What, If Anything, Is Mahāyāna Buddhism? Problems of Definitions and Classifications

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What, If Anything, Is Mahāyāna Buddhism? Problems of Definitions and Classifications

Author(s): Jonathan A. SilkReviewed work(s):Source: Numen, Vol. 49, No. 4 (2002), pp. 355-405Published by: BRILLStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/3270595 .

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WHAT, F ANYTHING,IS MAHAYANA BUDDHISM?*

PROBLEMSOF DEFINITIONSAND CLASSIFICATIONS

JONATHAN A. SILK

Summary

This study investigates some problems regardingthe definition of Mahayana

Buddhism.Tracing he historyof the notion in modem scholarship, t pays particular

attention o the questionof the relationbetween Mahayanaand so-called Hinayana

or SectarianBuddhism.Findingthe commonlyused methodsof classificationwhichrely on necessaryand sufficient conditions to be inadequate o the task, it suggests

the alternativeemploymentof polythetic classification,a method which permitsa

constantlyvariableset of questions and data to be taken into account in the most

flexible andaccommodatingmanner.

Any attemptto focus on a given object of study presupposes, in

the very first place, the ability to recognize that relevantobject, to

distinguisht from the

surroundingworld,that

is,to define the

object.And any attempt o sortor ordermore thanone objectrequiresus to

classify thosemultipleobjects.Thus,ourvery attempts o perceivethe

worldaroundus requireus to define and to classify.

Usually,of course,we have no needto consciouslyreflecton the de-

finitionsand classificationswe employ.Butwhen we are unsureof the

statusof anobject,when we thinktheremaybe some errorsn theway

objectsareorganized,when we encounter omeapparent isagreement

with those with whom we areattemptingo communicateconcerningan object,or when the very identityor even existence of an object is

in question,thenwe must resortto explicit strategiesof definitionand

classification n order o clarifythe discussion.

*I wish to express my sincere thanksto my erstwhile studentMs. Bonnie Gulas,

whose insights into taxonomyfrom the viewpoint of paleontologyhave been very

helpfulto me. Thanks also to Profs. KennethBailey andRichardEthridgefor their

encouragement.

? KoninklijkeBrillNV,Leiden(2002) NUMEN,Vol.49

Also availableonline- www.brill.nl



Jonathan A. Silk

The identityand the status of MahayanaBuddhismarepointsverymuch in question, and it is virtually self-evident that communica-

tion concerningMahayanaBuddhismoccasionsmany disagreements.Therefore, he need for the definitionandclassificationof Mahayana

Buddhism is obvious. But how we should approachsuch definition

and classification s somewhat ess plain.For it is basically truethat

in order o define anobjectone must have some fundamental ense of

what it is. I cannotknow thatmy definitionof applesmustaccommo-

dateMacintosh,Red Delicious andFuji,but not naveloranges,unless

I knowbeforehandhattheformerareapplesand the latter s not. And

yet, this processmustbe more than circular. must be able to refinemy understanding nd my definition,to correctmisclassificationsor

even alterentirelythe basis of the classificatory cheme as my famil-

iaritywith my objectof study grows.How this process may begin in

the firstplaceis a questionprimarilyor cognitivescientists,andneed

not concern us here. We may accept as an irreduciblegiven that an

objectof studyexists,whichhas been labeled"MahayanaBuddhism,"and thatcertainsenses of its definitionand classificationare and have

been heldby studentsof thisobject.Wemaytherefore ruitfullybegin

by examiningsome of theseideas.1

An apparentlyundamentalpresuppositionn at least most of the

conceptualizationsof MahayanaBuddhism so far is that it is one

pole of a binary set, that is, it is seen in oppositionto something

else, some other form of Buddhism. The questionthen arises how

the two are related.Dependingon who is talking,the opposite pole

may sometimes or even usually be called "Hinayana," r by those

with somewhat more historical awarenessdenoted by such namesas SectarianBuddhism,Nikaya Buddhism,ConservativeBuddhism,

Sravakayana, ndrecentlyMainstreamBuddhism or similarterms in

otherlanguages).Whatever he namesused, the conceptualizations

1One of the terminological ssues thatmightbe addressed s whetherwe aim at

typology or taxonomy;the former s conceptualand qualitative, he latterempiricalandquantitative. thinkwe will see below thatultimatelywhatwe seek is a taxonomy.

See Bailey 1994:6-7.

356



What, fAnything, s Mahaytana uddhism?

often basicallyas follows: First,there is an olderportionof monastic

Buddhism,usuallyfelt to be conservative,closer to the source,which

emphasizesa personal iberation rom samsaraaccessibleonly to themonkwho can devotehimself to intensive meditationpractice,and so

on. This is the Buddhismwhose modem living representatives the

Theravada chool, and when the term is used it is this whichis called

Hinayana, he small,or moreliterally nferior,vehicle.

The opposite of this, the Mahayanaor great, superiorvehicle, is

oppositein everyway. As portrayedby its partisans,MahayanaBud-

dhism canbe presentedas a sort of Reformation,n which thedecayed

partsof the old traditionarerejected n favorof new,positiveinnova-tions, although hese innovationsareof coursewholly in concertwith

the originaland authenticcore intentionsof Sakyamuni'sBuddhism.

The selfishnessof the old monastic,world-denying earchfor escapefrom rebirth s replaced by the bodhisattva deal. The bodhisattva s

thepolaroppositeof theHinayanamonk,andthisMahayanaBuddhist

hero,activein the world,must worktirelesslyfor the liberation rom

sufferingof all beings, because he knows that thereis no difference

between all beings and himself. ThusportrayedMahayanaBuddhismis at once both a timeless, universal ruth,a pathto liberation or all,

monk andlayperson(manor woman)alike,and a replacementor the

older, imited,indeedinferior,Hinayanapath.It almost goes without saying that there are too many objections

to this picture,this caricature, eally,of Mahayanaand Hinayanato

list them all. Among the problemswe mightnumber he questionof

whether his account claims to be history.History happens n time, of

course, andMahayanaBuddhismso presentedseems to be timeless.How can the timeless occur in history?Anotherobjectionmight be

simply thatthe pictureof Hinayanapresentedhere is not accurate,a

view takenby many modem partisansof TheravadaBuddhism,for

example,who neverthelessmay acceptthe basicbinaryscenario.That

such views areprevalents easily demonstrated.

The late Professor Andre Bareau, in his article on "HinayanaBuddhism"in the Encyclopedia of Religion, promoted as a new

standard eference,wrote:

357



Jonathan A. Silk

The termHinayanarefers o thegroupof Buddhistschoolsorsectsthatappeared

beforethe beginningof the common era and those directlyderivedfrom them.

The wordHinayana

... ispejorative.

t wasapplieddisdainfully

to theseearlyforms of Buddhismby the followersof the greatreformistmovement hat arose

justat thebeginningof the commonera,whichreferred o itself as theMahayana.

... Itwouldbe more correct o give the name"earlyBuddhism" o what is called

Hinayana, or the termdenotes thewhole collection of the most ancient ormsof

Buddhism: hose earlierthan the rise of the Mahayanaand those thatshare the

sameinspirationas these and have thesameideal,namelythe arhat.2

Yet other formulations are more abstract, less quasi-historical. A

look at several standardsources, some ratherrecent, is instructive. The

Bukkyo Daijii says:

Daij6. Mahayana.In contrast to Shojo [*Hinayana].The Dharma-gateridden

by people of great disposition. Dai means vast, Jo means carrying.So, this

is the Dharma-gateof compassion and wisdom, self-benefit and benefit for

others,which carriesthe people who have the bodhisattva'sgreat disposition,

depositing hem on the other-shore f Bodhi-nirvana.... TheMahayanaDoctrine

is designated as what is preachedin order to convert [beings] throughthis

Dharma-gate. n oppositionto this is the Hinayana, he Dharma-gateof selfish

liberationwhich carriesthe SravakasandPratyekabuddhas

o thegoal

of the

nirvanaof destruction.This is designated heHlnayanaDoctrine. . .3

Nakamura's Bukkyogo Daijiten says:4 "Great Vehicle. One of the

two great schools (ryuha) of Buddhist teachings. Arose in the lst-2nd

centuries. In contrarstto the preceding Buddhism, so-called Hinayana.

It is especially characterized by practice which saves others rather

than working for its own benefit, and thus emphasizes becoming a

Buddha. ...." Oda's Bukkyo Daijiten says:5 "Dai is distinguished from

Sho [small]. Jo means vehicle, and refers to Doctrine, that is the Great

Teaching. Hinayana is the teaching which causes [beings] to seek for

the quiescent nirvana of the wisdom of destruction of the body, within

which are distinguished the Sravaka and Pratyekabuddha, while the

2Bareau1987:195.3

RyukokuDaigaku1914-1922:5.3169c, s.v.

4Nakamura1981:920cd.

5Oda 1917:1144b.

358



What, if Anything, is Mahayana Buddhism?

Mahayanas the teachingwhich opensup omniscience,within which

are distinguishedthe One Vehicle and the Three Vehicles."In his

shortdescriptionat the beginningof his long article"Daijo" n theHobogirin,HubertDurt states thatMahayanas a "Metaphoricalerm

describing hesoteriologicalmovement,divided ntomanytendencies,

which developed within Buddhismwith the aim of promotingthe

conductof the Bodhisattvaas the idealof practice or the followers of

the movement."6Mochizuki'sBukkyoDaijiten says:7"GreatVehicle.

In contrast to HInayana.That is, the Dharma-gatewhich practicesthe six perfections,saves all beings, and converts bodhisattvaswho

aspireto become buddhas."t is clear from this samplethat,at least inour standard ources, the explicit formulationsof the definition and

classification of MahayanaBuddhism almost universallycontrast it

with "Hinayana."But even if we do not use the term HInayana,which without

questionis in origin intentionallycaluminous,is it right to see the

structureof Buddhism as essentially dichotomous (or if we take

anotherapproachwhich includes the so-calledVajrayana, ripartite)?

Or from anotherpoint of view, is the best way to think about-that

is, to try to conceptualize,define andclassify-Mahayana Buddhism

reallyto dividethingsintoMahayanaandnon-Mahayana t all?

This seems to be the way things have always been done, with

Mahayana ontrasted itherdoctrinally rinstitutionallywithHinayanaor SectarianBuddhism.And it might even be possible to trace one

sourceof this formulationn modem scholarship.Most scholars who

have expressedthemselves concerningthe institutionalrelationsbe-

tween Mahayanaand SectarianBuddhismseem to have been moti-

vatedby theirinterpretationsf remarksmadein the medievalperiod

by Chinesepilgrims,travellers rom BuddhistChinato BuddhistIn-

dia who keptrecordswhichreport n detailtheMahayana rHinayana

populationsof variousmonasteriesn Indiaand IndianCentralAsia. It

6Hobogirin, p. 767 (published1994).

7Mochizuki 1932-36:4.3248b.

359



JonathanA. Silk

is partlyon thebasisof theseaccounts hatEtienneLamotte, orexam-

ple, wrote his highlyinfluential tudyon theoriginsof theMahayana.8

Since the generaland overall honesty and accuracyof the informa-tion in thesepilgrim'srecordscan be verified romarchaeologicaland

otherevidence,thereseemedprima acie to be littlereasonto questiontheir accounts.Butthe interpretationf these documents s not always

straightforward,ndit is perhapsronicthatAugusteBarth,basinghis

ideas of the relationshipbetween the Mahayanaand the Hinayanaon

exactlythe sameaccounts,reachedconclusionsdiametrically pposedto those of Lamotte.

