Week 8 Persons Liable

8/6/2019 Week 8 Persons Liable

1/22

PERSONS LIABLETORTS AND

DAMAGES

Tortfeasor and Joint Tortfeasors

Art. 2176. Whoever by act or omission causes damage to another, there being fault ornegligence, is obliged to pay for the damage done. Such fault or negligence, if there is no pre-existing contractual relation between the parties, is called a quasi-delict and is governed by theprovisions of this Chapter.

Art. 2194. The responsibility of two or more persons who are liable for quasi-delict is solidary.

Worcester v Ocampo

Facts: The plaintiff is the Honorable Dean C. Worcester, a member of the Civil Commission ofthe Philippine Islands, and Secretary of the Interior of Insular Government. The defendants aretwelve persons designated by name in the complaint and alleged therein to be the owners,directors, writers (redactores), editors (editores), and administrators of a certain dailynewspaper known as "El Renacimiento" and "Muling Pagsilang," which defendants, as well asthe plaintiff, are residents of the city of Manila, Philippine Islands.

It is further alleged in the complaint that for a long time prior to the 30th of October, 1908, thedefendants were the owners, directors, writers, editors, and administrators of said dailynewspaper, and that said newspaper, during all the time mentioned in the complaint, waspublished and circulated daily in the Spanish and Tagalog languages in the city of Manila,having a large circulation throughout the Philippine Islands.

It is also alleged that for a long time the defendants had been maliciously persecuting andattacking the plaintiff in said newspaper, until at last, on said date, with the malicious intentionof injuring the plaintiff who then was still is a member of the Civil Commission of thePhilippines and Secretary of the Interior in the Government of the Philippines, they attacked theintegrity and reviled the reputation of the plaintiff, not only as a private citizen, but also as anofficial of the Government of the Philippine Islands; and with the object of exposing him to theodium, contempt, and ridicule of the public, they wrote, printed, and published in saidnewspaper in its ordinary number of the said 30th of October, 1908, a malicious defamation andfalse libel, form of an editorial entitled Birds of Prey which was injurious to the plaintiff.

It is alleged, among other things, in paragraph four of the complaint, that the plaintiff was onthe date of said publication, and still is, well known to the officials of the Government of thePhilippine Islands, and to the inhabitants of the Philippine Islands, and to the public generally,personally as well as a member of the Civil Commission of the Philippines and as a Secretary ofthe Interior; and the defamation and libel, and the words, terms, and language used in saiddefamation and libel were employed by the said defendants with the intention of indicating thesaid plaintiff, and that they should be understood, as in fact they were understood, by the publicofficials of the Government and the inhabitants of the Philippine Islands in general, as referringto the plaintiff. (Here follow the reasons for saying the editorial referred to plaintiff and why thepublic understood it as referring to him.)

The said defendants charged plaintiff with the prostitution of his office as a member of the CivilCommission of the Philippines and as Secretary of the Interior of said Islands, for personal ends;

with wasting public funds for the purpose of promoting his personal welfare; and with theviolation of the laws of the Philippine Islands and the ordinances of the city of Manila; withtaking part in illegal combination of the purpose of robbing the people, with the object of gainfor himself and for others; and lastly, with being a bird of prey, and that said defamation should


2/22


3/22


DAMAGES

who from their knowledge of the parties and circumstances are able to form a conclusionas to the defendant's intention and application of the libel is evidence for theinformation of the jury.

Mr. Odgers, in his work on Libel and Slander (p. 567), says:

The plaintiff may also call at the trial his friends or others acquainted with thecircumstances, to state that, in reading the libel, they at once concluded it was aimed atthe plaintiff. It is not necessary that all the world should understand the libel. It issufficient if those who know the plaintiff can make out that he is the person meant. (Seealso Falkard's Stockey on Libel and Slander, 4th English edition, 589.)

The correctness of this rule is not only established by the weight of authority but is supported byevery consideration of justice and sound policy. The lower court committed no error inadmitting the opinion of witnesses offered during the trial of the cause. One's reputation is thesum or composite of the impressions spontaneously made by him from time to time, and in one

way or another, upon his neighbors and acquaintances. The effect of a libelous publication uponthe understanding of such persons, involving necessarily the identity of the person libeled is of

the very essence of the wrong. The issue in a libel case concerns not only the sense of thepublication, but, in a measure its effect upon a reader acquainted with the person referred to.The correctness of the opinion of the witnesses as to the identity of the person meant in thelibelous publication may always be tested by cross-examination. (Enquirer Co. vs. Johnston, 72Fed. Rep., 443; 2nd Greenleaf on Evidence, 417; Nelson vs. Barchenius, 52 Ill., 236; Smith vs.Miles, 15 Vt., 245; Miller vs. Butler, 6 Cushing (Mass.), 71.)

It is true that some of the courts have established a different rule. We think, however, that alarge preponderance of the decisions of the supreme courts of the different States is in favor ofthe doctrine which we have announced here.

We are of the opinion that assignments of error Nos. 3, 4, and 7 may fairly be considered

together, the question being whether or not the evidence adduced during the trial of the cause inthe lower court shows, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the said editorial was libelous inits character. Here again we find that this question has been passed upon by this court in thecase of U. S. vs. Ocampo et al. (18 Phil. Rep., 1), and we deem it unnecessary to discuss thisquestion again, for the reason that the evidence adduced in the present cause was practically thesame, or at least to the same effect, as the evidence adduced in the cause of U.S. vs. Ocampo etal.It is sufficient here to say that the evidence adduced during the trial of the present causeshows, by a large preponderance of the evidence, that said editorial was one of the most

pernicious and malicious libels upon a just, upright and honorable official, which the courtshave ever been called upon to consider. There is not a scintilla of evidence in the entire record,notwithstanding the fact that the defendants from time to time attempted to make a show of

proving the truthfulness of the statements made in said editorial, which in any way reflects

upon the character and high ideals of Mr. Dean C. Worcester, in the administration of hisdepartment of the Government.

With reference to the fifth assignment of error, to wit: That the court erred in holding that thedefendants, Martin Ocampo, Manuel Palma, Arcadio Arellano, Angel Jose, Felipe Barretto,Gregorio M. Cansipit, and Galo Lichauco, were the proprietors of "El Renacimiento," the lowercourt said:


4/22


DAMAGES

Much time was consumed also in adducing evidence to show that none of the twelvedefendants were the owners of "El Renacimiento" and "Muling Pagsilang," but that six ofthem had originally contributed their money as a patriotic donation to the Filipinopeople, and that Martin Ocampo simply held the money and property of the paper astrustee for this people, and that the paper was being devoted exclusively to philanthropicand patriotic ends, and that Galo Lichauco had agreed to contribute to the same ends but

had not done so.

"This proposition," said the lower court, "in the light of the evidence, is so preposterous as toentitle it to little, if any, serious consideration. To ask the court to believe it is tantamount toasking the court to stultify reason and common sense. That those seven defendants namedcontributed their respective sums of money, as shown by the evidence, to the foundation of saidnewspaper in 1901, for their own personal benefit and profit, is fully and unmistakablyestablished. It is equally well established that Martin Ocampo is and was, not only a part owner,

but that he has been and is still the administrator or business manager of said newspaper, andthat the other six persons named are shareholders, part owners and proprietors thereof and

were such on the said 30th of October, 1908."

