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Food SecurityThe Science, Sociology and Economicsof Food Production and Access to Food ISSN 1876-4517 Food Sec.DOI 10.1007/s12571-012-0224-x

Water allocation rules in Afghanistan forimproved food security

Frank A. Ward, Saud A. Amer &Fahimullah Ziaee

ORIGINAL PAPER

Water allocation rules in Afghanistan for improvedfood security

Frank A. Ward & Saud A. Amer & Fahimullah Ziaee

Received: 17 February 2012 /Accepted: 28 October 2012# Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht and International Society for Plant Pathology 2012

Abstract In many arid countries, rules for the allocation ofirrigation water when shortages occur are poorly defined.These weaknesses present a critical constraint to food secu-rity and can be a major cause of poverty and hunger. Thesearch for flexible rules for the allocation of irrigation wateris especially important in dry regions of the developingworld where drought and climate change compound thechallenges faced by farmers, extension advisers, water man-agers and governments. Afghanistan is one country in whichinflexible arrangements for allocating irrigation water whendrought occurs continue to undermine its food security. Thispaper develops and applies an empirical framework to eval-uate several arrangements for the allocation of irrigationwater when shortages occur. The intent of the analysis isto identify a water allocation system for sharing shortagesthat minimizes the loss in economic benefits and food secu-rity by efficiently sharing water supplies when the inevitabledrought occurs. An integrated decision framework for waterresources is developed that unifies crop, water, and farmdata. Several water allocation rules that could increase the

flexibility of irrigated agriculture in dealing with watershortages are analyzed for their impacts on farm profit-ability and food security. Findings show that a propor-tional sharing of water shortages, in which each canalbears an equal proportion of overall shortages, is themost flexible rule among those analyzed for limitingthreats to food security and farm income. This watersharing arrangement is also seen as fair in many culturesand is simple to administer. In the developing world, thedesign and practical implementation of flexible rules foradapting to periodic water supply changes are importantas water shortages become more pronounced in the faceof droughts and climate variability. The results provide aframework for identifying, designing, and implementingwater allocation rules for food security in the developingworld’s irrigated areas.

Keywords Food security . Irrigation .Water rights . Riverbasins . Afghanistan

Introduction

Recent years have witnessed growing interest in the use ofintegrated water resources management (IWRM) as an ap-proach to guide policies that promote food security in thedeveloping world’s dry areas (e.g., Gupta and van der Zaag2008). Interest has been stimulated by growing evidence ofclimate change accompanied by increased variability in watersupply around the world. A related challenge is the need toensure food security, meet water demands for multiple usesand sustain key ecological assets for growing populations.Despite the widely recognized potential offered by integratinghydrology, economics and institutions, only recently has re-search started to address some of the challenges faced bypractical application of IWRM to guide the design of foodpolicies. IWRM plays an important role in informing policy

Support by these organizations is gratefully acknowledged:• New Mexico Agricultural Experiment Station• US Geological Survey• UNESCO-IHE Institute for Water Education, the Netherlands

F. A. Ward (*)Department of Agricultural Economics and Agricultural Business,New Mexico State University,Las Cruces, NM, USAe-mail: [email protected]

S. A. AmerUS Geological Survey,12201 Sunrise Valley Dr.,Reston, VA 20192, USAe-mail: [email protected]

F. ZiaeeMinistry of Agriculture, Irrigation, and Livestock,Kabul, Afghanistane-mail: [email protected]

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tradeoffs by keeping track of all sources and uses of water aswater supplies move from the headwaters to downstreamareas where the water is used for irrigation. IWRM is recog-nized as the best practice method to account for the interde-pendence of water use and food production in large systems ofirrigated regions in a watershed (Batchelor 1999).

Several studies have examined IWRM approaches foraddressing flexibility in water management. Jewitt (2002)described how IWRM principles could be applied to im-prove ecosystem functions in South Africa and Scott et al.(2003) showed how use of the IWRM framework couldbetter sustain aquifer dependent lives in Jordan. Severalchallenges were described by Biswas (2004) for implement-ing IWRM to inform the development of more flexible rulesfor water allocation for a number of developing countries.Mulwafu and Msosa (2005) documented uses of IWRM tocomprehensively tackle poverty in Malawi by rehabilitatingwater facilities, improving water supply capacity and pro-moting community-based management. Van der Zaag(2005) showed how the IWRM framework could help watermanagers in South Africa. Another application of IWRMwas described by Yates et al. (2005) who demonstrated itsuse through optimization modeling to support the design ofprograms for dealing with climate change. Castelletti andSoncini-Sessa (2006) described the use of IWRM to addressmanagement and institutional challenges for a water systemshared by Italy and Switzerland, and Lamberts (2006) pre-sented an IWRM framework for improving the performanceof key ecological assets in the Mekong River Basin. Gov-ernance structures for watersheds in California and Francecould be improved by IWRM, according to Davis (2007)and Fang et al. (2007) who showed how IWRM couldenhance water management in northwest China by the dis-covery of cost effective ways to conserve water and promotesustainable development. Murad et al. (2007) used theIWRM framework in the United Arab Emirates to addressproblems of salinity, evaporation and groundwater overdraftto promote the economic development of a country heavilyconstrained by scarcity of freshwater supplies. Harou et al.(2009) presented a state-of-the art review of the developmentand use of hydroeconomic models to support implementationof IWRM through better use of existing water supplies.

Batchelor (1999) discussed the extent to which IWRMprinciples could be used to find irrigation programs forraising water productivity at both farm and catchmentscales. Yang et al. (2003) found that clearly defined andlegally enforceable water rights and responsibilities for wa-ter managers and farmers can contribute to a more produc-tive irrigated agriculture. In an analysis of the Ruaha Riverin Tanzania, Lankford et al. (2004) discovered that imple-mentation of IWRM required better informed policy advicein order to draw policy-makers into scientifically informeddecision-making.

The journal Food Security has published a series ofrecent papers describing the kinds of irrigation managementimprovements needed to support growing food securityneeds in several parts of the world. Mu and Khan (2009)developed a decision support tool to conduct stochasticanalysis on future water availability and water demand tobetter address food security challenges in China. Waddingtonet al. (2010) identified poor management of irrigation wateras an important production constraint for six major foodcrops in 13 farming systems where there are high pov-erty rates in Sub-Saharan Africa, South Asia and EastAsia. Li et al (2011) identified the importance of drought andwater-related shortages compared with other constraints thatlimit production of wheat, rice, sorghum, and chickpea in fiveSouth Asian farming systems. The impact of climate changeon rice production in the lower Mekong Basin was examinedby Mainuddin et al (2011), who evaluated some widely usedadaptation options, including better irrigation management,and analyzed their implications for overall food security by2050. Better management of irrigation water was shown to bean important target area for adapting to shortages in the futurewater supply.

Huang et al (2009, 2010) examined the potential forwater institutional reform in China through better under-standing of emerging water institutions. Using survey datafrom northern China, they found that water managers need-ed increased incentives to manage their villages efficientlyin order to raise the productivity of regional irrigated agri-culture. The question of how to match water programs andpolicies to the needs of the world’s poor irrigation farmerswas identified by Namara et al (2010) as a difficult chal-lenge and one that required policy reforms. Their researchexamined an array of promising pathways through whichmanagement of agricultural water and policies could sustainreductions in poverty. Turral et al. (2010) examined theimplications of climate change on irrigation through impactson hydrology and water supply. The authors concluded thatemerging programs will require constant adaptation to cul-ture, climate, and economic forces. Despite the significantachievements described above, many of these articles rec-ognized the need to develop more flexible rules for theallocation of irrigation water. Allocation rules that allow forflexibility in times of drought will be needed to allow foradaption to climate variability and to sustain food securityand rural livelihoods in the developing world’s dry regions.

