Germany, the USA, and Russia in the Changing Worldjuly 7, 2017Interdependence and instability are defining characteristics of the modern globalized world. Despite the fact that globalization has brought clear advantages, such as the high rates of economic growth and the raising of living standards in almost all countries of the world, reducing the probability of a global armed conflict between key global players, it also has its disadvantages. The increasing competition primarily in trade and within economy as a whole for finite amounts of natural resources, in areas of influence and regulation, and for markets in general. The increase in the number and intensity of local armed conflicts, the emergence of new major players on the world arena (primarily China), including non-state and quasi-state actors, the shift of the conflict potential to the sphere of information and culture all exemplify that globalization not only increases opportunities, but also offers significant threats to future development.

The globalization of threats, in its turn, requires new approaches to the global governance system. Despite all efforts to reform the old (UN, OSCE, NATO) and form new global governance institutions (BRICS, G20), there is still no regulation in the world that could be relevant to the current state of development, pending challenges and threats. Thus, we still live in a situation of "timelessness" and "the end of history" of the 1990s, when the old bloc system of the Cold War times became part of history, and remained in the world were Euro-Atlantic institutions and associations headed by the United States.

These institutions, though having proved their relative effectiveness in comparison with their Soviet counterparts, appeared to be inadequate in their capacity to complete the tasks required in global governance. Moreover, as noted above, the rapid globalization opportunities and threats to development, as well as attempts of the Western countries to use these opportunities to the maximum advantage and to counter threats, began at least to seriously undermine the former unity of Western institutions and Euro-Atlantic community, if not to destroy it.

Until now, the crisis of Western institutions and the Euro-Atlantic world, as a rule, has been the weakening of the United States’ hegemony, reducing the share of Western countries in the world economy as an obstacle to European integration, crisis phenomena in the European Union, and as European security system issue, etc. At the same time, the current domestic political dynamics in the U.S. and EU countries — primarily in Germany — brings the issues of transatlantic or European-American relations to the forefront. The configuration of the future world order will depend on the dynamics of these relations.

Such tensions within Western institutions and the Euro-Atlantic region are also a serious challenge for Russian foreign policy, security, and economy, and, in general, for the understanding of its position in the world. Although Russia seeks parity with the United States in terms of strategic stability and global governance, the European Union and Germany remain the key priority for integration and development of relations, due to geographical and cultural-historical proximity and developed economic ties. However, Russia's aspirations face Germany's vision of its position and interests in Europe and throughout the world.

This leaves major questions unanswered. What are the major interests of each of the parties in the world and in Europe? Is there the potential for Moscow-Berlin axis? Is the U.S. really trying to prevent the normalization of Russian-German relations? How will the relations between Germany and the U.S. as well as between Russia and Germany develop in the short term?

In order to answer these questions, one should review the dynamics of the relations of the three countries up to the present date.

Russia-Germany-USA in the 2000s–2010s.Concerning the dynamics of relations between Germany and the U.S., Russia and Germany over the past almost two decades, one should firstly keep in mind the serious historical inertia in the relations. Such inertia, in some cases, can provide good conditions for the further development of relations (the case of Germany and the United States), or seriously complicate them (Russia- the U.S. case). However, regardless of the outcome, any inertia initially carries the threat of false interpretation of the other party’s interests and, as a consequence, incorrect strategic conclusions (Russia-Germany case). Since this article is primarily interested in the issues of German-American and Russian-German relations, we will not delve into the dynamics of Russian-American interaction in this period in great detail.

As already noted, relations between Germany and the United States had, and in part still retain, a solid safety margin. The assistance that the United States once provided to the Federal Republic of Germany on uniting the state on its terms (the takeover of the GDR, rather than developing a new constitution and the new status of the country), the country's membership in NATO as a guarantor of national security, broad economic and cultural-historical ties, and other policies all served to strengthen the ties between Berlin and Washington during the 90's in the previous century. However, in the early 2000’s there was a serious growth in disagreement between the two countries.

The first real challenge for the transatlantic ties between Germany and the United States was the decision of Second Bush Administration to begin a military campaign in Iraq in 2003. In many ways, this decision forereached the key characteristic of the U.S. foreign policy for many years to come-- namely, the gradual refusal to take the opinion of the allies, primarily of the NATO allies, in Europe into account, and the use of unilateral actions, with the possibility of creating so-called "coalitions of the willing." After the WWII, this practice was, and in many respects is, unacceptable for German political elites. The first stage of such friction at the time of Schröder’s office was largely leveled after Angela Merkel entered the office, as she was relying on the traditional approaches of German foreign policy, namely, maintaining good relations with the U.S. and maintaining transatlantic solidarity.

A Roadmap for U.S.-Russia Relations. Executive Summary of the CSIS and RIAC Report

The beginning of Barack Obama's presidency was promising for German-American relations. Along with the expectations of the U.S. withdrawal from the role of the "world policeman" (the approach shared by the two previous U.S. administrations) and a decrease in the employment of unilateral actions in the world arena, the German side wanted its overseas allies to be a partner in solving a number of problems. These include the issues of control over non-proliferation of weapons, the reforms of international organizations, and remedial actions after the global financial and economic crisis, to the problem of respect for human rights and control over environmental change. In addition, many people note that German public opinion was strongly impressed by the plans of the new administration on a wide range of domestic reforms. In particular, the public was impressed by the ideas of healthcare reform, active protection of human rights both within the country and abroad, etc. As further events illustrate, all of these expectations were clearly overstated. Many promises remained unfulfilled, including the shutdown of the Guantanamo prison, which, in the eyes of European public opinion, became a symbol of the violation of basic human

rights. In its turn, the disclosure of information on wiretapping of the European Union political leaders, especially of the German Chancellor Angela Merkel, further strengthened the distrust of the German society towards this main ally.

The economic dimension of the partnership between Germany and the United States was important in terms of increasing contradictions. Despite the constant quantitative growth in exports of German goods to the United States (which became the largest consumer of German exports), the problem of negotiating the establishment of the transatlantic trade and investment partnership has become one of the biggest stumbling blocks in bilateral relations. Despite the fact that it was the Germans initiated this agreement, and, in general, doing so promised many more benefits to Germany and the European Union through the reduction of tariffs and non-tariff barriers, which created regulatory standards, as a result of both internal political discussions and negotiations with overseas partners, German political elites and society once again faced the fear of a "zero-sum game" in favor of the United States.