Examining the evidence adduced during the cause in the lower court, we find, sometime beforethe commencement of the present action and before any question was raised with reference to

who were the owners of the said newspaper, that the defendant, Arcadio Arellano, in the case ofUnited States vs. Jose Sedano (14 Phil. Rep., 338), testified upon that question as follows:

Q. Who are the proprietors of "El Renacimiento"?

A. I, Martin Ocampo, Gregorio Mariano (Cansipit), Mr. Barretto, and Galo Lichauco.

Q. Who else?

A. No one else.

Q. And Rafael Palma is not so?

A. No, sir; Manuel Palma, the brother of Rafael Palma.

During the trial of the present cause, Arcadio Arellano testified that his declarations in othercause were true.

It also appears from the record (Exhibit B-J) that in the month of November, 1907, long beforethe commencement of the present action, "El Renacimiento," in reply to an article which waspublished in "El Comercio," published the following statement:

They (it) say (s) that this enterprise" (evidently meaning the publication of "ElRenacimiento") "is sustained by Federal money; that we are inspired by Federalpersonages. We declare that this, besides being false, is calumnious. The shareholders ofthis company are persons well known by the public, and never at any moment of theirlives have they acted with masks on--those masks for which "El Comercio" seems to haveso great an affection. They are, as the public knows: SeoresMartin Ocampo, Manuel

Palma, Arcadio Arellano, Angel Jose, Galo Lichauco, Felipe Barretto, and GregorioCansipit.


5/22


DAMAGES

Arcadio Arellano also testified during the trial of the present cause that he contributed P750 tothe establishment of "El Renacimiento;" that Martin Ocampo contributed the sum of P500; thatMariano Cansipit, Felipe Barretto and Angel Jose contributed the sum of P250 or P500 each;that Galo Lichauco contributed the sum of P1,000 and that Manuel Palma contributed P3,000.

During the trial of the present cause Arcadio Arellano, Martin Ocampo, and Angel Jose testified

as witnesses, relating to the ownership of the newspaper called "El Renacimiento." They testifiedthat whatever money they gave for the purpose of establishing said newspaper, was given as adonation, and that they were neither the owners nor coowners of said periodical. Thedefendants, Manuel Palma, Galo Lichauco, Felipe Barretto, and Gregorio Cansipit, did nottestify as witnesses during the trial of the cause in the lower court. No reason is given for theirfailure to appear and give testimony in their own behalf. The record does not disclose whether ornot the declarations of Arcadio Arellano, in the case of U. S. vs. Sedano (14 Phil. Rep., 338) atthe time they were made, were called to the attention of Manuel Palma, Galo Lichauco, FelipeBarretto, and Gregorio Cansipit, as well as the reply to "El Comercio," above noted. Proof of saiddeclarations and publication was adduced during the trial of the cause in the present case, andthe attorney of these particular defendants well knew the purpose and effect of such evidence, ifnot disputed; but, notwithstanding the fact that said declarations and publication were

presented in evidence, and notwithstanding the fact that the attorney for the defendants knew ofthe purpose of such proof, the defendants, Palma, Lichauco, Barretto, and Cansipit, were notcalled as witnesses for the purpose of rebutting the same.It is a well settled rule of evidence,that when the circumstances in proof tend to fix the liability on a party who has it in his powerto offer evidence of all the facts as they existed and rebut the inferences which thecircumstances in proof tend to establish, and he fails to offer such proof, the natural conclusionis that the proof, if produced, instead of rebutting would support the inferences against him,and the court is justified in acting upon that conclusion. (Railway Companyvs. Ellis, C. C. A.Reports, vol. 4, p. 454; Commonwealth vs. Webster, 5 Cush. (Mass.), 295; People vs. McWhorter4 Barb. (N. Y.), 438.)

Lord Mansfield, in the case ofBlatch vs. Archer(Cowper, 63, 65) said:

It is certainly a maxim that all the evidence is to be weighed according to the proof whichit was in the power of one side to have produced, and in the power of the other side tohave contradicted.

Mr. Starkey, in his valuable work on evidence (vol. 1, p. 64), lays down the rule that:

The conduct of a party in omitting to produce evidence in elucidation of the subjectmatter in dispute, which is within his power and which rests peculiarly within his ownknowledge, frequently offers occasion for presumptions against him, since it raises thestrong suspicion that such evidence, if adduced, would operate to his prejudice. (PacificCoast et al. Co. vs. Bancroft-Whitney Co., 36 C. C. A. Reports, 136, 153.)

At the time of the said declarations of Arcadio Arellano in the case of Sedano and at the time ofthe said publication in reply to "El Comercio," there was no reason for stating anything exceptthe truth: neither does there seem to have been any reason for publishing the fact that thedefendants were the owners of "El Renacimiento" unless it was true.

At the time there seemed to be no reason to have it appear that they were donors and publicbenefactors only. They seemed to be proud of the fact that they were the owners. The editors,


6/22


DAMAGES

publishers, and managers of "El Renacimiento," at the time the reply to "El Comercio" waspublished, seemed to be anxious to announce to the public who its owners were. It ("ElRenacimiento") had not then realized that it belonged to no one; that it had been born into thecommunity without percentage; that it had been created a terrible machine for the purpose ofdestroying the good character and reputation of men without having any one to respond for itsmalicious damage occasioned to honorable men; that it was a cast-off, without a past or the

hope of a future; that it was liable to be kicked and buffetted about the persecuted and destroyedwithout any one to protect it; that its former friends and creators had scattered hither andthither and had disappeared like feathers before a cyclone, declaring, under oath, that they didnot know their offspring and were not willing to recognize it in public. It seems to have been aMoses found in the bulrushes, destined by its creators to be a great good among the Filipinopeople, in teaching them to respect the rights of persons and property; but, unlike its Biblicalprototype, it became, by reason of its lack of parentage, an engine of destruction let loose in theState, to enter the private abode of lawabiding citizens and to take from them their honor andreputation, which neither it nor the State could restore. To rob a man of his wealth is to rob himof trash, but to take from him his good name and reputation is to rob him of that which does notmake the robber richer and leaves the person robbed poor indeed.

The appellants tried to make it appear that the money which they gave for the establishment of"El Renacimiento" was a pure donation. They claim that it was a donation to the Filipino people.They do not state, however, or attempt to show what particular persons were to manage, control,and direct the enterprise for which the donation was made. A donation must be made to definitepersons or associations. A donation to an indefinite person or association is an anomaly in law,and we do not believe, in view of all of the facts, that it was in fact made. A donation must bemade to some definite person or association and the donee must be some ascertained orascertainable person or association.

A donation may be made for the benefit of the public, but it must be made, in the very nature ofthings, to some definite person or association. A donation made to no person or associationcould not be regarded as a donation in law.It could not be more than an abandonment of

property. Of course where a donation is in fact made, without reservation to a particular personor association, the donor is no longer the owner of the thing donated nor responsible, in any

way, for its use, provided that the object, for which the donation was made, was legal. A persondoes not become an owner or part owner of a church, for example, to the construction of whichhe has made a donation; neither is he responsible for the use to which said edifice may beapplied. No one disputes the fact that donations may be made for the public use, but they must

be made to definite persons or associations, to be administered in accordance with the purposeof the gift.

We can not believe, in the light of the whole record, that the defendants and appellants, at thetime they presented the defense that they were donors simply and not owners, had areasonable hope that their declarations as to said donation, given in the manner alleged, would

be believed by the court.

