40

Spencer Orenstein

During the early hours of January 1st 1994, while most of the world was recovering from their celebration of the New Year, the Zapatista Army of National Liberation (EZLN) burst onto the international scene without any prior warning, occupying six towns and the city of San Cristóbal de las Casas.[endnoteRef:0] From the outset of their surprise campaign the Zapatista movement positioned itself as a new form of Revolution, one whose principle aims were not a play for power or influence. Humanity and compassion drove these postmodern revolutionaries, who sought to secure indigenous equality and an ultimate leveling of the ever unequal playing field. As the Zapatistas claimed in a communiqué: [0: As Quoted In: John Holloway and Eloína Paláez, Zapatista: Reinventing Revolution in Mexico (London: Pluto Press, 1998), 1.]

“The ‘center’ asks us, demands of us, that we should sign a peace agreement quickly and convert ourselves into an ‘institutional’ political force, that is to say, convert ourselves into yet another part of the machinery of power. To them we answer ‘NO’ and they do not understand it. They do not understand that we are not in agreement with those ideas. They do not understand that we do not want offices or posts in the government. They do not understand that we are struggling not for the stairs to be swept clean from the top to the bottom, but for there to be no stairs, for there to be no kingdom at all. They do not understand that we do not want a peace that only signifies a renaming of slavery and misery, a less strong form of saying death. They do not understand that the peace that they extol, the peace of those at the top, is only guaranteed to the powerful and condemned for those at the bottom.”[endnoteRef:1] [1: Subcomandante Marcos, “Las Derrotas del PRI no Significan el Fin del Partido de Estado, Advierte Marcos en su Comunicado,” La Jornada, August 12, 1997. (Accessed on 18 Feb. 2009. All translations are mine, unless noted otherwise).]

This quotation is particularly significant, as it implicitly juxtaposes the Zapatista revolution with other revolutionary movements, drawing a clear, and important, distinction, namely that the Zapatistas, unlike traditional revolutionary groups, were engaged in a struggle against power, rather than for it. These new progressive revolutionary ideals, specifically the search for dignity and equality rather than wealth and power, placed the Zapatista movement in direct opposition to former revolutions. Thus, the Zapatista revolution can be viewed as a post-modern revolution, a revolution whose sheer difference made it incredibly difficult for traditional media outlets to qualify. The term post-modernism can be defined with myriad variation. The Zapatista Revolution, not surprisingly, does not fit easily into any of these definitions of post-modern. Thus, it is necessary to qualify the justification for labeling the Zapatista Revolution, and its revolutionaries, as post-modern. The Zapatista movement, at its heart, operates completely outside of the many paradigms of modern revolution. Whereas traditional revolutionary movements relied solely on the strength of their arms and the support of local citizens, the Zapatista movement expanded their power base to unprecedented levels through the international propagation of their message, which in turn gained them immense international support. Additionally, both the Mexican Government and traditional media outlets had great difficulty qualifying the revolution, especially in the early period, as they were evaluating these new revolutionaries using antiquated terms. The major difficulty for both the Mexican Government and the traditional news media was understanding, and accepting, the new nature of the Zapatista movement. Many media outlets were completely unaware that they, in fact, were the strongest weapon in the Zapatista arsenal, as they provided the means through which the Zapatistas were able to transmit their ideological struggle to an international audience. Ultimately, the most evident marker of the Zapatista Revolution as a post-modern revolution is the Zapatistas use of new forms of communication, forms that allowed the words of the Zapatista movement to reach the international community making them immensely stronger than the force of any amount of traditional arms. The Zapatistas represented a complete break from traditional modern revolutionary activity. They relied on their message far more than their weapons, something which breaks completely from modern revolutionary paradigms. It is precisely the strength of the Zapatista message being distributed to an international audience that has sustained the revolution for sixteen years, morphing the struggle from a small armed rebellion in a forgotten Mexican state, to an international symbol for dignity, humanity, and a completely new and unique form of revolution, which gives a new face and voice to the once faceless and silent indigenous Mexican population.

The surprise appropriation of various locations in the southern state of Chiapas on January 1, 1994 by the Zapatista Army of National Liberation was accompanied with a declaration of war. This declaration, the First Declaration from the Lacandon Jungle, explicitly articulates specific revolutionary goals while simultaneously introducing the new Zapatista movement to the world. This initial communiqué opens with the declaration, “we are a product of 500 years of struggle…the inheritors of the true builders of our nation.”[endnoteRef:2] As this statement suggests, the vast majority of the Zapatista revolutionaries are of indigenous descent, and, as a result, indigenous rights and dignity always remain as the crux of the Zapatista agenda. In the official response of the Mexican government, via a short communiqué, “Chiapas state officials played down the incident, calling the attackers Indian peasants who did not speak Spanish and had not issued clear demands.”[endnoteRef:3] Indeed, when Carlos Salinas, the Mexican President at the time of the uprising, did finally make a statement he claimed that “this is not an Indian uprising but the action of a violent armed group.”[endnoteRef:4] These clearly false statements exemplify the inability of both Mexican government officials to comprehend the unique nature of the Zapatista revolution. The inability to qualify this post-modern revolution likely stems from two key sources. The first, and most obvious, source is exemplified by the statement from the Zapatistas that claimed “we do not want offices or posts in the government,” this quotation clearly places the Zapatistas as a revolutionary group seeking to fight against power, rather than for it.[endnoteRef:5] [2: As Quoted In: ¡Ya Basta!: Ten Years of the Zapatista Uprising. Oakland: AK Press, 2004) 643.] [3: Tim Golden, “Rebel Attacks Hit 4 Towns in Mexico,” The New York Times, Jan 2, 1994 (1 Mar. 2009).] [4: Phil Davison, “Salinas talks tough as Zapatistas strike back; Army poised for offensive as rebels threaten attack on Mexico City after destroying power lines in two more states,” The Independent [London], 8 Jan. 1994 (4 Feb. 2010)] [5: Subcomandante Marcos, “Las Derrotas del PRI” (18 Feb. 2009).]

To justify their revolution the EZLN’s Declaration of War includes Article 39 of the Mexican Constitution, which states: “National Sovereignty essentially and originally resides in the people. All political power emanates from the people and its purpose is to help the people. The people have, at all times, the inalienable right to alter or modify their form of government.”[endnoteRef:6] Thus, from the outset—during a period in which the EZLN was waging a more traditional form of revolution, occupying towns and cities—the Zapatistas clearly realized the importance of their words. As a small group of armed insurgents they never realistically could achieve their most lofty goal, which as they claimed in their first communiqué was to “advance to the capital of the country, defeat the Mexican Federal Army”; however, they understood that they could still achieve a measurable level of success by winning international aid and sympathy through the widespread publication of their ideals.[endnoteRef:7] These ideals have helped sustain the revolution for sixteen years, the majority of which have been spent disseminating the Zapatista message, rather than advancing a traditional form of armed insurrection. This initial communiqué ends with a request for the help of the people of Mexico, “for your participation, your decision to support this plan that struggles for work, land, housing, food, health care, education, independence, freedom, democracy, justice and peace.”[endnoteRef:8] This request, however, was equally extended to the international community as a whole, and the initial communiqué was followed by myriad others, each of which sought to insert the Zapatista Revolution into the international realm. As another communiqué, from Jan 13, 1994, declares, the desire for dignity and equality drives the EZLN in their eternal struggle for liberty, as “human dignity is not the birthright of only those who have their primary needs satisfied; those who have nothing material also possess that which makes us different from things and animals: dignity.”[endnoteRef:9] It is precisely this dignity that motivates and drives the revolutionary actions of the EZLN and precisely these strong words and communiqués that have allowed the revolution to continue today, transforming it into a postmodern revolution whose primary instrument of social change are words that reach an international audience, displaying the dehumanization of millions of Indigenous Mexicans who are systematically denied many of the basic rights they are guaranteed under the Mexican Constitution of 1917. [6: As Quoted In: ¡Ya Basta!, 643.] [7: Shadows of Tender Fury, 53.] [8: As Quoted In: ¡Ya Basta!, 645.] [9: EZLN:Documentos y Comunicados 1 de enero/8 de agosto de 1994 (México, D.F.: Ediciones Era, 1994), 71.]

