Weakening the Case for a "Summer Volatility Crush"

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Lehman Brothers does and seeks to do business with companies covered in its research reports. As a result, investors should be aware that the firm may have a conflict of interest that could affect the objectivity of this report. Customers of Lehman Brothers in the United States can receive independent, third-party research on the company or companies covered in this report, at no cost to them, where such research is available. Customers can access this independent research at www.lehmanlive.com or can call 1-800-2LEHMAN to request a copy of this research. Investors should consider this report as only a single factor in making their investment decision. PLEASE SEE ANALYST(S) CERTIFICATION AND IMPORTANT DISCLOSURES BEGINNING ON PAGE 5. Index Volatility Commentary S&P 500 realized volatility for the 10 trading days in August looks fairly low at about 6%; yet the average daily high-low range is of the same order as in June/July. This indicates market uncertainty is greater than what is captured by the realized volatility calculation. Since the end of World War II, median monthly realized volatility for August has been in line with other months, weakening the case for a “summer vol crush”. We believe the presence of macroeconomic catalysts could make the late summer more volatile than the last few years. S&P options expiring in September cheapened about 1 vol pt last week, more than any other maturity. We recommend investors purchase these on a hedged basis to get cheap gamma exposure. August 15, 2006 Ryan Renicker, CFA 1.212.526.9425 [email protected] Devapriya Mallick 1.212.526.5429 [email protected]

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Actionable trade ideas for stock market investors and traders seeking alpha by overlaying their portfolios with options, other derivatives, ETFs, and disciplined and applied Game Theory for hedge fund managers and other active fund managers worldwide. Ryan Renicker, CFA

Transcript of Weakening the Case for a "Summer Volatility Crush"

Page 1: Weakening the Case for a "Summer Volatility Crush"

Lehman Brothers does and seeks to do business with companies covered in its research reports. As a result, investors should be aware that the firm may have a conflict of interest that could affect the objectivity of this report.

Customers of Lehman Brothers in the United States can receive independent, third-party research on the company or companies covered in this report, at no cost to them, where such research is available. Customers can access this independent research at www.lehmanlive.com or can call 1-800-2LEHMAN to request a copy of this research.

Investors should consider this report as only a single factor in making their investment decision.

PLEASE SEE ANALYST(S) CERTIFICATION AND IMPORTANT DISCLOSURES BEGINNING ON PAGE 5.

Index Volatility Commentary

• S&P 500 realized volatility for the 10 trading days in August looks fairly low at about 6%; yet the average daily high-low range is of the same order as in June/July. This indicates market uncertainty is greater than what is captured by the realized volatility calculation.

• Since the end of World War II, median monthly realized volatility for August has been in line with other months, weakening the case for a “summer vol crush”.

• We believe the presence of macroeconomic catalysts could make the late summer more volatile than the last few years.

• S&P options expiring in September cheapened about 1 vol pt last week, more than any other maturity. We recommend investors purchase these on a hedged basis to get cheap gamma exposure.

August 15, 2006

Ryan Renicker, CFA 1.212.526.9425

[email protected]

Devapriya Mallick 1.212.526.5429

[email protected]

Page 2: Weakening the Case for a "Summer Volatility Crush"

Equity Derivatives Strategy | Index Volatility Commentary

August 15, 2006 2

Not Quite a Vol Crush

For the first 10 trading days of August, S&P 500 realized volatility at about 6% looks extremely low. However, the average daily high-low range in which the S&P 500 has traded – measured as a % of the day’s close – stands at 1%, which is close to the average for June and July (Figure 1).

This has two important implications for gamma traders:

• Implied vs realized spreads based on very short term realized volatility calculations are likely to look richer than they really are.

• For long gamma investors, delta-hedging from close to close would have been a suboptimal strategy over the last 10 days.

We take a closer look at the seasonality of realized volatility over the 60-year post World War II period from 1946 to 2005. To lessen the effect of outliers, we consider the median for each month over this period.

• We find that October has tended to be the most volatile month while December has been the most range-bound.

• S&P 500 realized vol in the summer months has been in line with that of other months (Figure 2), even though August has been a relatively uneventful month over the last 3 years.

This would mitigate the argument for a short gamma positioning at this stage in anticipation of a “summer vol crush”.

Figure 1: Realized Vol Looks Low Though Uncertainty Persists

Figure 2: Seasonality Does Not Justify Selling Gamma

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Source: Lehman Brothers, Bloomberg Source: Lehman Brothers, Bloomberg

Page 3: Weakening the Case for a "Summer Volatility Crush"

Equity Derivatives Strategy | Index Volatility Commentary

August 15, 2006 3

Economic Releases Continue to be Important

The noteworthy macroeconomic event last week was Tuesday’s Fed pause after 17 consecutive hiking decisions since June 2004. Investors had been waiting on the sidelines in anticipation of the decision – last Monday’s NYSE volume was the least in almost a month – and the market rallied about 5 handles following the FOMC meeting, only to reverse within minutes.

We examine select economic releases within the last two months to quantify the immediate market reaction to each of these (Figure 3). Given concerns about mounting inflation risks, CPI releases have been relatively important catalysts. For instance, within the first 30 minutes of trading after the July CPI release, the S&P 500 had moved 1% from its previous close.

Figure 3: Market Reaction to Select Economic Catalysts

Date Time Macro Catalyst SPX Return (first 30 mins)

SPX Return (first 60 mins)

VIX Change (first 30 mins)

VIX Change (first 60 mins)

13-Jun 8:30 PPI 0.2% 0.0% -0.4 0.314-Jun 8:30 CPI 0.5% 0.5% -0.8 -1.229-Jun 14:15 FOMC Meeting 0.8% 1.1% -2.7 -3.4

7-Jul 8:30 Non Farm Payrolls -0.3% -0.1% 0.3 0.118-Jul 8:30 PPI 0.3% 0.1% -0.7 -0.419-Jul 8:30 CPI 1.0% 1.1% -2.1 -2.520-Jul 14:00 FOMC Minutes -0.4% -0.4% 0.4 0.528-Jul 8:30 Q2 GDP 0.7% 0.4% -0.8 -0.64-Aug 8:30 Non Farm Payrolls 0.6% 0.6% -0.8 -0.78-Aug 14:15 FOMC Meeting -0.3% -0.6% 0.0 -0.1

Source: Lehman Brothers, Bloomberg

The economic calendar for this week includes PPI data on Tuesday and CPI on Wednesday. We expect inflation numbers to continue to be significant drivers of market volatility.

In this backdrop, we view the 1 vol pt cheapening over the last week in SPX Sep options as unwarranted. ATM implied vol in the Sep line is trading at around 12.8% and has dropped more than any other maturity. We recommend investors purchase hedged options maturing in September to get cheap exposure to potential future gamma.

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Equity Derivatives Strategy | Index Volatility Commentary

August 15, 2006 4

Figure 4: Macro Volatility Summary

S&P 500 Put-Call Skew

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ETF Rich/Cheap Analysis

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Source: Lehman Brothers, OptionMetrics, Bloomberg, FAME

Page 5: Weakening the Case for a "Summer Volatility Crush"

Equity Derivatives Strategy | Index Volatility Commentary

August 15, 2006 5

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