West Africa Insight

January 2010

November 2010Vol 2 No 1

A Publication of the Centre for Democracy and Development with Support from Rockefeller Foundation

Monthly News on Democratic Governance, Gender, Peace and Security

Conflict RiskConflict Risk

Events in Cote d'Ivoire are taking a turn for the worse. Mr. Laurent Gbagbo has sworn himself into office as President of the country and his opponent Mr. Alassane

Ouattara has also done the same. Security threats are also manifested in the closure of the country's borders by the army and the declaration of a dusk to dawn curfew. Signals of all foreign radio broadcasts are reportedly jammed to stop citizens listening to the condemnation of the unfolding coup d'Etat. The Electoral

Commission had declared opposition candidate Alassane Ouattara winner of the polls, against incumbent President Gbagbo. Subsequently, the Constitutional Council annulled Ouattara's votes. Presently, both the African Union and the ECOWAS are trying to mediate to avert the looming danger of violent conflict.

COUP IN COTE D'IVOIRE?

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Editorial Team

Editor in Chief - Jibrin Ibrahim

Editor - Okon Akiba

Associate Editor

- Okechukwu Ibeanu

Project Officer

- Daniel Nengak Gondyi

Project Officer (Technical)- Terfa Hemen

Table of Contents

Cote d' Ivoire: At the Cross Road of War or Consolidation of Peace 3

Post Electoral Violence in Guinea and Conflict Risk in West Africa 4

Women Must Play a Part in Peace building Initiatives 5

Al-Qaeda, Islamic Fundamentalism and Conflict in the Sahel 6

Sources 9

The Rockefeller Foundation is not responsible for views expressed in this publication

Researchers

Uchenna Idoko

Daniel Ehighalua

Editorial

Okon Akiba

Monthly News and Current Affairs 10

The Casamance: Avoiding Future Conflicts in Sene-Gambia 8

Conflict Risks

Youth Bulge And Restiveness 11

2

The past two decades have witnessed rapid escalation in prominence of security threats such as terrorism, state fragility, nuclear proliferation, bureaucratic corruption, and global warming. Equally disquieting is the new wave of non-state sources of instability including HIV/AIDS, food insecurity, and natural disasters. The uncertainties they portend for worldwide peace are yet to be accurately, comprehensively deciphered, and present recommendations for their solution often raise more questions than answers: Are state institutions developing the muscle and experience to confront emerging threats? Should regional economic organizations modify their role to find balance and order among warring parties? Can new security regimes eliminate the roots of conflict and solidify long-term peaceful relations across national borders? If answers to these questions are negative, the international community must immediately chart alternative strategies to change current trajectories away from violence and conflict footings.

Security and conflict risk exist and are magnified in West Africa—where state institutions are fragile and their weak economic underpinnings frequently yield violent internal conflicts that seem profoundly impervious to mediation; and the situation is made that much more difficult because specialized structures required to promote continuous dialogue and compromise among the political elite are either non-existent or lacking in vitality. Meanwhile, ethnic rivalries and malignant political vectors in the form of religious (Islamic) fundamentalism render the achievement of mutually acceptable outcomes from negotiations almost impossible; and massive flows of light weapons embolden insurgents and drive radicalized amorphous groups to seek violent solutions rather than negotiate peaceful settlement, agreements on identity crises.

With the challenges of an insecure region as the context, the search for peace must begin with inoculating and fortifying West Africa's conflict prone societies with values of democratic consultation—to enable them resolve crucial national questions of state legitimization, quality of citizenship, and political participation. Those states emerging from conflict also need regional cooperation to address socio-political tensions embodied in migration, illegal exploitation of natural resources and cross-border trafficking in illicit narcotic drugs. For that matter, reform of the security sector, demilitarization of politics, rehabilitation of female victims of war-time rape and forced pregnancy, and punishment of indicted war criminals (perhaps truth-telling) can ease the burden of memory and encourage peacebuilding.

These are some of the most crucial issues on the minds of policymakers and peace activists, many of whom share our confidence in regard to the capability of existing regional security regimes to contain the conundrum of inflammable conflicts, and to achieve positive outcomes.

Properly conceived, Conflict Risk is an appropriate theme to celebrate this launching of the second volume of West Africa Insight; it speaks clearly and articulately to the transformational dividends that will accrue to communities once a majority of leaders abandon violence and begin seriously to court reconciliation of conflicting interests through peaceful measures.