Beneath the surface, however, lurks a far more troubling reality, one which is elucidated by the Mexican journalist Fabrizio Mejía Madrid, who states “like millions of other Mexican children, I grew up seeing murals by Diego Rivera, where the Aztecs came to represent symbols and values, but not people.”[endnoteRef:10] Millions of indigenous Mexican citizens have been systematically dehumanized. This dehumanization denied indigenous Mexican citizens the basic qualities which unite all human beings and engender feelings of empathy. As Madrid claims, millions of people were denied a face, making it relatively simple for the Mexican Government to ignore their basic rights, for in Mexico, according to Madrid, “between the ‘Indian’ and the ‘indigenous’ there has never been any connection beyond the fact that neither had a face.”[endnoteRef:11] Furthermore, Madrid claims that “from as far back as I recall, ‘indigenous’ has meant that under the earth on which we walk there are vestiges of women and men who erected pyramids to worship the sun, dreamt about the number zero, sacrificed virgins and predicted eclipses.”[endnoteRef:12] Thus, in Mexico these Indigenous groups were reduced to mere vestiges of humans in a racial discourse based completely on misconceptions and stereotypes that reduced the Indigenous population to nothing more than poorly interpreted symbols of their culture. This racial discourse simultaneously distanced these groups from the rest of Mexican society, whilst equally denying them the ability to represent their culture on a international level, reducing the entirety of myriad indigenous groups and centuries of their life to nothing more than frightful images, such as human sacrifice. [10: Fabrizio Mejia Madrid. "The Magic of the Mirror." UNESCO Courier (June 2000): 3. Academic OneFile. Gale. University of Florida. (11 Mar. 2009). ] [11: Madrid, “The Magic of the Mirror.” (11 Mar. 2009).] [12: Madrid, “The Magic of the Mirror.” (11 Mar. 2009).]

The dehumanization of Indigenous Mexicans did not remove them completely from Mexican society; however, the racial reduction did not allow the Indigenous population a voice. According to Madrid, “we knew they existed because there were millions of them, though we stayed deaf to what they were trying to tell us.”[endnoteRef:13] The Mexican racial discourse placed the indigenous population as “a problem”, the solution to which was to throw away their vilified culture, for as Madrid asserts, “the only offer that we made to help them belong to Mexico: stop being Indians.”[endnoteRef:14] By placing indigenous rights and dignity at the crux of their platform the Zapatista Revolution was able to offer a new alternative to these formerly dehumanized masses, one which would resonate throughout the international community and bring once forgotten and marginalized indigenous groups to the forefront of the international consciousness. [13: Madrid, “The Magic of the Mirror.” (11 Mar 2009).] [14: Madrid, “The Magic of the Mirror.” (11 Mar 2009).]

One of the principle successes of the Zapatista revolution was its ability to humanize these once dehumanized masses, giving them a face and a story. As Madrid asserts, the use of ski masks by armed insurgents was particularly significant in that it obscured all but the most important aspects of the human face, the eyes and the mouth. Thus, as Madrid claims, “they made the country look at them.”[endnoteRef:15] Additionally, with an enormous amount of international news coverage, the Zapatistas forced the entire international community to look directly into the eyes of various groups of human beings who had previously been denied existence. As Madrid astutely remarks, since the inception of colonialism, “the Indians were not men and women who had to be wiped out, but simple non-humans who survived thanks to a national evasion: not looking at them head-on, in the eyes.”[endnoteRef:16] International news coverage of the Zapatista Revolution forced the Mexican government to admit that these indigenous groups were, in fact, human beings. Although the eyes had now been revealed these revolutionaries still lacked a strong voice. Various international news reports, in addition to countless EZLN communiqués, would allow for some of these forgotten persons to regain their voice, displaying their plight and subjugation to an international audience. This action, in turn, distinguished the EZLN from traditional revolutionary groups and placed them as a truly new and unique post-modern revolutionary group, one whose success or failure would be determined by the strength of their words, not the strength of their arms. [15: Madrid, “The Magic of the Mirror.” (11 Mar 2009).] [16: Madrid, “The Magic of the Mirror.” (11 Mar 2009).]

The initial news report from The New York Times dismisses the rebellion and gives it little of success, claiming that “the Mexican Government fought several small leftist rebel armies in the early to mid-1970’s, but virtually wiped them out with an aggressive, often brutal counterinsurgency campaign.”[endnoteRef:17] This brief initial report of the armed conflict concludes with a completely unsupported statement, that “in San Cristobal, two people said they believed that some of the men spoke with Guatemalan accents.”[endnoteRef:18] This type of inaccurate, and presumptuous, reporting marked the early period of the revolution, a period in which government officials and news outlets attempted to qualify the Zapatista movement, and its modern ideals, using antiquated notions. Indeed, when the voice of the combatants, themselves, began to emerge the inaccuracies of the initial news reports became evident. Claims of foreign combatants were completely rejected by a young Zapatista rebel identified only as Cristobal who claimed, “we are all Mexicans. There are no Guatemalans in our ranks. We are fighting for land, freedom, democracy and peace. We have risen up because we do not have enough to eat. We do not have work. Our uprising is the only path left for us to take to obtain the things we need to live.”[endnoteRef:19] Thus, almost immediately, the unique nature of the Zapatista Revolution was beginning to emerge. The mere fact that the international news media had such trouble qualifying the revolution demonstrates the distinctive nature of the Zapatistas’ postmodern revolution, one which redefined traditional revolutionary activity by focusing on the international propagation of the Zapatista ideals and message, rather than the prolonged occupation of government institutions, as the means for achieving equality and dignity for all Mexican citizens. [17: Golden, “Rebel Attacks Hit 4 Towns in Mexico” (1 Mar 2009).] [18: Golden, “Rebel Attacks Hit 4 Towns in Mexico” (1 Mar 2009)..] [19: Leslie Wipsa, "Zapatista will deal, but not at any price." National Catholic Reporter 4 Feb. 1994 (15 Feb. 2010)]

Another news report from Jan 3, 1994, two days after the outbreak of the revolution, is also dismissive of the EZLN. As the report states, “though they vowed to fight on until they reached Mexico City, the rebels did not appear to represent a serious military threat.”[endnoteRef:20] The Mexican government seemed to be equally dismissive of the Zapatistas, and “after the rebels swarmed into the towns on Saturday, aides to [President] Salinas initially played down the attacks. Suggesting that it viewed the uprising as a local matter, the federal Government left all public statements to Chiapas state officials.”[endnoteRef:21] Interestingly, while the Mexican Government, and western news outlets, struggled to identify the impetus for the revolution, initially linking “the Zapatista army today to two tiny radical groups…and to some liberal Roman Catholic priests in the area,” more perceptive parties were able to immediately identify the crux of the Zapatista discontent.[endnoteRef:22] As Gonzalo Ituarte, a spokesman for the Roman Catholic diocese in Chiapas, clearly states in the same news article, “the real antecedents I can see are the isolation and impoverishment of these people…the people of Chiapas and other parts of the country have been left in the caboose, and even disconnected from the train.”[endnoteRef:23] Thus while the Mexican government was unable, or unwilling, to accept any responsibility for provoking the revolution, through its neo-liberal economic policies which completely ignored the Mexican peasantry, a Roman Catholic priest, Ituarte, unequivocally states a more accurate cause of the revolution, namely the abandonment of a massive group of people and the denial of basic rights guaranteed to them in the Mexican Constitution. [20: Tim Golden, “Mexican Troops Battling Rebels; Toll at Least 57,” The New York Times, Jan 3, 1994 (25 Mar. 2009).] [21: Golden, “Mexican Troops Battling Rebels” (25 Mar. 2009).] [22: Golden, “Mexican Troops Battling Rebels” (25 Mar. 2009).] [23: Golden, “Mexican Troops Battling Rebels” (25 Mar. 2009).]