Among the writingsof the Chinese traveller-monks axian,Xuan-zangandYijing,9 hatof Yijing,theRecordof BuddhistPractices,dat-

ing from691, is the only one which makesa pointof carefullydefin-

ing its terminology.This makes it, for us, probably he most impor-tant of the availableaccounts.Yijing'scrucial definitionruns as fol-

lows:?1"Thosewho worshipthe Bodhisattvasand read the MahayanaSutrasare called the Mahayanists,while those who do not performthese are called the Hinayanists."n a phraseimmediatelypreceding

thatjust quoted,it seems to be statedthat schools or sects may be-

long to eithervehicle, andon this basis JunjiroTakakusu lreadyob-

servedover one hundredyearsago, in the introductiono his transla-

tionof Yijing'swork,that"I-Tsing's tatement eemsto implythatone

and the same school adheres o the Hinayana n one place and to the

Mahayanan another;a school does not exclusively belongto the one

or theother."11 nlytwoyears ater,AugusteBarthofferedhis detailed

comments on Yijingin the form of a reviewof the workof Takakusu

and Chavannes.12Discussing Yijing's statementabout the definition

8Lamotte1954.

9Faxian(mid-late4th century),Xuanzang(602-664) andYijing(635-713).10Takakusu1896:14-15. The text is the Nanhaijigui neifa-zhuanT. 2125 (LIV)

205cll-13.1Takakusu1896:xxii-xxiii.

12Barth1898, while actuallya detailedstudy n its ownright, s writtenas a review

of Takakusu1896 andChavannes1894.

360



What, if Anything, is MahaydanaBuddhism?

of the Mahayana, Barth concluded that "there were Mahayanists and

Hinayanists in all or in almost all the schools."13 He went on to draw

out some of the implications of this observation:14

The Mahayana hus appearsto us as a religious movement with rathervague

limits, at the same time an internal modificationof primitiveBuddhism and a

series of additions o this sameBuddhism,alongsideof which the old foundations

were able to subsist more or less intact. .. It is thusveryprobable hatthere are

many degrees and varieties in the Mahayana,and that it is perhapssomething

of an illusion to hope that,when we define thatof Asafigaor Vasubandhu,or

example,we will therebyobtaina formulaapplicable o all theothers.All things

considered,we can supposethatthings here are as they so often are in this so

unsteadyandmurkyBuddhism,andthat he bestwayof explaining heMahayana

is to not trytoo hard o defineit.

At the same time, however, Barth remained extremely cautious. He

suggested, even argued, that it was in Yijing's own interests to persuade

his audience that there was little or no fundamental difference between

the Mahayana and Hinayana, since Yijing was trying to propagandize

among his Chinese compatriots, almost all exclusive Mahayanists, the

Vinaya of the Sarvastivada.15 This is an insightful observation, andillustrates Barth's acute sensitivity to the multiple factors which could

have been at work in the background of the statements of any of our

witnesses.

Barth's approach and his observations seem to have remained un-

noticed by most scholars until Jean Przyluski, an extremely creative

and iconoclastic scholar, again remarked on the relation between the

Mahayana and HTnayana.Having discussed various Mahayana scrip-

3Barth1898:448.

14Barth1898:449-450.

15Barth 1898:450. It is actuallythe Vinayaof the Mula-SarvastivadahatYijing

translated nto Chinese. Although the relation between these two sects is not yet

entirely clear, it would be well to avoid conflatingthe two whenever possible. I

confess thatI remain unconvincedby the argumentsof Enomoto 2000 thatthe two,

Sarvastivada ndMula-Sarvastivada,re the same.

361



Jonathan A. Silk

tures in his seminal study on the early Buddhist Councils, Przyluski

concluded:16

As rapidand as incompleteas it is, this discussion of theMahayanist anonsal-

lows us at leastto recognizetheinsufficiencyof the theorieswhich haveprevaileduntil now in European earning.The Mahayanahas long been representedas a

uniqueschool whichdevelopedfromthe first n theregionsof North-westIndia,

from whence it spreadto Centraland East Asia. It is a subdivision of "North-

ernBuddhism."But this so-called "NorthernBuddhism" s only a geographical

expression.It alreadyappearedo openminds,like a showerof diverse sects ori-

ented toward heNorth,East orWest,andmoreprecisely,each sectresolves itself

in its turn nto two distinctparts,one Mahayanist, he otherHinayanist.Without

doubtone cannotnegatethe existence of aspirations, f greatdogmascommon toall theMahayanaactions.But theseconvergentendenciesdo not cause us to fail

torecognizethe remotenessof theoriginalgroups.Ouranalysisof the canonshas

shownus that therehadnot been a sole Mahayanassued from the Sarvastivada

school. One can also speak,upto acertainpoint,of aDharmaguptakaMahayana,

a MahasamghikaMahayana,and so on. The establishmentof this fact, in addi-

tion to its obvioushistorical nterest,has the advantageof allowingus, on many

points,a new and morepreciseinterpretationf documentsand of facts.

Noting the opinion of Louis Finot that there is some contradiction

between Yijing's description of Buddhism in Champa and the epi-

graphical evidence, Przyluski responded as follows:17

The contradictionbetweenthe testimonyof Yijingandepigraphy s only appar-ent. It seems inexplicable hat for such a long time theMahayanahasbeen taken

as a 19thsect, separate rom the Hinayanistic18 sects. But all difficulty disap-

pearsat the momentwhen one admits heexistence of a SarvastivadinMahayanaand a SammitiyaMahayana-that is to say, of groupsthe canon of which was

formed out of one or many basketsconsistentwith the doctrine of the Great

Vehicle and themanySravakapitakaselongingto theMulasarvastivada rSam-mitiyaproper.

Soon after the publication of Przyluski's remarksthey and the earlier

observations of Barth were noticed by Louis de La Vallee Poussin.

La Vallee Poussin observed that the question of "sect" is a matter

of Vinaya, of monastic discipline, and that the designation "school"

6 Przyluski1926-28:361-362.

17Przyluski1926-28:363.

362




is a matter of Abhidharma or doctrine. "There were in all the sects,

in all the groups subject to a certain archaic Vinaya, adherents of

the two schools, Hinayana and Mahayana, schools which are furthersubdivided into Sautrantikas and so on."18

La Vallee Poussin has clarified a very important distinction here,

although later scholars have not always followed his lead. Since

some confusion seems to have been caused heretofore by a certain

inconsistency in vocabulary, it is perhaps best to clarify our terms. By

the term "sect" I follow La Vallee Poussin and intend a translation or

equivalent of the term nikdya. A nikdya is defined strictly speaking not

by any doctrine but by adherence to a common set of monastic rules,a Vinaya. One enters a nikdya or sect through a formal ecclesiastical

act of ordination, an upasampadd karmavdcand. My use of the term

"sect" here differs, therefore, from at least one established modem

usage. A common presumption of Western uses of the term "sect"

posits a Weberian dichotomy, even an antagonism, between Church

and sect.19 This is not the case for the sects of Indian Buddhism,

as I use the term. All independent institutional groups in Indian

Buddhism, as defined by their (at least pro forma) allegiance to their

own governing Vinaya literature, are sects. The Buddhist Church in

India is constituted by the sects.20 There is no implication here of

18La Vallee Poussin 1929:234. In what is perhapsan isolated case in Japan,the

samepositionwas espousedby TomomatsuEntai1932:332.Therecan be little doubt

thatTomomatsu,who studied nFrance,wasdeeplyinfluencedby Przyluski's hought.19van der Leeuw 1938:1.261goes even farther:"[T]he sect ... severs itself not

only from the given communitybut from the "world" n general. ... [T]he sect is

not foundedon a religiouscovenant hat s severedfrom another eligious community

such as the church; t segregatesitself, rather, rom community n general. ... The

correlate of the sect is therefore not the churchbut the community; t is the most

extremeoutcome of the covenant."

20Theonly meaningfulcandidate or a "BuddhistChurch"n India s the so-called

UniversalCommunity, he samighaof the four directions.However,it appearsthat

this was a purelyabstractandimaginaryentity,with no institutionalexistence. (But

it is not known, for example,how gifts to this universalcommunity,often recorded

in inscriptions,were administered.)It may, in this sense, be something like the

363



Jonathan A. Silk

schism, of an old and established institution set off against a new and

innovative one.21

The term "school," on the other hand, refers to the notion designatedin Sanskrit by the word vada. Schools are defined primarily by

doctrinal characteristics, and are associations of those who hold to

common teachings and follow the same intellectual methods, but they

have no institutional existence. A Buddhist monk must belong to a

sect, that is to say, he must have one, unique institutional identification

determined by the liturgy according to which he was ordained.22

There is no evidence that there was any kind of Buddhist monk other

than one associated with a Sectarian ordination lineage until someChinese Buddhists began dispensing with full ordination and taking

only "bodhisattvaprecepts."23To break the ordination lineage in these

terms would be to sever oneself from the ephemeral continuity which

"Brotherhood f Man."This Brotherhood, houghit may exist, has no officers, no

treasurer, o meetinghall,no newsletter.21It is this lattertype of definition,however,which was assumedby T.W.Rhys

Davids 1908:307a when he wrote about "Sects(Buddhist)"

or theEncyclopediaof

Religion and Ethics. Rhys Davids assumedthe meaningof "sect in the European

sense-i.e. of a body of believersin one or more doctrinesnot held by the majority,a body with its own endowments, ts own churches or chapels, and its own clergy

ordainedby itself." He went on to say 308b: "Therewere no 'sects' in India,in any

properuse of thatterm.Therewere different endenciesof opinion,namedaftersome

teacher ..., or after some locality ..., or after the kind of view dominant. ... All the

followers of such views designatedby thetermsornamesoccurringn anyof the lists

were membersof the same orderandhad no separate rganization f anykind." think

this view is alsoquestionable,butin anycase thepointis thatRhysDavidsis applyinghere a verydifferentdefinitionof the term"sect" hanI am.

22Thispoint,and theterminologicaldistinction,hasbeen noticed andreiterated yHeinz Becherta numberof timesrecently.Becherthoweverrefers n his notesonly to

LaValleePoussin'sdiscussion.

23LaVallee Poussin 1930:20wrote:"Ibelieve that n theIndiaof Asangaas in that

of Santidevaone could not havebeen a Buddhistmonkwithoutbeingassociatedwith

one of the ancientsects, withoutacceptingone of the archaicVinayas."On the other

hand,I mean exactly what I say by the expression"there s no evidence. .." This

does not meanthat thereabsolutelywere no monksother than those associatedwith

Sectarianordinationineages.It meanswe have no evidenceon thispoint.

364




guarantees he authenticityof one's ordinationby tracingit back to

a teacher ordaineddirectly by the Buddha in an unbroken ine of

teachers,each of whom had in turnreceived ordination rom such aproperlyordainedteacher.Thus the mythology is such that if one's

ordination annotbe tracedback in a line whichbeginsatSakyamuni,it is not valid. It is again La Vallee Poussin who offers a crucial

observation:24

All the Mahiaynists who are pravrajita [renunciants]renounced the world

entering nto one of the ancientsects.-A monk, submitting o the disciplinarycode (Vinaya)of the sect into which he was received,is 'touchedby grace' and

undertakes he resolution o become a buddha.Will he rejecthis Vinaya?-'If hethinksor says "Afuturebuddhahasnothingto do with learningor observingthe

law of the Vehicle of Sravakas," e commitsa sin of pollution(klistaapatti).'

In the samestudy,La Vallee Poussin concludedthus:25

From the disciplinary point of view, the Mahayanais not autonomous.The

adherentsof the Mahayanaare monks of the MahasSamghika,harmaguptaka,

Sarvastivadinand other traditions,who undertake he vows and rules of the

bodhisattvaswithout abandoningthe monastic vows and rules fixed by the

traditionwith which they are associatedon the day of their Upasampad[fullordination].In the same way, at all times every bhiksu was authorized to

undertakehe vows of the dhiitagunas...