Cote d' Ivoire: At the Cross Road of War or Consolidation of Peace

ote d' Ivoire is currently in the throes of political Cconflicts that began to grip

that country in the late 1980s, following the collapse of the i n t e r n a t i o n a l p r i c e s f o r agricultural product—cocoa prices of which Cote d'Ivoire is a leading world producers sharply declined, forcing the then President Houphouet Boigny and his prime Minister Alassane Dramane Ouattara to accept the W o r l d B a n k s s t r u c t u r a l adjustment plan. But this economic intervention package did not stem the country's decline, rather social crises deepened in the years following. Specifically, the country's political conditions grew progressively worse through the years due, first, to the death of President Houphouet Boigny in December 1993; second, the emergent struggles for power among the political elite groups and lack of coherence in d e v e l o p m e n t p l a n n i n g would finally lead to a m i l i t a r y C o u p d'Etat of 1 9 9 9 ; worse still, p o l i t i c a l crisis came to a head in the armed conflict t h a t b e g a n o n September 19, 2002. Some say that the discriminatory policy of 'Ivoirity' heightened political t e n s i o n s b e t w e e n s e t t l e r populations and indigenes; and there were also sharp divisions among indigenes of the northern

and southern extractions. The effects of the crisis were disastrous for the country, leading to: the partition of the country into two zones (rebel and loyalist zone), serious violation of h u m a n r i g h t s , a n d t h e impoverishment of the population, social fracture, the upsurge of land and nationality problems.

The crisis did encourage deliberate search for peace, which scarcely resulted in any desirable outcomes, including the Lome, Accra, and Marcoussis Accords. Also noteworthy as a significant attempt at peace that failed was the Ougadougou Accord (March 4, 2007); it sought to build a permanent structure of dialogue (PSD) among disputants and rival groups for the control of political power in the country.

Although subsequent attempts at election did not yield a winner to control power by popular mandate,

the 2011 elections that started on October 15 brought

together 14 opposing candidates. And for

the first time, the t h r e e I v o i r i a n p o l i t i c a l p r i n c i p a l s , namely, Laurent Gbagbo, Henri Konan Bédié, and

Alassane Dramane O u a tta ra , c a m e

together to commit t h e m s e l ve s to t h e

p r o m o t i o n o f g o o d elections. And, there were signs

that things would be different and that Cote d'Ivoire would finally produce a leader without rancor for the following reasons: Ivoirian voters peacefully and in great number participated in this historic poll which was open to

everyone; a strong political consensus and a continuous support from the international community made it possible to hold this election ; voting seemed peaceful and reports did not sug gest that voters were intimidated by government forces or supporters; Independent Electoral Commission was seen to be well organized, impartial and transparent in handling the process; international standards were maintained, with a strong public participation by voters estimated at more than 83 percent. Unfortunately, election outcomes have continued to pose threats to the countries security, as both Gbagbo and Ouattara are each claiming a right to the presidency of the country.

In summary, Cote d'Ivoire is at the crossroads to consolidate its peace weakened severally in the last twenty years. Its future depends on the peacefu l resolution of the disputes arising from the elections because the country needs to get committed in its development which every part of the Ivoirian society and indeed Africa is clamoring for.

The key projects for the new Cote d'Ivoire are, among others, fight aga inst corrupt ion, peace building between Ivoirians t h e m s e l v e s a n d t h e i r counterparts in the sub region, security sector reform and the re-establishment of a national army, rebuilding of an impartial justice s y s t e m , r e d u c i n g y o u t h unemployment and promoting integration.

- Wodjo Fini Traore

3

Cote d'Ivoire is at the crossroads to consolidate

its peace weakened severally in the last twenty years. Its future depends on the peaceful resolution of the disputes arising from the

elections

4

Post Electoral Violence in Guinea and Conflict Risk in West Africa

hen Guinea's long s e r v i n g p o l i t i c a l Wl eader, Lansanah

C o nte h d i e d i n p owe r i n December 2008, he left a political vacuum that was swiftly filled by Captain Moussa 'Dadis' Camara through a military takeover. With t h at d e ve l o p m e nt , m a ny (including West Africa Insight, January 2010) w a r n e d o f a possible return of military rule and a t r e n d o f erosion of the region's hard-w o n d e m o c r a t i c g a i n s . T h i s p r e d i c t i o n p r o v e d t o b e correct when the military seized power in Niger Republic in February 2010 and almost succeeded in doing so in Guinea Bissau.

After a series of delays and setbacks, 77 percent of registered Guinean voters participated in a presidential election (June 27, 2010); though the results of that election proved to be inconclusive because none of the leading contenders was able to secure the absolute majority of votes required by law to be declared an outright winner. Cellou Dalein Diallo (Union of Democratic Forces in Guinea—UDFG) won 43.69 percent of votes, while Alpha Conde (Rally for the People of Guinea—RPG) won 18.25 percent. Although not sufficient to avoid a runoff, these individual scores are highly significant, bearing in mind that there were 24 candidates in the race.

