WEEKLY GLOBAL TERROR WATCH

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HIGHLIGHTS WEEKLY GLOBAL TERROR WATCH 24 – 30 Mar 2011

HIGHLIGHTS OF THE WEEKIndonesia. On 29 Mar 2011, unnamed intelligence sources claimed that JI terror suspect Umar Patek was arrested in Pakistan in early 2011. Unnamed security officials from Pakistan also confirmed that a tip-off from the CIA had led to the arrest. Meanwhile, POLRI said that it would be sending a joint team with other Indonesian agencies to Pakistan to verify Umar's arrest. Nevertheless, security analysts said that Umar's arrest was significant, because he was one of the few Indonesian militants who could explain to authorities the connections and extent of cooperation between Islamist militant groups in Asia.

Afghanistan. In an article an by Afghan independent secular daily newspaper Hasht-e Sobh on 26 Mar 2011, the author warned of the possible Taliban's reactions to the security transition. He said that the recent cessation of telecommunications operations in Helmand province was part of the Taliban's attempts to show the government and the international community that the Taliban wielded more power than the government in provinces where security responsibilities were to be transferred to Afghans. The author believed that the Taliban would increase their attacks on the seven provinces where responsibilities would be transferred, to prove that the security of Afghanistan could not be ensured without the Taliban. Separately, an National Directorate of Security (NDS) spokesman stated on 27 Mar 2011 that 91% of organised insurgent attacks in Afghanistan were prevented due to the efforts of the ANA and ANP, with the NDS providing intelligence to arrest the “masterminds” of the organised attacks.

Pakistan. Taliban forces base in North Waziristan reportedly had established a “vigilance cell” to hunt down people suspected of providing information to guide US' drone strike campaign. The cell was named “Lashkar-e-Khorasan (LeKh), reportedly made up of more than 300 members, and its purpose was to identify, capture and execute locals who were working for the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA). The bulk of LeKh came from the Haqqani network and the Hafiz Gul Bahadur group that control the regions along the Afghan border. The Tehrik-e-Taliban (TTP) was reported to have “occasional cooperation” with LeKh which operated in the Datta Khel, Miranshah and Mir Ali regions of North Waziristan.

Iraq. On 29 Mar 2011, an unknown number of militants, some wearing military uniforms and suicide vests, launched a series of coordinated attacks comprising suicide bombing and VBIED, on the provincial council building in Tikrit, about 160km north of Baghdad. 53 people were killed and 98 others were wounded in the attack.

Middle East. Israeli media on 25 Mar 2011 reported that the IDF was bracing for a possible further expansion of rocket attacks from Gaza, to as far as Tel Aviv. It was believed that Gaza militant groups possessed Iranian-made rockets, such as the Fajr-5, which were capable of reaching Tel Aviv. Subsequently, the IDF on 27 Mar 2011 stationed the first batteries of its Iron Dome short-range missile defence system in southern Israel. The system was stationed outside the southern city of Beersheva. Meanwhile, the second of the two batteries IDF possessed would soon be deployed at Ashkelon.

Gulf of Aden. According to international piracy monitoring organisation, Ecoterra International, as of 28 Mar 2011, at least 45 vessels remain under the control of pirates while at least 714 people remain hostages. Meanwhile, EU NAVFOR reported that on 28 Mar 2011 at around 0900hr GMT (1700H), pirates armed with RPGs hijacked a Kuwaiti-owned oil tanker, the MV Zirku, 463km SE of the Omani port of Salalah in the Gulf of Aden. The hijacked vessel was carrying 29 sailors. However, the Kuwait Petroleum Corporation later denied EU NAVFOR's report, saying that no such hijack took place.

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TABLE OF CONTENTS WEEKLY GLOBAL TERROR WATCH 24 – 30 Mar 2011

INDONESIA JI Terror Suspect Umar Patek Arrested in PakistanParcel Bombs Come from Outside Jakarta: KAPOLDA Metro JayaBashir Denies Plot to Undermine YudhoyonoWitness Admit Weapons Sold to Aceh CampIndonesian Counter-Terror Efforts Hampered by Several Issues: Former KADENSUS 88Decoding Indonesia’s Radical Islamists: What to De-Radicalise?

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THAILAND Violence in Thai South 7

PHILIPPINES Violence in the Southern PhilippinesAFP Files Charges Against NPAPeace Between Philippine Government, MILF Still a Long Shot: ICG

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AFGHANISTAN & PAKISTAN

Violence in AfghanistanAfghan, ISAF Forces Readying for Spring OffensiveTwenty-three Insurgents Join Peace ProcessISAF Abandoned Base in Pech Dara: Taliban91% Of Attacks Thwarted: NDSTaliban Changing Tactics in KunduzTaliban Orders Shut Down of Cell Phone Services in Helmand (update)Taliban Seize Control of Waygal DistrictTaliban Employs Modern Weapons in “War of Words”Taliban Attacks Will Increase Under Security TransitionSecurity Transition “Mere Propaganda”: Hezb-e Islami LeaderRebranding the TalibanViolence in PakistanTaliban Forms Cell to Hunt Down SpiesBin Laden Sets Alarm Bells Ringing

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IRAQ Violence in Iraq 17

MIDDLE EAST Violence in Middle East (Israel, Palestine and Lebanon)Hamas Urges Islamic Jihad to Stop Attacks on IsraelGaza Militants Offer Truce if Israel ReciprocatesHamas Seeks Diversion from Gaza Unrest: Israeli IntelligenceHamas Calls on UN to Halt IAF's Air Strikes on GazaIDF Braces for Rocket Fire Close to Tel AvivIslamic Jihad Orders Commanders to Go into HidingIDF Identifies Radar Sent to Hamas by IranFatah, Hamas Set to Hold Unity Talks in CairoIsraeli-Palestinian Tensions Escalating: A Special ReportRadical Islam in Gaza

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MARITIME SECURITY (GULF OF ADEN &

WATERS OFF SOMALIA)

Cumulative Figures of Kidnapped Vessels in SomaliaIncidents and EventsOther Developments

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SPECIAL REPORT Libya's Terrorism Option 25

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INDONESIA WEEKLY GLOBAL TERROR WATCH 24 – 30 Mar 2011

Terror Incident Charts

JI Terror Suspect Umar Patek Arrested in PakistanOn 29 Mar 2011, unnamed intelligence sources claimed that JI terror suspect Umar Patek was arrested in Pakistan in early 2011. He was believed to have served as JI's deputy field commander in the Bali nightclub bombings in 2002 that left 202 people dead. Unnamed security officials from Pakistan also confirmed that a tipoff from the CIA led to the arrest. However, it was unclear if the US would gain access to Umar. Meanwhile, POLRI said that it would be sending a joint team with other Indonesian agencies to Pakistan to verify Umar's arrest. Nevertheless, security analysts said that Umar's arrest was significant, because he was one of the few Indonesian militants who could explain to authorities the connections and extent of cooperation between Islamist militant groups in Asia. Sidney Jones of the International Crisis Group said that Umar would be able to explain the nature of linkages between Pakistan and South Asian groups, and more generally, with their Southeast Asian counterparts.

Parcel Bombs Come from Outside Jakarta: KAPOLDA Metro JayaKAPOLDA Metro Jaya IRJEN Sutarman on 29 Mar 2011 suggested that the recent spate of parcel bombs (refer to WGTW 10 – 16 Jan 2011 for details) could have originated from outside Jakarta. Meanwhile, KABARESKRIM POLRI KOMJEN Ito Sumardi admitted on 29 Mar 2011 that investigations of the parcel bomb attacks had been slow due to the lacked of suitable equipment to keep pace with technological advancements used by terror groups to make IEDs. Nevertheless, he assured that POLRI was relying on foreign assistance to catch up in technology.

Bashir Denies Plot to Undermine YudhoyonoAbu Bakar Bashir on 24 Mar 2011 denied that he had any knowledge of plans to topple the incumbent Indonesian government, insisting that he was not against President Yudhoyono but simply against the country's political system. He added that Yudhoyono might rule the country as long as he wanted, if the country was based on Islamic law.

Witness Admit Weapons Sold to Aceh CampA witness at Abu Bakar Bashir's trial on 24 Mar 2011 admitted that weapons had been sold to a militant training camp in Aceh, which Bashir was believed to be affiliated to. According to witness Sofyan Tsauri, a former policeman currently in jail for terrorism, at least 24 firearms and almost 20,000 rounds of ammunition had been sold to the Aceh camp for Rp350 million (US$40,250). He further admitted that militant training at the camp was intended to prepare militants for waging jihad in Palestine. Meanwhile, another suspected militant Joko Sulistyo during the trial said that the al-Qaeda flag was raised within the camp grounds to motivate the camp's trainees.

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Data from Janes Terrorism and Insurgency Centre

Mar Apr May Jun Jul Aug Sep Oct Nov Dec Jan Feb

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Minor AttacksMajor AttacksExtreme Attacks

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Definition of the scale of attacks according to Jane's Terrorism and Insurgency CentreExtreme Attacks: An attack that causes (or is intended to or demonstrably capable of causing) more than 1,000 fatalities or more than 2,000 injuries, or that causes the entire destruction of

many buildings or the complete loss of a major facility.)Major Attacks: An attack that causes (or is intended to or demonstrably capable of causing more than 20 fatalities or more than 50 injuries; or significant structural damage to one or more

buildings or physical facilities; or mass disruption of activities for a large number of people.)Minor Attacks: Damaging attacks that cause death, injury, damage to property or significant disruption to activities, below the threshold of ‘major’ attacks.