TheMahayana,n principleandin its origins,is only a 'particular evotional

practice,'precisely a certain sort of mystical life of which the center is the

doctrineof pure love for all creatures: his mystical life, like the mystical life

of ancientBuddhismwhich was oriented owardNirvanaandpersonalsalvation,

has for its necessary support he keepingof the morallaws, the monastic code.

The Mahayana s thus perfectlyorthodox and would have been able to recruit

adeptsamongthose monks most attached o the old disciplinary ule.

24La Vallee Poussin 1930:25. The reference at the end of this quotationis a

translation,althoughwithoutany mentionof the source,from the Bodhisattvabhumi

(Wogihara1936:173.5-10). La Vallee Poussin had in fact quotedthis passage years

earlier, 1909:339-40, theregiving the Sanskrit n note 1. At that time he also noted

thedifficultyof translatingklistadpatti,suggesting"unpechemortel."

25La Vallee Poussin 1930:32-33. In his prefaceto Dutt 1930:vii-viii, La Vallee

Poussinexpressedexactlythe same sentiments.

365



Jonathan A. Silk

After the time of La Vallee Poussin, few indeed are the scholars

who seem to have noticed these observations or pursued the study of

the Mahayana with an eye on this hypothesis. One scholar who has,however, paid attention to the hypotheses of La Vallee Poussin is Heinz

Bechert.26 I think, however, that Bechert has gone beyond where his

evidence leads him. He writes, for example:27

We learnfrom the accounts of Chinesepilgrims,andfromthe IndianBuddhist

sources themselves,that there had been Mahayanicgroupsin variousnikayas.

Thus,a latetextliketheKriyasangrahapafijikatill emphasizes hat he adherents

of Mahayanamustundergo he ordinationor upasampada s prescribedby their

nikayabeforebeingintroducedasMahayanamonksby another ormalact.Thus,the outside forms of the old nikayaswerepreserved, houghthey did not retain

theiroriginal mportance.

The claim that the old nikayas did not retain their original impor-

tance is not defended, and as far as I know there is little evidence that

would suggest this is true. What is more, without specifying what we

think "their original importance" was, how would we begin to inves-

tigate whether this may or may not have been retained? In another

formulation, Bechert has suggested the following:28

Forthose who acceptedMahayana, heirallegianceto theirnikayawas of quitea differentnature rom that of a Hinayanist: t was the observanceof a vinayatraditionwhichmade them membersof the Sangha,butit no longer necessarilyincluded the acceptanceof the specific doctrinalviewpoints of the particular

nikaya.Inthe context of Mahayana,he traditionaldoctrinalcontroversiesof the

nikayashadlost much of their mportance nd,thus,as a rule,one wouldnotgive

up allegianceto one's nikayaon accountof becominga follower of Mahayanisticdoctrinesoriginatingwithmonks ordained n the traditionof anothernikaya.

26Becherthas repeatedlypublishedmore or less the same remarks,sometimesin

thesame words. See forexample:1964:530-31; 1973:12-13; 1976:36-37; 1977:363-

64; 1982:64-65, and 1992:96-97. HisashiMatsumura1990:82-85, note 53, has also

offered some bibliographicnotes which indicate his awareness of the opinions of

Barthand his successors.

27Bechert1973:12.Thereference o theKriyasangrahapanjikas evidentlyto Dutt

1931:263.

28Bechert1992:96-97, virtually denticalwith 1977:363-64.

366




Whether or not this is partiallyor even totally true, I know of no

evidence which mightdecide the mattereitherway, and neitherdoes

Bechertprovideany.It is worthkeeping firmly n mind thatwe almostalways wish to say more thanthe availableevidence actuallyallows.

These are urges which, if not resisted, will almost surely lead our

studiesastray.29One thing that the approachesmentioned above have in common

is theirimplicit assumption hat the conceptof Mahayanamovements

is meaningful,but only in the context of some contrastwith what is

not Mahayana.This is generallyunderstood o refer to pre-Mahayana

Buddhism,althoughit need not, and I think in very many cases infact certainlydoes not. This non-MahayanaBuddhism s often desig-natedin modem writing"Hinayana."I think it is quitecertain,how-

ever,that the referentof the term"Hinayana,"when it occursin Bud-

dhist textsthemselves, s neveranyexistent nstitutionororganization,buta rhetorical iction. We can say rather reely,butI thinkquiteac-

curately, hat"Hinayana" esignates"whomeverwe, the speakers,do

not at the presentmoment agree with doctrinallyor otherwise here

in our discussion."30Althoughthe example is not from the earliestperiod,the scholarAsafga's commentin his Mahayanasutralamkara"Thatwhich is inferior (namely, the Hinayana)is truly inferior,"31

can hardlybe construedas referringto an actual, specific, and in-

stitutionallyidentifiablegroup of HinayanaBuddhists.In addition,

the rhetoricalcontextin which we find such referencessuggests that

such "enemies"were imaginedto be contemporary,which in turnis

a strongindicationthat whatever"Hinayana"mightreferto, it is not

pre-MahayanaBuddhism as such. A fundamental rror s thus made

29As an example see Cohen 1995:16, who says, without a shred of evidence:

"Mahayanistsmight come from all nikayas;yet there is an expectationthat prior

nikayaaffiliationsaremoot once a yanic conversion s made."

30It is in this sense formallysimilar o thedesignation irthikaortirthya, heformer

definedby Monier-Williams1899 s.v. quitewell as "an adherentor headof anyother

than one's own creed."The termsare,of course,derogatory. It is perhapsalso worth

notingthat,as far as I know,Buddhist exts do not referto otherBuddhistsas tTrthika.)

31Levi 1907:I. Od:yat hinah hrnam va tat.

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Jonathan A. Silk

when we imagine references to "Hinayana" in Mahayana literature

to apply to so-called Sectarian Buddhism, much less to Early Bud-

dhism.32It may be largely due to the numerous vitriolic references in

Mahayana literature to the "inferior vehicle" that some scholars, such

as Stephen Kent, have found it hard to believe that there could be any

sort of continuity between Sectarian Buddhism and the Mahayana.33

This misunderstanding is based on a series of erroneous identifications,

which we can encapsulate as the equation: Hinayana = Sravakayana= actual identifiable nikayas. Sasaki Shizuka points to the equally

erroneous equation: sravakaydna = sravaka = bhiksu.34 While it is

32An example of a scholar led into just such an erroris Cohen 1995:20, who

says: "Of all the categories throughwhich to reconstruct ndianBuddhism'shistory,

MahayanaandHinayanaare the most productive.Nevertheless,our reconstructions

have a secret life of their own. Eachyana can be definedpositively, througha nec-

essary and sufficient characteristic or individuals'membershipwithin that taxon.

Moreover,because these two yanas are logical opposites, each can also be defined

negatively, hroughts lackof the other's

necessaryand sufficientcharacteristic.How-

ever,in bothcases, thesepositiveandnegativedefinitionsare not conceptuallyequiv-alent. That is, the Mahayana s positively characterizedby its members'pursuitof

thebodhisattvapath;the Hinayana s negativelycharacterized s the non-Mahayana,

i.e., its membersdo notnecessarilypursueBuddhahood s their deal.However,when

positivelycharacterizedhe Hinayana s definedby members'affiliationwith one or

anothernikdya,which,of course,meansthattheMahayanas knownnegativelyby its

members' nstitutional eparationromthose samenikayas."33See Kent 1982. Kent, a specialist in sectarian movements but not terribly

knowledgeableabout Buddhism, suggested that the rhetoric of Mahayanasutras

resembles the rhetoric common to embattledsectariangroupsin variousreligions.He portrayed he contrastbetweenMahayanaand Hinayanamonks as one of great

hostility,and emphasizedthe role of the laity as a force in formingthe Mahayana

communitiesand theiroutlook. Notice here that Kent'suse of the term"sect" ollows

the standarddichotomousWeberiandefinition,andessentiallydiffers from the way I

use the term.

34I will discuss below the views of Lamotte,who considersthe Mahayana o be

anti-clerical.Hirakawa lso believesthatMahayanaexts areanti-clerical.His reason-

ing, as Sasaki has pointedout, is based on the idea that the so-called Sravakayana

is heavilycriticized n thatliterature.But attackson the Sravakayanaare not attacks

368



What, f Anything, s MahayanaBuddhism?

probablytrue that all sravakas are bhiksus,35 he reverse certainlydoes not follow. The polemical attacks on sravakas that we find in

some, although certainly far from all, Mahayanascripturesshouldbe understoodas a criticism not of all monks but of those who do

not accept the Mahayanadoctrines. Since the term Hinayana s not

an institutional abel but an ideological one, we might even looselytranslateit as "small-minded."The term embodies a criticism of

certaintypes of thinkingand of certainviews, but does not refer to

institutionalaffiliations.I thereforestrongly doubt, pace Kent, that

the Mahayana iteraturewhich criticizes the Hinayanais a product

of sectarianswho isolatedthemselves,or were isolated,physicallyorinstitutionally.Rather,I would suggest that it is a productof groupswhichdoctrinallyopposedothergroups,quite possiblywithinone and

the samecommunityorgroupof communities.

If MahayanaBuddhism is not institutionally separatefrom the

sects of SectarianBuddhism, and if it might exist in some form

more tangible than a set of abstractdoctrinalideas, how then can

we define it, how can we locate it? Let us posit that Mahayana

Buddhistswere the authorsof Mahayana criptures,and a Mahayanacommunitywas a communityof such authors.One immediate and

fundamental esult of this formulations that we must stop referring,at theveryleastprovisionally, o "theMahayana"n thesingular.Until

and unless we can establish affinitiesbetween texts, and therefore

begin to identify broadercommunities, we must-provisionally-

supposeeach scripture o representa differentcommunity,a different

Mahayana.36We should note here that if each Mahayanascripture

on monasticismin general (thatis, sravakabhiksu),but attacks on those who hold

doctrinalpositions which are worthyof criticism,that is anti-Mahayanapositions.

There s nothing"anti-clerical" bout t. Nevertheless,as Sasaki hasemphasized, his

misunderstandingervadesHirakawa'swork on the subject.See Sasaki 1997.

35At least in Mahayanaiterature, s far as I know. On this point,however,see the

interesting tudyof PeterMasefield 1986.

36Quite obviously, in the case of some texts, as Shimoda 1991 has arguedfor

the Mahiyana Mahaparinirvana-sutraor instance, a given literarywork may be

the productof more than one community,as it grew over time. I do not necessarily

369



Jonathan A. Silk

represents a different Mahayana community, we have gone farther in

the direction of diversity than Barth, Przyluski, La Vallee Poussin, and

others who suggested that we think in terms of Sectarian Mahayanas, aSarvastivada Mahayana, a DharmaguptakaMahayana and so forth. In

fact, theoretically speaking we might even go fartherstill and say, with

modem theorists, that each reading of a work which produces a new

interpretation allows, although it does not necessitate, the creation of

a new community. Radical re-readings, which amount to re-writings,

may indeed create new communities, but access to this level of the

tradition(s) is certainly impossible to obtain and so, from a practical

point of view, we are surely justified in accepting the generalities of a

given text as an integral unit, at least as a startingpoint.

If each Mahayana scripture denotes a Mahayana community, we

must next ask ourselves: What, then, is a Mahayana scripture? As,

again, only a starting point, a very practical and reasonable answer is

to posit that those scriptures identified by tradition, for instance in the

Tibetan and Chinese canonical collections, as Mahayana sutras should

be so considered.37 In fact, efforts to second-guess such traditional

attributions are virtually always based on preconceptions modem

scholars hold concerning the nature of the Mahayana, and almost never

on a considered and methodologically sophisticated approach to the

sources.

agreecompletelywith the detailsof Shimoda'sanalysisof the case of theMahayana

Mahaparinirvana-sutra,utthegeneralpointis beyonddispute.