After a careful examination of the evidence brought to this court and taking into considerationthe failure of the other defendants to testify, we are of the opinion that a preponderance of suchevidence shows that the defendants, Martin Ocampo, Manuel Palma, Arcadio Arellano, AngelJose, Galo Lichauco, Felipe Barretto, and Gregorio M. Cansipit, were the coowners of thenewspaper known as "El Renacimiento," at the time of the publication of the said alleged libel.


7/22


DAMAGES

The appellants discussed the eight and ninth assignments of error together, and claim that thelower court committed an error in rendering a judgment jointly and severally against thedefendants and in allowing an execution against the individual property of said owners, and citeprovisions of the Civil and Commercial Codes in support of their contention. The difficulty in thecontention of the appellants is that they fail to recognize that the basis of the present action is atort. They fail to recognize the universal doctrine that each joint tort feasor is not only

individually liable for the tort in which he participates, but is also jointly liable with his tortfeasors. The defendants might have been sued separately for the commission of the tort. Theymight have been sued jointly and severally, as they were. (Nicoll vs. Glennie, 1 M. & S. (EnglishCommon Law Reports), 558.) If several persons jointly commit a tort, the plaintiff or personinjured, has his election to sue all or some of the parties jointly, or one of them separately,

because the tort is in its nature a separate act of each individual. (1 Chiddey, Common LawPleadings, 86.) It is not necessary that the cooperation should be a direct, corporeal act, for, togive an example, in a case of assault and battery committed by various persons, under thecommon law all are principals. So also is the person who counsels, aids or assists in any way hecommission of a wrong. Under the common law, he who aided or assisted or counseled, in any

way, the commission of a crime, was as much a principal as he who inflicted or committed theactual tort. (Page vs. Freeman, 19 Mo., 421.)

It may be stated as a general rule, that the joint tort feasors are all the persons who command,instigate, promote, encourage, advise, countenance, cooperate in, aid or abet the commission ofa tort, or who approve of it after it is done, if done for their benefit. They are each liable asprincipals, to the same extent and in the same manner as if they had performed the wrongful actthemselves. (Cooley on Torts, 133; Moir vs. Hopkins, 16 Ill., 313 (63 Am. Dec., 312 and note);Berryvs. Fletch, 1st Dill., 67; Smithwickvs. Ward, 7 Jones L. 64; Smith vs. Felt, 50 Barb. (N. Y.),612; Shepard vs. McQuilkin, 2 W. Va., 90; Lewis vs. Johns, 34 Cal., 269.)

Joint tort feasors are jointly and severally liable for the tort which they commit. The personinjured may sue all of them, or any number less than all. Each is liable for the whole damagecaused by all, and all together are jointly liable for the whole damage. It is no defense for one

sued alone, that the others who participated in the wrongful act are not joined with him asdefendants; nor is it any excuse for him that his participation in the tort was insignificant ascompared with that of the others. (Forebrother vs. Ansley, 1 Campbell (English Reports), 343;Pitcher vs. Bailey, 8 East, 171; Booth vs. Hodgson, 6 Term Reports, 405; Vose vs. Grant, 15Mass., 505; Acheson vs. Miller, 18 Ohio, 1; Wallace vs. Miller, 15 La. Ann., 449; Murphyvs.

Wilson, 44 Mo., 313; Bishop vs. Ealey, 9 Johnson (N. Y.), 294.)

Joint tort feasors are not liable pro rata. The damages can not be apportioned among them,except among themselves. They can no insist upon an apportionment, for the purpose of eachpaying an aliquot part. They are jointly and severally liable for the full amount. (Pardrige vs.Brady, 7 Ill. App., 639; Carneyvs. Read, 11 Ind., 417; Lee vs. Black, 27 Ark., 337; Bevins vs.McElroy, 52 Am. Dec., 258.)

A payment in full of the damage done, by one of the joint tort feasors, of course satisfies anyclaim which might exist against the others. There can be but one satisfaction. The release of oneof the joint tort feasors by agreement, generally operates to discharge all. (Wright vs. Lathrop, 2Ohio, 33; Livingston vs. Bishop, 1 Johnson (N.Y.), 290; Brown vs. Marsh, 7 Vt., 327; Ayer vs.

Ashmead, 31 Conn., 447; Eastman vs. Grant, 34 Vt., 387; Turner vs. Hitchcock, 20 Iowa, 310;Ellis vs. Esson, 50 Wis., 149.)


8/22


DAMAGES

Of course the courts during the trial may find that some of the alleged joint tort feasors are liableand that others are not liable. The courts may release some for lack of evidence whilecondemning others of the alleged tort feasors. And this is true even though they are charged

jointly and severally. (Lansing vs. Montgomery, 2 Johnson (N. Y.), 382; Drake vs. Barrymore, 14Johnson, 166; Owens vs. Derby, 3 Ill., 126.)

This same principle is recognized by Act 277 of the Philippine Commission. Section 6 providesthat:

Every author, editor or proprietor . . . is chargeable with the publication of any words inany part . . . or number of each newspaper, as fully as if he were the author of the same.

In our opinion the lower court committed no error in rendering a joint and several judgmentagainst the defendants and allowing an execution against their individual property. Theprovisions of the Civil and Commercial Codes cited by the defendants and appellants have noapplication whatever to the question presented in the present case.

Possessors of Animals

Art. 2183. The possessor of an animal or whoever may make use of the same is responsible forthe damage which it may cause, although it may escape or be lost. This responsibility shall ceaseonly in case the damage should come from force majeure or from the fault of the person who hassuffered damage.

Vestil v Intermediate Appellate Court

Facts: On July 29, 1915, Theness was bitten by a dog while she was playing with a child of thepetitioners in the house of the late Vicente Miranda, the father of Purita Vestil, at F. RamosStreet in Cebu City. She was rushed to the Cebu General Hospital, where she was treated for"multiple lacerated wounds on the forehead" 1 and administered an anti-rabies vaccine by Dr.

Antonio Tautjo. She was discharged after nine days but was readmitted one week later due to"vomiting of saliva." 2 The following day, on August 15, 1975, the child died. The cause of death

was certified as broncho-pneumonia. 3

Seven months later, the Uys sued for damages, alleging that the Vestils were liable to them asthe possessors of "Andoy," the dog that bit and eventually killed their daughter. The Vestilsrejected the charge, insisting that the dog belonged to the deceased Vicente Miranda, that it wasa tame animal, and that in any case no one had witnessed it bite Theness. After trial, Judge JoseR. Ramolete of the Court of First Instance of Cebu sustained the defendants and dismissed thecomplaint. 4

The respondent court arrived at a different conclusion when the case was appealed. 5 It foundthat the Vestils were in possession of the house and the dog and so should be responsible under

Article 2183 of the Civil Code for the injuries caused by the dog. It also held that the child haddied as a result of the dog bites and not for causes independent thereof as submitted by theappellees. Accordingly, the Vestils were ordered to pay the Uys damages in the amount ofP30,000.00 for the death of Theness, P12,000.00 for medical and hospitalization expenses, andP2,000.00 as attorney's fees.


9/22


DAMAGES

Issue: WON Purita Vestil should be sustained in her argument that she is not the owner of thehouse or of the dog left by her father as his estate has not yet been partitioned and there areother heirs to the property and hence, not liable for the act of the dog

Held/Ratio: No. InAfialda v. Hisole, a person hired as caretaker of a carabao gored him todeath and his heirs thereupon sued the owner of the animal for damages. The complaint was

dismissed on the ground that it was the caretaker's duty to prevent the carabao from causinginjury to anyone, including himself.