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Indonesian Counter-Terror Efforts Hampered by Several Issues: Former KADENSUS 88Former KADENSUS 88 BG Tito Karnavian on 23 Mar 2011 opined that even as Indonesia made great strides in foiling militant attacks, its efforts were hampered by several issues, such as the lack of tough laws criminalising the expression of hate, and a comprehensive rehabilitation programme for convicts. Tito further admitted that Indonesia still lack a grand strategy to bring together all its assets to neutralise the terror movement. He also warned that the recent spate of terror plots, including a series of parcel bomb attacks in Jakarta, showed that terror networks continued to evolve and survive despite police crackdowns. In addition, he asserted that terror networks today had blended the old ideology, which was to create an Islamic state, with a new agenda, which was to be part of a global network like al-Qaeda.

Decoding Indonesia’s Radical Islamists: What to De-Radicalise?Source: Bilveer Singh, RSIS1, 22 Mar 2011

Counter-terrorism involves a plethora of tasks encompassing operational strikes against armed terrorists, de-radicalisation and rehabilitation. While no one faith has a monopoly of politically-motivated violence, for some, radical Islamism has emerged as the major challenge to most Muslim and non-Muslim states. While no consensus exists on how to define terrorism, radicalism, de-radicalisation and rehabilitation, the existence of the threat is undisputed. Since 2002, the more than 600 arrests and 50 deaths of the Jemaah Islamiyah and affiliated members in Indonesia alone testify to its ability to generate insecurity. Islamist terrorism’s rejuvenation was again demonstrated when more than 120 armed militants surfaced in north Sumatra from February 2010, targeting the police, now labelled as thoghut – enemies that could be killed.

What to Deradicalise?

Indonesia has responded with multiples counter-measures to meet the threat. This is premised on the principle that while Indonesia has to be lucky all the time in pre-empting terrorist strikes, the terrorists just need to be lucky once to harm society, the government’s image and its political will. The recent establishment of the National Anti-Terrorism Agency reflects the government’s resolve to address this priority. De-radicalisation is the new agency’s major goal which aims to persuade the radicals to abandon the use of violence followed by a change in the radicals’ mindset.

While many states have complemented hard counter-terrorism measures with soft ones, the key issue is – what is there to de-radicalise? The answer lies in what has been radicalised. Radicalisation is the transformation of an individual’s behavioural and cognitive outlook in terms of extremist thinking, sentiments and actions. In turn, de-radicalisation involves the abandoning of radical ideology, de-legitimising the utility of violence and a willingness to co-exist in a pluralistic milieu. The term counter-radicalisation is often preferred as this targets not just those who are exposed to radical ideas but also to pre-empt those who are yet to be contaminated by them.

Due to a host of factors, Indonesia continues to witness an upsurge of religious radicalism. Some salient characteristics, the DNA of radicalism so to speak, stand out when one analyses the attitudes and behaviour of jihadists.

DNA of the Jihadist

The jihadist embodies the following characteristics:

• a literalist approach towards religion with religious teachings being interpreted strictly based on the written word. The Arabs refer to this as zahiriah in command, meaning the supreme importance of the written word;

• a romantic importance attached to religion, with the unseen past viewed as good tradition and the ideal type that should be re-created; • holds the view that there should be no new interpretation or ijtihad of what has been stated in the Holy Quran. The opposition to new ‘tafsir’ or exegesis is based on the notion that the Quranic text is all-supreme and sacred, relevant for all times, and the context in which it is being practised is irrelevant. In short, the text always overrides the realm of practice;

1 http://www.rsis.edu.sg/publications/Perspective/RSIS0452011.pdf

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http://www.rsis.edu.sg/publications/Perspective/RSIS0452011.pdf



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• believes in ‘kebenaran mutlak’ or the unconditional absolute truth, with any other view treated as heretical. A believer of such ‘wrong’ views can be classified as an apostate or murtad, and labelled as a traitor to the religion;

• practises exclusivity, where working with adherents of other religions (kafirs or infidels) is considered haram or forbidden. Many Islamist hardliners will not even cooperate with Muslims who do not share their views, viewing them as jahiliyyahs (ignorant) or worst still, as kafir harbi (enemy infidels), which traditionally only described non-believers operating in a conflict zone, and how Muslims should relate with them;

Labelling those who disagree with the radical discourse as enemies has intensified conflicts among Muslims, exacerbated intolerance and widened the scope for violence within a state, especially in a Muslim majority one, best evident in the recent attacks on the Ahmadiyah sect in Java;

• sees justification in the use of violent jihad to realise their beliefs. Radical Islamists believe that violence carried out for religious causes is legitimate, with a jihadist achieving the ultimate goal of shahid or martyrdom by dying for a religious cause. Increasingly, ‘lesser’ jihad or violent jihad is preferred rather than greater jihad, which is for personal fulfilment. Increasingly too, the term qital, or armed struggle, is used. For radicals, whether the jihad is ‘far’, ‘near’, ‘offensive’ or ‘defensive’ is irrelevant as qital is deployed against Islam’s enemies;

• adopts Islamist radical ideology in political discourse. All issues are described purely in religious idioms with Muslims’ persecution as the common theme;

• virulently opposed to westernisation and democracy, as these are viewed as un-Islamic;

• resists liberalism, pluralism and secularism as being antithetical to Islam;

• is Sharia-minded, and aims to create a Darul Islam (Abode of Islam) as a prerequisite to Darul Salam (Abode of Peace), where Islamic law or Sharia would determine the rules of society.

Jihadi Salafist

Indonesian radical ideologues such as Abu Bakar Bashir and Aman Abdurrahman, essentially of the jihadi salafist persuasion, have been influencing dogmas and practices at various levels of society. This is leading to the Arabisation of Indonesian Islam, in opposition to the traditional practice of Islam Pribumi or indigenous Islam. Fissures are threatening to emerge between those championing Arabisasi Islam and Pribumisasi Islam, especially in Java, as Islam is more about religion while Arabisation is cultural in orientation.

Reversing, through counter-ideological measures, the political and theological discourses of the extremists would go a long way in undermining their aim of promoting radical thought in Indonesia’s body politic. The aim is to encourage the extremists to abandon violence and adopt a more moderate mindset. If violence is abandoned only on tactical grounds, as long as the violence-prone ideology survives, it will remain a threat to democratic societies as violence is inherent in such ideologies. As such, if Indonesia fails in its de-radicalisation efforts, it could result in greater insecurity in Indonesia and the Southeast Asian region.

(Extracted from source)

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THAILAND WEEKLY GLOBAL TERROR WATCH 24 – 30 Mar 2011


Violence in Thai SouthTable 1: Violence in Thai South (24 – 30 Mar 2011)

Location/ Province

Date Type of Attack

Casualties Comments

Narathiwat 27 Mar Shooting 1 killed A rubber taper was killed in an ambush by three suspected militants in Rueso district while driving a motorcycle to work.

Pattani 26 Mar Drive-by Shooting

1 killed Suspected militants on motorcycles shot dead a village head riding his motorcycle home in Muang district.

Yala 24 Mar Shooting 1 killed A village defence volunteer was shot dead by suspected militants in Raman district.

Yala 27 Mar Drive-by Shooting

1 killed1 wounded

A villager was killed while another was wounded after being shot by suspected militants on motorcycles at a market in Raman district.

Yala 29 Mar Explosive Projectile

2 wounded Suspected militants fired six M79 grenades at an RTA outpost in Muang district, wounding two RTA soldiers.

There were no updates for Thailand this week.

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PHILIPPINES WEEKLY GLOBAL TERROR WATCH 24 – 30 Mar 2011


Violence in the Southern Philippines

Table 2: Violence in the Southern Philippines (24 – 30 Mar 2011)Location/ Province

Date Type of Attack

Casualties Comments

Basilan 24 Mar Armed Clash

1 killed AFP troops killed a suspected Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG) militant during an armed clash in Ungkaya Pukan municipality.

Davao del Norte

25 Mar Armed Clash

1 killed A New People's Army (NPA) militant was killed in a clash with AFP soldiers in Suaon village, Kapalong town.

Sulu 30 Mar Armed Clash

3 killed AFP troops clashed with six ASG militants in Patikul town. Three of the militants were killed.

Surigao del Sur

29 Mar Armed Clash

2 wounded Two AFP soldiers were wounded during a clash with NPA militants in Bislig city. The militants withdrew without any casualties after realising that they were outnumbered..

Surigao del Sur

27 Mar Search Operation

- AFP soldiers captured a NPA militant in Barobo town during a search operation.

AFP Files Charges Against NPAThe AFP on 25 Mar 2011 said that it had filed criminal charges before the International Court of Justice (ICJ) against the NPA for the use of landmines. The NPA was alleged to have carried out seven landmine attacks since Jan 2011 in “continued defiance of international laws and an agreement with the government”. According to AFP spokesman BG Jose Mabanta, although the number of violations was lower compared to the same period in 2010, 2011's attacks were deadlier, killing two soldiers and a civilian and wounding five soldiers and four civilians.

