Water and Security in Southern Africa · hydrological data collection, necessary for creating or...

824—AFS—13 166

Publications on Water

Resources: No 1

Department for NaturalResources and the Environment

Water and Securityin Southern Africa

Leif Ohisson,University of Gothenburg

~E Ci~T~EV ANJ~

Foreword

Water is becoming an increasingly scarce resource, especially in dryclimate regions such as Southern Africa. A finite amount of freshwater shall satisfy the needs of the growing population, theproduction of food, industrial and energy production, cities andconservation of nature. An increased competition between differentusers of water, both within countries and between countries, can bea source of conflicts but also instrumental in creating opportunitiesfor strengthening cooperation.

As part of Sweden’s commitment to Agenda 21, Sida will give higherpriority to water resources in development cooperation.We are atpresent preparing a programme of support to sustainable use ofwater resources in the regional context of Southern Africa. Thisreport has been prepared to give background information onpotential conflicts related to water resources in that region. Theviews presented in the report are those of the author and are notnecessarily shared by Sida.

We hope that the report will contribute to the discussion andimproved understanding of water resources as an essential area forcooperation to prevent potential conflicts.

Stockholm in November, 1995

Johan Holmberg ~\Director, Department fo~Natural Resources and the Environment,Sida

~. J3}~C:

ISBN 91-586-7238-9

Water and Security in Southern Africa:

Summary of the StudyTheneedfor integrated,basinwide,waterresourcemanagementis consideredaprime securityobjectivefor theprospectsof SADC regionalcooperation.Anymeasurethatwill strengthensuchefforts thereforeought to bereviewedfor de-velopmentcooperationsupport.

In the short term, outdatedor non-existentdatamerit supportfor basichydrologicaldatacollection,necessaryfor creatingor updatingnationalwatermasterplans,aspartof assessingall river basinresources.Any programmedi-rectedat increasingawarenessof waterissuesamongdecision-makersin there-gion deservessupport.Thepossibility of utilizing existingcompetencefrom thenewSouthAfrica for regionalcapacity-buildingought to befully explored.

Water transferschemesto ameliorateacutewater shortagefor cities andwater-starvedregionsalreadyareat the topof theregionalagenda,andwill con-tinue to be sofor themediumterm,necessitatingregionalnegotiationsand un-derlining theneedfor basinwidemanagement.The mostimportantsuchregio-nalwaterresourcemanagementprogramme,theZACPLAN, hasbeenscrutini-zedextensivelyby expertisefrom bothwithin the regionand by externalrevie-wers.Judging by thesereviews,the principalagencyhandling the programme,SADC ELMS, would benefit from institutionalsupport.

Attention on securityaspectsof water issuessofar hasbeenconcentratedon the risk of watertransferschemescreatingconflicts — political or ultimatelyviolent — betweenstatesin the region.Themereperceptionof suchrisks is ase-curity threat in its own right, undermmingconfidence-creatingmeasuresbet-weencountries.On themeritsof availableevidence,however,theregionalcoo-perativeframework seemsstrong enough to handle presentaspectsof thisthreat,particularlysinceofficials on all levelsfrom the new SouthAfrica seemvery concernedabouteliminating any groundfor suspicionof regionalgreat-powerambitions.

Furthermore,concentratingon securityin this traditional inter-statesensemayobscurethepotentiallymuchlargerrisksin the long runof environmental-ly inducedscarcitiescreatingmiseryand conflicts within countries,leading toconsequenceswhich are very difficult to foresee.Conflicts betweenstatesmayturn out to be amongtheseconsequences.It is worth underlining,however,thatthemostlikely scenariofor suchfutureconflictsto arisewill be throughafailu-re to meetthe internalchallengesfacinggovernmentsandstatesalreadytoday.

Theseriskscanbemitigatedby cooperation,understanding,trust, identify-ing the expectationsand concernsand by determiningthe potentialof the re-sourcebase,sothat negotiationcanbe basedon facts.

Developmentcooperationeffortsaimedatpreparingcountriesin theregionfor a strategyof learning to live with aridity — i.e. using the availablewater,whereit is available,to its greatestadvantage— thereforeseemsimperative,aspartof a largerstrategyof preparingfor the inevitablelong-timeandlarge-scaleforcesof societalchange— with their inherentcapacityof creatingbreak-downtendenciesfor thestate— beingat work for thedurationof the foreseeablefuturein theSADC countries.

Contents:

Water and Securityin Southern Africa 1

Background 1

ChangingPerceptionsofSecurity 2

EnvironmentalScarcityofLandand Water 6

The ChallengeofSharedWaterResources 9

The internationalIWRMPolicy Framework 11

The SADCRegionalWRMFramework 11

Prospectsfor RegionalIWRMCooperation 16

~onciusion 17

Appendicies:

1. Population,Environmentand Security:An Overviewof theSADCCountries 19

II. SADCFoodSecurity:An Overview1995 25

III. SADCFoodSecurity:CountryProfiles 1995 29

IV. PopulationGrowthandLandScarcity 33

V. Waterand theEnvironment:An overviewoftheSADCcountries 35

W. SuifaceWaterManagementin Arid Regions 47

VII. PopulationGrowthand WaterScarcity 48

VIII. SharedRivers 51

IX. Major WaterTransferSchemes 53

X. TheInternationalIWRMPolicy Framework 56

Xi. The HelsinkiRules 58

Xii. ExistingAgreements 59

XIII. SADCRWRMProgrammes 61

XIV Abbreviations 63

XV. References 64

(Map drawnfo, this study, b~edon Chabwela. I{, Wa~iands’A Consa,vat,on Pmgraln7e tufSouthern Afi~IUCN and SADC, Narare,Nov 1991)

Major watertransferschemesshownby arrowson themap,includethefirst internationalinterbasinwatertransferin southernAfrica, from theCuneneto theCuvelain Namibia;plansfor divertingwa-ter from the Okavangoto Namibia;plansto divertwater from theZambezi-Chobweto Botswana,andpossiblyfurtherto SouthAfrica in severalsteps;and thelargestwatertransferschemein theworld, the LesothoHighlandsWaterProject,which will bring waterto SouthAfrica’s industrialheartland.Assessmentsof presentandfuture waterscarcityis basedon deliberationsin thestudy.

