What can we learn from MH17 Disaster?

What has changed since?

Joe SultanaDirector Network Manager

Email: joe.sultana@eurocontrol.int

12th November 2015

Contents

The context before July 2014

The immediate reaction after the shooting down

The air traffic management consequences

Have things changed, can it happen again?

2

3

The Network Manager - Connecting the Network to deliver Improved Performance, even in abnormal circumstances

European Traffic - Jan 2014

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5

European Aviation Crisis Coordination Cell (EACCC)

Coordinate management of response to thenetwork crisis affecting aviation in Europe

Activated when circumstances beyond normal environment of ops are evident

Members

EACCC

…

Airlines

ANSPMilitary

Airports

State focal

points

Coordinating Europe’s response in times of crises and disruption to air traffic management 6

Role of EACCC

Extreme weather

Major disruption

?NM manages the disruption

Crisis ? EACCC activatedAsh cloudAny other

disruption

Nuclear

7

EACCC Regulatory Framework

NM IREACCC

Network level

Mitigation Measures

Member State level

State focal

points

Contingency Plans

Requirement

Coordinating Supporting

Recovery Sustainability

8

Events in Ukraine Feb – Apr 2014 Feb 14 – indication that closure of Simferopol may be imminent

Mar 14 10 - Odessa and Dnepropetrovsk ACCs assume control of Simferopol ACC 28 - Russian Federation (RF) issues several NOTAMs changing location

indicators UKUR & announcing start of svc provision by RF as of 3 Apr 29 - NM telecon with ICAO, AOs and ANSPs on latest events including how

to deal with NOTAMs issued by RF without jeopardising network safety

2 Apr 14 ICAO issues a State letter drawing attention to possible safety risks in the

Simferopol FIR NM advice on Headline News to AOs to avoid the airspace and

circumnavigate Simferopol FIR due to safety concerns NM telecon with AOs and ANSPs on the situation Some AOs chose to route North of Black Sea, some route south avoiding

Ukraine

3 Apr 14 - EASA issue Safety Information Bulletin (SIB 2014-10)

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Events in Ukraine Jun – Jul 2014

Jun 14

5 - Ukraine issue NOTAM closing some routes in

Dnepropetrovsk FIR from 06/06/2014 till 01/07/2014 between

SFC - FL260

29 – Ukraine issue NOTAM closing routes in Dnepropetrovsk FIR

from SFC-FL260 from 01/07/14 till 29/07/14

Jul 14

14 - Ukraine issue NOTAM closing routes in Dnepropetrovsk FIR

from FL260 – FL320 (resulting in closing ATS routes from SFC-

FL320)

17 Jul – MH17

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MH17 Crisis – Network Manager’s role17 July (all times UTC)

~15.00 request for info on MH17 from KLM

UkSATSE confirmation - flight plot disappeared from radar screens

19.00 - EACCC telecon – dealing with crisis coordination response and political aspects

20.00 - NM Ops Centre (NMOC) telecon with ANSPs and AOs – tackling ops aspects:

Airspace closures Re-routings via Turkey, Bulgaria, Romania in south / Poland in

north

Immediate Network Manager Actions in MH17

Applied the national NOTAMS published by Ukraine

Processed the MH17 flight plan against the valid airspace

organisation

Responded to request from KLM on information about MH17

Gathered info about what might have happened and made

assessment as to immediate risk

As Chairman of the EACCC activated the Crisis cell

Closed Ukrainian airspace as decided by Ukraine

Managed the impact of the re-routing of flights with support of

Ukraine and neighbouring ANSPs

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The aftermath

Major traffic flow impacts, looking at solutions at network level

Address questions from EU Parliament, media, whether Network

Manager could have done more beforehand

Full participation in ICAO TF on Conflict zones

Easy-to-access portlet on airspace closures and warning with H24

ops response service

Support to safety case for partial re-opening of 4 routes over the

Black Sea

Heightened crisis in Lebanon, Syria/Iraq and now Egyptian

airspaces

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Complementing ICAO and European activities on Aviation Risks due Conflict Zones

Key areas ensuring sharing of relevant information assessment of risk locally and regionally

Network Manager Operational input on context Flight Plan processing Up-to-date situation picture with online Closure and Warnings Map

for Europe and beyond Providing AOs with an interpretation of complex network situation Monitoring of network operations Ability to react in real time

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List of published information through NOTAM, EASA-SIB, ICAO letters and national AIC/AIP….

….Illustrated on a map.Geographical coverage is NM area + adjacent Data are updated 24/7

NM portal protected area

Daily Flights in European NM AreaNE

Asia140

SE Asia415

1463

RussiaC Asia1460

NM area internal traffic 26548

Gulf578

923

590

Impact of crises in 2014 on traffic flows

28 November 2013

27 November 2014

Current situation in the South-Eastern Europe and the Middle East

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FPL TRAFFIC07 AUG 2015

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ICAO Task Force on conflict zones

NM member of Task Force on Risks to civil aviation arising from Conflict Zones (TF RCZ) established by ICAO end Jul 2014

safety and security aspects to civilian aircraft operating to, from and over conflict zones

how relevant info can be effectively collected & disseminated three meetings: two in Aug and one in Dec 2014 conclusions to ICAO High Level Safety Conf (HLSC), Feb 15

HLSC conclusion – establish a repository of risk assessment info

Operational as of Apr 2015

NM conflict zones portlet

Aviation risks

Threat to airspace usability assessment – security, operational expertise, political awareness

Mitigation measures – adequate?

Safety risk assessment methodology – still the basis

Enough information/access to threat analysis for those who have responsibility to make decision fly/no fly

Manage the situation and the consequences in particular impact of re-routings of major flows

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Managing a « risk » airspace

Risk factors monitored, risk mitigation plans updated

Ability to react timely to changes at network level – impact beyond region

Coordination at right level between ops stakeholders

Top-down decisions must be unambiguous

Systems can be fooled by « creative » flight planning

Support those who have to make judgement calls in a complex environment

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MH 17 Report of Dutch Safety Board

Main Air Traffic Management and Airspace conclusions:

Flight routes – none of the parties involved adequately identified the risks to civil aviation brought about by the armed conflict in the eastern part of Ukraine

Given the risk, the airspace should have been closed

Malaysian Airlines (and others) should not have selected this particular route

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Dutch Safety Board Recommendations

Improvements at 3 Levels:

Management of airspace in states dealing with armed conflict in their territory – safety improvement

How states and operators assess risks of flying over conflict zones – safety improvement

Accountability of operators regarding their choice of whether or not to fly over conflict zones – better risk assessment

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Obligation of the State

States must ensure that the airspace used by flights is safe Any information about risks and threats should result in advice or

warnings

Recommendation Be prepared to close airspace, coordinate with ANSP, info 3rd parties

What if there is no functioning, no ability to make risk/threat assessment, politics get in the way

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Obligation of the airline

Operators have to do all that is possible to operate the flight safely

Airlines rely on states to provide them information about risks and threats to flying

Recommendation

Operators need to make risk assessment for whole route,

gather and share info,

timely and structured process in place for info from state,

unpredictability of armed conflict is increased risk

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Recent experiences

Missiles from Caspian Sea to Syria

Loss of Russian MetroJet over Sinai

Potential closure of Afgan airspace

Network Manager preparation:

Sharing of available info

Scenarios prepared with ANSPs in region and others affected

Extensive briefings\teleconf with airspace users

Await decisions of states/safety risk assessments of airlines

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Thank you for your attention

Happy to take questions

Joe SultanaDirector Network Manager

Email: joe.sultana@eurocontrol.int

12th November 2015