Liberal Nationalism, Imagined Immigration and the Progressive

Dilemma

CHARLES LEDDY-OWEN

Abstract

The article critically evaluates liberal nationalist perspectives on immigration by drawing on

findings from a qualitative research project undertaken in 2014 among White British

interviewees in England. From one perspective the study’s participants’ attitudes seem to

support arguments made by David Goodhart and other liberal nationalists regarding

immigration, social trust and integration. However, further analysis suggests that these

attitudes are to a very significant extent drawn first from partially imagined ideas surrounding

immigration and second from potentially unreliable sources. These findings thus provoke the

question of whether social trust and notions of a national community are actually being

disrupted by immigration or whether they are being disrupted by prejudiced nationalist and

xenophobic perceptions about immigration and immigrants. The article will conclude by

arguing for more nuanced research into attitudes towards immigration and in favour of a

sceptical approach to nationalist frameworks for interpreting society and politics in Britain

today.

Keywords: attitudes to immigration; nationalism; liberal nationalism; social trust; qualitative

research

Introduction

1

The rise of UKIP and the apparently increasing salience to voters of immigration politics

must be connected to wider questions surrounding society and community in contemporary

Britain. Much of the time this connection is viewed through nationalist frameworks of

interpretation, with immigration seen to be – variously and to differing extents – disturbing

and undermining national borders, the national economy, culture, story, and so on. Such

nationalist interpretations have long been the terrain of the conservative or radical right, as

recently exemplified by UKIP’s stridently anti-immigration platform. Nationalism has also,

however, often provided a basis for more politically progressive perspectives on immigration

and belonging within the nation-state. Perhaps the most prominent, substantive engagement

on the left with British nationalism in recent years can be found in the work of David

Goodhart. Drawing on theories of ‘liberal nationalism’, which will be introduced below,

Goodhart’s central argument is that the sense of a common British nationality, which he

believes is required for a liberal democracy and redistributive welfare state to function

effectively, has been severely undermined by immigration.

What is liberal nationalism?

Theories of liberal nationalism emerged during the 1990s in the work of political

philosophers David Miller and Yael Tamir.1 For liberal nationalists, only nations can

engender the mutual trust, norms of reciprocity and practices of redistributive taxation

required for a liberal democracy and welfare state to function effectively.2 In short, without

the social bonds provided by nationality, the legitimacy of both the welfare state and,

potentially, democracy more broadly may be threatened.

2

The trickle-down effects of liberal nationalist theory on British party politics can

perhaps be detected in Gordon Brown’s Britishness drive and Ed Miliband’s ‘One Nation

Labour’ project. A more direct link can be found in the work of David Goodhart, most

prominently in his recent book The British Dream.3 Like Miller and Tamir, Goodhart

suggests that the nation is the core basic structure by which democratically legitimate, liberal

polities are and should continue to be formed. However, the emphasis of Goodhart’s

interpretation of liberal nationalism relates to concerns surrounding Britain’s ethnic diversity

following postwar and more particularly post-Blair immigration. While immigration plays a

relatively minor role in Miller’s and Tamir’s accounts of liberal nationalism, both raise the

potential practical and ethical problems it can cause the nation. For Miller, national cultures

are essentially fluid, so immigration is not necessarily a problem. Where immigration can

become problematic for Miller, however, is ‘when the rate of immigration is so high’ that

resources and ‘mechanisms of integration [such as schools and other state services] may be

stretched beyond their capacity’. In such cases ‘the absorptive capacities of the society in

question’, and thus the crucial mutual trust and ‘shared sense of nationhood’, are threatened

and it becomes legitimate to reduce the immigration rate.4

Reviewing evidence drawn from secondary sources, conversations with an array of

academics, politicians, policy-makers and a tour of ‘places of high minority settlement’,5

