Coloso fragmentado: The “intermestic” agenda and Latin American foreign policy

Abstract: “Intermestic” issues, including trade, migration, and drug-trafficking, dominate contemporary U.S.-Latin American relations and matter deeply to Latin American and Caribbean states. Despite their importance to Latin American leaders and publics, Latin American diplomats have had less success influencing U.S. policy than in other spheres. These failures owe, at least in part, to the dynamics that intermestic issues create in the U.S. foreign policy process. While those dynamics have been broadly explored, there has been less attention to the ways in which these dynamics affect Latin American and Caribbean foreign policy towards the United States. Building on work by Putnam, Milner, Tsebelis, and others, this article argues that intermestic issues have more veto players and narrower win-sets than traditional foreign policy issues, which complicates attempts at influencing U.S. policies. The argument is examined against the case of the U.S.-Mexico cross-border trucking dispute, where the Mexican government struggled with U.S. officials and interest groups for two decades to gain U.S. compliance with NAFTA. After briefly exploring other relevant issues, the article suggests that for Latin American policymakers, intermestic issues demand different diplomatic strategies.

Keywords: Intermestic, transnational, foreign policy, U.S.-Latin American relations, U.S.-Mexican relations, cross-border trucking, interest groups

Contact

Tom Long, Ph.D.Lecturer in International RelationsSchool of Politics and International RelationsUniversity of Reading, Whiteknights CampusReading, Berkshire, RG6 6AA, United Kingdom

Affiliated Professor, Division of International Studies, Centro de Investigación y Docencia EconómicasMexico City, Mexico

Tel: (44) 0118 378 7019Cel: (44) 07410466181t.s.long@reading.ac.uk

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Coloso fragmentado: The “intermestic” agenda and Latin American foreign policy 1

Since the end of the Cold War, the agenda of U.S.-Latin American relations has

been dominated by transnational or “intermestic” issues such as migration, trade,

transnational organized crime, and energy and environment. The term “intermestic,”

coined by Bayless Manning in 1977, is an English-language portmanteau describing

issues that are “profoundly and inseparably both international and domestic.”2 While

these issues are hardly a new feature of inter-American politics, they now occupy center

stage for both U.S. and Latin American policymakers.3 Because of their dual, domestic

and international natures, U.S. policies regarding transnational issues are often made with

attention on U.S. domestic politics. However, the effects of these U.S. policies

reverberate in Latin America, particularly in the Caribbean, Central America, and

Mexico, where ties with the United States are densest and most complex. Though the

political dynamics of intermesticity, as compared to “traditional” foreign policy issues,

have been widely discussed since the late 1970s, this discussion has focused on the U.S.

policymaking process—how Congress and interest groups constrain the executive and

favor certain policies. Reflecting that analysis, Abraham F. Lowenthal recently wrote that

“U.S. policy toward Latin America and the Caribbean is shaped less by strategic

1 This paper benefited tremendously the comments and suggestions of many scholars, including Abraham F. Lowenthal, Jorge Chabat, Phil Brenner, the late Robert A. Pastor, and two thoughtful anonymous reviewers. An early version was presented at the Latin American Studies Association conference, where I received helpful comments from participants and audience members, notably Christopher Darnton, Eric Hershberg, Sebastian Bitar, and Natalia Saltalamacchia. A subsequent version was circulated at a working paper at the Centro de Investigación y Docencia Económicas, where I wrote the current version of the paper while on a productive visiting professorship. I am grateful for the support.2 Manning, B. (1977). "The Congress, the Executive and Intermestic Affairs: Three Proposals." Foreign Affairs 55(2): 306-324.3 González, G. G. (2001). "Las estrategias de política exterior de México en la era de la globalización." Foro Internacional 41(4 (166)): 619-671, Deblock, C., D. Brunelle, M. Rioux and L. Murillo S (2004). "Globalización, competencia y gobernanza: el surgimiento de un espacio jurídico transnacional en las Américas." Ibid.: 66-102, Navarrete, J. E. and A. G. Sánchez (2006). La reconstrucción de la política exterior de México: principios, ámbitos, acciones: una colección de ensayos, UNAM.

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considerations than by the continuous interplay of various domestic pressure groups in a

policy process that is open to so many external influences. On issues other than imminent

threats to national security, it is often easier for various groups in the United States to

influence U.S. policy toward Latin America and the Caribbean than it is for the U.S.

government to coordinate or control it.”4

Rarely, though, have those influential groups included Latin American

governments. This is not for a lack of interest. Intermestic issues top Mexican, Central

American, and Caribbean foreign policy agendas, pressing these governments to engage

with the U.S. policymaking process and seek to influence domestically oriented U.S.

decisions on migration, drug policy, and assault weapons bans. Why have Latin

American states struggled to influence intermestic policies? One common response might

focus simply on the relative power of the actors involved. Given power asymmetries, the

lack of policy coordination—particularly Latin American states’ inability to influence

U.S. policies—might seem unsurprising. The powerful United States can ignore the

outsize effects of its policies on its weaker neighbors. This explanation has several

shortcomings. First, it is hindered by the unitary actor assumption, which is poorly suited

to explain intermestic issues precisely because these mix foreign and domestic policy and

involve numerous interest groups. Secondly, several related bodies of research indicate

that asymmetries of power can be offset by asymmetries of interest and intensity. This

work originates from three main schools. The first draws on Keohane and Nye’s work on

transnationalism, based in part on U.S.-Canadian relations. This has also influenced

4 Lowenthal, A. F. (2010). "Obama and the Americas: promise, disappointment, opportunity." Foreign Affairs: 110-124.

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studies of paradoxical negotiating outcomes.5 The second includes studies of how

powerful states lose conflicts to weaker but more determined state and non-state actors.6

The third includes new currents on small states in International Relations, which

examines how these states occasionally exert outsized influence.7 These perspectives

have more recently influenced studies of inter-American relations, prompting a greater

focus on how Latin American states have gained autonomy and influence in their

relations with the United States.8 However, intermestic issues seem to present a puzzling

exception to these trends—and one that is not particularly well explained by indicators of

power.

This is especially puzzling given what has been seen as a 15-year decline in U.S.

attention to the hemisphere following September 11, 2001. This “inattention” is

sometimes blamed for failures to cooperatively address shared transnational challenges.

In March 2014, Michael Shifter, a prominent Washington observer of inter-American

relations, testified before a U.S. House subcommittee on “U.S. Disengagement from

5 Keohane, R. O. and J. S. Nye (1977). Power and interdependence : world politics in transition. Boston, Little, Brown.6 Mack, A. (1975). "Why big nations lose small wars: The politics of asymmetric conflict." World Politics 27(02): 175-200, Maoz, Z. (1989). "Power, Capabilities, and Paradoxical Conflict Outcomes." Ibid. 41: 239-266, Sullivan, P. L. (2007). "War Aims and War Outcomes: Why Powerful States Lose Limited Wars." Journal of Conflict Resolution 51(3): 496-524.7 Braveboy-Wagner, J. (2010). "Opportunities and limitations of the exercise of foreign policy power by a very small state: the case of Trinidad and Tobago." Cambridge Review of International Affairs 23(3): 407-427, Chong, A. Ibid."Small state soft power strategies: virtual enlargement in the cases of the Vatican City State and Singapore." 383-405, Panke, D. (2012). "Dwarfs in international negotiations: how small states make their voices heard." Ibid. 25: 313-328.8 Russell, R. and J. G. Tokatlian (2009). "Modelos de política exterior y opciones estratégicas: El caso de América Latina frente a Estados Unidos." Revista CIDOB d'Afers Internacionals(85/86): 211-249, Darnton, C. (2012). "Asymmetry and Agenda-Setting in US-Latin American Relations: Rethinking the Origins of the Alliance for Progress." Journal of Cold War Studies vol. 14(no. 4): pp. 55-92, Darnton, C. (2013). "After Decentering: The Politics of Agency and Hegemony in Hemispheric Relations." Latin American Research Review 48(3): 231-239, Santana, C. O. and G. A. Bustamante (2013). "La autonomía en la política exterior latinoamericana: evolución y debates actuales." Papel Político 18(2): 719-742, Friedman, M. P. and T. Long (2015). "Soft Balancing in the Americas: Latin American Opposition to U.S. Intervention, 1898–1936." International Security 40(1): 120-156, Long, T. (2015). Latin America Confronts the United States: Asymmetry and Influence, Cambridge University Press.

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Latin America,” noting that “Senior officials have, understandably, been distracted from

this hemisphere.”9 This view, shared by observers in the United States and Latin

America, implies that if U.S. policymakers could find more time and resources for Latin

America, shared problems would be more effectively addressed.10 On the other hand, by

strengthening the “asymmetry of interest,” U.S. “inattention” should further advantage of

Latin American states that maintain an intense focus on influencing U.S. policy on a

particular issue. From the perspective of the bargaining literature, the effect of U.S.

