tn ar' ha of kn Ti !'; U Ch Ar Bu no 0\'t of me thl the of ex1 CLAI: WAYOFA FIGHTER TheMemoirsof CLAIRELEECHENNAULT MAJOR GENERAL,U. S.ARMY(Ret.) EditedbyRobertHotz Public Lihrarp SEP 1 91960 Dallas,Texas , G.P.PUTNAM'SSONS,NEWYORK T ~ T p< Cl tn ar ha of kn Ti su Ch Ar BL no the of ext Foreword THE United States islosingthe Pacific war. ThreeyearsafterV-J daythiscountryisfacingthelossofevery-thing it won during the four bloody years it took to defeat Japan. Here are the facts: General George C.Marshall told Congress in the spring of 1948 that if Manchuria were lost to theChinese Communists, theUnitedStates position insouthernKorea would be untenable. Manchuria has beenlost to the Chinese Communists. GeneralMarshallalsotoldCongressthatif theChineseCommu-nists controlled North China the United States position in Japan would be "extremely serious." NorthChina has been lost to theChineseCommunists. General Douglas MacArthur warned the Joint Chiefsof Staff inthe fallof1948thatif theChineseCommuniststakethelowerYangtze ValleyandShanghaitheAmericanmilitarybastiononOkinawawill beoutflanked and his position in Japan will beasexposed and unten-able asit was in thePhilippinesduring 1941. Asthisiswritten,theChineseCommunistsarefightingtoward the Yangtzeat Nanking.They areaiming to forceaYangtzecrossingand sweep to Shanghai. A completeCommunist victory in China will channelize the under-currentsof nativeumest alreadyswirling throughBurma,India,Ma-laya,andIndonesiaintoanotherrisingtideofCommunistvictories. The ring ofRed basescan bestretchedfromSiberiatoSai'gon.Then the stage will be set for the unannounced of World War III. IhavecompletedadecadeofobservingandadministeringAmeri-can policy in Asia.Iam convinced that thispolicy isplunging usinto adisastrous repetition of the errors that dragged us into World War II. Icanhearthetimefuseofathirdworld war sputteringinChinaas vii T ' T rr h. fi bt Jl( Cl tr ar h ~ of kr T1 .:plainedthathehadaplanforendingthe Japanesebombings-buy thelatest Americanfightersand hireArneri canpilotstoflythem.What did Ithink? Iwaspessimistic.Europeanorderswereabsorbingallplanesnot earmarked forthe Army and Navy. It appeared to me that theUnited States had nogood .fighterstosell.Iwasn't keenontheP-40because of the vulnerability of its liquid-cooledengine incombat.It appeared too heavyandslowtotakeonthefast-climbingNatesand Zeros. TheGeneralissimowasunimpressedby mycomments. "YoumustgototheUnitedStatesimmediately,"hesaid."Work outtheplansforwhateveryouthinkyouneed.Do what youcanto getAmericanplanesandpilots." General P.T.Mow accompanied me.We were directed to report to Dr.T.V.Soong immediately upon ourarrivalinWashington. TwodayslaterIwasinHongKongagain,waitingforthePan AmericanAirwaysclippertoSanFrancisco.Asthebigflyingboat settleddowninaplumeofsprayatthenowfamiliarmilestonesof Manila,Guam,Wake,Midway,andOahu,Ihadplentyoftimeto pondermytask.StrategyforstoppingtheJapanesebomberswas simple. The Japanese werethen throwing one hundred to one hundred 90 l f I I I andfifty bombers aday against Chungking,their primary target.Esti-matesoftheirreservestrength ledme to believe theywould raisethe antetofivehundredbombersifashowdownloomed.Experienced Americanpilots Hying the latest fightertypes could knockthe Japanese do\m,accordingtomy calculations,atarateoffivetooneinitially, andhigherasthe Japaneselosttheirconfidence.Thisprovedtobe a conservativeestimate.ActualcombatratiofortheoriginalFlying Tigerswastwelve to one. This was heavier attrition thanany air force couldafford.Bybreakingthe Jap's backoverChungking,wherethey would fightthe hardest,Ihopedtoinflictlossessufficientlyheavyto crippletheir entireChinabombing program.Then if theydecidedto continuebombingelsewhere,wewouldgetamplewarningviathe Chinesenetandcouldshift our forcestomeetthethreat whereverit developed.TheAmericanfightergroupwouldfunctionasahighly aerialfiredepartment,withtheaddedadvantageofknowing madvance where the next blaze would Hare. Tacticswerebasedonan improved versionof theEmperor'sbirth-dayturkeyshootoverHankowin1938,whichbaggedthirty-sixof thirty-nineJaps.Usingafour-squadrongroup,twosquadronswould make the initial assault on enemy bombers,leaving the third squadron a reserveto dive intothe fray at theproper moment totum defeat mtoabloodyrout.ThemoreImentallyfoughtthosebattlesover the greaterour margin of victory.The closerIHewto the UrutedStates,thedimmerappearedmyprospectsofgettingthe wherewithal really to fightthem. . InWashington Ireported toshrewd,eruditeDr.T.V.Soong.From his.mansionon Woodley Road,Dr. Soong wasdirectingChina'scam-paigntoextract concreteaid fromtheUnited States.Dr.Soongranks next to the Generalissimo as one of the ablest men in China. A Harvard andashrewdfinancierevenamonghisownpeople,Soong 15 oneofthefewmenintheworldtodaywhounderstandtheirown countryand theUnitedStatesequallywell. . SoongwasoneofthepillarsoftheNationalist in _the nmeteen-twentieswhenthemonumentaltaskofweldingChmamto aentityagainbegan.Asayoungmanheheldthepurse strings of the revolution.It washis resourceful financingthat kept the Generalissimo'sarmiesinthefieldbetterpaidandfedthantheir Soong'spolitical career hasbeen blighted by an cquircdbluntnessthatneversatwellwithtl1colderGeneralissimO, whois steeped inthe Chinesetraditionsofvenerationandrespectof elders.AsaresultSoonghas alternated rapidly betweennumber-hvo 91 manintheNationalistgovernmentandpoliticalexile.Hisrolein modernChinahasbeenequivalenttothatofareliefpitcherin a baseballgamewhositsout most of theactionin thebull pen andis calledintothegameonlywhenacrisisdevelopsthatcallsfora sure hand, keen mind, and stout heart. It is unfortunate for both China and theUnitedStatesthatSoonghasspentsomanyofthe criticalyears pitchingintheChinesebullpen.Heisthebestbridgeavailable betweentheUnitedStatesandChina.Anysound rapprochement be tween the two countries in moderntimeswill undoubtedly require his presenceasakeyfigure. Inthe winterof1940-41histaskintheUnitedStateswasmonu mental.The American people were like an ostrich with its head buried 1 inthesand,attemptingtopeckvigorouslythroughitstailfeathers. ThefewAmericaneyesfocusedabroadwerecenteredonEurope whereEnglandwasfightingforsurvival.TheOrientwascompletely forgotten.A sluggishly risingtide of publicopinion wasbeginning to Howforaid toEngland.Hundredsof Americanswereslippingacross the Canadian border tojoin the R.C.A.F.and fightin Europe, but the ideaofAmericanvolunteersinChinaseemedfantastic.VirtUally everybodytowhomIbroached thesubjecttoldme, with varyingde-greesofcourtesy,thatIwas insane. The night Iarrived in Washington, Dr. Soong took me to dinner with twodistinguishednewspapermenwhowerenotunfamiliarwith~ e Pacificsituation-EdgarAnselMowrer,thenwiththeChicagoDatly News and JosephWright Alsop,Jr.,of the New YorkHeraldTribune. They wereallsomewhatdismayedtolearnthat,inmyopinion, Japal neseintroductionoftheModelZerofighteroverChungkingduring1 the fallof 1940 now made it necessary tousethe best available ArnerI icanfightersinChina.PreviouslytheChineseplanshadbeenbased ongettingolder Americantypesnolongerneededby theAirCorps. andDr.Soong'seffortshadbeenaimedatcommitmentsfortypes alreadyobsolescentbyAmericanstandards.I MowrerandAlsopdescribedthedesperatepressurefromEngland for every new plane offthe Americanproduction lines.After losing. the' BattleofBritaintheLuftwaffewasthenengagedinitsfiercentght assaultsontheLondondockareas.ReportsfromAmericanobservers inEnglandweregloomy.MowrerandAlsopcontendedthatChina stoodnochanceofcuttingintoBritishaircraftprioritiesandcon:e quently my volunteer project had little hope forsuccess.Less than n ~ e monthslaterAlsop,inNavy unif01m,sawthefirstP-40'softhe Fast AmericanVolunteerGroupinChinaunloaded on theRangoondocks 92 andwaspestering mefor ajob with the "utterly impossible."Joewas latercapturedatHong KongonanA.V.G.supplymissionandspent ninemonthsin Stanley internment campbefore hewasrepatriatedon theGripsholm.HereturnedtoChinaasaChinaDefenseSupplies, Incorporated,officialand finallyservedasmy aideandadviserinthe FourteenthU.S.AirForce. Visitstomy old AirCorpsacquaintances in theMunitionsbuilding evokedthesamedisbelief.Mostof themwere then staff officersHying swivelchairsandputteringwithwarplans.Their planswereallfor Europe.WhenIvisitedtheMunitionsbuildingin1939,General ArnoldaskedmetolecturetohisstaffontheSino-Japaneseairwar. It tookAirCorpsheadquartersanhourtolocate alarge-scale mapof China,andtheone they finallyproduced had suchscantydetailthat I hadtopencil in most of the locationsthat figured in the war. CurrentintelligenceontheOrientjustdidn'texist.Allthetime I wasinChina,IconsideredthatmystatusasaretiredAirCorps gavemetheresponsibilityofpassingon toAmericanauthori- anymilitaryinformationthatwasavailable.Veryearlyinthe Smo-Japanesewar Imade acollection of new types of Japanese equip-mentsalvaged fromcrashed planes. Anintelligence officerattached to theU.S.Embassyrecognizedthesalvageasprimetechnicalintelli-ge.nceand Igave him his pick of it with the understanding that every-would be passed on to the Air Corps after the Navy had examined Jt.HehadhisMarinescratemuchoftheequipmentandcarriedit towhathethought wasthesafestplaceavailableinthoselastdays the fall of Nanking-the U.S.gunboat Panay. Two days later the anaywassunk by Japanese planes, and the Japanese equipment went downwithit into ten feet of Yangtze mud, whereit still rests. Postwar attemptstoraise the Panay were thwarted by the heavy mud deposits. It wasobviousthat theJapanese knew nothing of thePanay's intelli-gencecargo when theyattacked herforit would have given theman excellt' enexcusefortheoutrage. . 