37This should not be taken to mean that, with a certainhindsight,we may not

findtraditionalattributions o be occasionallywrong.We do find, for example,that

Chinesescripture ataloguessometimesdesignatealternate ranslations f Mahayana

scripturesas non-Mahayana.We may note for example the cases of T. 1469, in

fact a section of the Kdayapaparivarta, r T. 170, in fact a translation of the

Rastrapalapariprccha. either extis recognizedbytraditionalChineseclassifications

as a Mahayanascripture. am of course awareof the fact that the classificationof

scriptures n Chinaand Tibet (anddoubtlessin Indiatoo) was a polemical activity,motivatedby a multitudeof forces. These sources are not "objective," f course, a

trait heysharewitheveryothertypeof source.

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I have mentionedthat I think it more helpful, if not more accu-

rate,to referto multipleMahayana roups, o communitiesof theearly

Mahayana,rather han to employ the definite article "the"before thewordMahayana.Since I have definedthese communitiesby the texts

they produced,which areof coursemultiple, t is natural hatwe should

speak of these Mahayanas n the plural.It is a possible but not cer-

tainhypothesis hattherewere actualpeople, perhapsmonks,arrangedin multiple groups sharing Mahayanistic deologies. It is again pos-

sible, but not certain,that various monasticcommunities distributed

geographicallyover India on theone hand,and associatedwithdiffer-

ent sects of SectarianBuddhismon the other,produceddifferentvari-eties of earlyMahayanaBuddhism. f this is so, almostcertainly, hen,

lateron therewas a kind of leveling, perhapsby the time of Nagarjuna,

leadingto a moregeneralized"Mahayana,"n whichoriginallydistinct

sourceswere treatedand utilizedequally.38Thesuggestionof thistypeof diversityin the early stages of the movement is in harmonywith

the factthat,while apparently avingsomecharacteristicsn common,

variousearlyMahayana utrasexpresssomewhat,and sometimesrad-

ically,differentpointsof view, and often seem to have been written n

response o diversestimuli.Forexample, he tenorof such(apparently)

early sutras as the Kasyapaparivarta and the Rdstrapalapariprccha on

the one handseems to have littlein commonwith thelogic andrhetoric

behind the likewise putatively early Pratyutpannasam mukhavasthita,

Astasdhasrika Prajnaiparamitaor SaddharmapundarTkaon the other.

When we read this sutra iterature,we shouldmake an attempt o

pay particularattentionto its lateral internalstratification.By this I

intend an analogyto archaeology,and would suggest that we shouldbe able to distinguishnot only vertical,which is to say chronological,

layers,one textbeing laterthananother,butdifferenthorizontalstrata

of texts which may be more or less contemporaneous.Texts dating

38I thinkas a clear case of the Siksasamuccaya,datingfrom a rather aterperiod

to be sure, in which diversesutrasare quoted togetherwithoutapparent egardfor

their nitialsourceorprovenance. thinkthat the approachof this text to its materials

reflectsa sort of "leveling."

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Jonathan A. Silk

to the sameperiodmay still belong to different ineages, andmay be

the productsof distinct communities.Many scholarsseem, perhaps

without properlyhaving considered the matter,to have tried to fitall Mahayanaliterature(or more honestly, the small portion of it

with which they are familiar) into one chronological progression,with little regard or the possibilitythatwe may be dealingnot with

one traditionbut with many.A conflationof the multipletraditions

of Mahayana iterature nto "the"Mahayana,that is into a unitaryand monolithicentity, nevitablyproducesconsiderable onfusion and

apparent ontradiction.39

The very natureof this approach, ettingthe manytexts definethecommunitieswhich are groupedtogetherunder the generalrubricof

Mahayana,means on the one hand that the communityof concerns

which we may extractfrom a single text cannotrepresentmore than

one aspect of the many faceted Mahayana.On the other hand, it

suggests that a simultaneousstudy of multiple texts might detect

generalized patterns,but is unlikely to uncover the worldview of a

particularcommunityof authors.It seems reasonable then that we

might speak aboutthe Mahayana deology imagined by one text or

groupof textswithoutprejudicingheMahayana deology we may be

able to extract rom othersources.Wherethere s overlapbetween this

ideology and that found in other(early) Mahayana criptures,we maydareto speakof these overlapping eatures as characteristic f some

generalizedMahayanadoctrine.Therewill be otherfeatureswhich,

whileallowingus to groupourtextstogether nto,and as representing,a communityof concerns,at the same time set this communityapart

fromothers.In addition o theproblemof themultiplicityof texts,we mustalso

confront heproblemof the inherently luidstateof anysingle text it-

self. If we insist uponthe vertical andhorizontalstratification f the

sutra iterature,are we justifiedin treatingadmittedlydiversesources

39The comparable ituation n studies of the "treeof life" is critiqued n Gordon

1999.

372




such as late Sanskrit manuscripts, multiple Chinese and Tibetan trans-

lations, and other types of evidence, as a single unit? Must we not

rather treat each and every element in isolation? One practical solutionto the potential infinite regress we confront here is to treat as represen-

tative of an imagined authorial community those materials which have

a community of character or of value. To treat as a unit materials which

we may identify with each other conceptually means that we may well

be dealing occasionally with chronologically and geographically het-

erogeneous materials, and we must keep this fact in mind.40

Given that the sources through which we might locate Indian

Mahayana Buddhism and its communities are by definition its texts,it is natural that in investigating the origins and early history of the

Mahayana movement we should wish to avail ourselves of the earliest

accessible evidence. Unfortunately, we have absolutely no reliable

way of determining in just what that might consist. For despite a

rather facile application of the designation "early Mahayana," this

usage is rather disingenuous. The reason lies in the fact that we

have very little idea about either what sources belong to the earliest

period of the Mahayana movement, or even how we might find thatout. There may in fact be good circumstantial grounds for assuming,

as Paul Harrison has suggested,41 that none of the extant examples

of Mahayana literature date, in the form in which we have them,

to the period of the movement's rise, and so even the very earliest

recoverable materials must in some sense be called "medieval" (in the

chronological sense).42 Almost the only hint we get to the relative

401amquiteaware hatthere s a certaincircularity o this suggestion,but,as I said

above,I wouldpreferto see the logic as spiralrather han as a closed circle,progress

being possible.41Harrison1993:139-140.

421 do not know if this is what Mochizuki 1988:157 means when he says that

"TheMaharatnakuta,viewed from the point of view of its establishment,may be

called a Medieval Mahayanascripture."He may be referringto the compilation

of the collection by Bodhiruci in the eighth century,but at the end of the same

paragraph,Mochizuki assertsthattheseMaharatnaktta exts arecertainlyolder than

theMahayanaMahdparinirvana-sutra.

373



Jonathan A. Silk

chronology of comparativelyold Mahayanamaterialscomes from

theirChinesetranslations, atingback to roughlythe secondand third

centuriesC.E. What makes us suspectthat the literature s older stillis the impressionwe get fromthis material whichis, admittedly,not

always easy to understand)hat it already representsa considerable

degree of sophisticationand development,ratherthanrecordingthe

firstfew rough steps towardan expressionof a new and raw set of

ideas. If this impression s right,we will probablynever have access

to the oldest stratumof the Mahayana radition'siteraryexpressions.This is a crucialpoint,since in fact the tradition'siteraryremainsare

virtuallyall we have. Whateverarcheologicalor other evidence we

mightwish to employcan be contextualizedandgiven meaning only

throughan examinationof the tradition's iterature.

Because the content of Mahayana exts shows a very high degreeof familiarity-we might say a total familiarity-with virtuallyall

aspectsof SectarianBuddhist houghtandliterature,t is verydifficult

to believe that the authorsof these texts, the de facto representativesof the Mahayana ommunities,were other thaneducatedmonks. It is

difficultto imaginethat the Mahayana utrascould havebeen written

by anyone other than such monks or, more likely, communities of

such monks. If we follow the classical reasoningas expressedin the

normativeVinayaliterature, he only way to become a monk would

have been throughan orthodox ordination ineage, one which traces

its imprimaturdirectlyback to SakyamuniBuddha.At a very early

period,perhapsby the time of the so-called Second Council(although

we cannotbe sureabout his),therewould have been no wayto becomea monkexcept throughorthodoxordination nto one of the sectarian

Vinayatraditions.Unless there existed a traditionof which we are

totally gnorant-and thisis farfrom mpossible-the onlywayfor one

to becomea monk(or nun) n theIndianBuddhistcontextwas throughorthodoxordination. f we follow the assumptionsust articulated,he

immediate mplication s that all authorsof Mahayanasutras,that is

to say all those who made up the communities we have defined as

representative f the early Mahayana,were at one time members of

374




orthodoxordinationineages,membersof sects as I havedefinedthem

above.

Could the monk-authors f thesetexts,ourprototypical arlyMaha-yanists,have split from those ordination ineages and the sects theydefined? What would it mean to leave such a sect and start another

sect,giventhatthenormativelydefinedordinationineagecould not-

in its own terms-be broken?WithoutaVinayaof theirown,thebreak-

awaymonks would havebeen unable to carryout furtherordinations

of new monks in their own lineage. If correct, this suggests that

most probably t would not have been possible, in an IndianBuddhist

context,for one to become a Buddhistmonkat all without ordinationin an orthodox ordination ineage. Again, if this is true, Mahayana

communities could not have become institutionally ndependentof

Sectariancommunities,for they wouldhave hadno way of effectingthe continuityof the movement other thanby conversion of alreadyordainedmonks. Such an approach o the maintenanceof a religious

community,while not uninstancedn worldreligions, s relativelyrare,

and difficult to maintain.Moreover, f these Mahayanistswere either

doctrinalrebels or reactionaries-which is also far from sure-howcouldtheyhave coexistedwith their sectarianbrethren?Would t have

been necessaryto establisha new sect in orderto freely professtheir

newdoctrinesandbeliefs?It wouldnot,if dissent nmattersof doctrine

was permissible.The way in which sectarianaffiliations are decided is not nec-

essarily connectedwith questionsof doctrine.An institutionalsplitin a Buddhistcommunity s technicallytermedsamghabheda.It has

been suggested at least since the time of the Meiji period Japanesescholar Maeda Eun that early and fundamentalMahayanadoctrines

havemuch in commonwith theteachingsof theMahasamrghikaect.43

It is thereforeof great nterest o notice theMahasamghika efinitionof

sarmghabhedas offeredin the Mahasramghikainaya.Samghabhedais constitutedby a failure of all the monksresident n the samesacred

43Maeda 1903.

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JonathanA. Silk

enclosure(sfmd)to communallyhold the uposatharite.44Differences

over doctrineare not grounds orsamghabhedan the Mahasarhghika

Vinaya.In fact, whatappears o be a contrastwith the views of othersects, some of which allow doctrinaldisputesto split the community

(cakrabheda),has been shownby ShizukaSasakito be in realitya vir-

tualuniversalityof opinionthat the only true cause of schism,at least

in the times after the Buddha'snirvana, s failure to holdjoint rituals

(karmabheda).45 n the otherhand,this virtualuniformityof opinion

suggeststhatthe explicitpositionof the Mahasamghikan thisregardcannot serve as evidence for its particular onnection with a nascent

Mahayanamovement.We have been concernedso farmostlywithgeneralitiesof received

wisdom, acceptedideas which I suggest can no longer be accepted.It might be helpful to brieflyindicate here in particularwhy I have

foundmyself unable to acceptmanyof the ideas of perhaps he two

most influentialrecent scholarsof Mahayanahistory,HirakawaAkira

andEtienne Lamotte.The most characteristicdeas of Hirakawaand

Lamotteare,respectively, hatstuipaworship mpliesa lay community

at the heart of the earliestMahayana,and that Mahayana exts areanti-clerical.At least for Lamotte,moreover, hese two ideas are not

unrelated.