(in)attention is ambiguous. U.S. distraction alone does not necessitate the continuation of

policies unfavorable to Latin American and Caribbean states. Decreased U.S. attention

could present opportunities for Latin American countries to shape the agenda and

advance new policy ideas.11 Less powerful, but intensely committed, states can

sometimes overcome more powerful states with diffuse priorities. Seen through this lens,

Latin American states should have decent prospects for influencing U.S. policies if they

maintain resolve in the face of less cohesive U.S. policy preferences. This has not been

the case, even where coordinated policies would seem to promote a common interest.

Seen through a bargaining framework, the puzzle is: Why have Latin American

and Caribbean states so often failed to convert high levels of resolve into favorable

outcomes? Put another way, can Latin American and Caribbean states achieve policy

coordination on issues that require the United States to adjust intermestic policies? This

article argues that the lack of influence on U.S. policy is explained by the way in which

9 Shifter, M. (2014). U.S. Disengagement from Latin America: Compromised Security and Economic Interests. S. o. t. W. H. Committee on Foreign Affairs. Washington, D.C.10 Salcedo, G. (2013). "Delegating leadership: U.S. foreign policy towards Latin America." Post-Hegemonic Global Governance 3rd Edition(246): 79.11 Darnton, C. (2012). "Asymmetry and Agenda-Setting in US-Latin American Relations: Rethinking the Origins of the Alliance for Progress." Journal of Cold War Studies vol. 14(no. 4): pp. 55-92.

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intermestic issues mobilize interest groups, narrow domestic win-sets, and empower veto

players. Though the literature on intermesticity discusses the differing dynamics of U.S.

foreign policymaking, there is little attention to how these dynamics affect other

countries’ foreign policies towards the superpower. Intermestic issues create different

challenges (and some opportunities) for Latin American states. Employing IR models of

the interaction of domestic and foreign politics,12 the articles argues that the difficulty of

influencing intermestic issues will be even greater for Latin American and Caribbean

states than influencing traditional U.S. foreign policies. If Latin American and Caribbean

foreign policies are to succeed, it will be through a changed approach that recognizes

these dynamics.

In the following sections, the article reviews the literature on intermestic issues,

highlights their centrality in U.S.-Latin American relations, and draws on studies of the

intersection of domestic and international politics in order to develop more thorough

theoretical explanations of the concept of intermesticity—an idea which has gained

currency largely in policy-oriented scholarship. The article then examines a long-running

intermestic dispute between the United States and Mexico over cross-border trucking.

This is approached as a longitudinal case study in order to explore Mexico’s diplomatic

adaptations to U.S. policy dynamics. The article then turns briefly to other relevant

intermestic issues on the U.S.-Mexican and U.S.-Latin American agendas, before

concluding by highlighting theoretical contributions and the study’s practical relevance.

At the domestic-international crossroads

12 Putnam, R. D. (1988). "Diplomacy and domestic politics: the logic of two-level games." International Organization 42(03): 427-460, Milner, H. V. (1997). Interests, institutions, and information: Domestic politics and international relations, Princeton University Press.

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Manning coined the term “intermestic” in the context of U.S. Executive-

Congressional relations, arguing that a reorganization of the U.S. foreign policy process

was needed to keep up with the changing times.13 Though connections between the

foreign and domestic had always existed, Manning believed they were growing deeper,

with global interdependence more intensely and instantly felt at the local political level.

Subsequent work has followed Manning’s focus on the U.S. domestic policy process,

particularly on trade policy and Congressional involvement.14 The literature largely

agrees that U.S. presidents have less latitude when dealing with intermestic issues than in

“traditional” foreign policy.

IR theory on the confluence of international and domestic politics provides

theoretical grounding for intermesticity. In 1988, Putnam noted, “Domestic politics and

international relations are often somehow entangled, but our theories have not yet sorted

out the puzzling tangle.”15 There has been significant progress, much of it building on

Putnam’s famous two-level-game framework, in which international negotiators conduct

parallel sets of negotiations. The first is with foreign counterparts; the second operates at

a domestic level with actors who have the power to ratify or reject a final agreement. A

final accord must be acceptable at both levels, narrowing the range of possible outcomes

to areas where the “win-sets,” defined by Putnam as the full set of acceptable agreements,

for the two levels overlap.16 Any deal must gain approval from foreign and domestic

13 Manning, B. (1977). "The Congress, the Executive and Intermestic Affairs: Three Proposals." Foreign Affairs 55(2): 306-324.14 Barilleaux, R. J. (1985). "The President, "Intermestic" Issues, and the Risks of Policy Leadership." Presidential Studies Quarterly 15(4): 754-767. Lindsay, J. M. (1992). "Congress and Foreign Policy: Why the Hill Matters." Political Science Quarterly 107(4): 607-628.15 Putnam, R. D. (1988). "Diplomacy and domestic politics: the logic of two-level games." International Organization 42(03): 427-460.16 Ibid.

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interests, creating a back-and-forth between the international and domestic levels; larger

win-sets make agreement more likely. Over the next decade, Milner expanded on

Putnam’s approach to develop a more fully formulated theory of how domestic politics

influence international actions.17 Almost all states are characterized by a degree of

competing interests; therefore, to understand policy decisions, including foreign policy,

Milner argues we must take into account the interests of relevant actors (normally

executive, legislative, and societal interest groups), how institutions structure decision-

making, and who has access to information about the matter under consideration. These

factors vary both across states and according to issue type. Building on Milner, I argue

that intermestic issues have generalizable effects on interests, institutions, and

information, and that these complicate foreign diplomatic efforts. Intermestic issues

affect interests among a range of domestic political actors that is both more divergent and

more salient than in other foreign policy issues. Secondly, intermestic issues are subject

to different institutional patterns—more access points and veto players exist. Access

points are understood, following Ehrlich, as “policymakers susceptible to lobbying.”18

The availability of “access” to a policy process in this sense differs depending on a

country’s foreign policy institutions and the issue area (the U.S. policy process is often

seen as pluralistic and porous, though perhaps less so in security crises). Veto players,

following Tsebelis, are defined as “individual or collective decisionmakers whose

agreement is required for the change of the status quo.”19 Finally, intermestic issues will

17 Milner, H. V. (1997). Interests, institutions, and information: Domestic politics and international relations, Princeton University Press.18 Ehrlich, S. D. (2007). "Access to protection: Domestic institutions and trade policy in democracies." International Organization 61(03): 571-605.19 Tsebelis, G. (2000). "Veto players and institutional analysis." Governance 13(4): 441-474.

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be characterized by greater information parity between domestic actors than in traditional

foreign policy issues, where the executive enjoys an advantage.

Milner notes that when actors with “dovish” preferences have greater decision-

making authority, cooperative outcomes are more likely to result. While interests will

vary depending on the case, intermesticity tends to weaken the decision-making authority

of actors with preferences linked to traditional foreign policy concerns. Intermesticity

also affects institutions and information. Intermestic issues fragment authority between

the executive branch and Congress, as well as within those two branches where they cut

across agencies and committees. The scandal over “Fast and Furious,” an illicit-gun-

tracking plan gone awry, involved a central concern of U.S.-Mexican foreign relations,

but the Justice Department, the House Oversight and Government Reform Committee,

and the Senate Judiciary Committee were central actors in the partisan drama. In other

intermestic issues, local concerns may trump party affiliation, as voters and special

interests feel directly affected and let their representatives know.20 At the same time,

Latin American policy processes have grown more complex, with greater involvement

from executive agencies, legislatures, civil society, and subnational governments.21

The dynamics of the intermestic agenda are crucial to Latin America and

Caribbean countries in two respects. First, these issues will be intensely felt due to the

effects of asymmetrical interdependence, where the smaller partner in an asymmetrical

dyad tends to be both more sensitive and vulnerable to policy changes.22 While drugs, 20 Rogowski, R. (1989). "Commerce and coalitions: How trade affects domestic political alignments." Princeton, NJ.21 Schiavon Uriegas, J. A. (2010). Las relaciones internacionales de los gobiernos estatales en México en la década 2000-2009. Relaciones internacionales. B. Torres and G. Vega. México, D.F., El Colegio de México.22 Keohane, R. O. and J. S. Nye (1977). Power and interdependence : world politics in transition. Boston, Little, Brown, Von Riekhoff, H. and H. Neuhold (1993). Unequal partners: a comparative analysis of

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migration, and trade have significant impacts in the United States, they are usually

distributed (albeit unevenly) across a large geography and economy. The same issues are

more strongly felt in smaller countries. Salvadoran migration has had a significant impact

on the United States, adding hundreds of thousands to certain metropolitan regions, but

that effect is small compared to how it is felt socially and economically in El Salvador,

where those migrants represent one-quarter to one-third of the population and whose

remittances accounted for 17 percent of Salvadoran GDP in 2010.23

The fragmentation of U.S. foreign policy authority on intermestic issues creates a

complicated tableau for foreign leaders and diplomats, who must consider the positions

and power of a broader range of actors. Responsibility will be divided between

policymakers with foreign and domestic portfolios, creating a bedeviling array

bureaucratic actors often averse to interagency cooperation. Many intermestic problems

do not receive the sort frequent high-level attention that might force coordination,

subjecting U.S. intermestic policies to periods of drift, even as the asymmetrical effects

heavily impact smaller countries. Just as intermestic issues undermine the effectiveness

of the U.S. executive branch, they challenge the foreign policies of countries seeking to

change U.S. policy.

