Mesopotamia Cradle of Civilization Tigris and Euphrates River Valley.
WATER RESOURCES ALLOCATION AND CONFLICTS: The case of the Euphrates and the Tigris Mehmet...
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Transcript of WATER RESOURCES ALLOCATION AND CONFLICTS: The case of the Euphrates and the Tigris Mehmet...
WATER RESOURCES ALLOCATION AND CONFLICTS:WATER RESOURCES ALLOCATION AND CONFLICTS:
The case of the Euphrates and the TigrisThe case of the Euphrates and the Tigris
Mehmet Kucukmehmetoglu
Gebze Institute of Technology
Turkey
Jean Michel Guldmann
The Ohio State University
U.S.A.
INTRODUCTIONINTRODUCTION
History: Conflicts over the control of fertile and irrigable agricultural lands.
Today: Conflicts over the control of scarce water resources.
The Southeast Anatolia Development Project (GAP). Ethnicity & Religion: Turks, Arabs, Kurds, Sunnis, and
Shiites. High population growth rates: Doubling over 20 years. Inelastic water supply.
LITERATURELITERATURE REVIEW REVIEW Applications of Cooperative GamesApplications of Cooperative Games
Dinar & Wolf (1994)– Introduction of an international WM (Water Market)– Utilization of game theory and optimization– Incorporation of political feasibility analyses
Rogers (1969) – The Ganges – Game theory (non-zero sum games)
Rogers (1993) – ‘Reasonable and Equitable’ sharing – Pareto-Admissibility – Game theory
Application of Spatial Equilibrium Models Application of Spatial Equilibrium Models
to Water Allocation Problemsto Water Allocation Problems Flinn & Guise (1970)
First application of spatial price equilibrium model Hypothetical river basin and water allocation
Vaux & Howitt (1984) Average cost pricing v.s. marginal cost pricing Water Market in California Results 1) Reduces the need for large supply-augmenting
conveyance facilities 2) Provides welfare gains
Booker & Young (1994) Colorado River Institutional Model (CRIM) Water market for efficiency
The Euphrates and Tigris River Basin The Euphrates and Tigris River Basin Model (ETRBM)Model (ETRBM)
Goal: Development of a methodology and its application
Content:Benchmark ModelApplication of cooperative game theory
concepts to define sustainable benefits and water resources allocations
Model AssumptionsModel Assumptions Same agricultural productivity throughout the region; Environmental problems are ignored (e.g., salinization, low BOD); Same energy prices throughout the region; Water unit values in urban and agricultural areas do not vary
throughout the region; In Iraq and Syria, only cities exceeding 100,000 are incorporated; Groundwater resources are ignored due to lack of spatial information; Constant water transportation unit costs throughout the region; The optimization model maximizes the total net benefits, rather than
the benefits of any country or of any sub-portion(s) of the basin; Supply-to-supply internodal link unit costs are assumed to be the same
as agricultural transport unit costs between supply and demand nodes; Water withdrawals per acre and per person are constrained by upper
limits, to prevent excessive withdrawals.
Spatial Structure of the ETRBMSpatial Structure of the ETRBM
45 Supply Nodes (j) • Turkey has 15 supply nodes • Syria has 7 supply nodes • Iraq has 23 supply nodes63 Demand Nodes (i)• Turkey has total of 24 demand nodes• Syria has 16 demand nodes• Iraq has 23 demand nodesThree Interbasin LinksAll links from the Tigris to the Euphrates• from j=21 to j=12: Turkey to Syria • from j=28 to j=14: In Iraq • from j=31 to j=16: In Iraq
Mathematical Structure of the ETRBMMathematical Structure of the ETRBM
Optimization Technique: Linear Programming Objective function (Maximize)
– Agricultural benefits – Urban benefits– Energy benefits– Delivery costs to urban and agricultural uses – Transshipment costs over the links
Constraints (Subject to)– Node balance constraints– Feasibility constraints (Supply to Supply & Supply to Demand)– Minimum & maximum withdrawal constraints– Equalities
Objective FunctionObjective Function
)()()( 12,2112,2116,3116,3114,2814,28
, ,
,, ,
,, ,
DSSCTSSPQDSSCTSSPQDSSCTSSPQ
PQEGEPR
URBTCDSDWWTVALUR
AGRTCDSDWWTVALAGNEB
lj ljj
ijurbj ijurb i
ijagrj ijagr i
Sets:
i: demand nodes (1 to 63)
j & l: supply nodes (1 to 45)
agr: set of agricultural demand nodes
urb: set of urban demand nodes
Constraints: Node BalanceConstraints: Node Balance
l jlji iji
jji ji
PQTFWTRFR
RELQW
,,
,
i ijij WTRFRTRFN ,
ConstraintsConstraints
j iji WWT ,
MAXAGRSIZEWTMINAGRSIZE iii
MAXURBSIZEWTMINURBSIZE iii
l jlj QPQ ,
ljlj FTRNSSMPQ ,,
ijij FTRNSDMW ,,
Data and Parameter EstimatesData and Parameter Estimates
Supply Data– Tributary Flows– Return Flows– Evaporation
Demand Data– Agriculture & Urban Use
VALAG & VALUR MINAGR & MAXAGR MINURB & MAXURB
– Water Conveyance Cost and Energy Price Data Transportation Costs Energy
General Summary of the Benchmark SolutionGeneral Summary of the Benchmark Solution Energy benefits
constitute nearly 50% of overall returns;
Return flows make up almost 50% of the water input from tributaries, and are available for reuse;
Total water withdrawal is very close to the total tributary flow input, whereas water released to the Gulf makes up to 35% of the total tributary inflow.
