Welcome to Seattle, Washington · Welcome to Seattle, Washington. PDC 205: Redbook Overview 2...

Welcome to Seattle, Washington

PDC 205: Redbook Overview

6/6/20172

Parvati Consulting LLC

PDC Instructors

Kelsey L. Forde, CIH, CHHM

[email protected]

Timothy S. Stirrup, IH, REM

[email protected]

mailto:[email protected]


Redbook Overview

Purpose

Provide Overview of Redbook to Understand Use of Redbook

as Significant Resource for Hazards Analysis

Objectives

Redbook as Standard for Hazards Analysis (HA)

Overview of HA Process

HA = Hazards Identification (HI) + Hazards Evaluation (HE)

Additional Control Evaluation & Derivation

Selection of HE Techniques

Limitation of HE Techniques

Recognize Value of Team & Experienced Analysts/Leaders

Relationship with OSHA PSM

6/6/20173

Session Overview Module #1 – Redbook Overview/Preface (pg 3 – 9)

Module #2 – Management Overview (pg 11 – 14)

Module #3 – HE Introduction (pg 15 – 33)

Module #4 – HE Preparations (pg 35 – 69)

Module #5 – HE Techniques (pg 71 – 209)

Module #6 – HE Wrap Up (pg 211 – 294)

Module #7 – Supporting Information (pg 295 – thru App)

6/6/20174

Redbook Outline & Flow

6/6/20175

See Page 9

Module #1

6/6/20176

Guidelines

Redbook Overview/Preface

Historical Perspective

Published By Center for Chemical Process Safety

(CCPS)

Established in 1985 by American Institute of

Chemical Engineers (AIChE)

Develop & Disseminate Technical for Prevention of

Major Chemical Incidents

Supported by Nearly 100 Sponsoring Companies

CCPS 1st Project Preparation of Guidelines for

Hazard Evaluation Procedures Published 1985

6/6/20177

”…produce a useful and

comprehensive text prepared

to foster continued personal,

professional, and technical

development…in the areas of

chemical plant safety…”

Historical Perspective

Redbook Guidelines Encompass

Lessons Learned from Industry Accidents

US Chemical Safety & Hazard Investigation Board

(CSB)

Recommendations for Hazard Evaluations

http://www.csb.gov/

Process Safety Management Implementation

Laws & Regulations

International Standards

Experience Gained Since 1985 with Performing

Hazard Evaluations

6/6/20178

http://www.csb.gov/

Divided into Two Parts

Part I – Hazard Evaluation Procedures

The “Guidelines”

Provides Management Overview in 7 Pages

Describes Methods Used to Identify & Assess Hazards

Nine Chapters

Follow Flow of Performing Hazards Analysis

Part II – Worked Examples and Appendices

Companion to the “Guidelines”

Worked “Role Playing” Examples

Appendices as Valuable Resource

6/6/20179

Improvements with 3rd Edition

Added HE Concepts

Added Inherent Safety Reviews

HE Methods Divided

Non-Scenario Based

Scenario Based

Risk Estimation To Determine Adequacy of Controls

6/6/201710

Improvements with 3rd Edition

New Sections

Evaluating Procedure Based Operations

Evaluating Programmable Systems

Facility Siting Issues

HE with Layer of Protection Analysis (LOPA)

HE Reviews for Management of Change

Human Factors Added to Human Reliability Analysis

Integration of HE with Reliability & Security

Additional Checklists & Forms In Chapters & Appendix A

6/6/201711

Redbook Overview

Guidelines Provide

Aid for Initial Training of Hazards Analysts

Considerations When Making Risk Management

Decisions

Expectations for High Quality Hazard Evaluations

Reference Material for Experienced Hazard Analysts

6/6/201712

Redbook Overview

Guidelines Specifically Do Not Provide

Advice On How to Establish HA Program

Complete Hazards Analysis Program

Replace Experience of Qualified Facilitators/Analysts

6/6/201713


6/6/201714

Module #2

6/6/201715

Guidelines

Management Overview

Management Overview

Describes How HE Techniques Used Throughout Life of

Process/Facility

Realistic HE Expectations for Managers

What Each HE Procedure/Technique Provides

Limitations of HE Techniques

Presents HE Techniques as Integral Part of a Process

Safety Management Program

HE Organized, Formal Process

6/6/201716

Management Overview

HE Positive Aspects

Complement Traditional Health & Safety Worker Assessments

Focus on Process Safety Issues

Aid in Decisions

Improving Safety

Managing Risk of Operations

Identify & Analyze the Significance of Hazards/Hazardous Situations with a Process or Activity

Pinpoint Weaknesses in Design & Operation of Facilities6/6/201717

Management Overview

HE Performed Throughout Life of Process

Lifecycle Approach

Early Stages of R&D

Detailed Design & Construction

Periodically Throughout Operation

Decommissioning & Dismantlement

Efficiently Reveal Deficiencies In Design & Operation

6/6/201718

Management Overview

6/6/201719

– Preliminary Hazards Analysis

– Safety Review

– Relative Ranking

– Checklist Analysis

– What-If Analysis

– What-If/Checklist Analysis

– Hazard & Operability (HazOp) Studies

– Failure Modes & Effects Analysis (FMEA)

– Fault Tree Analysis (FTA)

– Event Tree Analysis (ETA)

– Cause Consequence Analysis (CCA)