Goodhart finds evidence for precisely this state of affairs in contemporary Britain. The

upshot of Goodhart’s considerations is what he calls the ‘progressive dilemma’ faced by the

left in today’s Britain. The progressive dilemma suggests that those of a progressive political

bent must choose where we stand in the tradeoff between ethnic diversity and ‘[t]he fact that

as we become more different from one another in lifestyle, values, ethnic and national

origins, we become less willing to sacrifice, trust and share’.6 For Goodhart, this dilemma is

exacerbated by the sheer number of immigrants but also by decades of multiculturalist

3

politics and thinking advocated or passively accepted by a political class in thrall to pro-

immigration and pro-diversity rhetoric. Goodhart thus advocates drastically reducing recent

net migration alongside a strengthening of the ‘national idiom’,7 a reinvigorated sense of

Britishness which he hopes will counteract what he portrays as the liberal left’s generally

elitist and ‘morally self-righteous’ universalist rhetoric which fails to take into account the

tradeoffs outlined by the progressive dilemma.8

There is no doubt that this kind of anti-immigration platform strikes a chord with

much of the British population today, as suggested by polling data, the meteoric success of

UKIP, Miliband’s regular apologies for the previous government’s policies and the coalition

government’s Immigration Bill and net reduction agenda. Important questions remain about

what anti-immigration attitudes mean to those who hold them, however, and about how this

relates to issues of social trust and to nationality. The remainder of this article will appraise

and critique attitudes towards immigration in relation to the liberal nationalist thesis by

exploring data drawn from a recent research project.

Gosport and immigration

The research findings presented here are drawn from a study undertaken in early 2014 in a

suburban area of Gosport, a town of 80,000 people on the south coast of England. Gosport

has had very little immigration in comparison to much of urban England, with 94 percent of

the population classifying themselves as ‘White British’ in the most recent census. The study

consisted of in-depth, semi-structured qualitative interviews with twenty-five participants

asking about immigration. The youngest participants were in their 30s and over half of those

interviewed were in their 60s or above. Some participants were interviewed as couples. All

were white, all were homeowners and all but one participant described their economic

situation as comfortable.

4

The reason for choosing the particular area of Gosport was due to its proximity to

Haslar Immigration Removal Centre, and subsequent articles drawn from the study will

explore participants’ perspectives from theoretical perspectives influenced by sociology and

geography. However, following the invitation to take part in the Political Quarterly

roundtable related to this special issue, which also coincided with the process of data

analysis, it occurred to me that patterns emerging from the data were relevant to the liberal

nationalism debates currently underway within political science and policy circles.

Furthermore, when reading or hearing about recent research relating to the rise of UKIP and

attitudes towards immigration in Britain it became clear that I had sampled an interesting

demographic and locale in relation to this literature—namely a white, middle-class

population in an overwhelmingly ‘White British’ area of southern England. Recent survey

analysis undertaken by Ford, Goodwin and Cutts suggests that average UKIP voters are over

50 years old and based in relatively prosperous areas of the south,9 and recent research

undertaken by Eric Kaufmann, as well as the 2014 local authority and EU Parliament election

results, have found a strong relationship between predominantly ‘white’ areas, anti-

immigration attitudes and support for UKIP.10 Though party politics was not broached

directly in the interviews, the study is thus well placed to add to this burgeoning—and, many

would argue, urgently important—research area.

The kind of qualitative research method practised here seeks to explore the deeper

meanings and nuances which are difficult to capture in survey research. The conclusion to the

article will consider the findings discussed below as they relate to and potentially

complement survey research. In what follows, the names of all participants have been

changed.

Participants’ attitudes towards immigration

5

All participants held views that were to some extent positive towards immigration in social,

economic or cultural terms, and many expressed sympathy for asylum seekers and refugees.

However, for all but one participant any positivity was qualified in ways that resonate with

the liberal nationalist position. The most common pattern found in the data suggests that

Britain can only take a certain amount of immigration for economic reasons:

Marie (60s): I do think probably the amount of people that have come to this small

island… is getting a bit top heavy isn’t it.

