What Could the United States Have Been? Andrea...

What Could the United States Have Been?

How England Hindered American Manufacturing

by an anonymous, but awesome (Andrea Awesnymonous??) student

ECON 40413: John Lovett

5 December 2018

Abstract:

Mercantilism was the dominant economic system throughout the colonial era. These policies lauded acquisition of raw materials and export-driven economies that would bring glory to the motherland. England exercised these policies heavily over its own colonial holdings. Seen as a both a threat and asset to England, colonial America was relegated to the duty of raw material-provider. England’s imperial policymaking largely staunched the ability of its colonies to develop a manufacturing industry, despite evident demand in the colonies for manufactured goods and potential decreases in shipping costs from domestic production. Instead, England utilized a variety of tax incentives and deterrents to coerce colonists into importing manufactured goods and artificially inflate England’s trade surplus. Because of this, what eventually became the United States suffered heavy economic loses as well as wasted opportunities to get a head start in the industrial era that approached rapidly after decolonization. Besides the heavy financial losses, there was also lost opportunities to develop good growth institutions, such as equality and investment in human capital. Ultimately, the United States is estimated to have lost millions of dollars from its relationship with England and was theoretically set back decades from its potential in the manufacturing industry. This paper concludes with a short discussion of the negative impacts English mercantilism had on less well-situated colonies, exemplified by Jamaica. The consequences of English mercantile insecurities pave the way for understanding economic development within its former colonies and the hinderances that plagued those countries following decolonization.

Anderea Awesnymonous 1

What Could the United States Have Been?

How England Hindered American Manufacturing

By: Anderea Awesnymonous

Abstract:

Mercantilism was the dominant economic system throughout the colonial era. These policies lauded acquisition of raw materials and export-driven economies that would bring glory to the motherland. England exercised these policies heavily over its own colonial holdings. Seen as a both a threat and asset to England, colonial America was relegated to the duty of raw material-provider. England’s imperial policymaking largely staunched the ability of its colonies to develop a manufacturing industry, despite evident demand in the colonies for manufactured goods and potential decreases in shipping costs from domestic production. Instead, England utilized a variety of tax incentives and deterrents to coerce colonists into importing manufactured goods and artificially inflate England’s trade surplus. Because of this, what eventually became the United States suffered heavy economic loses as well as wasted opportunities to get a head start in the industrial era that approached rapidly after decolonization. Besides the heavy financial losses, there was also lost opportunities to develop good growth institutions, such as equality and investment in human capital. Ultimately, the United States is estimated to have lost millions of dollars from its relationship with England and was theoretically set back decades from its potential in the manufacturing industry. This paper concludes with a short discussion of the negative impacts English mercantilism had on less well-situated colonies, exemplified by Jamaica. The consequences of English mercantile insecurities pave the way for understanding economic development within its former colonies and the hinderances that plagued those countries following decolonization.

Introduction

The United States is considered the quintessential example of a successful colonial

survivor. Following the American Revolution, the infantile country was able to establish itself

politically and economically, sowing the seeds of the world power it is today. However, the

United States was not immediately set up for success under its colonial master of England. A

crucial part of the economy was left underdeveloped for far longer than it might have been

without colonial interference: manufacturing. Due to mercantilist policies of the era, England

feared manufacturing competition from its own colonies and tightly restricted their ability to

develop industries specializing in secondary goods. Because of these policies and despite the

success the United States did come to enjoy, the question remains: what could the United States

have been without interference from England? How much development was lost as a result of


England’s policymaking that could have spurred years of economic success and perhaps even an

earlier industrialization?

These questions are imperative to understanding the effects of colonizers on their

colonies. There is great discrepancy between the development levels of former colonies, so

understanding what policies led to successful countries after decolonization is the first step

towards correcting mistakes of the past and paving the way towards a more prosperous future.

Although the United States is a colonial “success,” certain policies may have hindered the

potential afforded to the American colonists by the exceptional Goldilocks conditions of the

original thirteen American colonies. The greatest boon to studying the ways in which England

failed its, arguably, most successful colony is that it provides a critical frame of reference for the

damage inflicted to other colonies. If the United States did in fact lose out on enormous amounts

of economic development, it is worrisome to think what the consequences have been for less

fortunately situated colonies.