Irrigation in Afghanistan

Since the late 1970s, few countries have had a greater need forincreased flexibility in rules for the allocation of irrigationwater than Afghanistan. Afghanistan is home to 25 millionpeople (Pauli 2008; UN 2009) three quarters of whom live inrural areas (CSO 2008). Here, the high spatial and temporal

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variability in water supply, limited capacity of reservoir stor-age and poorly developed rules for the allocation of watercontinue to cause numerous hardships.

A 2010 FAO report (FAO 2010) estimated several indi-cators of weak food security in Afghanistan. The datashowed 32.8 % and 25.7 % of children under the age of5 who were underweight or who had died, respectively and,of all children, 59 % were under normal height for their ageand 8.9 % were under normal weight for their age. There-fore, even if these percentages are static or improving, in thecontext of rapidly rising population levels, absolute numbersmay be rising, indicating increased real suffering in thecountry over time. These hardships undermine rural live-lihoods, food security, and net incomes. The main reason fortaking land out of production is unreliable and/or inadequatewater supplies (Pauli 2008). Since 2000, several droughtshave occurred that have caused considerable damage toirrigated agriculture, undermined already weak food securi-ty and contributed to out-migration. Recent data estimateabout 36 % of irrigated systems developed in Afghanistanno longer function (FAO 2010).

Agriculture employs four-fifths of the Afghan populationand contributes to more than half of its gross domesticproduct. Improving the performance of Afghanistan’s irri-gated agriculture is essential to food security, rural live-lihoods and to a future stable and peaceful society (Lautzeet al. 2002; Asian Development Bank 2004; Ahmad andWasiq 2004). The Afghan agricultural community faces anumber of challenges related to irrigation for which thepractical application of IWRM has the potential to improvelives and livelihoods by addressing weak food security andlow farm net incomes (Mahmoodi 2008).

Food security in Afghanistan

Wheat is the main cereal crop for food consumption andsecurity in Afghanistan (USAID 2007). In 2002, wheat wasplanted on 2.4 million ha, about two-thirds of the nation’stotal cultivated area. Malnutrition threats to Afghanistan’srural population point to the importance of finding andimplementing more flexible rules for the allocation of irri-gation water. Large fluctuations in annual and seasonalstream flows (Shobair 2001; Shobair and Alim 2004) alongwith poorly developed rules for assigning and enforcingproperty rights in water have created economic and foodsecurity risks for many Afghan farmers (Maletta 2004,2006, 2007), especially those who live in downstream areas.

A major challenge facing Afghan water managers is theneed for good hydrologic, economic, agronomic and insti-tutional data that describe the country’s irrigated agriculture.In addition, the capacity to assemble relevant data into aframework that connects economics, crop production andfood security has been hampered by years of lost, damaged

or stolen hydrometric data networks, damaged irrigationinfrastructure, periodic drought and ongoing military con-flict. The lack of a unified analytical framework for discov-ering water allocation rules for adapting to water supplyshortages that are more flexible has left the region at con-siderable risk of food insecurity. It also has contributed tothe weak capacity of irrigated agriculture to provide a livingwage to the high percentage of Afghans who make theirliving in production agriculture.

In light of the unmet needs and gaps described above, thecontribution of this analysis is to create, describe and applya framework that enables water managers and water stake-holders to improve food security and raise farm net incomeswhen irrigated agriculture is faced with large, unexpected,and periodic changes in water supplies. Its goal is to conductan analysis of water allocation rules which are economicallyefficient and that support food security and farm livelihoodsin an environment where water supplies are scarce andfluctuate. It addresses the important and relevant issue ofhow water governance and allocation rules can be mademore flexible in adapting to water shortages. Moreover,Central Asia is a region for which little peer reviewedpublished research currently exists to address the need forbetter food security at the basin scale. In order to achieve itsgoal, this paper has four objectives relating to analysis ofwater allocation rules for irrigated agriculture in the BalkhBasin, Afghanistan.

& Assemble a historical database on water supply andwater demand that characterizes the hydrology, agrono-my, economics, and institutions governing irrigatedagriculture.

& Integrate these data into a framework that describesirrigated land and water use behavior at the basin scaleso that water managers, water administrators, and farm-ers can understand what influences profitability andfood-security in irrigated agriculture.

& Evaluate impacts on farm profitability and food securityassociated with selected water sharing rules for adaptingto water shortages.

& Identify those water allocation rules that could improvethe flexibility by which irrigated agriculture could betteradapt to periodic water shortages.

Materials and methods

Balkh Province is located in the northern part of Afghani-stan. Nearly half the province is mountainous. With a totalpopulation of about 1.12 million, it has 15 districts, with itscapital at Mazar-Sharif, a commercial and financial center ofabout 375,000 (Ministry for Rural Rehabilitation and De-velopment 2007). The Balkh River Basin (referred to

Water allocation rules in Afghanistan for improved food security


hereafter as the Basin) is located in northwest Afghanistan.The Balkh River (referred to as the River) and the canals fedby its supplies lie in the Jowzjan, Balkh, Samangan andBamian provinces (Fig. 1). The River supplies irrigationwater to 14 canals (Fig. 2). Each canal supplies water to alarge number of individual farmers within the Basin. Thecommunity served by each canal has a long history ofcustomary property rights in water, based on the paikalmeasurement system. The paikal is an Afghan land-waterunit equal to an average of about 80 ha of irrigated land andsufficient water needed to support its irrigation. A quantityof land equal to 80 ha irrigated per paikal of water is anestimated average under full water supply conditions (Beck2010a, b, p. 11). However, in Afghanistan, the paikal hasconsiderable variability. That variability occurs over loca-tions, water years and months within the irrigation season.

Throughout most of Afghanistan, the mirab is responsi-ble for allocating water within each canal’s service area toindividual farmers. The mirab system functions, but hasneither the support nor the authority of higher level institu-tions, such as village and provincial councils or national

government, to allocate water among canals that competefor the River’s supplies. In Afghanistan, the mirab is part ofan ancient water management system revolving aroundfarmer-elected water masters (mirabs) who live and workin the community. The mirab system, which generallyextends beyond ethnic, religious and political boundaries,has lasted for millenia. While much social stress has oc-curred as a result of military conflict since the 1970s, themirab system has survived and has often been the onlyremaining institution to support management of in-canaland on-farm water distribution (Lee 2006).

The mirab typically spends a large part of his time walk-ing his canal system and checking its control structures inorder to monitor technical or institutional problems and tomake sure the system functions continuously. Afghan canalsare rarely lined, so upkeep and maintenance is labor-intensive and requires vigilance. When system maintenanceis needed, the mirab finds and assigns labor from the com-munity of canal water users. Provision of unpaid labor forrepairs and maintenance is supplied in exchange for accessto the canal’s water. Labor is traded for water. Users

Fig. 1 Afghanistan Map Showing the Balkh River Basin. Adapted from Asian Development Bank (2004)

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who dodge contributing their share of labor are deniedcanal service rights. So incentives are well-placed tocontribute to upkeep. Under the system each water usercontributes to the system’s maintenance in proportion tothat user’s land area, and the land’s location on thecanal. A similar distribution of maintenance responsibil-ity occurs among different canals in a single watershed.Farmers in the upper parts of watersheds are expectedto contribute more labor to system maintenance thanthose at lower levels because of reduced reliability ofwater supplies in the lower reaches.

Data

One objective of this study was to collect and assemble thedata required to build an integrated framework to inform thedesign of more flexible water allocation rules. Data wereassembled for headwater inflows (water supplies), cropcosts and returns, land available for agricultural productionand wheat production that are required to sustain foodsecurity. The data used to characterize food security sustainedby wheat production come from Maletta and Favre (2003).Farm enterprise budgets were updated in 2009, based on

budgets originally prepared by Chemonics International. Thebudgets were revised by the AWATT team in Afghanistan in2009 to reflect more recent and local conditions (Eberle et al.2009). Data for cropland and their productive capacity wasbased on Kugbei and Shahab (2007).