1Y othereffortsthroughtheyears beforePearl Harbor to transmit mtelligencetowhereitwoulddothemostgoodwereaboutas SUccessfulasthisPanayventure.In1939theChinesecaptureda JapaneseNate(Type 97)intactand broughtit toChengtu,whereI fiew't th'th1 roughextensive service and combat tests mcomparison Wl theCurtissP-36,theBritishGloucesterGladiator,andtheRussian l-Ie.Withthe help of Chinese mechanics,Inoted all its specifications, :::photographs,andcompiledathickdossieronitscon-tion and performance. This plane was the forerunner of the Oscar, 93 andlatermanyoftheA.V.G.pilotsfounditmoretroublesome than theZerobecauseofitsastonishingrateofclimband incredibly short turningradius.It isstilloneofthebestacrobaticplaneseverbuilt. When IwasinWashingtonin1939,Iturnedovermydossieronthe NatetomilitaryintelligenceoftheWarDepartment.Somemonths laterinChinaIreceivedaletter fromthe War Department thanking me formyinterestand informingmethatmydatahadbeenturned overto"aeronauticalexperts,"whoinformedtheWarDepartment that it wasimpossibletobuild anaircraftoftheperformanceIcited with the specificationssubmitted. Ineverfoundout whothe "aeronauticalexperts"were,but in1940 "Possum" Hansell,then in charge of air intelligence,checked the War DepartmentfileswithmeandfoundtheNatedossiermissing,with only afilecopy of the War Department letter tomeindicating it had ever existed. The Air Corps had never even seen the dossier.Ibrought backthedataonthefirstModelZerointhefallof1940.Thefirst Model Zeros( Zeke)had a level top speed of 322 miles per hour, range of 1,100 miles with a belly tank, could climb 16,000 feet in six minutes, andwerearmedwitha20-mm.cannonandfour7.7machineguns. AirCorps technical manuals on Japaneseaircraft inuseat the time of PearlHarbor devotedablankpagetotheZero.Americanpilotsgot theirfirstinformationonitsperformancefromtheZero's20-JlUII cannonayear lateroverOahuandthePhilippines.. . Not until May of 1941did a senior Americanmilitary observer VISit theChinesewarzone.ThenBrigadierGeneralsH.B.Claggettand HaroldH.George,commandingAirCorpsunitsinthePhilippines, andCommanderE.B.McDonnell,oftheNavalAirService,visited Chungking.Avaineffortwasmadetopersuadethemtoallow ArrnY[ andNavypilots,onleavefromthePhilippines,totakeaerialgeog raphy lessonsinChinaby flyingcopilot on C.N.A.C.transports. AlthoughAirCorpsheadquarterswasinterestedonlyintheEuroI pean War,Idetected noevidencethatitstopplannershadabsorbed anyofthelessonsoftheBattleofBritainwheretheeight-gunned1 SpitfireandHurricane fightersproved more than amatch forGerman bombersunescortedor withfighterescort stretchedbeyonditseffec tiverange.BythetimetheAmericandaylightbombingoffensive againstGermanygotunderwayinthesummerof1942,theChinese overNanking,theBritish over London,and the A.V.G.overRangoon ioSt hadthoroughlyproved the failureofunescorteddaybombersaga determinedfighterattacks.YetAmericanheavybombersweresent 94 overEuropeunescorted by defensive fightersfor over ayearinavain attempttoprovethisfallaciousdoctrineofDoubet. Earlyin1940Irenewedmyrequestforareturntoactivedutyin theAirCorps,askingGeneralArnoldforassignmentasan instructor in fightertactics.He offered meapostasAir Corpsinstructorat the coast-artilleryschoolatFortressMonroe.LaterIlearnedIwastobe usedasareplacementforanotherAirCorpsofficerurgentlyneeded fora public-relationspost inWashington.Itold ArnoldIwasnotin-terestedintowingtargetsforantiaircraftgunnersandwouldreturn toduty only withAir Corpsunits.Arnold citedaregulationprohibit-ingretiredofficersfromservingwithtroopsortacticalunits.That regulationisstillonthebooks,andduringthewarIviolatedit for thethreesolidyearsIcommandedtheAmericanairunitsinChina. In December 1940 after my return to Washington, Elwood R.(Pete) Quesada,later commander of theNinthTactical Air Force inEurope andnowa lieutenant general commanding the Tactical AirCommand, againofferedme the coast-artillery post,withapromiseof promotion to Iwasthendrawing fifteenthousand dollarsayear fromthe Chinese,andAirCorpscaptain'spaywithoutflyingstatuscameto forty-threehundreddollars.Petewasslightlypiquedatmy Ingratitude.IneverdidconvincetheAirCorpsthatIwasnotjust lookingforaregular paycheckbut really wanted to do aspecillc job that I knewwasbeing badly neglected. of my time in Washington wasspent flyingadesk in the brick huildmg on V Street that was headquarters of China Defense Supplies, Incorporated.ThereIsat during the winterincivilianclothes,asan employeeof the Chinese government,planning thebasic strategy that I Wasdestinedtouseduringthenextthreeyearsasageneral inthe Armyof theUnitedStates. Originalplans calledfortheinjectionof arejuvenatedChineseAir Forcespearheadedby AmericanvolunteerstoupsetthePacificstale-mate.Thisplan was submitted in detail to Dr. Soong in January 1941. It waspredicatedon the assumption that Japan was preparing further withSingaporeastheprimaryobjective,theDutchEast Indiesand the Philippines asalternate objectives. It required no special intelligence or occult powers to forecastthese moves.EversinceNovember of1940,Japaneseactivitiescenteredon preparationsforathrusttothesouth.Veterandivisionswerewith-drawnfromChinaandreplacedbygreenconscriptsandChinese puppet troops.After the fallof France leftthe colonialgovernment of Indo-China at the end of ashaky limb, the Japanese began to squeeze 95 aneverendingseriesofconcessionsfromthefrightenedFrench colonials.TheGulfofTonkinportswereoccupiedbytheJapanese andturnedintostagingareasfortheproposedsouthernexpeditions. All Japanese troops engaged intheoffensive into southern China from Indo-Chinawere withdrawn and re-equipped inHanoi and Haiphong. JapaneseofficialsservednoticeontheDutchthattheNipponese Navy required oil fromthe Dutch East Indies, and all payments would bein yen or else!Althoughthe Frenchwerecapable of noresistance. the Japanese attacked afew garrisonsand killed someFrench soldiers toimpressthecolonialswiththeirferocity.Thenonaggressionpact 1 withRussiasecuredtheJapanesenorthernfrontierwhileTokyobe came moreandmorevociferousabout itssupport oftheAxis in Asia. ChineseintelligenceconsideredthattheextensionofJapaneseinHu ence intosouthernIndo-China,withits key naval baseat CamRanh BayandthegreatportofSa'igon,wouldbethefinalpreliminaryto thegreat southernoffensive. My plan proposed to throw asmall but well-equippedair force into China.Japan,likeEngland, floatedherlifeblood on theseaandcould bedefeatedmoreeasilybyslashinghersaltyarteriesthenbybing forher heart.AirbasesinFreeChina couldput all of the VJtal Japanesesupply lines and advanced staging areas under attack. Begun intimeanddeliveredwithsufficientweightanairoffensivefrom ,'t ChinacouldhavesmashedtheJapanesesouthernoffensivebefore 1 left itshomeportsand stagingareas. This strategicconcept ofChinaasaplatformof airattack onJapan offeredlittleattractiontothemilitaryplannersof1941.It wa_s untiltheTridentConferenceof1943thatIfoundany ofmystrategyoranysupportfortheplanstoimplementit.ThiS support came fromtwocivilians, President FranklinD.Roosevelt and Prime MinisterWinstonChurchill, and wasofferedagainst the strong adviceoftheir militaryadvisers. The firstphaseoftheseoperationsentailedpoundingtheairfields, ports,stagingareas,andshippinglaneswheretheJapanesewere accumulatingtheir military strengthinFormosa,HainanIsland,Can ton,andIndo-China.If successfulthese attackscouldforcethepostl ponement or cancellation of the Japanese offensive plans..r Theeffectofevensmall-scaleairattacksagainstamphibiousvasionprepa:ationsbeenablydemonstratedbytheRoyalForceoperationsagamsttheEuropeanchannelportsinthefall 1940. Thesecondphasewastobedirectedagainst' theJapanesehome 96 islands,toburn out the industrial heart ofthe Empire with fire-bomb attacksonthe teeming bamboo ant heaps of Honshuand Kyushu.The Japanesetaught meearly inthewarthe lessonofincendiariesonan Orientalcity.MtertheJapaneseburnedoutChungkinginthesum-mersof1939and 1940,theChinese chief of ordnance,GeneralYuTa Wei,anM.I.T.graduate,manufacturedsomecrudethermitefire bombs.They were not satisfactory, soearly in 1940 Iwrote to General Arnoldsuggesting the valueofafive-poundfirebomb foruseagainst Orientalcities.Arnoldwroteatestyreplythat"theAirCorpswas committedto astrategy of high-altitudeprecision bombing ofmilitary objectives" and that "use of incendiariesagainst citieswascontraryto our nationalpolicyof attacking only military objectives." In the spring of 1941, Dr.Lauchlin Currie, special adviser to President Roosevelt on China,approachedArnoldagain,at my request,onthesubject of in-cendiaries.ArnoldadmittedthattheAirCorpshadnofirebombs. FouryearslatertheTwentiethAirForceB-29'sspentnearlyayear in ineffectualhigh-altitude bombing of Japan with high explosivesbe-foreMajorGeneralCurtisLeMaythrewawayArnold'stext andsent them in at 5,000 feet, and overloaded with fire bombs, to burn the heart out of the industrial cities that nourished the enemy's military strength. _Tocarry out my strategic plans,Ineeded air bases along the eastern fnngeofFree China,Americanfightersandbombers,andacadreof experiencedAmericanpilotstoleadtheChinese.Theairfieldswere alreadyavailable in China,stretching inthreesinuouschainsroughly parallel to the China coast and about two hundred and fifty miles apart. The finalcluster of staging fields in Chekiang Province wasonlythree fiveairhoursfromthebiggestindustrialcitiesinJapan.Chinese pilotshadalreadyindicatedtheirvaluein1938bystagingMartin B-IO's out of them for the first enemy air raid on Japan. Theplanscalled foraforceof 350 fightersand 150bomberstouse these fields in 1941 with reinforcements of 700 fighters and 300 bombers arriving in China during 1942. At that time the Curtiss-Wright P-40 and theRepublicP-43werethemostmodernAmericanfightersthenin production.The LockheedHudson,atransport hastilyconvertedinto a for the British, was the only American bomber with a power- gunturret.Neither P-43nor Hudsonhad armorprotectionor eakprooftanks.InitialforcewastobeaP-40fightergroupanda Hudson bomber groupto be followed as soon aspossible by the P-43's andD' aouglas(A-24)dive-bomber group . . Supply was always a critical problem in China. To keep the proposed au forceinactionrequired fullcapacityofallavailablesupplylines. 97 Byearly 1941theBurmaRoadwastheonlyremaininglinkbetweenI FreeChinaandtherestoftheworld.Theseventeen-thousand-ton monthlypeakoftheroadcouldhavebeenincreased.Newrailroad construction in \Vest Chinaoffered another hopeof easingthesupply problem. Increasing the smuggling trade fromHong Kong tothe rocl-y' ChinacoastwouldsupplyourmostadvancedbasesinEastChina. ManylonganddrearydayswerespentatmydeskonV Street ploughing through the myriad of details for these plans.There was no precedent forthis kind of an air force.Every policy anddetail had to be thoroughly planned in advance.Imade adeal with Jerry Huang to have his War Area Service Corps house and feedall American airmen in China foronedollaraday.TheW.A.S.C.hadnoexperiencewith thepersonal habits ofOccidentals,soIhad toplanthehostelstobe built forthem in greatdetail,downtothesizeof roomsrequiredfor pilots, the amount of hot water required for showers, how many latrines necessary foreach hosteLand the quantitiesofcattle,pigs,eggs, and chickensthemeat-eatingAmericanswouldconsumepermonth.All' these problems and hundreds more the Chinese hadtobeginworking on many months before the firstAmericansarrived.It requiredallcl. the cunning and resourcesat his command for Huang to have the ho) tels ready whenthe Americansappeared. Ihadtopreparerequisitionsforeverypieceofequipmentwe needed-howmanyroundsofammunition,howmanypoundsof oxygen,flyingsuits,paperclips,six-tontrucks,machine-gunink,candy, sun goggles,shaving cream, razor blades, medical supph.es, carbon paper, typewriters, and all of the other strange gear with an air war was fought.Dr.Soonggave mecarteblancheonsupplies. "Buy what you need and send methe bills,"were hisonlyorders.. Many an American later owed hislife tothe quantity of sulfadrug) and vaccineswe took to China. Whenthe AmericanVolunteer Group was disbanded, we turned over enough drugsto last the U.S.forces. in China for a year, at a time when there was no sulfa or vaccine in Chinl and no way to get them there. Itraveledaroundthecountryatafuriouspace,visitingaircra_(t plants and equipment manufacturers.In oneweekIflewaroundtnp acrossthecountryfromWashingtontoLosAngelestwice, losing a single day's work at either end. Out of all these plans, the Ftrst American Volunt.eer Group of fighterpilots and fighterplanes only salvage.Chmese orders wereplacedfortheRepublicP-43 s at LockheedHudsons,but only afewof eachweredeliveredbeforethe JapaneseattackturnedoffthespigotofsuppliestotheOrient.The 98 fighter group wasChina's most urgent need-first to smash the Japanese overChungking and then to protect the trickle of supplies winding up