U.S.-Latin American relations and the intermestic agenda

relations between Austria and the Federal republic of Germany and between Canada and the United states, Cambridge Univ Press, Smith, P. H. and A. D. Selee (2013). Mexico & the United States : the politics of partnership. Boulder, Lynne Rienner Publishers, Schiavon Uriegas, J. A. (2014). La teoría de la interdepencia Teorías de relaciones internacionales en el siglo XXI: Interpretaciones críticas desde México. J. A. Schiavon Uriegas, A. S. Ortega Ramírez, M. López-Vellajo Olvera and R. Velázquez Flores. Mexico, Benemérita Universidad Autónoma de Puebla, El Colegio de San Luis, A.C., Universidad Autónoma de Baja California, Universidad Autónoma de Nuevo León, Universidad Popular Autónoma del Estado de Puebla: 271-286.23 Pecquet, J. (2013). Foreign governments lobbying hard in favor of immigration reform. The Hill. Washington, D.C.

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In three decades of work on intermestic issues in the Americas, the primary focus

of scholarship has been on how U.S. policies are made and what their (mostly

deleterious) effects are in Latin American and the Caribbean. In 1987, Lowenthal

questioned the continued relevance of the traditional U.S. security agenda in Latin

America, while still arguing that the region’s importance to the United States would grow

because of trade, migration, “narcotics, terrorism, environmental degradation,” and

human rights. In the following years, those largely intermestic issues spurred greater U.S.

engagement with Latin America around migration, trade and investment,

counternarcotics, and democracy promotion. The role of interest groups became salient

during the Clinton administration. Dent noted: “[T]he policymaking environment will

become increasingly fragmented and easier to penetrate to affect Latin American policy

issues.”24 The policies generated as a result of this fragmentation have affected Latin

American countries in ways both intended and unintended. From the end of the Cold War

until 2014, U.S. policy toward Cuba was shaped largely by domestic interest groups—

even as this undermined U.S. diplomatic standing.25

Except for a narrow focus on border security, high-level U.S. attention to Latin

America declined precipitously with the attacks on September 11, 2001. Instead of

eliminating intermestic logics, this decline enhanced the power of bureaucratic and

particular interests. U.S. domestic politics could provoke more direct intervention in the

hemisphere. LeoGrande saw a bureaucratic reason for George W. Bush policies that

redefined social and political issues as security threats: drugs, crime, health, and “the

24 Dent, D. W. (1995). U.S.-Latin American policymaking : a reference handbook. Westport, Conn., Greenwood Press.25 Brenner, P., P. J. Haney and W. Vanderbush (2002). "The Confluence of Domestic and International Interests: U.S. Policy Toward Cuba, 1998-2001." International Studies Perspectives 3(2): 192-208.

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‘threat’ of ‘radical populism.’”26 Similar concerns about drugs and instability have

promoted interventionist U.S. policies, shaking the United States from a policy of

“benign neglect.”27 Only a handful of studies have asked whether Latin American or

other states can influence U.S. policy on intermestic issues, mostly on the questions of

trade and migration. Rosenblum notes, “Neither the literature on U.S. immigration policy

nor that on U.S.-Latin American relations emphasizes a Latin American role in migration

policymaking.”28 During the 1980s, Mexico dealt with migration issues exclusively

through the executive branch, declining an invitation to testify in the Senate or take part

in public relations campaigns. The push for NAFTA created a new dynamic, Reynaldo

Yunuén Ortega Ortiz notes, where both governments sought to create new norms to

promote better trade and political relations. “El Proyecto de Salinas intentó cambiar esa

situación, de modo que el pueblo viera en Estados Unidos una oportunidad, no una

amenaza.”29 This facilitated a changed approach on migration, too. Alba argues that

cooperative dialogues became a more important feature of U.S.-Mexican migration

policy under both Zedillo and Fox, though the positive official tone often contrasted with

the harsh facts at the border.30

26 LeoGrande, W. M. (2005). "From the Red Menace to Radical Populism: U.S. Insecurity in Latin America." World Policy Journal 22(4): 25-35.27 Crandall, R. (2008). The United States and Latin America after the Cold War. New York, Cambridge University Press, Crandall, R. (2008). Driven by drugs : US policy toward Colombia. Boulder, Colo., Lynne Rienner Publishers.28 Rosenblum, M. R. (2004). "Moving beyond the Policy of No Policy: Emigration from Mexico and Central America." Latin American Politics and Society 46(4): 91-125.29 Ortega Ortiz, R. Y. (2000). Las relaciones México-Estados Unidos y la génesis del Tratado de Libre Comercio de América del Norte. México, Estado Unidos, Canadá, 1997-1998. B. Mabire. México, El Colegio de México: 23-61.30 Alba, F. Ibid.Diálogo y incomprensión: El tema migratorio a cuatro años de vigencia del TLC: 157-178, Alba, F. (2003). Del diálogo de Zedillo y Clinton al entendimiento de Fox y Bush sobre migración. México, Estados Unidos, Canadá, 1999-2000. B. Mabire. México, El Colegio de México: 109-164.

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The second area where there has been some attention to Latin American policies

toward the U.S. on intermestic issues regards trade negotiations, which have been

identified since E.E. Schattscheider’s Politics, Pressure, and the Tariff as a central point

of contention between international trading partners and domestic interest groups.31 The

North American Free Trade Agreement has been closely studied as a case of confluence

between U.S. foreign and domestic policies.32 Both the process of negotiating NAFTA

and its effects led to the formation of a very different Mexican approach to foreign

policymaking,33 but one still embroiled in intermestic issues.

Approaching intermestic diplomacy

Instead of looking at how intermesticity affects U.S. foreign policymaking or how

those policies affect Latin Americans, this asks how Latin American countries approach

issues that affect them as deeply as any foreign policy issue, but which U.S. policymakers

rarely consider foreign policy. Why has strong Latin American interest achieved so little

in terms of greater coordination and more positive outcomes, from those states’

perspectives? The prominence of intermestic issues should cause Latin American leaders

to shift resources to influence the broader range of actors in the U.S. policy process who

31 Schattschneider, E. E. (1935). Politics, pressures and the tariff; a study of free private enterprise in pressure politics, as shown in the 1929-1930 revision of the tariff. New York, Prentice-Hall. Pastor, R. A. (1980). Congress and the politics of U.S. foreign economic policy, 1929-1976. Berkeley, University of California Press.32 Garciadiego Dantan, J. (1994). El TLC día a día : crónica de una negociación. México, M.A. Porrúa Grupo Editorial, Milner, H. V. (1997). Interests, institutions, and information: Domestic politics and international relations, Princeton University Press, Mayer, F. W. (1998). Interpreting NAFTA : the science and art of political analysis. New York, NY [u.a.], Columbia Univ. Press, Cameron, M. A. and B. W. Tomlin (2000). The making of NAFTA : how the deal was done. Ithaca, Ny, Cornell University Press, Serra Puche, J. (2015). El TLC y la formación de una región: Un ensayo desde la perspectiva mexicana. México, Fondo de Cultura Económica.33 De la Garza, R. O. and J. Velasco, Eds. (1997). Bridging the border : transforming Mexico-U.S. relations. Lanham, Md., Rowman & Littlefield, Ortega Ortiz, R. Y. (2000). Las relaciones México-Estados Unidos y la génesis del Tratado de Libre Comercio de América del Norte. México, Estado Unidos, Canadá, 1997-1998. B. Mabire. México, El Colegio de México: 23-61, Domínguez, J. I. and R. Fernández de Castro (2001). The United States and Mexico : between partnership and conflict. New York, Routledge.

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make decisions regarding intermestic issues. This will likely spur growing attention to

Congress, executive branch agencies, and interest groups, business, and NGOs.

From the perspective of a foreign government, these intermestic dynamics focus

on two related aspects: win-sets and access points for domestic interests. Adapting

Putnam’s two-level framework, I argue that intermestic issues present a narrower

domestic win-set, or range of acceptable agreements, than traditional foreign policy

issues. Putnam presents his win sets in terms of relatively fixed ranges of preferences.

