WEEK #3

Socratic Practice(Euthyphro, Laches, and

Charmides)

(1-31-06)

AGENDA• Introduction

– Last week– Three Characteristic Features of S’s Practice

• Method/Elenchos• Profession of Ignorance• Preoccupation with Definition

– Paradigmatic Dialogues• The Elenchos

– Formal Structure– Vlastos’ Interpretation– The Text

• Ignorance• Definition

– Preoccupation– Socratic Fallacy

Last Week

• S believed his guilty verdict was based on informal charges

• S did not believe that he was guilty of these informal charges; but understood why he might be thought to be

• A subtle difference between what he is reputed to do and what he actually does

• Note: it is not a mistaken understanding of his doctrines that he blames, but a mistaken understanding of his practice

• Philosophy (here) is understood less as a set of beliefs/doctrines, than as a way of behaving, a practice

Informal ChargesSecond mention

• Second mention “Socrates is a criminal and a busybody, investigating the things beneath the earth and in the heavens and making the weaker argument (logos) stronger and teaching others these same things.” [Apology 19b4-c1: Fowler trans.]1. Natural Philosopher

2. Making weaker argument the stronger (Sophist)

3. Teaching this to others (Sophist)

Tonight’s Thesis

Socrates’ philosophical practice is characterized by three features

[1] A distinctive method

[2] A profession of ignorance

[3] A preoccupation with ‘definition’

Questions Tonight1. What is S’s distinctive method and what does he

take the results of it to be (and is he justified)?

2. How are we to understand Socrates’ disavowal of knowledge: as irony, as sincere, as a disavowal of one type of knowledge, but not of another?

3. What motivates Socrates’ preoccupation with definition? Is it because he is committed to the so-called ‘Socratic Fallacy’ or for some other reason?

Preliminaries

• Adequacy Condition– Interpretation should be potentially confused

with but subtly different from sophistry and natural philosophy

• The Evidence for the Interpretation– Apology– Aristotle & Xenophon (a bit)– The Socratic dialogues

Questions Tonight Again1. What is S’s distinctive method and what does he take the

results of it to be (and is he justified)?1. Elenchos2. Inconsistent beliefs3. yes

2. How are we to understand Socrates’ disavowal of knowledge: as irony, as sincere, as a disavowal of one type of knowledge, but not of another?

1. Sincere2. One type

3. What motivates Socrates’ preoccupation with definition? Is it because he is committed to the so-called ‘Socratic Fallacy’ or for some other reason?

1. Priority of definitional knowledge2. Fallacious?

Key Features in Apology

1. Profession of Ignorance2. Concern for the Soul3. Manner of Practice

– he went to those who seemed to be wise both [a] to themselves and [b] to many others (21c5-7), “thinking that there, if anywhere, I could refute the oracle and say to it ‘This man is wiser than I, but you said that I was.’” [21c1-3; Grube trans.]

Key Features Continued4. Immediate Aims

– He investigates and examines those who seem wise in order [a] to show him that he is not, if he is not (21c7-8 and 23b6-7), and [b] to learn from him, if he is (22b5).

5. Consequences– As a result [a] he quickly incurred their hatred and [b]

gained a reputation for wisdom “for each of those present thought that I was wise with respect to those things concerning which I had refuted the other” (22e6-23a5)

6. Three Classes of Examinees– Politicians (21c3-22a8)– Poets (22a8-c8)– Craftsmen (22c9-e5)

Dramatic Dates

• Euthyphro: 399

• Laches: 424-418

• Charmides: 432

• Delphic Oracle: either 431 or 422-413

Laches

THE CONTEXT OF THE QUESTION

I. Lysimachus’ Explanation for Inviting Laches and Nicias to View the Display [Laches 178a1-180a5]

II. Introducing Socrates [Laches 180a6-d3]III. Lysimachus Addresses Socrates [Laches 180d4-181c9]IV. The Speeches of Nicias and Laches [Laches 181d1-184c8]

I. Nicias [Laches 181d8-182d5]II. Laches [Laches 182d6-184c8]

V. An Argument that It is the Advice of the Expert Concerning the Care of the Soul that Should be Followed [Laches 184c9-186b8]

VI. Socrates Denies Expertise and Nicias and Laches Agree to be Examined [Laches 186b8-189d3]

VII.Introduction of the ‘What is F-ness?’ Question [Laches 189d4-190e3]

Laches ContinuedLACHES’ ANSWER1. First Definition [Laches 190e4-192b8]: not fleeing and facing the

enemy2. Second Definition [Laches 192b9-194c1]: an endurance of the

soulNICIAS’ ANSWERI. Transition to Nicias [Laches 194c]II. Third Definition [Laches 194c7-200c1]