The results of the presidential elections in the United States and the new office headed by Donald Trump were generally evaluated as negative in Germany, causing a new wave of disappointment towards the U.S. as a reliable ally. Although, according to the representatives of the German political elites, the initial shock is gradually becoming a secondary concern, while great concerns about the further U.S. commitments to NATO still remain. These include the concerns for the prospects for U.S. assistance in resolving the crisis in Ukraine, the issues of trade and economic relations, including the possible introduction of protective tariffs for German exporters, the issues on human rights, etc.

At the same time, German-Russian relations also came to the turn at the beginning of the 2000s. With a solid margin of safety, which was largely determined by the legacy of the "Eastern policy" of V. Brandt, and the priority for Germany in relations with Russia in the Eastern Europe.

The period of the first half of the twenty-first century was, in many ways, the most productive from the point of view of the development of bilateral Russian-German relations. Partly this was due to the inertia of the "Eastern policy" (that, according to many Russian and German experts de facto lost its importance after the unification of Germany), the development and deepening of trade, economic, cultural, and educational ties, as well as common approaches to understanding of international law and the role of multilateral institutions in the world. Historically, the largest expansion of the European Union in 2004 and the positive image of the EU in the Russian society of that period also played an important role. Overall, this allowed many experts to affirm the possible formation of the Paris-Berlin-Moscow axis, and the gradual integration of Russia into European structures and the construction of the so-called "Greater Europe from Lisbon to Vladivostok».

In spite of the rise to power of Angela Merkel, a supporter of strengthened transatlantic relations, Russian-German relations have all in all continued to develop in a positive way, especially in the sphere of economic cooperation. Although specific episodes, mostly connected to European security issues (including Russian President Vladimir Putin’s famous “Munich Speech” and Russia’s withdrawal from the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE) in reaction to the expansion of NATO) partially complicated bilateral relations, but nevertheless were not direct proof of an approaching crisis. It is worth separately mentioning the attempt to find a new trajectory for Russian-European relations under president Dmitry Medvedev, connected with the “Partnership for Modernization” initiative, which stipulated, along with widened trade and economic connections, gradual harmonization of the legal and regulatory mechanisms of Russia and the EU, considered to be the first concrete measure taken to build a “Greater Europe”.

The Ukrainian crisis and its consequences were unexpected for both sides. On one hand, for Russia, Germany’s position looked and still looks strictly pro-American. The Russian side assumed that the Federal Republic of Germany would support Crimea’s accession to the Russian Federation in 2014, analogous to the reunification of Germany in 1990 and Russia’s/the USSR’s position on the issue. On the other hand, Germany was caught off-guard by, from its point of view, the open annexation of foreign territory in Europe. The escalation of following events, including the military conflict in Eastern Ukraine, introduction of sanctions against Russia, and attempts to regulate the conflict using the “Minsk Agreements,” led to growing disappointment of both sides in not only political, but also economic connections.

One more factor which severely exacerbated and continues to exacerbate difficulties in Russian-German relations is Russia’s participation in the Syrian Civil War. For Germany, the Syrian conflict has become extremely sensitive not only because of the problems with Middle-Eastern refugees and the integration of forced migrants, problems now securely fixed in German domestic policy discussions, but also due to accusations of possible human rights violations by Russia during the implementation of air operations against anti-government forces in Syria. It is here that statements about how Russian interference significantly heightened the flow of immigrants to EU countries, and to Germany most of all, are frequently heard.

Today, the key strategic priorities of the United States are: finding new sources of economic growth including domestic reforms and returning some of the hi-tech industries back to the country, keeping NATO as the security guarantor in the Euroatlantic, searching for a solution to the Syrian crisis, and balancing China in the Asia-Pacific and trying to include it into resolving the North Korea nuclear problem. The EU at large and Germany in particular are viewed as semi-autonomous actors that may pursue their own interests as long as they do not collide with the interests of the US. Moreover, while keeping NATO as the main security guarantor in the region, more active EU and German involvement in European security is anticipated, mainly as a means of lifting the economic burden on the US economy. Russia is viewed mainly as a destabilizing power in European and international security systems, primarily because of the alleged interference in the Ukraine and in US and European domestic policies. It does imply that ad-hoc cooperation with Russia is possible for the US, though it is limited to a certain set of issues.

Strategic interests and prospects of Germany-US-Russia relationsAt the same time the top foreign policy imperative for Germany is keeping the EU together and on the track of ever closer integration. This imperative is based on a number of factors. First of all, the sheer idea of European integration and the EU was based on two imperatives: the need of containing Germany after its post-World War II economic and military revival, and on integrating the country into the Western regional and global governance institutions and thus preventing any form of German revenge-seeking. This action also affected the strategic thinking of German elites, and resulted in their strong passion for multilateralism in solving any global and international issues.

Secondly, the re-unification of Germany and the ensuing economic growth, as well as the weakening stance of France in European institutions, resulted in a surprising situation when mechanisms used for containing Germany and utilizing its economy in the interests of the EU became the mechanisms for Germany to secure its foreign policy interests. While dominating the issues of trade and financial regulation, Germany demonstrated political leadership in solving Southern Europe’s debt crisis, imposing sanctions against Russia, and in the admission of Syrian refugees. Therefore, it is Germany that really benefits from European integration and thus further European integration equals protecting German national interests.

 Russia and the West: How to Deal with the Threat of Extremism

Likewise, keeping good relations with the US is also one of the key priorities of German foreign policy. Despite all of the difficulties in dealing with the Trump administration and of the negative experience of the past decade, the US remains the key trading partner for Germany as well as the guarantor of European security. This in turn will push Germans into searching for a compromise with Trump, including the possible increase in military spending. The main risks lie in the possibility of trade-war and protective tariffs against German manufactures; therefore, German foreign policy is likely to become dependent on the political course of the new US administration.

The main complex issue will be the problem of further developing or at least stabilizing relations between Germany and Russia. Despite a significant number of people supporting restoration and development of bilateral relations between our countries, neither of our nations have any kind of clear and long-term vision of either party in its system of foreign and domestic policy priorities. For Germany, the need to have strong and special relations with Russia lost its significance after the re-unification and expansion of the EU. Since the key foreign policy imperative for Germany is keeping and strengthening the European integration, the interests of not only Poland and the Baltic States as well as Ukraine and Moldova to some extent largely outweigh the benefits of enhancing cooperation with Russia. Despite all the potential for expanding trade and economic ties as well as scientific, technical and cultural exchanges, Russia can offer little to become an intrinsically valuable priority for German foreign policy.