Ray (60s): It’s getting rather overcrowded in this country, the infrastructure and the rest

of the schooling, and the housing… The whole thing is not geared up to the amount of

people that we have here I don’t think. [pause] The National Health Service is creaking

… They’re all crammed into this little country.

Jamie (40s): I’m very aware of the issues about how many immigrants can you take into a

country which is very small and overpopulated in certain areas and has… a recession, and

job issues.

Variations on the term ‘small island’ were used by nearly all participants in relation to fears

surrounding pressured or dwindling economic and state resources. Ray’s concerns about the

strain put on the NHS and schools by the increased population were particularly common, as

were Jamie’s concerns relating to jobs. There are thus parallels between these perceptions

about immigration numbers and Miller’s liberal nationalist argument that if ‘mechanisms of

integration [are] stretched beyond their capacity’, in this case in economic terms, then the rate

of immigration should be questioned. These broad fears surrounding the economic effects of

6

immigration were, furthermore, associated by participants with the character and behaviour

of immigrants themselves, as the following excerpts demonstrate.

Caroline (30s): I think the problem is… welfare entitlement. If people want to come here

and work, brilliant, [but] it’s [a problem] when people come here, are attracted to it, and

are able to get all of the welfare benefits.

Bob (60s): It does seem unfair that they’re coming in sometimes, we’re told, to cash in on

the benefits system.

Stephen (70s): Well I mean you know some of them are coming over with no intention of

working… [Ruth talks over Stephen]

Ruth (70s): Pakistanis are a nightmare.

Participants expressed concerns about immigrants viewed as being savvy in ways of

successfully avoiding employment and making benefit claims from a welfare state portrayed

as overgenerous. For some older participants these views are associated with particular

migrant groups or ethnic minorities, such as ‘Pakistanis’ for Ruth, and sometimes with

Muslim ‘fanatics’. Younger and older participants alike shared Bob’s and Caroline’s

concerns that immigrant welfare-dependency is unfair, particularly for those within society—

immigrant or not—who do work and pay taxes. While younger participants, such as Caroline

elsewhere in her interview, often drew comparisons between perceived immigrant welfare-

dependency and what they saw as similar patterns among settled working-class residents of

Britain, for nearly all participants a more critical perspective was taken with immigrants.

7

These patterns thus again lend support to the liberal nationalist thesis, and specifically

Goodhart’s progressive dilemma, as for participants in this study the trust required for a

redistributive British welfare state seems to be undermined to a significant extent in relation

to questions of immigration, immigrants and ethnic diversity.

A minority of older participants also expressed strong concerns relating to the

integration of immigrants and/or ethnic minorities, with the distinction between these

categories often blurred:

George (60s): I mean there are places in Leicester and Birmingham… and I think it’s

[immigration is] just far too much, and locals get pushed out [...] I did have to go up to

Birmingham about eighteen months ago…and I just ended up in an area [in his car]…and

it was just at school time, and honestly I felt, well it frightened me… it was literally like

downtown Karachi… and I just thought, no this cannot be, this is not good, because you

just felt A) a stranger in your own country and B) I actually felt intimidated.

Norman (60s): I think it’s a good idea to have immigrants, but as Enoch Powell used to

say they should be integrated in the community… [There should] not [be] mass

immigration... That’s where the problems are… [For example, with] no-go areas.

Thomas (60s): If [immigrants] want to come in and start… [saying] ‘we want Sharia law’,

well… you can have Sharia law back in the country where you came from, you’re not

going to tell me to have Sharia law in this country, so when you’re trying to change my

culture I think that’s where the problem comes... and that’s when you get the tensions.

8

Participants here echo Goodhart’s description of ‘a new urban England… full of mysterious

and unfamiliar worlds just around the corner’,11 albeit with a greater emphasis on feelings of

tension, insecurity and threat. George is intimidated by the alienness of an area of

Birmingham; Norman invokes the spirit of Powell, suggesting that ‘no-go areas’ have

emerged (presumably for white people), and Thomas fears the encroachment of Islamic

culture and law on Britain. For these participants the sense of shared nationhood and mutual

trust that Miller argues should emerge through a process of absorption and integration of

immigrants into national public culture is failing, with some urban areas even being seen as

border zones engendering a sense of separation and unbelonging.