Main Study:

Water and Securityin Southern Africa

BackgroundThe triadpeace,securityand socialdevelopmentis identifiedby theSwedishgovernmentasthefoundationfor its foreignpolicy. Conflict preventionandre-solution will be explicitly supported.A specialForeignOffice deputyunder-se-creteraryof state,responsiblefor securityissues,hasbeenappointed.Theim-portanceof creatingregionalstructureswith acapabilityof preventingconflictsand incorporatingSouthAfrica in the SADC (SouthernAfrican DevelopmentCommunity) regionalcooperationis underlined.A specialtaskforceon securitym Africa hasbeenformed; the taskto delivera thoroughanalysisof securityis-sues,compileinformationon theorigins of conflict and availableexperienceson conflict resolution,and proposerelevantSwedishdevelopmentassistanceprogrammes,directedprimarily at southernandeasternAfrica. Theforeignmi-nister for developmentassistancehasstressedthatcompetitionfor naturalre-sourcesmayleadto seriousconflicts in the future.Waterscarcityis identifiedasthepotentiallygreatestfuturecauseof conflict in theSADC region.1

At thefirst SADC ConferencewherethenewSouthAfrica took part, in Ja-nuary 1995, the Swedishdiplomatic representationmadea specialaddresstomemberstates,urging themto treatwaterissuesas apriority area.2Ongoingat-temptsto createamechanismfor SADC regionalmanagementof sharedwaterresourceshavebeeninitiated and supportedby Sidaandotheraid agencies.

The May 1995high-levelmeetingof the OECD(Organizationfor Econo-mic CooperationandDevelopment)DevelopmentAssistanceCommitte(DAC),confirmedthededicationof memberstatesto conflict preventionandresolution,and the importanceof developmentassistancein the preventiveaspectsof thiswork. The needto concentrateefforts on the areasof humannghts and demo-cracywasparticularly stressed,aswasmeasuresto increaseprospectsof foodsecurity.The Swedishrepresentativeunderlinedthe importanceof developingnetworksof global andregionalorganizationsfor conflict management.3

1 InternalMemo, SidaNaturalResourcesManagementDivision,950502

2 InternalMemo, ForeignOffice, 1U2, 9502243 InternalMemo, Foreign Office, 1U3, 950710.

2 Water and Security in Southern Africa

Acting on theseguidelines,Sidais preparingfor a newprogrammeon Re-gionalWater ResourcesManagement(RWRM) in the SADC-region.Buildingon existingknowledgein theregion,theprogrammeaimsat increasingregionalandnationalcapacity.A sub-objectiveis to coupleSwedishinstitutionswith in-stitutionsin theregionto mutual benefit.As partof thepreparation,the presentdeskstudy on the relationshipbetweendifferent typesof water scarcitiesandpotentialconflictsrelatedto waterresourcesin the SADC-regionwascOmmis-sioned;thestudyalsoto suggestaframeworkfor amorethoroughinvestigation,andidentify researchinstitutionsin Swedenwith relevantcapacity.

This study

The studyhasthreemain pointsof departure:(1) Perceptionsof securityarechangingfrom military mattersto growingsocietalconstraints,dueto lackofnaturalresources;specificallyresourcesvital to foodproduction,andparticular-ly in developingcountries.Policy implicationsare yet to be determinedandmaypotentiallydiffer widely. (2) The limiting factorfor increasedfoodproduc-tion is availability of waterfor irrigation, leadingto competitionbetweendiffe-rentsocietalsectors,possiblyalso betweencountrieswith commonwaterre-sources.Particularly in dry developingcountries,waterscarcity thereforeamountsto a generalconstraintfor development,andcannotbe treatedsepara-tely from eitherpopulationdevelopment,landusechanges,or changesin deve-lopmentstrategy.(3) A researchprogrammerelevantto developmentassistanceefforts shouldpreferablybe compatiblewith therelevantpolicy documents,na-tional planningefforts in theSADC countries,and theexisting frameworkofre-gionalinstitutions.

Built on a reviewof thesethreeareas,prospectsanti stumblingblocksforSADC regionalcooperationon waterresourcesmanagementareanalyzedfortheir inherent,potentially both conflict-generatingandconfidence-buildingele-ments.

Backgroundmaterialusedfor theanalysis,andreferencesare collectedin anumberof appendicies,following themain report.

Changing Perceptions of SecurityParallellto, and evenslightly preemptingthe outcomeof theUNCED (UnitedNationsConferenceon theEnvironmentand Development)process,a newdis-coursehasemergedon environmentalthreatsto security.Tying in to an older,andunfortunatelysomewhatneglected,discoursewith spuriousSwedishconno-tations,4thenewdiscourseis markedlyhigh-profile,policy-onentedandof dis-tinctly US-Americanorigin.5

The original contentof this new discoursecould be summarizedasan at-temptto placetheUNCEDissues— deforestation,biodiversity, climatechange,

4. Cf. the work doneby Arthur Westingwhile atSIPRI(StockholmInternationalPeaceRe-searchInsutue),e.g.Westing1986.

5. Its beginnmg is convenientlymarkedby a seimnal 1989 article in ForeignAffairs by Na-tional SecuntyAdvisor JessicaTuchman Mathews, “Redefining Security” (Mathews1989)

Main Study: Changing Perceptions of Security 3

populationanddevelopmentissues— legitimatelywithin thesphereof highpo-litics. Waterissuesfiguredhigh on this agendaasa potentialsourceof interna-tional conflict, mostoftenbasedon much-quotedthreatsof warfrom severalofthenationalleadersin theMiddle East.Theanalysis,basically,wasof thetradi-tional geopoliticaland realpolitik variety.6

Within the semi-scientific,semi-policyspherethe discoursein lateryearshastakena turn with distinct apocalypticovertones,conjuringup imagesof ananarchic,chaotic(lack of) world order;7aswell asattemptsat formulatingade-quatesocietalresponsesto thesethreats,mostnotably perhapsby US vice-pre-sidentAl Gore,8andtheadministratorof USAID, BrianAtwood,whosuccintlysummarizestheemergingnewperspectiveon security:9

BosniaHaiti. Rwanda~Thesetroublingandunique crisesin disparateregions of theglobesharea commonthread.Theyare the darkmanifestationof astrategicthreatthat increasinglydefinesAmenca’sforeign policy challenge.Disintegratingsocietiesand failedstateswith their civil conflicts anddestabilizingrefugeeflows haveemer-ged asthe greatestmenaceto global stability [ ] The pyre of failed statesis fueledby [...Jendemic poverty, rapid population growth; food insecurity, environmentaldegradation,andunstableandundemocraticgovernments

Thedifferentstrandsofthediscourseand, more importantly,theirconsequentialpolicy implications,areconvenientlyanalyzedin relationto thethreecorner-stonesof Swedishforeignpolicy: peace,securityandsocialdevelopment.