The Zapatistas attempted to display the myriad unfulfilled promises made by the Mexican government to the people of Chiapas through various documents and communiqués. One of the principle criticisms made by the EZLN concerns the failure of the Mexican Government to provide basic elementary education for Chiapaneco children, rights which all Mexican citizens are guaranteed under the Mexican Constitution of 1917. Point six of the third Article of the Mexican constitution clearly and unequivocally states that “elementary education shall be compulsory.”[endnoteRef:24] This basic human right should be relatively simple for a modern government to provide; however, the state of education in Chiapas, according to Zapatista claims which are admittedly biased and lacking significant sources, violated one of the first basic articles of the Mexican constitution. According to Subcommandante Marcos, one of the principle voices of the EZLN, education in Chiapas is “the worst in the country. Seventy-two out of every one-hundred children do not finish the first grade. Half of the schools go no higher than the third grade, and half of them only have one teacher to teach all the courses.”[endnoteRef:25] This already dire situation is exacerbated in indigenous areas where, according to figures from the EZLN, “of the 16,058 schoolrooms in Chiapas in 1989, only 96 were in indigenous areas.”[endnoteRef:26] Thus, only slightly more than one half of one percent of the total schoolrooms in Chiapas in 1989 were available for the education indigenous children, a fact made even more jarring considering that there are “3.5 million people, two thirds of whom live and die in the countryside,” and amongst these 3.5 million people are “300,000 Tzeltales, 300,000 Tzotziles, 120,000 Choles, 90,000 Zoques and 70,000 Tojolabales.”[endnoteRef:27] Indeed, in the entire state of Chiapas “42.5 per cent of its three million or so inhabitants are Mayans.”[endnoteRef:28] Thus, while indigenous Chiapanecos make up nearly half of the total population of Chiapas, they are given access to only slightly more than one half of one percent of the total classrooms in the state. Accordingly, it is not at all surprising that “even the federal government acknowledges that only half of these people are literate.”[endnoteRef:29] By clearly pointing out the Mexican Government’s failure to provide basic services, such as elementary education, the EZLN is able to strike a far greater blow to the government than if they simply continued to occupy small towns or cities, as they did during the early revolutionary period. This initial traditional armed insurrection, which included the occupation of many towns and villages, was necessary to bring the EZLN into the international news media and the consciousness of the international community. The true success of the armed occupation, however, was its ability to publicize the plight of the population of the state of Chiapas, as well as the Indigenous Mexican population as a whole, and reveal the unfulfilled promises of the Mexican Government to an international audience. The publicity which the Zapatista Revolution received in the international news media, publicity which continues to this day, identified key failures of the Mexican Government. This negative publicity was particularly harmful to the Mexican Government as it occurred precisely when Mexico was trying to overhaul their image in the global political realm, promoting neo-liberal economic policies, namely the North American Free Trade Agreement, which sought to transform Mexico into a powerful, first world, economy. [24: Mexican Constitution of 1917, http://www.latinamericanstudies.org/mexico/1917-Constitution.htm (25 Mar. 2009).] [25: Shadows of Tender Fury: Letters and Communiqués. (New York City: Monthly Review Press, 1995), 35] [26: Shadows of Tender Fury, 35.] [27: Shadows of Tender Fury, 37.] [28: Madrid, “The Magic of the Mirror.” (11 Mar 2009).] [29: Shadows of Tender Fury, 37.]

International recognition of the Zapatista movement also motivated many foreign human rights workers to travel to the region. Some of these workers related their first hand experiences with the citizens of Chiapas to international news organizations. These primary accounts of the hardships endured, on a daily basis, helped to engender support for the revolution throughout the world. One account, written by a twenty three year old Canadian Master’s student, exemplifies this phenomenon. Tamara Ticktin traveled to a small village in Chiapas to work as a human-rights volunteer. As she relates, her function “as an observer was to record and document any human-rights abuses or violations committed by the Mexican army;” however, the true significance of her time in Chiapas extended far beyond the two week period she spent in the Mexican state.[endnoteRef:30] When Ticktin finally arrives in the small town, after an arduous journey through mountain paths, the first thing she notes are the poor living conditions of the 18 Tzetal Indians families living in the town. As she relates, “the plots of land the villagers own are so tiny and the land so infertile that the yields are too low to feed a family. As a result, the men have to supplement their labor by working on big farms. But the wages are so low that the people still go hungry - children with big distended stomachs are not an uncommon sight.”[endnoteRef:31] However, as Ticktin’s first-hand account goes on to reveal, procuring food is only the first obstacle that these Indigenous peoples must overcome to feed themselves and their family. Indeed, basic daily tasks that are viewed as simple in the western world are only achieved through difficult labor, and, as Ticktin writes, “cooking is an ordeal. Men and small boys set out every day to collect firewood but the supplies are so depleted that they have to trek for two hours from the village.”[endnoteRef:32] Simply staying warm also presents a nearly insurmountable obstacle for the populations who live in mountainous areas where, “the temperature often drops below 10 degrees C.”[endnoteRef:33] With limited monetary resources preventing the Indigenous population from buying sufficient clothing to combat the frigid cold, Ticktin relates that “every morning I'd wake up to the sight of shivering children with runny noses treading barefoot through the ice-cold mud to get water from the river.”[endnoteRef:34] Perhaps unsurprisingly, the lack of infrastructure made it nearly impossible for any of the villagers to receive adequate medical attention for any illnesses they may contract as a result of poor nutrition and frigid cold. [30: Tamara Ticktin, “An observer's story: A volunteer describes the daily hardships of life in a Zapatista village in Chiapas,” The Gazette [Montreal], 10 Feb 1996 (11 Mar 2010)] [31: Ticktin, “An Observer’s Story” (11 Mar. 2010)] [32: Ticktin, “An Observer’s Story” (11 Mar. 2010)] [33: Ticktin, “An Observer’s Story” (11 Mar. 2010)] [34: Ticktin, “An Observer’s Story” (11 Mar. 2010)]

It should be noted that Ticktin’s journey to Chiapas had practical results felt by all of the citizens of the village she visited. Constant incursions by the Mexican Army forced many communities in Chiapas to call for international support from human rights observers, in an attempt to avert human rights abuses. As Ticktin relates, “Reynaldo, the mayor of the village, told me that the military used to come through the village every day, harassing the people. The military has not entered the village since the observers arrived in August.”[endnoteRef:35] However, despite advances Reynaldo is aware that the any peace in their village is temporary and contingent myriad factors. Indeed, Reynaldo relates, rather pessimistically, that, despite the efforts of the human rights workers, the Mexican army will return to their village, telling Ticktin “No, you don't understand, they will come ... they will come.”[endnoteRef:36] Ticktin’s story personifies the willingness of foreign citizens to travel to Chiapas, giving practical and ideological support to the Indigenous population. Such an immense level of international support would have been unthinkable before the Zapatista revolution, as the lives of the Indigenous population in Mexico was ignored by fellow countrymen, and foreign citizens alike; however, the popularization of the struggle for Indigenous rights that emerged in the aftermath of the Zapatista revolution brought to light the lives of these once forgotten masses. [35: Ticktin, “An Observer’s Story” (11 Mar. 2010)] [36: Ticktin, “An Observer’s Story” (11 Mar. 2010)]

As western news media coverage increased, some of the revolutionaries themselves, men and women who the initial government communiqué had claimed could not even speak Spanish, provided perceptive insights into the situation. One of the most striking of these claims comes from a young rebel leader identified only as Jesús. As Jesús told a reporter from The New York Times, “there is no work, no land, no education, there is no way to change that in elections…This is not going to be a war of two or three years. This could be a war of 25 or 30 years.”[endnoteRef:37] In addition to enumerating some of the key causes of the revolution, Jesús also provides a strikingly accurate prediction of the future of the Zapatista Revolution. As Jesús predicted, the future of the Zapatista Revolution would transcend traditional revolutionary activity and expand the revolution internationally through the dissemination of Zapatista communiqués, creating a postmodern revolution whose main weapon was words, rather than guns. [37: Tim Golden, “Rebels Determined 'to Build Socialism' in Mexico,” The New York Times, Jan 4, 1994 (1 Mar 2009).]

The foresight of a young rebel leader can be starkly juxtaposed with the earlier response of the Mexican Government, as well as Western news media, which dismissed the EZLN as simply another brief revolutionary movement which could be quickly crushed using superior military tactics and techniques. Clearly, the Mexican Government underestimated the strength of words, and the Zapatista message, whose power today sustains the Zapatista Revolution more than fifteen years after its surprising inception. The brief one page report, from The New York Times, on the still very young rebellion concludes with another perceptive quotation from a peasant farmer, Romeo Jiménez, who states “the Government always says they will help us, and they never pay attention. We don’t know those [rebels] but we understand them.”[endnoteRef:38] [38: Golden, “Rebels Determined 'to Build Socialism' in Mexico” (1 Mar. 2009).]

