ASSIGNMENT 3

Under One Roof with the Authoritarian Leviathan: A

Gendered Reflection of the PAP and My Father

Liew Yi Ling, A0143455H

HY4231: Family-State Relations in Chinese History

November 23, 2018

I was twelve when I lied that my father physically abused me. It

happened during conversation I had with one of my male classmates over

text message. I remember having a foolish schoolgirl crush on said

classmate and I was eager to impress—to keep him interested and

engaged, I exaggerated and told many lies about events in my life. It was

on a weekday night, after school, where I found myself glued to the tiny

screen of my Sony Ericsson cell phone—an item my father gifted me

when I complained about not owning the latest phone in the market.

There was a lull in conversation between the boy I liked—he wasn’t

replying. Desperate to keep the conversation going, I sent him another

text message, telling him I was beaten by father. It was a lie, of course;

but it worked—his interest was piqued. Over the next few weeks, I’d

make up elaborate stories about how my father lashed out at me—once

even resorting to using his belt. Eventually, my mother found out about

these accusations which I flagrantly tossed around just to get the

attention of a boy. I don’t know why she was looking into the contents of

my cell phone; but when she confronted me about what I had done, I was

too ashamed to question what I believed was her invasion of my privacy.

If she hadn’t caught me then, I probably wouldn’t have stopped.

I confess to have told multiple lies as I was growing up; but accusing my

father of abuse is one of the most outrageous and reprehensible lie I told

to-date. It has been over a decade since, and I sometimes look back and

wonder why I did what I did; and I know for a fact that twelve-year-old

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me lied for reasons bigger than merely wanting to get the attention of a

boy. My mother never told my father what I had done; and I remember

crying and apologising for what I had done. But I know for a fact—I was

apologising not because I was sorry for what I had done, but because I

was sorry I got caught. While I know for certain that my father never hit

me or inflicted any form of physical punishment on me, I grew up

resenting how strict he was towards me. My father travelled a lot for

work, and my memories of him continue to revolve around his

disproportionate outbursts at me, when I fall short of expectations—and

occasionally at me mother and my paternal grandmother whom I live

with. He was the disciplinarian in the family, mostly expecting his

authority and demands to go unquestioned.

Fear was an emotion I remember him actively instilling in me as a child,

to which I came to believe was his way of extending his authoritarian

parenting. Whenever he returned home from his long business trips

abroad, anxiety and dread would fill me as I prayed for him to leave. I

took piano lessons growing up.1 However, I knew I was terrible at it and

no matter how hard I tried, my short, stubby fingers could not construct

any semblance of a melody. Over the years, I began losing patience for

music and started to stop practicing altogether. Soon, my parents began

to hear about my lackadaisical attitude towards music from my teachers.

My parents nagged at me practice and improve. However, I often refused

and ignored them. One day, my father snapped. I was in the living room

and I was glued to the television screen. Without warning, my father 1 I begged my parents to enrol me in piano classes when I was five or six when I found out that my friends in kindergarten had pianos at home and were taking music lessons.

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turned off the television and forcefully dragged me to the piano in my

room and demanded that I play for him. I refused. Finally, for the first

time ever, he raged; the windows rattled as he yelled and admonished me

for my refusal. As a punishment for disobeying him, he barked and

ordered me to stand on the piano stool and disallowed me from moving

for hours. All our neighbours heard the ruckus as I stood on the stool,

humiliated. Ever since, he would be quick to raise his voice at me

whenever I did something which he was not pleased with—I never was

able to grasp what made him tick as a child and his outbursts grew

increasingly frequent. Sometimes, I’d ask my mother for permission to go

out with my friends; she usually allowed as long as finished my

homework and came home early. From time to time, however, I’d come

home to an angry father, displeased that I went out. At first, I tried

explaining that I received permission from my mother; but he would shut

me up with an outburst. Initially, I protested, saying “Mummy said yes;”

in response, he would yell, “SO? YOU DID NOT ASK FOR MY

PERMISSION! YOU ARE NOT RESPECTING ME!” I would sometimes

find myself playing with my dolls to be surprised with another outburst

and punishments which often came in the form of a demand to practice

the piano or be humiliated with more inventive punishments. My

resentment towards him grew along as I did—I realised that the penalty

for angering him often resulted in mere admonishment. However, I soon

learned that his word was final and there were real consequences to

‘disrespecting his authority. Once, when I questioned why I had to

respect him when he did not respect me, he roared, “BECAUSE I SAID

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SO!” That very night, I was thrown out of the house and was only spared

from having to sleep along the corridors when my grandmother fearfully

came to collect me. In turn, I grew up tiptoeing around my father,

knowing that if I reduced interaction with him, I would minimize the risk

of incurring his unpredictable wrath.