Peace Between Philippine Government, MILF Still a Long Shot: ICGThe International Crisis Group (ICG) on 30 Mar 2011 provided an assessment which cited the breakaway of Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) leader Umbra Kato (refer to WGTW 1 – 9 Feb 2011 for details regarding the split) as an important complication to the negotiations between the Philippine government and the MILF. The ICG further asserted that there were now serious doubts on whether the 11,000-strong MILF could deliver on any peace accord that might emerge from the negotiations, especially in maintaining peace and security in the area.

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Data from Janes Terrorism and Insurgency CentreMar Apr May Jun Jul Aug Sep Oct Nov Dec Jan Feb

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AFGHANISTAN & PAKISTAN WEEKLY GLOBAL TERROR WATCH 24 – 30 Mar 2011

Terror Incident Charts (Afghanistan and Pakistan)

Violence in AfghanistanTable 3 : Violence in Afghanistan (24 – 30 Mar 2011)

Location/ Province

Date Type of Attack

Casualties Comments

Baghlan 24 Mar Search Operation

- Afghan and ISAF forces detained two insurgents in Baghlan-e Jadid district.


- Afghan and ISAF forces detained two Taliban leaders in Baghlan-e-Jadid district.


- ISAF forces detained a senior Taliban commander in Baghlan-e Jadid.

Baghlan 30 Mar Police Raid

- Afghan police detained a would-be suicide bomber in Farang wa Gharu district.

Eastern Afghanistan

29 Mar Militant Attack

1 killed An ISAF soldier of unspecified nationality was killed in a militant attack in eastern Afghanistan.

Eastern Afghanistan


1 killed An ISAF soldier of unspecified nationality was killed in a militant attack in eastern Afghanistan.

Farah 26 Mar Arson - Taliban insurgents set fire to four ISAF supply vehicles in Bakwa district.

Ghazni 24 Mar Roadside IED

1 killed2 wounded

A policeman was killed and another two were wounded when their vehicle hit a roadside IED in Gelan district.

Ghazni 25 Mar Air Strike 1 killed An insurgent was killed in an ISAF air strike in Andar district.

Ghazni 27 Mar Armed Clash

2 killed1 wounded

Two Taliban militants were killed and another was wounded in a clash with ANP forces when Taliban forces attacked the Rashidan district centre.

Helmand 23 Mar Roadside IED

2 killed Two UK soldiers were killed in a roadside IED in Helmand.

Helmand 25 Mar Air Strike 7 killed Seven civilians were killed in an ISAF air strike in Naw Zad district.

Helmand 25 Mar Air Strike Several killed

Several insurgents were killed in an ISAF air strike in Reg-e Khan district.

Helmand 26 Mar Armed Clash

Several killed and wounded

An ISAF patrol killed and wounded several insurgents in a clash in Sangin district.

Helmand 27 Mar Explosive Projectile

- ISAF forces engaged insurgents with mortar fire, killing one insurgent in Kajaki district.

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Major AttacksExtreme Attacks

Pakistan

AfghanistanMicro Attacks Micro Attacks

Extreme Attacks

Afghanistan

PakistanMajor Attacks

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Several killed

ISAF forces killed several insurgents planting an IED in Sangin district.


1 killed An ISAF patrol killed one insurgent in an armed clash in Sangin district.


Numerous killed

ISAF patrols killed numerous insurgents in armed clashes in Musa Qalah and Nahr-e Saraj district.

Helmand 28 Mar Military Operation

- ISAF forces killed several insurgents in Reg-e Khan Neshin district

Helmand 28 Mar Roadside IED

1 killed6 wounded

A woman was killed and six others were wounded when their vehicle hit a roadside IED in Nawzad district.

Helmand 28 Mar Search Operation

- Afghan and ISAF forces detained one suspected insurgent in Musa Qalah district.

Helmand 28 Mar Search Operation

2 killed Afghan and ISAF forces killed a Taliban IED facilitator and another insurgent in Dishu district. Security forces also detained several individuals.

Helmand 29 Mar IED Attack

3 wounded Three civilians were wounded in an IED blast in a market in Lashkar Gah.

Herat 27 Mar Abduction 4 abducted Militants hijacked four trucks carrying food and abducted their drivers in Pashtun Zarghun district.

Jowzjan 26 Mar Shooting 1 killed Taliban militants shot dead a civilian in Aqcha district on charges of spying for the government.

Jowzjan 29 Mar Search Operation

2 killed ISAF forces killed two Taliban militants and detained four others in Qosh Tepa district.

Kabul 26 Mar Search Operation

- Afghan and ISAF forces detained a Militant weapons facilitator and two other insurgents in Kabul.

Kandahar 23 Mar Militant Attack

7 killed3 wounded

Seven security guards were killed while three others were wounded in a militant attack between Arghandab and Zhari districts.

Kandahar 24 Mar Search Operation

- Afghan and ISAF forces detained a Taliban IED facilitator in Dand district.


- Afghan and ISAF forces detained several suspected insurgents in Kandahar City.


2 killed Afghan and ISAF forces killed two insurgents and detained a Taliban leader together with numerous other insurgents in Daman district.

Kandahar 25 Mar Suicide Attack

2 killed4 wounded

A child was killed and four civilians were wounded when a suicide bomber detonated his explosives in Spin Boldak district.


- Afghan and ISAF forces detained several suspected insurgents in Zhari district.

Kandahar 27 Mar Roadside IED

1 killed A Canadian soldier was killed in a roadside IED blast in Panjwaii district.


- Afghan and ISAF forces detained a Taliban leader in Kandahar City.

Kandahar 28 Mar Military Operation

4 killed An ANA Special Forces patrol killed four armed insurgents in Maiwand district.


- Afghan and ISAF forces detained several suspected insurgents in Zhari district.

Kapisa 29 Mar Armed Clash

Numerous killed

ISAF forces killed numerous insurgents in a clash in Alah Say district.

Khost 23 Mar Air Strike 5 killed A Haqqani leader and two other insurgents were killed in an ISAF air strike in Tere Zayi district. However, two civilians were inadvertently killed when their vehicle went too close.

Khost 24 Mar Search Operation

1 killed Afghan and ISAF forces killed a Haqqani facilitator and detained another in Sabari district.

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- Afghan and ISAF forces detained a Hezb-E Islami Gulbuddin leader in Sabari district.


- Afghan and ISAF forces detained numerous suspected Hezb-E Isami Gulbuddin (HIG) insurgents in Sabari district.


- Afghan and ISAF forces detained two Haqqani facilitators and another insurgent in separate incidents in Bak district.


- Afghan and ISAF forces detained a Haqqani leader and a a HIG facilitator in two separate incidents in Sabari district.

Kunar 26 Mar Abduction 50 abducted

The Taliban abducted 50 ANP policemen in an ambush at Chapa dara district. (Please see below for more details).

Kunar 28 Mar Military Operation

Numerous killed

Afghan and ISAF forces killed numerous insurgents in Sar Kani district.

Kunduz 24 Mar Roadside IED

3 wounded Three tribal militiamen were wounded when their vehicle hit a roadside IED.

Logar 26 Mar Search Operation

- Afghan and ISAF forces detained a senior Taliban facilitator in the Mohammed Aghah district.


- Afghan and ISAF forces detained a Taliban IED facilitator and several other insurgents in Pul-e Alam district.


- Afghan and ISAF forces detained several insurgents in Baraki Barak district.


- Afghan and ISAF forces detained several suspected insurgents in Mohammad Aghah district.


- Afghan and ISAF forces detained two suspected insurgents in Baraki Barak district.

Nangarhar 25 Mar Roadside IED

2 killed1 wounded

Two children were killed and another was wounded in a roadside IED blast in Behsud district.

Nangarhar 27 Mar Search Operation

- Afghan and ISAF forces detained two suspected insurgents in Jalalabad district.

Nimroz 26 Mar Militant Attack

- Militants ambushed an ISAF supply convoy in Delaram district. Four vehicles were destroyed and two others were damaged. There were no casualties reported.

Paktika 27 Mar Air strike 10 killed At least 10 insurgents were killed in an ISAF air strike in Barmal district.

Paktika 28 Mar Search Operation

- Afghan and ISAF forces detained a Haqqani facilitator in Orgun district.

Paktika 28 Mar Suicide Attack

23 killed60 wounded

23 people were killed and 60 others were wounded in a suicide attack on a construction company in Barmal district. (Please see below for more details).

Samangan 24 Mar Search Operation

- Afghan and ISAF forces detained several suspected Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU) insurgents in Dara Soof Payan district.

Southern Afghanistan


1 killed An ISAF soldier of unspecified nationality was killed in a militant attack.

Uruzgan 24 Mar Roadside IED

1 killed3 wounded

An Afghan policeman was killed and three others were wounded when a police vehicle hit a roadside IED in Terinkot district.

Uruzgan 28 Mar Search Operation

- Afghan and ISAF forces killed two insurgents and detained several others in Tarin Kowt district.

Zabul 24 Mar Search Operation

- Afghan and ISAF forces detained a suspected Taliban insurgent in Qalat district.

Zabul 26 Mar IED Attack

2 killed Two civilians were killed in an IED blast in Shamulzai district.

23 Killed in Truck ExplosionAFP reported on 28 Mar 2011 that three suicide bombers shot their way into the compound of a road construction company in

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the Barmal district of Paktika province. Once they gained entry, the insurgents detonated a truck loaded with explosives, killing 23 people and wounding about 60 others. The Taliban claimed responsibility for the attack, adding that they were targeting a joint Afghan-ISAF base. Officials had said that there were no Afghan or ISAF forces at the site.