I will begin by outlining the theoretical framework for mercantilism that led England to

both depend upon and fear its own American colonies. This discussion will transition into an

overview of how England enforced her mercantilist values on the Americas and what each of

these policies meant for the manufacturing sector both during the colonial period and

immediately following independence. I will attempt to estimate some of the financial value lost

by stymied manufacturing and speculate about the consequences of delaying important

institutional factors that are central to economic development. After examining the American

case, I will briefly touch on the impact of mercantilism in other areas of the world. Ultimately,

this paper will derive the consequences of English mercantilism on both the colonial economy

and post-colonial development.


British Mercantilist Policy: Accidentally Creating Desire to, and Demand for, Supply

Mercantilism is an economic policy that seeks to push the supremacy of the state by

accumulating great national wealth, usually in the form of gold, silver, and other precious metals

(i.e. specie). Although not a formal school of economic thought, its philosophies dominated the

decisions that European governments undertook from about the 16th to the 18th centuries. The

most notable aspect of mercantilist theory is the assumption that economics is a zero-sum game –

one country can only benefit at the expense of another country, which led European governments

to pursue absolute trade surpluses throughout this era. Operating under this assumption, England

faced a crossroads: their colonial holdings in America were absolutely necessary to provide them

with raw materials, but they were also a potential source of fierce competition if the colonies

evolved beyond dependence upon the mother country and primary sector specialization (Nettels,

1952). Given that England ultimate goal was to out-compete its European rivals by acquiring

specie wealth via trade surpluses, it could not run the risk of losing trading opportunities to its

colonies.

Nevertheless, England still had a strong incentive to encourage the colonies to be

productive, for their productivity generated more raw materials for English manufacturing

(Nettels, 1952, p107). According to mercantilism, imports are strictly negative. Increasing

imports results in an outflow of specie wealth, which means a country is losing by zero-sum

rules. Because of this assumption, the ability to extract raw materials was a requirement for

countries. Having to import raw materials to make manufactured goods would immediately

decrease a country’s progress towards a trade surplus, thus decreasing their supposed wealth.

Given the already over-crowded, exploited land in Europe, the best way for colonial powers to

ensure their access to raw materials was through the process of colonization. Nettels argues that


England’s primary motivation for affording its famously progressive property rights to colonial

settlers was derived from a need to increase raw material production; he states that “small

holdings inspired the colonists to work; their labor expanded production; and increased

production enlarged English commerce” (1952, p107). Besides the direct benefits England

derived from raw material production in the colonies, there was the hope that encouragement of

raw material production would keep colonists from pursuing manufacturing (Scrivenor, 1968).

However, encouraging development in the colonies was a double-edged sword.

Naturally, the entrepreneurial colonists had their own incentives to develop, evolve, and expand

into new industries. Simply put, many enterprises the English sought to curtail were extremely

profitable for colonists, which makes redirection away from those activities difficult (Nettels,

1952, p109). As much as England may have wanted colonists to become exceptionally efficient

raw materials producers, she fiercely rejected competition from her own colonies in the area of

manufacturing. Nettels writes: “after [an industry] had taken root under the influence of general

economic conditions, the government stepped in to regulate” (1952, p108). Mercantilist ideology

set England on a path of desperate attempts to hinder American manufacturing and promote its

own secondary goods on an artificially receptive market.

Besides fearing manufacturing competition from American colonists, the English were in

another mercantilist battle with other European nations. Successfully making England the sole

source of manufactured goods for the colonists satisfied the mercantilist need to have exports

exceed imports; consequently, the English worked diligently to staunch the flow of manufactured

goods to the colonies from anywhere besides England itself.

Stephen Conway (2015) outlined some of the numerous measures the English

government undertook in order to assert themselves as the dominant manufacturer for the


Americas in his essay “British Governments, Colonial Consumers, and Continental European

Goods in the British Atlantic Empire.” Primarily, the English government attempted to curtail

smuggling and legal re-exports from England to the thirteen colonies and Caribbean, especially

following the Seven Years War when there were exceptional political incentives to generate

more wealth than other European nations (Conway, 2015, p711-712). Various pieces of

legislation, such as the Molasses Act of 1733, added duties to foreign goods imported by the

colonies to make them costlier than their English counterparts. Other legislation prohibited the

colonists from exporting manufactured goods; for example, the Hat Act of 1732 prohibited

colonists from exporting beaver hats, and by 1750, England had banned the finishing of iron and

steel and the use of certain metallurgy equipment (Walton & Rockoff, 2014, p104; Scrivenor,

1968, p73). Besides incentivizing colonists to buy British, duties and bans provided revenue

directly to England. According to Conway, at one point in time “the government hoped to raise

₤50,000 in revenue from the new duties on foreign linens” alone (2015, p722). Unfettered access

to colonial markets (or the ability to tax the parts of the market that were not dominated by

England) was clearly seen by the English as indescribably crucial to their economic standing.