theBurmaRoad. Methodsofimplementingthefighter-groupplandevelopedfaster thanIexpected.It became evidentduring the winterthatChinabad a small but powerful circle of friendsin the White Houseand cabinet. Dr.Lauchlin Currie was sent toChina as President Roosevelt'sspecial adviserandreturnedastrongbackerofincreasedaidtoChinain general and my air plans in particular. Currie was shrewd and scholarly, adeptatthreadingprojectsthroughthe mazeofprewarWashington. AnothertrustedadviserofthePresident-Thomas Corcoran-didyeo-manserviceinpushingtheAmericanVolunteerGroupprojectwhen thepressureagainstit wasstrongest.Dr.Soong'stwoclosepersonal friends-FrankKnox,SecretaryoftheNavy,andHenryMorgenthau, Secretary of the Treasury, were the project'ssupporters in the Cabinet andinstrumental in clearing away many of the officialobstacles. A mutualfriendintroducedmetoKnoxsoonafterIarrivedin ThisbluffandheartyRoughRider,whowasthentry-mgtorideherdontheblue-water,battleshipadmiralsoftheNavy, was one of the best-informed men on the Pacific situation Iencountered inWashington.AfterourfirstmeetingKnoxcalledhisstaffanda numberof top-ranking Navy admiralsinto his officetohear mystory. "Idon'thaveanyauthorityaround here,"he toldthem."I'mjust a civilian,but Iwant youall to hear what this man hastosay." Knoxwasanxiousto havenavalairmenrepresentedintheA.V.G. andtookapersonalinterest inthe menwhojoined.Hespent several hourswith me going over the recordsoftheNavymeninthe A.V.G. I returned to Washington in 1943 and saw that the Navy made an Intelligentefforttoretaintheirservicesforthenavalairforce.This wasinmarkedcontrasttotheArmyAirCorpsattitudethatlabeled their A.V.G.alumni as black sheep. It was Knox who wasable to plead thecaseoftheA.V.G.inthehighestWhiteHousecirclesandwho probablydidthemosttoshoutdownthebitteroppositionofthe admiralsand thegenerals. Planes were a tough problem. American plane production had har?ly tostaggertoward itsdizzy wartimetotals.The desperateSitu-ation in England gave the Royal Air Force ashare of top priority with Air Corps on the few planes trickling off the lines.My visits to the aircraftplants were fruitless until Iwent to the Curtiss-Wright factory at Buffalo. China had been a long-time, profitable customer forCurtiss-Wright,somyoldfriend,BurdetteWright,Curtissvice-president, 99 cameup withaproposition.Theyhadsixassemblylinesturning out P-40's forthe British,who had taken overaFrench order after the fall ofFrance.If theBritishwouldwaivetheirpriority ononehundred P-40B's then rolling off one line,Curtiss would add aseventh assembly lineandmakeonehundredlater-modelP-40'sfortheBritish.The British were glad to exchange the P-40Bforamodel moresuitable for combat. The P-40B was not an ideal airplane forthe purpose required, but it wasbetter thannothingandthe onlything we couldgetat thetime. MostoftheP-40B'shad alreadybeenfittedwithBritish.303-caliber wing machine guns instead of American .30-caliber guns.The problem ofgettingodd-sizeammunitionforthesegunswasoneofour headaches in Burma. All of the planes were supposed to be fitted with BritishVHF(very-high-frequency)radioequipmentinEngland, .so wegotthem withoutanyradios.Unabletobuy militaryradioeqwp-ment, China Defense Supplies, Incorporated, had to purchase ordinary commercialsport-planeradios,addinganotherhazardtoourcombat operations. These radios may have been fineforflying the radio ranges on aplacid cross-countrytripinaPiperCub,but they couldn'tthestrain of combat operations and repeatedly failedat critical tunes. TheP-40Bwasnotequippedwithagunsight,bombracksorpro-visionsforattachingauxiliaryfueltankstothewingsorbelly. ofoureffortduringtrainingandcombatwasdevotedtoattempts to remedy thesedeficiencies.The combatrecordofthe Fust AmericanVolunteerGroupin China iseven more remarkable beca:use itspilotswereaimingtheirgunsthroughacrude,homemade,nng: and-post gunsightinsteadofthe moreaccurate opticalsightsused by the Air Corps and the Royal Air Force. By January 1941, the Soong-Morgenthau combination had persuaded the Britishtoaccept the Curtiss swap. In February the planes theNewYorkdocksreadyforshipmenttoRangoon.Atthiscnti ed stageWilliamD.Pawley,Curtiss-WrightsalesmaninChina, the picture. Pawley began an extraordinary internationalcareer selling CurtissplanesinChinaduringtheprofitablewaryears.WithChinese government heorganizedtheCentral Aircraft Manufactunng Company in China forthepurposeof buildingaircraft. Pawley'sroleintheA.V.G.projectbeganwithhisdemandthat Curtiss-Wrightpayhima10-per-centcommissiononthepurchase price of the one hundred P-40'sbeing soldto China.Hepro-ducedhiscontract withCurtisswhichcalledforthecommission 0 all planes sold by Curtiss inand threatened to get an injunction 100 againstshipmentoftheP-40'sunlesshewaspaid.Curtiss-Wright refusedtopayPawleyalleginghehadnothingtodowiththesale. werelostinfutilenegotiationsuntiltherewasacutedanger thattheChinesewouldlosetheplanes.RatherthanpayPawley, Curtiss-Wright was ready to sellthem back to theR.A.F. SecretaryMorgenthaucalledaconferenceonApril1,1941,fora showdown.Thefightlastedallday.TheChineseweresodesperate fortheplanesthey offeredtopayPawleyout of Chinesefunds.Mor-genthaurefusedtoletthemandconcentratedonwearingPawley down.Morgenthau threatened to take over the Curtiss contract as a war emergency,butPawleydidn' tscare.FinallytheChinesesuggesteda compromisewherebyPawleywouldbepaid$250,000-considerably lessthanthe $450,000he wanted-in returnforwhichCentralAircraft Companywouldassemble,testfly,andservicethe P-40'sinBurmaandChina.CAMCOthenhad anassemblyplantat Loi-WingjustacrosstheBurmeseborderinChinathatwasideally locatedasaheavymaintenancebase.LateinApril,theplaneswere shippedaboard anoldslowNorwegianfreighter.Thefirstplanewas lost whena cargo sling broke, depositing a P-40 fuselagein the waters ofNewYorkharbor. Personnel proved atougher nut to crack. The military were violently opposedto the whole idea of Americanvolunteers in China. Itried to convince them of the large return in tactics, intelligence, and equipment evaluationthey would get fromasmall investment inpersonnel.Many countries had tested their air strength in combat throughthe device of volunteersunderaforeign flag-the RussiansinChinaand Spain;the and Italians in Spain-but nobody in the Navy and Munitions buildingswouldbuyit.LauchlinCurrieandIwenttoseeGeneral ArnoldinApril of 1941.He was100 per cent opposedtotheproject. Arnoldtold us he couldn't spare asingle staffofficerthen without en-the Air Corps expansion program and that he would oppose VIgorouslyanydiversionofAirCorpsstrengthtoanyothercountry. MyronWood,chiefofAirCorpspersonnel,echoedArnold's sentiments.IntheNavy,Rear Admiral Jack 'Ibwers,thenchief of the ofAeronauticsandlatercommanderoftheNavy'sPacific au forces, also viewedthe A.V.G. as athreat to hisexpansion program. It wasduringthosediscouragingdaysthat astubby,sandy-haired 5econdlieutenant named Johnny Alison flewa P-40 to Bolling Field in Washington for a demonstration before Chinese and American official-;. Johnny Alisongot more out of that P-40 inhisfive-minutedemonstra-101 tionthananybodyIsawbeforeorafter.TheChineseweretremen douslyimpressed. When he landed, they pointed at the P-40 and smiled, "We need one hundred of these." "No," Isaid,pointing to Alison,"youneed one hundred ofthese." Johnny Alisonlater came toChinaafterteaching P-40trickstothe R.A.F.andtheRussians.Heranupabrilliantcombatrecordasa squadron leader, servedassecondincommand of Colonel PhilCoch ran'sFirstAirCommandoUnit,whichlandedWingate'sraiderstwo hundred miles behind the Jap lines in Burma, and finally was operations officeroftheseven-hundred-planeFifthAirForce inthePhilippines and Okinawa.Johnny isnow the Assistant Secretary of Commerce for Aeronautics,holdingone of the topadministrative postsin civilavia tionat theripeoldage of thirty-five. AlisonwasthekindofpilotIneededfortheA.V.G.Without one hundredofthemenforwhomJohnnyAlisonwasaprototype,the, P-40'smightjust aswellhaverustedontheRangoondocks.It took direct personal intervention fromPresident Rooseveltto pry thepilots andgroundcrewsfromtheArmyandNavy.OnApril15,1941,an unpublicized executive order went out under his signature, authorizing reserveofficersand enlistedmentoresignfromtheArmyAirNaval and Marine Air Services forthe purpose of joining the Axnencan Volunteer Group in China. Sincewewerestillworkinginstrictsecrecy,Pawleysuggestedto Dr.Soongthat CAMCObeusedasablindtohirepersonnel.A con fidentialcontract wasdrawn up between CAMCO and China Defense Supplies, Incorporated, in whichCAMCO agreed to handle all financial matters at cost and provide complete maintenance and rep3Jl' forour damaged aircraft at the Loi-Wing factory.Inthiscontract the A.V.G.fightersquadronswerecalled"advancedtrainingunits,':th; P-40'swere"advancedtrainers,"andIwasdesignated"supervisor. Orderswentout toallmilitaryairfields,signedbySecretary Knol and General Arnold,authorizingbearersofcertainlettersfreedornof thepost,includingpermissiontotalkwithallpersonnel.Field co!D manders were astonished when our mufti-clad recruiters appeared and enragedwhentheydiscoveredthepurposeofthevisitwastolure men out of the services.Several spluttering commanders called Wash ington long distance forconfirmationof theirorders.. Richard Aldworth, a retired Army pilot, was hired to head the recruit ingstaff.He wasstillsufferingfromold crashinjuriessothe of the work wassupervised by "Skip" Adair,assisted by Rutledge Jrvllle. 102 a retiredNavycommander,HarryClaiborne,andSentonL.Brown. Theycovered the country.There were notsomany air basesinthose days-QuanticofortheMarines;Norfolk,SanDiego,Pensacola,and JacksonvillefortheNavy;Bolling,Selfridge,McDill,March,Mitchel, Langley,Hamilton,Eglin,Craig,Maxwell,Barksdale,andRandolph forthe Army. Their offerwasaone-year contract withCAMCOto"manufacture, repair,andoperateaircraft"atsalariesrangingfrom$250to$750a month.Travelingexpenses,thirty daysleavewithpay,quarters,and $30additionalforrationswerespecified.Theywouldbesubjectto summarydismissalby writtennoticeforinsubordination,habitualuse of drugs or alcohol, illness not incurred in line of duty, malingering, and revealing confidential information.Before the end of the A.V.G.,Ihad todismissatleastonemanforeverycauseexceptrevealingconfi-dential information.A system of fineswasinitiated for minoroffenses. There was no mention in the contract of a five-hundred-dollarbonus foreveryJapaneseplanedestroyed.Volunteerswere toldsimplythat therewasarumorthattheChinesegovernmentwouldpay $500for eachconfirmedJap plane.They couldtaketherumorforwhat it was worth.It turnedouttobeworthexactly$500perplane.Although initiallythefive-hundred-dollarbonuswaspaidforconfirmedplanes destroyedinaircombatonly,thebonuswassoonappliedtoplanes destroyedonthe ground-if they couldbe confirmed. I hadoriginallyplannedtogiveeachpilotafinalpersonalcheck, in the hectic rush to get the group under way, I had to abandon the tdea. We made one last desperate attempt to get six trained staff officers fromtheAirCorps,butArnoldwasadamant.Ipleadedforthree finallyforasingle officeras group executive, but Arnoldstuckto his themethat the lossof evenonestaff officerwould crippletheAir expansion program. Later AirCorpsheadquarters bitterly criti-CIZedthe A.V.G.and its successors in China for their lack of staff work. Notuntilthe middle of 1943did the Armysend me any staff officers. In the meantime Ihad to use whatever Americanadventurers 1 could findknockingaboutlooseintheOrient. A clerkin the State Departmentpassport divisiongavememyfinal tasteofWashingtonofficialdom.Inapplyingformy passport,Ilisted my OCcupationas farmer.The clerk was skeptical. "I ownlandinLouisianaandImakealiving fromit,"Irepliedto ' un. "That makes me afarmer." He insisted I change my occupation. It took a call to the White House to COnVincehim that Iwas a farmer. 