However, in all of what I perceived to be his failings, I most definitely

was never hit as a child. In fact, I lived a comfortable life, never having to

worry about money. As an only child, I was privileged to grow up with a

room to myself at home—a luxury which I later discovered was not

accorded to most of my friends. I owned over forty dolls and had multiple

more boxes and cupboards stuffed to the brim with all the toys I desired.

As a teenager, I often could ask to upgrade my cell phone for a more

flashy and expensive one. While I know friends who needed to take up

bank loans to pay for university tuition fees, continuing education after

leaving high school was always an option my parents unconditionally

provided me with. At nineteen, I owned a credit card—one which my

father presented me with. On the other hand, my father grew up in a one-

room flat and paid for his own education. He, alongside my mother,

works extremely hard raise our family’s standard of living, and ensured

that I never had to struggle financially like they did. I am twenty-two

now, and I’m fully aware of the fact that my father contributes

significantly to provide for our family; but there continues to be a part of

me that harbours the resentment against my father which my deceitful

twelve-year-old self was consumed by.

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In attempting to better understand the family for this class in university,

I was confronted with the need to further investigate characteristics

defining a family in Singapore. As with many other Asian nations, the

state plays an active role in shaping the contemporary understanding of

what family means in Singapore. In the 1990s, scholars began to take

active interest on the topic of family. To a large extent, the state’s

implementation of contentious family-planning policies in the 1980s

paved the way for debates concerning the concept of a Singaporean

family. As a result, scholars raised questions about the implications that

these policies have on gender roles within the Singaporean family.

Among others, Netina Tan noted that the gender-based policies

implemented in Singapore in its first few decades of independence

entrench stereotypes which define the ideal family in Singapore.2

Scholars like Kenneth Paul Andrew Sze-Sian Tan and Stella R. Quah also

echo Netina Tan’s assertion about the highly-rigid and deeply-entrenched

roles ascribed to the men and women of a Singaporean family.3 In

particular, Kenneth Tan highlights that the ideal family, as invented by

the state, is defined by patriarchal heteronormativity; traditionally, the

male is stereotyped as the provider and protector while the female

remains relegated as the reproducer and nurturer.4 Prevailing literature

on gender roles in a Singaporean family often cite state polices like

mandatory male conscription (i.e. National Service) to explain the

2 Netina Tan, "Why Are Gender Reforms Adopted in Singapore? Party Pragmatism and Electoral Incentives," Pacific Affairs 89, no. 2 (2016): 369.3 Kenneth Paul Andrew Sze-Sian Tan, "Civic Society and the New Economy in Patriarchal Singapore: Emasculating the Political, Feminizing the Public," Crossroads: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Southeast Asian Studies 15, no. 2 (2001); Stella R. Quah, Study on the Singapore Family (Singapore: Ministry of Community Development, 1999).4 Kenneth Paul Andrew Sze Sian Tan, 96; 100.

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aforementioned ascribed role of males in the family.5 National Service, as

Tan elucidates, is a “rite of passage” for all Singaporean males where

they are socialized to “assume the role of protectors” of their family and

their nation.6 Additionally, medical benefits in the public sector are

channelled through male employees,7 further reaffirming the notion that

males are the breadwinners and unchallenged heads of households.