Integrated management framework

The basin-level approach is widely regarded as a best prac-tice in water management. Nevertheless much recent aca-demic literature has drawn attention to numerous specialchallenges posed by integrated water resources management(IWRM) as well as river basin management (RBM) appliedto the developing world (Lankford and Hepworth 2010;Pigram 2001; Svendsen et al. 2005). One of the motivationsbehind the current paper is to deal with the special chal-lenges in applying IWRM to the developing world underconditions of Civil War and foreign invasion.

An IWRM decision support framework was developed tomeet the need for a unified approach to inform debates onthe economic and food security performance of variouspossible rules proposed for water sharing that affect theuse of the River’s water supply for irrigation. Since 2002,

Fig. 2 Schematic of the Balkh Basin Canal System, Afghanistan. Adapted from Asian Development Bank (2004)



numerous consultants and development organizations haveproposed a wide range of institutional water reforms that aresignificant for Afghanistan. The Ministry of Energy andWater (MEW) is the most important organization assignedto the management of water resources. The principle ofIWRM has been promoted and a River Basin Managementapproach has been adopted, as described in Article 4 of the2009 Draft Water Law (Thomas and Ahmad 2009).

The framework was designed to improve the capacity ofthe Basin’s farmers, mirabs and other stakeholders to assessthe impacts of alternative water sharing rules on the leveland distribution of farm net income and food security. It wasalso designed to find a way to limit losses in food securityand farm net income associated with future periodicdroughts that would reduce the basin’s water supplies. Theframework unifies crop, water and farm data along withrules for sharing shortages when they occur. Our approachto developing more flexible rules for water management isconsistent with the well-known Nine Principles of Develop-ment: ownership, capacity building, sustainability, selectiv-ity, assessment, results, partnership, flexibility andaccountability (Natsios 2005).

Our model addresses three important aspects of IWRM:

& Flexibility: this permits the policy analyst to experimentwith various rules for allocation of available wateramong canals when possible water shortages occur.

& Basin scale: this accounts for the fact that more riverwater allocated to a canal in one part of the basin reducesthe availability of river water for a downstream or up-stream canal.

& Sustainability: this is based exclusively on surface water,so it addresses renewable supplies. Work is ongoing toaddress other dimensions of sustainability, such as thequantity, timing and duration of flows to support keyecological assets.

Figure 2 shows the 14 irrigation canals in the Basin inwhich each canal area has a customary amount of waterallocated to it during periods of full supply. A full watersupply in the Basin is 1,540 million cubic meters per year,based on the annual average of the 1964–1978 US Geolog-ical Survey data from the Rabat-I-Bala Gauge on the BalkhRiver. However, when supplies are progressively reduced inthe face of a drought of growing severity, passionate debatestypically center on which canals should shoulder what partof the overall shortage burden. It was with the intention ofinforming debates on basin-wide economic and food secu-rity impacts resulting from a number of potential rules forsharing shortages that we built the IWRM model (Fisher etal. 2005).

Food security is the top priority for Afghan irrigators inthe Basin. That security is enforced in our analysis byassigning the top priority to a level of wheat production

equivalent to the minimum number of calories required forthe regional population’s dietary consumption. Wheat pro-duction is valued above the production of other crops. Ourapproach emphasizes the importance that producers assignto wheat production in their planting decisions. It deals withthe long-recognized problem of putting a value on wheatproduction when wheat is a well-recognized poor contribu-tor to commercial farm income (Eberle et al. 2009). Thesedata are based on WHO estimates of minimum caloriesrequired for good health. However in practice, some cropwill be lost along the way through accidents such as wan-dering livestock, spillage and the like. Moreover, the mini-mum number of calories needed to work these lands mightbe higher because of the nature of work and factors such asclimate. Ensuring sufficient wheat for minimum calorierequirements may still leave people highly vulnerable toacute or unexpected shocks. Thus, 10 % more should beadded to provide a cushion to deal with contingencies(Table 1).

After food security is assured, if any water is left for agiven canal service area, it is allocated among the other(non-wheat) crops in order to maximize farm profitability.The highest valued crop is planted first. Farmers plant asmuch land to this crop as they can, until the entire areasuitable for that crop is planted or until the water supply isexhausted, whichever occurs first. If water remains after themaximum number of hectares of the highest valued crop isplanted, the next highest valued crop is planted. This pro-cess continues sequentially until the water from that canal isexhausted or until no positive net income can be earned byirrigating the crops, or there is no land area left suitable forplanting. That profit maximizing allocation of remainingwater is calculated for each water shortage sharing arrange-ment selected by the model user. The model accounts in aconsistent way for both farm net income and food security bymeasuring the additional value gained by planting wheat inthe same manner as commercially-valued crops. The model,in GAMS, is posted at the website at http://agecon.nmsu.edu/fward/water/, toward the end of the category “Integrated Wa-ter Management (IWRM) Basin Models with Multiple WaterUses.” If a drought is severe enough so that too little water isavailable for a given canal to support a food-secure level ofwheat production, the canal service area specializes in wheat.

Formulating water allocation rules

Patterns of water used in production, food security, and farmnet income are highly dependent on the water allocationrules that govern the distribution, timing, and level of waterallocations. This is especially true in the Basin, where noformally defined and consistently enforced rules exist forallocating water shortages. Weak water allocation rulesleave to chance the capacity of individual canals to produce

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http://agecon.nmsu.edu/fward/water/

http://agecon.nmsu.edu/fward/water/

a food-secure level of wheat and achieve an acceptable levelof farm net income. Individual canals take water when it’savailable, often more than the crop needs. Weakly definedand poorly enforced water allocation rules along with limit-ed storage mean than each farmer on each canal faces theincentive to appropriate as much as they can when the riverand canal flow. They may see nothing more for severalweeks or months.

This section describes the process and outcome ofseveral allocation rules analyzed for sharing shortages.Each has unique effects on the level and distribution offarm net income and food security. Historically, in thisBasin, there has been only limited debate over waterallocation rules when a full supply occurs, for in thatcase all canal service areas receive their full allocation.However, when a shortage occurs, rules for sharing theshortage take on considerable importance. The need toevaluate economic and food security impacts for anyproposed shortage sharing arrangements grows withgreater water scarcity. Several potential rules for sharingshortages are described below.

Upstream user priority

Allocating water with a priority assigned to upstream usersmeans that the farthest upstream (top) canal takes its cus-tomary (full) allocation while the next downstream canaltakes its full allocation if any water is left over after the topcanal appropriates water. This process continues sequentiallydownstream until the river is dry. This water allocation

method is the default rule when no existing legally bindingframework for water allocation is in place. According to Rout(2008) what we describe as upstream priority approximates tothe current method of water allocation in the Basin duringperiods of shortfall. Afghan farmers are typically ignorant ofactual crop water requirements. Irrigation scheduling practicesare still largely based on the maximum amount of water afarmer can capture. Present irrigation practices of Afghanfarmers include a tendency to over irrigate, which underminesthe food and water security of downstream farmers (Qureshi2002). Found a similar default rule for sharing irrigation waterin Nepal, where irrigators at the upper end of a riversystem took all the water they needed, leaving muchreduced quantities for those lower in the system. Tail-enders typically receive considerably reduced quantitiesof water and therefore bear the greatest burden of majorshortages in drought periods.