• Redbook Describes Specific Steps for Performing

HE with Following Techniques

Management Overview

Redbook Part I – Guidance on Process Safety

Management Program

Redbook Part II – Aid in Training & Experience

Redbook Part I & Part II

Analyst Understand Basics of HE

Performing HE of Simple Processes Using Simple HE

Methods

Redbook Part I & Part II Together with Experience

Analyst Scope, Organize, Lead, & Document HE

Facilitator Role for Analyst6/6/201720

Management Overview

Benefits of HE Program

Fewer Incidents Over Life of Process

Reduced Consequences of Incidents

Improved Emergency Response (Understanding of

Hazards)

Improved Training & Understanding of Process

More Efficient & Productive Operations

Improved Regulatory & Community Relations

6/6/201721

Management Overview

HE Program Requires Significant Investment

Completion of HE Requires Time (Hours to Months)

Documentation, Training, & Staff/Material Resources

Need Strategy to Use Properly Trained/Skilled Analysts

Select Appropriate HE Technique

Technique Commensurate with Problem

Available Information

Consequence/Risk

Ensure Effort Not Wasted by Over-Studying a Problem

with a More Detailed Approach than Necessary

6/6/201722

Management Overview

HE Limitations

Never 100% Certainty for Identification of All Hazards, Events, Causes, and Effects

Results & Benefits Cannot Be Directly Verified

Based on Existing Knowledge or Process/Operation

Quality Reflected in Drawing Accuracy, Procedure Accuracy, & Process Knowledge

Dependent on Subjective Judgment, Assumptions, & Experience of Analysts

Cannot Guarantee Incidents Will Not Occur

Limitation Provides Justification

Periodic HE Throughout Lifecycle

Justification for Management of Change (MOC)

6/6/201723

Management Overview

Four Pillars Establish Risk Based Process Safety

Understanding Hazards and Risks

Committing to Process Safety

Developing and Sustaining a Culture that Embraces Process Safety

Identifying, Understanding, & Complying With Codes, Standards, Regulations, and Laws

Establishing and Continually Enhancing Organizational Competence

Soliciting Input from Stakeholders – Employees, Contractors, & Neighbors

Manage Risks

Lessons Learned from Experience

6/6/201724

Module #3

6/6/201725

Guidelines – Chapter 1

Introduction to Guidelines


6/6/201726


Chapter 1 Overview

Describes How HE Techniques Fit Into PSM Program

Relates Use of HE Techniques to Risk Management

Introduces Terminology Used for Evaluating Process

Hazards In Context of a Typical Incident Sequence of

Events

Introduces Role of Safeguards in Preventing & Protecting

Against Upsets & Mitigating the Impacts of Loss Events

How HE Techniques can be Used Throughout Lifetime

Outlines Important Theoretical & Practical Limitations of

HE Techniques

Summarizes Expectations from Use of HE Techniques

6/6/201727


Standard Definitions

Hazard is a Physical or Chemical Condition with Potential

for Causing Harm to People, Property, or Environment

Hazard Evaluation is an Organized Effort to Identify and

Analyze the Significance of Hazardous Incident

HE Focus on Potential Causes and Consequences of

Episodic Events

HI Screen of Standard Industrial Hazards (SIH)

Occupational Safety & Industrial Hygiene

Addressed Through Codes and Standards

6/6/201728


Most High Quality Hazard Evaluations Require the

Combined Efforts of a Multi Disciplinary HE Team

Dependent on Need for Analysis, Selected Technique,

Potential Hazards, & Available Resources

HE Team Uses Combined Experience & Judgment with

Available Data to Determine Safeguard Adequacy

HE Team Recommend Solutions and/or Recommend

Additional Studies

6/6/201729


Understanding Risk = 3 Questions

Experience Based

Well Defined Process with Experienced Personal

Predictive Hazard Evaluation

Techniques

Relatively Undefined Process with

Limited Relevant Experience

6/6/201730

Page 18


Process Incident [Events] Anatomy

HE to Understand Risk of Process/Operation

Reduce Frequency

Reduce Consequence

Incident is Defined as an Unplanned (Sequence of) Event

with a Potential to Result in Adverse Impacts

Incident Sequence is a Series of Events

Initiating Cause & Initiating Event

1st Event in Sequence

Shift from Normal to Abnormal Operations ~ Deviation

Potential Emergency Situation

Loss Event

6/6/201731


Loss Event

June 201732

Page 23


Initiating Cause May Proceed Directly to Loss Event

If No Intervening Safeguards

Initiating Cause is So Severe That Impacts Safeguards

(Design Basis)

Impact is Severity of Consequences

Scenario is Incident Sequence with Initiating Event,

Consequence, and Frequency

Unplanned Event or Incident Sequence Resulting in a Loss

Event with Associated Impacts Including Success/Failure

of Safeguards

Ends with One or More Outcomes

Consequence Analysis Methodologies Evaluate to

Determine Loss Event Impacts ~ Scenario Based

6/6/201733


Safeguard is Any Device, System, or Action

Interrupts the Incident Sequence

Preventative Safeguard Prevents Loss Event

Affect Likelihood of Loss Event

Mitigative Safeguard Acts After Loss Event

Lessen Severity of Consequence from Loss Event

6/6/201734


Hazard Evaluations Should Be Performed Throughout the Life of a Facility

Early Stages of R&D

Detailed Design & Construction

Commissioning & Start-Up

Periodically Throughout Operating Lifetime

Decommissioning & Dismantlement

Determine Best HE Technique for Lifecycle Period

Some Methods Inappropriate or Impossible at Given Period

Level of Available Information Increases in Detail with Increased Lifecycle

Inadequate Information, Limited Resources, & Result Type

6/6/201735


HE Regulations (What’s Required?)