I. The Definition [Laches 194c7-195c1]: knowledge of fearful and daring things

II. Laches’ Testing of the Definition [Laches 195a2-196c1]III. Socrates’ First Testing of the Definition [Laches 196c1-197d8]IV. Socrates’ Second Testing of the Definition [Laches 197e2-

200c2]CONCLUSION [Laches 200c2-201c5]

Key Features in the Laches1. Socratic Professions of Ignorance

• S says he does not have knowledge concerning this affair and is not sufficient to judge which of them speaks the truth - for he has become neither a discoverer nor a pupil of anyone concerning these things. [186d8-e3]

• Well it would be a terrible thing, Lysimachus, to be unwilling to join in assisting any man to become as good as possible. If in the conversation we have just had I had seemed to be knowing and the other two had not, then it would be right to issue a special invitation to me to perform this task; but as the matter stands we are all in the same difficulty. [200e1-e5; Sprague trans.]

2. Concern for the Soul

• So now we say that we are examining a discipline for the sake of the souls of the youths... So we must examine this, if one of us is expert concerning the care of the soul and is able to care for it well and have had good teachers. [185e1-6]

3. Claims to Wisdom

• [a] Socrates indicates his belief that both Laches and Nicias seem to themselves to be wise at 186c8-d3, 190c4-5, and 194c2-7.

• [b] Their reputation among others for wisdom is suggested both at the beginning of the dialogue when Lysimachus seeks their advice concerning the important matter of the education of the sons (178a5-b5) and closer to the end at 197d1-5.

4. Immediate Aims

– Then now it is necessary first to examine this, if someone of us is expert concerning that for which we seek counsel or not; and if someone is, it is necessary to be persuaded by that one though one and leave the others alone, if not it is necessary to seek someone else. [184e11-185a3]

– Let us see if Nicias thinks that he is saying something and does not speak these things for the sake of the logos. Then let us find out from him more clearly what he thinks; and if he seems to be saying something we will agree, and if not we will teach. [196c1-4]

5. Consequencesa. Socrates reputation for wisdom

• Laches explains to Lysimachus that Socrates “always spends his time in those places where there is some fine learning or pursuit of the sort which you seek concerning the youth” (180c2-4)

• both Laches and Nicias advise Lysimachus and Melesias to retain Socrates as a teacher. Socrates is quick to remind the four of them that they “are all in the same difficulty”

b. Socrates, however, does not incur hatred

6. Laches & Nicias are politicians

The Problem of the Elenchos

Two Questions:1. What is Socrates trying to do or accomplish

by means of his elenchos?2. Is Socrates justified in attempting to

accomplish this by means of his elenchos, and if so, how?

• The Problem– Appears that the answer to [1] is ‘truth’– But the form suggests that, given that answer

to [1], the answer to [2] must be ‘no’

Preliminaries

• Translation: refutation, test, cross-examination– Used at Apology 21c1 re the Delphic Oracle

– Used at Apology 29e5 re those who profess to care about wisdom, truth and the best possible state of their souls

• Evidence– Almost never talks about, rather uses it

– Apology

– Gorgias 471e2-472c4

Form of the Elenchos1. p (apparent refutand)

2. q

3. r (premises of the elenchos)

4. s

5. (q & r & s) not-p

6. So, not- (p & q & r & s) (prima facie conclusion)

7. So, not-p (constructive conclusion)

Consequences of Form

• Not All Arguments in the Elenctic Dialogues are Elenchoi – Most of Apology – The speech of the Laws in the Crito– The first half of the Laches

• Remember Apology is explaining what is special about Socrates

Vlastos’ Misplaced MotivationIt left me with this question: if that were all Socrates expected to get from the elenchus – exposure of his interlocutors’ inconsistencies – where did he find positive support for those strong doctrines of his on whose truth he based his life? If the elenchus, his only line of argument, gave those doctrines no rational grounding, what did? Grote had not been troubled by that question because he found it possible to believe that Socrates’ own positive convictions and his critical assaults on thos of others ran on separate tracks. I could not. I could not reconcile myself to Grote’s missionary of the examined life who was a dogmatist himself.

The Kraut/Vlastos Debate

• Elenchos = Any Socratic Argument– We are wrong about its form– No special problem (Kraut)

• The fact that the premises “are logically unsecured within that argument.” is true of every argument

• What makes the elenchos special is the status of the premises

• Centrality of the ‘Doxastic Constraint’– ‘Say What You Believe’– Sincerity Constraint

• Given the DC, how do the premises get sufficient credibilty (alethic status) to justify concluding not-p?