100 IHewtoSanFranciscoonUnitedAirLinesand met thefirstcon-tingentoftheA.V.G.intheMarkHopkinsHotelonJuly7,the fourth anniversary of the Double Seventh,the night the Sino-Japanese war began. Nobody who saw that odd assortment of young men, look1 ing slightly ill at ease and uncertain in their new civilian clothes, could havepossiblyimaginedthat inafewmonthstheywouldbehistory.The firstgroup lefton July 10 aboard the Dutch ship Jaegers fontaine.Japanese intelligence was not fooled by passports claiming OC cupations of musician,student,clerk,banker,etc.,withaleaderwasafarmer.TheJapaneseradioannouncedthatthefirstgroupd AmericanvolunteerpilotsplanningtofightinChinahadleftSan Franciscoby ship. "ThatshipwillneverreachChina,"theJapaneseradiochortled "It willbe sunk." West of Hawaiipassengers onthe Jaegersfontainespotted twowar ships, steaming in loose escort formation.Navy pilots identified them as the U.S.cruisersSaltLake CityandNorthampton.The cruisersstuck with the Dutch boat as it swung far south of the regular shipping lanes toavoidthe Japanesebasesinthe Carolines.In theTorresStraits off Australia aDutch cruiser picked upthejob and convoyedthe liner to Singapore. IleftSanFranciscoonJuly8aboardaPanAmericanAirways Clipper with Owen Lattimore, special politicaladvisertothe General[ issirno, as atraveling companion. Just bafore we left, Ireceived confu mationofpresidentialapprovalforthesecondAmericanVolunteer Groupofbomberswithascheduleofonehundredpilotsand 181 I gunnersandradiomentoarrivein ChinabyNovember1941and equal number to follow in January 1942.Asthe big flyingboat roar intothe air overSanFrancisco Bay,Isettledcomfortably in myconfident forthe firsttime in my battle against the Japanesethat I everything Ineeded to defeat them.As we plowed on into the everund Ifeltsure that the blood-red settingsun sinking intotheocean ahea was symbolic. 104 8. RET_DRNINGto the Orient in the summer of 1941gave me a kaleido-scopicpreviewoftheAllieddefensesthatweretocrumblesoeasily whentestedafewmonthslater.InthesixtydaysafterleavingSan Francisco,IflewmorethantwentythousandmilesovertheAsiatic battlegroundstoweaveinternationallooseendsofthevolunteer projectintoa tight pattern of war. Hawaii,wheremyold19thFighterSquadronwasstillbased,was thefirststop.TheywereequippedwiththeP-40'sandP-36'sthat weretobe smashed on the groundat Wheeler Fieldbythe Japanese attackonDecember7.HowardDavidson,thencommanderofthe HawaiifightersandlateramajorgeneralcommandingtheTenthAir ForceinIndiaandBurma,met meforafewdrinksbetweenplanes. Howardtold me tales of woe about the P-40, including the startling in-telligence that he had constant trouble due to rusting of the main thrust bearings. AfterleavingHawaii,theClipper'scabincurtainsweretightly drawnandpersonalcamerasconfiscatedongroundsofmilitary security.ActuallytherewaslittletoseeexceptgoonybirdsonMid-way,sootyterns on Wake Island, andgrassshackson Guam.Civilian workerswere building crushed-coral runwaysonMidway,Wake,and buttherewerenosignsanywhereoffortifications tructionoranyunusualmilitarypreparations.Mostofthecivilian workerswerelatercapturedbytheJapaneseandmassacredincold blood . .ManilaIstayedwithGeneralsGeorgeandClaggett.Bothhad China afew monthsbefore.They both endorsed the American olunteerGrouptotheWarDepartmentasanexcellentmethodof testin .gmenandequipment.GeorgewaseagertogoontoChina WtthmeandjointheA.V.G.buttheWarDepartmentrejectedhis request. 105 Hong Kongdrowsedsleepily inthe humid summer heat,apparently sofamiliarwiththeJapanese,lessthanacannonshotawayonthe mainland,thatthepotentialenemybredonlycontemptamongthe crowncolony'sdefenders.FromHongKongIembarkedonanitin erarythatkeptmeshuttlingbetweenChina,Burma,andMalaya withthegreatswiftstridesthatonlyairtravelmakespossible. C.N.A.C.whiskedmefromHongKongtoChungkingtoreporton theincrediblesuccessoftheAmericanprojecttotheGeneralissimO. Chungkingwasalreadysmokingunderthefirstsummer It was still our intention to throw theA.V.G.over the Chinese capital andtheGeneralissimo wasimpatient forthelong-awaited air tobegin.IflewwesttoChengtutoarrangefortransferofammuru tionand bombsfromtheformerRussianflyingschool toChungking. AChineseAirForcetransport broughtmetoRangoononJuly2:3, whereIfoundmostoftheA.V.G.P-40'sstillsittingincrateson the docks where they had been unloaded late in June. MymissioninBurmaduringthosemidsummermonthswasthree-fold:firsttolocateaplacetoassembleandtrainmygroup;second tobeg,borrow,or steal the spare parts we would needsodesperately to keep our planes flyingin combat; and thirJ to findtime towhip the assortmentof volunteersintoakeen-edgedcombatgroup. Thethree-monthwrangleinWashingtonforcedabandonment

the original plans totrain the group at Kunmingduring the dry sunn) springandhavethemreadytofightoverChungkingwhenthe clear summer days broke over the capital. The resultantdelay in ship- the planesfromNew Yorkmadeitimpossiblefor toChmabeforethemonsoonrainsturnedthegrass-coveredaufieldsf Yunnanintoquagmires.Pawleyassistedmeinobtainingthe011 apavedRoyalAirForcefieldin Burma-ouronlyhopeoftrauun., during themonsoon. Presence of the American volunteers and their war planes inBUflll3 posedaticklishinternationalproblemfortheBritish,whoweredesperatelyengaged inAfrica,the Atlantic,and over theirhomelan. Their officialpolicy inthe Orient was to avoidwar with Japan or an} p_rovocation that might give the Japanese an excuse forfurther s1on.Nevertheless,oncetheA.V.G.arrivedinBurma,theBnti authoritieswereextraordinarilyhelpfulandstretchedtheirpolicr. to itslimitsto providethe A.V.G.withwhatit needed.WithoutBntiSh helpduringthis prewar period it wouldhavebeenalmosttogettheA.V.G.intofightingcondition.InApril1941,theBntlsd governmentinformedDr.SoongthattheA.V.G.mightassemblean 106 testHyits planesin Burma,but undernocircumstancescouldactual combattrainingbepermittedundertheBritishHag.GeneralP.T. oftheChineseAir Force,WilliamPawleyandhisbrotherEd, andmyselfgatheredinRangoontoconferwithSirReginaldHugh Dorman-Smith,governorofBurma,hismilitarycommander,Lieu-tenant General D. K. McLeod, and the senior air officer Group Captain E.R.Manning.Dorman-SmithandMcLeodweresympatheticand extremelyhelpful.However,the A.V.G.later had many disagreements withManning,athin, sallow Australianreservist.Manning was under-standablydisturbedby theadventofanirregulargroupsuchasthe A.V.G.intowhat heregardedashiscommand. GeneralMowarguedfortheChinesethat,sinceJapanrefusedto admitofficiallyshewasatwarwithChina,theAmericanvolunteers couldnotlegally be considered belligerents and were infact violating noneutralitybytheiroperationsinBurma.FinallylateinOctober, longaftertheA.V.G.arrivedinBurma,Londonreverseditsearlier decisionandpermittedfullcombattrainingwiththeprovisothat Bunneseairfieldswould not be used asabase to attackthe Japanese ortheirSiameseallies. TheRangoon conferences also produced aChinese-government lease

therecentlycompletedbutunmannedR.A.F.KyedawAirdrome SIXmilesfromToungoo,whichwasonehundredandseventymiles northofRangoononthe SittangRiver.The fieldwasinthemidstof themonsoonbelt but had a4,000-footasphalt runwayandteakwood barracks. The Toungoo lease had hardly been signed when the first contingent of volunteersarrived at Rangoonon July28.Imet themon thedocks and .shipped themoffby traintoToungoo, where Boatner Carneywas hastilypitchingcamp.AtthattimeCarney,whohadflowndown fromthe Kunming flyingschool,wasmy onlystaffofficer.Irecruited therestof the staff fromwhatever Americancivilianshappenedto be availableinIndiaandChinaduringthesummer. ThenextroundofmyOrientalodysseytookmetoSingaporeto getpennissionfromAir ChiefMarshalSirRobertBrooke-Pophamto gunsat ground targetsaroundToungooforstrafing BntishauthoritiesinBurmawereafraidthat firingwouldstirnative Unrest and in any casethey would not make adecisionwithout orders Singapore.Idevelopedanimmediatelikingandrespectfor StrRobertandhisaideAirViceMarshalPulford,whowaslater , edinactionoverMalaya.They wereengagedinthealmosthope-lesstask of building up British defenses in the Far East with a priority 107 onmanpower and materielthenrated lower thanEngland, theAtlan l tic, the Middle East, Russia,and evenIranand Iraq. Yetboth Brooke Pophamand PulforddideverythingtheycouldtobolstertheA.V.G. eventooffering usaportion of their ownextremely meager personnel and equipment. Iwasdisturbedbythe .naturalfeelingofmanyR.A.F.officersat SingaporethattheJapanese offerednocauseforconcernincombat Mter their experiences in the Battle of Britain the R.A.F.pilots felt con fident they couldhandlethe Japaneseairmen.British intelligence was then as bad asthat of theUnited States, and as a result the R.A.F. had no real knowledge of Japanese equipment or air tactics. AnurgentsummonsfromtheGeneralissimowhiskedmebackto Chungkingintimefortheworst bombingsofmylife.TheJapanese werehurlingahundredandfiftyplanesadayatthe capital,inafinalefforttoforceChinesesurrenderbeforethebig drivetothesouthbegan.TheywerealsousingChungkingforfinal combattrainingoftheairregiments thatweresoontosweepthe PacificskiesfromHawaiitoSingapore.IlandedatChungkingAugust8andwentthroughtworaidstryingtoreachtheGeneralis simo's headquarters outside the city.One raid caught me in aboardaYangtzeferry.ThenextdayIdodgedbetweenthreetoconferwiththeAmerican,British,andRussianmilitaryattache) andaroseat 2A.M.thenext morningto makethe longtripby f chairfromthehomeoftheBritishmilitaryattache,whereIw:u staying,totheC.N.A.C.airfieldbeforedawn.Wewerestillonthe wayatdaylightwhenthefirstJapanesebombersdisgorged.As: secondwavebombed,thechair-carryingcooliesdroppedme. scuttledoffamongthericepaddies.Iwalkedasfarasthefeff) landingonthesouthbankoftheriverandtookthethirdraidofthe pletel)' I morrung,Sittingonanoverturnedboat.Chungkingwascorn deserted.Not even adog was stirring inthe streets.Finally a Chinese inarowboatappearedfromupstreamandferriedmeacrossthe river. The boatman wanted fiftyChinese dollars forthejob.RuJ11lllag ingthroughmypockets,IcouldfindonlyfiveChinesedollarsP!us anassortmentofAmericandollarsandIndianrupees.Our over wu(five)andwushi(fifty)drewacrowdoutoftherur-rat .