, to base a strategy for dealing With people on the princi­ple of reciprocity is likely to doom that strategy to failure. Let us look at two quite different versions ofbasing a strat­egy on reciprocity.

3. An excessive "Golden Rule." First, there is what I call an excessive Golden Rule. It is based on an optimistic notion: "Let's behave toward them the way we would like them to behave toward us,

and hope for the best." If the Golden Rule is carried to such excess, the strat­egy might be summarized as follows: · Rationality. "Since we would like you

to base all your actions on love for us, we will base our actions not on rea­son but on love for you."

· Understanding. "Since we would like you to accept our understanding of the situation, we will accept yours."

· Communication. "Since we would like you not to bother us with prob­lems, there is no need to talk about any of our differences."

• Honesty and Trust. "Since we would like you to trust us completely; we will trust you completely:"

· Coercion and Persuasion. "Since we would like you to yield to us, we will yield to you."

· Acceptance. "Since we would like you to accept our interests and views as controlling, we accept yours as con­trolling."

No one seriously recommends this strategy; although some who work for peace are accused of doing so. How­ever, because it is such an obviously poor strategy others propose a strategy that is its direct opposite, also based on the principal of reciprocity.

4. A hostile eyejor-an-eye strategy. Here the guiding principle is for us to treat the other side the way they appear to be treating us. This relationship strat­egy can be summarized as follows: · Rationality. "Since anger dominates

your thinking, it will dominate ours." · Understanding. "Since you misun­

derstand us, we will put the worst interpretation on your actions--a pre­scription sure to produce misunder­standing."

· Communication. "Since you are not listening to us, we will not listen to you."

· Honesty and Trust. "Since you are apparently trying to deceive us, we will try to deceive you."

· Noncoercive modes of influence. "Since you are trying to coerce us, we will try to coerce you."

·Acceptance. "Since you treat our views as worthless, we will treat yours as worthless."

Each country is bound to understand its own point of view better than it does that of any other country. We are certain to see our own behavior as more legitimate and more justified than the behavior of an apparent adversary. Be­cause of such partisan perceptions, if we behave as badly as we think the other side is behaving, then it is almost certain that we, in fact, behave worse than they do. And if the other country should follow the same strategy; our relationship will get worse and worse in a downward spiral.

How does this rejection of any rela­tionship-building strategy based on rec­iprocity fit with arguments in favor of a policy of "tit for tat"? The Prisoners' Dilemma model used in analyzing a tit-for-tat strategy assumes that the only way two parties can communicate with each other is by making a substantive concession (in effect, making a gift and hoping for the best), or by making a substantive attack on the other's inter­ests (imposing substantive costs). If that is the only way in which two parties can communicate, then perhaps tit-for­tat is the best of several poor strategies. But the model assumes that we cannot disentangle substance from process, that communication is impossible except by imposing substantive costs or making substantive concessions. For­tunately; in the real world better com­munication is possible. We can com­municate in a wide variety of ways, and should.

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We still, however, face a dilemma. Our goal is to have the problem-solving aspect of our relationship mutual. We would like effective two-way commu­nication between the United States and the Soviet Union. We would like a situa­tion in which there is mutual trust, mutual understanding, mutual accep­tance, and in which we seek to influ­ence each other by non coercive means. But ifwe act first and trust the other, we may get taken. If, on the other hand, we behave no better than we think they are behaving, the relationship is likely to get steadily worse. That is the problem. If a successful strategy can­not be based either on doing what they do, or on the hope that they will do what we do, how do we build a mutual relationship?

An Unconditionally Constructive Strategy It appears that the best strategy on pro­cess is to be unconditionally construc­tive. That is, we should do those things, and only those things, that are good for the relationship and good for us whether or not they are reciprocated. On each of the dimensions of the working rela­tionship, we should take those actions that are unconditionally constructive. They will help the relationship and they will help us. We will be stronger, inde­pendently, whether or not our action is reciprocated. The strategy involves no risk, since each country benefits whether or not the other follows suit. Let us look at a summary of such a strategy: • Rationality. Even if they are acting

emotionally, be rational. · Understanding. Even if they misun­

derstand us, try to understand them.

· Communication. Even if they are not listening, consult them before decid­ing on matters that affect them.

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· Honesty and Trust. Even if they are trying to deceive us, be reliable.

· Noncoercive Modes of Influence. Even if they are trying to coerce us, be open to persuasion and try to per­suade them.

· Acceptance. Even if they reject our concerns as unworthy of consider­ation, care about them; be open to learning from them. To help understand this approach, it

may help to think of the relationship between an adult and a child. If a child is having a temper tantrum, an adult is not advised to have a temper tantrum in response. No matter how dominated by anger a child may be, a parent who wants to solve problems should behave rationally We may want to express anger, but we should be in charge of that anger. We don't want to let it take control.

Similarly, if others misunderstand us, we need neither reject their views nor accept them as binding, but try to understand them. The more we under­stand them, the better the relationship, and the better off we are, whether or not they understand us. The risk of serious collision is less if at least one party understands the other.

Even if they are not listening, we should try to listen. A good basic guide­line to promote effective communica­tion is always consult before dedding (ACBD). There is no need to give the other party a veto over an upcoming decision, but ask for their views.

When the United States decided to reduce the number of Soviet at the U.N. Mission in New York, the U.S. appar­ently announced the decision unilater­ally without prior consultation. I don't know why we couldn't have spoken with the Soviet government about that. And then the Soviet government did the same to the United States. Over-

night, they pulled out all the Soviet citizens who were working for the United States embassy. They could have said, "Do you really want this to hap­pen? Let's talk about other possibili­ties. We have the right to do this, but can't we do better?"

The relationship between our two countries does not depend on how many Soviet citizens are in New York or work for the U.S. Embassy in Moscow. What is important is how our two gov­ernments deal with each other. How do we deal with areas where we have different interests and different percep­tions? The best way to promote com­munication is to consult. Don't just tell people; ask their views.

And even if the other country appears to be deceptive, the choice is not among being deceived, deceiving them back, or believing what they say A better strategy is to be reliable. We give up nothing but what we might possibly achieve through trickery; we gain the persuasive power ofbeing credible. We can increase our reliability by making few commitments, and living up to those we make. And when we are rec­ognized as reliable, it is clearly good for the relationship and good for us. It strengthens the power of our words.

This strategy of being uncondition­ally constructive with respect to issues of process is the strategy that will best build a relationship. In pursuing such a strategy, each country retains its ability to make decisions. Each reduces the chance of its making a mistake from ignorance. And with a good working relationship, we greatly enhance our security Britain has enough nuclear weapons to destroy most of the impor­tant cities in the United States. Few Americans lie awake nights worrying about Mrs. Thatcher pushing the but­ton. Why? Our two countries used to be enemies, but the relationship is such now that nuclear weapons are essen­tially irrelevant to the way we deal with each other.

The fundamental notion that secu­rity is going to come from military hard­ware needs to be reexamined. Since 1776 the United States has had a lot of adversaries: Britain, Mexico, Spain, Ger­many, Italy, Japan, and China in the Korean War. With each of these former adversaries, the U.S. now has a working relationship.

There is only one major important relationship that needs to be built, that between the Soviet Union and the United States. Let's get to work.

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