In a great irony, the English attempts to block the import of foreign goods into the

colonies likely exacerbated colonial demand for manufactured goods. For example, Conway

states that “the British linen industry was unable to satisfy even home demand,” let alone out-

compete total European production (2015, p718). Essentially, this means that England was

denying the colonists foreign exports and opportunities to pursue domestic manufacturing but

leaving the demand that was then created unfulfilled. By stopping colonists from manufacturing

their own products, England clearly repressed an enormous economic opportunity that existed in

the growing colonial population.


Estimating the Financial Costs of Lost Manufacturing Potential

The previous section identified the motivation for the repressive nature of the English

over American colonial manufacturing, as well as the unfulfilled demand for manufactured

goods that was subsequently created. The difficulty in this analysis, however, lies in assessing

what the United States lost from its delayed entry into the world of serious manufacturing. One

way to determine the fiscal cost is through the examination of what the English gained from

mercantilism. This section will attempt to make some estimates about the secondary sector that

could have developed early in North American history.

In his 1998 article, “The Market for Manufactures in the Thirteen Continental Colonies,”

Smith examined the demand for manufactured goods within the American colonies by looking at

the value England derived from exporting to the American colonies. From 1772 to 1774, the

value of English exports to the colonies was estimated to be about ₤4,176,000, making the

colonies the most valuable American export market (Smith, 1998, p677). A quote attributed to

Benjamin Franklin in the 1750s claimed that “Pennsylvania may save ₤3,280,000 in seven

years… by giving up, ‘superfluities’” imported from the British (Smith, 1998, p677). These

numbers alone are staggering but become even more dramatic when the goods being imported

are examined; most goods were consumer goods, including textiles (e.g. wool products) and light

metal ware (e.g. iron nails). The simplistic nature of these goods demonstrates that they could

have been produced within the colonies themselves were the economic barriers removed. For

example, the first “iron plantation” was established in the 1640s in the Massachusetts

Hammersmith colony (Walton, n.d.). The iron was extracted from the colonies, processed in the

colonies into the useable raw material, and then exported to England to be made into consumer

goods, which were shipped back to the colonies. Although the colonies had a land-driven


advantage in the production of crude iron, it would have been natural for more advanced iron

products to be produced in the colonies after extraction were it not for the manufacturing barriers

(Harper, 1942, p7). Likewise, textiles made up 62.9 percent of total exports from England to the

colonies, despite the ability of the colonies to produce them (Smith, 1998, p689). This

redundancy forced the colonists to pay for a good they were equipped to extract and utilize

themselves without the unnecessary shuffling across an ocean.

An important caveat here is that the American colonies may not have been able to

directly out-compete English manufactures prices. In other words, the colonies did not

necessarily have a comparative advantage (or comparative equality) in manufacturing, largely

due to the high costs of labor. Consequently, without accounting for shipping costs, it might

seem that the colonists were better off avoiding manufacturing activities. However, shipping

costs did play a major role in the price of manufactures and were a detriment to the colonists

(Harper, 1942, p3). Thomas (1965) estimates that the colonists imported an average of ₤412,000

worth of goods per year during the period between 1963-1972 and that the shipping burden

averaged ₤66,000 per year (p630-631). Essentially, this means that there was roughly a 19

percent increase in the cost of imported goods due to shipping costs, which is an enormous

economic burden on a bourgeoning country. As the iron nails example in Figure 1 demonstrates,

the colonists may not have immediately been able to compete in the global marketplace due to

the higher costs of manufacturing combined with shipping costs, but at the very least they would

have been better off not importing English manufactures and producing their own for domestic

consumption.


Figure 1. The values in this example are fabricated in order to demonstrate the effects of shipping costs on the colonial marketplace. Although American manufactures were initially too expensive to rival England on the global scale, they would have

benefitted from reduced shipping costs by producing their own manufactures.