( sheltercavescut intotherockyriverbank.AnEnglish-speaking neseappearedfromthecrowdandofFeredtomediate.IgavebiJII '(111 mycard.Hereadthecard,whichexplainedthatIwasaforeJ.,. military advisertothegovernment,to the crowdandmadeahh tbout speec.Tecrowdapplauded,andtheboatmandepartedWl 108 any furtherclaims.Iwalked on throughthecity towardthe C.N.A.C. officetofindout if Ihad missedtheplane.The only personImet in thestreetswasArthurYoung,anAmericanwhowasthenfinancial advisertotheChinesegovernment.Hewasdrivingtothesafetyof thecountrybutorderedhischauffeurtotakemetotheC.N.A.C. officebeforereturningtopickhimup.C.N.A.C.clerksinformedme thattheplanehadturnedbackatthefirstair-raidalarmand"no comeback.,. I drove on to Dr. Rape'scompound ratherthanrecrossthe Yangtze, huttheyhad left forthe country,leavingonlyacookandanancient Chineseamahwho refusedto leave.The bombingsbeganagainand wentonalmostwithoutinterruption,dayandnightforseventy-two hours.Phoneandelectricitylineswerecut.Therewasnowaterand onlycoldricetoeat.Theseconddayastickofbombssmashed scatteringsteelsplintersintothecompoundanddrivingus thedugout on anearby hillside.Isat therelistening to theinter-mittentthunderofthebombs,moreangrythaneverbeforeasI thought of the delays that had made it impossible to hurl the American volunteersintothisbattle and prevent what turned out tobe the final ordeal of Chungking. There was small satisfaction then in knowing that the.planesandpilotscapableofsmashingtheJapaneseaireffortin Chinawere already in Asia.It wasAugust 22 beforeIcould get clear of bomb-spatteredChungking and return to Toungooto meet most of theAmericanvolunteers forthefirsttime.Thecampat Kyedawwas seething with griping and unrest when Iarrived.My firstbusinesswas toaccepttheresignationsof fivepilotswhowereeagertoreturnto theUnitedStatesandair-linejobs. ToungoowasashockingcontrasttoapeacetimeArmyorNavy postintheUnitedStates.Therunwaywassurroundedby quagmire and .pestilentialjungle.MattedmassesofrottingvegetationtheJUngleandfilledtheairwithasour,sickeningsmell.Torrential monsoonrainsandthunderstormsalternatedwithtorridheattogive theatmospherethetextureofaTurkishbath.Dampnessandgreen moldpenetratedeverywhere.Thefood,providedbyaBurmesemess wasterrible,andoneoftheprincipalcausesofgroup gripmg. Barracks were new and well ventilated, but along withthe air came stinginginsectinBurma.Therewereno orelectric ghtsandnotafootofscreeningtobeboughtmallBurma.We learnedthattheR.A.F.abandonedKyedawduringtherainyseason becauseEuropeanswereunabletosurviveitsfoulclimate.Thanks 109 totheabundanceofmedicalsuppliesauthorizedbyDr.Soongand the workof our three-manmedicalstaff-Doctors TomGentry,Lewis Richards,and SamPrevo-we survivedtraininginthispesthole outseriousillness.WhenBrooke-PophaminspectedtheA.V.G.at1 Kyedaw,hisfirstconcern wasforour sicklist.He inspectedthe large R.A.F.-builthospitalbeforehelookedat theplanesandwasamazed tofindonlyasinglepatient-amechanicwhohadhadhistonsils removedthedaybefore. PawleyfinallyprovidedthreeAmericansandsomeChineseme-chanicsfromhisLoi-WingfactorytoassembletheA.V.G.P-40'sat Mingaladon airdrome near Rangoon, but all radios,oxygenand armament had to be installed by group mechanics at Toungoo. During one of theperiodicBritishinspectionsof Kyedaw,Air \'ice MarshalPulfordvisitedmeandexclaimed,"Thisisincredible.Less thanamonthagoyouarrivedonthedocksatRangoonwithonlya briefcase,andnowyouhaveafightergroupreadytofight." Iassured Pulford that we were far fromready to fight. Ahead lay an arduoustrainingperiodduringwhichIhadtoteachmypilotsall the tricksoftheir enemy-how to use theirownequipment to the advantage,and howto fightand livetofightagainanother day.ThiS last factorwasextremelyimportantsince,withagroupsosmalland replacementssouncertain, wesimplyhad toreduceourown losseswellbelowaverage,atthesametimeboostingtheenemys highabovewhat he waspreparedtoabsorb.It wasnoeasytask. Whiletheplaneswerebeingreadiedforcombat,webeganfinal pilot training.It was arude shocktosomeoftheA.V.G.pilots when theymatriculatedinmypostgraduateschooloffighter at Toungoo.MostofthemconsideredthemselvesextremelyhotMteralongseavoyagebraggingtofellowpassengersaboutthell' prowessasfighterpilots,manyofthemwereconvincedtheywereI readytowalkdownthegangplankatRangoonandbeginingtheJapaneseAirForce.Somewerehighlyskepticalofwhata "beat-upoldArmycaptain"whohadbeen"buriedinChina"for yearscouldteachyouthsfreshfromofficialfontsofmilitaryknow! edge.ButIhadbeenworkingonmyplanstowhipthein theair forfouryears,andIwasdeterminedthat,whenthe icanVolunteerGroupwentintobattle,itwouldbeusingbasedonthat bitterexperience.. PilotslookedfrompromisingastheycheckedinatKyed;;: Thelongboattnp andDutchshipboard menushadleftmanyfla.andoverweight.TheyallappearedwiltedduringtheirintroductiO 110 tothehumidmonsoonheat.Fieldtransportationwascuttoamini-mumtokeepthemwalkingandsweating;regularschedulesofbase-ball,volleyball,andcalisthenicswereinstitutedtowhipthemback intogoodphysicalcondition. Theirflyingrecordswerenotimpressive.Iwantedpilotsbetween twenty-threeandtwenty-eightwithat leastthree yearsof experience in fighterplanes.Onlyadozenmetthesestandardsandhadever seena P-40.Morethanhalfthepilotshadneverflownfighters.We hadeverythingfromfour-engineFlyingFortresspilotstoNavy torpedobombers.LouisHoHmann,the oldest,wasaforty-three-year-oldNavyveteranandhadalmostasmuchfightertimeasIhad. HenryGilbert,theyoungest,hadjustturnedtwenty-oneandwas freshfromArmyflyingschool.Ofthehundredandtenpilotswho reachedToungoo,fourweremarines,withtherestaboutequally dividedbetweenArmyandNavy.Therewasalwayssomejoshing abouttherespectiveservicesbut neveranyofthebitterinterservice rivalryintheA.V.G.thatwassoevidentlaterinthewar. WebeganatToungoowithakindergartenforteachingbomber pilotshowto flyfighters.Somelearned fast and well.Bob Nealeand David''Tex" Hill,both Navy dive-bomber pilots,had the best combat ~ r d sintheA.V.G.GeorgeBurgardandCharleyBond,bothFly-mgFortresspilots,rankedamongthefirstten.Forothersitwasa long,tedious,andunsatisfactoryprocess.Manymulti-enginedpilots hadtroublegetting usedtothehundred-mile-per-hourlandingspeed andviolentmaneuversoftheP-40.OnemorningIwatchedthem crackupsixP-40'sinlanding-heavierlossesthantheA.V.G.ever sufferedinaday'scombat.ItremindedmeoftheItalian-trained Chinesepilots.WhileIwasissuingorderstocancelflyingforthe ~ s tof the day, amechanic, bicycling while watching awreck,crashed mtoaparkedplane,tearingapieceofftheaileronandputtingthe seventhplaneofthedayout of commission.Kindergartengotalong ~ t u r eonlandingsthatafternoon.To emphasizethepoint,awhite linewaschalkedmarkingonethirdoftherunwaylengthanda fifty-dollarfineslapped on anypilot whotouchedhiswheelsbeyond theline.Ourtrainingprogramwentonlongaftercombatbegan. AslateasMarch1942,afterthegrouphadbeenfightingfornearly fourmonths,westillhadeighteenpilotsclassifiedasnotreadyfor combat.NomatterhowpressingtheimmediateneedsofcombatI refusedtothrowapilotintothe frayuntilIwaspersonallysatisfied thathewasproperlytrained.Thatisprobablyoneofthemain 111 reasonsJapanesepilotswereabletokillonlyfourA.V.G.pilotsin sixmonthsofair combat. OurToungooroutinebeganat 6A.M.withalecture inateakwood classroomnearthefield,whereIheldforthwithblackboard,maps. andmimeographedtextbooks.AllmylifeIhavebeenateacher. rangingfromtheone-roomschoolsofruralLouisianatodirectorof oneof thelargest Air Corps Hyingschools,but Ibelievethat the best teachingof my careerwasdoneinthatteakwoodshackatToungoo. wheretheassortmentofAmericanvolunteersturned intotheworld famousFlyingTigers,whoseaerialcombatrecordhasneverbeen equaled by agroup of comparablesize. EverypilotwhoarrivedbeforeSeptember15gotseventy-two hoursoflecturesinadditiontosixtyhoursofspecializedflying.I gavethe pilotsalessoninthe geography of Asiathat theyall needed badly, toldthem something of the war inChina,and how the Chinese air-raid warning net worked. ItaughtthemallIknewabouttheJapanese.Dayafterdaythere werelecturesfrommynotebooks,filledd.uringthepreviousfour yearsofcombat.Allofthe bitterexperiencefromNankingtoChung kingwaspouredoutinthoselectures.CapturedJapaneseflyingand staffmanuals,translatedintoEnglishbytheChinese,servedas te:x:tbooks.FromthesemanualstheAmericanpilotslearnedmore about Japanesetacticsthananysingle Japanesepilotever knew. "YouwillfaceJapanesepilotssuperblytrainedinmechanicalflt ing,"Itoldthem."Theyhavebeendrilledforhundredsofhours. !II Hyingpreciseformationsandrehearsingsettacticsforeachsituation theymayencounter.JapanesepilotsBybythebook,andt b e s ~are thebookstheyuse.Studythem,andyouwillalwaysbeoneJump aheadoftheenemy. "Theyhaveplentyofgutsbutlackinitiativeandjudgment.TheyI gointobattlewithasettacticalplanandfollowitnomatter what happens ..Bomberswillholdtheirformationsuntiltheyare~ 1 1~ down.FtghtersalwaystrythesametricksoverandoveragaJn.. helptheAmericanpilotwhotriestofightthemaccordingtotbe!T plans. "The object of our tacticsisto break uptheirfotmationsand make themfightaccordingtoourstyle.OncetheJapaneseareforced. to deviatefromtheirplan,theyare introuble.Theirrigidairdiscipline canbeusedasapowedul weaponagainstthem." Iwentintodetailontheconstruction,performance,andarmament oftheJapaneseplanes,fillinginmanyoftheblanksinthewar. 112 Departmentmanuals.Mimeographedsheetscontainingdrawings, specifications,and performance dataonthe famousModelZeronavy fighter( Zeke)werepassed out toeachpilot.Shortlythereafterafew morepilotssubmittedtheirresignations.Idrewdiagramsofthe Japaneseplanesontheblackboard,circlingvitalspots-oilcoolers, oxygenstorage,gastanks,andbombbays-incoloredchalk.Erasing thecoloredcircles,apilotwouldbeaskedtostepupandredraw themfrommemory.Mymethodsweresimpleand direct,withplenty of repetition to make the lessonsstick.In afightyouseldom have time tothink,andit istrainingandreflexesthatcount. ThenIwentintothetacticsIhaddevisedtopittheP-40against theJapanesefightersandbombers. "Youmustusethestrongpointsofyourequipmentagainstthe weakpointsoftheenemy.Eachtypeofplanehasitsownstrength andweakness.Thepilotwhocanturnhisadvantagesagainstthe enemy'sweaknesswill winevery time.Youcan count ona highertop speed,fasterdive,andsuperiorfirepower.TheJapfightershavea fasterrateofclimb,higher ceiling,andbettermaneuverability.They tumon adimeand climbalmost straight up.If they canget you m:oaturningcombat,theyaredeadly. Useyour speed and diving power to makeapass,shootandbreak away.Youhavetheedge inthat kindof combat.Allyouradvantages arebroughttobearontheJapanesedeficiencies.Closeyourrange, fire,anddiveaway.NeverstaywithinrangeoftheJap'sdefensive firepowerany longerthanyouneedtodeliveranaccurateburst." Iharpedonaccurategunnery. "Youneedtosharpenyourshootingeye.Nobodyevergetstoo goodatgunnery.ThemoreJapsyougetwithyourfirstburst,the fewertherearetojumpyoulater.Accuratefiresavesammunition. Yourplanecarriesalimitednumberofbullets.Thereisnothing worsethanfindingyourselfinafightwithempty guns." "afterdayIdrewdiagrams,lectured,andalwaysrepeated, Fightinpairs.Makeeverybulletcount.Nevertrytogetallthe Japaneseinonepass.Hithard,breakclean,andgetpositionfor pass.Neverworryaboutwhat'sgoingtohappennext,or Itwillhappentoyou.Keeplookingaround.YoucanlicktheJapa-nese without getting hurt if you use your heads and are careful.Follow themhome.They areusuallylowongasand ammunitionwhenthey breakoHandheadforhome.If they maneuver or openfullthrottle, theywillnotget back." TheA.V.G.tacticsofshootinganddivingawaywerethesubject 113 ofconsiderableamusement.AtRangoontheR.A.F.22lstGroup postedanoticethat anyR.A.F.pilotseendivingawayfroma fight wouldbesubject tocourt-martial.In theChineseAirForcethepen altyforthesameoffensewasafiringsquad.Manyofthe American pilotshadbeeneducatedinthetail-chasingdogfightandhadlittle enthusiasm for the shoot-and-divetactics untilafter their first fight. Latertherewasampleopportunityforcomparison.TheA.V.G