Downstream user priority

Our definition of downstream priority is the opposite ofupstream priority. Under downstream priority, the mostdownstream (bottom) canal takes its full supply while thenext upper canal receives whatever flows are left in the riverafter the bottom canal is assigned its flows. For example,suppose that total river flows per year are limited to 3,000paikals (about 880 million cubic meters). The bottom canal(Mingajik Canal) then has a customary right to its full 160.8paikals, so under this arrangement that canal has the mostsenior right, which means it’s entitled to its entire customary

Table 1 Wheat requirementsfor food security used in analysisby canal, Balk Basin,Afghanistan

Canal Full supply canalwater allocation(Paikals)

Land capacity(Ha)

Total wheatproduction requiredfor food security(Metric tons)

Additional 10 %required for contingenciessuch as spillage and otheraccidents or losses

Aman Sahib 200 16,000 17,557 19,313

Nahr Shahi 560 44,800 49,158 54,074

Siagard 150 12,000 13,167 14,484

Balkh 70 5,600 6,145 6,760

Chemtal 164 13,120 14,396 15,836

Mushtaq 209 16,720 18,347 20,182

Abdulah 700 56,000 61,448 67,593

Dawlatabad 750 60,000 65,837 72,421

Charbulak 750 60,000 65,837 72,421

Faizabad 600 48,000 52,670 57,937

Murdian 332 26,560 29,144 32,058

Khanaqah 328 26,240 28,793 31,672

Aqcha 201 16,080 17,644 19,408

Mingajik 239 19,120 20,980 23,078

Total 5,253 420,240 461,123 507,235



right. In this case the next to bottom canal (Aqcha Canal)has the right to its entire 191.2 paikal customary right, as theRiver’s total flows per year, at 3,000 paikals, exceed 352paikals per year (160.8 million+191.2 million). This processof allocating the 3,000 total paikals continues from the bottomto the top of the watershed until the river’s entire flow isexhausted. After all those claims are met, no canals fartherupstream receive any water at all. This simple but revealingexample illustrates the allocation of the River’s availableflows by a downstream priority arrangement. While it issimple arithmetically, its implementation requires consider-able institutional machinery and scientific capacity, as it’s ahydrologically and institutionally complicated way to allocatewater. It requires considerable analytic capacity as numerouscalculations are required to implement shares of river waterprogressing from the bottom to the top of the watershed.

Despite its complexity, downstream priority as describedhere has the potential to increase both the Basin’s total farmnet income and to raise its food security in those specialconditions where the canals farther downstream have highereconomic productivity. This higher potential productivity isa common occurrence in the world’s irrigated areas wheredownstream areas possess longer growing seasons, highertemperature and more fertile soils, all of which allow awider diversity of staple or commercial crops to be planted.

Upstream user bears shortage risk

We defined this rule to reflect conditions in which a group ofcanals share a common priority (seniority) level. The groupsharing the common priority need not be contiguous. Sev-eral canals scattered at great distances and even separated byother canals could have an identical seniority level. Eachcanal within the group shares shortages with other canals ofthe group, and all canals within the group are assigned anequal priority. For the case when upstream users bear theshortage risk, those users have a more junior status than thedownstream users when drought occurs.

For example, suppose that a shortage sharing rule isdefined by which the seven upper canals receive no wateruntil the seven lower canals receive their entire allotment. Ifthere is enough total water in the River to secure deliveriesto all seven lower canals, then the upper seven share remain-ing water supplies in proportion to their customary fullwater right. Of course, there is nothing special about thenumber seven in either the junior or the senior group. Anynumber of users can be assigned to either group. The modelwe developed is quite flexible in allowing the policy analystto experiment with a wide range of water allocation rules forsharing shortages. An arrangement in which the upstreamusers bear the shortage risk is identical in principle to theU.S. Colorado River Compact (McCormick 1994). Thatriver sharing rule places the risk on the upstream region

associated with natural supply variability. This rule allowsfor a predictable amount of water to be allocated to the lowercanals even when overall supplies are highly variable within ayear or across years. An important question asks why anupstream and a downstream region would agree to such anallocation rule arrangement that obviously benefits down-stream users. History shows that they would agree whenupstream users have large amounts of capacity for storingflood flows and downstream regions have little or none. Inthat case, this rule arrangement can be attractive to bothregions, especially if the downstream user trades a high meanflow in exchange for shouldering the burden of a high varianceof flows. Under those conditions, a Pareto Improving outcomecan result because each region specializes in its comparativeadvantage: upstream users have storage to trap flood flows,while lower users have supply security in dry years.

Downstream user bears shortage risk

We next defined a rule for handling shortages that are oppositeto the rule in which the upstream group bears the shortage risk.When a downstream group of users bears a shortage risk,shortages are allocated so that a co-equal group of down-stream canals bears the higher shortage risk. Consider theexample in which seven upper canals receive their entire waterallocation as a group before the seven lower canals areallowed to take any water whatsoever. If there is enough waterin a dry period to assure deliveries to all seven top canals, thenthe lower group of seven shares whatever is left in proportionto its customary full right. We illustrate only for the case oftwo groups who share a common priority. Our approach hasenough flexibility for three or more groups to share a commonpriority.When downstream canals bear the shortage risk, thereis greater predictability in flows to the upstream canals duringdry periods. However, downstream canal farmers as a groupmight be willing to bear a shortage in a basin with highvariability of streamflows in exchange for higher mean flows,especially if they had access to a reservoir as a place to storewater in wet years for use in dry years.

Proportional sharing of shortages

Droughts reduce precipitation, which is typically seen asreduced streamflows at the headwaters. In these conditions,water shortages in the river can be shared proportionally.Under this rule, canals share the risk of shortages propor-tionally (McCormick 1994). When shortages are sharedunder this rule, a 25 % overall shortage produces a 25 %reduction of each canal’s customary full allotment. Thismethod provides a proportionate sharing of water supplyrisk among all canals and prevents any single canal or groupof canals from bearing a disproportionate burden of shortagerisks (some for all rather than all for some).

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Priority by scale of historical use

When droughts reduce streamflows at the headwaters, an-other way to share shortages is to assign priority to a canal’simportance, in which importance is defined based on thetotal amount of land served by the canal under fullsupply conditions. For example, Table 1 shows thatthree canals, Abdulah, Dawlatabad and Charbulak havelarger land capacity and a larger food requirement be-cause of a larger population living there. But none ofthese three districts is close to either the headwaters orthe tail of the river system. For this reason, we considera water sharing rule with priority set by the importanceof the canal. Under this proposed arrangement for short-age sharing, the top priority is assigned to the canalserving the largest land area under full supply condi-tions, with the second priority going to the secondlargest command area, and the like, until the river’swater supply is exhausted.

Evaluating water allocations

Water allocation rules

Each of the rules for sharing river water among irrigationcanals, described above, prescribes a different set of princi-ples for sharing when shortages occur. Like most regions ofthe world where crop irrigation is important, streamflows inthe Basin are highly variable from year to year. The basinhas been subjected to many droughts even in its very recenthistory. Data from the Afghan National Disaster MitigationPolicy database show that the country has been hit by severedroughts in 1971–1973, and 2000–2002 with significanteconomic damage resulting. The period 2003 to 2008 isthe most recent, when despite efforts by the Governmentof Afghanistan and numerous donor organizations, droughtimpacts were felt in shortages of drinking water and wheatsupplies. There were also high losses of livestock in thenorthern part of the country (Ziaee 2011). The analysis ofwater allocation rules described in this paper permits theconduct of numerous policy experiments. Those policyexperiments can be analyzed by comparing various rulesfor the allocation of water shortages, including rules that arecurrently practised as well as those that have never beenpractised. The capacity to experiment with rules that are notnow practised or with those that have never been practicedwas another motivation for the development of an integratedriver basin model. The development of a model allows arange of water sharing experiments to be conducted withouthaving the worst mistakes lead to ruin. It also allows policyanalysts to experiment with water sharing proposals faroutside the range of actual practice and permits a compari-son of hydrologic and economic outcomes under a range of

rules for sharing shortages among the canals shown inTable 1.

The policy analyst or water manager selects one of thewater sharing rules by assigning a comparative numericalpriority to each canal. None of the water sharing rulesproduces an overall constrained optimization of the basin’seconomic returns from water used in crop irrigation. Never-theless, each of the water allocation rules can be comparedwith the others in terms of their performance for limitinglosses to farm net income under drought. A well-knowndisadvantage of analyzing a discrete set of water sharingrules is that none may be as efficient in minimizing eco-nomic losses as a non-analyzed rule lurking in the back-ground. Moreover, even if several hundred water sharingrules were analyzed, there could still be a more efficient wayof allocating water shortages. Therefore the notion of a“most economically efficient” (optimal) water shortagesharing rule presents itself as a question of considerableimportance for the formulation and administration of watersharing rules (water right systems), as discussed below.