The sources of these attitudes

Taken together, the findings reviewed above therefore lend support to Goodhart’s liberal

nationalist perspective on immigration in contemporary Britain. They suggest that

perceptions of immigration and immigrants are contributing to an economically troubled and

socially divided society, thus undermining the trust and social bonds required for a

functioning, potentially progressively minded national polity. However, the word perceptions

is key here, as the remainder of this section exploring the apparent sources of these attitudes

will demonstrate. Each of the following excerpts is in response to the question of whether

immigration affects the participant’s life.

Norman (60s): Not personally, no [pause]. No. Erm [pause]…it’s [i.e. immigration is]

not down here.

Lloyd (40s): [long pause] I can’t think of one [an effect of immigration on his life]

directly. I can’t think of [one] indirectly [pause].

9

Caroline (thirties): It doesn’t affect me or my life in any way whatsoever.

Stephen (60s): Affect my life? No I don’t think so really, not down here… I’m sure it

would in some… other places… but I mean you look round here, there are very few

[immigrants].

Thomas (60s): Fortunately in Gosport I think the ethnic population is something like 2

per cent... so we don’t really have an immigration problem that much in Gosport, but I

could imagine some other places, yeah it probably is a big issue.

Jamie (40s): In terms of the Gosport area, for me it’s not a major issue… If I lived in

Birmingham I might [feel] slightly differently because… in some areas of

Birmingham I might feel quite isolated… So in terms of direct impact [of immigration

on her life] I’m aware of it… I watch the news most days, you know… I’m aware of

the cultural tensions, but here on a day-to-day basis it’s not a major issue for me.

Nearly all participants saw their lives as unaffected by immigration, an absence of impact

often linked to Gosport’s relatively low levels of immigration and ethnic diversity. As with

George’s earlier excerpt, in which he described an area of Birmingham as ‘like downtown

Karachi’, several participants ascribe the problems they associate with immigration and

immigrants to city life. Stephen, Thomas and Jamie are ‘sure’ or ‘imagine’ that immigration

—and/or the presence of ethnic minority individuals (the distinction is again blurred)—would

affect them ‘in some other places’, namely cities, where immigration is ‘probably… a big

issue’ and where one ‘might feel quite isolated’. The above excerpts thus suggest that the

10

perceived effects of immigration and ethnic diversity analysed earlier are partly being

imagined rather than directly experienced.

These findings echo Scott Blinder’s recent analysis of a nationally representative

study in which it was found that ‘public opinion toward immigrants and immigration is

directed toward pictures in our heads of immigrants rather than immigration per se and,

further, that these mental representations of immigrants may help determine attitudes toward

immigration policy’.12 Blinder finds that those who are the most hostile to immigration

believe that the largest amount of immigration stems from asylum claims, despite asylum

seekers contributing around 5 per cent to annual net migration figures.13 From the perspective

of the present study, participants seem to draw their attitudes to immigration from partly

imagined experiences and effects taking place elsewhere and in relation to other people.

Many participants have of course spent time in cities. However, most of those who

spoke of experiences involving ‘immigrants’, such as George in his car or another participant

who witnessed ‘gypsy beggars’ on a London train, based their concerns and fears on fleeting,

anecdotal episodes. This potential deficit in the representativeness of participants’ experience

as it feeds into their attitudes towards immigrants is, furthermore, linked to a potentially

important deficit of representative knowledge, as most participants were heavily reliant on

secondary sources for the information that appears to influence their views. These sources

include family and friends, such as the participant who discussed her daughter’s partner’s

sister who is reported to have lost her place in a council housing queue to Polish migrants,

and the participant who described her anger about what a friend told her about Muslim

women wearing niqabs on their passport photographs. Personal sources such as these will be

reliable to differing extents, with the former anecdote probably true and the latter information

certainly not. By far the most notable secondary source feeding into attitudes towards

immigration, however, was the media.