After the Ukrainian crisis erupted, Russia found itself trapped in a “security-development” dilemma. On the one hand, the key foreign policy priority for Russia has been maintaining its security. The rise of new security challenges and their rapid globalization aggravated this problem. At the same time, plummeting oil prices, economic stagnation and the threat of ever greater economic and technological underperformance, especially when compared to other developed countries, pushes Russian elites to normalizing relations with the EU and with Germany in particular, as well as the US. However, because of Russia’s desire to have a global stance equal or at least comparable to the US and EU, while at the same time the lack of German, European and American strategic vision of Russia’s role in Western global governance institutions remains apparent, the question of the “new normal” in Russia-West relations remains open.

To conclude, the relations in the “strategic triangle” of Russia-Germany-the US are likely to remain ambiguous. While dynamics are possible, much depends on the results of the first year of the Trump administration, the outcomes of parliamentary elections in Germany in September, and the possible parameters of Russian foreign policy after the presidential elections in 2018. However, even if all the conflicts in Ukraine and Syria are settled, the lack of strategic vision for each party in the system of their own foreign policy priorities will remain the key factor that hampers the strategic cooperation between our countries.

Fifth Task Force Position Paper Released

A group of prominent Members and Supporters of the Pan-European Task Force on Cooperation in Greater Europe, including former foreign and defence ministers and senior officials from Russia, the United Kingdom, Turkey, Poland, Germany, Italy and Finland has joined forces to appeal to the leadership of the countries in the Euro-Atlantic area to halt the downward spiral in West-Russia relations and manage its risks better through developing a more stable and sustainable security relationship.

Noting the gravity of the situation, they have warned that a serious risk of military confrontation between Russia and the West — intentional or otherwise — lurks down the road. While being realistic about the limited prospects of quick improvement of the relations, they have suggested that stabilizing the situation would necessitate a shared commitment to abstain from the use of force, a more cautious and restrained approach to the build-up of military potential by all countries in the Euro-Atlantic area, and proactive seizing of opportunities for arms control and confidence building.

Signatories to the Position Paper called on the political and military leaderships to agree, even if only implicitly, on four fundamental points:

1. A war between Russia and NATO cannot be won and must never be fought, and any attempts to achieve political goals by threat or use of force would be futile.

2. Any efforts to gain decisive military advantage in Europe or any of its regions by developing or deploying new weapons systems will ultimately be pointless, as other countries would counter such moves.

3. There are grave risks of an unmanaged, un-regulated deterrence relationship in which unintended escalation is more likely to happen.

4. The lack of a mutually satisfactory agreement on stabilizing the relationship would have a negative effect on each country’s broader national priorities, including economic development and social well-being.

Based on this assessment, the Position Paper includes the following recommendations:

— Check national decisions on new defence acquisitions and deployments against their potential to escalate tensions in Europe.

The principles of restraint and reasonable defence sufficiency should be taken into account when making national decisions on procurements and the development of the capabilities of armed forces.

— Observe the commitments of mutual restraint included in the NATO-Russia Founding Act

Both Russia and NATO have increased their deterrence potential, but - so far - avoided extending all their military might and employing all the available options for bolstering their forces. To avoid this scenario, The starting point for a more stable security relationship could be some form of credible return to and reconfirmation of basic principles and mutual restraint commitments, as enshrined in the NATO-Russia Founding Act of 1997.

— Preserve and ensure full implementation of the existing arms control and confidence-building agreements

The signatories highlight the value of existing agreements, including the INF Treaty, New START, and the multilateral Open Skies Treaty, and politically-binding confidence-building measures such as the Vienna Document, and remain concerned about the allegations of non-compliance. Some of them find continued value in the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE).

— Explore the opportunities for new arms control agreements

European security would benefit from opening discussions on new arms control measures, such as agreements on limiting strategic missile defence, the high-precision conventional strike missiles blurring the line with nuclear weapons, cyber-attack measures, use of drones, or the deployment of weapons in space.

— Initiate a comprehensive expert discussion on the conditions for strategic stability in Europe

The signatories recommend, as a starting point, that the expert community should engage more systematically to develop a concept of multilateral strategic stability for Europe, focused primarily on the conventional and nuclear doctrines, postures and military balance, strategic cyber operations, and other non-kinetic measures of confrontation which may have strategic consequences.

Finally, the signatories noted that, beyond stabilizing the adversarial relationship, a further priority should be to conduct disciplined dialogue, for the long haul, on the future of European security order.

The following Task Force Members are signatories to this Position Paper:

Des Browne, Member of the House of Lords, Former Defence Secretary (UK) (Co-Chair);

Igor S. Ivanov, Former Foreign Minister, President, Russian International Affairs Council, Corresponding Member of the Russian Academy of Sciences (Russia) (Co-Chair);

Adam Daniel Rotfeld, Former Foreign Minister, (Poland) (Co-Chair);

Özdem Sanberk, former Permanent Undersecretary, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and former Chief Foreign Policy Adviser to the Prime Minister, former Director of USAK (Turkey);

Malcolm Rifkind, former Foreign and Defence Secretary (UK);

Volker Ruehe, former Defence Minister (Germany);

Anatoliy Torkunov, Rector of Moscow State Institute of International Relations of the RF MFA, RAS Full Member, Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary of the Russian Federation (Russia);

Angela Kane, former UN High Representative for Disarmament (Germany)

Paul Quilès, former Defence Minister (France);

Anatoliy Adamishin, President of the Non-Governmental Organization "Association of Euro-Atlantic Cooperation", former Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary of the Russian Federation;

Tarja Cronberg, former Member of the European Parliament (Finland);

Alexei Gromyko, Director of the Institute of Europe of the Russian Academy of Sciences (IE RAS), (Russia);

Igor Yurgens, Chairman of the Board of the Institute of Contemporary Development, Vice President of the Russian Union of Industrialists and Entrepreneurs (Russia);

Sir Tony Brenton, former UK Ambassador to Russia (UK);

Vitaly V. Zhurkin, Director Emeritus of the RAS Institute of Europe, RAS Full Member (Russia);