An optimal water allocation

While each of the above rules assigns a unique sharing ar-rangement for allocating water supply shortages, none pre-tends to allocate the river’s scarce water efficiently among the14 canals that compete for the total supply. Because none ofthe water sharing rules described above could be guaranteed toproduce an economically efficient sharing of water shortages,a separate optimization exercise was conducted. Under thatexercise we performed an overall constrained optimization tofind the most economically efficient way to share the basin’swater shortages when they occur. The most economicallyefficient water sharing rule distributes whatever river wateris available for the basin among its canals to minimize the totalloss of farm net income produced by drought.

The economically efficient water allocation is indepen-dent of concerns for equity, culture, or historical watersharing rules. But in practice expectations and assessmentsof equity against cultural norms, historical practices, loyal-ties and the like, often take precedence over economicefficiency outside much of the western world. So the dis-covery and design of economically efficient water sharingrules must account for the context of how people live andthink and must also be presented to stakeholders in waysthat are compatible with such realities in order to be em-braced and carried out in action. Under a shortage sharingrule that is economically efficient, water gravitates to thecombination of canals and crops that minimizes the Basin’stotal loss in farm net income compared to net incomeproduced by a full water supply.

Results of this basinwide analysis of economic efficiencycan be interpreted as the outcome of a water sharing



arrangement that would allow unrestricted trading of waterfor cash. Under this idealistic trading economy, water buyerspay cash, receive water and allocate purchased water tocrops with a higher value than the cash spent to purchasethe water. However, there are many practical constraints thatblock the achievement of water trading. For example, infor-mation and knowledge asymmetries disadvantage somefarmers leading them to make poor decisions. More wide-spread and openly posted bid prices to buy or sell water canspread the benefits of a water trading economy more widelyand fairly. Such a posting of water trading information couldhelp more farmers overcome a lack of knowledge, powerand confidence. Despite all these advantages of water trad-ing, it can be argued that water trading raises risks oferoding ideas and world views of water as a communalresource and a basis for cooperation and community cohe-sion. Another well-known disadvantage of trading water forcash is the negative economic and cultural impacts to thewater exporting area associated with reduced productionthat would occur. In fact, trading of water for cash is rarelyseen in Afghanistan. This absence occurs for many reasons,including the fact that when money is paid for water, there islittle legal enforcement requiring the water seller to makethe sold water available to the buyer. The water seller maykeep both the money and the water, with little legal recourseavailable to the buyer.

The basinwide efficiency analysis was implemented as asingle constrained optimization, in which water was allocatedamong canals and crops to maximize total basin-wide farmnet income, subject only to constraints on the total watersupply available, an estimated crop water production re-lation, and data on crop prices, yields, and costs. Theimplementation of this special optimization model was basedon the use of positive mathematical programming combinedwith basin scale water allocation optimization (e.g., Dagninoand Ward 2012).

There is no guarantee that this idealized efficient waterallocation outcome would or even could occur in the Basinno matter how many cultural constraints to water allocationare dissolved. For this reason, results of the basin optimiza-tion are best interpreted as a reference point for comparingthe water shortage sharing rules described above. Still, aprincipled argument can be made that something close tothis outcome could be achieved if a community-enforcedsystem of rules for water sharing (water rights system) wereestablished, combined with rules that permitted, encour-aged, or rewarded water trading. Irrigators who had thegreatest economic need for water after the onset of a droughtwould rent, buy, or lease water or water rights from thosewho had a legal right to use water. The community-enforcedsystem of water rights described here needs a mechanismthat rewards competence, honesty, and immunity to corrup-tion and patronage. Finding or even designing such a

community in Afghanistan remains an open challenge. Inaddition to this, the important question remains that of whohas the legal right to sell water. Those who have the legalright to sell water can only be identified if a well-definedand consistently administered system of water rights isestablished. Without defined and enforced water rights, eachfarmer and any mirab can mount an argument claiming theyhave the right to sell water, even in the face of reducedoverall supplies (FAO 2006).

Results

Base conditions

We used the best data we could secure to reflect the Basin’srecent hydrologic, institutional, agronomic, and economicrealities, although these were still not good. Weak or non-existent data are a widespread phenomenon in Afghanistanand in most developing countries. Yet, the wait for researchgrade data to become available will postpone data-informeddecisions for a long time. So we used the data we could findand built a decision making framework that illustrated theuse and importance of the data. We chose this approach withthe hope that our results might engage enough debate tomotivate investments in better data. Where data are poor, it’san important exercise to see how sensitive the results are tothe data used. Those data for which small changes bringabout large adjustments in recommended policy emphasizethe importance of investing in better data. Results from asensitivity analysis performed on variability of price andyield data are available from the authors on request.

Data were secured on headwater inflows, crop costs andreturns (based on Eberle et al. 2009) and land available foragricultural production and wheat production required tosustain food security. Table 1 shows the land area servedby each of the 14 canals (varying from 5,600 to 60,000 ha)and the amount of wheat required for food security (Zaheer2009). Table 2 shows the data used for crop price, whileTable 3 presents net revenue per ha of land.

Food security requirements

Between 1998 and 2002, large amounts of food aid helpedoffset wheat production shortfalls, but food security chal-lenges remain (Chabot and Dorosh 2007). Table 1 shows thedetailed assumptions used to characterize wheat productionand food security requirements for the Basin’s rural farmhouseholds. The wheat production required for dietary foodsecurity was measured as the product of cereal food require-ments per capita, the number family members per house-hold, the number of wheat-consuming farm households, andthe percentage of current wheat production used for current

F.A. Ward et al.


food consumption (not invested for planting in the next season).The amount of wheat required to promote food-secure con-sumption is taken to be 180 kg per capita per year in each canalarea, with an estimated 210,000 farms producing and consum-ing wheat (Maletta and Favre 2003). The proportion of wheatwithheld for future planting is 10.9 %, based on Maletta andFavre and Chabot and Dorosh (2007). In the absence of ac-ceptable research grade data, each crop’s irrigation water re-quirement is set to 1 m in depth for the irrigation season.

Base cost and return farm budgets

Table 3 shows budgeted net income per hectare for theseven crops for which significant production occurs in theBasin. Farm net income per unit land is measured as pricemultiplied by yield minus production cost, described inEberle, et al. (2009). Net income per hectare for wheat istaken to be $US 1 above the net income for the highest netincome valued non-wheat crop. This approach was used to

Table 2 Base crop price by cropand canal from enterprise budg-ets, Balkh Basin, Afghanistan($ US per metric ton)

Crop Wheat Cotton Pulses Rice Potato Melons Tomatoes

Canal

Aman Sahib 708 2,472 1,022 475 132 66 101

Nahr Shahi 708 2,472 1,022 475 132 66 101

Siagard 708 2,472 1,022 475 132 66 101

Balkh 708 2,472 1,022 475 132 66 101

Chemtal 505 2,311 1,022 475 69 93 106

Mushtaq 505 2,311 1,022 475 69 93 106

Abdulah 505 2,311 1,022 475 69 93 106

Dawlatabad 505 2,311 1,022 475 69 93 106

Charbulak 505 2,311 1,022 475 69 93 106

Faizabad 314 2,311 1,022 475 69 66 101

Murdian 329 2,311 1,022 403 69 66 101

Khanaqah 329 2,311 1,022 403 69 66 101

Aqcha 329 2,311 1,022 403 69 66 101

Mingajik 329 2,311 1,022 403 69 66 101

Basin wide average 499 2,357 1,022 454 87 76 103

Table 3 Base income per hectare by Crop (Income per Ha is defined as (Crop Price) * Yield - Cost) and canal from enterprise budgets, Balkh Basin,Afghanistan ($ US per Year)