Solution
Net system benefit (NEB), 2,407,731,200$
Water use benefits (TECBW) 2,091,003,000$
Energy generation benefits (TECBE), 1,175,087,800$
Transportation costs for urban uses (TTCURB) 32,145,138$
Transportation costs for agricultural uses (TTCAGR ) 826,214,547$
Interbasin transfer cost (TTRSS ) 0$
Water release to the Gulf (GULF) 28,225
Total water withdrawal (TWT) 78,528
Total return flow (FRET) 42,582
Total in-out balance (TOTBAL) 0
Total agricultural water withdrawal (TWAGR) 77,505
Total urban water withdrawal (TWURB) 1,022
System Parameters
Total tributary flows (TFT) 81,920
Total reserve evaporation (RELT) 17,750
Minimum required total water withdrawal for agriculture (TWAGRMIN) 0
Maximum total water withdrawal for agriculture (TWAGRMAX) 122,519.12 Minimum required total water withdrawal for urban use (TWURBMIN) 0Maximum total water withdrawal for urban use (TWURBMAX). 1,880.95
Net benefits of Turkey and Iraq are almost the same – Turkey obtains most of her benefits from energy generation (75%)– Iraq obtains hers from agriculture (90%)– Syria obtains 56% from water withdrawals and 44% from energy generation
Energy generation potential at the upstream nodes Agricultural uses potential at the downstream nodes
– Turkey has the lowest transport cost– Iraq the highest transport cost
Total urban transportation costs constitute an insignificant share of the total transportation costs in the whole system and in each county
Summary
Economic Benefits 3,266,090,800$ 1,161,095,600$ 294,048,029$ 1,810,947,300$ Transport Costs 858,359,685$ 144,065,122$ 60,237,792$ 654,056,771$ Net Economic Benefits 2,407,731,200$ 1,017,030,400$ 233,810,237$ 1,156,890,500$ Economic Benefits / Transport Costs 3.81 8.06 4.88 2.77
Percent DistributionWithdrawal 64.0% 24.6% 56.3% 90.5%Energy 36.0% 75.4% 43.7% 9.5%Urban Withdrawal 4.7% 3.0% 2.9% 6.1%Agricultural Withdrawal 59.3% 21.6% 53.3% 84.5%
Transport CostsUrban Withdrawal 3.7% 7.6% 4.7% 2.8%Agricultural Withdrawal 96.3% 92.4% 95.3% 97.2%Link Transshipment 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0%
Total Turkey Syria Iraq
Benefit Allocation by Country and UseBenefit Allocation by Country and Use
Water Resources Allocation by Country, Basin, and UseWater Resources Allocation by Country, Basin, and Use
The highest withdrawal (61,934 Mm3) in Iraq Iraq obtains its major benefits from agriculture water withdrawal
Turkey (with nearly 2/3 of Iraqi land) withdraws only 1/6 of Iraqi withdrawal (10,263 Mm3)
Urban withdrawals (1,022 Mm3) Agricultural withdrawal (77,505 Mm3).