Hikmet Çetin, former Foreign Minister (Turkey);

Ruslan S. Grinberg, Scientific Director of the RAS Institute of Economics, Corresponding member of the Russian Academy of Sciences, (Russia);

Klaus Wittmann, former Bundeswehr General; Senior Fellow at the Aspen Institute (Germany)

The following Participants to the Task Force May 2017 meeting have added their signature to the Position Paper:

Carlo Trezza, Former Ambassador for Disarmament and Non-Proliferation, Former Chairman of the Missile Technology Control Regime (Italy);

Ünal Çeviköz, Former Ambassador to the UK, Iraq, and Azerbaijan, former President of the General Assembly of International Maritime Organization (Turkey);

Karsten Voigt, Former German-American coordinator in the Federal Foreign Office, Former President of the NATO Parliamentary Assembly (Germany);

Artem Malgin, Vice-Rector of Moscow State Institute of International Relations of the RF MFA (Russia)

Position Paper V July 2017 Managing the Cold Peace between Russia and the West Task Force on Cooperation in Greater Europe Task Force on Cooperation in Greater Europe ii About the Task Force The Task Force brings forward proposals to allow all countries of the region to decisively break with the costly legacy of the Cold War and focus more effectively on meeting the emerging political, economic, and security challenges of the 21st century. It addresses the causes of current levels of mistrust between key countries and actors in the region, has trust-building as a central theme in its deliberations, and sets out a rationale and vision for a cooperative Greater Europe and a range of practical steps necessary to move the international relations of the continent in that direction. The Task Force is supported by, and draws on, independent analytical work by the European Leadership Network (ELN), the Russian International Affairs Council (RIAC), the Polish Institute of International Affairs (PISM), and the Global Relations Forum (GRF). The Task Force is made possible by generous support from the Carnegie Corporation of New York and the Nuclear Threat Initiative (NTI). The Task Force has the following confirmed membership: • Igor S. Ivanov, former Foreign Minister, President, Russian International Affairs Council, Corresponding Member of the Russian Academy of Sciences (Russia) (Task Force Co-Chair); • Des Browne, former Defence Secretary (UK) (Task Force Co-Chair); • Adam Daniel Rotfeld, former Foreign Minister, (Poland) (Task Force Co-Chair); • Malcolm Rifkind, former Foreign and Defence Secretary (UK); • Özdem Sanberk, former Undersecretary of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Turkey) (Task Force Co-Chair); • Ana Palacio, former Foreign Minister (Spain); • Vyacheslav I. Trubnikov, former Director, Russian Foreign Intelligence, General (Rtd) and former Ambassador (Russia); • Paul Quilès, former Defence Minister (France); • Mikhail Margelov, Vice President of Transneft, former Chairman of the Foreign Affairs Committee of the Russian Federation Council (Russia). • Hervé Morin, President of the Normandy Region and former Defense Minister and Leader of the New Center party (France); • Georgy Mamedov, former Ambassador to Canada and former Adviser to President Putin (Russia). • Angela Kane, former UN High Representative for Disarmament Affairs (Germany); • Volker Ruehe, former Defence Minister (Germany); • Tarja Cronberg, former Member of the European Parliament and former Director of the Copenhagen Peace Research Institute (Finland); • Hikmet Cetin, former Foreign Minister (Turkey); iii Managing the Cold Peace between Russia and the West • Tony Brenton, former Ambassador to Russia (UK); • Pierre Lellouche, former Secretary of State for European Affairs and Foreign Trade (France); • Vitaly V. Zhurkin, Director Emeritus of the RAS Institute of Europe, RAS Full Member (Russia); • Klaus Wittman, former General of the Bundeswehr (Germany); • Borys Tarasyuk, former Foreign Minister (Ukraine); • Igor Yu. Yurgens, Chairman of the Board of the Institute of Contemporary Development, Vice President of the Russian Union of Industrialists and Entrepreneurs (Russia); • Anatoliy Adamishin, former Deputy Foreign Minister and Ambassador to the UK, President of the Association of Euro-Atlantic Cooperation, and Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary of the Russian Federation (Russia); • Ruslan S. Grinberg, Director of RAS Institute of Economics, Corresponding member of the Russian Academy of Sciences (Russia); • Alexei Gromyko, Director of the Institute of Europe of the Russian Academy of Sciences (IE RAS) (Russia); • Anatoliy Torkunov, Rector of Moscow State Institute of International Relations of the RF MFA, RAS Full Member, Ambassador Extraordinary