As other reports emerged it became evident that the local citizens were willing to support the rebels in practical, as well as ideological, terms. A local citizen of Chiapas, identified only as Guillermo, states “we help the army with food because they are our army. The government says the Mexican army is there to protect us, but this is not true. Those soldiers only come to repress the peasants, to beat us. But this army, the Zapatista army, it is ours.”[endnoteRef:39] The support of the local indigenous population was not a surprising development, as the vast majority of these citizens are aware, first hand, of the socioeconomic situation in Chiapas. Indeed, in the same interview with The National Catholic Reporter, Guillermo relates that his parents “worked on land that was not theirs. They were paid miserably, about 5,000 pesos ($1.40) per day to work from 6 in the morning till 3 in the afternoon, or later. Little by little, you realize the rich people have everything, and you have nothing.”[endnoteRef:40] This understanding of the struggle for liberty and equality, rights supposedly guaranteed under the Mexican constitution, would prove to extend far beyond the indigenous community. Many Mexican citizens sympathized with the plight of the indigenous citizens. This sentiment can, perhaps, best be personified by a quotation from a Mexican waitress working in the capital city of Chiapas, San Cristóbal de las Casas, who stated, “I understand them. I have seen the way the Indians are treated when they bring their harvests to market. The intermediaries, they make fun of them and pay them whatever they want. It breaks my heart to see how they are treated. There is too much social injustice in Chiapas.”[endnoteRef:41] [39: Wipsa, "Zapatista will deal, but not at any price." (15 Feb. 2010)] [40: Wipsa, "Zapatista will deal, but not at any price." (15 Feb. 2010)] [41: Wipsa, "Zapatista will deal, but not at any price." (15 Feb. 2010)]

Indigenous Mexicans from other states also ideologically supported the EZLN. As Ricardo Martinez, a twenty-two year old Nahuatl Indian from the eastern state of Veracruz told a reporter from The Independent of London, “our problem is the same as in the state of Chiapas. The caciques have taken over our plots. They have pistoleros (gunmen), paramilitary forces, even the army to support them. Last week, after the Chiapas troubles, the army sent tanks to our lands. But our only arms are our work tools - machetes and scythes.”[endnoteRef:42] Reports, such as these, from Mexican citizens raised the consciousness of the international community, publicizing the lives of a formerly marginalized group and gaining recognition on an international level. In fact, it is precisely the international recognition and sympathy for the plight of these marginalized citizens that has allowed the Zapatista struggle to endure for sixteen years, staking its place as a new form of extended post-modern revolution. [42: Phil Davison, “Peasant protests join Chiapas battle-cry ; For the first time in its six decades of unbroken power, Mexico's ruling party may be threatened by the growing demands of the country's dispossessed,” The Independent [London], 18 Jan. 1994 (27 Dec. 2009)]

Less than two weeks into the revolution, on January 12, 1994, a cease fire between the EZLN and the Mexican government was called in an attempt to begin peace negotiations. The cease fire stated that “the army will return fire only if fire upon, or if civilians are threatened by the rebels.”[endnoteRef:43] This peace, however, was disturbed the next day when, according to a Zapatista communiqué, “troops of the Federal Army violated the cease-fire” and fired, unprovoked, upon members of the EZLN.[endnoteRef:44] Who actually initially violated the cease-fire remains open to conjecture; however, reports from the Mexican daily La Jornada, quoted from a report filed in the British Broadcasting Company summary of world broadcasts, unequivocally state “there is no truce, no cease-fire in the Chiapas jungles.”[endnoteRef:45] The report also noted that “some isolated groups of soldiers had clashed with rebels on Wednesday and Thursday [12th and 13th January] without specifying which side fired first.”[endnoteRef:46] The report does, however, insinuate that the Mexican Government knowingly violated the cease-fire as it noted that “a dozen tanks entered the towns of San Miguel, Patate Viejo and Chivi on Thursday attacking EZLN rebels, and that helicopters and reconnaissance planes had participated in the attack.”[endnoteRef:47] The implications of widespread violations of the cease-fire were echoed by Zapatista combatants—amongst them a young rebel, identified only as Cristobal—who, in an interview with The National Catholic Reporter on February 4, claimed “just three days ago, there were bombings in Monte Libano. Our troops are respecting the cease-fire, and we will not act unless we are attacked.”[endnoteRef:48] Thus, it appears that the Mexican Government simply ignored the cease-fire, yet, despite the use of tanks and military aircraft, the Zapatista Revolution would not be destroyed. The Mexican Government seemed, again, to have underestimated the true strength of the Zapatista Revolution, namely its message; however, it would not be long before the Mexican Government attempted to control media coverage of the EZLN’s post-modern revolution. [43: Anthony DePalma, “Mexico Orders Cease-Fire and Offers Rebels Amnesty,” The New York Times, 13 Jan. 1994 (29 Mar. 2009).] [44: Shadows of Tender Fury, 69.] [45: EFE news agency, Madrid, in Spanish 1620 gmt 14 Jan 94, “Sporadic clashes reported in Chiapas despite truce,” BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, 17 Jan. 1994 (29 Mar. 2009).] [46: EFE “sporadic clashes reported in Chiapas despite truce” (29 Mar. 2009).] [47: EFE “sporadic clashes reported in Chiapas despite truce” (29 Mar. 2009).] [48: Wipsa, "Zapatista will deal, but not at any price." (15 Feb. 2010)]

In addition to overt military action against the Zapatistas, the Mexican Government also attempted to control the media coverage of the Zapatista Revolution. According to a letter issued by local radio and television journalists in Chiapas, Jose Luis Resendiz, president of the Association of Radio Stations and Television Stations, told several local journalists that "solely information confirmed by official sources should be given out."[endnoteRef:49] This clear attempt at government censuring of the media exemplifies the antiquated manner in which the Mexican Government viewed their battle against the EZLN. With expanded international methods of communication the Mexican Government was not able to censure coverage of the Zapatista Revolution. In fact, their attempts at undemocratic government control were revealed to an international audience, only furthering the Zapatistas’ claims of corruption. The attempts at government control were, likely, motivated by the unique nature of the Zapatista Revolution, specifically the notable level of national and international support that the Zapatistas were able to garner. Indeed, as El Proceso, one of the leading Mexican newspapers claimed, “there are few movements and leaders that produce such fascination amongst writers, journalists, photographers, actors, and directors as the Zapatistas and Subcomandante Marcos.”[endnoteRef:50] As the Zapatistas began to withdraw into the Lacandon Jungle they realized that their strongest weapon was their message. The Zapatistas cries for equality and dignity were juxtaposed with government attempts at media control, only furthering the Zapatistas’ position in the international community. Thus, during the cease-fire—which saw the Zapatista revolutionaries withdraw from their occupation of towns and cities, a traditional tactic of an armed revolutionary insurrection—the Zapatistas were able to strike a severe blow to the Mexican Government through their use of words. The strength of the Zapatista message was clearly becoming the true strength of the revolution, a force too strong for the Mexican Government to silence. [49: Diego Ribadeneira, “Mexico Seen Directing Media on Revolt,” The Boston Globe, 15 Jan. 1994 (1 Apr. 2009).] [50: Florence Toussaint, “Marcos, Canonizado,” El Proceso. 8 Jan. 1996 (21 Dec. 2009)]

Despite skirmishes between the EZLN and the Mexican Army, as well as covert attempts by the Mexican Government to influence media coverage of the Zapatista Revolution, dialogue between the Zapatistas and the Mexican Government continued until the Presidential elections in August. According to a letter from the EZLN to the newly elected Mexican President Ernesto Zedillo, “you decided to slam the door on the 21st of August and repeat the arrogance of a landslide victory.”[endnoteRef:51] The EZLN labeled the August elections as fraudulent, a view the citizens of Chiapas likewise held. There were some independent observers of the Mexican electoral process, but few of them from the state of Chiapas, including ten members of the Non-Governmental Organization Oxfam Canada. John Foster, the secretary of Oxfam Canada who was amongst the observers, noted, in a report from The Gazette of Montreal, that “we can't say this was a free and fair election,” although he also noted that “people have come a long way since the last election.”[endnoteRef:52] As The Gazette of Montreal reported “the 10 Canadians visited more than 50 polling stations and two-thirds of them spotted irregularities”; however, according to the report, “an international delegation including the Carter Centre, headed by former U.S. president Jimmy Carter, said the incidents were isolated and even taken with other problems, would not have affected the outcome of the elections.”[endnoteRef:53] Unfortunately, many opposition candidates claimed that these electoral problems had, in fact, obstructed the electoral process. [51: As Quoted In: ¡Ya Basta!, 80.] [52: Ingrid Peritz, “Intimidation and Voting Irregularities Noted by Canadian Election Observers,” The Gazette [Montreal, Quebec], 24 Aug. 1994 (1 Mar. 2009)] [53: Peritz, “Intimidation and Voting Irregularities” (1 Mar. 2009). ]