In my study of gender roles in a Singaporean family, I also noticed an

emerging strand in the discourse—scholars are now increasingly focused

on shifting gender roles. To a large extent, the current state of literature

highlights that the shifting gender roles pertain mostly to females and

their expanded roles in the family. Scholars like Kristina Göransson

contend that the result of upward sociability in Singapore has

engendered a renegotiation of gender obligations, wherein females are

now expected to enter the workforce and contribute to the family’s

income.8 In general, the discourse pertaining to shifting gender roles in

the family converges along a key strand of thought: while the female in

the family now takes on an increasingly active role in being a provider,

males are still regarded by society to be the main breadwinner of the

family.9 Gender-specific policies, like National Service, continue to be a

vital part of Singapore’s defence infrastructure. In a speech

commemorating the 25th anniversary of Operationally Ready National

5 Ibid., 97-8.6 Ibid., 98.7 Ibid., 105.8 Kristina Göransson, "Manoeuvring the Middle Ground: Social Mobility and the Renegotiation of Gender and Family Obligations among Chinese Singaporeans," Norsk Geografisk Tidsskrift - Norwegian Journal of Geography 67, no. 4 (2013): 254.9 Stella R. Quah, Study on the Singapore Family (Singapore: Ministry of Community Development, 1999), 16.

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Service, Prime Minister Goh Chok Tong emphasized that “as long as

Singapore remains sovereign, there will be National Service;”

additionally, he added that Singapore’s sovereignty remains intrinsically

linked to National Service.10 To-date National Service continues to be

mandatory for male citizens—the enduring nature of National Service

further demonstrates that the state continues to view males as the key

protector of our nation. Dialectically, as males continue to fulfil the

conventional role as a protector and provider, the females, despite also

contributing to the family’s income, remain confined in a position of

relative weakness and vulnerability in the family.

To this end, I noticed that scholars studying gender roles in the

Singaporean family are typically critical of the state’s contribution to the

evolving gender roles in the family. In 1959, the People’s Action Party

(PAP) won 43 of 51 seats in the Legislative Assembly. The 1959 elections

was a defining moment in the political history of Singapore—the PAP,

since 1959, has effectively been able to dominate Singapore’s

government. Hence, the political system of Singapore is characterized by

a one-party dominance rule, wherein the PAP is in a position where it is

both a political party and the government of Singapore.11 In this regard,

the PAP’s hegemonic rule of Singapore has been the subject of criticism

by scholars from Singapore and beyond—to wit, political scientist Hussin

Mutalib labelled Singapore as an illiberal “authoritarian state,” where

10 Chok Tong Goh, "Speech by Prime Minister Goh Chok Tong at the Dinner for Nsmen to Commemorate the 25th Anniversy of Operationally Ready National Service," news release, August 30, 1994.11 Bilveer Singh, Understanding Singapore Politics ([Hackensack], New Jersey: World Scientific, 2017), 32.

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the nation is emasculated by the party-state through its policies.12 Key to

the propagation of the view that our society is under the rule of an

authoritarian state is the sentiment that the PAP has a monopoly of

power in Singapore. As outlined by Thomas Hobbes, the way in which the

Soveraigne or the state ensures that he/it does not lose the power it

attained is through force.13 In the context of the PAP in Singapore,

punishment has served to be effective in consolidating political power.

The Internal Security Act (ISA), has allowed the party to detain anyone

without trial should they be viewed as a threat to the party and/or state.

On 2 February 1963, the party-state invoked the ISA and detained 113

suspected communists14—coincidentally (or not), most of many of the

PAP’s political opponents from the Barisan Sosialis party were among the

113 people. The ISA hence exploits detention as a tool to punish and

discipline elements who do not align themselves with the interests of the

party-state, and therefore are regraded to threaten the party-state’s

authority.

Returning to the issue of family in Singapore, academics like Netina Tan

and Kenneth Tan contend that the evolution of gender roles alongside the

perpetuation of male superiority in the family is a result of the

authoritarian rule imposed by the party-state. The political and socio-

economic policies implemented by the party-state have actively shaped

the nature of the family in Singapore. Apart from National Service, the

12 Hussin Mutalib, Parties and Politics: A Study of Opposition Parties and the Pap in Singapore (Singapore: Eastern Universities Press, 2003), 8-20.13 Thomas Hobbes, Leviathan (London: Penguin Books, 1985), 228.14 Ting Hui Lee, The Open United Front: The Communist Struggle in Singapore, 1954-1966 (Singapore: South Seas Society, 1996), 157.

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party-state’s aggressive enforcement of family planning policies between

the 1960s and 1990s demonstrably elucidate the PAP’s intervention into

the private lives of its citizens. In an attempt to control the burgeoning

population in the 1960s, the government passed the 1974 Voluntary

Sterilization Act which legalized sterilization for non-medical reasons.15

The “stop at two” campaigns accompanying this legislation thus

encouraged couples to keep their families small; 16 in turn, these family

planning programmes cemented the definition of family to be a

heteronormative conjugal entity. As the state continues to pursue these

interventionist national policies, so too does the distinction between

nation and state blurs.