Environment and peace

For manyresearchers,therelationbetweenenvironmentalproblemsorscarci-ties, on theone hand,andopenconflict (war) betweencountries,on theother,hasalwaysbeenthe mostspectacularand sought-afterconnectionto establish.But it wasnotuntil thepassingof thecold warerathatamplyfundedandappro-priately staffedprogrammeswereinitiated.Although someresultshaveemer-gedfrom Europeansoil, muchof thepresentknowledgederivesfrom aseriesofjoint Canadian-USprojects.10

The first projectin this seriesamassedempiricalevidencefrom a teamofforty researchersfrom four continents,indicating that scarcitiesof renewable

6. This particularstrandof reasoningwas initiatedby another seminalarticle, “Water Wars”by JoyceStarr,this time in ForeignPolicy (Starr1991),followed by severalbooks on po-tential water wars, e.g Ohlsson(ed.) 1992 & 1995,Bulloch & Darwish 1993 A Swedishresearchproposalis outlinedin Wallensteen& Swain 1994

7 This strandwasstarted by RobertKaplanandhis — widely read in policy circles — “TheComing Anarchy: How scarcity, cnine, overpopulation, tribalism, anddiseaseare rapidlydestroying the socialfabric of our planet”, in TheAtlanticMonthly (Feb 1994).Someofthesethreadswere alsopicked up by the influential histonan Paul Kennedy in his 1993book,Preparingfor the TwenlyfirsrCentury

8. In his 1992 book,Earth in theBalance.Forginga NewCom,nonPurpose

9 In a 1994 WashingtonPostarticle, poignantly entitled “Suddenly,Chaos” USAII) is theUSdevelopmentcooperationagency.

10 The projectshave beencarriedout in a surprisinglyshort spanof yearsunder the continu-ousleadershipof ThomasHomer-Dixon, PeaceandConflict Studies,Toronto The mainEuropeanproject is the Swiss“Environment and Conflicts Project”, hostedjointly by theSwissPeaceFoundation (Beme), andCenter for Security Studies andConflict Research(ZUrich). A Swedishcontributionis sketchedin Wallensteen 1992.


resources— cropland,forests,waterandfish — arealreadycontributingto violentconflicts in many partsof thedevelopingworld, eventhoughtheseconflictsof-ten appearto be causedsolely by political, ethnic or ideological factors.Theprojectboldly concludedthat theseconflicts foreshadowa surgeof similar vio-lence in coming decadesasenvironmentalscarcitiesworsenin manydevelo-ping countries.Conflicts over sharedwater resourceswas considereda highrisk; althoughtheoutcomewasmoreoftendeemedto be political conflictsbet-weencountriesthanwar.Themereperceptionofwaterissuesasapotentialcon-flict source,however,remainsapowerful factorperse.1’

By the time of the secondproject, risks of internationalconflict wasde-emphasized.Instead,efforts were concentratedon reducedstatecapacityandrisksfor civil violence(asopposedto internationalconflictor war),asa conse-quenceof environmentalscarcities;stressingthat environmentalchangeis onlyone of threemain sourcesof renewableresourcescarcity.The second,popula-tion growth, reducesa resource’spercapitaavailability by dividing it amongmoreandmorepeople.Thethird, unequalresourcedistribution,canconcentratearesourcein thehandsof a fewpeopleand subjecttherest to extremescarcity.Theterm “environmentalscarcity” allows thesethreedistinct sourcesof scarci-ty to be incorporatedinto one analysis.12

As will be seen,this conceptis particularly useful when analyzingwaterscarcity,since,on the onehand,it pointsto the importanceof finding moreeffi-cient waysof using theexisting water, in order to stretchthe resourcebaseinthe faceof diminishing per capitaallotments;and on theotherhandthe impor-tanceof diminishinginequalitiesin distribution.

In summary,theresearchso far doesnotallow for establishingaclearcau-sal connectionbetweenenvironmentalfactorsandthreatsto peace(noteveninthe seeminglyclear-cutcaseofRwanda).13It does,however,indicatethatcom-plex environmentalscarcitiesof the typedescribedaboveis an aggravatingfac-tor in underminingthecapacityof weakstates,leadingto increasedrisk of civilviolence and, ultimately,to possiblebreak-downof the state.As a result, em-phasisin the third project haschangedagain;now towardsestablishinglinksbetweenthetwo factorspopulationandenvironment,on the onehand,and themoregeneralconceptofsecurity,on theother.14

11 Theoutcomeof theproject (“EnvironmentalChangeandAcuteConflict”, sponsoredbythe AmericanAcademy of Arts and Sciencesand the University of Toronto, 1990-93)issummarizedin Homer-Dixon 1991,Homer-I)ixon et a!. 1993,andHomer-Dixon 1994Waterconflicts were treatedin Gleick 1992,Lowi 1992.

12. I have tried to introduce the conceptof environmental scarcity on theSwedishscenein ahcentiate thesis, “Miljorelaterade resurskonflikter” (Ohisson 1995) Pointsof departurefor the project “Environmental Scarcities,State Capacity, and Civil Violence”, running1994-96,aresummarizedin Homer-Dixon 1994.

13 Rwanda, before its collapse,had one of the lowest per capitaallotmentsof agnculturalland in the world. The crucial factor unleashLng the ethnic violence,however, seemstohavebeenregimeinsecurity.Cf. Percival& Homer-Dixon 1995.

14 Someof thefast-trackresultsof “The Projecton Environment.,Populationand Security”(startedin July 1994,sponsoredby theAmerican Associationfor theAdvancementof Sci-enceandUniversity of Toronto) aresummarized in Homer-Dixon 1995,Percival & Ho-mer-Dixon 1995,andGizewski& Homer-Dixon 1995 — with more to come,i.a. “Environ-mental Scarcity andViolent ConflicL The Caseof South Afnca”.

Main Study: Changing Perceptions of Security 5

Environment and security

It hasbeenarguedthat “security”, in thecontemporaryusageof theterm,is aconceptthat’virtually hadno meaningbeforethesecondWorld War, andthat itis almostinextricablylinked with theneedsof themilitary in thepost-warworldorder.Significantly, attemptsto establishlinks betweenenvironmentalscarcitiesandsecuritydid not receiveofficial backinguntil the break-downof this secu-rity (or, asit were,insecurity)order.