Even the Mexican Government, in an article from The Times of London, acknowledged some electoral problems, including “a shortage of ballot papers [that] deprived at least a million Mexicans of the chance to vote in [the] election, which was won by the ruling Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI).”[endnoteRef:54] Opposition leaders, however, claimed that the fraud was far more widespread and malicious than a simple shortage of ballot papers. As the same article in The Times of London reported “opposition leaders, blaming 'electoral alchemy' by which names were mysteriously erased from the electoral roll, claim the number of those unable to vote was even higher, perhaps eight million in an enfranchised population of 45 million.”[endnoteRef:55] Thus, two to seventeen percent of the entire electorate were denied the right to cast their vote, a right clearly given to them in Article 35 of the Mexican Constitution of 1917, which states “the prerogatives of citizens are: I. To vote at popular elections.”[endnoteRef:56] Claims of electoral fraud were obviously negated by members of the ruling PRI party; however, some American politicians also backed the claims of the Mexican Government. John McCain, U.S. Senator from Arizona, told reporters in Chiapas “'I haven't seen anything, any technical aspects of this election which would skew it or have a significant impact on [theresult].''[endnoteRef:57] Other observers however, including Sergio Aguayo, director of Civic Alliance, noted that ''the quality of the election is in question,'' and Bruce Kiernan, a former director of Helsinki Watch, a human rights group, noted that “this is an authoritarian state, which has rigged elections before, and this time there was manipulation of the press, unfair campaign financing, vote buying, and intimidation.''[endnoteRef:58] Thanks in large part to the Zapatista Revolution, an event which greatly increased media coverage and interest in Mexican politics, the fraudulent history of the PRI government was displayed to an international audience. The revelation of prior PRI transgressions helped strengthen the Zapatista cause in the international community. When Zapatista claims of rampant historical voting fraud were corroborated by international human rights associations, the strength of the entire Zapatista message increased dramatically. Thus, the Mexican Government clearly and unequivocally acted in a manner that, again, completely subverted the will of the Mexican Constitution of 1917. After yet another fraudulent election many Chiapenecos decided they would no longer support the corruption of the PRI government. [54: David Adams, “Million Mexicans Deprived of Vote,” The Times [London, UK], 24 Aug. 1994 (1 Mar 2009).] [55: Adams, “Million Mexicans Deprived of Vote” (1 Mar. 2009).] [56: Mexican Constitution of 1917, http://www.latinamericanstudies.org/mexico/1917-Constitution.htm (25 Mar. 2009).] [57: David Clark Scott, “Opposition, Mayan Rebels Cry Foul in Mexican Vote,” Christian Science Monitor, 24 Aug. 1994 (1 Mar. 2009).] [58: Scott, “Opposition, Mayan Rebels” (1 Mar. 2009).]

The unwillingness to support a corrupt government became apparent in December of 1994, when the PRI candidate for governor, Eduardo Robledo Rincon, was set to take office in Chiapas. According to an article in the December 5, 1994 edition of the weekly newspaper, Proceso:

“in Chiapas there is no doubt: the discourse of the new President of Mexico, Ernesto Zedillo, is going to be tested this Thursday the 8th of December when Eduardo Robledo Rincon, a member of the PRI Party, is set to assume gubernatorial power, opposite the rejection of peasants and indigenous citizens who complain of electoral fraud and will only recognize as governor the journalist Armando Avendano Figueroa.”[endnoteRef:59] [59: Guillermo Correa and Julio Cesar Lopez, “La Prueba de Zedillo en Chiapas: Imposicion o Democracia, Robledo o Avendano, Paz o Guerra," Proceso, 5 Dec. 1994 (19 Feb. 2009).]

This quotation reflects the fraudulent nature of the ruling PRI party as well as the level of local discontent with the electoral results. Although these peasants and indigenous citizens were not armed combatants they clearly displayed solidarity with the EZLN through their calls for transparent elections, proving that the Zapatista message had, at the least, been accepted locally. In fact the local discontent was so strong that “from December 1994 to February 1995, the territory at least partially under EZLN control grew from four municipalities to 38 as many towns and hamlets declared themselves free from the control of the official municipal authorities.”[endnoteRef:60] This declaration against the municipal authorities demonstrates that many local Chiapanecos were not only ideologically united with the EZLN, but, in fact, were willing to take strong actions in order to regain control of their own land. Thus, through the use of words rather than force the Zapatistas were able to occupy far more towns and hamlets than they had occupied during the initial revolutionary actions in January. [60: Sarah Washbrook, The Chiapas Uprising of 1994: Historical Antecedents and Political Consequences (London: Routledge Press, 2006). ]

The EZLN was, likewise, critical of the PRI government, claiming in their letter to Zedillo that the Zapatistas “hope to have, at last, the opportunity to decide our own destiny. The hope that democracy, liberty and justice become more than the subject of speeches and textbooks.”[endnoteRef:61] Quite clearly, this EZLN communiqué criticizes the inaugural speech of Zedillo in which he states: [61: As Quoted In: Ya Basta!, 81]

“I am convinced that it is possible in Chiapas to achieve a new negotiation, one that will bring us to a just, dignified and definitive peace…We search for everyone the methods to arrive at an agreement built in concordance with democracy and the opportunity to develop with equality. We want a motherland of peace, a nation of equality, a Mexico with justice for all. Progress and peace are everlasting in a state of the law, where respect for the Army, and its appropriate guarantees, is accompanied with the respect for the rights of the rest of the nation. The law binds everyone together. No one can be above the law.”[endnoteRef:62] [62: Correa and Lopez, “La Prueba de Zedillo en Chiapas” (19 Feb. 2009).]

Zedillo, and his calls for equality, echo the sentiments of the Zapatista movement. The Zapatistas claimed, however, that Zedillo’s speech was simply another attempt to pander to the Mexican population, promising them basic human rights which they are never, in reality, given. In fact the speech sounds quite a bit like a Zapatista communiqué, with its calls for a motherland of peace and a nation of equality in which no one is above the law.

Talks between the Zapatistas and the Government stalled during 1995; however, there was a reinvigoration during the early months of 1996, with leaders of the Government and the EZLN set to discuss proposals regarding indigenous rights and equality Chiapas. These discussions, in addition to proposing reforms of the Mexican Constitution, included potential modifications of the civil, penal and electoral codes, as well as attempts to modify the basic law of the judicial branch in order to consolidate the political, economic, social and cultural rights of the indigenous peoples of Chiapas. The mere fact that the Mexican government was willing to sit down with a rebel group and discuss human rights represents a significant accomplishment within the framework of Mexican internal relations. Indeed as Jesus Acosta, a researcher for the Miguel Agustin Pro Juarez Human Rights Group, stated in an interview with The Globe and Mail of Toronto, “when we talk about gains, never in Mexico's recent history has there been such an awareness of the indigenous peoples… and the EZLN was the catalyst for that.”[endnoteRef:63] According to reports from the Mexican newspaper La Jornada, the Mexican government committed to working towards reforms, including “recognition of Indian autonomy, adoption of a plebiscite or referendum to elect authorities, remunicipalization of Indian regions, organization and regulation of elected Indian town councils in keeping with practice and customs, and the possibility of allowing Indian communities to participate in elections without the involvement of political parties.”[endnoteRef:64] [63: Andrew Downie, “From Blood and Guts to Hearts and Minds” The Globe and Mail [Toronto, CA], 20 Jan. 1996 (4 Feb 2010).] [64: La Jornada, Mexico City, 6 Feb 1996, “Chiapas State government, congress to reform state constitution,” BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, 12 Feb 1996 (14 Mar 2010)]

On January 19, 1996, according to reports from the French news agency Agence France Presse, the Zapatistas and government representatives reached a tentative agreement concerning the recognition of indigenous rights. In a joint statement released to various news agencies, the two sides called for the creation of a "new social pact," which one of the Zapatista negotiators, identified only as Tacho, welcomed, while also noting that it took “an indigenous army, war and death" to finally motivate the Mexican government to "commit itself in documents to promote our existence and our rights."[endnoteRef:65] Tacho noted, “the accords represent a triumph for a new form of dialogue and political negotiation nobody ever has carried out," emphasizing that the accords "benefit the national indigenous movement, and the local steps forward are many."[endnoteRef:66] However, in a somewhat sardonic tone, he noted that “words and commitments no matter how firm and serious will serve no purpose if our people continue to be harassed… We rose up to demand justice ... that can only come about with profound changes in political, social and economic relations ... the government now has the possibility to show that war is not the way."[endnoteRef:67] Additionally Tacho, staying true to Zapatista claims of representing the indigenous population, stated that, despite the preliminary agreements, the Zapatistas would “listen to the word of our people on these commitments and proposals.”[endnoteRef:68] [65: Agence France Presse, Paris, “Chiapas Rebels, Government Reach Tentative Agreements,” 19 Jan. 1996 (4 Feb 2010).] [66: Agence France Presse, “Zapatista rebels agree to sign first peace accords in Mexico,” 14 Feb. 1996 (4 Feb. 2010)] [67: Agence France Presse, Paris, “Chiapas Rebels” (4 Feb 2010).] [68: Agence France Presse, Paris, “Chiapas Rebels” (4 Feb 2010).]