There is flexibility within a range of acceptable outcomes, but that range is assumed to be

pre-determined, particularly for the domestic actors with whom an international

negotiator must simultaneously contend. In practice, the range of preferences might be

malleable, with foreign and domestic actors seeking to shape it. The cost of “no-

agreement” will affect win-set size, and perceptions of those costs may change. The

second part of the explanation focuses on the number of access points, or “policymakers

susceptible to lobbying,” available in the policy process. Intermestic issues, by their

nature, involve hosts of departments and agencies. Though these agencies are formally

part of the executive branch, they are often more responsive to Congressional oversight

and appropriations committees that shape their budgets and operations over decades than

to other parts of the executive. This opens more access points, which are readily taken

advantage of by interest groups. Ehrlich argues that as the number of access points

increases in a democracy, so does protectionism.34 The same might hold for other

domestically oriented policies with international effects, leading to less “dovish”

outcomes, in Milner’s terms. Access points provide not just an opportunity for influence,

34 Ehrlich, S. D. (2007). "Access to protection: Domestic institutions and trade policy in democracies." International Organization 61(03): 571-605.

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but give many more actors—primarily members of Congress—de facto vetoes.35 Unless

foreign actors can overcome domestic interests, then the greater number of access points

that characterize intermestic issues will narrow the win set, giving the executive less

wiggle room even in cases where he/she would like to accommodate the interests of a

foreign ally. With the executive more constrained, foreign ministry and presidential

diplomacy will decline in effectiveness.

Because the dynamics of intermestic issues vary from those of traditional foreign

policy issues, they require a different type of diplomacy. To influence intermestic

policies, Latin American governments will have to try to expand domestic win-sets and

neutralize veto players. In theory, access points also open doors for the foreign

governments that patronize Washington’s myriad lobbying and PR firms.36 Lobbying

presents an option for foreign governments seeking influence, though they face greater

legal, political, and financial restrictions than domestic actors, which might also represent

groups of voters and make campaign contributions. For smaller Latin American and

Caribbean states, this will be an even taller order. Intermestic diplomacy demands greater

resources, both in the form of cash for hiring lobbyists and lawyers well-versed in the

U.S. process, and in terms of diplomatic staffs. The states of the Caribbean littoral face

another challenge—though perhaps one that is fading in recent years. As a response to

U.S. interventions, many Latin American and Caribbean states developed diplomatic and

international legal traditions focused on non-intervention and non-interference in foreign

affairs. These traditions could produce reluctance to get deeply involved; even if that is

dismissed, they have produced diplomatic corps with less experience in managing the 35 Tsebelis, G. (2002). Veto players: How political institutions work, Princeton University Press.36 Newhouse, J. (2009). "Diplomacy, Inc. : The influence of lobbies on U.S. foreign policy." Foreign Affairs May/June.

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“inside baseball” that dominates Washington politics. These states, too, face domestic

political situations that affect their foreign policy efforts.

Case selection

Using this approach, this paper examines an illustrative case involving U.S.-

Mexican relations. I do not claim this relationship is representative of U.S.-Latin

American relations more broadly. As the largest country of the Caribbean littoral, Mexico

can deploy greater resources to support its foreign policy objectives—as evidenced by its

aggressive, costly lobbying for U.S. Congressional approval of the North American Free

Trade Agreement. Additionally, Mexico shares a border and an immense commercial

relationship with the United States, which makes Mexico more salient on the U.S. agenda

and offers greater access to bureaucrats and members of Congress. On the other side, the

article focuses on the United States. In part, this reflects the literature on intermesticity.

Given its relatively open, pluralistic, and divided policy process, the United States’

system includes many access points and veto players. It is not clear how generalizable

this argument is to other democratic countries—though it has been suggested that the

European Union and many of its member states similarly provide myriad access points.37

Though hardly a “median case,” cases from U.S.-Mexican relations provide the

case-study researcher with “extreme values” that help explore causal mechanisms against

competing explanations. U.S.-Mexican relations are characterized by deep intermesticity

in which economies, societies, and security are intertwined. Within U.S.-Mexican

relations, I examine the bilateral dispute over cross-border trucking, which formed part of

37 Mazey, S. and J. Richardson (2006). "Interest groups and EU policy-making." European Union: Power and policy-making: 247, Dür, A. (2008). "Bringing Economic Interests Back into the Study of EU Trade Policy‐Making." The British Journal of Politics & International Relations 10(1): 27-45.

16

NAFTA. When the trucking provision was due to go into force, the United States delayed

implementation. On the U.S. side, the case drew in Congress and a host of interest

groups; it also sparked a strong reaction from Mexico. Mexican and U.S. foreign policy

goals were opposed for much of this case, which is a necessary precondition to examine

Mexican attempts to alter U.S. foreign policy. The case extends from 1995 to 2011,

covering several presidential periods in both countries. Longitudinal, within-case

comparisons allow for an examination of different factors, exploring more than the

correlation of intermesticity with outcomes. It is one case that comprises many

observations. A case study allows for the examination of causal mechanisms, as well as

the preferences and interactions of the myriad actors involved—how in addition to why.

After treating this case in depth, I highlight a number of other issues where intermestic

dynamics have limited Latin American influence, though for reasons of space, these are

treated with much less depth.

Intermestic foreign policy: NAFTA Trucking Dispute

On March 16, 2009, in the midst of a recession, the Mexican government

announced tariffs on 89 U.S. exports, accounting for about $2.4 billion worth of trade.38

The immediate provocation for the retaliatory tariffs, which had been authorized nine

years earlier by a trade-dispute panel, was a Congressional decision to eliminate funding

for a pilot cross-border trucking program. The action was the nadir of a 15-year dispute

between Mexico and the United States. The disagreement about whether Mexican

trucking companies would be allowed to operate within the United drew in business

38 Levin, J. J. and M. Drajem (2009). Mexico Retaliates With Tariffs After U.S. Bans Trucks. Bloomberg.com. New York. For a list of the products affected, see “Mexico Retaliation: NAFTA Trucking Dispute,” U.S. Department of Commerce. Available online: http://www.trade.gov/mas/ian/static/MX%20Retaliation%20Summary_FINAL_public%20version_Latest_tg_ian_002692.pdf .

17

organizations, labor unions, lobbyists, federal agencies, and the Mexican government.39

This segment of the 16-year feud lasted more than two years before the Obama

administration, the U.S. Congress, and the Mexican government forged a deal.40 The

question was significant for Mexican leaders, both on its own and as a symbol of U.S.

compliance with NAFTA obligations. However, U.S. diplomatic institutions appeared

powerless against Congress, parochial agencies, and a swarm of interest groups.

In 1980, President Jimmy Carter signed a package of deregulation known as the

Motor Carrier Act, which allowed Canadian and Mexican trucking companies to operate

within U.S. borders. Just five Mexican carriers registered to do so, and Mexico did not

allow U.S. truckers. In 1982, Congress passed a moratorium on allowing foreign trucks,

though the act allowed the president to waive the ban. Though Reagan allowed Canadian

trucks to continue to operate, extensions of the moratorium kept Mexican truckers out

through the mid-1990s; American truckers were likewise banned from Mexico.41 NAFTA

dramatically altered the legal context. In negotiations in 1992, the George H.W. Bush

administration specifically pushed for the inclusion of trucking in NAFTA. The trucking

provisions were to come into force in December 1995, but the U.S. Teamsters sued to

block the agreement’s implementation. Initially, the U.S. and Mexican governments

coordinated to delay the first phase of implementation, which would have allowed trucks

to operate in U.S. and Mexican border states. U.S. officials cited concerns about safety,

39 MacDonald, C. (2009). "NAFTA Cross-Border Trucking: Mexico Retaliates After Congress Stops Mexican Trucks at the Border." Vanderbilt Journal of Transnational Law 42(5): 1631-1662.40 Presidents Calderón and Obama announced a deal in March 2011 under which Mexico would lift half the retaliatory tariffs while the U.S. began registering Mexican trucks. The rest of the tariffs would lifted when the first Mexican company began operating across the border. Registration began in mid-July and the first carrier, Transportes Olympic, began operating in October 2011. 41 MacDonald, C. (2009). "NAFTA Cross-Border Trucking: Mexico Retaliates After Congress Stops Mexican Trucks at the Border." Vanderbilt Journal of Transnational Law 42(5): 1631-1662.