Taliban Abduct 50 Policemen, Demand Prisoner SwapReuters reported on 27 Mar 2011 that Taliban insurgents abducted 50 off-duty Afghan policemen in Kunar province. The insurgents ambushed the unarmed policemen in Chapa Dara district when the policemen were travelling from Nuristan province after collecting their salaries. Pajhwok further reported on 28 Mar that because of mediation by tribal leaders, the Taliban freed 19 of the 50 policemen. However, the Taliban demanded the release of 15 jailed Taliban militants in exchange for the rest of the captives.

Afghan, ISAF Forces Readying for Spring OffensiveXinhua quoted ISAF spokesman BG Josef Blotz on 28 Mar 2011 as saying that Afghan and ISAF forces were preparing to counter a Taliban-led spring offensive in Afghanistan. He added that ISAF was trying to “change to environment” such that when the insurgents try to attack in the spring, they would be facing a different situation. Blotz noted that the ISAF's “mutual, multi-pronged offensive strategy” was hitting the insurgents hard. Blotz added that the joint forces had launched an operation in Helmand and parts of Kandahar, in an effort to prevent insurgent movement. [Comments: AFP reported on 15 Mar 2011 that ISAF was confident that its troops could match an expected Taliban counter-attack in the Spring (Refer to WGTW 10 – 17 Mar 2011 for details)].

Twenty-three Insurgents Join Peace ProcessTolo News reported on 26 Mar 2011 that 23 insurgents have left militancy to join the peace process in Baghlan province. Officials confirmed that the insurgents had joined the government side in Jalgi district

ISAF Abandoned Base in Pech Dara: TalibanAfghan Islamic Press quoted a Taliban commander, Haji Dawran Safi, in Kunar on 27 Mar 2011 as claiming that ISAF forces had abandoned a military base as they could not repulse Taliban attacks. He said that all ISAF forces had left the Kandgol military base in Pech Dara in Kunar province and the Taliban were now controlling a vast area there. Safi also stated that the Taliban had set up an administration there, forming a 12-member council to govern the area and appointing about 200 people to police the area and provide security. Safi added that educational and health institutions would remain open and a new judicial system would be established. Safi also warned that the Taliban were now preparing to attack another important ISAF base in the Manogai area.

91% Of Attacks Thwarted: NDSPajhwok reported on 27 Mar 2011 that 91% of organised insurgent attacks in Afghanistan were prevented due to the efforts of the ANA and ANP, with the National Directorate of Security (NDS) providing intelligence to arrest the “masterminds” of the organised attacks. A NDS spokesman praised the NDS, and stated that militants had only managed to execute 9% of their planned attacks.

Taliban Changing Tactics in KunduzPajhwok reported on 24 Mar 2011 that Afghan officials believed that the Taliban were changing tactics to focus on suicide attacks and assassinations of government officials as they were being forced out of their sanctuaries in Kunduz. The article stated that in the past, the Taliban controlled the Chardara, Imam Sahib and Dasht-e Archi districts of Kunduz but Afghan and ISAF forces had driven them out. However Taliban spokesman Zabiullah Mujahid claimed that the insurgents had moved out of Kunduz because of winter, not because of the government's military operation. The article also quoted an unnamed Taliban commander as confirming that the Taliban were currently focusing on suicide attacks and planting IEDs, however he said when spring came, Taliban forces would return to their districts. Meanwhile, Commander of the 303 Pamir Zone in North Afghanistan GEN Daud Daud said that unless people support the ISAF and the ANSF, ensuring security was impossible.

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Taliban Orders Shut Down of Cell Phone Services in Helmand (update)AFP reported on 24 Mar 2011 that the Taliban had ordered all mobile phone services to shut down in Helmand, starting in Lashkar Gah. Mobile Telephone Networks, one of Afghanistan's four mobile phone operators was quoted as saying that the Taliban threatened to attack its operations should it not switch off the signal in Helmand. The article also quoted a Taliban spokesman as saying that the shutdown had been ordered as Taliban fighters had been increasingly targeted by ISAF forces and they suspected that ISAF was using the services of phone companies against them. It was previously reported that on 16 Mar 2011, the Taliban ordered the shut down of mobile phone networks in Helmand (refer to WGTW 10 – 16 Mar 2011 for details).

Taliban Seize Control of Waygal DistrictThe Associated Press reported that on 29 Mar 2011, about 300 Taliban militants seized control of the district centre in Waygal district in Nuristan province. Nuristan provincial police chief, Shamsul Rahman, was quoted as saying that the militants took control of the main village in Waygal district and police forces retreated as they had “no way to fight” as they did not possess enough “heavy weapons”. He admitted that the Taliban had influence over large parts of Nuristan's districts for months now. A spokesman for the provincial governor said that the government was preparing to launch a counter-offensive to retake the district. Meanwhile, the Taliban claimed that the district was captured along with 12 police officers.

Taliban Employs Modern Weapons in “War of Words”Eurasia quoted Abdul Sattar Maiwandi, the editor-in-chief of an official Taliban website named: Al-Emarah, in an interview on 20 Mar 2011 as saying that the Taliban understood the importance of winning the “war of words” and its bearing on the actual war. He claimed that the Taliban employed a number of tactics on the modern media battlefield, and said that there was an official “media committee” to oversee the effort. He claimed that a professional production studio called Al-Shahamat had been set up to produce videos. His website Al-Emarah featured a series of videos criticising projects funded by the US and the coalition, as well as videos which showed suicide bombings against the ANSF and the coalition. Maiwandi revealed that the Taliban was taking advantage of mobile phones as well, in which news posted on their site would be converted to SMS texts, and sent to subscribers, who would further disseminate it. While many in the public had questioned why the government do not do anything to stop the dissemination, Afghan Information and Technology Ministry spokesman Emal Marjan replied that it was simply not possible for such information to be controlled. Separately information-technology expert Azmat Gharanai believed that the Taliban used the Internet to reach out to foreign sympathisers and financiers, in which the Taliban was effective in using sites like YouTube, Twitter and Facebook.

Taliban Attacks Will Increase Under Security TransitionIn an article titled: "Cessation of telecommunications operations in Helmand, a Taleban reaction to the transfer of responsibility for security" by Afghan independent secular daily newspaper Hasht-e Sobh on 26 Mar 2011, the author warned of the possible Taliban's reactions to the security transition. He said that the recent cessation of telecommunications operations in Helmand province was part of the Taliban's attempts to show the government and the international community that the Taliban wielded more power than the government in provinces where security responsibilities were to be transferred to Afghans. The author believed that the Taliban would not increase their attacks on the seven provinces where responsibilities would be transferred, to prove that the security of Afghanistan could not be ensured without the Taliban. He concurred that the security transition would be fraught with many challenges and difficulties because Taliban would focus all their capabilities to show that the government was incapable of assuming this responsibility.

Security Transition “Mere Propaganda”: Hezb-e Islami LeaderOn 28 Mar 2011, Pajhwok quoted Hezb-e Islami Afghanistan leader Golboddin Hekmatyar as calling the security transition to the ANSF “a mere propaganda”. He claimed that although the ANSF were already in the seven areas, they had failed to keep the security. He insisted that his organisation was not responsible for the burning of schools and clinics, and instead blamed US security company Blackwater for the deeds. He added that the coalition must leave Afghanistan unconditionally, and alleged that the insurgents who were joining the peace process were not real insurgents, but were produced by intelligence agencies. He further urged Afghan youths to rise and stand up against the government, like in Yemen, Egypt and other Islamic countries.

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Rebranding the TalibanSource: Centre for Conflict and Peace Studies2, 19 Mar 2011

Afghanistan's government may want to bring the Taliban back into the fold, but not all Afghans support this strategy. Since the beginning of his second term in office, President Karzai has increasingly favoured a political settlement to the war. Sources close to the president say that he had begun to lose hope in a military solution before his re-election campaign and that the behaviour of Western diplomats during the election saga further strained already rocky relations with the White House. Feeling isolated by his allies, the president immediately went in search of a political solution.

His first step was to bring local leaders together for a Consultative Peace Jirga. Considered a choreographed event by many opposition leaders, the Jirga echoed the president's agenda and called for the reintegration of Taliban members who denounce violence and ties to al-Qaeda. It also led calls for the creation of the High Council for Peace as the body that would lead negotiations with the Taliban.

To ease the reintegration of the Taliban, the government has sought to emphasise the ideological differences between the group and al-Qaeda, insisting that a large portion can be persuaded to join the democratic process. Some, including Farouq Wardak, the minister of education and a member of the High Council for Peace, argue that the Taliban has changed.

Publicly, the government has stopped referring to the Taliban in association with violence against civilians. Last month, more than 100 people were killed in attacks in Jalalabad and Kunduz, which were strongly condemned by the president. Not once, however, was the word 'Taliban' mentioned in his statements.

But many in Afghanistan argue that the Taliban has not done enough to show that it has changed and that its oppressive regime and continued violence against civilians remains fresh in the public memory. Those critical of the efforts also question whether the Taliban's links to al-Qaeda are really as superficial as the government claims. Nadery points to the example of the stoning of a young couple in Kunduz three months ago. "The video tapes of the incident I reviewed shows Arab and Uzbek fighters are not only publicly present at the scene but also serving as organisers of the murder event," he says.