Purita Vestil's testimony that she was not in possession of Miranda's house is hardly credible.She said that the occupants of the house left by her father were related to him ("one way or theother") and maintained themselves out of a common fund or by some kind of arrangement (on

which, however, she did not elaborate ). 7She mentioned as many as ten of such relatives whohad stayed in the house at one time or another although they did not appear to be close kin. 8

She at least implied that they did not pay any rent, presumably because of their relation withVicente Miranda notwithstanding that she herself did not seem to know them very well.

There is contrary evidence that the occupants of the house, were boarders (or more of boarders

than relatives) who paid the petitioners for providing them with meals and accommodations. Italso appears that Purita Vestil had hired a maid, Dolores Jumao-as, who did the cooking andcleaning in the said house for its occupants. 9 Her mother, Pacita, who was a nursemaid ofPurita herself, categorically declared that the petitioners were maintaining boarders in the house

where Theness was bitten by a dog. 10 Another witness, Marcial Lao, testified that he was indeeda boarder and that the Vestils were maintaining the house for business purposes. 11 Andalthough Purita denied paying the water bills for the house, the private respondents submitteddocumentary evidence of her application for water connection with the Cebu Water District,

which strongly suggested that she was administering the house in question. 12

While it is true that she is not really the owner of the house, which was still part of VicenteMiranda's estate, there is no doubt that she and her husband were its possessors at the time of

the incident in question. She was the only heir residing in Cebu City and the most logical personto take care of the property, which was only six kilometers from her own house. 13 Moreover,there is evidence showing that she and her family regularly went to the house, once or twice

weekly, according to at least one witness, 14 and used it virtually as a second house. Interestingly,her own daughter was playing in the house with Theness when the little girl was bitten by thedog. 15 The dog itself remained in the house even after the death of Vicente Miranda in 1973 anduntil 1975, when the incident in question occurred.

The petitioners also argue that even assuming that they were the possessors of the dog that bitTheness there was no clear showing that she died as a result thereof. On the contrary, the deathcertificate 17declared that she died of broncho-pneumonia, which had nothing to do with the dog

bites for which she had been previously hospitalized. The Court need not involve itself in an

extended scientific discussion of the causal connection between the dog bites and the certifiedcause of death except to note that, first, Theness developed hydrophobia, a symptom of rabies,as a result of the dog bites, and second, that asphyxia broncho-pneumonia, which ultimatelycaused her death, was a complication of rabies.

On the strength of the foregoing testimony, the Court finds that the link between the dog bitesand the certified cause of death has beep satisfactorily established. We also reiterate our rulinginSison v. Sun Life Assurance Company of Canada,20 that the death certificate is notconclusive proof of the cause of death but only of the fact of death. Indeed, the evidence of the


10/22


DAMAGES

child's hydrophobia is sufficient to convince us that she died because she was bitten by the dogeven if the death certificate stated a different cause of death. The petitioner's contention thatthey could not be expected to exercise remote control of the dog is not acceptable. In fact, Article2183 of the Civil Code holds the possessor liable even if the animal should "escape or be lost"and so be removed from his control. And it does not matter either that, as the petitioners alsocontend, the dog was tame and was merely provoked by the child into biting her. The law does

not speak only of vicious animals but covers even tame ones as long as they cause injury. As forthe alleged provocation, the petitioners forget that Theness was only three years old at the timeshe was attacked and can hardly be faulted for whatever she might have done to the animal.

Owner of Motor Vehicles

Art. 2184. In motor vehicle mishaps, the owner is solidarily liable with his driver, if the former,who was in the vehicle, could have, by the use of the due diligence, prevented the misfortune. Itis disputably presumed that a driver was negligent, if he had been found guilty or recklessdriving or violating traffic regulations at least twice within the next preceding two months.

If the owner was not in the motor vehicle, the provisions of Article 2180 are applicable.

Chapman v Underwood

Facts: At the time the accident occurred, which is the basis of this action, there was a single-track street-car line running along Calle Herran, with occasional switches to allow cars to meetand pass each other. One of these switches was located at the scene of the accident.

Chapman, the plaintiff, had been visiting his friend, a man by the name of Creveling, in front ofwhose house the accident happened. He desired to board a certain "San Marcelino" car comingfrom Santa Ana and bound for Manila. Being told by Creveling that the car was approaching, heimmediately, and somewhat hurriedly, passed from the gate into the street for the purpose ofsignaling and boarding the car. The car was a closed one, the entrance being from the front or

the rear flatform. Plaintiff attempted to board the front platform but, seeing that he could notreached it without extra exertion, stopped beside the car, facing toward the rear platform, and

waited for it to come abreast of him in order to board. While in this position he was struck frombehind and run over by the defendant's automobile.

The defendant, Underwood, entered Calle Herran at Calle Peafrancia in his automobile drivenby his chauffeur, a competent driver. A street car bound from Manila to Santa Ana beingimmediately in front of him, he followed along behind it. Just before reaching the scene of theaccident the street car which was following took the switch that is, went off the main line tothe left upon the switch lying alongside of the main track. Thereupon the defendant no longerfollowed that the street car nor went to the left, but either kept straight ahead on the mainstreet-car track or a bit to the right. The car which the plaintiff intended to board was on the

main line and bound in an opposite direction to that in which the defendant was going. Whenthe front of the "San Marcelino" car, the one the plaintiff attempted to board, was almost infront of the defendant's automobile, defendant's driver suddenly went to the right and struckand ran over the plaintiff, as above described.

The judgment of the trial court was for defendant.

Issue: WON Underwood should be liable for the act of his driver during the accident


11/22


DAMAGES

Held: No. A careful examination of the record leads to the conclusion that the defendant's driverwas guilty of negligence in running upon and over the plaintiff. He was passing an oncoming carupon the wrong side. The plaintiff, in common out to board the car, was not obliged, for his ownprotection, to observe whether a car was coming upon him from his left hand. He had only toguard against those coming from the right. He knew that, according to the law of the road, noautomobile or other vehicle coming from his left should pass upon his side of the car. He needed

only to watch for cars coming from his right, as they were the only ones under the law permittedto pass upon that side of the street car.

The defendant, however, is not responsible for the negligence of his driver, under the facts andcircumstances of this case.

Although in Johnson vs. David the owner of the vehicle was not present at the time the allegednegligent acts were committed by the driver, the same rule applies where the owner is present,unless the negligent act of the driver are continued for such a length of time as to give the ownera reasonable opportunity to observe them and to direct his driver to desist therefrom. An owner

who sits in his automobile, or other vehicle, and permits his driver to continue in a violation ofthe law by the performance of negligent acts, after he has had a reasonable opportunity to

observe them and to direct that the driver cease therefrom, becomes himself responsible forsuch acts. The owner of an automobile who permits his chauffeur to drive up to Escolta, forexample, at a speed of 60 miles an hour, without any effort to stop him, although he has had areasonable opportunity to do so, becomes himself responsible, both criminally and civilly, forthe results produced by the acts of his chauffeur. On the other hand, if the driver, by a suddenact of negligence, and without the owner having a reasonable opportunity to prevent the acts orits continuance, injures a person or violates the criminal law, the owner of the automobile,although present therein at the time the act was committed, is not responsible, either civilly orcriminally, therefor. The act complained of must be continued in the presence of the owner forsuch a length a time that the owner, by his acquiescence, makes his driver's act his own.