18

environmental soundness, and drug trafficking, while Mexico feared its trucking industry

was ill-prepared to face American competition.42 In an eleventh-hour postponement,

Clinton extended the moratorium, arguing that the delay was needed to ensure road

safety. Instead of being able to operate more freely, U.S. officials stepped up inspections

of Mexican trucks at the border in response to union concerns without coordinating

policies with Mexico.43 Trucks were restricted to operating within 25 miles of the

border.44 The decision upset some U.S. trucking companies that had been planning to

expand into Mexico, but placated an important Democratic constituency. Chaffing at the

unilateral inspections, Mexico quickly protested under NAFTA’s Chapter XX dispute

settlement mechanism;45 Mexico’s Trade and Economy Secretary Herminio Blanco

warned that a failure to implement would constitute a violation of the treaty. The first

stage of Chapter XX dispute resolution calls for consultations, and for nearly three years,

Mexican economy and transportation officials and their U.S. counterparts undertook

Chapter XX consultations. However, starting from a tense meeting on January 19, 1996,

those consultations failed to produce an agreement despite a number of false starts from

the U.S. Department of Transportation.46 After nearly three years, Mexico requested the

formation of an arbitration panel under NAFTA’s Free Trade Commission, which found

in favor of Mexico and set a deadline and conditions for opening to Mexican trucks.47

42 Sanger, D. E. (1995). Dilemma for Clinton on Nafta truck rule. New York Times. New York, MacDonald, C. (2009). "NAFTA Cross-Border Trucking: Mexico Retaliates After Congress Stops Mexican Trucks at the Border." Vanderbilt Journal of Transnational Law 42(5): 1631-1662.43 Sanger, D. E. (1995). Dilemma for Clinton on Nafta truck rule. New York Times. New York, Sanger, D. E. (1995). U.S. and Mexico postpone Nafta truck crossings. New York Times. New York.44 Carbaugh, R. J. "NAFTA and the US-Mexican Trucking Dispute."45 Hall, K. (1995). Mexico protests border action, NAFTA complaint takes U.S. by surprise. Journal of Commerce: D2.46 Rico Galeana, O. A. (2001). La integración del autotransporte de carga en el marco del Tratado de Libre Comercio de América del Norte. [Mexico]; Sanfandila, Qro., Secretaría de Comunicaciones y Transportes ; Instituto Mexicano del Transporte.47 Watch, W. (1998). Mexico Seeks NAFTA Panel on Truckers. Wall Street Journal. New York: A11.

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When the U.S. House proposed steep fines for Mexican trucks that passed the allowed

zone of operations, Mexican officials boycotted meetings on the subject48 Despite

pressure from Mexico directly and through the arbitration finding, the Clinton

administration flouted the January 2000 deadline, which “delighted the powerful

Teamsters union at a time when Vice President Al Gore [was] vigorously seeking its

endorsement.” It also drew increasingly vociferous protests from Mexican officials, who

cited the clear violation of the trade accord. Republicans protested the action,

complaining that the administration was making decisions to boost Gore’s standing.49

Some Congressional Democrats cited union concerns in support of the administration.50

The U.S. decision owed heavily to domestic political factors, which narrowed the Clinton

administration’s win-set to the point where it did not seem to overlap with Mexico’s. The

Mexican position largely reflected major exporters’ preferences.51 Clinton’s stalling

allowed Democrats to ignore Mexican protests and delay the issue for the rest of the term.

Shortly after George W. Bush’s inauguration, the NAFTA arbitration panel ruled

against the United States. A former Texas governor who promised to enhance ties with

Mexico, Bush owed little to the Teamsters or other cross-border-trucking opponents. The

NAFTA panel’s decision, made official in February 6, 2001, said the U.S. Department of

Transportation must judge shipping company applications on merit, not nationality. It

allowed Mexico to assess damages and retaliatory tariffs should the United States refuse 48 Espinosa, J. (1999). Rechazan transporte mexicano. El Universal. Mexico City.49 Burgess, J. (2000). Battle at the border Washington Post. Washington, D.C.: H01, Greenhouse, S. (2000) "U.S. delays opening border to trucks from Mexico." New York Times.50 Lipinski, D. (2000). American and Mexican truck drivers are casualties of NAFTA. Congressional Record. Washington, D.C., GPO Access: H2376-H2377.51 Interestingly, several major Mexican trucking groups welcomed Clinton’s decision and continued to oppose the opening at least through 2001, but the Mexican government pressed ahead with the case during both PRI and PAN governments. Rico Galeana, O. A. (2001). La integración del autotransporte de carga en el marco del Tratado de Libre Comercio de América del Norte. [Mexico]; Sanfandila, Qro., Secretaría de Comunicaciones y Transportes ; Instituto Mexicano del Transporte.

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to comply; Bush announced he would do so before making an official visit to Mexico.

Seemingly, the Bush administration’s win-set aligned closely with Mexico’s. However, at

this point, the second part of the above explanation comes into play: Intermesticity

created numerous access points and empowered veto players. Following Bush’s

announcement, the issue gained increased attention in Congress. With their interests no

longer represented by the White House, opponents including the Teamsters turned their

attention to Congress.52 Mexico, at least initially, did not.

Given the trade issue’s implications for domestic interest groups, and the need

to appropriate funds to certify Mexican trucks, the Democratic-controlled Senate held

important cards. The debate surfaced in the 2002 transportation appropriations bill. The

House adopted a strong-armed amendment that “none of the funds from this act may be

used to process applications by Mexico-dominated motor carriers” to operate outside the

immediate border region.53 The House Subcommittee on Highways and Transit examined

the arbitration finding in a hearing on July 18. In his testimony, Transportation Secretary

Norman Mineta said that recent Congressional votes “have sent a very clear message.

That is, that Congress will insist the United States have a vigorous, effective safety

program in place prior to implementing the truck and bus accession provisions of

NAFTA.” Mineta vowed to work with Congress and asked the House to restore funding

to implement NAFTA obligations by the start of 2002, reflecting as much concern with

Congress as with Bush’s stated policy.54 Senator Patty Murray, chair of the transportation

52 Greenhouse, S. (2001). Bush to open country to Mexican truckers. New York Times. New York.53 Sabo, M. (2001). Amendment offered by Mr. Sabo. Congressional Record. Washington, D.C., GPO Access. 147: H3586.54 (2001). NAFTA arbitration panel decision and opening the border to Mexican motor carriers. Subcommittee on Highways and Transit. Washington, D.C., GPO Access.

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appropriations subcommittee, took aim at the House approach of blocking traffic and at

the president’s approach of open borders.

I think we have done a very good job of not doing what the House did, which was

to absolutely prohibit any truck from coming across the border, and not do what

the President has asked, which was to simply open up the borders and let trucks

come through at will, but to put together a comprehensive piece of legislation

which I believe will clearly mean we will be able to have a bill that is passed that

assures constituents, whether they live in Washington State or constituents living

in border States, when they see a truck with a Mexican license plate, they will

know that truck has been inspected, that its driver has a good record, that it is safe

to be on our highways, as we now require of Canadian trucks and American

trucks.55

Murray’s plan, co-sponsored by Alabama Republican Richard Shelby, called for

compliance reviews for Mexican companies performed by the Department of

Transportation. Mexican truckers would have to pass a 22-item checklist of standards,

drastically delaying full implementation of the ruling. In a letter to appropriations chair

Senator Robert Byrd of West Virginia, President Bush threatened to veto the

transportation bill if it banned Mexican trucks. The bill drew threats of retaliation from

Mexican President Vicente Fox.56 The dynamic set up an inter-branch showdown in

which the U.S. executive favored policy coordination with Mexico. The Teamsters

intensified lobbying in July, focusing on alleged public safety implications of Mexican

trucks. Union leader James Hoffa made several trips to the Hill. The appeal to public

55 Murray, P. (2001). Department of Transportation and Related Agencies Appropriations Acts of 2002. Congressional Record. Washington, D.C., GPO Access. 147: S8302.56 Weiner, T. (2001). Mexico vows to retaliate against U.S. on trucking. New York Times. New York.

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safety, along with GOP efforts to court segments of the Teamsters, led some

Congressional Republicans to distance themselves from Bush’s policy.57 Congress

ignored Bush’s veto threat and passed an appropriations bill, P.L. 107-87, with the

Senate’s safety checklist.58

With the House’s blanket prohibition out of the final bill, the White House and

Congress compromised in the conference bill. Bush backed away from his veto threat. In

the wake of the September 11, 2001 attacks, the administration could scarcely reject

additional screening at the borders.59 A year after the bill went into effect, Secretary

Mineta declared that all the Congressional stipulations had been met and that the

department would begin to process Mexican applications. The certification was

challenged by an Inspector General report in 2005, which concluded that only eight of the

conditions had been fulfilled. The plan was quickly halted by a court challenge requesting

an environmental review; the decision was overturned 18 months later, but during that

time, implementation was effectively halted.60 The courts provided another veto point that

rarely affects presidential decisions on traditional foreign policy issues.