Others, however, insist that the relationship between the Taliban and al-Qaeda has always been a strained marriage of convenience. Hekmat Karzai says there have been indications that the relationship is growing more strained and points to the fact that Mullah Omar has not shown any interest in al-Qaeda's globalist jihad in his recent addresses. "But not enough has been done to build confidence for the Taliban to disassociate themselves from al-Qaeda," Karzai adds. "What do they leave all that for?"

Some analysts, however, believe that the strategy of talking to the Taliban might not achieve the peace and stability Afghans are looking for and argue that the insurgents are too fragmented to be dealt with through negotiations.

"In my view, the whole idea of negotiations with [the] Taliban is a fruitless endeavour," says Hassan Abbas, a professor of South Asian politics and security at Columbia University and a former Pakistani government official.

Abbas points to the multiplicity of groups involved in the insurgency and their varying interests. He argues that making peace with figureheads might not solve Afghanistan's problems. "Mullah Omar and Co. are no more in effective control of the Taliban insurgency in Afghanistan - they are becoming irrelevant in fact," he says. It is also unclear whether NATO and the US are fully on board with the Afghan government's attempts to reach a political settlement. The Obama administration's support for Karzai's agenda has been minimal at best and, at a time when NATO is focusing on a military transition out of the country, a cohesive strategy towards an end-game in Afghanistan is lacking.

Karzai's mistrust of US officials further undermines a unified approach. At the regional level, too, Pakistan's ambiguous policy towards the Taliban complicates the peace process, with many believing that unless a decisive understanding is reached with Islamabad, any internal peace with the Taliban will be superficial and temporary.

But Abbas says that the Pakistani army is deeply suspicious of long-term US interests in Afghanistan and "believes that US-India interests are aligned" in the country. The lack of clarity in the mandate of the High Council for Peace is also a source of worry for Afghans, who are not sure whether the organisation, whose members were appointed by the president, is simply a facilitating body or one that has the authority to make concessions to the Taliban.

2 http://www.caps.af/detail.asp?Lang=e&Cat=3&ContID=9647

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"The High Council has an advisory role and it has no executive powers," explains Fazel, a member of the Council, in response to those queries. "It has a mediator role to facilitate the environment of peace with the Taliban and help the integration process now and post peace." But many remain concerned that the ambiguity of the council's role could compromise Afghanistan's hard-won achievements.

(Abridged from source)

Violence in PakistanTable 4 : Violence in Pakistan (24 – 30 Mar 2011)

Location/ Province Date Type of

Attack Casualties Comments

Balochistan 24 Mar Shooting 2 killed Pakistani police recovered two bullet-ridden bodies in Hub City.Balochistan 27 Mar IED Attack - A gas pipeline in the Sui district was destroyed in an IED blast planted by militants.

Balochistan 29 Mar Militant attack 1 wounded Insurgents opened fire and torched a NATO tanker in Kalat district. One driver was

wounded.

FATA 23 Mar IED Attack 8 killed2 wounded

Two Pakistani soldiers were wounded in an IED blast in Orakzai Agency. Subsequently, Pakistani soldiers killed eight militants in a counter-attack.

FATA 25 Mar Militant Attack

13 killed11 wounded35 abducted

Militants opened fire on two vehicles carrying Shiite Muslims, killing 13 people, wounding 11 and abducting 35 others in Kurram Agency.

FATA 27 Mar Search Operation - Pakistani security forces detained the leader of Lashkar-e Islam, a banned militant

organisation, in Kurram Agency.

FATA 27 Mar Militant Attack 6 killed Six people were killed when insurgents launched a rocket at a passenger bus in Kurram

Agency.

FATA 28 Mar Militant Attack 13 killed 13 Pakistani soldiers were killed in friendly fire, when a mortar landed in the wrong

location. Several other militants were also killed and detained in the attack.

FATA 28 Mar Militant Attack 14 killed 14 Pakistani security personnel were killed in a militant ambush in Khyber Agency

Islamabad 30 Mar Suicide Attack 13 killed 13 people were killed when a suicide bomber detonated his explosives at a police

checkpoint in Swabi townKhyber- Pakhtunkhwa 23 Mar Suicide

Attack5 killed25 wounded

Five people were killed and another 25 were wounded when a suicide bomber rammed his car into a police station near Hangu. (please see below for details of the attack)

Khyber- Pakhtunkhwa 28 Mar IED Attack - Two schools in Kohat were destroyed in IED blasts planted by militants.

Sindh 25 Mar Shooting 1 killed A man was shot dead in Gulistan-i-Jauhar, Karachi.Sindh 25 Mar Shooting 1 killed A man was tortured and subsequently shot dead in the Landhi area, Karachi.Sindh 25 Mar Shooting 1 killed A civilian was shot dead in Mauripur, Karachi.Sindh 25 Mar Shooting 1 killed A man was shot dead in Korangi, Karachi.Sindh 25 Mar Shooting 1 killed The bullet-riddled body of a man was found in Azizbad, Karachi.Sindh 25 Mar Shooting 1 killed A man was shot dead in the Pakistan Bazaar area in Karachi.Sindh 25 Mar Shooting 1 killed A man was shot dead in Frontier Colony, Karachi

Sindh 25 Mar Shooting 1 killed The bullet-riddled body of a man recently kidnapped, was found in Soldier Bazar market, Karachi.

Sindh 28 Mar Shooting 1 killed A religious activist was shot dead by militants who ambushed his car in Mauripur, Karachi

Five Killed, 25 wounded in Suicide AttackReuters reported that on 23 Mar, a suicide bomber driving an explosive-laden car detonated his explosives near a police station near Hangu town in Khyber-Pakhtunkwa killing five people and wounding 25 others. The bomber was targeting the police station building but failed to do so because of the barricades erected outside the building. The dead included a policeman and four civilians, while most of the wounded were civilians. Apart from the police station, the blast also damaged several homes and shops nearby.

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Taliban Forms Cell to Hunt Down SpiesExpress Tribune reported on 28 Mar 2011 that Taliban forces base in North Waziristan had established a “vigilance cell” to hunt down people suspected of providing information to guide US' drone strike campaign. The cell was named “Lashkar-e-Khorasan (LeKh) and its purpose was to identify, capture and execute locals who were working for the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA). The bulk of LeKh came from the Haqqani network and the Hafiz Gul Bahadur group that control the regions along the Afghan border. The Tehrik-e-Taliban (TTP) was reported to have “occasional cooperation” with LeKh. LeKh operated in the Datta Khel, Miranshah and Mir Ali regions of North Waziristan, while a source in the tribal belt said that LeKh was made up of more than 300 members. The article noted that an intelligence official in the Pakistan Army confirmed the existence and activities of the LeKh.

Bin Laden Sets Alarm Bells RingingSource: Syed Saleem Shahzad, Asia Times Online3, 25 Mar 2011

After a prolonged lull, the US Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) has launched a series of covert operations in the rugged Hindu Kush mountains of Pakistan and Afghanistan following strong tip-offs that al-Qaeda leader Osama bin Laden has been criss-crossing the area in the past few weeks for high-profile meetings in militant redoubts.

Asia Times Online has learned that decision-makers have put a lot of weight on the information on Bin Laden's movements as it has come from multiple intelligence agencies, in Pakistan, Afghanistan and Saudi Arabia. For at least two years, little credible news has emerged of Bin Laden's movements and motives. Now, intelligence officials believe they have top-grade accounts as they come from the inner circles of militant camps.

Officials are said to be "stunned" by the visibility of Bin Laden's movements, and their frequency, in a matter of a few weeks in the outlawed terrain of Pakistan and Afghanistan, the most unprecedented reports about him since he evaded the US in the Tora Bora mountains in Afghanistan in 2001. The development has fuelled speculation in intelligence circles that al-Qaeda could be planning another major attack along the lines of the 9/11 assault on New York and Washington. However, extensive investigations by Asia Times Online, including exchanges within al-Qaeda's camps, point in another direction: given the nature of Bin Laden's meetings, this appears to be the beginning of a new era for a broader struggle in which al-Qaeda, through its Laskhar al-Zil (Shadow Army), will try to capitalize on the Arab revolts and the Palestinian struggle and also revitalize and redefine its role in Afghanistan.

Several weeks ago, Bin Laden is reported to have met with Gulbuddin Hekmatyar, the legendary Afghan mujahid and founder and leader of the Hezb-e-Islami Afghanistan (HIA) political party and paramilitary group, in a militant camp in thick jungle on the fringes of Kunar and Bajaur provinces in Afghanistan. "The talks appeared to discuss some grand strategy and Osama bin Laden aims to take Gulbuddin Hekmatyar on board, especially as Hekmatyar's commanders have brokered ceasefire agreements with NATO forces in Afghanistan and Hekmatyar's representatives have been negotiating a truce with the Americans," an intelligence source told Asia Times Online.

Adding to the view of the importance of Bin Laden's meeting with Hekmatyar is that it took place when the interest of the CIA and its special forces had already been piqued by reports of the al-Qaeda leader's movements in Kunar and Nuristan for meetings with various militant commanders and al-Qaeda bigwigs. Bin Laden would have been aware of the dangers and was obviously prepared to take the risk. While intelligence agencies might be involved in a guessing game about Bin Laden's plans and a possible grand al-Qaeda operation, his movements can be read in the perspective of recent discourse in al-Qaeda circles and a major shift in its policies.