This claim was substantiated two weeks later in a report from the Mexican newspaper El Proceso, who reported “the preliminary agreements achieved between the EZLN and the government delegates are being consulted in the Zapatista communities; if they are approved they will continue on their course towards the national Congress and the local legislators. It is probable that very soon we will see profound transformations in the legal system of the country in regards to the indigenous populations.”[endnoteRef:69] The mere possibility of achieving measurable equality represented an immense ideological victory for the Zapatistas, and more importantly the indigenous community which they represented. Indeed the optimism of the accords can be noted in the tone of the Mexican media, who qualified the events as “fundamental, in that they aspire to establish a new social pact and a new manner of conceptualizing national unity, based in respect for plurality.”[endnoteRef:70] Even the Mexican Government seemed, on a public level, to accept the necessity of assuring the integration of the indigenous society. In fact the Mexican Government, in a statement released to El Proceso, assumed “the worthy compromise of fortifying the participation of the indigenous communities’ in the national development, in a manner respecting their traditions, institutions and social organizations.”[endnoteRef:71] [69: Pablo Latapi, “Mexico: La Casa de Dodos Sus Pueblos,”El Proceso [Mexico City] 5 Feb. 1996 (4 Feb 2010)] [70: Latapi, “Mexico: La Casa de Dodos Sus Pueblos,” 5 Feb. 1996 (4 Feb 2010)] [71: Latapi, “Mexico: La Casa de Dodos Sus Pueblos,” 5 Feb. 1996 (4 Feb 2010)]

The official recognition of these pacts, known as the San Andrés accords, included many significant declarations concerning the rights of the Indigenous population. The agreements were vast; however, they included significant recognitions of the cultural validity of the indigenous populations via “the treaty between the peoples and cultures that form part of Mexican society based on the principle of mutual respect for their differences, underneath a framework of fundamental equality.”[endnoteRef:72] Significantly, the accords also acknowledged the right to individual self determination, stating “the government will respect the exercise of self determination of the indigenous communities.”[endnoteRef:73] Most importantly, however, the federal government explicitly assumed responsibility for the following eight points: A) To recognize the indigenous populations en the national Constitution. B) To expand political participation and representation. C) To guarantee full access to justice. D) To promote the cultural manifestations of the indigenous community. E) To assure education and training. F) To guarantee the satisfaction of basic necessities. G) To promote production and employment. H) To protect indigenous migrants.[endnoteRef:74] Thus, at the very least, the San Andrés accords represented a significant step in the official recognition of a formerly ignored segment of the Mexican population. [72: Víctor Osorio, "A 5 anos de San Andres." Reforma [México D.F., México] 16 Feb. 2001 (4 Feb. 2010)] [73: Víctor Osorio, "A 5 anos de San Andres." (4 Feb. 2010)] [74: Víctor Osorio, "A 5 anos de San Andres." (4 Feb. 2010)]

However, reports from within the dialogues seem to suggest that, in reality, the Mexican government had little interest in any true reform of the existing social institutions and practices. Indeed, as Ricardo Robles, the chief consultant for the EZLN and a noted scholar on the indigenous peoples of Mexico, claimed “the general context of every moment of dialogue has been this: war and not peace…it was nothing more than a part of the same war, more abstract, more humiliating, more disparaging and racist hidden under the mask of decent people.”[endnoteRef:75] The true intentions of the Mexican Government can only be speculated upon; however, Robles makes a rather stark accusation, one which characterizes the government as potential bullies, claiming that one of the negotiators from the Mexican Government made it clear that the government intended to “intimidate the EZLN” through “the proportion of their [Zapatista] arms compared to the arms of the Mexican Government.”[endnoteRef:76] Thus, it appears that, despite the immense news coverage of the Zapatistas, the Mexican Government continued in its insistence that the Zapatistas could be simply overwhelmed by the force of the Mexican Army, a view that proved to be erroneous. [75: Tomas Gerardo Allaz, “No Son Hombres?” Reforma [México D.F., México] 4 Mar. 1996 (8 Feb 2010).] [76: Allaz “No Son Hombres?” 4 Mar. 1996 (8 Feb 2010).]

In an attempt to respond to claims by Robles, as well as various other international observers, that the Mexican Government did not approach the January negotiations completely openly, a new round of peace talks was scheduled for June 5. These talks, however, were compromised before they even began. On May 2 a federal judge in the Mexican criminal system sentenced two documentarians, Javier Elorriaga and Sebastián Entzin, to thirteen and six years in prison, respectively, for being sympathizers of the Zapatistas. Members of the EZLN claimed that the government offered no witnesses against the defendants and, perhaps most importantly, that the judge relied on testimony that had been ruled inadmissible by other courts. The allegedly unjust imprisonment of these two men motivated myriad protests, both nationally and internationally, amongst them demonstrations in front of the Mexican Consulate in San Francisco. As the newspaper El Mensajero, a Spanish language newspaper located in San Francisco, reported during the demonstrations, two members of the human rights group Global Exchange met with the Mexican diplomat César Lahud, encouraging him to send a letter to the Mexican President, Ernesto Zedillo, in support of the release of the documentarians. As Ted Lewis, the director of the Global Exchange’s Mexico campaign related “we tried to help convince the Mexican government that dialogue is better than repression…and that's where the Mexican government finds itself in a great contradiction. On the one hand they are carrying a legally constituted dialogue, and on the other they are threatening arrests and calling people terrorists.”[endnoteRef:77] However, while the Mexican judicial system was imprisoning supposed sympathizers, Mexican president Ernesto Zedillo continued his public support for indigenous rights and equality, stating, during a visit Chiapas, “from Chiapas I reiterate to all Mexicans that the government of the republic is for peace with dignity and for reconciliation with respect. We are dedicated to advancing the consolidation of the dialogue to forge consensuses that will become bridges to closeness, conciliation and agreement.”[endnoteRef:78] Public rhetoric not withstanding, the Mexican government did not appear to be interested in achieving any important changes. [77: Alfonso Serrano, "En busca del diálogo: manifestantes en el Consulado Mexicano de San Francisco protestan la persecución de los supuestos Zapatistas por el gobierno mexicano." El Mensajero 5 June 1996 (18 Mar. 2010)] [78: Serrano, “En Busca del Diálogo,” 5 June 1996 (18 Mar. 2010)]

While officials from the government negotiated with rebel leaders, news reports began to emerge alleging myriad serious human rights violations, violations that bring into question the true intentions of the Mexican Government. Claims of widespread human rights violations were leveled against the Mexican Government by human rights groups and foreign governments alike. The U.S. based group, Human Rights Watch, issued a report in February of 1996 which alleged that “during the 1995 crackdown, the Mexican government fell into several patterns of abuse, including the use of forced confessions; the attempt to disguise arbitrary action as legal procedure...the blindfolding of detainees...and the ill-treatment of detainees, including torture.”[endnoteRef:79] Human Rights Watch reported various accounts of torture, including the case of Maria Gloria Benavides, whom the government claims is Comandante Elisa of the EZLN. The report quotes her as saying she was “held at a military prison where she was made to undress repeatedly and to sign statements she was not allowed to read. Benavides also accuses interrogators of threatening to harm her 18-month-old son if she did not confess.”[endnoteRef:80] It should be noted that Benavides was subsequently acquitted of all charges when a judge ruled that police never obtained a valid search warrant when they arrested her, and that her statement had been coerced. [79: Farhan Haq, “Mexico-Human Rights: Group Condems Torture of Zapatistas,” IPS-Inter Press Service [New York], 9 Feb 1996 (11 Oct. 2009).] [80: Haq, “Mexico-Human Rights,” 9 Feb 1996 (11 Oct. 2009).]