The dispute simmered quietly until 2007, when a new transportation secretary

announced a “demonstration program” to allow a hundred Mexican carriers to operate in

the U.S. within 60 days. However, as compared to 2001, when Republicans controlled the

57 Cooper, H. (2001). Bush wants to reverse House attempt to keep Mexican trucks off U.S. roads. Wall Street Journal. New York, Landers, J. and C. Lee (2001). Senate in path of truck fight. Dallas Morning News. Dallas, Tex.: 1D, Shenon, P. (2001). Teamsters may stall Bush goals for Mexican trucks and trade. New York Times. New York: A1.58 (2001). An act making appropriations for the Department of Transportation and related agencies for the fiscal year ending September 30, 2002, and for other purposes. 107-87. United States of America: 833, Fritelli, J. (2010). North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) implementation: The future of commercial trucking across the Mexican border. Washington, D.C., Congressional Research Service.59 Alvarez, L. (2001). Senate votes to let Mexican trucks in U.S. New York Times.60 Fritelli, J. (2010). North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) implementation: The future of commercial trucking across the Mexican border. Washington, D.C., Congressional Research Service.

23

House and Democrats held the Senate by the narrowest of margins, Congress now

included many Democrats recently elected on anti-Bush platforms. In the confirmation

hearings for Transportation nominee Mary Peters, Arkansas Senator Mark Pryor had

asked if the department “is considering a pilot program to allow some long-haul Mexico-

domiciled motor carriers to operate throughout the United States.” Peters answered there

were no immediate plans for a pilot program.61 When the pilot program was announced

months later, Congress expressed its displeasure. The program had been jointly

developed by the U.S. and Mexican transportation departments, the result of policy

coordination between two executive branches, and was announced by U.S. Ambassador

to Mexico Tony Garza.62 Before the program could begin, Congress attached a provision

to an omnibus appropriations act that stipulated additional conditions regarding safety

and public comment for the pilot program. The legislation mandated a review by the

Inspector General; the day the IG report was released, the Department of Transportation

sent a letter to Congress stating that the issues had been addressed. The program began

immediately, on September 6, 2007.63 The fight continued. In cooperation with U.S.

officials, Mexican Transportation and Communications Secretary Luis Téllez traveled to

Washington in October to press for the program’s continuation, in what appears to be the

first high-level Mexican visit to Congress on the issue. Meanwhile, opposing U.S.

domestic interests continued to pressure Congress. A December 2007 appropriations bill

61 (2006). Nomination of Mary E. Peters to be Secretary of Transportation. Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation. Washington, D.C., GPO Access.62 In Mexico, new President Felipe Calderón supported the initiative, which was led by transport Secretary Luis Téllez Kuenzler. Notimex (2007). Ingresarán transportistas mexicanos a EU. El Universal. Mexico City.

63 Kovach, G. C. (2007) "For Mexican trucks, a road into U.S." New York Times, Fritelli, J. (2010). North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) implementation: The future of commercial trucking across the Mexican border. Washington, D.C., Congressional Research Service.

24

again barred the use of funds for the demonstration program. DOT authorized a two-year

extension of the program anyway. The amendment in the appropriations bill had

precluded funds from being used to “establish” a program, so the administration

announced the law did not apply because the program was already in operation—

disregarding Congressional intent and handing Mexico a brief pyrrhic victory. “Congress

tried but was unable to stop the demonstration project during the Bush administration.”64

The Teamsters, along with some consumer safety and environmental groups continued to

protest the program.

The political landscape changed with the election of Barack Obama to the

White House and broad Democratic majorities to both houses of Congress with union

support. Correcting the ambiguity in the previous legislative language, Congress stated:

None of the funds appropriated or otherwise made available under this Act may

be used, directly or indirectly, to establish, implement, continue, promote, or in

any way permit a cross-border motor carrier demonstration program to allow

Mexican-domiciled motor carriers to operate beyond the commercial zones along

the international border between the United States and Mexico, including

continuing, in whole or in part, any such program that was initiated prior to the

date of the enactment of this Act.65

The Obama administration had little interest in saving the program and provoking unions

or its allies in Congress. The president’s win-set aligned with the interest groups and

members of Congress who had managed to veto and stall Bush’s attempts at policy

coordination. Obama signed the bill, calming the inter-branch dispute that had boiled 64 MacDonald, C. (2009). "NAFTA Cross-Border Trucking: Mexico Retaliates After Congress Stops Mexican Trucks at the Border." Vanderbilt Journal of Transnational Law 42(5): 1631-1662.65 (2009). Omnibus Appropriations Act.

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over during the Bush administration. Trimming his sails to the domestic winds, Obama

soon faced an international storm. Angered by a decade of stalling and another indefinite

suspension, Mexico applied punitive tariffs to U.S. products with an estimated value of

$2.4 billion. The Mexican government had long avoided the option, for fear that it would

spill over into the larger trading relationship and hurt the Mexican economy. In response

to Mexico’s gambit, Obama spokesman Robert Gibbs announced the administration

would collaborate with Mexico and Congress to propose new legislation to create a

trucking project.66 Mexico’s selection of products, most subjected to moderate 10 to 20

percent tariffs, was aimed at the states and districts of powerful members of Congress and

immediately spurred reactions from various trade groups. Transportation Secretary Ray

LaHood planned meetings with members of Congress.67 Mexico added duties on

Christmas trees and other significant exports from Oregon, taking aim at Senator Murray,

who chaired the relevant subcommittee, and Representative Peter DeFazio, who had for

years highlighted his safety worries about Mexican trucks.68 Mexico’s intermestic

diplomacy caused a quick splash.

A week after the tariffs took effect, LaHood went to the Hill and met with

lawmakers. The White House hoped to have an agreement for Obama to take to an April

meeting with Mexican President Calderón. However, two key Democrats were ill-

disposed to any program that allowed Mexican truckers into the United States.69 Mexico’s

tariffs fractured Congress’s approach to the issue, creating a stalemate for the remainder

of the term. Despite promises from the administration to both Mexico and Congress that a

66 Boadle, A. (2009) "Mexico slaps tariffs on U.S. goods in truck feud." Reuters.67 Conkey, C., J. de Cordoba and J. Carlton (2009) "Mexico issues tariff list in U.S. trucking dispute." Wall Street Journal.68 DiMessio, R. (2009) "Mexico’s new tariffs could cost Oregon millions." The Oregonian.69 Conkey, C. (2009) "LaHood pitches Mexico truck plan to skeptical lawmakers." Wall Street Journal.

26

new plan was forthcoming, no replacement program emerged. LaHood was reported to

have proposed a plan to cabinet officials in March 2010, but it was never made public.70

The tariffs inspired a change of heart from Senator Murray, who introduced

appropriations language in July 2010 to re-start the demonstration program. In May 2010,

Murray met with the Mexican ambassador and sent a letter to President Obama

demanding a solution to the problem. Murray included language in the transportation

appropriations bill directing the secretary of transportation to resolve the dispute by

October.71 Her wording did not make the version passed by the House, however, and was

replaced with a restriction that any cross-border plan meet previous Senate

requirements.72 Fifty-four representatives wrote LaHood and U.S. Trade Representative

Ron Kirk on March 1, 2010, to “implore you to work quickly to implement a solution that

ensures safety and normalizes trade” and asking for improved inter-branch

communication.73 Mexico’s tariffs raised the costs of “no-agreement” and broadened

domestic win-sets, though some opponents remained stalwart. Congressional opponents

asked not for an end to the dispute, but that the administration renegotiate the relevant

section of NAFTA. DeFazio argued it would be “difficult, if not impossible, to receive

Congressional support” for any new trucking plan. His letter invoked the Mexican drug

war, arguing that U.S. trucks could not operate in Mexico because they would be

hijacking targets.74 Asked about the dispute during an unrelated hearing on May 6,

LaHood said a plan was “closer than soon,” referring to a promise made during a

70 (2010) "LaHood floats proposal aimed at resolving Mexican trucking dispute." Inside U.S. Trade Online.71 Murray, P. (2010) "Mexican trucks: Murray includes language in bill urging administration to protect Washington State farmers."72 (2010). Transportation, Housing, and Urban Development, and Related Agencies Appropriations Act 73 Cardoza, D. (2010). R. LaHood and R. Kirk. Washington, D.C.74 DeFazio, P. (2010) "DeFazio leads bipartisan letter urging repeal of Mexican truck program and addresses retaliatory tariffs."

27

previous visit to the Hill that a plan was on the way.75 After more than a year on inaction,

Mexico expanded its retaliatory tariffs on August 16, 2010, citing the lack of progress.76

The divisions in Congress—and amongst Congressional Democrats—stymied any

administration hopes of addressing the situation during the 111th Congress. Despite its

promises to provide a new plan, the administration appeared ambivalent, caught between

Mexican pressures and shifting domestic policy preferences. Even as win-sets appeared

to move closer to an alignment that could permit policy coordination, veto players like

DeFazio remained important actors. Key Congressional Democrats used their positions

first to kill the demonstration project and then to maintain the status quo.