Interestingly,almostimmediatelywith theadventof thenew discourseonenvironmentalsecurityin theUS,a heateddebatewasstartedin thatcountryonthe feasabilityof using securityasaviableconceptfor treatingenvironmentallyrelatedproblems.Proponentsfor using theconceptseemedto havea clear-cutcase:Whatcould bemore basicto a country’sprospectsthan accessto naturalresourcesanda healthyenvironment?And environmentalpollution doesnot re-spectborders.Contendersarguedthatenvironmentalprotection,accessto natu-ral resources,and potentialconstraintsfor foodproduction,areindeedof prima-ry concern,particularlyfor developmentpolicies,andclearlymerit thehighestdegreeof nationalandinternationalconcern.Thesegoals,however,run arisk ofbeing compromisedby using a conceptthatby its inherentlogic will advocatemilitary-typesolutions,or makefor acontinuationof themilitary nationalsecu-rity agendaon problemareashithertolargely uncompromizedby this logic. 15

At theroot of this debatelies theinherentambiguityof the conceptbehindthe term“security”, which allows for attemptsof twisting it, from its prevalentcontemporarymeaningof “military and nationalsecurity”, into its more basicmeaning“social andsocietalsecurity”.16 Theadvantagesof makingsuchanat-tempt, in order to gain entranceto the sceneof high politics, may seemover-whelming. Theproblems,however,will occurpreciselywhenenteringthe areaofpolicy making. Will theUS shouldera responsibilityfor sustainabledevelop-mentin e.g.southernAfrica, if an analysisof the“new” or “alternative” securi-ty issuesshowthatthey posevery little threatto nationalsecuntyin thetraditio-nal sense?Will Sweden,in the long run?17

Environment and socialdevelopment

Peaceresearchhasa strong traditionof stressingpositive peace(prospectsforsocialdevelopment)asopposedto negativepeace(mereabsenceof war). The

15 Different views,and reviews of the US debate, arefound in Lipschutz 1992,Claussen1995, Dabelko& Dabelko1995,Matthew 1995,de Sherbinin 1995

16 This is a feature particular to theEnglishusageof theterm Thecorrespondingadvantagedoesnot existin Swedish, where the meaning of “s~kerhet”overwhelnungly is investedwith military connotations,andvirtually empty of “socialochsamhàllehgtrygghet” Pro-ponentsof including environmental issuesin a new perception of “sakerhet” thus runmuch larger risksin the Swedish debate, than theirEnglish speakingcontemporariesdowhen they arguefor the relevancyof “environmentalsecurity”.

17. Thesefearsmay seempremature. The presentstudy, however, is only oneofat leastthreeofficial reports, related in one way or anotherto the subjectof environmental security, thatmy own department lately hasbeenaskedto takepartin, clearly pointing to the importan-cepaid to thenew discourseon securityin Swedishofficials circles. A word of warning, inthecontext of theongoinginternational debate,would be that a smularstruggle for deliria-tory powermay be going on betweendifferent actors closeto the Swedishpolicy sphere


specialtaskforceon sustainabledevelopmentassistance,appointedby theSwe-dish ForeignOffice, ties in to this tradition (albeitnot explicitly) whenthey,onthe onehand,maintainthe importanceof includingenvironmentalandresourceissuesin anew securitypolicy, but, significantly andon theotherhand,takeavery strong standagainstmilitary concernsor solutionshavinganything to dowith this newagenda;heavily investing it insteadwith traditionalSwedishcon-cernsfor socialdevelopment.18

Sweden,it is argued,shouldcontinueits traditionof beingoneof thelead-ing countriesin theworld on assistancefor sustainabledevelopment,making it

ahigh-profile issueof Swedishforeignpolicy. Waterresourcemanagementex-plicitly is definedasthenumberone natural resourcespriority area,aspartofpreservingthebasisfor foodproductionin recipientcountries.The importanceof including regionalframeworksfor conflict resolutionprocessesaspartofthedevelopmentassistanceis stressed.19

Implicitly, water scarcity therebyis definedasa threat,not first and fore-mostto internationalpeace,but to theability of developingcountriesto pursueasuccessfulsocialdevelopmentpolicy, asa resultof challengesto thestate,duein turn to acombinationof populationincrease,and scarcityof land and waterresources.Therestof this study will try to underpinthis interpretationby com-plementingit with theanalyticstrengthof theconceptenvironmentalscarcityasdefinedearlier.

Environmental Scarcity of Land and WaterAt a 1994 meetingof African agricultural ministers,ZimbabweanministerKumbirai Kangai condemnedthelack ofinvestmentin agricultureby theconti-nent’sgovernmentsand said thatwithout a changein direction “themajority ofourstateswill continueto begfor foodandaid from theinternationalcommuni-ty,,.20

Africa is uniquelyvulnerableto food insecurity.21With thelowestper ca-pita incomesandthemostrapidpopulationgrowth,the continenthasmovedinthelast threedecadesfrom foodself-sufficiencyto dependenceon outsidersforonefifth ofits food.At thesametime, thecontinentsuffersmore thanany otherfrom droughtand desertification. Only Asia has a larger area of degraded land.Although rainfall in some areasof the region is adequatefor producingfoodalsofor others,the lackof transportinfrastucturestill posesgreatdifficulties.

It is still an openquestion,whetherthecyclical patternof droughtsin facthaschangedits periodicity,so that droughtsareoccuringmoreoften than theyusedto, which is an effect to be expectedfrom global climate change.The re-curring droughtsin southernAfrica meanwhilecontinue to be a seriouschal-lengeto thefoodsecurityof the region.22

18 The taskforcevery wisely abstainedfrom trying to find a Swedish translation for the term“environmental secunty”, thus temporarily circumventing someheavily mined temtory.Cf. Utrikesdepartementet 1994,p 30 if

19. Utnkesdepartementet1994,p 12, 64,68.

20 Engelman& LeRoy 1995,p. 2621 Cf. Appendix I, “Population, Environment andSecurity~An Overview .

Main Study: Environmental Scarcity of Land and Water 7

Despitetheselimitations, African farmershave proven themselvesenor-mously resourcefulandhaveexpandedfoodproductionon averageby two per-centayear.Yet populationis growingby threepercentannuallyon average.Indecadesto come,thesetrendsinexorablywill induceenvironmentalscarcitiesof landandwaterin severalSADC countries.23Facinthesechallenges,theim-portanceof programmesaimedat increasingthecompetenceof farmersto ma-nagepropertyin thefaceof rainfall scarcitycannotbe overstated.

It hasbeensaid that farmersdo not producein orderto provehow muchfood it is possibleto grow on a certainarea,but for selling their produceon amarket. Productionfiguresthus tell us more aboutthe economicsof food pro-duction, thanpotentialfood productioncapability. Seenin this light, the fooddeficit in southernAfrica couldbe interpretedmoreasaresultof generalecono-mic failure, than as an inherentweaknessof the agriculturalbase. Foodnotgrowncan be bought,if theeconomyis working.~

Others,however,maintain thatchangesin prospectsfor global foodprices,asa resultof increasingdemandsfrom growingpopulationswho canafford tobuy food, still will meandifficulties for economicallyweak areaslike southernAfrica.25

Population and land

Theareaof potentially arableland in southernAfrica is limited, andthelandit-self is extremelyvulnerable.As populationgrowthcontinueswell into the nextcentury(asit will, in spiteof changingreproductivepatterns;themothersof to-morrowarealreadyborn,andthey aremany),per capitaallotmentsof agricul-tural landwill shrink.