Accordingto Buddhistcanon law, the putativelynormativestipu-lationsof the Vinayas,the distinctionbetweenlaity andmonastics is

definedby the difference n thepreceptsthey take. A monk has taken

the primaryand secondary nitiations(pravrajyaand upasampada),andhas vowed to upholda set of monastic rules (thepratimoksa).A

lay follower of Buddhismhas takenthe threerefuges(in the Buddha,DharmaandSangha)andperhaps ive,or eight,vows. In addition, he

44Thesituation s nuancedby theexistenceof thecategoriesof samanasamrvasaka

and ndndsamvasakamonks. See Kieffer-Ptilz1993:52-54, and Chungand Kieffer-

Piilz 1997:15. The constellation of sarmghabheda,nikdyabheda, cakrabheda,

karmabheda,samdnasarhvdsaka nd nanasamvdsakadeserves to be thoroughly

(re)investigated.

45Sasaki1992, 1993.

376




laymanor laywomanmay vow to give up not only forbiddensexual

activitybut all sexual activitywhatsoever.One who takes the three

refuges,or more, is called an upasaka(male lay disciple) or upasika(femalelay disciple).46Therewould in additionof coursebe those who

casuallygave alms and so forth,but theseare not consideredorrecog-nized to be Buddhist ay supportersn anyformalway.In spiteof the

availabilityof thisterminology,manyMahayana uitrasenerallyseem

to preferthe set of termspravrajitaandgrhastha,thatis, renunciant

andhouseholder,a distinction hatrequires eparatediscussion.

RichardRobinsonhas suggestedthatrather hanthese technicaland

strictcategoriesa moreuseful distinction s that between "laicizing"and "monachizing," nd "secularizing" nd "asceticizing."47 y this

Robinson means to emphasizetendencies toward ay participation r

lay control,as opposedto monasticcontrol,or a greaterconcernwith

worldly activities or values as opposedto the values of renunciation

andascetic practice.There is quitea bit of grey space in Robinson's

definition,but it serves to highlightthe fact that a strict distinction

betweenlay andmonastic,regardlessof the roles the individualsplay

in the social life of the community,can be misleading.His distinctionallows us to speakof an asceticizedlaity,for examplea householder

who vows to give up sex with his wife altogether,or secularized

monastics,forexamplea monk who lives ata royalcourt.

Lamotte,who stronglyadvocated he idea thattheMahayana epre-sents thetriumph f lay aspirationsnBuddhism,48sedtheexpression"anti-clerical"o characterize arlyMahayana utras,pointing specifi-

cally inhis influentialpaperon thesubject o theRdstrapalapariprcchd,

46Let us recall the words of La Vallee Poussin yet again 1925:20: "Scholarsset

up between monk,novice and lay people a differenceof degree,not of nature.All

three aresdmvarikas,people who have accepteda samvara[vow-JAS]... All three

possess the 'moralityof engagement,' amadantasila, hemoralitywhichconsists not

in the simpleavoidanceof sin butin the resolution o refrain rom it."

47Robinson1965-66:25-26.

48He flatly stated this in Lamotte 1955:86:"The advent of the Mahayanaconse-

crated he triumphof lay aspirations."

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Jonathan A. Silk

whichhe calls an "anti-clericalract."49t is truethatthe single verse

he quotesappears o be a violent criticismof monks,50buta glanceat

the contextmakes it quiteclear that the Rastrapalapariprcchd is notcriticizingmonks in generaland is far fromanti-clerical-ratherquitethe opposite.The text is concernedwith (future)evil anddegenerate

monks,andthedecayof the trueteaching.Inthis sense the textmightbe consideredmore a reactionarydocument hana revolutionary ne.

Whatwe see here is notanti-clericalism, utagainrather heopposite:a concernwith the purification f the clergy,andthe relatedassertion

of its superiority ndrightfulplaceas the sole legitimaterepresentative

of Buddhistorthodoxy. haveaddressed his theme in anotherpaper,51andobservetherehowpervasive hisideologyis in Buddhism,notonlyin Mahayana utras,but even in earliercanonical extsbelongingto the

Nikaya/Agama orpus.

If, as I have argued,the Mahayanacame into existence and per-sisted withinpre-existingBuddhist ocial and nstitutional tructures,t

would follow thatall monasticmembersof theMahayana houldhave

been associated with a traditionalordination ineage. I have further

suggestedthat the Mahayana extsmust havebeen writtenby monks,andhavedefinedmy notion of a Mahayana ommunityas one consti-

tutedby theauthorsof these texts.Theremay,of course,have also (or

instead)been another ype of Mahayanacommunity,but it would be

incumbentupon whomeverassertedthis to be the case to show how

thiscould havebeen so. HirakawaAkira s probably hemost influen-

tial of those who do not believe the earliestMahayana o have been a

monasticmovement,and he suggeststhat formalMahayanaBuddhist

socialunitsdidexistindependently f thetraditionalectarian afghas.Hehasofferedanalternativeolution o ourquestions,centeringonthe

suggestionthatwhatmade suchnon-monasticMahayanagroupspos-sible was theirorientation round tuipaworship.

49Lamotte1954:379.50He gives noreference,buttheverse is in fact to be found n Finot1901:28.17-18.

51See Silk forthcoming.

378




Hirakawa holds the Mahayana to have been a movement promotedin contrast to Nikaya communities by non-ordained people who de-

voted themselves to stupa worship.52 One of the main presuppositionsbehind Hirakawa's thinking on this subject is the contrast between

Nikaya Buddhism and the Mahayana, in which he was perhaps influ-

enced by the writings of Nalinaksha Dutt.53 The importance of this

should be clear. If we compare, as we inevitably must, Mahayana Bud-

dhism with its ubiquitous background, mistaken ideas about that back-

ground or pre-existing Buddhism will lead to erroneous conclusions

about the situation of the Mahayana. In one particularregard I think it

is precisely here that Hirakawa has gone astray.Hirakawa's ideas are based on a very wide reading in the Vinaya

literatures, Agamas, and Mahayana sutras. Basically stated, his posi-tion is that the Mahayana grew out of lay communities institutionally

external to the Nikaya Buddhist communities. These lay communities

grew up around stuipasnot associated with any Nikaya Buddhist sect,

and the lay groups managed and administered the stupas. Gradually

they infiltrated the monastic communities, and in response to this there

was a transformation within the monastic communities in which someof these outside ideas and practices were adopted. This is the genesisof the Mahayana.

Hirakawa's argument for this theory runs as follows: According to

the Mahaparinirvana sutra, just before the death of the Buddha he

forbade monastic participation in the stupa cult, ruling that this was

521 translate s "Nikaya ommunity"Hirakawa's apanese xpressionbuhakyodan.

Although Hirakawahas publisheda certainnumber of articles in English, and an

Englishtranslation f one half of his popular urveyof IndianBuddhismhasappeared

(Hirakawa 1990), I refer in all cases to his latest Japanesepublications,on the

assumption hat hesepresenthis most recentand consideredviews. Hehas, moreover,

been publishinga series of Collected Works n which manyof his older studies are

reprinted, ometimes with some modifications.When newer versions of old papersareavailable,I generallyreferto the moreupdatedpublication. n themain,the ideas

discussed n the presentcontextare foundin Hirakawa1954 (rpt.1989).53Hirakawa eldom refers to Westernscholarlyworks,but does occasionallytake

note of Dutt 1930-not however n Hirakawa1954.

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Jonathan A. Silk

the domain of the laity. In addition, since the cult of the stupa consists

in worship offered with flowers, perfumes, dance, and music, it would

not have been possible for monks to participate, since such activitieswere forbidden to them by the Vinaya. In addition, the fact that there

are no inscriptions on stupa sites identifying a stupa as belonging to a

particularsect proves that stuipaswere not the domain of the monastic

community. All of this shows that, despite some suggestions that the

Mahayana grew up from within specific sects of Nikaya Buddhism, it

could not have been Nikaya sect monks who created the Mahayana. It

must have been lay people who were the managers of the stiipas.54

Gregory Schopen has shown conclusively that the standardinterpre-tation of the Mahdparinirvana sutra's prohibition of monastic stupa

worship is wrong.55 The sutra is far from prohibiting monastic wor-

ship of stipas, since the prohibition applies only to participation in the

actual funeral ceremony, and moreover may apply not to all monks but

only to Ananda, and not to all funerals but only to that of the Bud-

dha. Be that as it may, it is clear that there are no doctrinal grounds,

at least in earlier literature, for the idea that monks were prohibited

from participation in stupa rites. Schopen has also shown elsewherethat in fact stupas were a common if not central feature of Indian Bud-

dhist monastery life, and that the main stupas of monastic sites did in

fact belong to specific sects of Sectarian Buddhism.56 As far as the

541believe we can lay out Hirakawa'sargument atherclearly almost in his own

words: Hirakawa1954 (1989):377: Because lay believers (zaikeshinja)erected the

stiipaof the Buddha,and distributedhis sarTrarelics), therefore yueni) in the time

when theMahaparinirvdnautra was redacted n the primitiveSanghathe believers

(shinja)wereresponsible or the administration f the stupas(buttono keiei iji), and

bhiksuswere notdirectly nvolved.BecauseVinayasof the sects (buha)discussstupas

they were taken care of by the NikayaBuddhistcommunities(buhakyodan) n the

NikayaBuddhistAge (buhabukkyojidai-whateverthat s!). At the sametime, there

weremany ndependent tupasnotconnectedwith sects (buha).Themanystupaswith

dedicatorynscriptionswhichdo not recorda sect nameprovestherewere stupasnot

connectedto a sect.

55Schopen1991.

56See for exampleSchopen1979 and 1985.

380




prohibition to participate in dance, the offering of flowers and so on,

Sasaki Shizuka has shown that this rule is not in the oldest stratum of

the Vinaya tradition, and that even once introduced a specific excep-tion was made for offerings to the Buddha, including stupa offerings.57

Given this, Hirakawa's argument against the monastic basis of stupa

worship can be shown to lack evidence, and with this falls the main

pillar of his argument for the lay origins of the Mahayana. We may

mention in addition the idea that only lay people would have been able

to afford to endow such expensive structures as stipas. Here again,

Schopen has repeatedly demonstrated that contrary to the impression

traditionally derived from a reading of the Vinayas, monks were notat all the completely penniless renunciants we sometimes romantically

like to imagine them to have been. Some monastics seem to have been

wealthy patrons, and perfectly capable of endowing expensive struc-

tures, and moreover of recording this fact in inscriptions carved on

those structures.58

To be fair, Hirakawa has in fact repeatedly offered extremely

detailed and learned arguments for the theories I have summarily

critiqued here. A full critique worthy of his arguments would beinvolved and lengthy, and I am happy to refer here to the detailed

studies of Sasaki in this regard.59 Moreover, the model Hirakawa

suggests is not necessarily his alone. A sociological study of a new

religious movement has clearly stated the presuppositions as follows:60

New movementsin religion tend, in the natureof things, to be the productof

lay initiative.They have often arisenas responsesto what have been perceived

as deficiencies in the clergy,andoften as a challenge-expressed or implicit-

to priestlydominance.In effect, thatchallengehas usuallybeen a demand for

opportunities f moreopenaccessto spiritual esources,accompaniedby distrust

of complicated liturgies and elaboratedoctrines which the priests alone are

57Sasaki1991.58Thatmonksandnunsof highstatusmademanyendowmentswasalreadypointed

out, for example, by Njammasch1974:281-282. However,she seems to resist the

conclusion thatsuch monkspossess personalwealth(p. 283).59Most accessibleis his Englisharticle Sasaki 1997.