Bin Laden's meeting with Hekmatyar and other militant commanders in the Hindu Kush can be seen as a part of this new war in which al-Qaeda aims to involve the whole Muslim nation. Hekmatyar's HIA has been a part of al-Qaeda's Laskhar al-Zil, which comprises elite guerrillas. Possibly, al-Qaeda aims to revitalize its operations in Afghanistan, and throughout the world, along with mainstream resistance groups (sons of the soil or Ibnul Balad) and in addition to Islamic political parties. While fears attached to Bin Laden’s unprecedented visibility and movement for a grand al-Qaeda operation cannot completely be dismissed, it is more possible that al-Qaeda will undertake both worldwide terror operations and join forces with mainstream Muslim groups. (Abridged from source)

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IRAQ WEEKLY GLOBAL TERROR WATCH 24 – 30 Mar 2011


Violence in IraqTable 5 : Violence in Iraq (24 – 30 Mar 2011)

Location/ Province

Date Type of Attack

Casualties Comments

Al Anbar 26 Mar Assassination

1 killed Militants shot dead a Iraqi Police COL in Ramadi city.

Babil 28 Mar VBIED 1 killed16 wounded

A civilian was killed and 16 others were wounded in a VBIED blast in Mussayab.

Baghdad 26 Mar Roadside IED

9 wounded Nine people were wounded in a roadside IED blast in Iskan district.


3 killed Three civilians were killed when their car hit a roadside IED in the Abu Ghraib area.

Baghdad 26 Mar VBIED 1 killed3 wounded

A university professor was killed in a VBIED blast near al-Nusour Square. Three other people were wounded.

Baghdad 26 Mar Militant Attack

1 killed2 wounded

An Iraqi soldier was killed and two others were wounded in a militant attack on a check point in al-Hurriyah district.


4 wounded Four people were wounded in a roadside IED blast at an intersection near al-Shaab football stadium.


3 wounded Three people were wounded when an Interior Ministry vehicle convoy hit a roadside IED in Tayran Square.


2 wounded Two people were wounded in a roadside IED blast in Amriyah neighbourhood.


3 wounded Three civilians were wounded in a roadside IED blast in eastern Baghdad.


4 killed9 wounded

Four people were killed while another nine were wounded when militants attacked a goldsmith shop in Qahira district.


5 wounded Five people, including three policemen, were wounded in a roadside IED blast in Kadhimiya district.

Baghdad 29 Mar Explosive Projectile

2 wounded Two people were wounded when two rockets landed near a hotel on Abu Nawas street.


2 wounded Two soldiers were wounded in a roadside IED blast in the Abu Ghraib area.


2 killed Militants stormed the house of an Iraqi army officer, killing two of his brothers.


5 killed Militants stormed a home in Abu Ghraib area, killing five brothers who were inside.

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IRAQ WEEKLY GLOBAL TERROR WATCH 24 – 30 Mar 2011

Diyala 26 Mar IED Attack 1 killed1 wounded

A farmer was killed and his son was wounded in an IED blast at their orchard near al-Maqdadiyah town.

Diyala 28 Mar Militant Attack

- Militants attacked the house of Iraqi Army BG Ali Hussein. BG Hussein's guards detained one of the militants.

Diyala 28 Mar Search Operation

- Iraqi security forces detained five suspected militants near al-Khalis town.

Diyala 28 Mar Search Operation

- A joint Iraqi and US force detained two militants leaders in a village east of Baquba.

Ninawa 26 Mar Shooting 2 killed The bodies of two men were found near Mosul with gunshot wounds to their heads.

Ninawa 26 Mar Shooting 1 killed A man was killed in a drive-by shooting in Mosul.

Ninawa 28 Mar Militant Attack

7 killed Seven people were shot dead when militants stormed a house in northern Mosul.

Ninawa 30 Mar Explosive Projectile

13 wounded 13 people were wounded when militants threw a hand-grenade at a police patrol in central Mosul.

Ninawa 30 Mar IED Blast 1 killed One person was killed in an IED blast near his house in southern Mosul.

Salah ad Din


53 killed98 wounded

53 people were killed and 98 others were wounded when a suicide bomber detonated his explosives and militants stormed the provincial council building in Tikrit city. (Please see below for more details).

53 Killed in Tikrit AttackAFP reported on 29 Mar 2011 that an unknown number of militants, some wearing military uniforms and suicide vests, launched a coordinated attack on the provincial council building in Tikrit, about 160km north of Baghdad. 53 people were killed and 98 others were wounded in the attack. A suicide bomber first detonated his explosives, clearing the way into the building for the rest of the militants. Following that, security forces and the militants engaged in an hours-long shootout. As police reinforcements were arriving at the scene, a VBIED was detonated, instantly killing a Iraqi police COL Imad Nofan, his deputy and a journalist. A police official was quoted as saying that the security forces eventually took control of the provincial council building.

There were no other updates for Iraq this week.

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MIDDLE EAST WEEKLY GLOBAL TERROR WATCH 24 – 30 Mar 2011

Terror Incident Charts (Israel, Palestine, Lebanon)

Violence in Middle East (Israel, Palestine and Lebanon)

Table 6: Violence in Middle East (24 – 30 Mar 2011)Location Date Type of

AttackCasualties Comments

Rafah, Gaza

30 Mar Air Strike 1 killed1 wounded

The IAF conducted an air strike in Rafah, specifically targeting two Islamic Jihad militants who were travelling on a motorcycle. One of the militants was killed while the other was wounded.

Gaza 24 Mar Air Strike 3 wounded IAF aircraft attacked four targets in Gaza, including a mortar launch installation near Gaza city, a group of militants in northern Gaza, a disused Hamas intelligence HQ near Gaza city and a rocket-launching site near Shati refugee camp. Three people were lightly wounded.

Gaza 27 Mar Air Strike 2 killed An IAF air strike killed two people in Gaza.

Gaza 29 Mar Explosive Projectile

- Militants in Gaza attempted to fire Qassam rockets at Sderot, Israel, but the rockets exploded within Gaza. No casualties were reported.

Jenin, W. Bank

24 Mar Search Operation

- Palestinian security forces arrested two senior leaders of the Islamic Jihad in Jenin, northern W. Bank.

W. Bank 24 Mar Search Operation

- Palestinian Authority (PA) security forces arrested 10 Islamic Jihad militants during overnight operations in the W. Bank.

Eshkol, Israel

26 Mar Explosive Projectile

- Two rockets were fired into Eshkol Regional Council from Gaza. One of the rockets damaged a house. No casualties were reported.

Hamas Urges Islamic Jihad to Stop Attacks on IsraelIsraeli media on 24 Mar 2011 reported that Hamas government PM Ismail Haneya had telephoned Islamic Jihad SEC-GEN Ramadan Shallah to order his group to stop firing rockets and mortars at Israel, in order to avoid an all-out confrontation in Gaza. Meanwhile, Islamic Jihad spokesman Khader Habib indicated his group's willingness to observe an unofficial ceasefire “if Israel stopped its attacks”. In addition, two senior Islamic Jihad officials had reportedly travelled to Syria to hold discussions with senior Islamic Jihad leaders about the recent wave of violence.

However, contrary to the above report, the Middle East Newsline (MENL) on 25 Mar 2011 quoted unnamed Palestinian sources as saying that Hamas had been supplying mortars and rockets to other Gaza militias for attacks on Israel. The sources further claimed that some of the militias were trained to fire rockets with ranges up to 45km. One of the sources said that Hamas would rather have other militias claim responsibility for rocket attacks as they were less likely to trigger massive Israeli retaliation.

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Gaza Militants Offer Truce if Israel ReciprocatesFollowing a two-hour meeting between Hamas and other Gaza militant factions, Hamas official Ismail Radwan on 26 Mar 2011 said that Gaza militants were committed to observe a truce with Israel as long as Israel reciprocated the move. However, Islamic Jihad co-leader Khader Habib warned that there was a need for Gaza militants to respond to any escalation of violence by Israel.

Hamas Seeks Diversion from Gaza Unrest: Israeli IntelligenceThe Middle East Newsline (MENL) on 24 Mar 2011 quoted unnamed Israeli intelligence officials as saying that Hamas was seeking to divert attention from growing unrest in Gaza by lifting restrictions on its armed wing as well as other Palestinian militias in attacks on Israel. The officials further claimed that Hamas was operating both missile, mortar and rocket gunners in Gaza as well as bomb cells in the W. Bank. They also assessed that by lifting restrictions, Hamas had eased tension with other Palestinian militias, particularly Islamic Jihad.

Hamas Calls on UN to Halt IAF's Air Strikes on GazaIsraeli media reported that Hamas spokesman Taher al-Nunu had on 25 Mar 2011 called on the UN to put an end to the IAF air strikes in Gaza. Al-Nunu also urged the Arab League to work urgently to stop “recent Israeli aggression”, saying that Israel must be prevented from “exploiting the instability in the region and the world to carry out massacres against the Palestinian people”.