Ultimately, this implies that had the colonists been allowed to exploit their own talents

and markets in the New World, millions of pounds could have been saved by colonists and

injected back into their own markets. This would raise the value of GDP in the colonies and set

up the infantile United States as an industrial power from the outset of its history.

Later in his article, Smith continued to assert the existence of a strong demand for

manufactured goods within the colonies – the average annual imports of English merchandize

from 1700 to 1704 was ₤0.95 per person, compared to ₤1.32 per person from 1770 to 1774

(1998, p685). Concurrently, the population in the colonies multiplied by a factor of 8.6 (Smith,

1998, p695). Despite the dramatic increase in demand for these goods, England remained

insistent upon trying to enforce its supply monopoly. For example, prior to the Revolutionary

War, alum – a mordant necessary for high-quality dyeing of textiles and producing leather – was


“exclusively supplied from Great Britain and was mined off the north-east coast of England”

(Smith, 1998, p690). This meant that England enjoyed a monopoly on quality textile and leather

production by failing to share via export the raw materials for production. With alum relatively

unavailable to colonists, England further solidified its dominance in the production of these

goods and most of the colonists’ textile needs had to be met by imports (Smith, 1998, p697).

Other acts of dominance came from the previously mentioned Wool Act of 1699, which

restricted inter-colonial trade in wool and wool products, and the Hat Act of 1732, which

prohibited colonists to manufacture hats even though wool and beaver fur were both plentifully

supplied by the colonies (Smith, 1998).

Even the limited colonial manufacturing that did manage to gain a foothold was no match

for the triumph of England’s economic manipulation, for “the greater part of the colonial labour

force (perhaps up to 80 per cent of the total) were engaged primarily in farming” (Smith, 1998,

p700). There was a clear, voracious demand for manufactured goods that colonists were largely

unable to enjoy. Potentially millions of pounds and an entire economic sector went unexploited

by colonists during the pre-revolutionary era. Had the United States had access to manufacturing,

perhaps its dominating economy could have developed sooner and garnered an early edge in the

industrial era looming around the corner.

In a classic piece of economic historical literature, Lawrence Harper states that English

mercantilist policies “had as its purpose, exploitation, and as its means, regulation” (1942, p2).

This claim is the basis for Robert Thomas’ 1965 quantitative analysis of British imperial policy.

Primarily, Thomas concerns himself with the effects of the Navigation Acts, which he breaks

down into four distinct regulatory sections: (1) laws regulating shipping, particularly when

concerning nationality of the crew and ship, (2) laws regulating the destinations of colonial


exports, (3) laws that encouraged the colonists to pursue particular industries, and (4) laws that

directly prohibited colonists from participating in industries that competed with England itself.

These areas are systematically analyzed by the real monetary impact they had on the colonies in

an attempt to discern the cost of living as a colonial Englishman rather than an independent

“American.”

The focus of my extrapolation from this article is the third facet of the Navigation Acts:

laws that pushed colonists to pursue certain industries above others. These laws operated under

“an elaborate system of rebates and drawbacks… to encourage the production of specific goods

for export to Great Britain” (Thomas, 1965, p620). Using this system, England hoped to protect

the most important manufactured goods and goods that yielded a large customs revenue (Walton

& Rockoff, 2014, p94). For example, enumerated goods – which could only be shipped to

England from the colonies – were given preferential duties to encourage their production. These

goods included tobacco, sugar, indigo, cotton-wool, pig iron, and other raw materials (Thomas,

1965, p620-621). Notably, the goods that England made the most profitable for production from

their artificial manipulations of pricing via various tax schemes were overwhelmingly raw

materials. Not only did England explicitly ban certain products from being produced in the

colonies, she strongly incentivized the colonies to keep industries other than the primary sector

underdeveloped.

Thomas also outlines various numerical indicators of the Navigation Acts’ harmful

effects on the colonies; his calculations ultimately estimate that the average net burden on the

colonies by the year 1763 was a staggering $2,255,000 per year, not adjusted to present values

(1965, p626). Part of this stems from an inefficient allocation of resources; for example, indigo

would likely not have been an exported product for the colonies without artificial bounties (i.e.


money to encourage trade) (Thomas, 1965, p629). England’s policies pushed the colonies away

from the activities they may have otherwise found profitable, such as textile production, and

towards agricultural activities that England could not compete in anyway. Furthermore, the

colonies were coerced into buying English goods that, in some cases, they would not have if they

were independent from England (Thomas, 1965, p631). Again, this occurred on a scale of

millions of dollars annually. Had the American colonists been independent of England, there

were likely significant economic benefits to reap. Although the per capita burden was not

astronomical, I would argue that the aggregate is what matters when considering the

development of the country in the long run, making the staggering total a significant blow to the

United States’ potential economic development.