OSHA 29 CFR 1910.119

Process Safety Management (PSM)

Process Hazards Analysis Every 5 Years

Management of Change

Clean Air Act 40 CFR 68

Chemical Accident Prevention Provisions

Hazard Assessment

Risk Management Plan (RMP)

6/6/201736


Recognize HE Theoretical & Practical Limitations

Completeness: No Guarantee All Incident

Situations, Causes & Effects Considered

Snapshot In Time & Place

Reproducibility: Sensitive to Analyst Assumptions

That May Generate Different Results

Document Assumptions

Inscrutability: Result Difficult to Understand and

Use

Graded Approach of Technique to Complexity of

Process &

Consider Potential Severity of Consequence

6/6/201737


Recognize HE Theoretical & Practical Limitations

Relevance of Experience: Team May Not Have

Appropriate Base of Experience

Rely More on Technique Than Experience

Ensure Team is Well Rounded

Subjectivity: Analyst Judgment When

Extrapolating from Experience to Determine if

Problem is Important

Use Standard Analysis Tools

6/6/201738

Module #4

HE Preparations

6/6/201739


Preparation for Hazard Evaluations


Hazard Identification Methods


6/6/201740

HE Preparation

Chapter 2 Overview

Describes Infrastructure Needed to Support HE Program

Gives Examples of Scope Statements for HE

Outlines the Skills & Information for HE

Addresses Schedule & Logistical Considerations for HE

6/6/201741

HE Preparation

Success of All Subsequent Analysis Depends Upon

Adequate Preparation

Fundamental Requirement

Clear Commitment of Process Safety

Empower Managers to Commit Resources

Actively Support Staff Involved in Process Safety

Infrastructure Commitments

Organize & Maintain Process Knowledge & Information

Assign & Support Knowledgeable & Experienced

Personnel

Act on Results of HE in Timely Manner6/6/201742

HE Preparation

Analysis Objectives

Clearly Define Objectives of Analysis

Don’t Waste Time Focusing Resources on Relatively Minor

Problems

Select Correct Technique to Efficiently Focus Resources

Different Stages of Lifetime

Available Information

Available Resources

See Table 2.1 Typical Hazard Evaluation Objectives at

Different Stages of a Process Lifetime (pg 37)

6/6/201743

HE Preparation

Analysis Scope & Boundaries

Focus Resources

Wasted Resources Evaluating Out of Scope Process

Neglect Missed Important Parts of Process

What Consequences

Receptors

Severity of Consequence

Other Impacts ~ Environment, Business, Facility Damage

Document Scope

6/6/201744

HE Preparation

Information Requirements

Process Physical & Procedure Information

System for Collecting and Documenting Process Knowledge

Available Information Changes Over Lifetime of Process

Include Consensus Standards (NFPA, ASME)

Internal Lessons Learned

External Resources

See Table 2.2 Example Information Used to Perform HE (pg40)

Software Programs

Dedicated Scribe Record Results Visible to All

Two Projecting Systems Available

HE Documentation & Process Information Simultaneously

Commercial Software Not Necessary & With Limitations

6/6/201745

HE Preparation

All HE Techniques Are More Thorough & Effective

When Performed by a Team

Optimum Size Varies According to Analysis

Too Few & Too Many Are Problematic

Team Personnel & Skills

Composition of the Team Performing HE is Essential

Level & Types of Skills

Type & Complexity of Process/Operation

Hazard Evaluation Technique Selected

Objective of Analysis

3 Basic Roles

Leader, Scribe, & Contributor(s)

6/6/201746

HE Preparation

Lead Analyst [Facilitator]

Requirements

Training & Experience With Selected Technique

Interpersonal & Leadership Skills

Technical Background/Expertise

Role

Provides Direction, Organizes & Executes Analysis, & Facilitates Team Meetings

Orchestrates HE

Defines Scope/Boundaries, Propose HE Technique, Choose Team Members, & Document Results

Manages HE Documentation, Interprets Input, & Reports Results

Discriminator

Most Experience Team Member Performing HE

Ideally Independent from Design/Process Team6/6/201747

HE Preparation

Ensure that Proper HE Technique is Selected & Applied

Organize Team Review and Negotiate for Resources

Communicate with Personnel at All Levels

Motivate a Group to Achieve a Common Goal

Work with Wide Range of Personalities

Interpret Engineering Drawings & Understand Process Operations

Ask Questions & Probe for Further Explanations Without Making Team Members Defensive

Maintain Objectivity, Honesty, and Ethical Conduct, Reporting All Significant Findings