After a 4-month delay that was characterized by violence and

disputes over the leadership of the electoral commission, the runoff was finally conducted on November 7, 2010. By the time the votes from the run-off were counted, the fortunes of the leading contenders had changed: Cellou Dalein Diallo scored 47.48 percent of the votes cast while his

o p p o n e nt , A l p h a C o n d e secured 52.52 percent of

the votes and emerge w i n n e r . T h i s

dramatic turn of events between the 2 rounds of voting (similar t o w h a t happened in Ghana in 2008)

w a s r e c e i v e d w i t h s h o c k by

Cellou Dalein Diallo, his Union of Democratic

Forces in Guinea (UDFG) and their supporters. The decision of Guineans to switch from a candidate who scored almost a half of the votes in the first round to another who scored a scanty 18 percent of the votes is explained by many as being caused by

realignment of forces along ethnic lines, which dynamics are beyond the immediate purview of this piece. It will suffice to say that Alpha Conde successfully mopped up the votes of the other 22 candidates dropped after the first round to emerge winner ; however, he failed to make in-roads into the Peul dominated regions of Guinea. It is of utmost importance therefore that his presidency should concentrate on building bridges into the Peul regions to help allay fears of Malinke domination of the Peuls.Following announcement of the run-off election results, violent clashes erupted in the Guinean capital city of Conakry—between rival party supporters and also between supporters of the candidates and security officials. According to AP, 62 persons were h o s p i t a l i z e d o n M o n d a y November 15, in one hospital alone. The Guinean post-election violence brings to mind images of a similar incidence in Kenya in 2007. On Wednesday November 17, General Sekouba Kouyate, the h e a d o f t h e t r a n s i t i o n a l

Guineans protesting after the re-run presidential votes: http://www.cocorioko.net/?p=4568

The decision of Guineans to switch from a candidate who

scored almost a half of the votes in the first round to another

who scored a scanty 18 percent of the votes is explained by many as being caused by realignment

of forces along ethnic lines

government, declared a state of emergency in Guinea to help arrest the violence. However, there are reports of violence along Peul/Malinke ethnic faultline in neighbouring Sierra Leone.

Post election violence in Guinea is a disturbing negative trend with serious implications for West Africa and should be brought u n d e r co nt ro l b efo re t h e legislative elections coming up in Guinea in 2011. Guinea shares borders with Cote d'Ivoire, Liberia, Sierra Leone and Guinea Bissau; and these are all countries with high conflict risk potentials. Also, the election anticipated in Cote

d'Ivoire since 2005 and finally conducted on October 31, 2010 was also inconclusive and a run-off is scheduled for November 28. The ethnic tensions underlying the campaign between the contenders in Cote d'Ivoire (President Laurent Gbagbo and former Prime Minister Alassane Ouattara) are more pronounced than those of Guinea. Presidential election in Burkina Faso (also neighbouring to Guinea) is slated for November 21.

2011 presents a busy schedule on West African elections calendar with presidential and parl iamentary elections coming up in Niger, Nigeria, The Gambia, Cape Verde, Liberia, and

Women Must Play a Part in Peacebuilding Initiatives

omen have paid a heavy price in the Wlong and violent

conflicts that ravaged the West Afr i can reg ion beg inn ing effectively in early 1990. They have continued to endure unprecedented levels of sexual violence and physical assault, along with related HIV infection, involuntary pregnancies and all related health complications. Violent conflicts have forced several women to flee from their homes as refugees, suffer increased insecurity that comes from not having their traditional s u p p o r t s y s t e m s o n hand—including posttraumatic stress disorder and other psychological consequences of conflict. Women are the main victims of food insecurity that comes from not having an adequate means of livelihood and from culturally prescribed, and in some cases, legal prohibition on owning land.

Following resolution 1325 (2000) that was passed ten years ago, some progress has been m a d e i n t e r m s o f a c co m m o d at i n g wo m e n ' s interests. In many post-conflict West Africa countries, the

number of women in government has increased dramatically, quotas have been set and implemented, and women have used their public decision-making roles to advance women's rights. There is increased public awareness in regard to the differential impacts of conflict on women, and this is reflected in post-conflict needs analyses and planning frameworks.

But significant gaps remain and so more needs to be done. For instance, while there is an increase in the extent to which peace agreements address gender issues, only 16 per cent of peace agreements contain specific provisions on women's rights and needs. Also, even though gender analysis is found in post-conflict needs assessments in Liberia and Sierra Leone, less than 8 per cent of proposed recovery budgets identify spending priorities addressing women's needs, and just 5.7 per cent of actual spending in multi-donor trust funds is allocated to building gender equality and promoting women's empowerment.

Po s t - c o n f l i c t e m p l o y m e n t generation programmes have not sufficiently targeted the most vulnerable groups, including female h e a d s o f h o u s e h o l d a n d

impoverished women, and investment in women's property rights and livelihood prospects is inadequate. Women in these countries have raised many other pressing issues, such as the need to include women in peace negotiations and state building, to ensure women's physical secur i ty and to proper ly investigate crimes committed against women in conflict and post-conflict situations.