Crop Wheata Cotton Pulses Rice Potato Melons Tomatoes

Canal

Aman Sahib 1,587 293 236 1 1,585 482 410

Nahr Shahi 1,587 293 236 1 1,585 482 410

Siagard 1,587 293 236 1 1,585 482 410

Balkh 1,587 293 236 1 1,585 482 410

Chemtal 1,018 222 236 1 25 1,017 592

Mushtaq 1,018 222 236 1 25 1,017 592

Abdulah 1,018 222 236 1 25 1,017 592

Dawlatabad 1,018 222 236 1 25 1,017 592

Charbulak 1,018 222 236 1 25 1,017 592

Faizabad 483 222 236 1 25 482 410

Murdian 525 222 236 525 25 482 410

Khanaqah 525 222 236 525 25 482 410

Aqcha 525 222 236 525 25 482 410

Mingajik 525 222 236 525 25 482 410

Basin wide average 1,002 242 236 151 471 673 475

a Income per hectare for wheat is defined as $1 above the highest valued other crop to assign top priority to assure food security



account for the significant contribution to food security madeby subsistence wheat production. Existing enterprise budgetsdeveloped using national averages showed that farm net in-come per hectare produced by cotton, pulses and rice allproduce negative returns. However, considerable amounts ofthese crops are produced in the Basin. To reflect the observedcropping patterns and returns seen in the Basin, net incomevalues for the Basin’s enterprise budgets by crop were adjust-ed to more closely represent the land use patterns and cropyields recently seen on the ground (Kugbei and Shahab 2007).

Crop land limits

The Basin is home to a wide range of geographicconditions that affect the economic performance of pro-ducing each crop shown in Tables 2 and 3. So, in eachcanal service area, the physical geography, soils andclimate affect the amount of land by crop that is eco-nomically practical to bring into production in thosefortunate cases when water is available. Base quantitiesof land in production by crop are derived from theanalysis of Kugbei and Shahab (2007).

Impact of water allocation rules on food security

Table 4 presents results for food security outcomes associatedwith each of the six alternative water sharing rules describedearlier in the paper. Results shown in Table 4 emphasize theimportance of flexibility for any watersharing rule to sustainfood security in the face of various levels of total water supplyavailable. Results are presented by canal for varying amountsof water shortage for each of the six water sharing rules.

Table 1 shows that the total quantity of wheat re-quired to sustain a food secure output of 461,123 metrictons depends on water supply, rules for sharing watershortages, and wheat yields. For the base case there isno shortage in caloric intake from wheat production thatoccurs in periods of full water supply, regardless of therule for sharing water shortages. However, the foodsecurity and food poverty implications of various rulesfor sharing shortages look very different as total Basinshortages become more pronounced.

Table 4 vividly reveals the important principle thatrules for sharing water shortages have a direct and largeimpact on food security. Different water allocation rulesproduce dramatically different outcomes for the capacityto support a food-secure level of wheat production whenwater shortages occur. The two shortages analyzed aredry (25 % supply reduction) and drought (50 % reduc-tion). Among the six rules examined for sharing watershortages, a proportional sharing of shortfalls performedthe best in minimizing losses to food security. The fiveremaining rules performed much worse. This remarkably

high level of flexibility sustained by proportional shar-ing of shortfalls far out-performs all other shortagesharing rules under both a 25 and 50 % reduction inthe basin’s water supplies. Its supremacy compared tothe other five rules is sustained even under a severedrought in which overall basin supplies fall to half theirnormal level. This finding shows that regional foodsecurity for securing dietary caloric intake can be sus-tained under even a severe drought scenario, as long aswater shortages are shared proportionally among the 14canal service areas.

A top performing water allocation rule

A proportional sharing of shortage is the supreme watershortage sharing rule for protecting against food poverty asdroughts intensify. Nevertheless, the reform of water allo-cation rules (institutional reform) can require overcominglarge amounts of inertia as well as possibly needing newprojects, bureaucracies and legal frameworks. Institutionalreform can command a high cost indeed. For example onerecent article on institutional reform in rural Indian irrigationfound that those reforms face many challenges. These canbecome intractable due to long-established bureaucracies,power relationships, and special interests (Atwood 2005).

When the Basin’s water supplies are full (just over 5,250paikals), there is plenty of water for both wheat and com-mercial crops throughout the Basin. With half of full watersupplies, 77 % of the irrigated land is still planted to wheat,as wheat for household subsistence remains the top priority.In fact, enough wheat production to sustain adequate foodsecurity requires only about 39 % of the full supply ifproportional shortage sharing is well-administered (notshown in Table 4). Enforcing and providing resources tosupport the high level of honesty and discipline required bywater administrators is a difficult ideal to carry out in anyculture, especially where water administrators are under-paid. But it’s even harder to implement in a culture wherethe allocation of water among competing canal service areashistorically depended on political connections (who youknow) rather than on an impartially administered systemof justice. The burdens imposed by an invading foreignmilitary force make honest and even-handed water admin-istration even harder.

Weaker performing water allocation rules

Remarkably Table 4 shows that one of the poorestperforming water sharing institution is the one mostcommonly practised in the Basin (Rout 2008), the rulewe described as “upstream priority.” For both a 25 and50 % shortfall, upstream priority is a poor performer.Upstream priority means that shortage sharing rules for

F.A. Ward et al.


Tab

le4

Regionalfood

security

definedas

wheat

prod

uctio

n,by

water

sharingarrang

ement,water

supp

lyandcanal;Balkh

Basin,Afghanistan

(Metrictons)

Irrigatio

nwater

shortage

sharingarrang

ement

Base

Upstream

priority

Dow

nstream

priority

Upstream

bears

shortage

risk

Dow

nstream

bears

shortage

risk

Propo

rtional

sharing

Priority

byscale

ofhistorical

use

Water

supp

lyscenario

Normal

Dry

Droug

htDry

Droug

htDry

Droug

htDry

Droug

htDry

Droug

htDry

Droug

htSho

rtage

025

%50

%25

%50

%25

%50

%25

%50

%25

%50

%25

%50

%

Canal

Aman

Sahib

17,557

17,557

17,557

00

16,143

017

,557

17,557

17,557

17,557

00

NahrShahi

49,158

49,158

49,158

00

45,199

049

,158

49,158

49,158

49,158

49,158

0

Siagard

13,167

13,167

13,167

00

12,107

013

,167

13,167

13,167

13,167

00

Balkh

6,14

56,14

56,14

50

05,65

00

6,14

56,14

56,14

56,14

50

0

Chemtal

14,396

14,396

14,396

00

13,237

014

,396

14,396

14,396

14,396

00

Mushtaq

18,347

18,347

18,347

8,90

40

16,869

018

,347

18,347

18,347

18,347

00

Abd

ulah

61,448

61,448

61,448

61,448

056

,499

061

,448

61,448

61,448

61,448

61,448

61,448

Daw

latabad

65,837

65,837

65,837

65,837

39,536

65,837

65,837

65,837

30,109

65,837

65,837

65,837

65,837

Charbulak

65,837

65,837

065

,837

65,837

65,837

65,837

65,837

30,109

65,837

65,837

65,837

65,837

Faizabad

52,670

52,670

052

,670

52,670

52,670

52,670

52,670

24,087

52,670

52,670

52,670

52,670

Murdian

29,144

00

29,144

29,144

29,144

29,144

29,144

13,328

29,144

29,144

29,144

0

Khanaqah

28,793

00

28,793

28,793

28,793

28,793

28,793

13,168

28,793

28,793

28,793

0

Aqcha

17,644

00

17,644

17,644

17,644

17,644

17,644

8,06

917

,644

17,644

00

Mingajik

20,980

00

20,980

20,980

20,980

20,980

20,980

9,59

520

,980

20,980

00

Basin

widetotal

461,12

336

4,56

224

6,05

535

1,25

725

4,60

444

6,60

928

0,90

546

1,12

330

8,68

246

1,12

346

1,12

335

2,88

724

5,79

2



dividing up the River’s waters among competing canalsare defined by a complete lack of effective administra-tion. The top canal takes whatever water flows in theriver, and ones farther downstream take what’s left. Thisprocess continues until the river runs dry. Not surpris-ingly wheat supplies fall to 53 % of the amount re-quired for food security (246,055/461,123 metric tons)when water supplies fall to 50 % of full and when thebasin lacks definition or effective administration of awater sharing rule. This finding presents a serious in-dictment of the existing way that water shortages areshared in the Basin.