In the case before us it does not appear from the record that, from the time the automobile took

the wrong side of the road to the commission of the injury, sufficient time intervened to give thedefendant an opportunity to correct the act of his driver. Instead, it appears with fair clearnessthat the interval between the turning out to meet and pass the street car and the happening ofthe accident was so small as not to be sufficient to charge defendant with the negligence of thedriver.

Caedo v Yu Khe Thai

FACTS: Caedo and family were traveling Highway 54 on the way to the airport. Privaterespondents were traveling on the opposite direction. Bernardo was the personal river of Yu.Both vehicles were running at moderate speeds when a carritela was traveling the samedirection as Bernardos. The latter overtook the caritella and took the lane Caedos were traveling

and caused multiple injuries and damage to the Caedos. Bernardo was held liable.

ISSUE: Whether or not the owner of the vehicle who was riding with the driver at the time of theaccident be held solidarily liable.

RULING: The court ruled that if the causative factor was the drivers negligence, the owner ofthe vehicle who was present is likewise held liable if he could have prevented the mishap by theexistence of due diligence. The basis of the master's liability in civil law is not respondentsuperior but rather the relationship of paterfamilias. The theory is that ultimately the negligence


12/22


DAMAGES

of the servant, if known to the master and susceptible of timely correction by him, reflects hisown negligence if he fails to correct it in order to prevent injury or damage.

Provinces, Cities, Municipalities

Art. 2189. Provinces, cities and municipalities shall be liable for damages for the death of, orinjuries suffered by, any person by reason of the defective condition of roads, streets, bridges,public buildings, and other public works under their control or supervision.

Guilatco v Dagupan

FACTS: Guilatco, (Court Interpreter) was about to board a tricycle at a sidewalk when at PerezBlvd when she accidentally fell into a manhole causing her right leg to be fractured. Perez Blvd isa National Road under the control and supervision of City of Dagupan.Such manhole is partially covered by a flowerpot leaving a gaping hole about 2 ft long and 1feet wide. She was hospitalized, operated on and confined. She had been deprived of income.She sued for damages. The lower court ruled in her favor; hence, this petition.

The city contends that Perez Boulevard, where the fatal drainage hole is located, is a nationalroad that is not under the control or supervision of the City of Dagupan. Hence, no liabilityshould attach to the city. It submits that it is actually the Ministry of Public Highways that hascontrol or supervision through the Highway Engineer which, by mere coincidence, is heldconcurrently by the same person who is also the City Engineer of Dagupan.

ISSUE: WON Control or supervision over a national road by the City of Dagupan exists whichmakes City liable under Art 2189

HELD: Yes.

RATIO: Art 2189 says : Provinces, cities and municipalities shall be liable for damages for thedeath of, or injuries, suffered by, any person by reason of the defective conditions of roads,streets, bridges, public buildings, and other public works, under their control and supervision.Thus, it is not even necessary that such defective road or street belongs to the City.In the case at bar, the control and supervision of the national road exists and is provided for inthe charter of Dagupan. It provided that the laying out, construction and improvement ofstreets, avenues and alleys and sidewalks, and regulation of the use thereof, may be legislated bythe Municipal Board. Such control and supervision is exercised through the City EngineerTangco, who aside from his official capacity as City Engineer, was also Ex Officio HighwayEngineer, Ex Officio City Engineer of Bureau of Public Works, and Building Official and receivedcompensation for these functions. The function of supervision over streets, public buildings andpublic works, pertaining through the City Engineer is coursed through a Maintenance Foremanand a Maintenance Engineer. Although these two officials are employees of the Natl Govt, theyare detailed with the City of Dagupan and hence receive instruction and supervision from thecity through the City Engineer. Hence the City is liable.

Quezon City v Dacara

Facts: Sometime on February 28, 1988 at about 1:00 A.M., Fulgencio Dacara, Jr., son ofFulgencio P. Dacara, Sr. and owner of '87 Toyota Corolla 4-door Sedan with Plate No. 877 (sic),

while driving the said vehicle, rammed into a pile of earth/street diggings found at Matahimik


13/22


DAMAGES

St., Quezon City, which was then being repaired by the Quezon City government. As a result,Dacarra (sic), Jr. allegedly sustained bodily injuries and the vehicle suffered extensive damagefor it turned turtle when it hit the pile of earth. Indemnification was sought from the citygovernment, which however, yielded negative results. Consequently, Fulgencio P. DacaraComplaint for damages against the Quezon City and Engr. Ramir Tiamzon.

Defendants admitted the occurrence of the incident but alleged that the subject diggings wasprovided with a moun[d] of soil and barricaded with reflectorized traffic paint with sticks placed

before or after it which was visible during the incident on February 28, 1988 at 1:00 A.M. Inshort, defendants claimed that they exercised due care by providing the area of the diggings allnecessary measures to avoid accident. Hence, the reason why Fulgencio Dacara, Jr. fell into thediggings was precisely because of the latter's negligence and failure to exercise due care."

After trial on the merits, the RTC found that the evidence proffered by the complainant (hereinrespondent) was found to be sufficient proof of the negligence of herein petitioners.

The CA agreed with the RTC's finding that petitioners' negligence was the proximate cause of thedamage suffered by respondent. Noting the failure of petitioners to present evidence to support

their contention that precautionary measures had indeed been observed, it ruled thus:

"x x x. Sadly, the evidence indicates that [petitioners] failedto show that they placed sufficientand adequate precautionary signs at Matahimik Street to minimize or prevent the dangers to lifeand limb under the circumstances. Contrary to the testimony of the witnesses for the[petitioners], namely Engr. Ramir Tiamzon, Ernesto Landrito and Eduardo Castillo, that there

were signs, gasera which was buried so that its light could not be blown off by the wind andbarricade, none was ever presented to stress and prove the sufficiency and adequacy of saidcontention."10

Further upholding the trial court's finding of negligence on the part of herein petitioners, the CAgave this opinion:

"x x x. As observed by the trial court, the negligence of [petitioners] was clear based on theinvestigation report of Pfc. William P. Villafranca stating to the effect 'that the subject vehiclerammed into a pile of earth from a deep excavation thereat without any warning devi[c]e

whatsoever and as a consequence thereof, Dacara, Jr. lost control of his driven car and finallyturned-turtle causing substantial damage to the same.' As a defense against liability on the basisof quasi-delict, one must have exercised the diligence of a good father of a family which[petitioners] failed to establish in the instant case."11

Whether Article 2189 is applicable to cases in which there has been no death or physical injury,the CA ruled in the affirmative:

"x x x. More importantly, we find it illogical to limit the liability to death or personal injury onlyas argued by appellants in the case at bar applying the foregoing provisions. For, injury is an actthat damages, harms or hurts and mean in common as the act or result of inflicting on a personor thing something that causes loss, pain, distress, or impairment. Injury is the mostcomprehensive, applying to an act or result involving an impairment or destruction of right,health, freedom, soundness, or loss of something of value."12

Issue: WON Quezon City must be held liable on the ground of negligence
http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2005/jun2005/gr_150304_2005.html#fnt10http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2005/jun2005/gr_150304_2005.html#fnt11http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2005/jun2005/gr_150304_2005.html#fnt12http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2005/jun2005/gr_150304_2005.html#fnt10http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2005/jun2005/gr_150304_2005.html#fnt11http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2005/jun2005/gr_150304_2005.html#fnt12


14/22


DAMAGES

Held/Ratio: Yes. That the negligence of petitioners was the proximate cause of the accident wasaptly discussed in the lower court's finding, which we quote:

Facts obtaining in this case are crystal clear that the accident of February 28, 1988 whichcaused almost the life and limb of Fulgencio Dacara, Jr. when his car turned turtle was theexistence of a pile of earth from a digging done relative to the base failure at Matahimik Street

nary a lighting device or a reflectorized barricade or sign perhaps which could have served as anadequate warning to motorist especially during the thick of the night where darkness ispervasive.