Insofar as gender roles is concerned, the nation-state correspondence is

a concept which explains the expansion of female roles alongside the

entrenchment of male dominance in the family. Effectively, the

authoritarian nature of the party-state is comparable to the male in the

family, whose key responsibilities are protecting and providing;

consequently, the citizenry plays the role of the female. Politically, the

dominant national rhetoric of our nation’s survival remains rooted in a

deliberate construction of the narrative that the party-state is integral to

Singapore’s sovereignty—as Singapore continues to thrive amidst the

challenges that we have been confronted with over past half-a-century,

so too does the legitimacy of the PAP’s single party-state rule. The

longstanding dominance of the PAP in state governance thus serves as a

political advantage for the party to continue justifying its authoritarian 15 "Voluntary Sterilization Act," in Chapter 347 (Singapore: Singapore Statues Online).16 Kenneth Tan, 101.

9

rule of the citizenry. Therefore, the party-state’s active assertion that its

longstanding hegemonic governance is imperative our nation’s prosperity

thus allows the PAP to justify its dominance by reinforcing the notion that

it is the protector of our state’s sovereignty. In a Hobbesian conception

of the nation and the state, the PAP’s paternalistic governance of its

citizenry is thus a self-perpetuation vehicle which justifies the

authoritarian rule. Dan Slater, in studying authoritarian governments,

coins the term authoritarian Leviathans to describe governments which

assert hegemonic control over its ‘subjects.’17 Singapore, unlike China,

has a one-party state dominant rule and not a one-party state rule;

however, the fact that the PAP has actively leveraged on state apparatus

to extend to promote the longevity of its political domination thus makes

for the labelling of the PAP as an authoritarian Leviathan a logical

conclusion. In return for the peace and prosperity of our nation, we are

hence expected to surrender our authority to the PAP’s protection.

Economically, the same understanding applies to explain the state’s role

of being our nation’s provider. The state’s commitment to neo-classical,

laissez-faire market economics continue to be touted as key to our

nation’s economic success over the decades.18 Between 1965 and 1990,

Singapore’s GDP growth averaged at around 6.5% per annum.19 In 2017,

Singapore’s GDP (PPP) per capita amounts to USD$90,531 per annum,

thereby placing the value of our nation’s GDP per capita third in rank

17 Dan Slater, Ordering Power: Contentious Politics and Authoritarian Leviathans in Southeast Asia (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010), 14.18 Edward K. Y. Chen, Hyper-Growth in Asian Economies: A Comparative Study of Hong Kong, Japan, Korea, Singapore and Taiwan (London: Macmillan, 1979), 183-84.19 "World Development Report, 1992," (New York: Oxford University Press, 1992).

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globally.20 Indeed, while many of our Asian neighbours continue to be

classified as ‘developing,’ Singapore has long since graduated from this

label and is now considered to be one of the world’s most economically

developed nations.21 In large part, the state’s role in raising our nation’s

standard of living remains undeniably crucial. The government’s bold

shift to promote foreign direct investments (FDIs) in the late-1960s is

widely regarded as one of the most important strategic policies in our

economy history.22 In general, few Southeast Asian nations adopted such

a liberal economic outlook during the time Singapore did because many

were faced with political instability which were detrimental to attracting

foreign investors.23 On the other hand, authoritarian measures employed

by the PAP to effectively clamp down on its political opponents, alongside

the implementation of policies to root out communalism in the 1960s and

1970s created an ideal climate for FDIs. The notion that the party-state’s

contribution to providing for the electorate through the bolstering of

economic growth over the decades thus makes for a compelling

argument to justify its authoritarian rule of our nation. In this regard, the

gendering of the nation and state is thus a key framework which explains

the power dynamics in Singapore, while further reinforcing the intrinsic

family-state correspondence.

To this end, I discovered that the common approach to evincing the

family-state correspondence is largely propounded through identifying 20 "World Economic Outlook Database," (International Monetary Fund).21 "World Economic Outlook: Challenges to Steady Growth," in World Economic and Financial Surveys (Washington, D.C.: International Monetary Fund, October 2018).22 Euston Quah, ""An Economic History of Singapore: 1965-2065" - Keynote Address by Mr Ravi Menon, Managing Director, Monetary Authority of Singapore, at the Singapore Economic Review Conference 2015 on 5 August 2015," news release, August 5, 2015.23 Ibid.