Calculationsmadefor this study showthat by 2025 Malawi and Tanzaniawill fall below thecritical bench-markof 0,07 ha of croplanciper capita,to bejoined in 2050 by Lesotho,Mozambique and Swaziland,and severalothercountriescomingdangerouslyclose.~

This bench-markis not a fixed limit, but it is consideredto be a thresholdof concern,beyondwhich countriescannotsupportthemselveswithout depen-ding on massiveinput of fertilizersand — significantly— massiveirrigation. Theseriousnessof thechallengecan be mitigatedby efforts directedat increasingwater-useefficiency and conservingthe inherentproductive capacity of theland.This,in turn, will entailbroadcapacity-buildingprogrammes,sincefailingto raisethecompetenceof farmersmayalsomeanthatefforts directedat enfor-cingan equitablelanddistributioncouldcontributeto theunwantedeffectof in-creasingthe environmentalscarcity of land through increasedsoil degrada-tion.27

22. For an estimation of the food-securitychallengesfrom thepresent drought in southernAfrica, only three years after the last one, seeAppendix II “SADC Food Security Anoverview 1995”, andAppendix 111 “SADC FoodSecurity A country overview”, built onthe USAID FamineEarly WarningSystem,FEWS.

23 Cf Appendix IV, “Population Growth andLand Scarcity”24 The wellknown authonty on the econonucsbehind starvation, AmartyaSen, adoptsthis

line of reasoningin a recent work on prospectsfor global food production (Sen 1994).25 Brown & Kane 1994 I have reviewedthe debatein Ohlsson 1995

26. Cf Appendix IV “Population Growth and Land Scarcity”

8 Water and Securityin Southern Africa

On theotherhand, failure to enforcean equitablelanddistributionwill in-creaseotherproblems.Thevery needsfor increasedoutput,modernizationandintensificationof agriculturein that casewill leadto a surplusof labour,whowill seekemploymentin cities, placing greatdemandson the modernsector.Thegrowthof cities themselves,and thedemandson landfrom industry, roadsand otherinfrastructurewill furtherencroachon agricultural land. Societalef-fectswill include increasedmigrationfrom the countrysideto cities, possiblyalso betweencountries,entailing risks of conflictsbetweendifferent groupsofthe population,andsocialdiscontentamongtheunemployed.

Population andWaterIn Africa, morethanperhapsin anyothercontinent,thedemandfor increasedfoodproductioncapacitytranslatesintoademandfor moreof thescarceresour-ce water.As notedby thespecialtaskforce on sustainabledevelopment:“It isunlikely that peoplein water-starvedareaswill die of thirst; theywill die ofstarvation”.~

Irrigation accountsfor between60 percentand three-quartersof all waterusedin southernAfrica.29 Of this, about60 percentis wasted,notonly throwingaway a valuable resource,but causingseriousenvironmentalproblems.InSouthAfrica, theregion’s biggestirrigator, only one percentof theagriculturalland is irrigated,but it produces30 percentof the valueof agriculturalproduc-tion. Botswana,whosecurrencyis namedafter themostimportantresourceinthe region,pula or rain, in 1991 decidedit could afford to irrigate only wherethereis no otherpossibleusefor thewater.This hasmeantgiving up thegoaloffoodself-sufficiencyin favour of foodsecurity;a poignantexampleof water,not agricultural land, being the limiting factor for food productionin southernAfrica.

At the baseof theenvironmentalscarcityof water in southernAfrica liesclimatic and environmentalfactors,difficult to overcome.The“thirst of the at-mosphere”in manypartsof the regionmakesmostof therain evaporatebeforeit is absorbedby theground;rainfall itself is scarceandunreliableon a year-to-year basis, producinglittle run-off exceptin a few areasm the south-east.Asizeableportionof theavailablewater in mostcountriescomesfrom riversori-ginatingoutsidethatcountry.

A measureof the precariouswater balancein theregioncanbehad fromthefact that oneman-madedamalone,LakeKariba,containsanamountof wa-ter equalto 20 percentof the entire region’s annualrunoff. It is in turn morethan threetimes the quantity of water consumedannuallyin the entire region(yet little of it can beusedwithoutjeopardizingpowergeneration).

The enviromentalscarcityof wateris exacerbatedin the first instancebysimplepopulationgrowth, andfurtherby theneedsfor sustainingincreasingpo-pulationsthroughagricultureand industry. Waterscarcityalieadyranksasthe

27 As pointedout by P Heyns, Department of Water Affairs (DWA), Nanubia.28 Utrikesdepartementet1994,p29(my translation).29. SARDC (SouthernAfncanResearch& DocimentationCentre)1994,p. 11 and196. The

differentestimatesseemto comply with estunatesof iirigation’s partof global wateruse,usually givenas two-thirds (Sandra Postel in Gleick 1993,p. 56). Cf. alsoAppendix V:“Environment andWater An Overview of theSADCcountries”.

Main Study: The Challenge of Shared Water Resources 9

numberoneconstraintin severalof theregion’scountries.SouthAfrica andMa-lawi areclassifiedas“water-stressed”by hydrologists.Namibiahasgreatdiffi-cultiesin mobilizing its availablewater.~°Recurringdroughtsin Zimbabweal-mostforcedevacuationof thecountry’ssecondcity Bulawayoin 1992. Swazi-land is totally dependenton rivers runningoutor in to the country,andthusvul-nerableto thegood-will ofneighbouringcountries.

Calculationsmadefor thisstudy, albeitmarredby lackof up-to-datedata,show that by any count themajority of the region’scountrieswill sufferfromacutewater shortageswithin the nextfew decadesasaresultof the inexorabletrendsinfluencingenvironmentallyinducedwaterscarcity.31

In theshortrun, the waterneedsof the regionhasconcentratedinterestonefforts to supplymorewater;exploitingexistingsourcesmoreheavily,and thusbringingtheproblemsof sharedwaterresourcesinto focus.In a slightly longerperspectivescompetitionbetweendifferentsocietalsectors,alreadyapparent—agriculturevs. industry,andcountry-sidevs. cities— will bring newrisksofcon-flicts of interestto the fore,within counthesandbetweenthem.

Main attentionin theregiontoday is directedalmostexclusivelyon thein-herentlyconflict-generatingattemptsat increasingsupply; in the long run, ho-wever, the needfor a completelynew wateruseregimewill haveto be con-templated,aimedat refining methodsofwaterdemandmanagement,waterawa-reness,conservationandrecyclingof existingwater;andevenrestructuringin-dustryand agriculture,in orderto maximizetheeconomicuseof availablewa-terresources.Basedon availablereports,awarenessof thisnecessityis still lowin theregion,implying in theshortrunaneedfor educationalprogrammes,andin the longruna wholenew agendafor research,developmentcooperationandcapacitybuilding.