and Plenipotentiary of the Russian Federation (Russia). Please note that not all members of the Task Force on Cooperation in Greater Europe have officially endorsed this position paper; for a full list of signatories please see page 4. Task Force on Cooperation in Greater Europe 1 Managing the Cold Peace between Russia and the West Task Force on Cooperation in Greater Europe Position Paper V July 2017 Euro-Atlantic security has grown complicated, dangerous and difficult to improve, with a multitude of unknowns. Russian and Western perceptions of European security differ fundamentally and continue to drift further apart. A serious risk of military confrontation between Russia and the West – intentional or otherwise – lurks down this road. In such circumstances, an immediate priority is to halt the downward spiral in our adversarial relationship and manage the risks better through a stable and sustainable West-Russia security relationship. This is the main focus of this Task Force intervention. At the same time, we feel that to do no more than this would be to condemn the continent to another round of Cold War, in which it would be increasingly difficult to escape the action-reaction cycle of a West-Russia arms race. So a further priority should be to conduct disciplined dialogue, for the long haul, on the future of European security order, not requiring either side to change its view of fundamental differences but asking of both sides a patient and sustained engagement to improve mutual understanding and confidence. Such a dialogue should also cover the possibility for collaboration in such areas as offer mutual benefit, based on broader common threat perceptions and on shared values. The proposal It would be unrealistic to call for a complete freeze on the introduction of new types of armaments, new military deployments and larger exercises in Europe. Instead, this Position Paper calls for all sides - Russia, NATO, its member states, and other European countries - to observe the rules of reasonable sufficiency and restraint in making decisions concerning their military postures. It also calls for preserving and expanding arms control and confidence-building instruments that can help stabilize the situation. It is obvious that in many ways we have already passed the point of no return, and that any hopes for a return to the way things were in 2013 are futile. There is no sense in denying that, for a number of Euro-Atlantic states, Russia is perceived as a military threat, and vice versa. In the current circumstances, the best course would be to move to a phase of stable and sustainable mutual security relationship. That should involve a commitment to abstain from the use of force, a more cautious and restrained approach to the build-up of military potential by all countries in the Euro-Atlantic area, and proactive seizing of opportunities for arms control and confidence building. We should also take into account the real situation in terms of force postures in Europe and regional 2 Managing the Cold Peace between Russia and the West and sub-regional balances of military power, in order to identify the most dangerous hotspots of possible conflicts. We suggest that reaching this phase would require all sides to agree, even if only implicitly, on four fundamental points: 1. Our political and military leaderships should accept that a war between Russia and NATO cannot be won and must never be fought, and any attempts to achieve political goals by threat or use of force would be futile. 2. They should accept that any efforts to gain decisive military advantage in Europe or any of its regions by developing or deploying new weapons systems will ultimately be pointless, as other countries would counter such moves. 3. They should recognize the grave risks of an unmanaged, un-regulated deterrence relationship in which unintended escalation is more likely to happen. 4. They should admit that the lack of a mutually satisfactory agreement on stabilizing the relationship would have a negative effect on their broader national priorities, including economic development and social well-being. The recommendations In its previous interventions, the Task Force has made the case for a lasting peace in Ukraine, for NATO and Russia agreeing on instruments and procedures to prevent incidents or accidents, and for the two sides to resume military-to-military contacts. While we continue to call for further progress on these issues, this Position Paper formulates a broader set of recommendations to the leaderships of all Euro-Atlantic countries, including Russia: - Check national decisions on new defence acquisitions and deployments against their potential to escalate tensions in Europe. The principles of restraint and reasonable defence sufficiency should be taken into account when making national decisions on procurements and the development of the capabilities of armed forces. For example, some countries treat the addition of new strike capabilities (including long-range conventional systems, ballistic and cruise missiles) as well as strategic defences as a way of enhancing their deterrence and defence potential. Yet these capabilities, especially if acquired in bigger numbers, will create pressure for the other side to respond. The decisions to obtain them should thus be carefully scrutinized from the viewpoint of consequences for European stability. - Observe the commitments of mutual restraint included in the NATORussia Founding Act

Moscow is plainly displeased with developments such as the deployment of new NATO units in the Baltic region, a more frequent NATO presence in the Black Sea, Task Force on Cooperation in Greater Europe 3 the strengthening of the NATO Response Force or the development of the Alliance’s Very High Readiness Joint Task Force. NATO Allies are clearly alarmed by Russia’s actions against Ukraine which they perceive as a violation of the NATO-Russia Founding Act. They are also concerned by the strengthening of Russia’s military potential in the west of the country and its large-scale, short notice military exercises which are seen as violations of at least the spirit of Moscow’s Vienna Document commitments. Yet, both sides have so far avoided extending all their military might and employing all the available options for bolstering their forces, including for example through major new nuclear deployments. The starting point for a stable security relationship could be some form of credible return to and reconfirmation of basic principles and mutual restraint commitments, as enshrined in the NATORussia Founding Act of 1997. - Preserve and ensure full implementation of the existing arms control and confidence-building agreements In an adversarial relationship, formal arms control agreements are a means to prevent wars; stabilize, manage and reduce the costs of the confrontation; and increase trust. That is why they are especially important in the current critical stage of Russia-West relations. We highlight the value of existing agreements, including the INF Treaty, New START, and the multilateral Open Skies Treaty. We support their goals and remain concerned about the allegations of non-compliance, which should be promptly resolved. Some of us find that the non-consensual suspension of the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE) undermines the legal integrity of the regime and see critical value in its preservation, with any appropriately introduced revisions to reflect the changing context. We also urge that politically-binding confidence-building measures, including the Vienna Document, should be preserved, implemented fully and in good faith, and strengthened where possible. - Explore the opportunities for new arms control agreements Revitalizing the existing arms control commitments, linked with the threats and risks of the past, will not be sufficient to bring security to the continent now and in the future. European security would benefit from opening discussions on new arms control measures, such as agreements on limiting strategic missile defence, the high-precision conventional strike missiles blurring the line with nuclear weapons, cyber-attack measures, use of drones, or the deployment of weapons in space. Some of us argue that a possible successor to the CFE Treaty developed through a process agreed by all the parties should also be included among those measures. We acknowledge that some of these discussions will take place within the framework of bilateral US-Russia contacts. But they all require a European input and, in most cases, active European participation to be effective. 4 Managing the Cold Peace between Russia and the West - Initiate a comprehensive expert discussion on the conditions for strategic stability in Europe In the past, strategic stability dialogue was conducted between the US and Russia and focused primarily on the issues of nuclear parity between them. There has been no comparable mechanism to tackle the basic question of strategic stability in Europe, with sustainable mutual deterrence as its core. We recommend, as a starting point, that the expert community should engage more systematically to develop a concept of strategic stability for Europe. Such an approach would not replicate the past and ongoing debates about the security architecture for Europe and broader principles of the Russia-West relationship based on Helsinki and Paris Charter principles. As this paper suggests, it could be limited and focused primarily on the conventional and nuclear military balance, strategic cyber operations, and other non-kinetic measures of confrontation which may have strategic consequences. When fully developed, such a concept could then be applied to managing the process of achieving peace and stabilization of security on the continent, fully utilizing the potential of the OSCE and its Structured Dialogue, as well as the NATO-Russia Council. Signed Members of the Task Force • Igor S. Ivanov, former Foreign Minister, President, Russian International Affairs Council, Corresponding Member of the Russian Academy of Sciences (Russia) (Task Force Co-Chair); • Des Browne, former Defence Secretary (UK) (Task Force Co-Chair); • Adam Daniel Rotfeld, former Foreign Minister, (Poland) (Task Force Co-Chair); • Malcolm Rifkind, former Foreign and Defence Secretary (UK); • Özdem Sanberk, former Undersecretary of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Turkey) (Task Force Co-Chair); • Paul Quilès, former Defence Minister (France); • Mikhail Margelov, Vice President of Transneft, former Chairman of the Foreign Affairs Committee of the Russian Federation Council (Russia). • Angela Kane, former UN High Representative for Disarmament Affairs (Germany); • Volker Ruehe, former Defence Minister (Germany); • Tarja Cronberg, former Member of the European Parliament and former Director of the Copenhagen Peace