The analysis of the economic burden of English imperial policy harbors is not without

criticism in both directions, economists such as Larry Sawers argue that, if anything, Thomas’

estimates are too conservative. In his 1992 essay, “The Navigation Acts Revisited,” Sawers

outlines his belief that Thomas has understated the burden imposed by the English on the

American colonists. There appears to be a fair bit of academic consensus that the English

policies, especially the Navigation Acts, were fiscally detrimental to the colonies. Whether or not

these costs were offset by other financial benefits, such as necessary military spending the

English absorbed to protect the colonists, is debatable. However, this is inconsequential to the

discussion of manufacturing in colonial America, for the Acts can reasonably be assumed to

negatively affect manufacturing development regardless of their other benefits. Given the

potential for industrial dominance after decolonization that could have occurred if the colonies

had been allowed to respond to their enormous demand for consumer goods early on, it is


reasonable to argue that English policy may have set the United States back decades in terms of

its fiscal health and industrial development.

Evidence for Developmental Importance of Manufacturing

As stated above, some economists have examined the English mercantilist policies in the

American colonies and concluded that the Navigation Acts and other economic policies had little

consequence on the American pocketbook or development (Walton & Rockoff, 2014).

Furthermore, they note that there were benefits to being part of England’s colonial empire -

defense spending was not the colonists’ burden, and although their trade was restricted to

England, she was a massive empire with which to enjoy a partnership. However, these theories

are shortsighted. Manufacturing has been shown to be an important factor in economic

development and economy growth. As Rocha asserts in his 2018 article on the development of

manufacturing sectors, “countries that achieved the fastest economic growth… are the countries

where the increase shift towards manufacturing has been largest” (p117). This is apparent when

we examine the impacts of the industrial revolution. Thanks to industrialization and the rise of

the manufacturing industry, many countries saw an explosion of GDP per capita, declines in

birthrates, increases in life expectancy, increased literacy, and an expansion of gender equality

(Diebolt & Perrin, 2013). Broadly speaking, the rise of the manufacturing sector that led to the

Industrialization ultimately led to increased living standards in the parts of the world lucky

enough to be able to take advantage of it.

An important way that this translates to better growth for a country is the better equality

that accompanied industrialization1. For example, manufacturing jobs allowed many women to

1 Although this may not be true equality by today’s standards, it was a relative improvement for the time.


enter the workforce outside the home. The expansion of manufactured textiles and linens were

dominated early on by women and children, for they were a cheap source of labor relative to

their male counterparts (Humphries & Weisdorf, 2015, p427, 432). Women who worked in

textile factories were uniquely able to support themselves without the assistance of a husband

and consequently saw their socioeconomic position improve (Humphries & Weisdorf, 2015,

p430). This early improvement in equality that resulted from the higher wage, less male-

dominated manufacturing industry was an important stepping stone to economic development.

As argued by Diebolt and Perrin (2013), the technological progress that allows for manufacturing

processes (as opposed to primary sector production or small-scale subsistence “manufacturing”)

spurs a positive feedback loop that enriches equality. Again, looking at the case of women, they

assert that as manufacturing takes off, the returns to human capital increase sufficiently to make

having men and women in the workforce viable against them staying at home for childcare.

Consequently, women receive more education in order to enter the workforce, which contributes

to their economic well-being, human capital, and the health and human capital of their offspring.

These developments encourage more technological advancement, human capital investment, and

equality of workers, which begins the cycle again and encourages an upward trend of equality.

Because of this feedback mechanism, equality is arguably one of the most important

factors of long-term development; it can break the cycle of low human capital and induce a

prioritization of human capital that ultimately breeds more equality, and so on (Engerman &

Sokoloff, 2005). Although it may be cynical, calculating reasoning, if there are economic gains

from educating and involving more diverse classes of society (e.g. women) in the labor market,

that trend will eventually be fostered. Manufacturing provided those economic gains, opening the

door to economic success for those previously excluded – poor farmers, unskilled workers,


women, etc. Additionally, it breeds a demand for good, economically institutions, such as

education (Engerman & Sokoloff, 2005).