The Challenge of Shared Water ResourcesA completeoverviewof sharedriver systemsandongoingwaterprojectsin theregionis providedin AppendixVifi: “SharedRiverSystems”.As will be seen,almostall sharedriver basinshave majorprojectsthat will haveeffectsondownstreamcountries.Interest,however,is concentratedon the majorperennialrivers; theZambeziin particular,but also theOkavango,theOrange,thePun-gue, theCuneneand theSave.

The Zambeziis the largestriver in Africa running into the Indian Ocean,with 26 million Qeopleliving within its catchmentarea,in eightof the elevenSADC countries.~2Lackof wateris regardedasthemain constraintfor agricul-tural productionin all but8 percentof thearableland in theZambezibasin.Theareaembracescapitalsand other larger towns, like Harare,Lusaka,Llongwe,Bulawayo,andLivingstone.Themain proposedwaterprojectsare:

30 An accountof themeasuresnecessaryto safe-guardwater supply for cities and agncultureunder theseextremedrylandconditions is given in Appendix V. “Surface Water Manage-mentin Arid Regions”.

31. Cf. calculationsin Appendix VII “Population Growth andWater Scarcity”32. Angola, Botswana, Malawi, Mozambique, Namibia, Tanzania,Zambia and Zimbabwe

Cf. Amestrand1993


• MatabelelandZambeziWater Project.to providewaterto Bulawayo,Zim-babwe’ssecondcity, andaccessibleruralcommunitiesandagriculturalde-velopmentalalternativesiteson the Zambezi,both upstreamanddown-streamof Victoria Falls.

• BotswanaWaterProjectinvolving thesupplyof ZambezilChobeRiverwa-ter from Kazungulain NorthernBotswanato a damat Selibi-Phikweandthenon to Gaborone.As afirst steptheNorth-Southcarrierfrom thedamatSelibi-Phikweto Gaboronewill be constructed.

• Extentionof theNationalWaterCarrier in Namibiato bring waterfromOkavangoto centralNamibia.

• SouthAfrican WaterProjectinvolving thetransferof waterfrom Kazungu-la acrossBotswanato theTransvaal.This projectis controversialamongtheZambeziriver riparianstates.

• Otherprojectsinclude theBatokaGorgeHydroelectricschemepresentlybeingstudiedby Zambiaand Zimbabwe,andthe Namibianhydropowerschemeon Cunene,which involvesAngolanwaterinterests.

Other majorwatertransferschemesstartedorcontemplatedin theregionareoutlinedin AppendixIx.33 Theyinclude the presentlylargestwater transferschemein theworld, theLesothoHighlandsWaterProject(LHWP), one of thefew suchprojectsthatdoesnot involve theZambezi.Interestingly,theLHWPistheonly watertransferschemethat accordingto someviewshasbeeninstru-mentalin creatingopenconflictsin theregion.

Facingcritical watershortages,SouthAfrica negotiatedin vain with Lesot-ho for thirty yearsto divertwater from Lesotho’smountainsto the arid SouthAfricanprovinceof Transvaal.In 1986SouthAfrica gavedecisivesupportto asuccessfulmilitary coup againstLesotho’stribal government.SouthAfrica de-claredthat it helpedthecoupbecauseLesothohad beenprovidingsanctuarytoguerrillasof theAfrican National Congress.This wasundoubtedlya key moti-vation, but within monthsthe two governmentsreachedagreementto constructthehugeHighlandsWaterProjectto meetSouthAfrica’s needs.It seemslikely,therefore,thatthe desirefor water wasanulterior motivebehindSouthAfricansupportfor thecoup.34

Accordingto otherviews, theLHWP in factbroughtLesotho,NamibiaandSouth Africa togetherand showedthe value of watercommissionsand operdiscussionof fearsandexpectations.35

Lesothois almost the only countryin the regionwith abundantwaterre-sources.Thecompensationsystemin LHWPhasbeendescribedasthe mostge-

33 It is importantto realizethat mostof theseprojects,with the importantexceptionsof theLHWP andMatabelelandprojects,arcasyet only contemplated.Ideasand projects, how-ever, tend to be powerful agentsof creating imagesof threatsand conflictual interests.Feelings in Zambia,asanexample,havebeenrunning very high over the recently signedProtocolon Protocol on SharedWatercourseSystemsin the SADC Region (moreof thisbelow). SaysZambia’s southern region’s most influential chief, Chief Mukuni, whosekingdom spansthe longestdistancealong the Zainbezi in Zambia,according to newsre-ports: “I amready to die over the tapping of water from the river.”

34. Homer-Dixon 1991.

35. As pointedout by P. Heyns,DWA Namibia

Main Study: The International IWRM Policy Framework 11

nerousin Africa. But a prominentBasothochiefviewsit asthedeclineof ana-tion andthesurrenderof sovereigntybecauseit takesawaythe only wealthLe-sotho has.36As will be seenfrom calculationsin Appendix VU: “PopulationGrowthandWaterScarcity”,Lesothoitself will be sufferingfrom waterscarcitywithin afew decades,andthuscanbe saidto havesold out its ownfuture.

Theothersideof thecoin is thatSouthAfrica will alsobe dependenton Le-sothoin thefuture, and thatLesothowill gain from the projectby gettingmorewater than it would have, if the water would haveflown uniutilized into thesea.37

Namibia,who is contemplatingwaterwithdrawalsfrom theZambeziin thenorth to sugarplantationsin the Caprivi strip, and from the Okavangoto thecentral area of thecountry,is also affectedin thesouth by the LHWP, throughwithdrawalsfrom thesharedOrangeRiver, andhasgiven a“no objection” onlyto phaseI of theproject.

The caseof Lesotho,aswell asthe numberof waterwithdrawalsplannedfrom the Zambezi, highlights the need for a functional and confidence-generatingregionalframeworkfor waterresourcemanagementnegotiations.

The lnternationaJ JWRM Policy FrameworkTheexisting internationalconsensuson a frameworkfor integratedwaterre-sourcemanagement(IWRM) hasgrownoutof aseriesof policy meetingsanddocuments,often spearheadedby SwedishandNordic scientistsanddevelop-mentpolicy-makers,fighting for the importanceof placingwaterissueson theinternationalagenda.

Theyincludethefour “Dublin Principles”:(1) Water andlandmustbe ma-naged in an integrated way. (2) Management must be participatory and on thelowestpossiblelevel. (3) Positivepolicies must be formulatedto addresswo-men’sneedsand empowerwomen.(4) Watershouldbe recognizedandtreatedasan economicgood.