Research Institute (Finland); • Hikmet Cetin, former Foreign Minister (Turkey); • Tony Brenton, former Ambassador to Russia (UK); • Vitaly V. Zhurkin, Director Emeritus of the RAS Institute of Europe, RAS Full Member (Russia); • Klaus Wittman, former General of the Bundeswehr (Germany); Task Force on Cooperation in Greater Europe 5 • Igor Yu. Yurgens, Chairman of the Board of the Institute of Contemporary Development, Vice President of the Russian Union of Industrialists and Entrepreneurs (Russia); • Anatoliy Adamishin, former Deputy Foreign Minister and Ambassador to the UK, President of the Association of Euro-Atlantic Cooperation, and Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary of the Russian Federation (Russia); • Ruslan S. Grinberg, Director of RAS Institute of Economics, Corresponding member of the Russian Academy of Sciences (Russia); • Alexei Gromyko, Director of the Institute of Europe of the Russian Academy of Sciences (IE RAS) (Russia); • Anatoliy Torkunov, Rector of Moscow State Institute of International Relations of the RF MFA, RAS Full Member, Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary of the Russian Federation (Russia); Non-Members of the Task Force • Karsten Voigt, former Member of the Bundestag and former President of the NATO Parliamentary Assembly (Germany); • Carlo Trezza, former Ambassador for Disarmament and Non-Proliferation (Italy); • Ünal Çeviköz, former Ambassador to the UK and former Deputy Undersecretary for Foreign Affairs (Turkey); • Artem Malgin, Vice Rector of MGIMO University (Russia). Enquiries This paper is published in the name only of those Task Force members who have signed it, and not on behalf of the Task Force in its entirety. Updates on project activities will be placed on the ELN, PISM, RIAC and GRF web-sites at the following addresses: www.europeanleadershipnetwork.org; www.pism.pl; www.russiancouncil.ru; www.gif.org.tr. For more information, including press enquiries, please contact: Thomas Frear, Research Fellow at the European Leadership Network Tel: (+44) (0) 203 176 2553 Email: thomasf@europeanleadershipnetwork.org Task Force on Cooperation in Greater Europe xi The Task Force brings forward proposals to allow all countries of the region to decisively break with the costly legacy of the Cold War and focus more effectively on meeting the emerging political, economic, and security challenges of the 21st century. It addresses the causes of current levels of mistrust between key countries and actors in the region, has trust-building as a central theme in its deliberations, and sets out a rationale and vision for a cooperative Greater Europe and a range of practical steps necessary to move the international relations of the continent in that direction. The Task Force is comprised of distinguished former political, military and diplomatic figures. It is supported by, and draws on, independent analytical work by the European Leadership Network (ELN), the Russian International Affairs Council (RIAC), the Polish Institute of International Affairs (PISM), and the Global Relations Forum (GRF). Task Force on Cooperation in Greater Europe

Kathy Leach: UK Needs to Look at Wider European NeighborhoodFULL VERSION OF THE ARTICLEWith Brexit and UK-EU talks all over news, everyone is worried about what is to come for Great Britain in both domestic and foreign dimensions. Kathy Leach, Joint Head at Policy Unit of Foreign and Commonwealth Office, shares her views on the possible foreign policy priorities, challenges Brexit entails and Russia-UK cultural ties.What is your opinion on UK foreign policy priorities for the upcoming years?For the obvious reasons, the most important priority is to negotiate exit from the European Union and create a base for the future relationship with our European partners. European countries are our friends and neighbors, so making sure that we have the right economic, political, social, cultural infrastructure in place to continue those relationships will be our most important priority. Beyond that, we need to look at the wider European neighborhood,

because this is where many of the biggest challenges for us at the moment come from. I’m thinking about the Middle East, I’m thinking about Russia, the Balkans, North Africa. Working with our European friends and partners to jointly tackle some of the challenges coming from the wider neighborhood is going to be a big focus. And there is the third thing. The UK has always been a global power and developing our relations as broadly as possible has always been important to us. For instance, one of the points of Brexit is to look for further economic opportunities overseas. In particular, South Asia, Asia-Pacific, the enormously growing economies of India and China, are going to be a big focus for us.

RIAC and RUSI Report “Defining Dialogue: How to Manage Russia-UK Security Relations”

Will the transition period be required once the exit procedure is completed?It’s two years to negotiate the exit agreement, unless everybody agrees to extend. The deadline is the end of March, 2019. One of the questions the Prime Minister has raised in her previous speeches is whether there could be a further transition period after that, but that’s not at the moment clear.

So what will be the main challenges in upcoming years? Maybe in foreign policy, maybe in domestic as well, with all the changes that are in stock now?Well, I think there is a whole series of challenges connected with Brexit, and clearly our future trade relationship with Europe is the most important one. We want to have the best deal we can including the freest access possible to the single market. The Prime Minister has said that we will leave the single market and the Customs union. So what we have to do is negotiate a deal which gives our companies best access, and ensures that those very integrated European supply chains are not disrupted. There are going to be big implications for agriculture, which for the last forty years has been part of the common agricultural policy with a complicated system of subsidies and incentives. We now have the opportunity to think about how we are going to manage some of those sectors that have been governed by European laws and regulations. And that will be challenging to do in the time, but I think does offer opportunities.

Russia-UK relations are now going through a rough period. Still, both of our countries have enormous cultural heritage. Do you think that cooperation on a cultural base could be a good stimulus for economic cooperation in the future?I think it’s always worth doing. And as you mentioned, there’s so much in the past that we can draw on. A great example from last year was a joint exhibition about the exploration of space, which was hugely successful. This year, actually, is the UK-Russia year of scientific cooperation. So again, I think it’s really important, particularly when things are quite difficult at the political level, to look for the people-to-people contacts, but also the subjects where the real experts, the scientists, the artists, the cultural people can get together and work together. The commercial relationship between Russia and the UK has always continued through the ups and downs of the political relationship, and certainly we’re committed to that. We have some good British companies working in Russia, we have Russian companies in the UK, and we want this tradition to continue.

http://www.eng.kavkaz-uzel.eu/articles/firearm_incidents_victims_2014_2015.html

Infographics. The statistics of the number of victims in the North Caucasian Federal District regions for a period of 6 years

        The "Caucasian Knot" has prepared an interactive infographics for the categories of victims for the period of 2010-2015, based on its own data and open sources information. By clicking each figure, you can see distribution of casualties in the center of the circle, divided by categories such as security forces, militants, and civilians.Regions:

Dagestan Kabardino-Balkaria Chechnya North-Caucasian Federal District Ingushetia

There is a growing trend from the part of UN organizations, major international and regional  powers to

impose sanctions on states, former presidents, armed militia leaders, tribal leaders, military officers,

businessmen, or charities in the Middle East. This is indicated in several cases such as imposing

sanctions on the government of Qatar, the Assad regime in Syria, Hezbollah in Lebanon, Huthi militias

and former president Ali Abdullah Saleh in Yemen, and the Iranian regime.