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similarities between the roles played by the males in the family and that

of the state’s in Singapore; however, I assert that a reversal of this

approach can, too, demonstrate the link between the family and the

state. In particular, as I embarked on the critical study of gender roles in

my family, I came to the realisation that the power dynamics in my family

mirrors that of the larger nation-state interaction in Singapore. In

rationalizing the authoritarian and paternalistic nature of the party-state,

I, too, began to understand my father’s actions. As does the party-state

demand its rule to be unchallenged through the use of discipline and

punishment, so too does my father. To me, my father was the

authoritarian Leviathan who used fear to discipline and “submit [myself]

… to his government.”24 As with scholars who blame the party for

exploiting the state’s apparatus to consolidate its authority, so too am I

when I criticize my father for disciplining me to ensure that his word

goes unquestioned. Kenneth Tan argues, the PAP “inflicts punishment

and offers rewards to control the behaviour of the citizenry;”25 he cites

occasional consultation of public opinion as an example of a reward.

Correspondingly, Netina Tan assert that the expansion of female role in

the Singapore serves only to pander to “show the party’s ‘softer side’… to

appeal to a more demanding electorate.”26 According to Tan, gender

reforms, which engender shifting gender roles in the family—providing

women with more responsibility—is part of the PAP’s ‘strategic

calculations’ to ensure dominance of rule in Singapore. As such, Tan

24 Hobbes, 228.25 Kenneth Tan, 106.26 Netina Tan, 370.

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explains that the continued entrenchment of male superiority reveals the

disingenuousness in the intentions of gender reforms. Dialectically, this

implies that the reason behind the increasingly mellow nature in his

engagements with me over the recent few years is a response to my

resentment for the larger goal of monopolizing authority in the family.

I recall the lies I told about my father when I was twelve. As I attempt to

grapple with the arguments of these critics towards the state’s

authoritarian rule, I begin to wonder if—like them—I am too quick to

demonize my father. I am in no way implying that these scholars lie about

the authoritarianism of the political rule in Singapore. As presented by

decades of scholarship, the party-state’s hegemonic control of the nation

is evidenced by many of its policies. However, the increasingly

consultative policies adopted by the party-state remain irrefutable in

suggesting that it is no longer the authoritarian Leviathan as it used to

be in the formative years of nation-building.27 Likewise, am I then

perhaps too quick to cast judgement on my father and brand my father as

an unreasonable tyrant? The use of discipline and punishment, according

to Hobbes, is the state’s way of consolidating power;28 at the same time,

he also argues that the and state are intrinsically bound as a Common-

Wealth.29As I elucidated earlier, the nation-state correspondence remains

intrinsic to Singapore. Similarly, my father and I share an unbreakable

27 These consultative policies include engaging the citizenry actively through a partnership between the government, the private sector, and the “people sector.” In this framework of “social tripartism,” the state seeks to increase social participation in nation-building endeavours. For instance, civic organisations like the Action and Research (AWARE) have impacted policymaking through lobbying behind closed doors and offering well-researched recommendations to the state and its citizenry. 28 Hobbes, 228.29 Ibid., 227.

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bond which extends beyond mere blood relations. As such, if my father is

an authoritarian Leviathan, so too is my family a Hobbesian Common-

Wealth. Beyond merely craving the monopoly of power, the PAP’s

authoritarian use of punishment and discipline is arguably for the

progress of the nation and its peoples. Withal, my father’s authoritarian

parenting is also reflective of his desire for me to succeed in life.

Earlier, I complained that music sparked the beginning of the disconnect

between my father and I. What I failed to include is the fact that my

father, as a child, was passionate about music. In the tiny one-room flat

which he lived with his family, he found joy in investing his time playing

the drums. One day, after the incessant complaints about the noise from

his drumming, he returned home from school to realise that my

grandfather—his father—threw his drum set away. A part of me still

shares the resentment that twelve-year-old me harboured—I still do not

forgive him for his outbursts and punishments. However, as I begin to

delve into the complexities shrouding the authoritarian Leviathan, I am

increasingly able to understand his actions.

14

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