Ultimately, what has been derived above is a movement of development from

manufacturing, to industrialization, to equality, to economic prosperity. This suggests that

America did not only lose out on immediate financial benefits during the time that England

hindered the manufacturing sector, but rather it sustained social and long-term economic losses

as well. Institutional equality may have arisen sooner under an early, robust manufacturing

sector, especially since women were such an important source of labor during

protoindustrialization; moreover, allowing manufacturing to develop and draw women into the

labor force could have alleviated some of the issues of labor scarcity in the thirteen colonies.

Additionally, this equality, besides being a moral and philosophical success, may have spurred

exceptional development of human capital, which is one of the most important factors for

economic growth (Chirwa & Odhiambo, 2016). The short-sighted, fundamentally misguided

mercantilist policies imposed upon the American colonies by the British may have stunted the

development of key institutions that produce massive economic growth.

Discussion

The implications of the burdensome forces of English mercantilism paint a bleak picture

for the success of her colonial offspring. Throughout colonization, England acquired roughly one

hundred colonial territories (Sawe, 2018). Of these colonies, few had the exceptional conditions

of the thirteen original American colonies that made them ideal for Europeans settlement. While

the American colonists were eventually able to push back against economic restrictions they felt

were unjust, other colonies did not have a free population present that allowed for such dissent.

In colonies that were extractive or plantation in nature, they felt the consequences of


mercantilism without any of the benefits or the ability to readily oust the imposing English. They

were used solely to feed the need for raw materials at the expense of their own wellbeing.

The American colonists may have suffered from lost manufacturing potential under the

English empire, but many other countries were left in a position where the development of a

robust secondary sector could not even be fathomed imminently after decolonialization. America

colonists were at least able to settle the land and were not mere resource-extractors for the

English. Instead, they were afforded a moderate degree of autonomy and property rights that did

not exist in more oppressive colonies that led to a successful, earlier revolution. Other countries,

such as Jamaica, were purely plantation colonies for the purpose of obtaining resources for the

English. No significant settler population was instituted, and independence did not come until

much later. To this day the effect of mercantilism can be seen in Jamaica; as of 2017, nearly 20

percent of its population is still engaged in primary sector activities, versus under 2 percent of

the population in the United States (“Jamaica,” 2018; “United States,” 2018). Furthermore, the

United States’ GDP (at purchasing power parity) per capita is nearly $60,000, while Jamaica is at

roughly $9,000 (“GDP per capita,” 2018). The divergence between these two former English

colonies demonstrates the disparate paths countries take after decolonization and the potential

harm that English mercantilism caused globally. Although the American colonial case alone

shows the enormous economic impacts of these policies, their effects may have been devastating

on less fortunately established colonies.

Conclusion

This paper aimed to examine the effects of English mercantilist policies on the American

colonial development of manufacturing. Throughout the colonial era, the predominant, informal

school of thought about economic matters was mercantilism, which prioritized resource


extraction and constant trade surpluses. This led England to both need and fear the American

colonies, for they were a critical source of raw materials, but presented a threat to England’s

trade surplus if they could develop into a formidable rival. Consequently, England pursued

mercantilist policies by imposing a plethora of regulations on the American colonies that

restricted manufacturing activities either directly or by price manipulations (e.g. duties or

subsidies). Through encouragement to pursue primary sector activities, England hoped to distract

the colonists and secure her manufacturing dominance.

These regulations ultimately stunted the growth of the American colonial manufacturing

sector. Although the level of importation of manufactures into the thirteen colonies demonstrated

that there was a clear demand for such goods, the colonists were not allowed to produce their

own manufactures or import them from anywhere besides England. Furthermore, the Navigation

Acts alone are estimated to have costs the colony millions from their economic restrictions. In

addition to immediate fiscal losses, there are long-term developmental losses from England’s

policymaking. Manufacturing expansion tended to result in relative increases in equality, which

led to positive institutional development, such as investments in human capital. Essentially, the

English mercantilist policies stymied American manufacturing, resulting in enormous losses to

both short- and long-term economic development. As demonstrated by the case of Jamaica, the

American colonies may still have been able to operate successfully under mercantilism in a way

that allowed them to develop even under harmful policies, but not all nations were so fortunate.

In its totality, the damage done to much of the world from English mercantilism is likely

unquantifiable and irredeemable.


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