andR.A.F.foughtsidebysideoverRangoonwithcomparable num hers,equipment,andcourageagainstthesameodds.TheR.A.F. barelybrokeevenagainsttheJapanese,whiletheAmericansrolled up a15to1score.In February1942the Japanesethrewheavyraids against Rangoonand Port Darwin,Australia,inthesameweek.Over RangoonfiveA.V.G.pilotsinP-40'sshotdown17outof70 raiderswithout loss.OverDarwin11out of12U.S.ArmyAirForces P-40'swereshot down by asimilar Japanese force.A fewweeks later acrack R.A.F.Spitfire squadron wasrushedtoAustraliafromEurope andlost17outof27pilotsoverDarwinintworaids.TheSpitfire was far superior tothe P-40 as acombat plane. It was simply a matter oftactics.TheR.A.F.pilotsweretrainedinmethodsthat excellentagainstGermanandItalianequipmentbut suicideagamst theacrobaticJaps.TheonlyAmericansquadroninChinathatJapaneseeverlikedtofightwasaP-38squadronthathadfought lD North Africaand refusedto change itstacticsagainstthe Japanese. DuringthefirstyearofthewartheA.V.G.tacticswerethroughouttheArmyandNavy by intelligencereportsand returDlng A.V.G.veterans.AtleastoneNavycommanderinthePacificand anAirForcescolonelwiththeFifthAirForceinAustraliawere later for what were originally the Topolishthesetactics,everypilotwentthroughs1xtyhours specializedHying.MostoftheHyingwasdoneimmediatelyafterI lectures inthe cool of themorning before themonsoonthunderstorms b'lI sweptuptheS1ttangValley.Pilotswentalofttodogfightw 1 e d watchedfromaricketybamboocontroltowerwithfieldglassesan microphone.Icoachedeachpilotasthoughhewerethestar back on our footballteam.Overthe fieldradioIgavehimarunol.D:- ) commentaryonhisflyinganddictatedadditional notestomy tary,TomTrumbleofLincolnNebraskawhoservedmewelJlO '''tb forOnu_.egroundIwentoverthese''1 d the pilot,g1VInglh1madetailedcritiqueofhisHyingandtacticSan prescribingspecificpracticemethodstobolsterhisweakspots. Later Isent pilots up in pairs Hyingtogether to givemutual support 114 withoneplanealwaysprotectingtheother'stail.Finallywedid squadronformationwork.practicing attacksonbombersandstrafing againstgroundtargets.IstillplannedtousetheA.V.G.asagroup withonesquadronforinitialattack,thesecondforsupport,andthe thirdforthedecisiveairbornereservetoenterbattleatthecritical moment.Therehad never been an air battle in which airborneplanes wereusedasreservesinthemanner thatgroundforcespoisedtheir reservestotryfordecisiveblows.Iwassure Icoulddoitwithmy fightergroupagainsttheJapanese.UnfortunatelyInevergotthe chance. Duringthe trainingperiod at Toungoowelostour firstplanesand buriedour firstdead in the cemetery of St.Lukes,Church of England. JackArmstrongofHutchinson,Kansas,waskilledinamid-aircolli-sionwithanotherP-40,whiledogfighting.MaxHammer,ofCairo, Illinois,crashedtohisdeathinamonsoonstormwhiletryingto gropehiswaybacktothe field.Peter AtkinsonofMartinsburg,West Virginia,diedwhenhispropellergovernorgavewayandtorehis planeapartinascreamingpower dive. Thepilotshadaslittle regard forCurtiss-Wright'sP-40at Toungoo asI did,but fordifferentreasons.Mymaincomplaintswerethevul-nerabilityofitsliquid-cooledengineincombat anditslackofdrop-pableauxiliaryfueltanksandbombracks.Beforethepilotsleftthe UnitedStates.theP-40hadacquiredareputationasakillerinthe handsofrelativelyinexperiencedpilots.Thepilots'knowledgeofthe planewasbasedalmostentirely on the cropofrumorsthensprouting atmilitaryflyingfieldsontheerraticflyingqualities,hotlanding speeds,andinferiorpowerplantoftheP-40.Mostofthemwere convinceditwasa"no-good"combatairplane.Whentheypassed

Surabaya,Singapore,andRangoonandsawtheDutchand BntishequippedwithAmerican-madeBrewsterBuffaloestheymut-darklythat "itwasahelluvanotethatAmericanshadtofight m second-rateplanesbecauseallthebestweregoingtotheBritish andDutchunderlend-lease."WhenR.A.F.pilotsflewBuffaloesto Toungootherewaslittleenthusiasmformockdogfightswiththem. ActuallytheBuffalowasinferior tothe P-40inevery respect,particu-larlyrateofclimbandarmamentwhereitcarriedonlytwo.30- machinegunsagainstthe .30'sandtwo.50'softheP-40. Fmally R.A.F.tauntsgrewtoopointedtoignore,and adogfightwas betweenErikShilling,ofWashington,D.C.,andanR.A.F. P.110tinaBuffalo.Muchtoeverybody'sastonishment,Shillingflew nngsaroundhisopponent.Later whentheAmericanssaw the Buffa-115 , loesdroplikeHiesundertheJapaneseonslaughtoverRangoon,P-40 stockroseuntilfinallyA.V.G.pilotsrefusedanR.A.F.offertotrade HawkerHurricanesforP-40's. ByearlyfallwordoftheA.V.G.activities at Toungoohadfiltered aroundtheOrient,andwewereplaguedbyasuccessionof\isits fromAmericanandBritishofficersandnewspapercorrespondents. Wehadnopersonnelavailabletoglad-handvisitorsandlittletime toexplainwhat wasgoingon.Weofferedthemtherunofthefield withquartersandfoodsimilar toour own.It didn' trequire anF.B.I. sleuth todiscover that there wasnomilitarydisciplineontheground. thatwehadnosparepartsforeitherplaneorengines,andthat 1 someoriginalvolunteershadquitinfearordisgust.Thebarracks at K yedawField duringthetrainingperiod had muchoftheatrnos phereofacollegecampusontheeveofahomecomingfootball game.OnedistinguishedforeigncorrespondentforalargeAmerican newspaperwasgreetedwithashowerofemptybeerbottlesashe approachedthebarracks.OnoneoccasionDr.TomGentrywas' arousedaftermidnighttotakeseveralstitchesintheskullofa pilot whowasunfortunatelyselectedtobecrownedkingofToungoob) hisfellowswithaglasswater pitcher.Therewasalwaysafter-hoursroughhousing and violent griping about almost everythmg. Myideasonhowtohandleagroupofhigh-spirited,adventuroUS volunteerfighterpilotsandgroundcrewsdepartedradicallymilitarytradition.ForrigidmilitarydisciplineItriedtoameasureofsimpleAmericandemocraticprinciples.Rigid wasconfinedto, theairand combat matters.Onthegroundwetned toliveasnearlyaspossibleunderthecircumstancesasanormal Americancommunity.Mostoftheproblemsofgrouplivingwere solvedbymajorityruleafterdiscussionsinopenmeetings.Ever} bodywasfreetogripeandvoicehisopinions.Wemetregularh onceaweekforthatpurposeandto formulatehighpolicyon longthebar shouldremain open, whenalllights weretogoout,an ere' otherweightymatters.Wehadnoguardhouse,andnosalutesw required.If somebodycared to salute me,Ialwaysreturned it. weresomewho always saluted.For minor infractionsofthe CAMC00 contractprovisions,therewasasystemoffinesrangingupto$! administeredbyaboardofstaffofficersandsquadronleaders. MyhandlingoftheA.V.G.inthismannerwasnotcalculated

inspireanythingbut distrustintheorthodoxmilitarymind.The taryobserversregardedthegroupasanundisciplinedmob.reportsthatwentbacktoLondonandWashingtonandcirculat 116 aroundRangoonwereprettybad.Probablytheworstreportwas madebyColonelRossHoytandMajorRoyGrusenberg,ofthe AmericanMilitary Missionto China, who were fartoo conventionalto approvean unorthodoxorganizationsuch asthe A.V.G.and muchtoo inexperiencedtohaveanyunderstandingofthevalueofourspe-cializedtactics.In contrast thechief of themissionBrigadierGeneral JohnMagruderwashelpfultouswithinthelimitsofhispower. EarlyinNovemberIreceivedacablefromDr.Soong,"Reports toU.S.WarDepartmentstateyourgroupcannotbereadybefore February 1942and willnot last two weeksincombat.Yourcomment requested." IrepliedtoSoongandtheGeneralissimothatthegroupwould bereadybytheend of November1941,thatitwouldlast aslongas neededincombat,butthatwedesperatelyneededsparepartsto keepourplanesinoperation. Theproblem of spare partswasthe most critical problemwe faced and it continuedtohaunt mealmosttothe eve of V-Jday.When the Chinesebought one hundred P-40B's fromCurtiss-Wright,they could obtainnosparepartstogowiththeplanes.BurdetteWright,vice-presidentofCurtiss-Wright,toldmehisfinnwasunderordersfrom theAirCorpstomakeonlycompleted,flyableplanesandtoignore productionofspareparts,withoutwhichaplanecan'tflyforlong. It wasthesamebasicmistakemadebytheLuftwaffeandtheJapa-neseAirForce,whodependedonentireplanesforreplacements ratherthansparepartstorepair theplanesalreadyinthefield.For-tunatelytheAirCorpsdiscovereditserrorbeforeitbecamefatal. Butthatdiscoverycametoolatetohelpus.Wright informedusthat ~ ecouldn'texpectanyP-40sparesbeforeJanuary1943.Evenrou-tinetrainingflightsatToungootookaheavytollofourplanes.We werefranticfortail-wheeltires,electricswitches,radiotubes,gun solenoids,oxygenbottles,carburetors,sparkplugs,batteries,andthe thousandandoneotherobscurebutvitalthingsthatkeepanair-planeintheair.DuringthefallwebeattheOrientalbushesfrom ChengtutoSingaporetryingtobeg,borrow,orstealspareparts. AtonetimethereweremorethanadozenA.V.G.menscattered fromCalcuttatoManila,searchingforanythingthatwecoulduse. Brooke-PophaminSingaporeofferedusthepickofhisBuffalo spares,butunfortunatelytheywouldn'tfitP-40's. Whenthisbecameevident,IsentJoeAlsoptoSingaporetosee W ~ tother help could be secured from the R.A.F.Brooke-Popham and Air MarshalPulford had nothing to givebuttheir good offices.Alsop 117 suggestedtoBrooke-Pophamthatthe necessaryP-40sparesmight be obtained fromGeneral MacArthur inManila,with the aidof a strongr letter of recommendation fromthe AirChief Marshal.Brooke-Popham at once agreed,and Alsopsat upmost of that night drafting the letter intheofficeofColonel,laterBrigadierGeneral,FrancisBrink,then U.S.MilitaryObserverinSingapore.ThenextdayBrooke-Popham signedthisletter;AlsopwasabouttosetoffforManilabyspecial plane,whenPawleysuddenlyappearedandannouncedthathehad beenauthorizedbyme(whichhehadnot)totakeoverthediscus sions.PawleytooktheletterpreparedbyAlsopandproceededto Manila.Thelettersecuredforusabadlyneededsupplyoftiresfor ourP-40's,but Pawleydidnotunderstand oursituationclearly;P-40 sparepartswereinshortsupplyinManila;andthepartswhichwe needed just as urgently astireswere not forthcoming.,( WhenAlsopreturnedtoToungoo,andinformedmeofPawleys unnecessaryintervention,Iwasmorethanalittleannoyed.Atthe suggestionofGeneralMagruderandDr.Soong,whohad meanwhile' returnedtoChina,IdecidedtosendAlsopon toManilatogetthe sparepartsPawley hadfailedtoobtain.Meanwhile,thegranttous oftiresbyMacArthurwasoftremendousimportance,sincemanyof our aircraftwere actuallygrounded becausetheir tireswereworn.bytraining.AdmiralThomasHart,thencommanderoftheAsiatic Fleet,providedthreeNavyPBYpatrolbombersto.flythetiresfrom Manila to Singapore, whence Brooke-Popham rushed themtoRangoon byboat.Thisstrongandtangiblevoteofconfidenceby Hart,andBrooke-Pophamat atimewhenit wasthemilitary fashion to pooh-pooh the volunteers wasastrong boost to my morale andone of the mainpropsbehind the subsequent combat record of the A.V.G. ThestaffofChinaDefenseSupplies,Incorporated,in Washington, particularlyDavidCorcoran,WhitingWillauer,William and Harry Price, did a valiant job of scouring forsupplies.They finally amassedanotherloadofP-40sparesandaccessoriesandsentthern, acrossthePacificviaPan AmericanClipperinearlyDecember. ClipperhadjusttakenofffromWakeIslandonthemorning 0 December 7,1941,when word of the Japanese attackon Pearl Harbor d bv vas received. The spare parts weredumped on Wake and replace' civilianworkersastheClipperreturnedtotheUnitedStates.When the Japsfinallycaptured\Vake,partofthebootywasourofparts.Notuntil March1942,whenanotherPanAmericanChpper flewthe other wayaroundthe worldtoreachCalcutta with twotons ofincendiaryammunitionand P-40parts,didtheA.V.G.get another 118 ounceofsuppliesfromtheUnitedStates.C.N.A.C.planesrushed thepreciouscargofromCalcuttatoKunminginoneofthefirst