With the election of a more Republican Congress in the 2010 midterms, prospects

for resolving the dispute improved. In March 2011, the executive assembled its plan, with

Mexican President Calderón’s state visit creating a deadline. The two presidents

announced a plan to create a program similar to the one nixed in early 2009. The final

agreement was offered in June 2011, after Congressional review and public comment.

Both Mexican and American trucks would have to face requirements, stricter than those

in NAFTA, to operate across the border. Though trucks can make cross-border hauls,

they are prohibited from shipping cargo within the other country. Despite the restrictions,

the Teamsters and other unions continued to attack the proposal as killing jobs,

depressing wages, and inviting greater drug violence.77 However, pressure from

supportive interest groups had grown significantly because of the Mexican tariffs, adding

75 (2010). Hearing on FY 2011 budget proposals to support the interagency partnership for sustainable communities. Subcommittee on Transportation, Housing and Urban Development, and Related Agencies. Washington, D.C.76 Hendricks, D. (2010) "Mexico’s tariff list may ding Texas." Houston Chronicle.77 Aguilera, E. (2011) "U.S., Mexico reach truck deal." San Diego Union-Tribune, Williamson, E. (2011) "U.S., Mexico agree to settle trucking feud." Wall Street Journal.

28

U.S. farmers and meat exporters to the coalition of pro-business groups and the truck-line

lobby American Trucking Associations. The second round of tariffs had targeted a range

of agriculture, and pork producers were being hurt in an important foreign market.78

Unlike the previous, rancorous periods when administrations sought to implement the

NAFTA provision, the three months of comment were largely silent on Capitol Hill.

Teamsters President Hoffa continued to rail against the program in the press, but the

tariffs had turned powerful interests like the U.S. Chamber of Commerce, not a major

force on the issue earlier, into vocal backers of the deal. Through a high-stakes move,

Mexico had deployed aspects of the interdependent relationship to shift the domestic

politics of this intermestic issue. To be sure, DeFazio—transportation unions were his

campaign’s top backer—and a few others remained adamantly.79 After the deal was

signed in July, DeFazio protested to Secretary LaHood and introduced a bill (H.R. 2407)

to prohibit funding for required electronic onboard recorders for Mexican trucks.80 Now

in the minority, however, DeFazio’s bill was stuck in committee and failed to gain

traction. On October 21, 2011, the first truck admitted under the program, based in

Monterrey, Mexico, crossed the border at Laredo, Tex.81 The Mexican government lifted

the tariffs, ending the dispute—at least for the time being. For nearly 16 years, the

dynamics of intermestic politics—narrow win-sets and access points that empowered

veto players—had overcome Mexican efforts to gain compliance with NAFTA, initially

from the same president who had signed it, then from the supportive son of the president

78 Arrioja, J. E. (2011) "Mexico to cut 50% of U.S. tariffs as truck border dispute ends." Bloomberg, Rojas, M. (2011). Re: Docket No. FMCSA-2011-0097. D. o. Transportation. Washington, D.C., American Trucking Associations.79 Appelbaum, B. (2011). U.S. and Mexico sign trucking deal. New York Times. New York, (2012). "OpenSecrets.org." 2012.80 DeFazio, P. (2011) "DeFazio fights cross-border trucking "pilot" program ".81 Hendricks, D. (2011) "Mexican truck is making historic delivery in U.S." Houston Chronicle.

29

who negotiated it. Even the final solution remains tentative—a demonstration program—

and falls short of the opening detailed by NAFTA.

It is important to briefly consider alternative explanations for the case. The most

common explanation, both from Realism and from the main schools of thought on U.S.-

Latin American relations would point to U.S. power as the explanation for Mexico’s

ineffectiveness in pursuing the implementation of the NAFTA provision. Power was not

absent, but it does not provide a satisfactory explanation. U.S. President George W. Bush

sought to effect policy coordination with Mexico, but he failed to do so because of

Congressional opposition and bureaucratic stagnation. Institutionalists might point to

NAFTA as an international agreement that would help realize joint gains, monitor

implementation, and compel compliance through international arbitration. However, the

United States ignored the decisions of international panels. Liberal scholars focused on

interdependence come closer to the mark in explaining Mexico’s final, partially

successful gambit of levying tariffs aimed at particular members of Congress. However,

while interdependence offered useful tools, the fact of interdependence preceded the

implementation of the pilot trucking program. Instead, to understand both the decade of

non-cooperation and the conclusion of partial U.S. compliance, we need to look at how

the dynamics of intermesticity affect the confluence between U.S.-Mexican bilateral

relations and U.S. domestic politics.

Relevance to other issues

The following section briefly highlights additional areas where, despite Latin American

efforts and the existence of shared interests, little progress has been made. In each, U.S.

30

intermestic dynamics appear to be a crucial factor. These examples are offered to suggest

the plausibility of the above argument and to suggest directions for further study.

Drugs and guns

As Juan D. Lindau argued in 2000, U.S. foreign counter-narcotics policies have

emerged largely from a domestic political context that merged puritanical roots, racial

biases, public fear of crime, and interest group pressure. The effect on Mexico, initially

apathetic about drug production and distribution, became obvious when the Nixon

administration effectively shut the border, causing chaos and economic damage that fell

asymmetrically to the south of the Rio Grande. Nowhere were these intermestic dynamics

clearer than in the annual “certification” hearings in the U.S. Congress regarding

Mexican collaboration with counternarcotics efforts, in clear contravention of the logic of

interdependence that NAFTA represented. Lindau points out the “impenetrability of the

U.S. legal system” and Mexico’s failed attempts to press the United States to adjust its

lax gun control laws, even as these worsen drug-related violence.82 Under President

Vicente Fox, Meyer notes that, “En el delicado asunto del narcotráfico, como ha sido el

caso por un largo tiempo, la colaboración mexicano-estadunidense se mantuvo en medio

de recriminaciones, desconfianza y tensión.” Fox scored a partial intermestic success,

winning the support of several members of Congress to provisionally exempt a

democratizing Mexico from the certification ritual.83 Cooperation increased, but often

Mexican influence seemed symbolic. The dynamic continued during Calderón’s sexenio.

U.S.-Mexican security cooperation grew ever deeper, driven externally by U.S. pressure

82 Lindau, J. D. (2000). El narcotráfico y las relaciones México-Estados Unidos. México, Estado Unidos, Canadá, 1997-1998. B. Mabire. México, El Colegio de México: 179-215.83 Meyer, L. (2003). México y el poder del norte al cierre del siglo: 1999-2000. México, Estados Unidos, Canadá, 1999-2000. B. Mabire. México, El Colegio de México: 9-20.

31

and internally by the increase of high-profile violence.84 However, the close security

cooperation did not allow Mexico greater influence in U.S. intermestic policy debates.

When former Mexican President Felipe Calderón addressed the U.S. Congress in May

2010, he criticized the recently passed Arizona anti-immigration law and called for

Congress to reinstate a ban on assault weapons. Such direct intervention in domestic

politics by a Mexican president would have been unthinkable a few decades before, but it

did nothing to change the parameters of the U.S. domestic political debate. The deeply

intermestic nature of this problem has stymied bilateral cooperation, even when it relates

to a high priority of the U.S. president, which has been the case with gun control for

much of President Obama’s two terms. Mexico’s influence on the matter has been null.

Lindau concludes that, “Desafortunadamente para México, todos los remedios para los

males que engendra la guerra contra el narcotráfico están fuera de su control, en vista de

la enorme demanda de drogas en Estados Unidos.”85

Criminalization of migration

Until recently, few sending states seemed interested in engaging with U.S.

migration debates; Mexico long preferred a policy of no policy toward its emigrants.