11

Rachel (30s): We hear all this about Romania and… and everyone’s going on about

an influx.

David (50s): You can only take so much or then you’re going to be saturated… I

don’t know if it’s getting that way, it’s just what you read in the papers.

Laura (60s): There are criminal elements [among immigrants] and it’s those that the

Daily Mail picks on…you know, the Romanians… [spoken over by George]

George (60s): I’ll believe everything that I read in that paper alright [laughing].

Many of the views voiced in these excerpts are consistent with the previously discussed

theme of Britain as a small, resource-strained island, though here they are particularly related

to fears surrounding the opening of restrictions to workers from Romania and Bulgaria which

had taken place less than two months prior to the interviews and which was accompanied by

something akin to a smear campaign in the popular and right-wing press. The regularity with

which media-influenced views were drawn on by participants suggests that the arguments

surrounding national resources and welfare voiced in the previous section were also

significantly influenced by media sources—see, for example, the earlier excerpts in which

Jamie discussed her awareness of tensions in cities thanks to ‘the news’, and in which Bob

used the phrase ‘we’re told’ in relation to welfare abuse.

This is not to suggest that participants were merely passive dupes, as many also

expressed a healthy level of cynicism towards media coverage. This is evident in Laura’s

12

apparent criticism of the Daily Mail for ‘picking on’ Romanians (cynicism mirrored by her

husband George’s sarcastic praise of the newspaper), and also with David’s qualification of

the potential accuracy of the view he is expressing. Despite this widespread cynicism,

however, each participant reiterates what they have read despite their apparent doubts, and

media reporting is ultimately drawn on as a key, if not the principal or only, source of

information from which their attitudes towards immigration and immigrants are derived.

Participants thus discuss immigration and immigrants as primarily a problem for other

people in relation to imagined or fleeting experiences in other places, usually cities, and in

relation to secondary sources of varying reliability. To a significant extent, therefore, as with

Blinder’s study, the negative attitudes to immigration held by participants are drawn from

imagined ‘pictures… of immigrants rather than immigration per se’.14 This notion of

imagination is not meant to suggest fabrication or invention out of nothing. I am certainly not

casting doubt on the feelings of insecurity that may arise in relation to immigration, on the

often very real and emotive personal experiences of friends and relatives or on the integrity of

many media accounts. Furthermore, it is beyond the scope of this article to evaluate the

complex debates surrounding integration, the extent to which the UK economy is being

strained by immigration and the extent and impact of immigrant welfare-dependency (though

each of these issues is highly contested and for most participants in this study the flow of

information and experiences seems to point in an unambiguously anti-immigration direction).

The key argument I am making here is that in analysing the views of this study’s participants,

who have minimal contact with migrants and who feel that their lives are unaffected by

immigration, their negative attitudes towards immigration, immigrants and/or ethnic

minorities seem to be significantly influenced by partially imagined and potentially

prejudiced, usually secondary, experiences and sources. The implications of these findings

13

for the liberal nationalist framework and in terms of research into attitudes towards

immigration will be discussed in the final section.

Discussion and conclusion

The first findings section suggests that the liberal nationalist model might help explain and

legitimate—while in turn being validated by—this study’s participants’ perspectives on

immigration and immigrants, the economy, social trust and integration. However, the second

findings section suggests that the extent to which imagination and potentially unreliable

sources feed into anti-immigration attitudes in Britain greatly undermines the liberal

nationalist interpretation. In On Nationality, David Miller suggests that the ‘quality of

political debate’ and openness of discussion are crucial if a liberal democracy is to function

effectively.15 From this perspective, attitudes towards immigration should ideally be rooted in

experience and/or in rational deliberation based on accurate, reliable information rather than

on the kinds of sentiments and prejudices that are highly problematic for genuinely open

discussion and debate. If public attitudes suggest that immigrants are perceived as

economically damaging to the state or as failing to integrate towards the norms of the

national community, and if immigration is perceived as responsible for a decline in social

trust, we can ask to what extent these attitudes are the reasoned response of members of a

beleaguered national community, but we also need to ask the extent to which they indicate a

xenophobic backlash mentality based on nationalist and potentially racist prejudice.16 The

balance between these two positions is difficult to evaluate, but until we have a clearer view,

the liberal nationalist interpretation or legitimisation of anti-immigration attitudes in Britain

should be handled with care.