African Women's concerns on the issue of peace are the outcome of a process that

5

Benin as well as in neighbouring Chad, Cameroon and Mauritania. As we approach these elections, ethnicity and tribal considerations are likely to impact on the conduct and outcomes of these elections as well as influence policies of the governments to be formed. There is therefore urgent need for adequate preparations for the polls and adequate conflict assessments to prevent the risk of electoral violence which could jeopardize the gains of democracy in the region.– Nengak Daniel

Nigerian women protesting over sectarian violence; http://www.news24.com/Africa/News/Nigerian-women-protest-killings-20100311

6

started with the Kampala Action Plan on Women and Peace (1993), the African Platform of Action on Women, Dakar (1994), the Fourth World Conference on Women, Beijing (1995), and the Women's Leadership Forum o n P e a c e Johannesburg (1996). It was in this context that the OAU and the ECA j o i n t l y established and l a u n c h e d i n November 1998, the A f r i c a n W o m e n ' s Committee on Peace and Development (AWCPD) which is a major cornerstone of women's inclusion in peace processes and empowerment endeavours in the region following Beijing.

Since then, several other

r e g i o n a l m e e t i n g s a n d

deliberations have taken place in

search of a common platform on

the issue of women and peace.

The Pan-African Women's

Conference on a Culture of

Peace, co-organised by UNESCO,

OAU and AWCPD in Zanzibar in

May 1999 resulted in the

unanimous adoption of the

Zanzibar Declaration and Agenda for

Peace. The Pan-African Women's

Organisation Peace Forum held in

Algiers concluded its deliberations by

launching the Algiers Appeal. The

Special Forum on Peace of

t h e S i x t h Re g i o n a l

Conference gathered

great momentum

and resulted in the

o f f i c i a l

endorsement of the

Declarations and

R e s o l u t i o n s

adopted by women's

associations and NGOs

meeting in the Peace

Tent. Thus, the Sixth Regional

Conference on Women concluded

deliberations on the issue of peace by

reiterating its commitment to the

Zanzibar Declaration and Agenda for

Peace and by endorsing the Algiers

Appeal and the Declarations of the

Peace Tent during the Sixth Regional

Conference on Women.

On October 31, 2000, the United

Nations Security Council unanimously

adopted Resolution 1325 on Women,

Peace, and Security. The historic

resolution was the culmination of

years of act iv ism by women

determined to challenge the classic

perspectives on warfare that ignore

he Sahel region of West

A f r i c a o c c u p i e s a Ts t r a t e g i c p o s i t i o n

between the Sahara to the north

and the tropical rain zones to the

south. Mali, Niger, Nigeria and

Senegal are situated in this zone

with the main traditional

inhabitants being the semi-

nomadic Fulani, Berber and Tuareg

people who are predominantly Sunni

Muslims. The Tuaregs have very close

ancestral, commercial and religious

connections with the North African

states of Algeria, Morocco, Libya and

Tunisia. The West African Sahelian

states of Niger and Mali remain the

hotbeds for conflicts. Religion is at

the core of the relationship with their

North African neighbours. It is

religion that provokes friction

a n d c o n f l i c t , w h i c h h a s

heightened concerns about the

export of the fundamentalist

variant of Islam—a variant or

extreme brand of Islam that

rejects secularism, refuses to

acknowledge the secular state as

the ultimate vehicle for modern

Al-Qaeda, Islamic Fundamentalism, and Conflict in the Sahel

- Uchenna Idoko

both violence against women

and, especially, the significant

contributions made by women

to peace processes around the

world. The resolution calls upon

the United Nations and member

states to (1) ensure the

protection of women and girls

during armed conflict, (2)

consider the rights of women

during peace processes and

inc lude women in peace

negotiations and peace support

operations, and (3) increase the

participation of women at

decis ion-making levels in

institutions engaged in conflict

resolution and peacebuilding. Nonetheless, serious challenges remain. Sexual violence is an all too common tactic of war and often continues unabated after the guns fall silent. Women also continue to face obstacles to e n g a g e m e n t i n p e a c e negotiations, these challenges r e q u i r e t h e s t r o n g e s t commitment in implementing resolution 1325 (2000) in the coming years. Advancing the peace and security agenda for women is critical to maintaining regional peace and security.

Sexual violence is an all toocommon tactic of war and

often continues unabated after the guns fall silent. Women also

continue to face obstacles to engagement in peace

negotiations, these challenges require the strongest

commitment in implementing resolution 1325 (2000) in the

coming years

7

political relations between state

a n d s o c i e t y, a n d s e e k s

implantation of the theocratic

state, based on Islam.

Al-Qaeda has preyed on this

fundamentalist bent in parts of

the Sahel to whip up Islamic

sentiments that continue to

confront the modern state

structure based on democracy.

Al-Qaeda still largely remains an

amorphous ideology. That

'ideology' has mutated as it

undergoes the process of

transportation around the

world. Al-Qaeda in the Sahel

found a base for its activities

along the borders of Sudan,

Niger and Mali, with incursions

into Burkina Faso and Chad.

Recent developments such as

the recent kidnapping of

European citizens have brought

to the fore the potential danger

of allowing Al Qaeda to gain a

stronger foothold in the region.