Impact of water institutions on farm income

Table 5 shows farm net income levels that can be achievedunder each of six water shortage sharing rules analyzed inthis study. Among the six rules analyzed, a proportionalsharing of shortfalls performs with the highest level offlexibility in adapting to both modest and severe watershortages. The results showcase the importance of propor-tional sharing of shortfalls as a top performer in sustainingfarm net income. The reason rests on the principle that allcanals get some water under proportional sharing no matterhow severe the drought. This principle is illustrated belowwith several results:

Table 5 shows that as the basin’s water supplies arereduced from their base levels of 1,540 million cubic metersper year by 25 % to 1,155 million, farm net income fall byonly 10.0 % in the basin under a proportional loss sharingarrangement compared to base levels. Similarly, farm netincome levels fall by a comparatively small 33 % from$292.1 million to $194.5 million annually when watersupplies fall by 50 % to 770 million cubic meters per yearunder that same water sharing rule.

Proportional sharing also scores high based on jus-tice. Its perception as a fair way to share shortages willappeal to the sense of justice embraced in most cultures.In addition, that water sharing rule is comparativelysimple to implement to conditions on the ground, re-quiring few complex calculations, no detailed hydrolog-ic models, and little water-metering technology. Forthese reasons, we believe that our findings stand achance of being put to good use. Still, on-the-groundimplementation of any water shortage-sharing rule fordistributing water among a system of canals that areseparated by several hundred kilometers from top tobottom requires extensive community (e.g., basin-wideor national) administrative machinery. The administra-tion of such a rule needs to extend beyond the individ-ual, farm, turnout, village or canal. So, until a largercommunity, such as the Afghan national government,develops more national enforcement authority, possibly

implemented with national water administration elec-tions, the existing mirab system with all its limitations,will continue play a major role in the allocation ofwater.

With the exception of proportional sharing of short-ages, most of the water-sharing rules present a majorweakness. Just as some districts lose all water in somedroughts, some lose none even in the most severedrought for some irrigation water sharing rules. Assome of the districts suffer no shortage even in theworst drought (all for some), these same districts facelittle incentive to invest in measures to conserve water.Water use can be reduced by investing in water con-serving technologies, idling land, reducing water appli-cations per unit land on existing crops, or eliminatinglower valued crops.

Incentives matter. The incentive package produced bywater a sharing rule has an immense influence on out-comes for both food security and farm net income. Forexample Table 5 shows that Aman Sahib and NahrShani Districts receive full water supplies under the“Upstream Priority” rule. Instead of these districts con-serving water in a drought and making available waterfor higher valued crops for downstream districts likeAqcha and Mingajik, they continue to produce lowvalued crops as well as irrigating more heavily thanrequired for maximum net income or even maximumyields. These results show that all water sharing rulesother than ‘proportional sharing of shortages’ presentpoor incentives for the Basin’s irrigators to seek outand discover ways to minimize either physical or eco-nomic losses from water shortages. Therefore, without aproportional sharing of water shortages, low valuedcrops such as pulses are kept in production and highvalued crops like wheat, so important for achievingfarm family food security, drop out of production withall the tragic consequences that follow.

An economically efficient water sharing arrangement

Table 6 shows the outcome of a water shortage sharingarrangement that minimizes the Basin’s loss of farm netincome under two alternative water supply conditions:dry and drought. The table reveals important messagesabout efficient shortage sharing institutions: as droughtconditions worsen, total water shortages are not allocat-ed proportionally among the canals. For minimizingtotal farm net income losses, most canals receive slight-ly more than 75 % of their base water right when 75 %of the basin’s supplies are available. However two canalservice areas, Charbuluk and Faizabad, bear a largerproportion of the water shortage because current averagefarm net income per unit water is lower in those two

F.A. Ward et al.


Tab

le5

Potentialregion

alfarm

netincomeby

water

sharingarrang

ement,water

supp

ly,andcanal;Balkh

River

Basin,Afghanistan

($USmillion/year)

Irrigatio

nwater

shortage

sharingarrang

ement

Base

Upstream

priority

Dow

nstream

priority

Upstream

bears

shortage

risk

Dow

nstream

bears

shortage

risk

Propo

rtional

sharing

Priority

byscale

ofhistorical

use

Water

supp

lyscenario

Normal

Dry

Droug

htDry

Droug

htDry

Droug

htDry

Droug

htDry

Droug

htDry

Droug

htSho

rtage

025

%50

%25

%50

%25

%50

%25

%50

%25

%50

%25

%50

%

Canal

Aman

Sahib

14.25

14.25

14.25

0.00

0.00

9.15

0.00

14.25

14.25

13.06

11.25

0.00

0.00

NahrShahi

39.12

39.12

39.12

0.00

0.00

25.61

0.00

39.12

39.12

35.84

30.84

39.12

0.00

Siagard

11.09

11.09

11.09

0.00

0.00

6.86

0.00

11.09

11.09

10.17

8.79

0.00

0.00

Balkh

5.25

5.25

5.25

0.00

0.00

3.20

0.00

5.25

5.25

4.81

4.16

0.00

0.00

Chemtal

10.50

10.50

10.50

0.00

0.00

4.81

0.00

10.50

10.50

9.73

6.68

0.00

0.00

Mushtaq

13.38

13.38

13.38

3.24

0.00

6.13

0.00

13.38

13.38

12.40

8.51

0.00

0.00

Abd

ulah

44.83

44.83

44.83

44.83

0.00

20.54

0.00

44.83

44.83

41.52

28.50

44.83

44.83

Daw

latabad

48.03

48.03

44.69

48.03

14.38

48.03

45.49

36.00

10.95

44.48

30.54

48.03

48.03

Charbulak

44.01

44.01

0.00

44.01

44.01

44.01

41.47

36.00

10.95

40.46

30.54

44.01

44.01

Faizabad

19.02

14.83

0.00

19.02

19.02

19.02

16.99

13.67

4.16

16.18

11.59

19.02

15.74

Murdian

11.69

0.00

0.00

11.69

11.69

11.69

10.56

8.16

2.50

10.12

6.97

11.69

0.00

Khanaqah

13.23

0.00

0.00

13.23

13.23

13.23

11.27

8.13

2.47

10.33

6.89

10.41

0.00

Aqcha

8.11

0.00

0.00

8.11

8.11

8.11

6.91

4.98

1.51

6.33

4.22

0.00

0.00

Mingajik

9.64

0.00

0.00

9.64

9.64

9.64

8.21

5.92

1.80

7.53

5.02

0.00

0.00

Basin

widetotal

292.14

245.29

183.11

201.79

120.06

230.03

140.90

251.29

172.76

262.95

194.51

217.10

152.61



service areas than elsewhere. They produce a higherpercentage of low valued crops. So under an economi-cally efficient water trading arrangement, regardless ofhow much water these two canals receive as their cus-tomary water right, trading would occur. When watersupplies fall to either dry or drought conditions, if watertrading existed, both districts would rent or lease out aconsiderable amount of their assigned right to the other12 service areas.

Table 6 also shows that the marginal value of water(shadow price) increases dramatically in the face of a moresevere drought, increasing from an average of $13,449 perpaikal for a 25 % shortage to more than $29,000 per paikalfor a 50 % shortage. Notice that the efficient allocation ofsupply shortages occurs so that the marginal value of wateris nearly equal for all 14 canal service areas. Only when theshadow price of water is equal everywhere is there nofurther opportunity for gains from additional trading ofwater for cash.

Table 6 shows results of the economically efficientwater shortage sharing arrangement. It shows thatamong the six water allocation rules analyzed, a pro-portional sharing of shortfalls is the closest to beingeconomically efficient. So in conditions where markettrading is impractical or violates cultural sensitivities, aproportional sharing of shortfalls produces results thatare close to the economically efficient shortage sharingarrangement. This is an important finding: it shows that

among the six shortage sharing rules analyzed, a pro-portional sharing of shortages is nearly as efficient asthe shortage sharing outcomes that would prevail underthe ideal water trading arrangement.