60Wilsonand Dobbelaere 1994:232.

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Jonathan A. Silk

permitted o claim fully to understand.The lay impulsehas been to seek more

immediate piritualhelpwith less of the manipulative pparatusn whichpriestly

classes tend to invest.Consciously

orunconsciously,

helay

movement seeks a

reorientation oncerningthe vital focus of spiritualendeavor(for example,by

emphasison faith rather han on ritualperformances).Priests seek to preserve

orthodoxyand become custodiansof sacredobjectsandplaces. They mark off

theirpurported iety bydistinctivemeans of training,by tonsure,dress,andritual

routines,all of whichleadthem to distance hemselvesfromordinarypeopleand

everydayaffairswhich not infrequently hey see as mundane,andperhapseven

as a sourceof pollution.In suchcircumstances,aymenare sometimesprompted

to seek new means by which to acquireprotection rom the untowardand for

new sources of reassuranceabout salvation(in whatever ormsalvationmay,in

theirculture,be conceived).Such a growing divergenceof orientation s likelyto be exacerbatedf a priesthood-purportingto offerindispensable ervice-in

itself becomescynical, corrupt,andself-indulgent.A processof this kind leads a

disenchantedaityeither o have recourse o competingagentswho claim to offer

assistancetowardsalvation,or to takespiritualaffairs nto their own hands.61

I do not mean to imply that Hirakawa has knowingly borrowed a

model from the sociology of religion, but ratherI want to suggest that

this model is fundamentally taken for granted in much of the thinking

concerning religious history, especially that which is seen to relate

to the evolution of "sects." There is little point in speculating on the

general applicability of the model in religious studies as a whole, but

even if the model were generally applicable, it would remain true that

it need not necessarily apply to each and every case.

61The authorsgo on, in the following paragraph,o makeexplicit the applicationof theirremarks:"Theprocess outlined in the abstractapplies to various historical

instances,conspicuouslyto the historyof Protestantism.The Reformation,whist not

an initially lay movement, met, with its doctrine of the priesthoodof all believers,

the aspirationsof the laity, whilst subsequentdissentingand schismatic movements

soughtmore directaccess to saving grace, and wideropportunities or lay spiritual

experience.Such strugglesbetween priests and laity are by no means confined to

Christianhistory: they have occurred in various religious contexts." The authors

continue, n an overlycredulousmanner, believe, to discuss theissue of the schism

between the NichirenShoshuand the S6ka Gakkai,relyingalmostentirelyit seems

on polemicalmaterials in English!)publishedby therespectiveparties,primarily he

latter.

382




Now, even if we posit MahayanaBuddhismas a movement-or,

I shouldpreferto say at least for the early Mahayana,movement-s,

plural-which has doctrinalbut no institutionalexistence as such,whichis neithera nikaya,anorthodoxordinationineage,nora vada,a

school definedby doctrines,butrathera sort of meta-levelmovement,

which drew its adherents rom monastic Buddhismbut adherence o

which in no way contradicted he established sectarian dentification

of its followers,andwhichwas co-local, compatiblewith,andexisted

within, the complex of these Buddhist communities,distinguishedfromnon-Mahayana rimarily n the level of philosophicaldoctrineor

"systematics,"ome emphases n practice,formsof literaryor artistic

expression,and some aspectsof mythologyandcosmology,and even

if we acceptthat it was only in this realmof doctrineand rhetoric hat

HinayanaBuddhismexisted,withoutanyreal-world xistencein India

orelsewhere,I thinkourquestfor definitionhasstill fallen into a maze

from which it mightnotescape.Even if we accept that the distinction between Mahayanaand

non-Mahayanawe find in the works of Indian authors

has,from a

descriptiveratherthan a polemical point of view, been ill-drawn,

the existence of the very distinction itself fixes the basic and hence

following questions n a dichotomous rame,settingMahayana gainst

non-Mahayana.In other words, the question "Whatis Mahayana

Buddhism?" till means more or less the same thingas "What s the

relationbetweenMahayanaandtheBuddhismof the sects?"

By failing to questionthe very frameworkwhich lies behindthe

dualistic distinctionwhich we recognizeas very likely nothingmorethanpolemical,we are casting the whole questionof the identityof

MahayanaBuddhism n entirelythewrongterms.

Anotherwayto look at theproblem s to suggestthatanexamination

of the underlyingmodels of definitionand classificationwhich have,

albeit no doubt subconsciously,guided scholars so far may reveal

failuresof theirtheoriesto adequatelyaccount orall the relevantdata.

Since a theory is nothingmore than a structureor construct within

whichto organizedata,such failures arefatal. An examinationof the

383



Jonathan A. Silk

possiblemodelsfor definitionand classificationmaylikewise suggestnew approacheso theproblem.

Philosophersof languagedistinguishbetween two basic types ofdefinitions,"Stipulative" efinitionsand "Lexical"definitions.In the

former,one stipulatesexactly what one means by a certain term,

whetheror not that sense is intuitive or even acceptableto others.

In many cases we must rely on stipulativedefinitions,and in fields

like science andlaw, they areusuallyessential. For instance,laws or

contracts without stipulateddefinitions are unenforceableand often

meaningless.On the otherhand,for manyuses stipulativedefinitions

are obviouslynot what are needed. In most cases, in fact, we couldnotcarryoutordinary ommunicationf we were to relyon stipulativedefinitions. What we are concerned with in these cases is "lexical"

definition.

Lexical definition s what a dictionaryaims for. How is a word most

generallyused? What do most users of a word intendby it? What

do they intendit to mean?A dictionaryaims, amongotherthings,to

formalize for us the consensus of a word's usage. One problem,of

course,is that this meaningis often extremelyhardto pin down. TheAmerican Heritage Dictionary of the English Language, for example,

defines "red"as

Any of a groupof colors thatmay varyin lightnessand saturation,whose hue

resembles hatof blood;the hue of thelong-waveendof thespectrum; ne of the

additiveor lightprimaries; ne of the psychologicalprimaryhues, evoked in the

normalobserverby the long-waveend of the spectrum.

It is clear how deeply contextualized this definition is. "Red"

resemblesblood. How close does somethinghave to be to "resemble"

somethingelse? What is the "long-wave"end of the light spectrum?How long is long?62The same dictionarysays that a "hero" s "anyman noted for feats of courageor nobilityof purpose,"or "aperson

prominentn someevent, field,period,or causebyreasonof his special

62Itmaybe thatthereare technicaldefinitionsof "longwavelight" n optics,stated

for instance in terms of a range of Angtr6ms.This simply makes this partof the

definition nto a virtual autology,however.

384



What, fAnything, s MahayanaBuddhism?

achievementsorcontributions."ut what s "nobilityof purpose"?Are

notvillainsalso "prominent"?What s theproblemhere?

One problemis that this type of definition aims at identifyinganessence. These definitionsaim to locate one or a veryfew characteris-

tics thatare definitive.And this is very problematic.A definition s a

descriptionof a class. All membersof a class are included n thatclass

because the definitionappliesto them. Classes are definedby defini-

tions, and what definitionsdo is define classes.63But a definitionwill

notonly qualifya given particularor inclusion n a class; it mustalso

excludeotherinstances.A definition ells us whatqualifiesas a mem-

berof a class, and also what does not qualify.That is one reason thatthedefinitionof "hero"has a problem.The word"prominent"-whichthe samedictionarydefinesas "widelyknown"-does not exclude vil-

lains. And of course,our commonusage tells us thatvillains are not

heroes.While this definition s perhapssufficiently nclusive,it is not

sufficientlyexclusive.

And what of essences? A good definition lets us make explicitthe implicit characterof the object of the definition,and establish

its unity as an object. In other words, it allows us to include and

excludeappropriately.Generallyspeaking,we ordinarilyassume that

we can do this by locatingthe definitivefeaturesor characteristics f

the object of our definition,the feature or group of featureswhich

are necessary and sufficientto determinemembership n the class.

This is what we generallymeanby essence. If such featuresexist, we

can establishwhat is called a MonotheticClass (see below). When

we are using real language,however,we generallydo not function

in this way. We work, as the dictionaryquotedabove recognizes,by

associatingresemblances.We work by analogy. Somethingis "red"

if it resembles-in the appropriateways-other thingswe think of as

63It is worthstressinghere that while individualsmay evolve, classes do not. The

characteristics f an individualmaychangesuch that the individualmayno longerbe

includedas a memberof a certainclass, but the class itself cannotchange.

385



JonathanA. Silk

"red."64 ut how can we formalizethatunderstanding?Or,first,why

would we wantto formalize t?

Of course,we generallydon't need to formalizedefinitions.Mostreadershaveprobablynever lookedup the word"red" n a dictionary.

Why should one? We usually only need to resort to definitionsin

borderlinecases, or when there is a problem.But sometimes it is

important o resortto a definition,and so we sometimesdo want to

formalizeourunderstanding.Howcan we do this whenwe cannotfind

an essence, a featureor set of featureswhich is both necessaryand

sufficient o qualifyanobjectfor inclusionin a class?

In developing his philosophy of language, Ludwig Wittgenstein

spoke about what he called "FamilyResemblances"[Philosophical

Investigations?67].65How do we know,Wittgensteinwondered, hat

somethingis a "game."What ties all sorts of games togetherinto

a class? Wittgensteinof course was not concernedto formalizethe

similarityhe spoke about,being primarily nterested n logical and

natural anguage problems.But a coincidence of intellectualhistory

brought togetherthese ideas of Wittgensteinwith those of scholars

who are concerned o formalizesuch"FamilyResemblances," amely

the biological taxonomists.The problemfor such scholars is really

quitesimple.What animals(orfor some,plants)arerelated o others?

What forms a species?The connectionbetweenWittgenstein'sdeas

and those of the biological taxonomists led to the suggestion of

utilizinga differentapproach o classificationwhich does away with

therequirementornecessaryand sufficientconditions.Thisapproachis thatof thePolytheticClass.ThePolytheticClass,of course,contrasts

with the MonotheticClass mentionedabove.

641 leave out of considerationhere the fact thatall humansvery closely agreeon

whatis a good exampleof "red"and what is not. The psychology and neuroscience

of this is rathercomplicated,but the result is a well established fact. See Varela,

Thompsonand Rosch 1996:157-171, esp. 168; the classic studyis Berlin and Kay

1969.

65Wittgenstein1958:32.

386




In a PolytheticClass, to be considereda memberof the class each

objectmustpossesses a large(butunspecified)numberof featuresor

characteristicswhich are consideredrelevantfor membership n thatclass. And each such set of features must be possessed by a largenumberof members of the class. But-and this is the key-there is

no set of features which must be possessed by everymember of the

class. There s no one featureor setof featuresnecessaryand sufficient

for inclusionin the class. When a class has no single featureor set of

featurescommon to all its members, t is calledFullyPolythetic.This maybe expressed n over-simplifiedormgraphically:66

Individuals

1 2 3 4 5 6

Characteristics A A A

B B B

C C C

D D D

F F

G G

H H

Here individuals1, 2, 3, 4 form a fully polytheticclass, while 5 and

6 form a monotheticclass.

Onecansee how this is anattempt o formalize henotion of FamilyResemblances.We can think about it this way: How does one define

a "family"?We might want to consider features such as marriageor blood relation,but what of adoptedchildren?We might want to

considercohabitation,but of course,manyfamilymembers ive apart.And so on. Any single featureis open to the challenge of counter-

example,butat the same time ourclassificationmust also exclude,so

we cannotsimply relyonexhaustiveistingof possiblefeatures, est we

be forced therefore o include ndividualswe want to exclude.So while

66Needham1975:357.