Although the present article’s findings are limited in that they are drawn from a small

sample in a particular area of England, suggestive parallels can be found with larger,

14

nationally representative survey-based studies. A substantial literature suggests that anti-

immigration attitudes in Britain are far more influenced by ideas surrounding ‘symbolic’

threats—to culture, values and identities—than by ‘rational’ personal economic interests or

actual levels of immigration.17 The findings presented above and in Blinder’s study provoke

questions about the extent to which these symbolic threats relate to imagined immigration

and unreliable secondary information. This is arguably a major reason why surveys such as

those of Bobby Duffy and colleagues (see this volume) find a 50-point gap between people's

perceptions of immigration as a local and national problem—most imagine a much direr

picture nationally than they experience locally.

There is some statistical evidence that relatively fast ethnic minority immigration

within an area can lead to an increase in support for the far right18 and, as McLaren finds in a

cross-European survey, there appears to be some evidence for a negative relationship

between immigration and social trust, albeit again largely in relation to perceptions of rather

than actual immigration.19 However, other studies suggest that there is little if any such

relationship when deprivation is taken into account,20 and in much qualitative research

exploring areas of substantial economic deprivation and ethnic diversity, evidence is found

for the kinds of successful multi-ethnic intermixing and informal community-building that

are difficult to measure through surveys.21 In The British Dream Goodhart himself notes each

of these positive patterns, but dismisses the research as insufficiently sophisticated.22

Taking the present study and wider literature into account, I would argue that even in

highly diverse areas where conflict may be taking place and where diversity may be leading

to some decline in trust, it remains crucial to ask how much anti-immigration resentment or

anxiety is related to reliable knowledge or actual negative experiences and how much is

related to partially imagined ideas surrounding immigration influenced by prevalent

nationalist interpretations and prejudices. Explaining such patterns might be particularly

15

interesting through a comparative approach to places where UKIP’s anti-immigration

platform has been most successful: on the one hand in towns such as Boston where there has

been a relatively quick pace of demographic change and on the other in the far more

numerous places, such as Rotherham, Portsmouth, Mansfield or Sunderland, where the rate of

change and ethnic diversity is far more limited.

None of this is meant to suggest that there are no issues surrounding immigration or

that segregation is not a serious problem in parts of England. Nor is it in disagreement with

Goodhart’s criticism of New Labour’s handling of immigration, particularly in preparing

communities for its effects. Nor does it aim to play down the very real issues relating to the

availability and fair allocation of state resources. I would also agree with Goodhart’s

suggestions that research needs to take more variables into account and that ‘more reliable

knowledge’ is required that goes beyond analysis of the same sets of national surveys23 as

well as often esoteric qualitative research. We need a concerted and more creative effort from

researchers, using mixed quantitative and qualitative approaches, to try to work out what

aspects of immigration and diversity are viewed positively or negatively among the

population of Britain, why and when. Many of the aforementioned problems associated with

immigration on which Goodhart and I share common ground can perhaps be explained by the

poor quality of public information and debate surrounding immigration and ethnic diversity,

and unless researchers and policy-makers have a better idea about what is actually being

observed and measured in relation to oft-reported public attitudes, and thus a fuller picture of

the terrain with which we are dealing, then the discussion surrounding any related policies

will remain muddied. The progressive dilemma is empirically contested and its nuances are

still only partially understood, but if egalitarian liberalism does require a tradeoff between

solidarity and diversity then we need to be better able to account for and understand the

balance sheet.