Concurrently, the ongoing

conflicts in Afghanistan and Iraq

h ave s e r ve d to i n c re a s e

America's interest in the region.

In the years to come, the Sahel

will likely remain a zone of

strategic interest to Washington.

Meanwhile, internal conflicts

within the countries of the Sahel

continued unabatedly: in

particular, the Tuaregs in the

uranium endowed Niger and

Mali have always felt alienated

from their governments and

they have continued to pose

threats to internal and regional

order.

America is increasingly

finding the Sahel region a

strategic point in its 'global war

on terror.' Away from Pakistan,

and much of the Middle East, the

Sahel region retains American

interest for several reasons:

Uranium from the region was

reported transported via Sudan to

service alleged nuclear plants in

Saddam's Iraq. As we might also want

to recall, an American aerial

bombardment of Sudan to wipe out

a uranium plant consumed

a commercial baby

food manufacturing

factory instead.

S t i l l , t h e

A m e r i c a n s

c o n t i n u e t o

m o u n t

surveillance in and around the Sahel, more as a preventive measure than any attempt at directly confronting the terrorist haven. AFRICOM is America's strategic security and arrowhead organization dealing with the situation; and its activities are conducted indirectly, through security partnership plans with the governments of the region, rather than directly, given the obvious backlash (political and religious), which a direct involvement could engender.

Beyond what we currently know, about the impacts of fundamentalist organizations in the region

exemplified in staccato incidents of kidnapping, it is difficult to predict with any degree of certainty the combination of factors capable of triggering fully fledged violence. What seems

overtly discernable is that the Sahel is

becoming a safe h a v e n f o r

r e l i g i o u s bigots. Most of the Sahelian s t a t e s a r e either weak or f r a g i l e , o r

undemocratic. This leaves the

situation perilously slippery and open to

any innocuous incident tipping the balance of conflict. With effective surveillance and early warning signals, the region could retain stability in the short term and offer security for ordinary citizens and foreigners. But the prospect for long term peace is a matter for continuing examination and analyses of internal and external factors impinging upon the region's security. - Daniel Ehighalua

Tuareg Rebels – a force to content with: http://www.stratfor.com/memberships/120295/analysis/mali_cease_fire_tuareg_how_long

Tuaregs in the uranium

endowed Niger and Mali

have always felt alienated

from their governments

and they have continued to

pose threats to internal

and regional order

he Casamance is the region of southern Senegal that Thas the peculiarity of being

physically separated from the northern part of the country by another country – the Gambia. It has a border with Guinea Bissau, a very unstable and militarised narco-state. The Casamance is one of the potential conflict zones that could create a major conflagration in West Africa over the next decade. The dangerous mix of an intransigent Senegalese State unwilling to negotiate cultural and political differences, the development of a narco-state in Guinea Bissau and growing dictatorship in the Gambia could create a major theatre of war in the region.

Under French colonialism, the major economic interest was in t h e g ro u n d n u t p ro d u c i n g n o r t h e r n r e g i o n a n d t h e Casamance area was neglected. In addition, the Jola people of the Casamance were not part of the savannah and Muslim culture of the rest of the country so cultural difference was compounded by political neglect even after independence. The result was that by 1982, Casamance declared rebellion against the Senegalese State opting for independence. Between 1982 and 1992, the Senegalese State tried to use its military might to defeat the i n d e p e n d e n c e m o v e m e n t without success. Negotiations started in 1992 and in 2000, a cease fire was negotiated but the issue of autonomy and an acceptable political pact remains unresolved.

The Casamance problem is compounded by the crisis of the neighbouring State of Guinea Bissau. In November 2008, President Nino Vieira and General Batista Tagme Nawai were assassinated by warring camps of the army. Indeed, assassinations in the army and political camps have occurred in 1993, 1998, 2000, 2005 and 2007. The killings were all related turf battles within the army for the control of the growing cocaine trade with Latin America for onward shipment to Europe. A spin off of the trade has

been arms shipment to the rebels in Casamance. Indeed, t h e a t t e m p t t o investigate the arms shipment to the Mouvement des F o r c e s Démocratiques du le Casamance (MFDC) rebels in Casamance in 1998 accelerated assassinations in the army. Attempts by t h e E c o n o m i c Community of West African States to carry out security sector reforms in Guinea Bissau to discipline the army have so far not yielded fruit. The growing level of the circulation of small arms emanating from the drug barons of Guinea Bissau is therefore a potential trigger to larger armed conflicts in the region.

T h e s i t u a t i o n i s f u r t h e r complicated by political developments in neighbouring Gambia. The Gambia has the distinction of being the only African country that decided not to have an army when it obtained independence in 1962. The reasons are as follows: Gambia is a country totally immersed within, and surrounded by its powerful and large neighbour, Senegal. President Jawara therefore decided that blood relations and negotiation with Senegal would be the base for constructing the country's security.