"Contrary to the testimony of the witnesses for the defense that there were signs, gasera whichwas buried so that its light could not be blown off by the wind and barricade, none was everpresented to stress the point that sufficient and adequate precautionary signs were placed atMatahimik Street. If indeed signs were placed thereat, how then could it be explained thataccording to the report even of the policeman which for clarity is quoted again, nonewas foundat the scene of the accident.

x x x x x x x x x

"Negligence of a person whether natural or juridical over a particular set of events is transfixedby the attending circumstances so that the greater the danger known or reasonably anticipated,the greater is the degree of care required to be observed.

x x x x x x x x x

"The provisions of Article 2189 of the New Civil Code capsulizes the responsibility of the citygovernment relative to the maintenance of roads and bridges since it exercises the control andsupervision over the same. Failure of the defendant to comply with the statutory provision foundin the subject-article is tantamount to negligence per se which renders the City governmentliable. Harsh application of the law ensues as a result thereof but the state assumed theresponsibility for the maintenance and repair of the roads and bridges and neither exception norexculpation from liability would deem just and equitable."20 (Emphasis supplied)

Petitioners belatedly point out that Fulgencio Jr. was driving at the speed of 60 kilometers perhour (kph) when he met the accident. This speed was allegedly well above the maximum limit of30 kph allowed on "city streets with light traffic, when not designated 'through streets,'" asprovided under the Land Transportation and Traffic Code (Republic Act 4136). Thus, petitionersassert that Fulgencio Jr., having violated a traffic regulation, should be presumed negligentpursuant to Article 218521 of the Civil Code.22

These matters were, however, not raised by petitioners at any time during the trial. It is evidentfrom the records that they brought up for the first time the matter of violation of RA 4136 intheir Motion for Reconsideration23of the CA Decision dated February 21, 2001. It is too late inthe day for them to raise this new issue. It is well-settled that points of law, theories orarguments not brought out in the original proceedings cannot be considered on review orappeal.24To consider their belatedly raised arguments at this stage of the proceedings wouldtrample on the basic principles of fair play, justice, and due process.

Proprietors of Buildings
http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2005/jun2005/gr_150304_2005.html#fnt20http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2005/jun2005/gr_150304_2005.html#fnt21http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2005/jun2005/gr_150304_2005.html#fnt22http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2005/jun2005/gr_150304_2005.html#fnt23http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2005/jun2005/gr_150304_2005.html#fnt23http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2005/jun2005/gr_150304_2005.html#fnt24http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2005/jun2005/gr_150304_2005.html#fnt24http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2005/jun2005/gr_150304_2005.html#fnt20http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2005/jun2005/gr_150304_2005.html#fnt21http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2005/jun2005/gr_150304_2005.html#fnt22http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2005/jun2005/gr_150304_2005.html#fnt23http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2005/jun2005/gr_150304_2005.html#fnt24


15/22


DAMAGES

Art. 2190. The proprietor of a building or structure is responsible for the damages resultingfrom its total or partial collapse, if it should be due to the lack of necessary repairs.

Art. 2191. Proprietors shall also be responsible for damages caused:

(1) By the explosion of machinery which has not been taken care of with due diligence, andthe inflammation of explosive substances which have not been kept in a safe andadequate place;

(2) By excessive smoke, which may be harmful to persons or property;(3) By the falling of trees situated at or near highways or lanes, if not caused by force

majeure;(4) By emanations from tubes, canals, sewers or deposits of infectious matter, constructed

without precautions suitable to the place.

Art. 2192. If damage referred to in the two preceding articles should be the result of any defectin the construction mentioned in Article 1723, the third person suffering damages may proceedonly against the engineer or architect or contractor in accordance with said article, within theperiod therein fixed.

Engineer/Architect of Collapsed Building

Art. 1723. The engineer or architect who drew up the plans and specifications for a building isliable for damages if within fifteen years from the completion of the structure, the same shouldcollapse by reason of a defect in those plans and specifications, or due to the defects in theground. The contractor is likewise responsible for the damages if the edifice falls, within thesame period, on account of defects in the construction or the use of materials of inferior qualityfurnished by him, or due to any violation of the terms of the contract. If the engineer or architectsupervises the construction, he shall be solidarily liable with the contractor.

Acceptance of the building, after completion, does not imply waiver of any of the cause of actionby reason of any defect mentioned in the preceding paragraph.

The action must be brought within ten years following the collapse of the building.

Head of a Family for Things Thrown/Falling

Art. 2193. The head of a family that lives in a building or a part thereof, is responsible fordamages caused by things thrown or falling from the same.

Dingcong v Kanaan

Facts: Dingcong brothers are co-lessees in the upper floor of the house owned by Saenz Brothers established the central hotel in the building where they were the managers A guest, Echivarria, occupied room 10 of the hotel for P30 per month Kanaans occupied the lower floor of the hotel where they established a bazaar Echivarria let his faucet leak while the pipes of the hotel were undergoing repairs A bucket was placed underneath the leaking faucet to catch the dripping water th e bucket overflowed


16/22


DAMAGES

Water seeped through the floor the merchandise in the bazaar below got wet and damagedworth around P1T Kanaans brought an action for damages against the managers (brothers Dingcong) andEchivarria (person who let the faucet leak) CFI absolved the deceased Dingcong brothe r only but held Echivarria liable CA reversed holding Dingcong liable for the damages

Issue: WON the manager can be held liable

Held: YES

Ratio: Dingcong, as a co-lessee and manager of the hotel has to answer for the damage caused bythings that thrown or falling from the hotel (Art. 1910 of the Codigo Civil) Echivarria was a guest of the hotel and was the direct cause of the damage But Dingcong did NOT exercise the diligence of a good father of the family He knew that the pipes of the hotel were under repair, presumed that the guest Echivarria

would use the faucet, but only provided a bucket to deal with the problem of the leaks

Judgment Affirmed.

Owners of Enterprises/Other Employers

Art. 1711. Owners of enterprises and other employers are obliged to pay compensation for thedeath of or injuries to their laborers, workmen, mechanics or other employees, even though theevent may have been purely accidental or entirely due to a fortuitous cause, if the death orpersonal injury arose out of and in the course of the employment. The employer is also liable forcompensation if the employee contracts any illness or disease caused by such employment or asthe result of the nature of the employment. If the mishap was due to the employee's ownnotorious negligence, or voluntary act, or drunkenness, the employer shall not be liable for

compensation. When the employee's lack of due care contributed to his death or injury, thecompensation shall be equitably reduced.

Art. 1712. If the death or injury is due to the negligence of a fellow worker, the latter and theemployer shall be solidarily liable for compensation. If a fellow worker's intentional maliciousact is the only cause of the death or injury, the employer shall not be answerable, unless itshould be shown that the latter did not exercise due diligence in the selection or supervision ofthe plaintiff's fellow worker.