Gorgias 471e2-472c4

[B]ecause you’re trying to refute me rhetorically (rhetorikos ... elenchein), like those who think they’re refuting people in the jury-courts. For there one side think they are refuting the other whenever they produce many respectable witnesses for whatever statements they make, and the man who says the opposite provides himself with only one or none at all. But this kind of refutation (houtos de ho elenchos) is worth nothing towards the truth ... [for] I, all alone, don’t agree; for you don’t compel me, but you produce all these false witnesses against me and try to dislodge me from my property and the truth. But if I can’t produce you, all alone by yourself, as a witness agreeing on the things I’m talking about, I think I have achieved nothing of any account in what our discussion is about. And I don’t think you’ll have achieved anything either unless I, all alone, bear witness for you, and you let all the others go. Here is one form of refutation (houtos tis tropos elenchou), so you and many others think. But there is another one too, so I think, for my part. [Irwin 1979 trans.]

Vlastos’ View:Thesis 1 and 2

1. Socrates takes his elenchos to establish the truth or falsehood of a particular proposition

• The crucial text is “Has it not been proved (apodedeiktai) that what was asserted [by myself] is true?” [Gorgias 479e8; Vlastos trans.]

2. In addition to requiring that the premises at step 2 are believed by the interlocutor they must also be believed by Socrates

“Does Socrates, for his part, believe that [the premises of his elenchos] are true? In standard elenctic argument there can be no doubt of this: it follows from Socrates’ conviction that the contradiction does more than expose inconsistency within the interlocutor’s beliefs - that it refutes his thesis, as we can see, for instance, when Polus is told that the argument which faulted him “proved true” the Socratic thesis against his (Gorgias 479e8 [(T1) above]). Socrates could not have said this unless he were convinced that [the premises] which are shown to entail [the apparent refutand] are themselves true.” (Vlastos 1985 8; 1994 45

Vlastos’ Presuppositions

A. Anyone who ever has a false moral belief will always have at the same time true beliefs entailing the negation of that false belief (1983a 52 and 1994 25 with minimal revision), and

B. The set of moral beliefs held by Socrates at any given time is consistent (1983a 55 and 1994 28 with minimal revision), entail

C. The set of moral beliefs held by Socrates at any given time is true (1983a 55 and 1994 28 with minimal revision)

My View

• Skeptical about [B]– My view is quite the opposite of yours: ... But it’s true

that, obviously under the influence of my ignorance, I chop and change, and even hold the opposite opinion sometimes. [Hippias Minor 372d7-e1; Waterfield trans.

• Not necessary • Deny Thesis 2 – so, if problem, then can’t be

solved• Deny Thesis 1 – no problem

Considerations Against Thesis 1

• Laches 193e8-194a4: But are you willing that we should be persuaded with our statement to this extent? ... With the one that commands us to endure. If you are willing, let us hold our ground in the search and let us endure, so that courage itself won’t make fun of us for not searching for it courageously - if endurance should perhaps be courage after all.” [Sprague trans.; my emphasis]

• Laches 199e6-10

Last Elenchos

1. Courage is a part of virtue. [Laches 198a1-6]

2. Fearful things are future evils and daring things are future non-evils or goods. [Laches 198c2-4]

3. Courage is knowledge of fearful and daring things. [Laches 198c6-8]

4. The same knowledge knows future, present and past things. [Laches 199a6-9]

5. Then, courage is not only knowledge of fearful and daring things. [from [ii], [iii], and [iv]; Laches 199b9-c2]

6. Then, courage is knowledge of past, present and future goods and evils. [from [ii], [iii], and [iv]; Laches 199c3-d3]

7. If someone knows all goods and evils (past, present, and future), then that person is not lacking in any virtue. [Laches 199d4-e2]

8. Then, courage is not a part of virtue, but the whole of virtue. [from [vi] and [vii]; Laches 199e3-5]

9. [i] and [viii] are inconsistent. [Laches 199e6-10]

10. So, we have not discovered what courage is. [Laches 199e11-12]

Considerations Against Thesis 2

• Methodological Remarks– LA: Why, what else would anyone say, Socrates?

SOC: Nothing, if that is what he thought. LA: Well, this is what I think at any rate. [Laches 193c6-8; Sprague trans.]

• Aim of Eliminating Conceit– Availability Constraint

• Actual Premises– Euthyphro 7a-8a

Euthyphro First Elenchos1. If x is god loved, then x is pious and if x is god

hated, then x is impious. (Euthyphro 7a6-8)2. The gods fight with, differ with, and hate each

other. (Euthyphro 7b2-4)3. The just and the unjust, the fine and the foul, and

the good and the bad are the subjects of difference which make individuals hate each other.