But Gambia's small police force attempted a coup d'état in 1981, thus forcing President Jawara to call for Senegalese intervention and the result was the establ ishment of the Senegambia Federation, which collapsed in 1989. The Gambia then established an army and in 1994, Lt Yahya Jammeh of the newly formed Gambian Army ousted President Jawara and took over power. He initiated a four-year transition programme and was elected President at the end of the transition.

Since then, President Jammeh has become increasingly authoritarian and his regime has been systematically violating the human rights of Gambians a n d a s s a s s i n a t i n g p e r c e i v e d

opponents. He has also become increasingly megalomaniac. Since October 2010, he has encouraged the emergence of a movement campaigning for him to be declared Emperor of the Gambia. A possible outcome of the present political situation in the Gambia is the emergence of violent conflict as President Jammeh has closed all democratic doors to political change. President Jammeh is from the same ethnic stock as the rebels of Casamance and it is suspected that he has also been involved in funding the insurgents in that trouble part of the country.

The final cause for concern is political developments within S e n e g a l i t s e l f. P r e s i d e n t Abdoulaye Wade is engaged in a dangerous political game of imposing his son as the next President of the country, and the political move is generating massive internal opposition. With rising political tensions being c r e a t e d b y m o n a r c h i c a l tendencies in Senegal and the Gambia and ethno-drug gang wars in the narco-state of Guinea Bissau, the political perspective for the next decade in Sene-Gambia is to say the least worrying.

- Jibrin Ibrahim

8

The Casamance: Avoiding Future Conflicts in Sene-Gambia

President Wade of Senegal with the Late MFDC leader Augustin Diamacoune Senghor

AF

P

SourcesPost Electoral Violence in Guinea and Conflict Risk in West Africa

http://www.wanep.org/wanep/warn.html?start=4 http://www.consultancyafrica.com/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=611:post-election-reflection-guinea-conakry&catid=42:election-reflection&Itemid=270http://www.ndi.org/electionscalendarhttp://www.france24.com/en/20101115-guinea-alpha-conde-wins-presidential-vote-electoral-commission-diallo-politics-africa-cnei?quicktabs_1=0http://af.reuters.com/article/guineaNews/idAFLDE6AF14620101116?sp=true http://www.america.gov/st/texttrans-english/2010/November/20101118162815su9.954476e-02.htmlhttp://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-11778523

9

Women Must Play a Part in Peace building Initiatives

http://www.uneca.org/eca_resources/Major_ECA_Websites/beijingplus5/african_womens_concern_for_peace.htmhttp://www.peoplebuildingpeace.org/thestories/article.php?typ=theme&id=80&pid=18http://www.wanep.org/wanep/component/content/article/24-up-coming-events/156-6th-regional-conference-of-women-in-peacebuilding-program-wipnet.htmlhttp://www.unifem.org/materials/item_detail.php?ProductID=183http://web.mit.edu/cis/pdf/WomenReport_10_2010.pdf

Al-Qaeda/Tuaregs in the Sahel

1. United States Department Country report for Niger and Mali 2009.

2. International Crisis Group updates on trends

3. Human Rights Watch Report for 2008/09

Youth Bulge and Restiveness

http://www.oecd.org/document/19/0,3343,en_38233741_38246806_38283987_1_1_1_1,00.html

http://www.globaldashboard.org/2009/02/18/the-dangerous-demographics-of-west-africa-2/

http://www.diplomatie.gouv.fr/en/france-priorities_1/development-and-humanitarian-action_2108/immigration-

migration_2396/the-mobility-of-the-population-in-west-africa_9624.html

http://www.internationalpeaceandconflict.org/profiles/blogs/780588:BlogPost:488

http://www.docstoc.com/docs/10177892/Youth-Unemployment-and-Regional-Insecurity

http://www.onlinenigeria.com/population/?blurb=132

http://www.geography.ccsu.edu/kyem/GEOG466_Africa/POPULATION_GEOGRAPHY.htm

http://www.wilsoncenter.org/index.cfm?event_id=184591&fuseaction=events.event_summary

http://www.humansecuritygateway.com/documents/Mac-Ikemenjima_YouthPost-ConflictWestAfrica.pdf

The Casamance: Avoiding Future Conflicts in Sene-Gambia

http://www.odihpn.org/report.asp?id=2408http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/para/mfdc.htmhttp://www.chathamhouse.org.uk/research/africa/papers/view/-/id/238/http://www.janes.com/articles/Janes-World-Insurgency-and-Terrorism/Mouvement-des-Forces-Democratiques-de-la-Casamance-MFDC-Senegal.html

Monthly News and Current Affairs

T h e A f r i c a n U n i o n ( A U ) observation mission led by former Central African Premier Anicet Georges Dologele on November 23, 2010 commended the smooth presidential election held on November 21, in Burkina Faso. The head of the mission said that the “November election has been free, transparent, fair, and equitable”.H o w e v e r, s o m e p r o b l e m s observed include the low turnout of electors to polling stations, the s c a n t n u m b e r o f e l e c t o rs registered compared to the size of the population, difficulties related to the distribution of voting cards, and the non-conformity of information on the voting card to the provisions of the electoral code.http://www.apanews.net/spip.php?article135869