Encourage, Direct, and Focus Group Discussions

Judge Relative Importance of Issues and Help Team Drop Those Not Worth Reviewing

Summarize Issues, Negotiate Compromise, and Forge Consensus

Appreciate Different Points of View and Empathize with Team Members

Remain Impartial and Maintain The Teams Respect

Manage Pace of Team Discussions and Tactfully Maintain Schedule

Sense Team Fatigue, Boredom, & Unsuitability and Implement Corrective Action

Keep the Team Working Together

Suspend Discussion of Issues That Cannot Be Resolved By Team

Fulfill Team Members’ Psychological Needs Without Letting One Ego Dominate Team

6/6/201748

Important Team Leader Responsibilities

HE Preparation

Scribe

Requirements

Trained Analyst

Basic/Developing HE Experience

Roles

Designated to Formally Document Discussions/Workshops

Dedicated Role During Team Meetings

Discriminator

Good at Software & Hardware

Not Junior/Administrative Support

6/6/201749

HE Preparation

Contributor(s)/Experts

Requirements

Key Experience with Process

Specific Knowledge of Process and/or Hazards

Members with Operations, Maintenance, & Engineering Experience

Objectively Analyzing Any Identified Hazard

Roles

Provide Specific Input Into HE

Process Knowledge

Hazards SME

Discriminator

Variety of Experience & Expertise

May Include Management to Ensure Resources Available & Consensus Decisions

More Than One Role Per Contributor

6/6/201750

HE Preparation

Schedule & Execution

Schedule Not Dictated by Immediate Need for Results

Allow Team Members Preparation Time

Schedule Review Meetings & Facility Tours

Team Meetings with Entire Team

Ideally Face-to-Face

Limited to 4 – 6 hrs Per Day

Adequate Meeting Space & Support Materials

Onsite vs Offsite

6/6/201751

HE Preparation

Initial Team Review Meeting

Orientation

Specific Objectives, Scope, & Boundaries

Site, Company, & Regulatory Requirements

Roles & Responsibilities of Team Members

Training on Specific HE Technique

Schedule for Completion

Process Overview

Operations Expert Provide Overview

Overview of Hazards

Process Flow (P&ID, Flow Diagrams)

Facility Walkdown

Evaluation of Existing Operation or Like Operation

Include Utility Systems & Maintenance Functions

6/6/201752

HE Preparation


Documentation of Attendance

Determine Required Minimum Participants

Attendance Taken At All Meetings

Record Name, Role, & Qualifications

Review of Process Safety Documentation

Review of Process Safety Document (If Exists)

Chemical, Process Technologies, Equipment Specifications, Utilities, & Operating Procedures

Related Standard and Codes

Previous Incidents Review

Previous 5 Years

Incidents/Near Misses

Industry Warnings & Safety Alerts6/6/201753

HE Preparation


Hazard Identification & Inherent Safety Review

May Include Initial Hazard Identification

May Include Opportunities to Eliminate or Reduce Hazards

Global Facility Siting & Human Factors Considerations

May Include Separate Discussion on Global Facility Siting

May Include Separate Discussion on Human Factors

Typically Addressed After Completing HE

6/6/201754

Hazard Identification

Chapter 3 Overview

Importance of Identifying Hazards

Contemporary Approaches for HI

Use of Experience in Analyzing Material Properties &

Process Conditions

Several Structured Approaches for HE (with Examples)

Describes Types of Results Expected from HI

6/6/201755


Identification of Specific Undesirable Consequences

Receptor Based Identification

Identification of Material, System, Process, & Facility Characteristics [That Could Produce Consequences]

Evaluate Significance of Potential Hazard

Analyzing Material Properties & Process Conditions

Material Lists & MSDS

Published Sources (i.e., CDC/NIOSH, AGCIH TLV/BEIs, EPA AEGLs)

Trade/Industry Specific Guidance

Legal Material Limits

6/6/201756


Using Experience

Identify All Hazards Even If No Facility Specific Events

Facility Specific Experience to Identify Hazards/Hazardous Situations

Consider Both Normal And Abnormal Conditions

Process Conditions Create/Exacerbate Hazards

Compare Material Properties to Consequences of Concern

Hazard = Fire ~ Identify Pyrophoric/Flammable/Combustible Materials

Hazard = Explosion ~ Identify Materials with LEL

Develop Interaction Matrices

Structured Approach

Interactions of Specific Parameters (Materials, Energy Sources, Process Conditions, Human Health, etc)

Chemicals versus Parameters

Chemical Compatibility Tools & Analysis

6/6/201757


Thoroughness of HI Reflected in Quality of HE

Scope & Complexity of HE ~ Selection of HE Method

Directly Proportional to Number and Types of Hazards

Hazards/Magnitude of Hazards Understood or Unknown

HI Results

Simple List of Materials or Conditions

Flammable/Combustible Materials

Toxic/Corrosive Materials

Energetic Materials

Hazardous Reactions/Chemical Compatibility

List Contains Hazardous Properties & Quantities

List of Physical Hazards (e.g., pressure, temperature, mechanical energy, radiation, electrical, etc)

6/6/201758


HI Through HE

Checklist Analysis Technique

Standard List of Hazards

Standard List of Material/Physicals Hazards

What-If/HazOp

Creatively “Think” of Hazards

May Not Discover All Hazards

May Discover Process Hazards Not Discovered On HI Checklist/List

Not Recommend Unless Resource Limited or Focused on Single Hazard

What-If/Checklist ~ Checklist/What-If

Initial Assessment of Worst Case Consequences

After HI Before HE

Effect Radius/Distance and/or Estimated Impact to Receptors

Identify Most Significant Hazards For HE Focus ~ HI Screen6/6/201759


Hazard Reduction Approaches & Inherent Safety Reviews

Reduce Process Risk & Address Hazards

Inherent – Eliminate Hazard by Substitution or Change Process Parameters

Passive – Reduce Risk Using Design Features

Active – Engineering Controls That Respond to Abnormal Situations

Procedural – Administrative Controls to Prevent/Minimize Effects

Inherently Safer Design Strategies

Minimize – Reduce Quantities of Hazardous Material

Substitute – Substitute Hazardous Material with Less Hazardous Material

Moderate – Use Less Hazardous Conditions, Less Hazardous Form of Material, or Facilities that Minimize Release

Simplify – Design Facilities That Eliminate Unnecessary Complexity To Make Operating Errors Less Likely

Inherently Safer Design Strategies Are More Reliable Than Risk Reduction

6/6/201760


Inherent Safety Reviews

Integrated Into Design Processes and Standards

To Identify & Understand Hazards

To Find Ways to Reduce or Eliminate Hazards

Use Separately or In Conjunction With HE Methods

Checklist Reviews, What-If, & HazOPs

Requires Preparation Commensurate with HE

Considered At Appropriate Stages of Process Lifecycle

R&D, Conceptual Design, Engineering Design, & Operations

Team Process Operations & Maintenance with ES&H SMEs

Results Incorporate into HE Documentation

ISR Process Overview (see flow chart)