387



Jonathan A. Silk

rejectingthe "necessaryand sufficientfeatures"model, by collecting

a largenumberof featureswe can establisha pattern,a resemblance

betweenindividuals.And in fact, manynumerical axonomiststry toformalize hisprocessto thepointwhere t is almostautomatic, hat s,

where thedegreeof resemblancecanbe calculatednumerically.There is of course a differencebetweennatural ciences and social

or humanisticstudies.While for the most partnaturalscientists try

to select featureswhich are themselvesdiscreteempiricalparticulars

(for instance,does an animalhave an internalor externalskeleton?),

even for them an element of the ad hoc remains.67Nevertheless,

despitea certainambiguity,n manycases natural cientistscan selectmonotheticallydefined features. But for those of us interestedin

studyingsocialphenomena, heveryfeatureswhichwe must consider

will themselvesoftenconstitutepolytheticclasses.68

A particularlyood case for theapplicationof this methodconcerns

the notionof religion. Religionhasbeennotoriouslydifficult o define,

though t is notnecessary o recount hathistoryhere.Ratherwe should

directour attention o the questionof the methodof definition.What

we want to do, in a nutshell,is finda definitionwhich will allow usto includein the class of religionall those phenomenawhichwe feel

arereligionsor religious,and exclude those we feel are not. In other

words, we want to formalize our lexical definitions.Many previous

attemptshave failed because counter-examplescould be produced,because the suggesteddefinitionsexcludedindividualswe sensed, as

usersof the word"religion,"o be religions,or becausetheyincluded

individuals we felt were not religions; that is, they failed either to

properlyncludeorproperly xclude. Sometimes his has causedfunny

pseudo-problems.MostpeopleconsiderBuddhism o be areligion, yet

67Forexample,a researchermightask, is or is not a single-celledcreature olerant

to 0.5 ppmof salinein solution?But why pick the number0.5 ppm?Is it not totally

arbitrary, d hoc? Anotherexampleis found in the way morphological eatures are

recognizedby those attempting ladisticanalyses.Holes andbumpson bones ("large

fenestra,"orinstance)arerecognizedas significant n basically impressionisticways.

68Needham1975:364.

388



What, if Anything, is Maha-yanaBuddhism?

many Buddhistsdo not considertheir object of ultimate concernto

be God or a god. So, some scholarshave suggestedthatBuddhism s

not, in fact, a religion, but rathera philosophy.These scholars triedto impose a stipulativedefinitionwhere a lexical definitionbelonged.But those who were willing to let the data direct the theory, nstead

of letting the theoryor definition make them manipulate heirdata,

realizedtherefore hat theism is obviouslynot a good touchstonefor

the definition of a religion. The suggestion that Buddhism is not a

religion is an exampleof failureto properly nclude an object in the

class.

On the other hand, if we look to the functionalists,those who

suggest that religion is what produces meaning and focus in one's

life, what organizes one's social interactions and so on, we have

anotherproblem-not this time of inclusionbut of exclusion.A theistic

definitiondid not enableus to include Buddhismas a religion,which

we want to do. A functional definition, on the other hand, may

preventus fromexcludingAmericanBaseball,for example,from the

class ofreligions.

For ofcourse,

baseballprovides

a sourceofgreat,

perhapseven ultimate, meaning for many people, it can structure

their worldviewand their social interactions,can produceand focus

meaning,and so on. But we shouldexpect our definition of religion

to excludebaseball,andso while the functional eatureswhichmight

determine nclusion in the class are certainlyimportant, hey cannot

be necessaryandsufficient.A polytheticapproach,on the otherhand,

allowsus to incorporate smanyfeaturesas we feel necessary,without

makinganyone particulareaturedecisive. This is its greatstrength.Before we try to applythis all to the problemof MahayanaBud-

dhism, let us make the assumption,which I think is not radical,that

MahayanaBuddhism s a kind of Buddhism,andthat there are kinds

of Buddhismwhich are not Mahayana.But this is not necessarilythe

samethingas sayingthatMahayanas a species of Buddhism,an im-

portantdistinction.Forwhat, ndeed, s the relationbetweenMahayana

Buddhism and the rest of Buddhism,or between Mahayanaand the

largerclass of Buddhismof whichit is a part?

389



JonathanA. Silk

When definingindividualreligions or religious traditions,we are

usuallytalkingaboutastructurally ifferent ypeof classthan he class

of religion. The class "religion"qualifiesinstancesfor membershippurelyon what is calledby thebiologistspheneticgrounds.69 henetic

relationshipsarerelationshipsof similarity,which are definedstrictly

synchronically,incetheyindicatea product.Thereneed be no histori-

cal relationshipwhatsoeverbetweentwo instances or them to bothbe

membersof the same class. In the studyof religionan instanceof this

type of relationis what we call phenomenologicalsimilarity.As van

der Leeuwhas discussed n suchinterestingdetail,70we cantalk about

instances of prayer,of asceticism,and so on in traditionswhich havehad no historicalcontact,andin the sameway we can talk about"re-

ligions"without mplyingin any way a historicalconnectionbetween

the world'sreligions.In otherwords,we can grouptogether nstances

withoutregard or theirhistory.Theirpresentsimilarity s what is of

interest.71

In contrast o this,phyleticrelationships how the course of evolu-

tion, and thus indicate a process.Two individualsrelatedphyletically

sharesomecommonly nherited eatures rom a commonancestor,and

they mayshare his featureeven if theirevolutionarypathsdiverged n

the ancientpast.If the commonancestry s relativelyrecent,we speakof sharedderivedcharacteristics,72whichlink two or moreindividu-

als, butseparate hem from the rest of their common ancestors.Such

recentrelations,which aredefineddiachronically, re termed "cladis-

tic."

So we have two basic categories:First arerelationshipswhich are

synchronic, n which two individualsmaybe grouped ogetheron thebasis of ancientcommon inheritancesor common chancesimilarities,

69Bailey 1983:256.70van der Leeuw 1938.71These aretermedby thebiologists homoplasies,similarcharacteristicsndepen-

dentlyevolved. Whenthe originsof the similar characteristics reindependentlyac-

quired hey are termedconvergent,whenindependently volvedparallel.

72Technicallycalledsynapomorphies;Gould1983:358.

390




adventitioussimilaritieswhich have been independentlyacquiredbythe individual.Secondarerelationsbased on common similaritiesdue

to a genetic and historical link which produced n both individualsashared nnovation,not sharedwith theircommonancestor.

Phenetic-that is, synchronic,phenomenological-classification is

possible for all groups,whetheror not they have any previous,that

is to say historical,connection,butcladisticor phyleticclassification

requireshistorical nference.Whenwe talkaboutthe class "religion,"we areof course concernedwith pheneticrelationships,but when we

study a given religious tradition, t is usually the cladistic form of

classification hat we are interested n, which is to say,historical inksarevital.73

We cancertainlyrelate some traditionswithin heclass "Buddhism"

to eachotherfromsomeperspectivesby meansof their sharedderived

characteristics-thatis, cladistically.Thus,broadlyspeakingMongo-lian Buddhismcan be linked to Tibetan Buddhismby, among other

things, their shared derived characteristics,or their shared innova-

tions. We can drawa tree-diagram-what is called by the biologists

a cladogram-illustratingsuch relations.74But does this same approachapplyto the objectwe call Mahayana

Buddhism?Does the pair of Mahayanaand other-than-Mahayana

form, as many writerson Buddhismseem to assume, what is tech-

nically called in cladisticsa "sistergroup," hatis two lineages more

closely relatedto each otherthanto any other lineages?75Or is the

whole question being asked in a misleading way? Is it possible that

scholars who have considered the questionhave somehow assumed

some version of a modelwhichmirrors hebiologist'scladisticclassi-

fication?Naturally t is unlikely that their motivation or this is to be

73This is not true,by the way, with classifications of types of religions, such as

"New Age" Religions. Such classifications,like the classification"religion" tself,

almostalwaysrely on pheneticrelationships.74On the applicationof biological concepts to otherfields of study,see the very

interestingessays in Hoenigswaldand Wiener1987.

75Cf. Gould 1983:357.

391



Jonathan A. Silk

foundin biologicalclassification tself, andwhile it is obvious thatone

possible sourceis an analogicalextensionof the ProtestantReforma-

tion idea, and the relationbetweenCatholicismandProtestantism,tis also far fromimpossiblethatgeneralnotions of necessaryand suffi-

cient conditionsand of species classificationhave led scholarsto cer-

tainassumptions. t is these very assumptionswhich I thinkwe must

question.And so we come backto our corequestion:Justwhat is the

relationshipof Mahayanao therest of Buddhism?

The definitionwe seekof MahayanaBuddhismmustbe a lexical de-

finition.It wouldbe pointlessfor us to suggesta stipulativedefinition,

althoughsuchstipulativedefinitionsoffered forexamplein traditionaltexts like thatof Yijing may certainlybecome data for ourquest.We

want to determinewhat are generallyagreedto be the limits of the

class, in this case of MahayanaBuddhism.And this class shouldbe

definednot monotheticallybutpolythetically, hrougha largenumber

of featureswhich cumulativelycircumscribe he class. I suggest the

place we will look for features which will lead us to a definition of

MahayanaBuddhismshould n the firstplacebe theMahayana utras.

But-and this is not as meaninglessas it might at first sound-Mahayana utrasare Buddhisttexts, and all Buddhist texts are Bud-

dhist texts. In other words, we assume that all Buddhist texts are

Buddhist-but really without knowing what we mean by this, and

withouthavingformalized his feeling. This suggeststhat rather han

askingwhat makesa MahayanaBuddhisttext Mahayana t mightbe

better o askwhat makes t both BuddhistandMahayana.Or we mightvisualize the problemin a quite differentway: is thereany way we

canlocalizeMahayanaexts within someimaginarymulti-dimensional

spacewhich we call "Buddhism"?

If we imagineBuddhismas a multi-dimensionalpace, and we do

not prejudgethe locationsof differentkinds of Buddhism-with for

exampleTheravadan one corer and Zen far away in another-but

instead start our thinkingon the level of individual exts, I think we

would quicklyrealize that various texts would be located at various

pointsin this multi-dimensionalmatrix,some textsbeinglocated more

closely to each other than to a thirdtype of text. Of course, there

392



What, f Anything, s Mahadyanauddhism?

can be no such thing as an absolute location, but only a location

relative to otherobjects in the space (just as is the case in the three

dimensions of our physical universe).This is related to the "degreeof resemblance" alculationswhich,as I mentionedabove,numerical

taxonomistsemploy. Slightly more thoughtwould show us that the

problem s morecomplicatedstill. For what are the criteriaby means

of which we would locate our texts in this space?In fact, there is an

infinite numberof possible criteria we might want to use to locate

the objects of our study,and an infinite numberof ways of relatingour data points to each other,and thus an infinitenumberof multi-

dimensionalmatrices. For instance, we should recognize that eventhe unit "text" s itself amenableto furtheranalysisand localization.

Let us consider the exampleof one sutra,the Kasyapaparivarta,ustfor the sake of argument.We have a Sanskrit version (in this case

only one nearly complete manuscript,with a few variantfragments,but sometimes we will have more), a Tibetan translation,and a

number of Chinese versions, not to mention a commentaryto the

text extantin severalversions,quotations n otherworks,and so on.