Nigeria's Independent National Electoral Commission (INEC) on November 21 formally released the new time table for the conduct of the 2011 General Elections in the country: presidential election is scheduled for April 9, 2011 and that of the governorship for April 16. Legislative Elections into the S e n a t e a n d H o u s e o f R e p r e s e n t a t i v e s ( N a t i o n a l Assembly) will hold on April 2 and that of States Houses of Assembly on April 16.http://www.apanews.net/spip.php?article135872

President Blaise Compaore of Burkina Fasso was re-elected with an 81 percent (or 1.3 million) of the votes cast in the presidential elections held on November 21. Compaore is 59 years old and has been in power since 1987. His nearest rivals were Hama Arba Diallo, who won about 8 percent of the v o t e s a n d o p p o s i t i o n l e a d e r Benewende Stanislas Sankara, who secured only 5.52 percent of the votes. A few challengers to Campoare said they would reject the outcome of the vote, citing serious irregularities in the polls.http://www.google.com/hostednews/afp/article/ALeqM5jQ-2RDG_ggGLkK-8XKwuWzVZ3oSQ?docId=CNG.38e1dc44f823cc3b1c8604ec5f26e3b0.541

A diplomatic row is brewing between Nigeria and Iran over the shipment of 13 containers of arms and ammunition into the country. Although the arms-laden ship came from the Indian port in Mumbai, it was alleged that the ship originated from Iran. It was also alleged that Nigeria might have been a routing point for the arms, which are believed to be on the way to Gaza Strip in the Middle East, with the consignment belonging to the Hamas Militant Group.http://thenationonlineng.net/web3/news/17960.html

Compiled by Farida Ibrahim

10

Gambian President Yahha Jammeh

says he will not run for another five-

year mandate when his current third

term ends early next year. President

Jammeh said his decision stems from

his conviction that democracy should

prevail in the Gambia. But he warned

that violence associated with

elections in many countries in Africa

will not be tolerated. He made the

announcement when he addressed

his Cabinet in an emergency meeting

in the capital on November 8, 2010.

http://allafrica.com/stories/201011

091115.html

According to the Project Coordinator of the West African Reg iona l F i sher ies Pro ject (WARFP), Dr. Lawrence Issah Braimah, millions earned from fishing end up in other countries because of unprotected waters due to lack of a functioning coast guard to keep surveillance on Liberia's territorial waters. He explained that the country is losing an estimated US$12 million in revenues per annum from illegal fishing activities. Dr. Braimah said the fishery market attracts both local and foreign investors, including Chinese fishermen, but noted that hundreds of them do not obtain license for fishing, thus making Liberia to lose almost US$12 annually from this sector.http://www.apanews.net/spip.php?article135864

opulation is a potential

h u m a n a s s e t f o r Pd e v e l o p m e n t i f

harnessed and used effectively;

on the contrary it can pose

p r o b l e m s t o n a t i o n a l

development when or where

domestic policies are negligent

and ineffective in properly

mobilizing and channelling the

productive energies of the

youth in society. With a current

population of over 300 million,

West Africa is faced with this

dilemma of either benefitting

from a huge population of

which about 60 percent is said

to be below the age of 20, or

pay the price of failures.

Population growth rate is

influenced by the interplay of

the three main demographic

processes of fertility, mortality

and migration. In West Africa,

there is no doubt that while

health care facilities remain

inadequate, there have been

improved birth survival rates

leading to a bulge in population

mostly consisting of younger

people between the ages of 15-

40. Migratory trends resulting

from factors such as conflicts,

climate change and the search

for employment has lead to an

increase of population in urban

centres of the region.

The consequences of the

t r e n d t o w a r d i n c r e a s e d

population have been the

concurrent increase in the need

to create employment, and

satisfy higher demands for

services such as education and

health care and to stem rapid

rural-urban migration. But

leadership within the region has

consistently failed to address the

above-mentioned problems in the

last fifty years—endemic system of

corruption that is pervasive in the

region is partly to blame.

A few studies show that fully-

blown carnage and violence (of the

last two decades) that consumed

different West African countries

such as Liberia, Sierra Leone, Ivory

Coast, and Nigeria started as low

intensity conflicts reflecting social

disaffection towards governments'

negligent developmental policies

including paying inadequate

attention to the needs of younger

people in the region. Let us look at

the condition in a few conflict risk

centers in West Africa: Nigeria's

Niger Delta has become the hot-bed

of communal violence due in part to

bad public policies and the impacts

of exploitative expatriate oil

companies. The upshot has been

the emergence of militant youth

groups—they are bent on using

force to disrupt oil production in the

area by attacking and destroying oil

installations. Kidnapping of

foreigners for ransom is another

dimension of the conflict in the

Delta. Elsewhere, in Guinea Bissau

a n d i n G u i n e a — C o n a k r y i n

particular, rising illegal trade in

narcotics is disrupting normal life

a n d p u t t i n g t h e y o u t h a t

risk—especially when many of them

are being recruited as conduits in

the illicit drug trade itself.