6/6/201761


6/6/201762

Page 65

Module #5

Hazard Evaluation Techniques

6/6/201763

Guidelines – Chapter 4 & 5





6/6/201764


Difference Between Scenario & Non-Scenario Based HE

Non-Scenario Based

Experienced Based on Facility/Team Experience

Efficient at Broad Brush for Hazards Review

Applied Early in Design/Operation for Safety Improvement Efforts

Scenario Based

Predictive & Analytical

Systematically Determine What Can Go Wrong

Systematically Determine Safeguards

Applied Throughout Process Lifecycle

Divided Into 2 Groups

Wide Range of Hazards

Specific Use in Special Situations

6/6/201765

Hazards Analysis Process

Three (3) Step Process ~ Redbook

Step 1: Prepare for Review

Step 2: Perform Review

Step 3: Document Results

Step 4: Complete Actions/Follow Up

Remember

Input from HI

HI Identifies Hazards

HI Screen of Hazards of Concern

Focus on Systems/Components Associated with Hazards of Concern

Determine Hazard Evaluation (HE) Method

6/6/201766

Non-Scenario HE Techniques

Chapter 4 Overview

Non-Scenario Based HE Techniques

Purpose, Description, Types of Results, Resource

Requirements, & Analysis Procedure For Each Technique

4 Non-Scenario Based HE Techniques

Preliminary Hazards Analysis (PHA/PreHA)

Safety Review

Relative Ranking

Checklist Analysis

Illustrates Each Method with a Brief Example

6/6/201767

Non-Scenario HE Techniques Preliminary Hazards Analysis (PreHA) [MIL STD 882]

Purpose:

Evaluate Hazards Early in Lifecycle

Identify the Basic Risk Control Strategies to be Developed Later in Lifecycle

Description:

Formulates List of Hazards and Generic Hazardous Situations By Considering Process Characteristics Rather Than Specific Process Information

Type of Results:

Qualitative Description of the Hazards With Qualitative Ranking of Hazardous Situations Used to Prioritize Recommendations

Resource Requirements:

Limited Process Information; 1 – 2 Experienced Analyst; 5 – 17 Days

Analysis Procedure

Collect Information (Typically Limited)

Identify Hazards, Safeguards, Causes, & Effects

Assign Hazard Category: Negligible, Marginal, Critical, & Catastrophic

Identify Potential Controls

Documenting Results

Typically Recorded in Simple Table Format

6/6/201768

Non-Scenario HE Tecniques Safety Review

Purpose:

Ensure Operation & Maintenance Meet Design Intent and/or Standards

Performed as a Pre-Startup Safety Review

Description:

Walkthrough Inspection, Design Review, and/or Interviews Against Requirements

Type of Results:

Qualitative Description of the Potential Safety Problems & Suggested Corrective Actions For Identified Deviations & Newly Discovered Safety Items


Detailed Design, Process, and Procedural Information; Small Team of Well Qualified Analyst; 2 – 14 Days

Analysis Procedure

Collect Detailed Information (Design, Codes/Standards, Equipment Information)

Formal Team Meeting(s)

Review Hazards & Related Requirements (i.e. Codes, Standards, Procedures)

Process Review & Inspection – Walkthroughs, Design Reviews, & Interviews

Documenting Results

Formal Report with Recommendations for Deviations, Discoveries, & Improvements

6/6/201769

Non-Scenario HE Techniques Relative Ranking

Purpose:

Determine Most Significant Areas of Concern

Rank Areas of Concern Before More Intensive Reviews

Description:

Use of Index to Rank Hazards/Hazardous Situations

Index Based on 3 Questions ~ What Can Go Wrong? Impact? Likely?

Type of Results:

Ordered List of Processes, Equipment, Operations, or Activities

Not Typically Used for Analysis of Safeguards


Basic Physical & Chemical Information; Single Analyst; 1 – 4 Days

Analysis Procedure

Collect Basic Material/Process Information

Assign Relative Ranking Based on 3 Questions (Qualitative vs Quantitative)

Rank Hazards/Hazardous Situations

Documenting Results

Simple List Ranking Hazards/Hazardous Situations

Potential Identification of Safety Weaknesses and Corrective Measures 6/6/201770

Non-Scenario HE Techniques Checklist Analysis

Purpose:

Verification of System Status Using Written List of Requirements/Procedural Steps

Description:

List of Known Hazards, Design Deficiencies, and Incidents

List of Requirements/Procedural Steps

List of Other Parameters (e.g., chemical properties, codes/standards)

Type of Results:

Typically List with “No,” “Yes,” or “Not Applicable” & Associated Corrections


Information to Create Checklist; Single Analyst; 2 – 12 Days

Creating Checklist is Intensive Effort

Analysis Procedure

Select Checklist

Perform Walkthrough, Design, Procedure, Codes/Standards Review

Documenting Results

Qualitative Report (w/ Completed Checklist) & Recommendations

Potential for Inherent Safety Review ~ Minimization, Moderation, & Simplification

6/6/201771

Scenario HE Techniques

Chapter 5 Overview

Scenario Based HE Techniques

Purpose, Description, Types of Results, Resource Requirements, & Analysis Procedure For Each Technique

8 Scenario Based HE Techniques

What-If Analysis

What-If/Checklist Analysis

Hazard & Operability (HazOp) Studies

Failure Modes & Effects Analysis (FMEA)

Fault Tree Analysis (FTA)