16

At the same time, we need to make sure that the progressive dilemma is the

appropriate question to pose and ask whether the nation is the basic structure of society that

liberal nationalists claim. Just as many in seventeenth-century England understood and

interpreted their lives, politics, economics and culture through the prism of religion, yet today

are seen by historians to have primarily done so in relation to issues of individual liberty,

economic structures, class struggle, competition between rising and established elites and so

on, the same can perhaps be seen today with nationality. What Goodhart terms the ‘national

idiom’, like religion historically and today, certainly has real effects, but its importance,

empirical validity and moral and political legitimacy remain very much open to

investigation.24 Building a theory from which to advocate a progressive and egalitarian

society and democracy should be based above all on a grounded, empirical and critical

approach rather than abstract reasoning based on existing norms, identifications and patterns

of behaviour—and still less on a partially imagined political and social landscape.

Notes

17

1 D. Miller, On Nationality, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1995; Y. Tamir, Liberal Nationalism, Chichester, Princeton University Press, 1993. 2 Miller, On Nationality, p. 98Ibid. p. 98. [AQ: Miller or Tamir?]3 D. Goodhart, The British Dream: Successes and Failures of Post-War Immigration, London, Atlantic Books, 2013.4 Miller, On Nationality, p. 128. Also see Tamir, Liberal Nationalism, pp. 126–7.5 Goodhart, The British Dream, p. xii.6 Ibid. p. 261.7 Ibid. p. 283.8 Ibid. pp. 321–2.9 R. Ford, M. J. Goodwin and D. Cutts, ‘Strategic Eurosceptics and polite xenophobes: Support for the United Kingdom Independence Party (UKIP) in the 2009 European Parliament elections’, European Journal of Political Research, 2012, vol. 51, no.2, pp. 204–234. [AQ: Please provide issue number.]10 E. Kaufmann, ‘Local context and UKIP support,’ talk at British Future, 8 May 2014, http://www.sneps.net/research-interests/whiteworkingclass 11 Goodhart, The British Dream, p. 47.12 S. Blinder, ‘Imagined Immigration: The Impact of Different Meanings of “Immigrants” in Public Opinion and Policy Debates in Britain’, Political Studies, 2013 (awaiting print), p. 2. [AQ: Can this be adjusted or should date be changed to 2014? Was it published online ahead of print?] Yes it has been published online - http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/1467-9248.12053/abstract. Not sure how this would be referenced though.13 Ibid. pp. 9, 16.14 Ibid, p. 2.15 Miller, On Nationality, pp. 70, 96.16 As argued in S. Lægaard, ‘David Miller on immigration policy and nationality’, Journal of Applied Philosophy, 2007, vol. 24, no. 3, pp.283-298. [AQ: Please provide page number.]17 See, for example, L. McLaren and M. Johnson, ‘Resources, group conflict and symbols: Explaining anti-immigration hostility in Britain’, Political Studies, 2007, vol. 55, no. 4, pp. 709–32.18

E. Kaufmann, ‘Local context and UKIP support’.  19 L. McLaren, ‘Cause for concern? The impact of immigration on political trust’, Policy Network Paper, London, Policy Network, 2010.20 P. Sturgis, I. Brunton-Smith, S. Read and N. Allum, ‘Does ethnic diversity erode trust? Putnam’s “hunkering down” thesis reconsidered’, British Journal of Political Science, 2011, vol. 41, no. 1, pp. 57–82.21 E.g. L. Back, New Ethnicities and Urban Culture: Racisms and Multiculture in Young Lives, London, UCL Press, 1996; H. Beider, Community Cohesion: The Views of the White Working Class Communities, York, Joseph Rowntree Foundation, 2011. 22 Goodhart, The British Dream, p. 275.23 Ibid., pp. 275, 332.24 See also Sinisa Malesevic, ‘The chimera of national identity’, Nations and Nationalism, vol. 17, no. 1,

2001, pp. 272–90; Jon E. Fox and Demelza Jones, ‘Migration, everyday life and the ethnicity bias’, Ethnicities, 2013, vol. 13, no. 4, pp. 385–400.