New programs are however

being put in place by a few domestic

and international organizations to

curb the exposure and recruitment

o f y o u t h s i n t o c r i m i n a l

activities that could generate

and expand conflict in the

region. For example, the

Active Non-Violence and

C o n f l i c t Tr a n s f o r m a t i o n

Program for youths in and

around Monrovia (Liberia) are

put together by West Africa

Network for Peacebuilding

(WANEP). It provides over 650

students and 450 community

youth with opportunities for

d i r e c t i n v o l v e m e n t i n

community-oriented programs

including seminars and lectures

on conflict prevention and

conflict management. There

are plans to enlarge these kinds

of programs throughout the

r e g i o n , t o m i n i m i z e o r

completely eliminate those

conditions that attract youths

to crimes capable of raising the

spectre of violent conflicts.

On the whole, however, the

ultimate antidote to conflict in

West Africa must include the

p r o m o t i o n o f b a l a n c e d

e c o n o m i c d e v e l o p m e n t .

Governments in the region

must accept the responsibility

a n d g u a r a n t e e t h a t

populations enjoy at least the

minimum of basic human

needs; international and

domestic civic organizations

can help by pressurizing public

officials to accept the culture of

democratic accountability.

-Terfa Hemen

Youth Bulge And Restiveness

11

Conversation

Centre for Democracy and Development,4 Kikuyu Close, Off Nairobi Street, Wuse II Abuja. Website:www.westafricainsight.org

Tel:+234(0)9 6716454 Fax:+234(0)5233226 E omail:cddabv@cddwestafrica. rg

Regarding Conflict in West Africa

Excerpts from a conversation with Professor Alioune Tine, held in Abidjan on November 2 just after the first round of the Ivorian presidential election. He is President of Rencontre Africaine pour la Défense des Droits de l'Homme (RADDHO), and shared views with Editor-in-Chief, Jibrin Ibrahim.

West Africa Insight: It seems evident that the conditions of peace and security have changed significantly in West Africa since the early 1990s

You seem to suggest links between elections and war in West Africa

. Certainly. Charles Taylor and his National Patriotic Front of Liberia (NPFL) ignited a civil war in the re g i o n w h e n t h ey b e ga n infiltrating Nimba county in north-east Liberia from Cote d' Ivoire in December 1989. One observable change is that the war diverted ECOWAS's main focus away from economic integration and toward mediation and peace-making; beginning also in the mid-2000 there has been a steady movement away from violence and toward peace in the key countries that experienced severe, prolonged wars such as Liberia and Sierra Leone; yet another sign of change concerns the occurrence of low intensity conflicts as the outcome of elections—exemplified perhaps clearly by the Cote d' Ivoire experience of post-election conflict in 2000.

Bad governance by the political elite is the key causal factor. To hide their true nature, they seek and maintain power through inflammation of ethno-regional sentiments. Political parties develop schemes for the politicization of ethnicity in their power game. Not surprisingly,

elections in Liberia, Guinea, Guinea Bissau, Cote d'Ivoire, and Nigeria and so on, have had a strong ethnic flavour—which has led to violence and in some cases civil war.

Yes, there are possible solutions to the problems, and they are four-fold. The citizenship rights of all members of the political community must be respected and inclusiveness should the organising political principle; the immunity of the political class must end, effectively, those who commit crimes against humanity must be punished by the law to deter future heinous crimes; corruption must be confronted and eliminated, in part, by br ing ing eth ics into our governance system and societies; l a s t l y , o u r e d u c a t i o n a l s y s t e m — p a r t i c u l a r l y t h e universities, are collapsing and must be restored so that they can regain their status role of generating new ideas and ideologies for national development.

Any conceivable solutions?

Can we draw or point to possible political futures?

I foresee a continuous de-escalation of conflicts in the region over the next twenty years. President Tandja's dictatorship led to military intervention—but the coup l e a d e r s a r e s h o w i n g uncharacteristic respect for the rule of law, by establishing a p r o g r a m o f d e m o c r a t i c transition. Also, it seems that fifty years of dictatorship is ending in Guinea; and a growing number of countries in the region are committed to sustaining the democratic process such as Ghana, Mali, Cape Verde and Benin Republic.

Yes, of course. Multi-party political culture is severely threatened by President Wade's current attempts to establish a republican monarchy in Senegal; a civil war looms large in Guinea Bissau both because of the threat of an overbearing military and the existence of ethno-regional tensions in that country; and Cote d'Ivoire struggles with seemingly irresolvable internal political tensions. Overall, however, the values of human rights that are beginning to take root among the few wel l - funct ioning governments in the region will likely percolate, eventually subverting remnants of arbitrary rule.

But surely there must be causes for concern in certain areas

Alioune Tine