Event Tree Analysis (ETA)

Cause Consequence Analysis (CCA)

Human Reliability Analysis (HRA)

Illustrates Each Method with a Brief Example

6/6/201772

Scenario HE Techniques What-If Analysis

Purpose:

Brainstorming Approach to Identify Hazards/Hazardous Situations, or Event Sequences with Potential Undesirable Consequences ~ May Include Cause/Initiating Events

Description:

Use of Facilitator, Scribe, & Team

Not Inherently Structured, Requires Skilled Facilitator

Ideally Divide Questions Based on Hazards and/or Process Areas

What If Can Be Effective & Efficient With Experienced Team/Facilitator

Type of Results:

Random Tabular Listing of Hazardous Situations with Consequences & Safeguards


Supporting Information; Representative Team; 1 – 29 Days

Analysis Procedure

Collect Chemical Data, Process Description, Drawings, & Operating Procedures

Seed Analysis Tables for Workshop Meetings For Team Brainstorming

Documenting Results

Qualitative Report (w/ Completed What If Analysis Worksheet) & Recommendations

Potential for Inherent Safety Review ~ Resolve “What-If Question”

May Provide Input into Further More Refine HE Analysis6/6/201773

Scenario HE Techniques What-If Analysis/Checklist

Purpose:

Systematic Use of Checklist Using Brainstorming Approach to Identify Hazards/Hazardous Situations, or Event Sequences with Potential Undesirable Consequences ~ May Include Cause/Initiating Events

Description:

Use of Facilitator, Scribe, & Team ~ Requires Skilled Facilitator

Structured Approach to Identify All Hazards/Hazardous Situations

Type of Results:

Systematic Tabular Listing of Hazardous Situations with Consequences & Safeguards


Supporting Information; Representative Team; 1 – 31 Days

Analysis Procedure

Collect Chemical Data, Process Description, Drawings, & Operating Procedures

Seed Analysis Tables for Workshop Meetings For Team Brainstorming

Qualitatively Determine Significant of Effects and Relative Recommendations

Documenting Results

Qualitative Report (w/ Completed What If Analysis Worksheet) & Recommendations

Potential for Inherent Safety Review ~ Resolve “What-If Question”

May Provide Input into Further More Refine HE Analysis

6/6/201774

Scenario HE Techniques HazOp

Purpose:

Careful, Systematic Review to Determine Whether Deviations Can Lead to

Undesirable Consequences

Identification of Causes, Consequences, & Safeguards for Process Nodes

Description:

Use of “Prescribed” Terminology – Guidewords + Parameters = Deviation

Use of Facilitator, Scribe, & Team ~ Requires Skilled Facilitator & Trained Team

Systematically Identify Hazard & Operability Problems

Type of Results:

Deviations for Each Node Recorded in Table Format With Consequences &

Safeguards


Extremely Detailed P&ID; Highly Skilled, Trained Team; 13 – 86 Days

Analysis Procedure

Explicitly Define Purpose, Scope, & Objectives

Collect Supporting Information Prior to Workshop So Team Can Prepare

Determine Nodes, Standard Guidelines, Deviations, & Safeguards

Complete Node by Node

Documenting Results

Tabular Format with Separate Action Items6/6/201775

Scenario HE Techniques FMEA

Purpose:

Identify Single Component/System Failure Modes, Causes, Effects, & Actions

How Can Equipment Fail, What Are Causes, & What Are Effects

Description:

Evaluates How Equipment Can Fail and Effects of Failures on Process

Use of Facilitator, Scribe, & Team ~ Requires Skilled Facilitator & Trained Team

Systematically Evaluates @ Equipment/Component Level (e.g., pieces & parts)

Type of Results:

Failure Modes, Causes, Effects, & Safeguards for Each Equipment in Table Format


Extremely Detailed P&ID, Equipment Functions; Trained Team; 7 – 42 Days

Analysis Procedure

Define Problem (Boundaries) & Resolution Level ~ Typically Lowest Level Analysis

Detailed Equipment Descriptions & Unique System, Equipment, & Component Identifiers

List All Failure Modes with Specific Equipment, Then Analyze Cause/Effect/Actions

Documenting Results

Systematic & Consistent Tabulation of Effects from Equipment Failure

Equipment Identification Allows One-on-Correlation to System6/6/201776


Fault Tree Analysis (FTA)

Purpose:

Deductive Technique Focusing On A Single Incident or System Failure

Identify Combinations of Equipment Failures & Human Errors Resulting In Incidents

Description:

Graphical Model That Displays Combinations of Equipment/Human Failures

Single Analyst (or Team) with Input & Review by Process Engineers

Systematically Evaluates “Top Event” With Specific Logic /Event Symbols & Definitions

Type of Results:

System Failure Models with Boolean (and, or) Logic Gates to Describe Failures


Extreme System Knowledge; Qualified Analyst/Experienced Team; 9 – 100 Days

Analysis Procedure

Define Problem Via Top Event & Boundary Conditions

Construct Fault Tree Model/Analyze Fault Tree Model

Documenting Results

Formal Report with System Description, Problem Definition, Assumptions, & FTA Models

6/6/201777


Event Tree Analysis (ETA)

Purpose:

Inductive Technique Focusing On A Single Incident or System Failure

Graphic Representation of Possible Outcomes of Success/Failure of Protective Systems Following Specific Initiating

Cause

Description:

Graphical Listing of Incidents That Can Occur ~ Event Sequences

Single Analyst or Team for Brainstorming

Type of Results:

Event Tree Models with System Sequence for Failures


Extreme System Knowledge; Trained Analyst; 6 – 80 Days

Analysis Procedure

Identify Initiating Causes or Loss Events & Safeguards

Constructing Event Tree

Describing Resulting Event Sequence Outcomes

Determining Minimum Cut Sets (Shortest Branch)

Documenting Results

Formal Report with System Description, Problem Definition, Incident Initiating Cause, Assumptions, & Minimum Cut

Sets 6/6/201778


Cause-Consequence Analysis

Purpose:

Blend of FTA & ETA

Graphic Representation to Identify Causes and Consequences of Potential Incidents

Description:

Inductive Features of ETA with Deductive Features of FTA

Cause-Consequence Diagram Displays Relationship Between Outcomes & Causes

Typically Simple Systems Otherwise Graphically Overwhelming

Type of Results:

Diagrams with Incident Sequences and Qualitative Descriptions of Potential Incident Outcomes


System & Safeguards Knowledge; Trained Analyst; Small Team; 6 – 70 Days

Analysis Procedure

Selecting Event or Type of Incident & Identifying Safeguards

Develop Event Sequence Paths & Intermediate Events With Safeguard Failures

Evaluate Event Sequence Minimum Cut Sets

Documenting Results

Formal Report with System Description, Problem Definition, Incident Initiating Cause, Assumptions, Cause-

Consequence Diagrams, & Minimum Cut Sets 6/6/201779


Chapter 6 Overview

Factors Influence Selection of Appropriate HE Technique

Question Based Flowchart to Choose HE Technique

Selection Criteria

6/6/201780

Appropriate HE Technique Selected for Each Process or

Operation to Ensure Effort Not Wasted by Over-Studying a

Problem with a More Detailed Approach than Necessary

Each HE Technique Unique Strengths & Weaknesses

Relative Importance of 7 Selection Factors

Summary of Typical Staff Effort Estimates for Hazard

Evaluation Techniques

Pg. 185, Table 6.4

Criteria for Selecting Hazard Evaluation Techniques

Pg. 187, Figure 6.2

Example Flowchart for Selecting Hazard Evaluation

Technique

Pg. 188, Figure 6.3

6/6/201781


6/6/201782



Importance Level 1 – Motivation for Study & Type of Results Needed

Most Important Factors

Most Effective HE to Provide Necessary Information Required to Satisfy Reasons for Study

(1) Motivation

What is Reason for Study?

New Process?

Response to Accident?

(2) Type of Results

List of Hazards

List of Potential Incident Situations

List of Alternatives for Reducing Risk or Areas Needing Further Study

Prioritization of Results

Input for a Quantitative Risk Analysis

6/6/201783


Importance Level 2 – Type/Level of Information Available, Characteristic of Analysis Problem, & Perceived Risk

Inherent Boundary Conditions for Analysis

Stage of Lifecycle Often Dictates Type/Level of Information

(3) Type of Information Available

Stage of Lifecycle ~ R&D/Design & Operations

Quality/Currentness of Available Documentation

(4) Characteristic of Analysis

Complexity & Size of Problem

Type of Process & Type of Operations in Process

Nature of Inherent Hazards

Types of Incidents, Situations of Concern, Failures, & Events

(5) Perceived Risk

Amount of Experience, Nature of Experience, & Continued Experience Relevance

Higher Risk Requires Higher Level of Analysis

Change to Operations/Experience

6/6/201784


Importance Level 3 – Resource Availability &

Analyst/Management Preference

Often Are Controlling Factors ~ Mistakenly

Resource Limitations – Time & Staff

Erroneously Picking Perceived Favorite Technique

(6) Resource Availability

Skilled & Knowledgeable Leaders in Given HE Technique

Skilled & Knowledgeable SME in Process/Hazards

Target Dates to Perform Study

Financial Resources

(7) Analyst/Management Preference

Management Preference Based on Other Influences

Analyst Preference Based on Specific HE Skills & Experience

6/6/201785


Knowledgeable & Informed Manager Decision

Benefits, Strengths, Limitations, & Resource Requirements

Qualified Analyst Recommendation Based on Factors

Weighted Recommendation from Selection Factors

Reflect Preference/Ability of HE Techniques

Potential Use of Detailed HE Technique in Less Detailed Way

Ultimately Quality of Results from HE is Function of the Quality of Team/Team Efforts

Use of Multiple HE Techniques

Broad Brush Technique To Narrow Issues

Detailed Technique To Improve Understanding of Specific Issues

6/6/201786

Module #6 - Finishing Up

6/6/201787


Risk Based Determination


Analysis Follow-Up


Extensions/Special Applications

Guidelines – Part II

Worked Examples

Guidelines – Appendices


6/6/201788


Chapter 7 Overview

Guidelines for More Detailed Evaluation of Scenario Risks

Basic Concepts of Estimating Loss Event Impacts,

Initiating Frequency, and Safeguard Effectiveness

Examples Comparing Risks for Determining Adequacy of

Safeguards

Use of Layer of Protection Analysis (LOPA)

6/6/201789


Preventive Safeguards

Intervene After Initiating Event Induces Abnormal

Conditions

Not Reduce Likelihood of Initiating Cause

Reduce Likelihood of Loss Event

Mitigative Safeguards

Intervene After Loss Event Occurs

Reduce Severity of Consequences of a Loss Event

6/6/201790


Experienced-Based Action Decisions

Lessons Learned

Historical Knowledge

Risk-Based Action Decisions

Adequacy of Existing Safeguards

Risk As Low As Reasonably Practicable

Qualitative Analysis

Frequency x Consequence = Risk

Frequency = Initiating Event x Safeguard Failure

Consequence Severity

Frequency/Likelihood (Numeric vs Descriptive)