The objectives of introducing such sanctions vary. It could be to bring about a radical change in the policies of

the targeted states, or make an adjustment in specific issues such as international terrorism and nuclear

proliferation, or weaken these political regimes, dry up the "financial reservoirs" of armed militias, or

push actors to deal with the faltering political transition.

   

On the other hand, sanctions do not necessarily intend to punish the other party, in one way or another, lifting

sanctions may aim to bring about a positive impact on one side or the other as internal political conditions

change. Examples of these are the European Union removal of Aisha Gaddafi’s name from the list of asset

freeze; supporting the commitment of the target state to follow specific paths as reflected in the lift of U.S.

sanctions on Al-Bashir's regime in Sudan, and rebuilding bilateral economic ties as the cases of Russia and

Turkey.

To elaborate, there are multiple objectives behind the imposition of sanctions, which could be explained as

follows: 

Behavior Modification

Reasons behind Increased Recourse to Sanctions in the Region

1-To alter the policies of targeted states: this applies to the current trend of Arab States boycotting Qatar,

which was translated into severing political ties and degrading economic relations. Those states presented 13

demands to Doha to study and implement as prerequisite to restoring relations. These demands are related to

countering and cutting funding to terrorist and armed militia groups, shutting down Al-Jazeera channel and its

media networks, closure of the Turkish military base, reducing diplomatic representation with Iran, among

others.

However, Qatar rejected these demands, as stated by Mohamed Bin Abdulrahman Al Thani, Qatar’s Foreign

Minister, while he was in Rome on July 1, and also after his meetings in the United States with delegates of

the permanent members of the Security Council, as well as some non-permanent states’ ambassadors, where

he said that “Doha is ready for dialogue under proper conditions", without specifying what those conditions,

reflecting the desire of Doha to escalate the crisis.

In this context, Omar Ghobash, the UAE Ambassador in Russia in an interview with the Guardian newspaper

on June 28, said, "There are certain economic sanctions that we can take which are being considered right

now", adding that “One possibility would be to impose conditions on our own trading partners and say you

want to work with us then you have got to make a commercial choice”. Meanwhile, Egypt demanded on June

28 during a UN session on "the Challenges of Combating Terrorism in Libya"  documentation of the repeated

violations by certain states, particularly Qatar, to sustain sanctions on Libya.  Ambassador Tariq Al-Kuni said

that Qatar should be subjected to sanctions for arming terrorist groups and organizations in Libya.

Partial Change

2- To partly change policies of targeted states: that is related to specific issues such as nuclear

proliferation and counter-terrorism, which applies to sanctions imposed by the United States against Iran. The

US Senate majority, on 15 June, passed an act imposing new sanctions on Tehran, especially regarding

supporting acts of international terrorism, as well as its ballistic missile program. Moreover, a large number of

Republicans and Democrats opposed the nuclear deal reached in 2015 with Iran, and President Trump holds

the Iranian regime responsible for instability in the region.

Through these sanctions, the White House and Congress sanctions convey a clear message that

Washington's new strategy is to confront Iran through sanctions on the its Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps,

which is accused of supporting terrorism, and those involved in the development of the Iranian ballistic missile

program. This comes as a response to a letter of challenge from the Iranian President Hassan Rouhani who

asserted that his country would continue its ballistic missile program, followed by another letter from the

National Security and Foreign Policy Commission spokesman in Shura Council, Hossein Naqvi Hosseini, who

said on 16 June that "The Commission is drafting a counter bill as response to the sanctions bill on Iran".

Punishing Authoritarian Regimes

3- Weakening authoritarian political regimes: especially those accused of violating human rights, as the

case of  Western countries’ sanctions against the Assad regime in Syria. In this regard, the Swiss Federal

Court kept a freeze on the assets of the Central Bank of Syria, according to a statement issued on 16 June,

the Court rejected an appeal filed by the Syrian Government after the Court decision to include Syrian entities

and individuals whose assets were frozen in Switzerland in the black list, due to the ineligibility of the Bank to

challenge its inclusion in that list. This comes in the context of the sanctions adopted by the Council of the

European Union against the Assad regime.

For its part, the European Union declared, in its foreign ministers' meeting in Brussels on May 29, 2017, the

imposition of sanctions against 27 Syrian persons holding central positions in the regime and responsible for

human rights violations and 8 institutions that support the regime financially. European Union’s sanctions on

the Syrian regime includes an embargo on oil, restrictions on some investments, and freezing the assets of the

Central Bank of Syria within the Union, and restrictions on technology-related exports that can be used in

internal security, repression or intercepting communications via phone or Internet.

The US Treasury also imposed, on May 15, sanctions on five people and five entities accused of providing

support to the Syrian regime, including Mohamed Abbas, who runs the financial interests of Rami Makhlouf, a

cousin of President Bashar Al-Assad as well as Iyad Makhlouf and Ehab Makhlouf (Vice-President of

SyriaTel), along with sanctions on Al-Bustan Charity run by Rami Makhlouf and other sanctions on 271

employees of Syria's Scientific Studies and Research Center (SSRC), which is responsible for the production

of chemical weapons that were used in the attacks against armed opposition groups in Khan Sheikhoun, Idlib

on 4 April 2017.

The Canadian Government followed the same approach and sanctioned 17 of the Assad regime officials by

freezing their assets and banning financial dealings with them, as well as 5 entities related to the use of

chemical weapons in Syria, chemical companies and research centres such as Mahrous Group, Organization

for Technological Industries (OTI), Sigma Tech, Higher Institute of Applied Science and Technology (HIAST),

and the National Standards and Calibration Laboratory (NSCL).