Afable v Singer Sewing Machine

Facts: Leopoldo Madlangbayan was a collector for the Singer Sewing Machine Company in thedistrict of San Francisco del Monte, outside of the limits of the City of Manila, and he wassupposed to be residing in his district according to the records of the company. Hiscompensation was a commission of eight per cent of all collections made by him. On theafternoon of Sunday, November 16, 1930, Leopoldo Madlangbayan while riding a bicycle wasrun over and fatally injured at the corner of O'Donnel and Zurbaran streets in the City of Manila

by a truck driven by Vitaliano Sumoay. It appears that Madlangbayan had moved to TeodoraAlonso Street in Manila without notifying the company, and that at the time of his death he wasreturning home after making some collections in San Francisco del Monte. According to the


17/22


DAMAGES

practice of the company, if collectors made collections on Sunday they were required to deliverthe amount collected to the company the next morning.

On November 21, 1930, Vitaliano Sumoay, the driver of the truck within caused the death ofLeopoldo Madlangbayan, was convicted for the crime of homicide through reckless negligence,and was sentenced to imprisonment for one year and one day, and to indemnify the heirs of

Leopoldo Madlangbayan in the sum of P1,000.

On February 19, 1931, the widow and children of Leopoldo Madlangbayan brought the presentaction to recover from the defendant corporation under Act No. 3428, as amended by Act. No.3812, P100 for burial expenses and P1,745.12 for compensation. Plaintiffs' complaint wassubsequently amended, and they sought to recover under sections 8 and 10 of Act No. 3428 fiftyper cent of P16.78 for 208 weeks of P1,745.12 plus P100 for burial expenses.Issue: WON Singer is liable for expenses incurred by Afable

Held/Ratio: No. The accident which caused the death of the employee was not due to and inpursuance of his employment. At the time that he was over by the truck Leopoldo Madlangbayan

was not in the pursuance of his employment with the defendant corporation, but was on his wayhome after he had finished his work for the day and had left the territory where he wasauthorized to take collections for the defendant. The employer is not an insurer "against allaccidental injuries which might happen to an employee while in the course of the employment",and as a general rule an employee is not entitled to recover from personal injuries resulting froman accident that befalls him while going to or returning from his place of employment, becausesuch an accident does no arise out of and in the course of his employment.

The words "arising out of" refer to the origin or cause of the accident, and are descriptiveof its character, while the words "in the course of" refer to the time, place, andcircumstances under which the accident takes place. By the use of these words it was not

the intention of the legislature to make the employer an insurer against all accidentalinjuries which might happen to an employee while in the course of the employment, butonly for such injuries arising from or growing out of the risks peculiar to the nature ofthe work in the scope of the workman's employment of incidental to such employment,and accidents in which it is possible to trace the injury to some risk or hazard to whichthe employee is exposed in a special degree by reason of such employment. Risks to

which all persons similarly situated are equally exposed and not traceable in somespecial degree to the particular employment are excluded.

Although some courts have held otherwise, we think the better rule is as we have stated it. Wedo not of course mean to imply that an employee can never recover for injuries suffered while ofhis way to or from work. That depends on the nature of his employment. In the case at bar, if the

deceased had been killed while going from house to house in San Francisco del Monte in thepursuance of his employment, the plaintiffs would undoubtedly have the right, prima facie, torecover.

In the case at bar the deceased was going from work in his own conveyance.

An employee quit work, mounted his motorcycle and started for home. When riding downthe street he collided with an automobile driven by another employee. He sustained injuries

which resulted in his death. In holding that the accident did not arise out of in the course of


18/22


DAMAGES

the employment, the court said: "To come within the term "injury received in the course ofemployment " it must be shown that the injury originated in the work, and, further, that it

was received the employee while engaged in or about the furtherance of the affairs of theemployer. If it be conceded that the injury originated in the work, it would still be necessary,in our opinion, to show that the employee was engaged in the furtherance of his employer's

business."

Furthermore, it appears that the deceased had never notified the defendant corporation of hisremoval from San Francisco del Monte of Manila, and that the company did not know that he

was living in Manila on the day of the accident; that the defendant company did not require itsemployees to work on Sunday, or furnish or require its agents to use bicycles. These areadditional reasons for holding that the accident was not due to and pursuance of theemployment of the deceased. If the deceased saw fit to change his residence from San Franciscodel Monte to Manila and to make use a bicycle in going back and forth, he did so at his own risk,as the defendant company did not furnish him a bicycle or require him to use one; and if hemade collections on Sunday, he did not do so in pursuance of his employment, and his employeris not liable for any injury sustained by him.

Alarcon v Alarcon

Facts: On June 3, 1955 the defendant hired Urzino Azaa and his brother to dig a well on hisland in Caramoan, Camarines Sur. After the day's work the two had dug a hole about five feetmeters deep without striking water.

On the next day Urzino resumed his work with one Generoso Zulueta as co-worker. Generosowas also hired by the defendant in place of Urzino's brother who did not return to work.

Urzino and Generoso started their work early in the morning. Urzino was lowered into the holewith a rope to dig deeper. On reaching the bottom he quickly remarked that he was not feelingwell. Generoso told him to get ready to be pulled up, but a moment later Urzino fainted and

slumped helplessly into a sitting position.

Generoso quickly called for help. A policeman and other persons immediately responded. Aftertheir arrival Generoso lowered a ladder and proceeded to descend into the hole. After havinggone down about two meters, he felt a current of hot air with an obnoxious odor around him. Hesoon realized that he was not feeling well. Accordingly, he desisted from descending farther andinstead he climbed up out of the hole. One of the men then volunteered to go down in his place,

but he too could not reach the bottom for the same reason.

Realizing that it was not safe to go into the hole, Generoso and others thought of anothermethod to get Urzino out. With a rope tied into a loop on one end, they caught one of his legsand pulled up his body. They next put him on bed while someone summoned a doctor. In lessthan five minutes the municipal health officer arrived. He quickly attempted to revive Urzino

but his efforts proved unavailing because he was already dead. He certified that Urzino died ofasphyxia. On the day of his death Urzino was single, 20 years old, and living with his mother

who is the plaintiff. She filed this action to recover compensation for her son's death under theprovisions of Art. 1711 of the Civil Code.

Issue: whether the defendant falls under the provisions of said Article 1711


19/22


DAMAGES

Held/Ratio: No. Art. 1171 provides that owners of enterprises and other employers are obliged topay compensation for the death of or injuries to their laborers, workmen, mechanics or otheremployees, even though the event may have been purely accidental or entirely due to afortuitous cause, if the death or personal injury arose out of and in the course of theemployment. The employer is also liable for compensation if the employee contracts any illnessor disease caused by such employment or as the result of the nature of the employment. If the

mishap was due to the employee's own notorious negligence, or voluntary act, or drunkenness,the employer shall not be liable for compensation. When the employee's lack of due carecontributed to his death or injury, the compensation shall be equitably reduced.

Defendant herein does not own any enterprise. He is merely a school teacher who needed a well.Neither does he fall under the category of "other employers" mentioned in said Article 1711.Under the principle of ejusdem generis, said "other employers" must be construed to refer topersons who belong to a class analogous to "owners of enterprises", such as those operating a

business or engaged in a particular industry or trade, requiring its managers to contract theservices of laborers, workers and/or employees.

As His Honor, the trial Judge had correctly observed the terms "capital", "management",

"industrialist", "manager" and "owners of enterprises", used to describe the employers alludedto in said section 2, indicate that they contemplate those engaged more or less in business orindustry. In fact, the aforementioned Article 1711 merely states the philosophy underlying the

Workmen's Compensation Act (Act No. 3428) and must be interpreted in relation thereto, forArticle 2196 of the same Code provides that "compensation for workmen and other employees incase of death, injury or illness is regulated by special laws". Pursuant to section 39(b) of Act No.3428, as amended: Laborer' is used as a synonym of 'Employee' and means every person whohas entered the employment of, or works under a service or apprenticeship contract for anemployer. It does not include a person whose employment is purely casual and is not for thepurposes of the occupation or business of the employer. . .