Summary
Euphrates Urban 180 0.2% 45 0.1% 58 0.1% 78 0.1%Tigris Urban 843 1.1% 190 0.2% - - 652 0.8%Euphrates Agriculture 35,475 45.2% 3,402 4.3% 6,273 8.0% 25,800 32.9%Tigris Agriculture 42,030 53.5% 6,626 8.4% - - 35,405 45.1%
BasinEuphrates Total 35,655 45.4% 3,447 4.4% 6,331 8.1% 25,878 33.0%Tigris Total 42,873 54.6% 6,816 8.7% - - 36,057 45.9%
UseUrban Total 1,022 1.3% 235 0.3% 58 0.1% 730 0.9%Agriculture Total 77,505 98.7% 10,028 12.8% 6,273 8.0% 61,205 77.9%
OverallTotal Withdrwals 78,528 100.0% 10,263 13.1% 6,331 8.1% 61,934 78.9%
Total Turkey Syria Iraq
COOPERATION AND CONFLICT IN WATER COOPERATION AND CONFLICT IN WATER RESOURCES ALLOCATION: RESOURCES ALLOCATION:
Game – Theoretic AnalysesGame – Theoretic Analysesa. Independent Action by Individual CountriesStep 1
Step 2
Step 3
Diagram 1 Diagram 2 Diagram 3
b. Two-Country CoalitionsStep 1 Step 1 Step V=T+1
Step T=V+1
Step 2 Step 2
Diagram 1 Diagram 2 Diagram 3
c. Grand Coalition
Step 1
Diagram 1
LEGEND
Return Flows
Water Releases
Turkey
Syria
Iraq
T
S
I
T
S
I
TS
I
T
SI
T
S I
T
S
I
T T
SEnergy Prices (EPR) EPR = $0 EPR = $25 EPR = $100 Agricultural Productivity (VALAG) Weights Water Resources
(TTF=Bm3) Turkey: 1.1 Syria: 1.0 Iraq: 0.9 59.8 Minimum A11 A12 A13 81.9 Average A21 A22 A23 A 92.6 Maximum A31 A32 A33
Agricultural Productivity (VALAG) Weights Water Resources (TTF=Bm3) Turkey: 1.0 Syria: 1.0 Iraq: 1.0
59.8 Minimum B11 B12 B13 81.9 Average B21 B22 B23 B 92.6 Maximum B31 B32 B33
Agricultural Productivity (VALAG) Weights Water Resources (TTF=Bm3) Turkey: 0.9 Syria: 1.0 Iraq: 1.1
59.8 Minimum C11 C12 C13 81.9 Average C21 C22 C23 C 92.6 Maximum C31 C32 C33
Objective FunctionsObjective Functions
lst lstst
ijtuj ijtu i
ijtaj ijta i
PQEGEPR
URBTCDSDWWTVALUR
AGRTCDSDWWTVALAGNEBt
, ,
,, ,
,, ,
)( 12,2112,21
, ,
,, ,
,, ,
DSSCTSSPQ
PQEGEPR
URBTCDSDWWTVALUR
AGRTCDSDWWTVALAGNEBs
lss lssss
ijsuj ijsu i
ijsaj ijsa i
)()( 16,3116,3114,2814,28
, ,
,, ,
,, ,
DSSCTSSPQDSSCTSSPQ
PQEGEPR
URBTCDSDWWTVALUR
AGRTCDSDWWTVALAGNEBi
lsi lsisi
ijiuj ijiu i
ijiaj ijia i
NEBiNEBsNEBtNEBtsi
NEBiNEBsNEBsi
NEBsTINEBsNEBsNEBtNEBti &
NEBiTSNEBiNEBsNEBtNEBts &
Individual Country Objectives
Coalition Objectives
Grand Coalition Objective (Equivalent of Objective in the Benchmark Model)
Core ConditionsCore Conditions
min),min( NEBtNEBtSINEBtX t
min,min NEBsNEBsTINEBsX s
min,min NEBiNEBiTSNEBiX i
NEBtsXX st
NEBtiXX it
NEBsiXX is
NEBtsiXXX ist
Models for Core and Subsidy DeterminationModels for Core and Subsidy Determination
Maximize
Subject to
ZF
min),min( NEBtNEBtSINEBtX t
min,min NEBsNEBsTINEBsX s
min,min NEBiNEBiTSNEBiX i
NEBtsXX st
NEBtiXX it
NEBsiXX is
NEBtsiZXXX ist
Shapley Allocation (e.g., Iraq)Shapley Allocation (e.g., Iraq)
Iraq joining the “empty” coalition
Iraq joining either the Turkey or Syria coalition
Iraq joining the Turkey-Syria coalition
minNEBiIBi
minNEBtNEBtiIB ti
minNEBsNEBsiIB si
minNEBtsNEBtsiIB tsi
Core Analysis SummaryCore Analysis Summary
Differences Between Shapley, Core, and Minimum BenefitsDifferences Between Shapley, Core, and Minimum Benefits
FURTHER RESEARCHFURTHER RESEARCH Environmental issues
– Gulf area preservation (intrusion), salinization, drainage Utilization of nonlinear objective functions Incorporation of groundwater resources Multi-period river basin analyses
– Utilization of large reservoirs More details for the demand nodes (smaller size) Projections for the future demands Water transfers to the other countries
– From where to where?– Impacts to the system
Evaluation of impacts of important projects and government subsidies– e.g., Urfa Tunnel