Other instances reported by Human Rights Watch, however, suggest that coerced statements were frequently found to be admissible in court. Indeed, sixteen of eighteen people, of the more than twenty arrested during the crackdown of 1995, interviewed by Human Rights Watch “reported that they gave coerced statements to government officials after being blindfolded, subjected to incessant and loud music, and deprived of liquid or food for up to forty-eight hours. Initially, none had adequate legal assistance.”[endnoteRef:81] One particularly appalling case involves a Mexican citizen, Alvaro Castillo Granados, who “told Human Rights Watch/Americas that police forced him into the back of a car, stuffed a rag into his mouth, and forced mineral water up his nose. The police who interrogated Castillo shocked him with an electric baton and almost suffocated him with a plastic bag,” and yet, despite these torturous actions “a judge dismissed the torture allegations, claiming that even if proved, they would not detract from the value of the detainees' confessions.”[endnoteRef:82] [81: Human Rights Watch World Report 1996. (11 Oct. 2009).] [82: Human Rights Watch World Report 1996. (11 Oct. 2009).]

Reports of serious and arbitrary human rights violations emerged throughout the international press, including an article from The Irish Times, which included an interview with a Mexican citizen, Francisco Lopez, who “was blindfolded and taken away in a helicopter,” days after the rebellion began.[endnoteRef:83] After arbitrarily detaining Mr. Lopez, Mexican officials proceeded to give Lopez “electric shocks on my back and a rifle butt was slammed against my head.”[endnoteRef:84] Thus, while the Mexican Government officially was negotiating with the Zapatistas, with stated intentions to reform the Mexican constitution and legal system, they were subjecting dozens of Mexican citizens to horrific violations of their basic human rights. Indeed, as Amnesty International astutely suggested, “the long-lasting policy of impunity for human rights violations in Mexico ensures their perpetuation, despite government promises to the contrary.”[endnoteRef:85] [83: Michael McCaughan, “Mexican rulers seek to discredit rebels: The Zapatistas have exposed the morbid condition of Mexico's political system,” The Irish Times [Dublin], 11 Feb. 1994 (8 Feb. 2010)] [84: Michael McCaughan “Mexican rulers seek to discredit rebels” (8 Feb. 2010)] [85: Deutsche Presse-Agentur, “Amnesty International reports continued violations in Mexico.” 16 Feb 1996 (15 Sept. 2009)]

International human rights groups were joined by government agencies which also alleged serious human rights abuses in Mexico. Less than three weeks after the initial fighting began, European Members of Parliament adopted a resolution, in which they implored the Mexican Government not to violate human rights. The resolution called for “dialogue between the Mexican government and the EZLN that should, as soon as possible, lead to a definitive ceasefire and help remedy the injustices and discrimination suffered by the poorest sectors of the Mexican people.”[endnoteRef:86] Despite calls to avoid human rights abuses, a report by the U.S. State Department from 1995 alleges serious human rights violations including, “extrajudicial killings, by the police, torture and illegal arrests.”[endnoteRef:87] These claims were echoed two years later in another report by the State Department, which alleged, among other violations “arbitrary detentions, illegal arrests, torture of persons in police custody and extra-judicial executions.”[endnoteRef:88] President Zedillo was leveled by similar claims during a 1996 trip to Canada. Despite a declaration in front of both houses of the Canadian Parliament, in which the Mexican president stated that “there is no place for human rights violations” in Mexico, Canadian officials noted, during private meetings, that Zedillo's "responses were either very general or very legalistic, and we were not satisfied with that."[endnoteRef:89] Thus, once again, the public rhetoric of the Mexican government proved to be incongruous with their actions. [86: IPS-Inter Press Service, “Mexico-Human Rights: Euro MP’s Take Up the Chiapas Cause,” 20 Jan. 1994 (15. Sept 2009)] [87: Rita Beamish, “State Department Accuses Mexico of Widespread Rights Abuses,” The Associated Press [Washington, DC] 2 Feb. 1995 (8 Feb. 2010)] [88: Isaac Levi, “Mexico angrily rejects U.S. human rights report,” The Associated Press [Mexico City] 31 Jan. 1997 (8 Feb 2010)] [89: Stephen Dale, “Mexico-Canada: Human Rights Steals Spotlight in Zedillo Visit,” IPS-Inter Press Service [Ottawa] 12 June 1996 (8 Feb 2010)]

Human rights violations perpetrated by the Mexican government did not emerge through the course of the uprising; rather they were the byproduct of the complete impunity enjoyed by officials responsible for them. From the first week of the conflict reports began to emerge from officials such as Patricia Gomez, director of investigations for the Fray Bartolome human rights center in San Cristobal. Gomez stated, during the first week of the conflict, “we are hearing many cases of flagrant human rights violations… And we would probably hear more except the army surrounds (our office) and people are afraid to come in.”[endnoteRef:90] Mexican citizens were not the only people subjected to grotesque violations of their human rights. One particular case of abuse involved a Venezuelan biologist, Peter Bichier who works with the Smithsonian Institution in Washington, who was stopped while driving along a highway in Chiapas. After searching Bichier, he was transported to a government office, where his feet were bound during eight hours of questioning. According to Bichier, “they said, 'don't try to escape, because if you do we're going to hit you and hit you hard.”[endnoteRef:91] Thus, international citizens, as well as Mexican nationals, had just cause to fear for their safety. [90: David Scanlon, “Mexico: Army accused of 'ruthless' actions,” The Ottawa Citizen 7 Jan. 1994. (8 Feb 2010)] [91: Scanlon, “Mexico: Army accused of 'ruthless' actions,” (8 Feb 2010)]

In the wake of widespread human rights abuses, and due to what the Zapatista’s labeled as a lack of “political will to solve the conflict,” dialogue between the Mexican Government and the Zapatistas was shut down during August of 1996, after 17 meetings between the two sides.[endnoteRef:92] The two sides did not hold any formal meetings until 2001, with the Zapatistas seemingly willing to return to their strongholds in the Lacandon jungle. The Mexican government, however, did not seem as willing to allow the Zapatistas to simply retreat and, as a result, the following years were marked with “an important increase in the prescience of military and paramilitary forces.”[endnoteRef:93] [92: Marcela Turati, “Un Aniversario Más Pero Sin Tensions,” Mural [Mexico City] 1 Jan. 2001 (11 Mar 2010)] [93: Turati “Un Aniversario Más Pero Sin Tensions,” (11 Mar 2010)]

The EZLN, however, seemed to open the possibility of dialogue in December of 2000, when Subcommandante Marcos declared that “all of those who have declared war on us, in all of its varying forms, all of them have gone. Some of them are being investigated for their links with organized crime, others are in exile, others are now unemployed.”[endnoteRef:94] Indeed, despite years away from the political scene the Mexican paper, Mural, noted in January of 2001 that “the EZLN has been able to remain in the national political consciousness and they still have the sympathy of various groups and sectors of the national and international civil societies.”[endnoteRef:95] However, the Zapatistas signaled that the possibility of new dialogue would be contingent on the closure of “7 military positions, each one signifying an affront to the desire for peace.”[endnoteRef:96] Finally, in order to reopen the negotiations, the Zapatistas called for “the liberation of those accused of being part of the EZLN and the constitutional recognition of indigenous rights and culture.”[endnoteRef:97] Interestingly, despite years away from the direct spotlight, the Zapatistas seemed to hold new forms of political capital, including amongst deputies of their former rivals, the PRI party. Jaime Martínez Veloz—a member of the PRI party in the national assembly, in regards to the indecision of the president of the Mexico, Vicente Fox—told reports “I find the position of the President to be a very dangerous and risky one, as it puts at risk the lives of the Zapatistas, that is to say that the government has not done its share of the work.”[endnoteRef:98] Strong remonstrations of the President, by members of the most powerful political party, exemplify the power of the Zapatista movement to motivate persons from varying political and regional backgrounds to support the rights of the Indigenous Mexican population. [94: Turati “Un Aniversario Más Pero Sin Tensions,” (11 Mar 2010)] [95: Turati “Un Aniversario Más Pero Sin Tensions,” (11 Mar 2010)] [96: María Teresa del Riego and Marcela Turati, “Reconocen Zapatistas Avances para el Dialogo” Reforma [Mexico City] 2 Jan. 2001(19 Jan. 2010)] [97: Mayolo López, "Ofrece Fox a EZLN cumplir exigencias." Reforma [Mexico City] 14 Jan. 2001 (19 Jan. 2010)] [98: Claudia Guerrero, "Pide PRI y PRD a Fox que le cumpla al EZLN." El Norte [Mexico City] 15 Jan 2001. (19 Jan. 2010.)]