IDF Braces for Rocket Fire Close to Tel AvivIsraeli media on 25 Mar 2011 reported that the IDF was bracing for a possible further expansion of rocket attacks from Gaza, to as far as Tel Aviv. It was believed that Gaza militant groups possessed Iranian-made rockets, such as the Fajr-5, which were capable of reaching Tel Aviv. Subsequently, the IDF on 27 Mar 2011 stationed the first battery of its Iron Dome short-range missile defence system in southern Israel, but stressed the initial deployment was experimental. The system was stationed outside the southern city of Beersheva. Israeli PM Benjamin Netanyahu however warned that the Iron Dome would not provide a complete or comprehensive protection, emphasising that it was impossible to protect all homes. Meanwhile, the second of the two batteries possessed by IDF would soon be deployed at Ashkelon.

Islamic Jihad Orders Commanders to Go into HidingIsraeli media on 24 Mar 2011 reported that the Islamic Jihad had order all its commanders to go into hiding, out of fear that the IDF would aim to assassinate them. Notably, the IDF had reportedly raised the prospect that the recent bombing in Jerusalem (refer to WGTW 17 – 23 Mar 2011 for details of the bombing) was the work of the Islamic Jihad. While the terror organisation did not claim responsibility for the bombing, a group spokesman lauded the attack and said it was a “natural response to the enemy's crimes”. [Comments: IDF officials had earlier warned that assassinations might be carried out against militant leaders. Refer to WGTW 17 – 23 Mar 2011 for details.]

IDF Identifies Radar Sent to Hamas by IranThe Middle East Newsline (MENL) on 23 Mar 2011 reported the the IDF had identified a radar allegedly sent to Hamas by Iran. The radar was intercepted in the Mediterranean Sea and found on board the Liberian-flagged MV Victoria (refer to WGTW 10 – 16 Mar 2011 for details of the interception). Unnamed IDF sources revealed that the radar was a SharpEye radar manufactured by UK company Kelvin Hughes, which was designed to guide the C-704 anti-ship missiles. IDF sources added that Iran could have received the radar either through China or the UAE port of Dubai.

Fatah, Hamas Set to Hold Unity Talks in CairoOn 28 Mar 2011, National Committee and Alliance of Palestinian Factions SEC-GEN Khaled Abdel Majiud said that Hamas and Fatah officials had agreed to resume reconciliation talks in Cairo in Apr 2011. The talks would reportedly focus on PA President Mahmoud Abbas' offer to travel to Gaza (refer to WGTW 10 – 16 Mar 2011 for details), the establishment of a new and unified government and political leadership, and holding presidential and parliamentary elections. Majiud added that Abbas's recent initiative to visit Gaza for talks with Hamas leaders would be postponed until the talks in Cairo were concluded. Meanwhile, Arab League SEC-GEN Amr Moussa on 29 Mar 2011 said that the Arab League was ready to host Palestinian

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reconciliation talks.

Israeli-Palestinian Tensions Escalating: A Special ReportSource: Stratfor4, 23 Mar 2011

Israeli PM Benjamin Netanyahu has reportedly delayed his 23 Mar 2011trip to Moscow following a bombing at a bus stop in central Jerusalem that injured as many as 34 people. The bombing follows a series of recent mortar and rocket attacks emanating from the Gaza Strip reaching as far as the outskirts of Ashdod and Beersheba, as well as the 11 Mar 2011 massacre of an Israeli family in the W. Bank settlement of Itamar.

Attacks in Jerusalem, while rare, raise concerns in Israel that a more capable militant presence is building in the Fatah-controlled W. Bank in addition to the Hamas-controlled Gaza Strip. Even before the Jerusalem bombing, Israeli DPM Silvan Shalom told Israeli citizens in a 23 Mar 2011 Israel Radio broadcast that “we may have to consider a return” to a second Ops CAST LEAD in Gaza. He added, “I say this despite the fact that I know such a thing would, of course, bring the region to a far more combustible situation.” The past few years of Palestinian violence against Israel have been mostly characterized by Gaza-based rocket attacks as well as a spate of attacks in 2008 in which militants used bulldozers to plow into both civilian and security targets in Jerusalem. Though various claims and denials were issued for many of the incidents, the perpetrators of these attacks – likely deliberately – remained unclear.

The names of shadowy groups such as the “al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigade-Imad Mughniyah” also began circulating, raising suspicions of a stronger Hezbollah – and by extension, Iranian – link to Palestinian militancy. (Imad Mughniyah, one of Hezbollah’s most notorious commanders, was killed in Feb 08 in Damascus.) The al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigade-Imad Mughniyah group claimed the 11 Mar 2011 W. Bank attack, which Hamas denied. Palestinian Islamic Jihad’s (PIJ) armed wing, the al-Quds Brigades, has meanwhile claimed responsibility for the recent rocket attacks launched from Gaza that targeted Ashkelon and Sderot. PIJ spokesman Abu Hamad said on 23 Mar 2011 prior to the Jerusalem bus bombing that his group intends to begin targeting cities deep within Israeli territory as it enters a “new phase of the resistance.” This is notable, as PIJ, out of all the Palestinian militant groups, has the closest ties to Iran.

The wider regional context is pertinent to the building crisis in Israel and the Palestinian territories. Iran has been pursuing a covert destabilization campaign in the Persian Gulf region to undermine its Sunni Arab rivals, particularly in Bahrain and Saudi Arabia. The Saudis reacted swiftly to the threat with the deployment of troops to Bahrain and are now engaging in a variety of measures to try to suppress Shiite unrest within the kingdom itself. The fear remains, however, that Iran has retained a number of covert assets in the region that it can choose to activate at an opportune time. Iran’s opening another front in the Levant, using its already well-established links to Hezbollah in Lebanon and its developing links to Hamas and other players in the Gaza Strip and W. Bank, remains a distinct possibility and is likely being discussed in the crisis meetings under way in Israel at this time.


Radical Islam in GazaSource: International Crisis Group5, 29 Mar 2011

The recent Israel-Hamas escalation returns a spotlight to Gaza and the Islamist movement’s relationship with more militant organisations. Gaza arouses multiple concerns: does Hamas seeks to impose religious law; has its purported Islamisation stimulated growth of Salafi-Jihadi groups; and will al-Qaeda offshoots find a foothold there? Hamas faces competition from more radical Islamist groups, though their numbers are few, organisation poor, achievements against Israel so far minor and chances of threatening Gaza’s government slight. The significance of Gaza’s Salafi-Jihadis is less military capability than constraints they impose on Hamas: they are an ideological challenge; they appeal to members of its military wing, a powerful constituency; through attacks within and from Gaza, they threaten security; by criticising Hamas for not fighting Israel or implementing Sharia, they exert pressure for more militancy and Islamisation. The policy of isolating Gaza and ignoring Hamas exacerbates this problem. As the international community seeks new ways to address political Islam in the Arab upheaval’s wake, Gaza is not the worst place to start.

4 http://www.stratfor.com/node/189285/analysis/20110323-israeli-palestinian-tensions-escalating-special-report5 http://www.crisisgroup.org/en/regions/middle-east-north-africa/israel-palestine/104-radical-islam-in-gaza.aspx

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In the last few years, Hamas has faced new Islamist challengers in Gaza. They are groups of militants, known as Salafi-Jihadis, who adhere to a strict interpretation of Islamic law and see themselves not as liberators of Palestine but as part of a global movement of armed fighters defending Muslims against non-Muslim enemies, a category many of them believe also includes Shiites and Palestinian secularists. Although their current strength is low, these groups – which are responsible for a sizeable proportion of Gaza-based rocket attacks toward Israel – could well trigger an escalation that, as illustrated in the past week, could have serious consequences for Gaza, Israel and the region as a whole.

Over time, Hamas’s relationship with such militants has shifted from cooperation to antagonism. One of Gaza’s oldest Salafi-Jihadi groups, Jaysh al-Islam (Army of Islam), participated with Hamas and another faction in the 2006 capture of Israeli corporal Gilad Shalit. In the years since, Hamas has cracked down on Jaysh al-Islam and similar groups, acting decisively when it met with anything resembling a direct defiance of its governmental authority. In Aug 09, when the spiritual leader of Jund Ansar Allah (Soldiers of God’s Supporters), a newer Salafi-Jihadi group based in Rafah, denounced Hamas, declared an Islamic Emirate in Palestine, and demanded the imposition of Sharia (Islamic law), Hamas brutally confronted it, resulting in more than two dozen deaths, 100 injuries and the group’s near total elimination.

Hamas’s policy since then has been one of containment, directed not only at Salafi-Jihadi militants, who are arrested when caught violating the ceasefire it until recently had been upholding, but also at Hamas members who sympathise with these groups. Most Salafi-Jihadis in Gaza are young, low-ranking former members of the military wings of established factions, primarily Hamas and Islamic Jihad but also the Popular Resistance Committees and Fatah. Reasons for their defections vary, but the majority state that primary among their sources of dissatisfaction with Hamas were its participation in the 2006 legislative elections, acquiescence to ceasefires with Israel and failure after taking over Gaza to implement Sharia.

The influence of Salafi-Jihadis is not prominent, but nor is it negligible. They accuse Hamas of laxity in enforcing religious mores, a charge that resonates with many movement supporters and leads the government to greater determination in applying Islamic law. At the same time, the exigencies of governing, hope of increasing diplomatic ties and pressure from many Gazans, human rights activists and Westerners pull in an opposite direction. The result has been a zigzagging policy in which Islamising decisions are announced, at times retracted when citizens object, and on occasion nonetheless enforced. More worrying has been a series of bombings, shootings, burnings and lootings aimed at targets that appear un-Islamic and for which no suspect has been publicly tried. In many cases, it is still unclear who or what was behind them. Some suspect Salafi-Jihadi groups, others Hamas’s more militant members, who were thought difficult to reprimand while the government faced criticism for imposing a ceasefire – now broken – that had neither convinced Israel to lift its closure of Gaza’s borders nor ended the Islamist movement’s diplomatic isolation.