Discussion

The challenges of Afghan irrigation water management arehuge to put it mildly, and a straightforward solution is unlikelyto appear soon. Yet, to achieve the more limited aim of raisingagricultural production, one good strategy is to increase theeconomic and food security effectiveness of water allocationby finding rules that encourage a higher valued use of existingwater. Our analysis of Afghan irrigation water sharing rulesfound that flexibility in adapting to shortages in the riversystem’s overall water supply is an essential requirement tosustain national food grain security. Water shortage sharingrules that fail to spread shortages proportionally around thebasin can contribute to food shortages that, without donorassistance, can escalate to famine. For our analysis, the bestperforming water shortage sharing rule for meeting the needsof food security and farm net income was found to be aproportional sharing of shortfalls because it is the most flex-ible in adapting to unexpected changes in overall water sup-ply. In addition this water allocation rule is perceived as fair inmany cultures and is also simple to administer.

Table 6 Cost-minimizinga adaptation to drought and shadow price of water by water supply scenario and canal, Balkh Basin Afghanistan

Shortage Base 25 % 50 % Base 25 % 50 % Base 25 % 50 %Canal Water allocation by canal Income by canal Shadow price by canal

Proportion water use compared to full supply Proportion income compared to full water supply $US/Paikal

Aman Sahib 1.00 0.78 0.50 1.00 0.96 0.84 – 13,449 29,698

Nahr Shahi 1.00 0.79 0.50 1.00 0.96 0.83 – 13,449 29,838

Siagard 1.00 0.78 0.50 1.00 0.96 0.84 – 13,449 29,438

Balkh 1.00 0.78 0.50 1.00 0.96 0.84 – 13,449 29,697

Chemtal 1.00 0.77 0.57 1.00 0.95 0.87 – 13,449 27,289

Mushtaq 1.00 0.77 0.57 1.00 0.95 0.87 – 13,449 27,289

Abdulah 1.00 0.77 0.57 1.00 0.95 0.87 – 13,449 27,289

Dawlatabad 1.00 0.77 0.57 1.00 0.95 0.87 – 13,449 27,289

Charbulak 1.00 0.73 0.51 1.00 0.94 0.84 – 13,449 27,013

Faizabad 1.00 0.65 0.32 1.00 0.85 0.55 – 13,449 27,951

Murdian 1.00 0.70 0.39 1.00 0.89 0.63 – 13,449 28,472

Khanaqah 1.00 0.79 0.51 1.00 0.93 0.72 – 13,449 29,729

Aqcha 1.00 0.79 0.51 1.00 0.93 0.72 – 13,449 29,729

Mingajik 1.00 0.79 0.51 1.00 0.93 0.72 – 13,449 29,729

Basin wide 1.00 0.75 0.50 1.00 0.94 0.81 – 13,449 28,357

a Cost defined as reduction in farm net income compared to earnings with a full water supply

F.A. Ward et al.


An important qualification of our analysis is that isthat food security is considered in terms of total pro-duction and dietary caloric requirement for the wholebasin. This aggregate view of food security does notguarantee food security for all families in the Basin.Although a large percentage of the population is en-gaged in farming, not everybody has land or access toland and water for crop production. Others may need torent land or buy food. This challenge opens an impor-tant area for further research. Another important limit ofour work lies with the limitations of quantitative analy-sis. We found that the proportional sharing was themost effective approach for sustaining farm incomeand food security in the face of drought. But quantita-tive economics may not be the most effective way tocommunicate and persuade irrigation water users andmirabs to take action. While our evidence is strong, itwill be a challenge to get the findings and their impli-cations embraced and put into action. At a minimum,implementing the path forward will require considerablecommunication with a wide range of water stakeholders.

Translating our results into a just water rights administra-tion system will be difficult in Afghanistan or other develop-ing countries with weak administration, pervasive corruptionand world views different from policy analysts schooled inwestern analytical thinking. The required legal system oftendoes not exist in any meaningful way in rural areas. Even inregional capitals the legal system is not affordable, convenientor timely for most people. Therefore, huge challenges remainin finding culturally compatible methods to enforce the watersharing rules described here. If the courts are not available orlack the authority to enact enforcement then any new watersharing rule, even if it provides much more reliable foodsecurity, is difficult to make legally binding. One possibilityis for enforcement to be conducted through other institutionssuch as tribal councils or the clergy.

Our approach leaves much to be carried out on theground. The existing water sharing system in which theupstream users are the top priority users by default willbe difficult to change for many reasons. Centuries ofplanting and water use habit will not change overnightwithout open and vigorous public debate of the alter-natives discussed in this paper. Moreover, while propor-tional sharing of shortfalls produces the greatest farmnet income and achieves the greatest food security whendroughts occur, upstream water users may have thegreatest amount of power and are unlikely to relinquishthat power voluntarily. Water markets could help movewater from where it is to where it’s more productive. Howeverthe idea of trading water for money or other resources is stillweakly developed in Afghanistan.

A broader scope approach for dealing with droughtwould improve reservoir storage while also instituting a

better water allocation system. The joint development ofstorage and enactment of a more efficient water alloca-tion system would make it easier to meter availablesupplies during drought periods, greatly simplifying ad-ministration of the kind of water allocation system de-scribed in this paper. Better data combined with theexisting or improved analysis have considerable power toperform an important function in a more sustained and in-formed water management system in the Balkh Basin. To theextent that the approaches described in this paper aretransferable, we anticipate their application could sup-port greater flexibility in water institutions in other partsof the developing world’s irrigated areas.

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Frank A. Ward is Professor ofWater Economics and Policy in thedepartment of Agricultural Eco-nomics and Agricultural Businessat New Mexico State University.His recent work has examinedconservation and economically ef-ficient use of water resources in theface of drought and climatechange for irrigated agriculture,urban, and environmental uses. Italso includes policy planning,program formulation for waterresources development, analysisof water resource systems, institu-

tional strengthening, and climate change adaptation. He has made addi-tional contributions in methods to conduct economic appraisals;developing interdisciplinary approaches to analysis of water policyissues; and principles and procedures for valuing environmental waterservices. 8Dr. Ward has conducted integrated hydrologic-agronomic-institutional-economic analyses to support sustainable river basin man-agement and climate change adaptation. His recent work on integratedriver basin analysis has been applied to the Rio Grande Basin of NorthAmerica and to river basins in Afghanistan, Iraq, Israel, Australia, Egypt,

Jordan, Iran, Central Asia, and Turkey. He has published extensively onwater resources, including more than 65 peer-reviewed journal articles inwater resources systems analysis and policy, environmental management,and irrigation economics. He has authored 2 books on the economics ofnatural resources and the environment.

Saud Amer is International Wa-ter Resources Program Managerof the Middle East and Africa.He works for the US GeologicalSurvey in Reston, Virginia. Dr.Amer is also an adjunct associateprofessor in the Department ofagricultural economics and agri-cultural business at New MexicoState University (USA). He re-ceived a Ph.D. in remote sensingfrom the University of Arizona(USA) in 1990. Dr. Amer has22 years’ experience in interna-tional development, research,

and management of water resources. Much of his development planningwork in the past 5 years has focused on a range of water issues facingAfrica, Central, and South Asia. He is currently overseeing water devel-opment projects dealing with increased food security in Saudi Arabia andpoverty eradication in Afghanistan, Iraq, and Ethiopia.

Fahimallah Ziaee is policy ad-viser to the Minister for Agricul-ture, Irrigation, and Livestockfor the Afghan Government,Kabul, Afghanistan. He has ex-tensive experience in agricultur-al engineering in connectionwith water improvement projectsin Afghanistan. Mr. Ziaee com-pleted his M.Sc. Degree in May2011 from the UNESCO inDelft, the Netherlands.



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