The state government of Chiapas seemed to share a desire to promote dialogue between the federal government and the Zapatistas. Emilio Zebadúa, the General Secretary of the Government of the state of Chiapas, announced on February 5, 2001 that, with the coordination of the Attorney General of the state of Chiapas, the state government of Chiapas would look “to find new judicial elements that would permit the liberation of additional Zapatista members.”[endnoteRef:99] With the Mexican government, on the state and federal level, proving to be receptive to dialogue, the Zapatistas began a march towards the capital city, in the hopes of, finally, securing the official recognition of Indigenous rights in the Mexican Constitution, a significant event that, despite promises made in the San Andrés accords, had yet to be achieved. On the first of March of 2001 the Mexican President, Vicente Fox, declared that the Mexican government was “prepared to enter the table of dialogue; prepared to advance in complying with the conditions that sustain the Zapatistas.”[endnoteRef:100] In this environment of cooperation and optimism 15,000 Zapatistas arrived in Mexico City on the eighth of March, after a trip of three thousand miles, covering eleven Mexican states. Upon their arrival, Subcommandante Marcos asked “that you help us, so that together we may achieve what we all wish.”[endnoteRef:101] With the support of politicians, such as Cuauhtémoc Cárdenas, a former presidential candidate and the son of former president Lázaro Cárdenas, various members of the EZLN, not including Subcommandante Marcos, were allowed to speak in front of the legislature, leading to the approval, by a slight vote of 220 in favor and 210 not in favor, of the “Law of Indigenous Rights and Culture.”[endnoteRef:102] While this law was a significant step forward, in the sense that the legislative body of Mexico officially recognized some rights of its indigenous population, it failed to achieve all of the desired goals, namely land reforms, leaving the Zapatistas feeling as though they had not achieved their true goals. [99: Daniel Pensamiento, “"Preven liberar a mas zapatistas." El Norte [México D.F., México] 6 de febrero 2001(19 Jan. 2010)] [100: Margarita Vega, "Estamos listos para dialogo.- Fox." Reforma [México D.F., México] 2 Mar. 2001(23 Jan. 2010)] [101: Guadalupe Irízar, “Les pedimos que nos cuiden'." Palabra [México D.F., México] 9 de marzo 2001(23 Jan. 2010)] [102: Pilar Franco, "Mexico: La Voz de los Zapatistas Resonar en el Parlamento.” Noticias en Español (2001). (1 Feb 2010).]

Having failed to achieve all of their lofty goals, the Zapatistas again retreated to the Lacandon Jungle to plan their next move. The disappointment of not achieving, what they viewed as complete justice for the Indigenous population of Mexico was bitter; however, the Zapatistas would not simply fade away into the revolutionary history of Mexico. One June 2, 2006, the day of Presidential and Gubernatorial elections in Mexico, the EZLN announced the implementation of The Other Campaign. As Subcommandante Marcos declared, “they propose that today, the second of June, is the day of the elections and, thus, we present another alternative for our people.”[endnoteRef:103] The Other Campaign advocated “reasoned abstention.”[endnoteRef:104] According to Subcommandate Marcos, The Other Campaign had already, on June 2, 2006, integrated “724 collectives and groups, 263 social organizations, 136 indigenous communities, 72 leftist political organizations and 3,695 individuals” into the framework of their new campaign. The Other Campaign continues today, integrating more individuals and groups into the Zapatista framework and helping to support the ongoing revolution through an international exchange of information. The success of The Other Campaign cannot be easily evaluated, as it is an ongoing process; however, it provides yet another clear example of the power of the Zapatista message, one whose strength has sustained the movement 16 years after its surprising inception. [103: Emiliano Ruiz, “Anuncia Marcos movilizacion." Reforma [México D.F., México] 2 June 2006 (1 Feb. 2010)] [104: María Teresa del Riego, “Promueven abstencion.” Palabra [México D.F., México] 2 July 2006 ( Feb. 2010)

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]

.Almost immediately, the Zapatistas staked their claim as truly new and unique post-modern revolutionaries. These new revolutionaries gained their most appreciable levels of success through the dissemination of their message, not thorough the use of traditional modern forms of armed insurrection. The Zapatista Revolution was initially viewed by the Mexican Government, as well as traditional media outlets, as merely another small armed insurrection that could be easily silenced through traditional displays of military and political power. The Zapatista revolution, however, quickly proved to be difficult to qualify. Initial news reports were extremely dismissive of the Zapatista Revolution, viewing it as simply another small insurrection that would quickly be silenced by the Mexican Government, destined to be nothing more than a brief footnote in the long revolutionary history of Mexico. This antiquated view was strongly refuted by members of the EZLN, who predicted that the struggle to achieve true equality and dignity for all Mexican citizens could not be realized in a matter of a few months or even years.

Through the use of new forms of communication the Zapatistas were able to refute initial claims from the Mexican Government, claims that labeled them as indigenous peasants who could not speak Spanish and had no real demands or platform. Through the international news media the Zapatista Revolution was able to promote its ideals of dignity and equality, while simultaneously giving a face and a voice to millions of indigenous citizens. These indigenous Mexicans had, since the inception of colonialism, been dehumanized. This dehumanization allowed for the Mexican Government, and the international community, to ignore the plight of millions of Mexican citizens who were denied access to the birthrights they had been guaranteed under the Mexican Constitution of 1917. The Zapatista Revolution, through its use of words rather than arms, was able to insert these formerly marginalized masses into the international consciousness, assuring that they could no longer be viewed as mere vestiges of human beings. The Zapatista Revolution forced the entire international community to look directly into the eyes of the indigenous communities. These eyes were then accompanied by words spoken from the exposed mouths of the Zapatistas, words that told of government abuse and injustice. As Zapatista claims of human rights abuses were corroborated with myriad reports from independent international observers, as well as foreign government agencies, the Zapatista message grew. The power of their message proved to exceed the power of arms and the traditional strategy of prolonged armed occupation. The Zapatistas gained recognition on an international scale during the initial cease-fire between the two sides, recognition that continues to this day, proving that their words were their strongest weapons.

Presidential and gubernatorial elections were held in August of 1994 and, thanks in large part to the international media coverage of the Zapatista Revolution, this election was placed under completely new levels of international scrutiny. Although there was certainly some degree of electoral fraud in the elections of 1994, they marked an historic occasion. For the first time in nearly seven decades the PRI party did not receive a majority of the votes in the presidential election, although their candidate Ernesto Zedillo did win the election. Under increased international scrutiny the PRI party was unable to influence the election overtly, although independent observers did note measurable levels of irregular electoral activities. Nonetheless this election marked the end of complete PRI control of the electoral process, and, in fact, Zedillo would prove to be the last in the line of seventy consecutive years of PRI control of the presidency.

International support for the Zapatistas also forced the government to negotiate with the rebels. Negotiations between government officials and indigenous groups forced the government to officially recognize indigenous rights and culture, making it difficult for these formerly forgotten groups to be ignored; however, after investigating the actions of the Mexican Government, and not simply their rhetorical devices, it becomes clear that myriad human rights abuses, once again, exemplified the unwillingness of the Mexican Government to practice what it preached. Despite the injustices committed by the Mexican Government, the accords signed are a significant step forward in the political and racial discourse within Mexican society. The recognition of indigenous rights and culture would have been impossible without the Zapatista Revolution, and, in turn, the success of the Zapatista Revolution would have been impossible without the support of various human rights organizations and, most importantly, the international news media which served as the perfect platform for the dissemination of the Zapatista message.

The Zapatista message was quickly accepted by many local citizens of Chiapas. Far more surprising, however, was the immense international audience which the EZLN was able to garner, using new methods of communication which cemented their status as post-modern revolutionaries, fighting against power, rather than for it. Ultimately, the true success of the Zapatista Revolution is found in its longevity, something that the Zapatistas achieved through the propagation of their message to an international audience. The Zapatistas place in the international consciousness humanized a once dehumanized and vilified group of indigenous citizens, while simultaneously cementing the EZLN as a post-modern revolutionary movement, one that still exists today, more than sixteen years after the initial insurgency, through the power of words, not weapons.