large-scaledeliveriesofaircargoacrosstheHumpbetweenIndia andChina. OurtroubleswiththeBritishauthoritiesin Burmacontinued.Kye-dawAirfieldwastechnicallyunder thejurisdictionoftheR.A.F.but therewasaconstantconflictbetweenthemilitary,thecivilgovern-mentofBurma,andnativeBurmesethatincreaseddi.fficultyofour training operations.We were forbidden to use American armed guards overourcampandequipmentandforbiddentoemployBurmese asguards.Nativesswarmedoverthefieldobservingallouractivity. Theopportunities forespionageandsabotagewereunlimited.Many timesIsawyellow-robedBuddhistpriestsofasectknowntobe violentlyanti-BritishandsuspectedofactingasJapaneseagents, wanderingaroundourplanes.OftenIhadtochaseBunnesenatives outofmyofficeastheystoodinsidethethresholdwatchingme work.WefinallygotauthoritytohireunannedBurmeseguardsbut theywereuseless.EventuallyMajorGeneralBruceScott,commander oftheNorthShanArmywithheadquartersinToungoo,unofficially detailedarmedand trustworthyGurkhaguardstokeeptheBurmese out ofour hair. Lessimportantbut moreannoyingthanthelackofsecuritywere theinevitableruleslaiddownforusbyGroupCaptainManning, whostuckstrictlytotheletterofR.A.F.peacetimeregulations. wereforbiddentoalterthebarracksbysomuchasdisturb- asingleboardorinstallingalightsocketwithoutobtaining wnttenapprovalfromR.A.F.headquartersinRangoon.Nearlythree monthswereconsumedintheinvolvednegotiationsnecessarytoget tobuild-atourownexpense-agunnerybuttforbore- ourP-40machineguns.Nosuchconstructionwasincluded 10 theR.A.F.engineer'smanual,andManningcouldnotunderstand whyI was so concerned over the accuracy of our guns. Throughoutourfive-monthstayatToungoowewereneverin communicationswiththeR.A.F.inRangoonoranywhereelse 10 theOrient.ManningrefusedtogivemeanR.A.F.codebookor acceptA.V.G.codebooksforradiocommunications,forcingusto relyontelegraphstationsoperatedbynativeBurmeseofdoubtful loyaltytotheBritishorapubliclong-distancetelephone.Ioffered tosendourownradioequipmentandpersonneltoRangoonto setupdirectradiocontactwithManning.Againhebluntlyrefused. Duelargelytothe effortsofBrooke-Popham,theR.A.F.inBunna 119 loanedusconsiderablehigh-octaneaviationgasoline,oil,andammu-nitiontofittheBritish.303-calibergunsinmanyofourP-40's.We werealsoloanedanR.A.F.aerialcamera,which washastily installed inaP-40by R.A.F.mechanicsand neverreturned.For nearlya year itprovidedalltheAmericanphotoreconnaissanceinAsia.Brooke-PophamandPulfordwereenthusiasticbackersofthevolunteer projectfromthetimeofourarrivalintheOrient.Earlyinthefall theyplacedhighpriorityonshipmentofaviationgasolinefrom theDutchEastIndiestoRangoon.Asaresultwhenwarcameand supplieswerecut offtherewasamillion-gallonreserveinRangoon. InNovemberBrooke-PophamalsoofferedonesquadronofBuffalo fightersandonesquadronofBlenheimbombers,mannedbyR.A.F. volunteers,toserveundermycommand.Finalnegotiationsforthe transferofthesesquadronsfromSingaporewereunderwaywhen theJapaneseattackhitMalayaandtheBritishneededeveryplan_e theyhadthere.AnotherBritonwhowasextremelyhelpfulwasStr ArchibaldClark-Kerr,thenBritishambassadortoChinaandlater ambassadortotheUnitedStates.Clark-Kerrcutthroughasnarlof Britishand Burmese red tapetopermit theA.V.G.tomoveitsequip-ment inBurmaacrossthebordertoChinawithoutanydelaysfrom customsand local taxcollectors. MonsoonrainsendedinOctober.Butthecooldryseasonfailed to bringitstraditional relaxation.Tensionin Burmamounted steadily witheachnewday,likethetwistingofaturnbuckle,tightening nervesalreadytautandrawwithuncertainty. KyedawAirdromewasonlysixtymilesfromthe Thailand Asearlyas1939Japaneseengineersbuiltachainofairbases _10 Thailand,whichwerearrangedtocatapultasizeableairoffensive whenevertheJapanesechosetooccupythefields.TheThai ment,squeezedforyearsbetweenthegrindingmillstonesofBntish and French imperialism,madeit quiteclearthatJapaneseaidwould be welcomeanytimeit wasforthcoming.Allthatstoodbetweenus andtheThailandfieldswasaloneBritishcivilservant,manninga jungle post near the border, equipped with binoculars and a telephone. Ever sincelateJulyIhad beenhammeringatManningtobolster theBurmeseair-raidwarningnet.HewasafraidtouseBurmese spottersinthejungleareasthatlayalongtheborderbecausethe)' were too anti-British to be trustworthy,and he hadnootherpersonnel available.ManningclaimedthesinglespotterbetweenToungooand the border provided adequate warning facilities.He promisedtosend 120 usanair-raid warning siren forthe field. When it arrived it turned out tobea battered brassship'sbell. TworadarsetsreachedBurmain lateNovemberandweresetup atMoulrneinandRangoon,wheretheycoveredtheapproachesto southernBurmabutgaveusnoprotectionatToungoo.Theseradar stations were linked with the airdromes by civilian long-distance phone lines,mannedbyBurmese whooften tookan hourtoput throughan airraidwarningmessage. It took no special intelligence to know that the situation was rapidly buildinguptotheboilingpointinAsiaduringthefallof1941.It isimpossibletoassembleandequipamajormilitaryexpeditionin completesecrecy.TheJapanesewere neveran exceptiontothisrule. AlloftheirmovesdowntheChinacoastsince1937werepreceded byampleindicationsoftheirgeneralintentions.WhentheUnited slapped the oil embargo on Japan in the summer of 1941, it was evtdenttoallwhohad beenfollowingtheSino-Japanesewar closely thattheJapanese would have tostrikesoonforoilorcrawl back into theirshell.Duringthefalltherewasawealthofevidencethatthe Japanesepreparationsfortheoffensivewereunderway.InChina

ve.terandivisionswere withdrawn to Japanand Formosa and replaced Chinesepuppet troops. The stagingareasofCanton,Haiphong, HamanIsland,andFormosawereteemingwithactivity.Chinese reportedmajornaval movementsdownthe coastfromJapan. DuringNovemberJapaneseZeroswerereportedforthefirsttime ontheFrenchairfieldaroundSaigoninsouthernIndo-China.Total Japaneseaircraft in Indo-China roseduring November from 74to245. Brooke-Pophamreportedtheappearanceofunidentifiedaircraftover MalayaatnightduringthefinalweekofNovember.R.A.F.fighters wereunable to intercept what were certainly Japanesereconnaissance planes.Brooke-Pophamalsosoughttomakeaerialreconnaissanceof CamRanh Bayinsouthern Indo-ChinawhereJapanesenavalactivity wasswellingtosuspiciousproportions.CamRanhBayprovedtobe thebasefromwhichtheJapaneseamphibiousexpeditionsagainst andSiamwerelaunchedafewweekslater.R.A.F Catalina ft.ymgboats at Singapore were tooslow forthejobsoBrooke-Popham requestedGeneralMacArthur todothe jobfromthe Philippineswith aBoeingB-17.MacArthurregretfullyrepliedthathisordersfrom Washingtondidnotpermitsuchamission.It wasnosecretthatthe stagewasbeingsetforadrivetothe DutchEast Indiesasthe mini-mumobjectiveandanaU-outoffensivetodrivetheWesternpowers fromthePacificas themaximumpossibility. 121 IsentoutfirstfighterpatrolsovertheThailandfieldsonOctober 24andkept themunderdailysurveillancefromthenon.Ourfighterst' woulddroneoverThailandattwentythousandfeet,watchingfor dustplumesonthefieldsbelow.Inthedryseasonevenabicycle crossingafieldraisedacloudofdust.Onthefewoccasionsour pilotsspotteddusttheycamedownforaquicklook,buzzingthe fieldsabovethepalmtops.Onmoonlightnightswekeptfighter patrolsaloftduringthecriticalhourswhenthemoonwasbestfor bombing.Frommid-NovemberonIspentthehoursofduskand dawninthecontroltoweronthealert.EacheveningTomGentry and Isat in the control tower smoking apipe, too tense to talk, watch ingthewhiteplumeofagiganticwaterfallcascadingdowntheside ofthemountainsfaracrosstheSittangValleyinthedirectionof Thailand.When it becametoodark toseethe white waterfall against themountainswe climbeddowntosnatchafewhoursof fitfulsleep before beginning the vigil againinthe predawngloomof 4 A.M. Mywatchinthecontroltowerendedat11A.M.onthemorning ofDecember8.SincewewereonthefarsideoftheInternational DateLine our calendarsreadonedayinadvanceof thoseinandtheUnitedStates.AsIwalkedacrossthe field,oneofourradio mendashedacrosstheturfwavingamessagefrantically.Itwasthe newsof PearlHa1bor intercepted fromanAmericanradionews1 herisingtideofthePacificwarhadatlastengulfedtheUmted Statesand overtaken our AmericanVolunteerGroup. r 122 9. MYworstfearsinthirtyyearsofHyingandnearlyadecadeof combatcameduringthefirstweeksaftertheattackonPearlHarbor overthepossibilityofgettingcaughtonthegroundbyaJapanese airassault onthe A.V.G.at Toungoo.This fearhadbeengnawingat meeversincemid-Octoberwhenthevolunteergroupbegantotake shapeasacombatunitandIorderedthefirstaerialreconnaissance overtheJapanese-builtairfieldsinThailand.IknewtheJapanese Werewellinformedontheconditionof mygroup.Ialsoknewthey ~ o u l dhavescantregardfortheneutralityofBurmaiftheycon-SideredtheA.V.G.arealmenacetotheiractivitiesinChina.After PearlHarborIconsidered aJapanese attackonToungoo acertainty. Myonlythought was to meet it with my planes in the air.During my longfightagainsttheJapaneseIconstantlystrovetoputmyselfin the .placeof theenemyaircommandersand diagnosetheirprobable tactics.GenerallymyexperienceprovedIallottedthemtoomuch credit. Nearly halfthe A.V.G.menat ToungoowereNavymenandmany ofthemhadservedat PearlHarbor.Itoohadmyownmemoriesof Hawaiiinthedayswhenthe19thFighterSquadron,whichIcom-manded,wasbasedonFordIslandaspartoftheairdefensesof PearlHarbor.In1925weexperiencedoneoftheJapaneseattack scaresthatperiodicallyswepttheislands.It provedtobeabaseless rumor.However,forthreeweeksIhadthe19thFighterSquadron Warminguptheirplanesinthedarkofearlymorning.\Vctook offbeforethe firststreaks of dawnto rendezvousover Oahu at 10,000 feetwhereit wasalreadyday.Wepatrolledthe approachestoPearl Harboruntillongafter sunrise hittheground.There werenoorders frommysuperiorstostandthisalert,andoursquadrontookalot ofribbingfortheperformance.Iknew,asdoeseveryRegularAnny officer,thatthefirstresponsibilityofaunitcommander-whether 123 heheadsaninfantryplatoonoranairforce-istotakemeasuresto ensure hisownunitagainst tactical surprise by the enemy.The transi tioofrompeaceto warcomeshardforcivilians,but forprofessional soldiersthere is no excuse. If I had been caught with myplanes on the ground,asweretheAirCorpscommandersinthePhilippinesandl in Hawaii, Icould never again have looked my fellow officers intheeye. ThelightnesswithwhichthiscardinalmilitarysinwasexcusedJ bytheAmericanhighcommandwhencommittedbyRegularArmy officershas alwaysseemed to me oneof the moreshockingaspects of thewar.Americanshavebeenpronetoexcusethefailingsoftheir' militaryleaderspartly because of theglowof finalvictoryandpartly becausetheystilllackallthefactsfromwhichtoformanhonest and accurateappraisal-factsthathavebeencarefullywithheldthepublicundertheguiseofcensorshipallegedlynecessarytotarysecurity.ItishightimetheAmericanpeoplemadeit businessto findoutmoreaboutwhythementheypaidfortwenty yearsto provide forthe nationaldefenseweresopitifully unprepared forthecatastrophethatnearlyengulfedusall.Thepenaltyforthe failure to do sowill be anew and evenmoredisastrous Pearl Harbor. TheJapaneseattackonHawaiiconfrontedmewithanabrupt changeinplans.AlthoughmyfightersquadronsatToungoo';ere ready foraction,other phases of the project were ina morestate.ExceptfortheP-40tiressentbyGeneralMacArthurAdmiral Hart fromthe Philippines, we had no spares so vitally needthe tokeeptheplanesrepairedaftercombat.Hudsonbombersfor. SecondAmericanVolunteerGroupwereparkedonLockheed'sall' portatBurbank,California.Theywereimmediatelytakenoverthe