Choke off funding

4- Dry up the "financial reservoirs" of armed militia: one of the objectives of sanctions on violent actors in

the region is to choke off funding sources that help them in recruitment and destabilization operations.

Washington and Riyadh have included, on May 20, 2017, one of Hezbollah leaders, Hashem Safieddine, on

the first ever foreign joint terrorist designation. Safieddine is the head of the executive council of the party

(designated by the two countries as a terrorist organization) and runs the political, economic and social

affairs of the party, as well as its role in supporting Bashar Al-Assad, and he is seemingly being groomed to

succeed Hassan Nasrallah. Consequently, his assets will be frozen in Saudi Arabia and any financial dealings

with him through the financial sector will be prohibited. 

For its part, the UN Security Council also decided, on February 23, 2017, to extend international resolutions

provided for in Resolution 2216 against Huthi leaders and former Yemeni President Ali Abdullah Saleh an

extra year, and extend the mandate of the Sanctions Committee which includes controlling and facilitating the

freezing of funds, and preventing travel of Abdulmalik Al-Huthi, until late February 2018. The resolution also

requested the Expert Panel to present a biannual briefing report to the Sanctions Committee in July 2017, and

a final report to the Security Council in December 2018. The aim of the sanctions is to punish the Huthi militia

for insisting on blocking the delivery of humanitarian aid to Yemen and exacerbating the dangers of Al-Qaeda

in the Arabian Peninsula.

Transcend the transitional phase

5- To push actors to transcend the faltering political transition: Security Council has recently and

unanimously decided to extend the mandate of the Expert Panel of sanctions imposed on Libya to 15 February

2018, the resolution included adding oil derivatives to the goods banned from export. It also added to the travel

ban and assets freeze list anyone involved in planning attacks against United Nations personnel, including

members of the Expert Panel.  

The resolution stressed the importance of the counter-terrorism efforts of the Government of National Accord

headed by Fayez al-Sarraj through unified security forces under its authority. It also urged Member States to

provide the necessary assistance to the government to counter threats facing Libya’s security. This  makes it

incumbent upon the government to continue to improve the control of arms supplied to Libya or sold and

transferred, track foreign terrorist fighters, and increase its coordination with its neighbors and close satellite

channels that promote terrorism and violence.

This view was also echoed by Egyptian Ambassador Tariq Kuni, Assistant Foreign Minister for Arab affairs  –

in the presence of the Chairman of the counterterrorism committee of the Security Council, Chairman of the

Sanctions Committee on "ISIS" and "Al Qaeda" and Chairman  of the Sanctions Committee on Libya – during

United Nations meeting called by Egypt on June 28, where he stressed that Libya is facing threats and

neighboring countries are required to stop supporting terrorist groups with money and weapons, which

requires taking actions against states that violate UN resolutions including Qatar. 

On the other hand, lifting sanctions on countries or individuals in the region, has many effects, as follows:

1- A changed domestic political situation: General Court of the European Union lifted sanctions on Aisha

Gaddafi, the former Libyan leader's daughter, on March 28, based on the changed situation in Libya, since

there is no longer any justification, from its point of view, to continue a ban on travel and freezing financial

assets imposed 2011 for its alleged "close link to the regime". Although the European Union amended the

sanctions in 2014, it kept the list and refused a request to remove her name. In 2017, the Court accepted

Aisha Gaddafi’s appeal and lifted sanctions imposed six years ago. 

2- State stringent commitment to specific policies: the U.S. lifted the economic sanctions on Sudan in 13

January, which were imposed on Khartoum two decades ago, former U.S. President Barack Obama had

outlined a six-month period to monitor policies and laws related to economics and promoting peace and

combating terrorism. Washington has included Sudan on a blacklist of State sponsors of terrorism since 1993.

Sudan has been under trade embargo since 1997 because of the indictment of Bashir's regime of supporting

Islamic groups, especially harboring Al-Qaeda leader Osama bin Laden during the period (1992-1996).

However, what helped lift sanctions on Sudan, at the end of June, was the adherence of the government to the

required five paths, according to the vision of the U.S. security and intelligence community: cooperation in

fighting terrorism, ending the war in the Sudan, ending support for rebels in South Sudan, ending support for

the Lord's Resistance Army (LRA) in Uganda, and delivery of aid to the needy in conflict zones. This was

preceded by the US State Department welcoming Sudan's efforts in combating terrorism, particularly fighting

"ISIS" and other terrorist groups, as reflected in a statement by State Department spokesman John Kirby on

September 20, 2016.   

It should be noted that there are other sanctions imposed on Khartoum, as the UN Security Council decided in

February to extend the mandate of the Sanctions Committee on Darfur (established by the resolution 1591

/2005) for a period ending on March 18, 2018, and the sanctions to be renewed every year, in relation to the

prohibition of arms sales to Sudan, under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations.

In this context, too, Umma party chief Sadek al-Mahdi, in interview with al-Sharq al-Awsat newspaper in

London, on June 28, downplayed U.S. sanctions on Sudan, saying that their impact will remain limited unless

Sudan's name is removed from the U.S. list of State sponsors of terrorism, and finding solutions to the Security

Council resolutions amounting to 63 resolutions against Sudan, and a mechanism to convince the Paris Club

to relief its debt.

3- Rebuilding bilateral economic relations: Russian President Vladimir Putin, in late May, issued a decree

removing the obstacles to Turkish citizens working in Russia, and repealing the ban on Turkish companies

working in certain sectors in Russia. This comes in parallel with consultations between Russian and Turkish

foreign ministries to renew the agreement signed between the two countries in 2010, and lift all sanctions in an

endeavor to rebuild economic ties between both sides especially after transcending a period of tension in the

aftermath of downing Russian fighter in November 2015. It seems that there are understandings between

Moscow and Ankara on several issues in the region.

Stressful Effects

Bottom line, it seems that using sanctions as a foreign policy instrument will be on the rise during the

next period in Middle East crises, especially given the possibility of converting sanctions into aid if the

targeted states were to comply with the demands of the United Nations, the United States, the

European Union and the major powers in the region. Indeed, the growing effects of sanctions on the

targeted states cannot be ignored, even a modern state cannot resist them, in the words of former U.S.

President Woodrow Wilson, who said that sanctions are “a peaceful, silent and deadly” weapon at the

same time.