To this should be addedthe OECD/DAC requirementthat developmentprogrammesshouldcontainadistinctelementofconflict preventionandresolu-tion. Furtherimportantcontributionsto the internationallyacceptedframeworkof waterresourcemanagementhasbeenmadethroughwork carriedout withinthe InternationalConventionto CombatDesertification.38

The SADC Regional WRM FrameworkWithin theregionitself and in donorcircles it is generallyagreedthat waterre-sourcemanagementnecessarilyentailsregionalcooperation.A review of thebackgroundmaterialprovidedfor thisstudy,however,showsthat thetypeof in-stitutionsmostsuitable,andtheirscopeofresponsibility,arestill contestedissu-

36. SARDC 1992.37. As pointedout by P. Heyns,DWANamibia38. Cf AppendixX “The InternationalIWRM PolicyFramework” Theovemding framework

formanaginginternationallysharedwater resources,the Helsinki Rules, is reviewed sepa-mtely in Appendix XI SeealsoLundqvist & Jønch-Clausen1994


es.In what follows, theexistingregionalframeworkpertinentto waterresourcemanagementwill be reviewedfor its capacityto comply with the needfor ba-sinwide management,participatorydevelopment,capacity-building,conflict-preventingandconfidence-building.39

Generalenvironmental national legislation

Severalcountries,notably Botswana,Tanzania,ZambiaandZimbabwe,havepreparedNationalConservationStrategies(NCSs),modelledon IUCN’s (Inte-nationalUnion for theConservationof Nalure)World ConservationStrategy,toguidenationalenvironmentalpolicies.Lesotho,Malawi andMozambiqueuseNationalEnvironmentalAction Plans(NEAPs)for thesamepurpose,associatedwith World Bank-sponsoredeconomicstructuraladjustmentprogrammes(SAPs)asapreconditionfor aid. Namibiawasthe first countryin theregion toenshrinein its constitutionaclauseon protectionof thenaturalenvironmentandhasan apporvedenvironmentalassessmentpolicy.

Most countriesin theregion haveestablishedcentralenvironmentagen-cies,suchasZimbabwe’sNaturalResourcesBoard orTanzania’sNationalEn-vironmentManagementCouncil.

EnvironmentalImpact Assessmentson hydroelectricschemeshave beendone in Angola on the Kapandahydroproject,in Botswanaon theBokaadam,and jointly by Zambiaand Zimbabwein theZambezivalley. Preparationsareunderwayto incorporateEIAs into law in Botswana,Zambiaand Zimbabwe,while SouthAfrica hastableda white paperfor an all-embracingenvironmentalethics.’~

National Water MasterPlans

The BotswanaNationalWaterMasterPlan Study from 1991 is oneof Africa’smostrealisticplansfor sustainablewaterresources.It clearlydemonstratedthatthewaterresourcesof Botswanado notallow for any largescaleirrigation.As aresultBotswanahasgiven up its previousstrategyof self-sufficiencyin foodandinsteadadopteda policy of “food-security”, i.e. the economyhasto bestrongenoughto purchasefood from abroad.

Lesqtho’sMinistry ofAgriculturehaslaunchedaprojectwith funding fromSidacalled “ProductionThroughConservation”(PTC). It is aneffort to decen-tralizethedecision-makingto district level in order to improvetheprovisionofrelevant,timely and effectiveservicesto peoplein the villages. PTC meansplanningatthe lowestappropriatelevel in accordancewith theNordic Freshwa-terInitiative.

In some of the SADC countries(South Africa, Botswana,Namibia,Zim-babwe’sZambeziValley, TanzaniaandMalawi) studiestowardwatermanage-mentmasterplanshavebeenmade.Namihiais developingherwaterresourcesaccordingto the 1974WaterMasterPlan.in othercountriestheplanningof fu-taredevelopmenthasnot reachedthat far. This pertainsin particularto Mozam-

39 Almost nomatenalpertinentto the two remammgDublin principles, genderissuesandthecorrectpricing of water, hasbeenfound in the matenal, which further underlines the needfor researchandeducationalprogrammes,also in the region, on theseareas.

40. SARDC 1994

Main Study: The SADC Regional WRM Framework 13

biqueandSwaziland.Thesecountrieswill be prone to adverseeffectsfrom oth-er countries’wateruseasaconsequenceof its downstreamsite. In Zimbabwethereis an urgentneedfor a NationalWater ResourceDevelopmentPlan,sincethe existingWaterMasterPlan, preparedsomeyearsago with NORAD (Nor-wegianAgency for InternationalDevelopment)funding, mainlyconcernsruralsupply.41

Regionalagreements

A wide plethoraof waterresourcemanagementprogrammesare~oingon in theregion;someof themostimportantbeingcoordinatedby SADC, 2 but far fromall.

In November1981, the SADC Council of MinistersrequestedLesothotocoordinateregional activities on soil, water conservationand land utilization.Eight sectoralcoordinationunits havesincebeenestablished,including theEn-vironmentand Land ManagementSector (ELMS), entrustedwith overall re-sponsibility for environmentalissuessince1990.

SADC ELMS is a three-tierprogrammedevelopedto definepriority areasof concernto the region.Sevenareasof concernhavesofar beenidentified,in-cluding: sustainablewatersupply andquality; efficientuseof energyresources;anddemographicchangeandpressures.

Oneof themostimportantprojectshandledby SADC ELMS, theZambeziRiverAction Plan(ZACPLAN), involvestheeight countriesof the Zambeziii-ver basin, and focuseson ways to guaranteethequantity andquality of watercrossingbordersthroughsharingarrangementsandcompensation.ZACPLAN’sprinciplescomefrom theSADC Treaty itself, which providesfor cooperationinthe areaof naturalresourcesandtheenvironment.’3

ZACPLAN, however,is only one of many ongoing regionalnegotiations.Namibiahasworkingjoint river-basinmanagementagreementswith Angola onthe Cunenesince 1990; with Botswanaon the Okavangosince1991; and withAngola andBotswanaon theOkavangosince l994.’~Botswana,Mozambique,SouthAfrica andZimbabwehavealsosetup a joint committeeon theLimpoporiver. Other water agreementshave tendedto be short-term,mostly in accordwith theHelsinki rules.