The international community’s policy of snubbing Hamas and isolating Gaza has been misguided from the outset, for reasons Crisis Group long has enumerated. Besides condemning Gazans to a life of scarcity, it has not weakened the Islamist movement, loosened its grip over Gaza, bolstered Fatah or advanced the peace process. To that, one must add the assist provided to Salafi-Jihadis, who benefit from both Gaza’s lack of exposure to the outside world and the apparent futility of Hamas’s strategy of seeking greater engagement with the international community, restraining – until recently – attacks against Israel and limiting Islamising policies advocated by more zealous leaders. There is no guarantee that engaging Hamas politically and normalising the situation in Gaza would lead the Islamist movement to greater pragmatism or diminish the appeal of more radical alternatives. But it is worth the try.

President Mubarak’s ouster likely will be followed by a revision of Egypt’s approach toward Gaza – notably a significant loosening of the border closure and improved relations with Hamas. This would appear to be the natural consequence of the eventual election of a more representative, accountable government that better reflects the views of a citizenry dismayed by the former regime’s policies. Such a shift should be seen as an opportunity for others – Europeans and Americans in particular – to revisit their own assumptions. And to understand that the alternative to Hamas in Gaza is not only or necessarily Fatah. It also is the more radical Islamist groups they have every interest in combating.


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MARITIME SECURITY (GULF OF ADEN & WATERS OFF SOMALIA) WEEKLY GLOBAL TERROR WATCH 24 – 30 Mar 2011

Piracy Incidents Charts [Gulf of Aden (GoA), Waters Off Somalia (WOS)]

Cumulative Figures of Kidnapped Vessels in Somalia

According to international piracy monitoring organisation, Ecoterra International, as of 28 Mar 2011, at least 45 vessels remain under the control of pirates while at least 714 people remain hostages.

Incidents and Events

Indian Navy Sinks Hijacked Ship, Arrests 16 Pirates

The Indian Navy on 28 Mar 2011 reported that it had arrested 16 Somali pirates and rescued 16 crewmen after a battle with a hijacked ship in the Arabian Sea earlier on 26 Mar 2011. The hijacked ship was an Iranian fishing vessel which was seized by pirates on the same day near Lakshadweep islands off India's west coast. The pirates were attempting to capture another merchant vessel, the MV Maersk Kensington, when they encountered an Indian Navy vessel and an Indian Coast Guard vessel. The Indian Navy vessel reportedly sank the fishing vessel.

Pirates Seize Kuwaiti-owned Oil Tanker

EU NAVFOR reported that on 28 Mar 2011 at around 0900hr GMT (1700H), pirates armed with RPGs hijacked a Kuwaiti-owned oil tanker, the MV Zirku, 463km SE of the Omani port of Salalah in the Gulf of Aden. The hijacked vessel was carrying 29 sailors including 17 Pakistanis, three Egyptians, three Jordanians, two Ukrainians, one Indian, one Filipino, one Iraqi and one Croatian. It was on its way to Singapore from Bashayer, Sudan. However, the Kuwait Petroleum Corporation later denied EU NAVFOR's report, However, the Kuwait Petroleum Corporation later denied EU NAVFOR's report, saying that no such hijack took place.

Pirates Attack Maltese-Flagged Chemical Tanker

Marisk reported that on 28 Mar 2011, a Maltese-flagged chemical tanker, the MT Nave Cosmos, was attacked approximately 70km SE of Sur, Oman. The vessel was in position 22:14N 060:05E when it came under attack from two or three skiffs, taking on RPG fire. However, the vessel successfully evaded the hijacking.

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Data from the International Maritime Bureau (IMB) Piracy Reporting Centre

Aug/GoA

Aug/WoS

Sep/GoA

Sep/WoS

Oct/GoA

Oct/WoS

Nov/GoA

Nov/WoS

Dec/GoA

Dec/WoS

Jan/GoA

Jan/WoS

Feb/GoA

Feb/WoS

0

2.5

5

7.5

10

12.5

15

17.5

20

22.5

25

27.5

30

63 1 3 4

10

1

24

14 2

152

2

8

1

5

1

1

6

Successful HijacksAttempted Attacks

Month/Location in 2011

No.

of A

ttack

s

17/3 18/3 19/3 20/3 21/3 22/3 23/3 24/3 25/3 26/3 27/3 28/3 29/3 30/3

0

1

2

3

4

5

6

1

Successful HijacksAttempted Attacks

Date in 2011

No.

of A

ttack

s

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MARITIME SECURITY (GULF OF ADEN & WATERS OFF SOMALIA) WEEKLY GLOBAL TERROR WATCH 24 – 30 Mar 2011

Pirates Attack Oil Tanker Off Yemeni Coast

Marisk reported that on 29 Mar 2011, a Yemeni-flagged oil product tanker, the MT Rudeef Gna, was attacked approximately 180km WSW of Mukallah, Yemen. The tanker was attacked by a single skiff at position 13:30N 047:30E and was able to successfully evade the attack after armed guards fired at the skiff.

Other Developments

UN Funds Special Prison for Pirates in Somalia

The United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) had funded a new prison for the captured pirates in Hargeisa, the capital of the Somalia's break away region of Somaliland. Somaliland's Minister for Internal Affairs said that the construction of the prison was completed and the inauguration ceremony would soon be held in Hargeisa.

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SPECIAL REPORT WEEKLY GLOBAL TERROR WATCH 24 – 30 Mar 2011

Libya's Terrorism OptionSource: Scott Stewart, Stratfor6, 23 Mar 2011

On 19 Mar 2011, military forces from the US, France and Great Britain began to enforce UN Security Council Resolution 1973, which called for the establishment of a no-fly zone over Libya and authorized the countries involved in enforcing the zone to “take all necessary measures” to protect civilians and “civilian-populated areas under threat of attack.” Certainly, Libyan leader Moammar Gaddafi has no doubt that the US and European military operations against the Libyan military targets are attacks against his regime. He has specifically warned France and the UK that they would come to regret the intervention. Now, such threats could be construed to mean that should Gaddafi survive, he will seek to cut off the countries’ access to Libyan energy resources in the future. However, given Libya’s past use of terrorist strikes to lash out when attacked by Western powers, Gaddafi’s threats certainly raise the possibility that, desperate and hurting, he will once again return to terrorism as a means to seek retribution for the attacks against his regime. While threats of sanctions and retaliation have tempered Gaddafi’s use of terrorism in recent years, his fear may evaporate if he comes to believe he has nothing to lose.

One option is to reach out to regional jihadist groups such as al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), while another is to cultivate already improving relationships with jihadists groups in Libya such as the Libyan Islamic Fighting Group (LIFG). Indeed, Gaddafi has released hundreds of LFIG members from prison, a process that continued even after the unrest began in Feb 2011. It is doubtful that the LIFG really feels any affinity for Gaddafi – the group launched an insurgency against his regime in the mid-1990s and actually tried to assassinate him – but it could be used to funnel funds and weapons to regional groups like AQIM. Such groups certainly have no love for the French, Americans or British and might be willing to conduct attacks against their interests in exchange for weapons and funding from Libya. AQIM is desperate for resources and has been involved in kidnapping for ransom and drug smuggling to raise funds to continue its struggle. This need might help it overcome its disdain for Gaddafi.

In the long run groups like AQIM and LIFG certainly would pose a threat to Gaddafi, but facing the very real existential threat from the overwhelming military force now being arrayed against him, Gaddafi may view the jihadist threat as far less pressing and severe.

Other potential agents for Libyan terrorist attacks are the various African rebel and revolutionary groups Gaddafi has maintained contact with and even supported over the years. Many of the mercenaries that have reportedly fought on the side of the Libyan loyalist forces have come from such groups. It is not out of the realm of possibility that Gaddafi could call upon such allies to attack French, British, Italian or American interests in his allies’ respective countries. Such actors would have ready access to weapons (likely furnished by Libya to begin with), and the capabilities of host-country security services are quite limited in many African states. This would make them ideal places to conduct terrorist attacks. However, due to the limited capabilities exhibited by such groups, they would likely require direct Libyan oversight and guidance if they were to conduct attacks against hardened targets in Africa such as foreign embassies.

Terrorism, however, has its limitations, as shown by Gaddafi’s activities in the 1980s. While the Libyans were able to launch several successful terrorist strikes, kill hundreds of people and traumatize many more through terror multipliers like the media, they were not able to cause any sort of lasting impact on the foreign policies of the United States or France. The attacks only served to harden the resolve of those countries to impose their will on Gaddafi, and he eventually capitulated and renounced terrorism. Those Libyan-6 http://www.stratfor.com/weekly/20110323-libyas-terrorism-

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SPECIAL REPORT WEEKLY GLOBAL TERROR WATCH 24 – 30 Mar 2011

sponsored attacks in the 1980s are also an important factor governing the way the world views Gaddafi – and today they may be playing a large part in the decision made by countries like France that Gaddafi must go. Of course, it is also this attitude – that Gaddafi must be forced out – that could lead him to believe he has nothing to lose by playing the terrorism card once again.


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