AirCorps,andweheardnomoreofthemuntiltheyIll ChinafortheChineseAirForceinthe latesummerof1942.A siZe-ablegroupofbombercrewsalreadyatseaontheirwaytoweredivertedtoAustraliaandinductedintotheU.S.ArmYFirSt shipmentofreplacementfighterpilotsmetthesamefate. EventsofDecember7and8madeitclearthatthefightergroup wast.he salvagefr.omalltheelaborateplansthathadsopamstakinglywovenmWashington.HadIknownthenthated o:erayearthisfightergroupwouldbetheonlyeffectiveau forcetoopposetheJapaneseontheAsiaticmainlandIproba wouldnot haveenteredthecombatwithsuchhighhopes.d ItwasimmediatelyevidentthatbothendsoftheBurrna}\oak wouldhavetobedefendedfromheavyairassaultssincethewrec 124 ingofRangoon,theportofentry,andKunming,themaindivision pointinChina,byairattackwouldofferarelativelycheapand effectivemeansoftighteningtheJapanesefingersonChina'sthroat \\ithoutdrainingthefar-flungenemyoffensivesinthesouthernPa-c ~ c .Rangoonwastheonlyfunnelthroughwhichsuppliescould stillcometoChina.KumningwasthevitalvalveinChinathat con-trolleddistributionofsuppliestotheChinesearmiesinthefield. FromthebeginningtherewasdissensionamongthenewA1Iies. TheGeneralissimoofferedtheBritishsixdivisionsofhisbesttroops andallofhisheavymotorizedartilleryforthedefenseofBmma. TheBritishspurned theoffer,and Chiang'stroopssat idle inYunnan untilMarch1942whenthefallofRangoonfinallyconvincedthe Britishtheyneeded help.The Britishhowevershowednosuchreluc-tanceovertheAmericanVolunteerGroupof theChinese AirForce. TheypressedhardfortransferoftheentiregrouptoRangoonto operateunderR.A.F.command. I opposedthistransfer just asstubbornly asthe British refusedthe helpofChinesegroundtroops.EarlyinthefallIconferredwith GroupCaptainManning over theaerialdefense of Rangoon.Hethtn had no warning net and only asingle runway at Mingaladon, ten miles fromRangoon,onwhichtobasehisfighters.IsuggestedhebuiJd somedispersalfieldstothewestofRangoonandfillinthegap betweenthenewfieldsandtheThailandborderwithanetworkof airspotters'postslinkedbyspecialtelephoneandradio.Withthose facilitiesourfighterswouldhavebeenabletomeettheenemyover Rangoonwithplentyofwarningandaltitudeandbesecurelypro-tectedonthegroundat fieldsbeyondtheJ aps'range.Ihadlearned earlyinthislonggameagainsttheJapanesethatitissuicideto fightairbattleswithoutadequatewarningoftheenemy'sattacks andamainbaseoutofhisrange.Manning,however,regardedhis singlerunwaywithinJapaneserangeasadequateandplacedareli-anceonhiscombinationofradarandlong-distancephonethatwas neverborneoutbyexperience.Manninghadalsocommittedthe R.A.F.underhiscommandtocombattacticsthatIregardedas SUicidal.Byservingunderhiscommand,Iwouldhavelost.myo ~ authorityoverthegroupandforcedmypilotstoaccepth1sstup1d orders.Allduringtheperiodwewerenegotiatingfortransferofall ora part oftheA.V.G.toRangoon,Manningrefusedtoallowmeto enterhisfighter-controlroomorbecomefamiliarwithanyofthe facilitiesthatweweresupposedtousejointlyintheairdefenseof Rangoon. 125 We finallyworkedout an agreement,satisfactorytoboththeGen eralissimoandtheBritish,wherebyonesquadronoftheA.V.G wouldassisttheR.A.F.inthedefenseofRangoonwiththeother twosquadronstobestationedatKunming,theChinaendofthe BurmaRoad,wherewehadadequatewarningnetanddispersal fields.TheRangoonsquadronremainedundermydirectcommand subjectonlytooperationalcontrolbytheseniorR.A.F.officerin Burma.InthiswaytheAmericanpilotsremainedfreetousetheir owntacticswhilecomingunderstrategicdirectionoftheR.A.F. Manningagreedtoprovidehousing,transportation,food,andcom municationsfortheAmericansquadronatRangoon.Thishefaued to do. The day after PearlHarbor(December9by our calendar)we had halfadozenfalsealerts.Witheachnewclangofthebrasswarning bell,TomTrumble,mysecretary,grabbedhisrifleandtinhatand dashedfortheslittrencheswhileIslungonmybinoculars trottedtothe controltower.On December10 Thailand "surrendered totheJapanese,andenemytroops,ships,andplanespouredinto BangkoktoestablishabasefortheassaultonBurmaandMalaya. Isent ErikShillingonaphoto-reconnaissancemissionover Bangk?k inaspecialstripped-downP-40equippedwithanR.A.F.aerial camera.Thisimprovisedphotoplanewasabout18milesper fasterand could climb3,000feethigherthantheaverageP-40,but It was completely outclassed by the speedy Japanese high-altitudeplanes that continued to do theirworkunmolested overAsiauntilthe firstLockheedLightnings( P-38)arrivedinChinainthe summer of 194'3.EscortedbyEdRectorofMarshal,NorthCarolina,andBert Christmanof Fort Collins,Colorado,inregularP-40's,Shilling photo-graphed the docksandairfields of Bangkok from26,000feet. WhenIsawhispictures,Iexploded.DocksalongtheRiverwerejammedwithenemytransportsdisgorgingtroopssupplies.DonMaungairdromeoutsidethecitywaspackedWI 1 Japaneseaircraft,parkedwing tiptowingtipandawaitingdispersa tothechainofadvancedbasesclosertotheBurmaborder.A dozen bomberscouldhavewreckedtheJapaneseairoffensiveintwenty minutes. This was but one of the many times during the war when a kingdolll waslostforwant of afew planes. 11 . The Squadronby ArvidOlson,ofHo[2 wood,California,movedtoMmgaladonairdromeonDecernber tojointheR.A.F.inthedefenseofRangoon.AtToungooween' 126 couragedeverypossiblemovement rumorabout the restof thegroup toconfusetheBurmesespieswhilewetiedupourlooseendspre-paratorytoestablishinganewbaseatKunming.Therewerestill twenty-fivepilotsnot sufficiently trained to be turned looseincombat andadozenP-40'sunderrepairatToungoo,butwhentheradio crackledfromKunmingthattheJapanesewerebombingthecity onDecember18,it wasapparent that thetimeto movehad come. Thegroupwassoorganizedthat everything essentialto immediate combatoperationscouldbeairborne.Permanentbasepersonneland suppliesleftToungoobytruckconvoyuptheBurmaRoad.Three C.N.A.C.transportsswoopeddownonToungooontheafternoonof theeighteenthandwhiskedme,mycombatstaff,andtheoxygen, ammunition,andsparepartsweneededforfightingtoKunming r beforedawnthenextday. TheFirstandSecondSquadronsflewfromToungootoKunming ontheafternoonoftheeighteenthwitharefuelingstopatLashio. At ToungootheFirst Squadroncircled on patrolcoveringtheSecond Squadron'stake-off,andatKunmingtheroleswerereversedasthe Secondstayed in the air until the First Squadron had landed, refueled, andwasreadyforcombatagainat Kunming. By dawn onthe nineteenth we hadthirty-fourP-40'sreadyto fight atKunmingwithafighter-controlheadquartershookedintothe !unnan warningnet and theChinesecoderoomsthatweremonitor-mgJapanese operationalradiofrequenciesanddecodingenemymes-sages.Forthefirsttimesincemid-OctoberIbreathedeasier. Itwasthiskindoflightningmobilitythat wasnecessaryto realize thefullpotentialofairpower.ToachieveitmeantthatIwoulc.l havetooperateonaskeletonizedbasiswithairmendoubling Ill grounddutiesandafewkeymendoingtheworkofanentire staff.ItmeantthatIcouldneveraffordtheexcessstaffpersonnel requiredbymoreorthodoxmilitaryorganizations. It Wasthisabilitytoshiftmy combatoperationssixhundredand fiftymilesin an afternoonand athousandmiles in twenty-fourhours thatkepttheJapaneseoffbalanceforfourbloodyyearsandpre-ventedthemfromlandinuacounterpunchwiththeirnumerically SUperiorstrengththatmighteasilyhaveputmyalwaysmeager forcesout of business. hadlittlestrainonourpatienceforthefirstpay-offonthese tactics.December19passedquietlywiththreeP-40reconnaissance patrolsoversouthernYunnanbutnosignoflifefromtheenemy. At9:45A.M.onthetwentiethmyspecialphonefromtheChinese 127 coderoomrang.It wasColonelWongShuMing,commanderofthe1 ChineseFifthAirForceandChinesechiefofstafffortheA. \'.G His messagesaid,"Ten JapanesebomberscrossedtheYunnanhordes at Laokay heading northwest." FromthenonthebattleunfoldedoverYunnanasithaddone a I hundred times before in my head. Reports filteredin fromthe Yunnan net astheenemy bomberspenetrated deeperintoChina. "Heavy engine noise at stationX-10." "UnknownsoverheadatstationP-8." "Noiseof manyabovecloudsat stationC-23." Position reports recorded on our fighter-control board added up to a coursedesignedto bringtheenemy bomberstoabout fiftyeast of Kunming, fromwhich point they would probably beginthe crrchn. andfeintingtacticsdesigned toconfusethewarningnetbeforethell finaldash to the target. IorderedtheSecondSquadrontomaketheinterception.Ja:l Newkirk,ofScarsdale,NewYork,ledonefour-planeelementIll searchofthe bomberswhileJimHoward,of St.Louis,sonofformer medicalmissionariesinChina,ledanotherfour-planeformationon defensive patrol aboveKunming.Sixte.enplanes ofthe FirstcommandedbyRobertSandell,ofSanAntonio,Texas,wereheld Ill reserveinthestand-byareawest of Kunming,readytojointhe fray at the decisivemoment.the Ifiredared flaresendingtheSecondand First Squadrons into airanddrove with myexecutiveofficer,HarveyGreenlaw,and preter,ColonelHsu,tothegreattimberedclaypyramidloo!lllll: abovethegrassymoundsofaChinesegraveyardonagentleoverlookingthefield.Thiswasourcombat-operations . shelter t k aduplicateset ofradioandphonecommunications.Ins1dethe dankinteriorwestudiedtheplottingboardbythelightof heldbyGreenlawwhileHsutookphonereportsfromthe?hind net.Outside,thewinterairoftheKunmingplateauwascnsp clear.ScatteredpuffballcloudsfloatedlazilyabovethecityatIO,.a feet.\Veatherreportstothesouth indicatedasolidovercast brushin= the mountainpeaks.thaD This wasthemom.entIhadbeenawaitingfor bv 2 fouryears-AmcncanptlotsmAmericanfighterplanesf 'tbe Chinesegroundwarningnetabouttotackleaformation ificr ImperialJapaneseAirForce,whichwasthensweepingtheskiesvictoriouseverywhere.IfeltthatthefateofChinawasned in the P-40cockpitsthroughthewinteryskyoverYunnan.Iyearn 128 heartilytobe ten yearsyounger and crouched in acockpitinstead of a dugout,tastingthestalerubberofanoxygenmaskandpeering aheadintolimitlessspacethrough thecherry-red ringsofagunsight. Suddenlyvoicesbrokethroughthecracklingradiostatic. '"Therethey are." "No,no,they can't be Japs." "Lookat thoseredballs." .. Let'sget'em." Thenmaddeningsilence.IorderedSandell'sreservesquadronto diveto!liang about thirty milessoutheast of Kunming alongthe Japs' lineofprobable approach.There wasnothingmoreontheradio.The Chinesenetreportedthebombershadreversedcourseandwere headingbacktowardIndo-China.Soundsofgunfirewereheard, andtheheavyfallofJapanesebombsinthemountainsnear!liang wasreported. There was nothing todo but return to the field and wait. Chinesewerealreadystreamingbacktothecityfromtheirrefuge amongthegravemounds,incredulousthatnobombshadfalJen. patroloverKunmingcamedown.They hadseennothing. flightreturned,sheepishandchagrinedoverabadcase of huckfeverontheir firstcontact withthe enemy.They had sighted Japformationoftengraytwin-enginedbombersaboutthirty lllllessoutheast of Kunming,but forafewincreduloussecondscould hardlybelievethebomberswerereal1yJaps.Thebombersjettisoned theirbombs,puttheirnosesdownforspeed,andwheeledback toward Indo-China. By the time Newkirk's flight recovered and opened fire,thebombershadtoobigalead-toobigthatisforeverybody EdRector.ThelasttheotherpilotssawofRectorhewas stillchasingtheJapsat fullthrottle. FinallySandell'ssquadroncamestragglingin.Fromthewhistling ofthe wind in their open gun barrels and the slowrollsasthey buzzed thefield,weknewtheyhadbeeninafight.Theyhadsightedthe Japformationin fullretreatover!liangaboutthirtymilessoutheast

Kunming,scuttlingalongontopofasolidovercastwithRector stillinpursuit. theP-40'sdive