4. So, there are somethings that some gods consider just, fine, or good and other gods consider unjust, foul, or bad. [from [iii] & [iv]] (Euthyphro 7e1-3)

5. The things one considers fine, good, or just, one loves and the opposite of these one hates. (Euthyphro 7e6-7)

6. So, the same things are hated and loved by the gods. [from [v] & [vi] (Euthyphro 8a4-5)

7. So, the same things are god-hated and god-loved. [from [vii]] (Euthyphro 8a5)

8. So, the same things will be pious and impious. [from [i] & [viii] (Euthyphro 8a7-8)

Definition

• Frequency of ‘What is F-ness?’ Question

– Not in Apology

– Aristotle & Xenophon

Metaphysics 1078b17-29

“Socrates busied himself concerning the ethical virtues (ethikas aretas) and was the first to seek to define them universally (peri touton horizesthai katholou zetiuntos protou) ... He was reasonable in seeking the what it is (to ti estin); for he sought to syllogize, and the what it is (to ti estin) is the starting point of syllogisms... For Socrates may be fairly attributed two things, epagogic arguments (tous t' epaktikous logous) and defining the universal (to horizesthai katholou)...”

Metaphysics 987b1-4

Socrates, however, was busying himself about ethical matters and neglecting the world of nature as a whole but seeking the universal (to katholou zetountos) in these ethical matters, and fixed thought for the first time on definitions (peri horismon epistesantos protou ten dianoian). [Ross trans.]

Memorabilia I i 16

“His own conversation was ever of human things. The problems he discussed were, What is godly, what is ungodly; what is beautiful, what is ugly; what is just, what is unjust; what is prudence, what is madness; what is courage, what is cowardice; what is a state, what is a statesman; what is government, and what is a governor;--these and others like them, of which the knowledge made a gentleman, in his estimation, while ignorance should involve the reproach of slavishness”

Memorabilia IV vi 1

“For Socrates held that those who knew what each of the things that are are would be able in addition to teach (or show) it to others; on the other hand he said it was no wonder that those who did not know were baffled themselves and baffled others; because of these things he never ceased seeking with his companions what each of the things that are are.”

Socratic Dialogues

• Charmides• Laches• Euthyphro• Hippias Major• Lysis• Protagoras (part)

• Gorgias (part)• Republic I• Meno (part)• Theaetetus• Sophist

Motivation

(PD) If A fails to know what F-ness is, then A fails to know anything about F-ness.

(SF) If A knows what F-ness is, then A knows everything about F-ness.

Euthyphro 4d9-5d1EUTH: (a) [My relatives say] that it is impious for a son to prosecute his father for murder - knowing poorly, Socrates, how the gods view the pious and the impious.SOC: (b) Euthyphro, do you think that you have such accurate knowledge concerning divine affairs, and concerning pious things and impious things that, the situation being as you say, you do not fear that by prosecuting your father you may be doing something impious? EUTH: (c) Socrates, I would be useless and no different than the average man, if I did not know accurately all such things.

...SOC: (d) Tell me, then, what you just now asserted you knew clearly, what sorts of things you say the pious and the impious are in the case of murder and all other actions.

Laches 190b7-c2

Then isn’t this necessary for us to begin, to know what virtue is? For if we do not know at all (to parapan) what virtue happens to be, how would we become advisors to anyone regarding how it might best be attained.

Laches 189e3-190b1For if we happen to know concerning anything whatever that its being added to something makes that thing to which it is added better and further we are able to cause that thing to be added to it, then it is clear that we know that thing itself concerning which we advise how someone might best and most easily attain it ... If we happen to know that sight added to the eyes makes them better and further we are able to cause it to be added to the eyes, then it is clear that we know what sight is concerning which we advise how someone might best attain it. For if we did not know what sight is or what hearing is, we would hardly be advisors or doctors worthy of attention concerning eyes and ears, how someone might best attain hearing and sight.

Charmides 176a6-b1:

I don’t know if I have temperance or if I don’t; for how would I know that concerning which neither of you is able to discover what it is, or so you say?

Sufficiency

Then teach me what this form itself is, so that looking to it and using it as a paradigm, I can say that that which is such as it, whether done by you or anyone else, is pious and that which is not such as it, is impious. [Euthyphro 6e3-6]

Is it a Fallacy?

• Geach: “We know heaps of things without being able to define the terms in which we express our knowledge.”

• Charity has led many to deny Socrates’ commitment to the priority

• Charity ought to lead us to revisit the kind of knowledge involved in the priority principle– Professions of ignorance– Delphic oracle– Doxastic coherence requirement