From one perspective,we would expect all of these to be located

veryclosely together n ourimaginaryspace;they are all versionsof,

or intimatelyrelatedto, the "same text." From anotherperspective,

however,if we are interested n translationvocabulary or instance,

we might also have good reasons to want to relate the Chinese

translationof the Kasyapaparivartaof one translatormore closelyto other translationsof the same translator han to other Chinese

versions of the Kasyapaparivarta,and certainlymore closely than

to the Tibetan translationof the same text. Or again, a text withdoctrinalcontentmightfromthatperspectivebe relatedmorecloselyto anotherof similarcontent,the HeartSuitraPrajndpdaramitdhrdaya)with theDiamondSutra Vajracchedikd),orinstance,whileif we were

interested n the same text used liturgicallywe might groupit with

quiteanother extortextsto which it mightbe unrelatedn termsof its

contentbut with which it may be used togetheror similarlyin ritual,

the same Prajidpadramitahrdayaith the Smaller SukhdvatTvyuha,

perhaps.So the sortsof groupings he datawill producewill dependon

393



JonathanA. Silk

whatwe areaskingof ourdata.There will not be one final definitive

grouping,that is to say, no one unique localization of our objects

withinourimaginarymulti-dimensionalpace.And the moreflexibletheorganization f ourdata, he morecomprehensivelywe will be able

to understandand classify its internalrelations.To put this another

way, none of the objectswe are interested n-no matterhow we are

likely to define those objects, singly or as groups-will be relatedto

anotherobjector set of objectsin a single, uniqueway. The relation

will dependon whataspectsof the objectswe choose to relateeverytime we ask a question.And if we mapthe relationsbetweenobjects

withinour multi-dimensional pace, the geographyof thatspacewillthereforebe determinedby the combinationof objectsandaspectsin

question.Sincewe havemultipleobjectsandvirtually imitlessaspectsto compare-constrained only by the imaginationwhich generatesour questions-no unique mappingor solution is even theoretically

possible.There are in fact establishedtechniquesavailable n the so-called

Social Sciences for thinkingabout such problems.One of the most

importantnumerical echniques s called ClusterAnalysis.What clus-ter analysisenables one to do is rationallydeal with a large amount

of data,clustering t into morecompactforms for easiermanageabil-

ity. The clustersmay be definedin any numberof ways. It mightbe

possiblefor us, for instance,to select features,such as the occurrence

of doctrinalconcepts,key words, stock phrasesor the like, and code

them 1 or0 forMahayanaornon-Mahayana.Butgivenourgoals, one

of which is to avoid prejudicing he relationshipbetweenMahayana

and otherforms of Buddhismas this monotheticclassificationwould,

such anapproach an be seen to embodythe same sortof flaw inherent

in previousthinkingon the subject.76A much betterapproachwould

be to clusterdiscretelyratherthancumulatively, hat is, to measure

the presenceor absence of given factors,andthen measure the total

clustered actors ndividually,not additively.The clusterswhich result

76This is also the sameflawto which cladisticanalysesareprone.

394




would,then,allow for the formationof a polytheticclass.77Naturally,the mathematicsbehind such statisticalmethodsof multivariate naly-

sis aresophisticated,andI do not pretend o have even a rudimentaryunderstanding f the technical details.My wish here is to introduce

thebroadest,most generaloutlinesof theprocedure,and to appealfor

a considerationby scholarsof Buddhismof this newway of conceptu-

alizingthe verynatureof theproblem,rather han to offer a definitive

arrayof statistical echniques o carryout the detailsof theproject.Let us step back for a moment to the self-evident claim offered

above:MahayanaBuddhism is Buddhism.As such, not only should

instances of MahayanaBuddhismbe related and relatableto otherobjects in the same class, but to other objects in the larger class

"Buddhism" s well. Just how those MahayanaBuddhistobjectsare

relatedto Buddhistobjectswill provideus an answerto ourquestion

concerningthe relationbetweenMahayanaBuddhismand Buddhism

as a whole-that is to say,thequestionWhat s MahayanaBuddhism?

Another way of putting this is as follows: If we start with the

assumption hat there is somethingcalled Mahayana,but we do not

know what its featuresare,we will want to look at the objectswhichwe thinkmightbe definitiveof Mahayanaand extractfrom those the

qualitieswhich groupor cluster themtogether.Moreover, f we think

these same or other objects might also belong somehow to another

set-even on a different ogical level, forexample,theset of Buddhism

at large-we will want to have a way of determining o what extent

the object is Mahayanaand to what extent it is simply Buddhist.

Thatis, what we will be looking for is not a presenceor absenceof

Mahayana,buta questionof degreeof identificationwith somecluster,or even betterof generallocationwithin the whole space, in this case

of "Buddhism."

The only attemptI know of to do anythingeven remotelylike this

is that of ShizutaniMasao,78who looked not at Buddhist literature

in generalbut rather ried to stratifyMahayana utraschronologically

77See Bailey 1994.

78Shizutani 1974.

395



JonathanA. Silk

into what he termedPrimitiveMahayana(genshi daijo) and Early

Mahayana(shoki daijo) on the basis of the presence or absence

of certain concepts and technical terms. Unfortunately,as far as Ican see, he approached he problempurely impressionisticallyand

withoutanyrigorousmethod.Moreover, havegravedoubtsabout he

possibilityof establishingeven a relativechronologyof this literature

purelyon the basis of internalevidence,not to mentionthe backward

methodologyof such an approach.Nevertheless,carefulreadingof

Shizutani'sstudy might yield valuableclues for futureresearch.

What I suggest instead in no way precludes taking into account

the age or relative age of our sources; it simply does not dependon such a determination.The comprehensivecomparisonof multiple

aspectsof a largenumberof objectswill allow us to see the multiplenaturesof these objects,theirrelative similaritiesanddifferences,in

a comparativeight.Let us againconsideran example.Individualsdo

not hold consistent sets of ideologicalor political viewpoints.Not all

vegetariansare opposed to the deathpenalty,not all abortionrightsactivistsoppose nuclearpower,and so on. The complex makeup of

ideologies which characterizesany given population,however,canbe studied statistically.It is a similar census which I suggest for

the populationof "Buddhism,"he objectsconstitutingwhich include

texts,artobjects,and so on.

Once we rejectthe groundlessassumption hatMahayanaand non-

MahayanaBuddhismarerelated n the fashion of cladisticclassifica-

tion, then we are freed to exploreotherdimensionsof the definitions

of MahayanaBuddhism.We areenabled andempowered o think in

terms of degreesof similarityandrelatedness,rather hansimplythe

dichotomyrelated/unrelated.his in turnenables us to thinkmore flu-

idly about the ways in which,for example,a MahayanaBuddhist ext

may borrowliteraryconceits of earlierliterature,or a mythological

episode, while reformulatinghe doctrinalcontent of the episode. It

gives us a tool to think aboutmultipleways that one and the same

object might be used, while the object itself remainsessentiallyun-

changed.A stone image of Sakyamunimay have differentmeanings

in different ritual contexts, just as a textual pericope may shift its

396



What, fAnything, s Mahayadnauddhism?

meaning-or we should bettersay, have its meaning shifted-by its

changing context. Such an appreciationgives us good tools for re-

thinkingproblemssuch as the "transfer f merit"orthe "perfections,"claimed as characteristicof MahayanaBuddhismbut found in non-

Mahayanaiterature s well, amonga host of otherpossibilities.This also enables us to deal with theproblem,alluded o above,that

very obviously much of the literature ommonlycited in discussions

of MahayanaBuddhism as that of "SectarianBuddhism,"and surelynotrarely mpliedto represent omepre-Mahayanadeas,in fact dates

from a periodafter the rise of the MahayanaBuddhistmovement.If

we assume thatMahayanaBuddhismarosein the firstcenturyof theCommonEra-a reasonabledatingwhich in realitywe haveverylittle

or no evidence to justify-and we simultaneouslyrecognize that no

Chinesetranslation f Buddhistmaterialpredates hatperiod,that the

Pali canon was not written down before the fifth century,althoughits redactionclearly predatesthat time, and so on, we must come

to appreciatethat even if we wish to be much more careful about

our comparisonsof Mahayanaand pre-Mahayanamaterials hanwe

have been heretofore,we will have a very tough time of it. To thiswe add the problemof contamination. f we revert to the previous

assumptionof a cladistic classification for a moment, and borrow

here the model of the philologists' cladogram,the stemma or tree

diagramhe has borrowed rom the biologist in the firstplace, we will

have to recognize that the history of MahayanaBuddhism reflects

a heavily cross-contaminated ituation.The materials to which we

are comparingour extant MahayanaBuddhist literaturemay well

have been writtenor revisedin light of thatvery MahayanaBuddhistmaterial tself, and vice versa ad infinitum.Even theoretically, here

is no way to producea clean schematicof the relationsin question,

anymorethan t would be possibleto clarifya mixture n a glass after

orangejuice had been pouredinto soda, thatmix pouredinto coffee,

then added back into the orange uice, and so on. The contamination

397



JonathanA. Silk

is complete, its history irreversible.79This leaves us only with the

possibility of clarifyingvariousaspects of the phenetic, synchronic

relationsbetweenobjectsof ourinterest.But this does not in anywaymean that we are to ignore traditional nformation.Yijing-and of

coursehe is not theonly source-tells us thatworshipof bodhisattvas

is definitiveof MahayanaBuddhism.We need not takethis,even if he

so intended t, as anecessaryandsufficientcondition o accept t as one

pointin ourdataset,oneobjectwhich is to be broughtntoconjunctionwith others.The sameappliesto theproblemof the identificationof a

giventextas, forexample,a Mahayana utra.Chinese sutracatalogues

do not give us a definitiveanswer,butprovideone feature o be takenintoaccount n theprocessof formulatinga polytheticdefinition.And

so too for features such as the mentionof emptiness,bodhisattvas,

the perfections,and so on. With such tools in hand we may be able

to approachanew the problemof the definition and classificationof

MahayanaBuddhism.

In conclusion,let me explainwhat is behindthe title of my paper,which I confess to have borrowed from authors more clever than

I. I was inspired in the first place by the title of a paper by the

paleontologistandbiologist StephenJ. Gould, "What, f Anything, s

a Zebra?";Gouldin turnhadborrowedhis title froma paperof Albert

E. Wood, "What, f Anything,Is a Rabbit?"80What Gould wonders

is whether the various strippedhorses actuallymake up a cladistic

group.If they do not, then strictlyandcladisticallyspeakingthereis

no such thingas a zebra. This line of thought got me thinkingabout

MahayanaBuddhism.I firstthoughtI could ask"What, f anything, s

MahayanaBuddhism?" ecauseI wantedto know whetherMahayanaBuddhismwas cladisticallyrelatedto non-MahayanaBuddhism.But

what I have come to realize is that what we really want to know is

how to locateMahayanawithrespectto Buddhismas a whole, and as

79Of course, some history may be recoverableeven fromhighly contaminatedor

hybridized xamples.Some of theprocesseswhichled to anextantcomplexstatemaybe tracable-but not all.

80Gould 1983;Wood 1957.

398



What, fAnything, s MahaydnaBuddhism?

a partof thatquestionwe want to understandabove all how objectsare defined as "Mahayana"n the first place. But cladistics cannot

helpus here.Askingaboutthe relationof Mahayanao Buddhismas awhole is closer to askingaboutthe relationof the zebrato thecategory"animal"orperhaps"mammal").The tools we must use to approachthe definitionandclassificationof MahayanaBuddhismare much less

rigid and dichotomousthancladistics,much more fluid,variableand

flexible. And so, with an aesthetic reluctancebut a methodological

confidence,I concede that this incarnationof Gould's title does not

properlyset the stage for the taskfacingus as we attempt o confront

the problem of how to define MahayanaBuddhism.But after all,

perhaps ormmay be permitted o trumpcontent ust this once. As a

title "TheDefinitionof MahayanaBuddhismas aPolytheticCategory"seems sufficientlyanaemictojustifythepoetic licence.

UCLA JONATHANA. SILK

Department f EastAsianLanguagesand Cultures

Box 951540

Los Angeles CA 90095-1540, USA

[email protected]

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What, If Anything, Is Mahāyāna Buddhism? Problems of Definitions and Classifications

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