Instead, U.S. immigration policy was influenced by business groups interested in

maintaining flows of low-wage labor, pitted against nativist reprisals especially during

periods of high unemployment.86 More recently, debates on U.S. immigration laws have 84 Chabat, J. (2013). "La seguridad en la política exterior de Calderón." Foro Internacional LIII(3-4): 317-341.85 Lindau, J. D. (2000). El narcotráfico y las relaciones México-Estados Unidos. México, Estado Unidos, Canadá, 1997-1998. B. Mabire. México, El Colegio de México: 179-215.86 Alba, F. (2009). Migración internacional y políticas públicas. El estado de la migración. Las políticas públicas ante los retos de la migración mexicana a Estados Unidos. P. Leite and S. E. Giorguli. México, D.F., Consejo Nacional de Población: 23-45, Delano, A. (2011). Mexico and its diaspora in the United States : policies of emigration since 1848. New York, Cambridge University Press, Manaut, R. B. (2011). "México, Centroamérica y Estados Unidos: migración y seguridad." Migración y seguridad: nuevo desafío

32

drawn intense interest from Mexico and from countries throughout Central America and

the Caribbean, some of which have engaged in lobbying and public relations efforts

targeted at the U.S. Congress.87 Mexican and Central American policymakers have

indicated that the current state of migration policy, with high levels of undocumented

immigration through the first decade of the 21st century, was far from their optimal

preference. Many of these policymakers listed migration as the top bilateral issue and

believed they could influence U.S. migration policies to some extent.88

Alba notes that U.S. and Mexican politicians promoted NAFTA with specious

arguments that the agreement would relieve migratory pressures by delivering immediate

economic growth. Though the “spirit of NAFTA” contributed to initially positive

discussions between the U.S. and Mexican governments, Mexican frustration grew as the

Clinton administration confronted increased migration with stiffer border controls and

enforcement.89 The subsequent Bush and Fox administrations continued bilateral

dialogues, and Mexico initially achieved some of its smaller goals (if not the “whole

enchilada” that Fox sought).90 However, as Alba notes, U.S. unilateral enforcement

actions vitiated the spirit of this cooperative dialogue, worsened conditions for Mexican

migrants, and led to more deaths on the border. Though Mexico achieved higher-level

participation, the theme of migration was never “normalized” in the way Fox hoped. This

situation—and its intermestic dynamics—were greatly complicated by the September 11,

en México, México, Colectivo de Análisis de la Seguridad con Democracia: 180-182.87 Pecquet, J. (2013). Foreign governments lobbying hard in favor of immigration reform. The Hill. Washington, D.C.88 Rosenblum, M. R. (2004). "Moving beyond the Policy of No Policy: Emigration from Mexico and Central America." Latin American Politics and Society 46(4): 91-125.89 Alba, F. (2000). Diálogo y incomprensión: El tema migratorio a cuatro años de vigencia del TLC. México, Estado Unidos, Canadá, 1997-1998. B. Mabire. México, El Colegio de México: 157-178.90 Meyer, L. (2003). México y el poder del norte al cierre del siglo: 1999-2000. México, Estados Unidos, Canadá, 1999-2000. B. Mabire. México, El Colegio de México: 9-20.

33

2001 attacks.91 In the early 2000s, Mexican policymakers felt they had greater influence

on U.S. executive migration policy than Congressional policy, and even less influence on

the positions taken by non-governmental groups.92 Durand argues that by the late 2000s,

migration had been greatly minimized in the bilateral agenda, overwhelmed by the

securitization of U.S.-Mexican relations.93 In the wake of failed immigration reform bills

and facing a nationalist backlash exemplified by Republican presidential candidate

Donald J. Trump’s harsh anti-immigrant and anti-Mexico rhetoric, the limits of that

influence have never been clearer.

In another context, Griffin argued that Caribbean countries are victims of

domestic U.S. anti-crime politics, which provoked strict deportation policies.94 Deportees

have, at least in public perception, driven a crime wave in the receiving Caribbean states.

Central American gangs, or maras, are also to some extent an unintended consequence of

U.S. crime and deportation policies.95 The 2013-2014 wave of unaccompanied minors

reaching the U.S.-Mexico border, escaping situations of poverty and violence,

demonstrated that intermestic issues can provoke political crises for both U.S. and Latin

American leaders. The presidents of Honduras, Guatemala, and El Salvador have sought

91 Alba, F. Ibid.Del diálogo de Zedillo y Clinton al entendimiento de Fox y Bush sobre migración: 109-164, Alba, F. (2009). Migración internacional y políticas públicas. El estado de la migración. Las políticas públicas ante los retos de la migración mexicana a Estados Unidos. P. Leite and S. E. Giorguli. México, D.F., Consejo Nacional de Población: 23-45.92 Rosenblum, M. R. (2004). "Moving beyond the Policy of No Policy: Emigration from Mexico and Central America." Latin American Politics and Society 46(4): 91-125.93 Durand, J. (2013). "La "desmigratización" de la relación bilateral balance del sexenio de Felipe Calderón." Foro Internacional LIII(3-4): 343-364.94 Griffin, C. E. (2002). "Criminal deportation: The unintended impact of US anti-crime and anti-terrorism policy along its third border." Caribbean Studies: 39-76.95 Arana, A. (2005). "How the street gangs took Central America." Foreign affairs. 843: 98-110, Vogt, W. A. (2013). "Crossing Mexico: Structural violence and the commodification of undocumented Central American migrants." American Ethnologist 40(4): 764-780, Bruneau, T. C. (2014). "Pandillas and Security in Central America." Latin American Research Review 49(2): 152-172.

34

to pressure the U.S. government over the crisis and its causes,96 but ultimately these

attempts have drawn attention to domestic problems, poor governance, and corruption as

drivers of emigration. Whether it regards assault weapons or migration, Latin American

states have struggled to achieve more accommodating U.S. policies, despite increased

diplomatic efforts.

Conclusions

Can Latin American countries influence U.S. intermestic policies? The case of

Mexican trucking offers an emphatic “sometimes,” along with warnings about the

difficulties. The issues of drugs, guns, and migration also highlight the difficulties. To

return to Milner’s framework, intermestic issues produce specific dynamics of interests,

institutions, and information. Because trucking was thoroughly intermestic, the divergent

interests of numerous actors were salient. Most clearly, the interests of foreign policy-

oriented policymakers who sought smooth relations with Mexico and compliance with

international agreements, were very different from numerous legislators and the societal

interests, like the Teamsters, who backed them. Intermesticity multiplied access points

and allowed for the emergence of veto players. Institutions granted the legislature

numerous manners to shape, limit, and even cancel executive plans for meeting NAFTA

obligations. Interest groups accessed U.S. courts to delay U.S.-Mexican policy

coordination. Finally, the executive had no appreciable information advantage, especially

given the close relationship between the relevant U.S. agencies and related legislative

committees. Though greater comparison between traditional foreign policy and

intermestic cases is needed, this logic suggests that influencing intermestic issues is 96 McGreal, C. (2014). Central American leaders meet Barack Obama to criticise US border policy. The Guardian. London.

35

actually more difficult than influencing traditional foreign policy matters, though Mexico

had access to tools, in the form of international panels and “tools of interdependence”

that few other states do.97

How do the dynamics of intermesticity affect Latin American diplomacy to the

United States? The uneasy resolution of the case suggests that effectively influencing

these issues requires a different approach, with greater engagement with the U.S.

Congress and interest groups. Late in the case, Mexican officials began to engage directly

with Congress, before finally using tariffs to apply pressure and shift domestic win-sets.

This sort of diplomacy is more resource intensive, and of the countries around the

Caribbean littoral, Mexico is almost certainly best equipped to engage in intermestic

diplomacy. Central American and Caribbean states will face greater hurdles—and might

need to seek other alternatives, such as Antigua and Barbuda’s attempt to use the WTO to

pressure the United States over gambling.98 An Antiguan attempt to lobby and use tariffs,

as Mexico did, would be unlikely to succeed given the massive difference in market size

and resources. However, along with other examples, the example signals that institutional

routes that remove issues from domestic politics might be more helpful. NAFTA’s

Chapter 11 dispute resolution panels have worked relatively well. Though these initially

were a major break for Mexico, moving away from reliance on the Calvo Clause, they

facilitated the private investment that Mexico’s leaders sought via NAFTA at an

acceptable cost.99 In these cases, institutions offer an end-run around intermestic politics.

97 Chabat, J. (1997). Mexico's foreign policy after NAFTA: The tools of interdependence. Bridging the border : transforming Mexico-U.S. relations. R. O. De la Garza and J. Velasco. Lanham, Md., Rowman & Littlefield: pp. 33-47.98 Jackson, S. (2012). "Small states and compliance bargaining in the WTO: an analysis of the Antigua–US Gambling Services Case." Cambridge Review of International Affairs 25(3): 367-385.99 Vega Cánovas, G. (2003). ¿Inversión contra soberanía? México y Canadá y el capítulo 11 del TLCAN. México, Estados Unidos, Canadá, 1999-2000. B. Mabire. México, El Colegio de México: 197-242,

36

However, at the moment, some of the Western Hemisphere’s most salient

concerns remain trapped in U.S. intermestic politics. The confluence of the domestic and

international is central to understand U.S.-Latin American relations and the challenges

and opportunities for Latin American diplomacy today. It suggests that issues that are

intermestic from a U.S. perspective will present high hurdles for Latin American

countries that seek to influence U.S. policies, which has both scholarly and policy

implications given the widely noted salience of transnational issues. Both scholars and

practitioners have emphasized the need for greater policy coordination to address

transnational challenges including trade, energy and environmental, pandemics, and

migration. However, this article suggests that intermestic policies will present particular

problems for policy coordination, and from the perspective of Latin American and

Caribbean policy, will require dramatically different foreign policies.

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