Inasmuch as the employment of Urzino Azaa by defendant herein was "purely casual" and was

not "for the purposes of the occupation or business" of said defendant, it is clear to us thatUrzino Azaa is not covered by the provisions of the Workmen's Compensation Act. Neithermay plaintiff herein avail of the benefits of the Employer's Liability Act (Act No. 1874), whichshe does not invoke, for it is not claimed that Urzino's death was due to "a defect in thecondition of the ways, works or machinery connected with or used in the business of theemployer," or to "the negligence of a person in the service of the employer." Hence, there is nomeans by which defendant herein may be held liable for Azaa's death, due to an accidentalcause or fortuitous event.

Manufacturers/Producers

Art. 2187. Manufacturers and processors of foodstuffs, drinks, toilet articles and similar goodsshall be liable for death or injuries caused by any noxious or harmful substances used, althoughno contractual relation exists between them and the consumers.

Art. 1170. Those who in the performance of their obligations are guilty of fraud, negligence, ordelay, and those who in any manner contravene the tenor thereof, are liable for damages.

Art. 1171. Responsibility arising from fraud is demandable in all obligations. Any waiver of anaction for future fraud is void.


20/22


DAMAGES

Art. 1172. Responsibility arising from negligence in the performance of every kind of obligationis also demandable, but such liability may be regulated by the courts, according to thecircumstances.

RA 7394The Consumer Act of the Philippines

ARTICLE 97. Liability for the Defective Products - Liability for the Defective Products. AnyFilipino or foreign manufacturer, producer, and any importer, shall be liable for redress,independently of fault, for damages caused to consumers by defects resulting from design,manufacturer, construction, assembly and erection formulas and handling and making up,presentation or packing of their products, as well as for the insufficient or inadequateinformation on the use and hazards thereof.

A product is defective when it does not offer the safety rightfully expected of it, taking relevantcircumstances into consideration, including but not limited to:

a) presentation of product;b) use and hazards reasonably expected of it;

c) the time it was put into circulation.

A product is not considered defective because another better quality product has been placed inthe market.

The manufacturer, builder, producer or importer shall not be held liable when its evidences:

a) that it did not place the product on the market;b) that although it did place the product on the market such product has no defect ;c) that the consumer or third party is solely at fault.

ARTICLE 99. Liability Defective Services - The service supplier is liable for redress,

independently of fault, for damages caused to consumers by defects relating to the rendering ofthe services, as well as for insufficient or inadequate information on the fruition and hazardsthereof.

The service is defective when it does not provide the safety the consumer may rightfully expectof it, taking the relevant circumstances into consideration, including but not limited to:

a) manner in which it is provided.b) the result of hazards which may reasonably be expected of it;c) the time when it was provided.

A service is not considered defective because of the use or introduction of new techniques.

The supplier of the services shall not be held liable when it is proven:

a) that there is no defect in the service rendered;b) that the consumer or third party is solely at fault

ARTICLE 106. Prohibition in Contractual Stipulation - The stipulation in a contract of a clausepreventing, exonerating or reducing the obligation to indemnify for damages effected, asprovided for in this and in preceding Articles, is hereby prohibited, if there is more than one


21/22


DAMAGES

person responsible for the cause of the damage, they shall be jointly liable for the redressestablished in the pertinent provisions of this Act. However, if the damage is caused by acomponent or part incorporated in the product or service, its manufacturer, builder or importerand the person who incorporated the component or part are jointly liable.

RA 9803The Food Donation Act

AN ACT TO ENCOURAGE THE DONATION OF FOOD FOR CHARITABLE PURPOSES

Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the Philippines in Congressassembled:

SECTION 1.Short Title. - This Act shall be known as the "Food Donation Act of 2009",

SEC, 2.Declaration of Policy, - It is the policy of the State to alleviate national poverty andreduce food wastage.

As such, the State shall implement measures to encourage the donation of apparently

wholesome food for charitable purposes.

SEC. 3.Definition of Terms. - For purposes of this Act, the following terms shall be defined asfollows:

a) "Apparently Wholesome Food" refers to food that meets all quality and labelingstandards imposed by pertinent laws and administrative regulations even though thefood may not be readily marketable due to appearance. age. freshness, grade, size,surplus, or other conditions. It does not include milk products as defined and coveredunder Executive Order No. 51, the "National Code of Marketing of BreastmilkSubstitutes, Breastmilk Supplements and Other Related Products",

(b) "Donate" is to dispose of an apparently wholesome food in favor of another. It

includes giving by one person to another person of an apparently wholesome food fordistribution, notwithstanding that the former has charged a nominal fee from the latter,if the ultimate beneficiary is not required to give anything of monetary value.

(c) "Food" refers to any raw, cooked, processed, or prepared edible substance, ice,beverage, or ingredient used or intended for use in whole or in part for humanconsumption.

(d) "Gross Negligence" refers to voluntary and conscious conduct, including a failure toact, by a person who, at the time of the conduct, knew that the conduct was likely to beharmful to the health or well-being of another person.

(e) "Intentional Misconduct" refers to conduct by a person with knowledge at the time of

the conduct that the conduct is harmful to the health 01' well-being of another person.

(f) "Charitable Purposes" refers to philanthrophic, humanitarian and non-profitobjectives, including the benefit of the needy, poor, sick, prisoners, orphans, etc.

SEC. 4. Coordinating Mechanism. - To ensure effective and sustained inter-agency and multi-sectoral coordination, the Department of Social Welfare and Development (DSWD) shall serveas the main coordinating agency together with the Philippine National Red Cross as auxiliary forthe implementation of this Act.


22/22


DAMAGES

SEC. 5.Liability for Damagesfrom Donated Food. A person, whether natural or juridical,shall not be subject to civil or criminal liability arising from the nature, age, packaging, orcondition of apparently wholesome food that a person donates in good faith for charitablepurposes. This shall not apply, however, to an injury or death of an ultimate beneficiary of thedonated food that results from an act or omission of a person constituting gross negligence or

intentional misconduct.

SEC. 6.Implementing Rules and Regulations. The DSWD, in coordination with theDepartment of Health (DOH) and its attached agencies, the Bureau of Food and Drugs(BFAD) and the National Nutrition Council (NNC); the National Disaster Coordinating Council(NDCC); theUnion of Local Authorities of the Philippines (ULAP); other relevant governmentagencies, nongovernment organizations includingthe Philippine National Red Cross and privateentities shall formulate and issue the necessary rules and regulations for the implementation ofthis Act within ninety (90) days after the effectivity of this Act.

SEC. 7.Repealing Clause. - Any law, presidential decree or issuance, executive order, letter ofinstruction, rule orregulation inconsistent with the provisions of this Act is hereby repealed or

modified accordingly.

SEC. 8.Separability Clause. - If any portion 0" provision of this Act is declaredunconstitutional, the remainder of this

Act or any provisions not affected thereby shall remain in force and effect.SEC. 9.Effectivity Clause. - This Act shall take effect fifteen (15) days from the date of itspublication in at least one (1) newspaper of general circulation.

Week 8 Persons Liable

Documents

Transcript of Week 8 Persons Liable