Control Analysis

Frequency Reduction ~ Preventative

Consequence Reduction ~ Mitigative

Risk Binning

6/6/201791

Risk Based Determination Layer of Protection Analysis (LOPA)

Use in Conjunction with Results from Other HE Technique for Identification of Concerns/Issues

Simplified Quantitative Analysis

Order of Magnitude

Initiating Cause Frequency

Consequence Severity

Likelihood of Failure

Independent Protection Layers (IPL)

Probability of Failure On Demand (PFD)

IPL Will Not Perform the Required Task

Identify Highest PFD at IPL

Results in Order of Magnitude Risk Estimates

Estimate of IPL Adequacy

6/6/201792

Analysis Follow-Up

Chapter 8 Overview

Importance of Prioritizing Results

List of Identified Hazards

Description of Significance of Events/Hazards

Recommendations for Reducing/Eliminating Issues

Ideally Rank Solutions Versus Rank Problems

Rank Via Immediate Actions, Planned Actions, & Further Evaluations

Importance of Documenting Results

Consolidate & Preserve Results for Future Use

Provide Evidence Performed Per Sound Engineering Principles

Support Other PSM Activities

Guidelines for Communicating Results

Strategies for Management of Change

6/6/201793

Extensions/Special Applications

Chapter 9 Overview

Combining Tools

HazOp with LOPA

What-If with LOPA

Special Topics

Evaluating Hazards for:

Procedure Based Operations

Programmable Control Systems

Reactive Chemical Systems

Human Factors

Consideration of Human Factors

Completing Human Reliability Analysis

Facility Siting, Layout, & Facility-Based Personal Protection6/6/201794

Module #7 – Supporting Info

6/6/201795

Guidelines – Part II

Worked Examples


Part II Worked Examples

Example Description of Facility & Process

Example HI

Example HE Techniques

R&D: What-If Analysis

Conceptual Design: PreHA

Pilot Plant: HAZOP

Detailed Engineering: FTA/ETA

Construction/Start-up: Checklist Analysis & Safety Review

Routine Operation: Safety Review for Management of Change

Routine Operation: HAZOP Study for Cyclic Review

Plant Expansion: Relative Ranking & HAZOP for Batch Process

Incident Investigation: FMEA & HRA

Decommissioning: What-If/Checklist Analysis

6/6/201796


Example Checklists & Forms for HE

Legend of Symbols & Abbreviations for Drawings

Commercially Available Software Aids for Performing

Hazard Evaluations

Chemical Compatibility Chart

Process Safety Enhancement Resources

6/6/201797

Relationship to OSHA PSM

Process Hazard Analysis (PHA)

29 CFR 1910.119 The employer shall use one or more of

the following methodologies that are appropriate to

determine and evaluate the hazards of the process

being analyzed.

Checklist; What-If; What-If/Checklist; HazOp; FMEA; FTA; or an appropriate equivalent methodology

PHA Frequency – Every time there is a significant process

change; a minimum of every five years

Include PHA as part of management of change (MOC)

process

Retain PHA records for the life of the process

June 201798

Preferred PHA Methodology

Formal HI Using Standard Checklist

Screen HI for Hazards to Carry Forward into HE

Typically Screen on SIH ~ Codes & Standards

Preferred “Broad Brush” HE Method

What-If/Checklist ~ Not In Form of What-If Question (e.g., Event)

Use List of Hazards Carried Forward as Checklist

Use of Process Areas as Checklist

Use HE Worksheet with Process Area, Event, Cause/Initiating Event, Hazard, Consequence, & Frequency

Perform Additional HE and/or Accident Analysis If Necessary

Higher/Unacceptable Residual Risk

Unclear Control Strategies

Better Definition of Frequency or Consequence6/6/201799

Preferred PHA Methodology

Use of Risk to Determine Control Adequacy

Standard Frequency, Consequence, & Risk Tables

Qualitative Analysis

Analyze Unmitigated Consequence & Frequency ~ Inherent Risk

Apply Identified Preventative/Mitigative Controls

Determine Mitigated Consequence & Frequency ~ Residual Risk

Perform Control Hierarchy Analysis

Document “Safety Envelope”

Initiate Management of Change

Identify Changes

Evaluate Potential Impact to Analysis & Subsequent Controls

6/6/2017100

Session Objectives

Purpose

Provide Overview of Redbook to Understand Use of Redbook

as Significant Resource for Hazards Analysis

Objectives

Redbook as Standard for Hazards Analysis (HA)

Overview of HA Process

HA = Hazards Identification (HI) + Hazards Evaluation

Additional Control Evaluation & Derivation


Limitation of HE Techniques

Recognize Value of Team & Experienced Analysts/Leaders

Relationship with OSHA PSM

6/6/2017101

Follow Up with Parvati

Facility/Worker Safety

Redbook Training

Redbook Overview

Redbook HE Techniques

What-If/Checklist

Failure Modes & Effects Analysis

Hazard & Operability Analysis

Layer of Protection Analysis (LOPA)

Risk Analysis

Inherent Safety Reviews

Perform Process Hazards Analysis

Facilitate Hazard Evaluations

Peer Review PHA (HI + HE)

STAMP/STPA

Traditional ES&H/IH Services

6/6/2017102

Kelsey L. Forde, CIH, CHHM

[email protected]

(505) 967-8917

Timothy S. Stirrup, IH, REM

[email protected]

(505) 980-3743

www.parvaticorp.com



http://www.parvaticorp.com/

Welcome to Seattle, Washington · Welcome to Seattle, Washington. PDC 205: Redbook Overview 2...

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