Thereareapproximately22 majoragrementsbetweentheelevendifferentSADC statesconcerningjoint cooperationin variousfields, including water.Insomeareastheinstitutionscreateddoesnot functionwell, andin othercasesnoagreementsforjoint cooperationon sharedwatercoursesystemshavebeenesta-blishedat all.4~

The Protocol on SharedWatercourseSystems

ZACPLAN wasinitiated alreadyin 1985by UNDP (United NationsDevelop-mentProgramme),SADC ELMS, and theZambezibasinstates,exceptNami-

41. Arnestrand1993,andcommentsby P. Heyns,DWANamibia

42 The SADCprogrammesarelisted in Appendix XIII “SADC WRM Programmes”

43. SARDC 199444 P Heyns,DWA Namibia

45 Theseagreementsarelisted in Appendix XII “Existing Agreements”


bia, which wasnot yet independent.Out of the work on the ZACPLAN hasgrown, in a sometimestortuousprocess.the so called“Protocol on SharedWatercourseSystemsin the SADC Region”,originally plannedfor acceptanceatthe 1993SADC summit,butnot agreeduponuntil 1995.~

The 1992 Treatyestablishingthe SouthernAfrican DevelopmentCommu-nity defines“Protocol” asan instrumentofimplementationof theTreaty,havingthesamelegal forceastheTreaty.TheProtocolis thereforean extremelyimpor-tant document,as a legal baseto dealwith the region’s international rivers,thoughnot interferingwith alreadyexistingagreements.47

In 1994 theproposedProtocol was further strengthenedby incorporatingprovisionsfor andtheencouragementof theSADC statesto establishappropri-ate institutionslike PermanentRiver Basin WaterCommissionand OperatingAuthorities to managethe water resourcesof sharedwatercoursesystemsin asustainableway.’~

After manydelays,theprotocolwassignedat theAugust1995SADC sum-mit, with theexceptionof Mozambique,Tanzania,andZambia.49Thepositionof the Swedishgovernment,conveyedto the SADC, is that the protocol is amile-stonein SADC cooperation.Implementationof theprotocol is now takenoverby theZambeziRiverAuthonty (ZRA), Lusaka,Zambia.

Evaluationsof the existingframework for regional WRM cooperation

Realscientific backingcanbe foundwithin theregion for almostall conven-tionsaffecting thefateof southernAfrica. But muchof this expertiseis scatte-red in universities,public researchinstitutionsandin theprivate sector,andisnot fully utilized by governmentsin theregion.5°

A conclusionof the Sub-SaharanAfrica HydrologicalAssessmentProject(SSAHAP,a studyconductedon ELMS’s behalf)was thatinstitutionsaremorefrequentlyconstramedby organisationaland administrativeproblemsthanbytechnicaldifficulties. While a strong baseof highly qualified professionalsal-readyexistsin the region,the lackofefficiencyof waterresourcesinstitutionsisacommonproblem.Institution buildingandstrengthening— at both thenationalandregional levels— is generallyrecognizedasa key objectiveof all waterre-sourcesdevelopmentprojectsin the region. In theview of SADC ELMS itself,this is thereforean areawhereexternalsupportis urgentlyneeded.51

Severcriticism againstthe presentframeworkfor regionalcooperationonwater resourcemanagementis deliveredby the team appraisingZACPRO 6(Projectareano. 6 within ZACPLAN; developmentof an integratedwaterre-sourcesmanagementplan for theZambeziRiver Basin, fundedby the Nordic

46 The Protocoldoesnot replaceZACPLAN, which is for theZambezionly47 Editorial, Splash,Vol 10, No 1, 1994

48 Manuscnptby P. Heyns,DWA Namibia

49. The technical reasongivenfor not sigmng at the summitis the needfor thesecounthestogetparliamentaryapproval before sigmng. For someof the other countnestheprotocol isvalid immediately upon signing, while others again needto go thmugh a processof ratifi-cation.

50. SARDC 1994

51. Editonal,Splash,Vol 10, No 1, 1994

Main Study: The SADC Regional WRM Framework 15

countries),stating that “ministers and water sectorinstitutionsof the regionhavelimited knowledge”andare“unawareof specificobjectivesandconstrain-ts”. Initiatedpersonsnumber“just a few individuals” in eachcountry.Planningefforts so far go little beyondtheHelsinki rules anddo not comply to the Co-penhagenandDublin principlesof managmenton the lowestappropriatelevel.According to the appraisalteam,no appropriateprovisionshavebeenmadeforcapacity-buildingtraining andeducation.Oneof themajorreasonsfor theslowprogressandfew tangibleresultsis deemedto be theinappropriateinstitutionalframework.52

Thereseemsto be a hugegap betweenthecomplexity of theproject, andthecapacityand competenceof the nationalagenciesconcernedwith waterre-sourcesmanagementin theripariancountries.Somecountries,suchasBotswa-na,arebetteroff andsome,suchasAngolaandZambia,worse.Thepriority puton ZACPLAN is low; theparticipationsofar very limited andthecommitmentsmadeindicateno majorchange.Writesonereviewer:“Unlessfinancialstabilityis achieved,thereis little hopethatZACPRO6 will be any differentfrom otherfailed planningexercisesin theregion.”53

Theappraisalof the project, which alsohasbeencharacterizedasa“so fardonor-drivenactivity”, echoesothercnticism directedat SADC ELMS. By allpartiesconcerned,the organizationis regardedas a valuableforum for discus-sion anda well-funtioning clearing-housefor information; a common opinion,however,beingthatplanningefforts arebetterhandledby othertypesof organi-zations,suchasaWaterCommissionsetup by theripariancountries.M

P. Heyns,of the NamibianDepartmentof WaterAffairs, arguesfor estab-lishing PermanentRiver Basin WaterCommissions(PRWBCs) with adequateterms of referenceand appropriatepowers to meet its commitments.ThePRBWCsshouldeventuallyproposeattreatyfor theequitableand beneficialut-ilization of thewaterresourcesof theparticularbasin.DS

Such a commission,the ZambeziRiver Basin WaterCommission(ZAM-COM), hasbeenproposedby Namibiaand Botswana,and is consideredthemost viable solution to solve the ZACPRO 6 problems.Similar Commissionshavebeenset up jointly be severalcountriesin the regionfor commonrivers,suchastheCommissionfor theOkavangoRiver setup by Angola,NamibiaandBotswana,the Commissionfor the CuneneRiver set up by AngolaandNami-bia, andthe Commissionfor theLesothoHighlandWater Projectsetup by Le-sothoandSouthAfrica. However,settingup sucha Commissionand providingit with a competentsecretariatis not an easy task; it will taketime andrequireextensivesupport.56

52. Wangenetal 1995 P Heyns,DWA Nanubia,regardsthis asa very sweepingstatement,andpoints to the rural water supply competenceat hand in Namibiaand South Africa.

53 Nilsson 199554. Ibid.; Nilsson 1994, 1995,Arnestrand1993, InternalForeignOffice 1U2 memoon SADC

meetingin Lilangwo, Malawi, January1995 It is beyond my competenceto evaluateopi-mons aired from the region, anddeterminewhethertheymay be expressionsof interestfrom particular countnesor groups, or not

55 Manuscnpt by P Heyns madeavailable to Sida.

56 Nilsson 1995.For examplesmentioned, cf Appendix XII “Existing Agreements”


Otherstakea differing view on the needfor a secreteriat.The Namibianperspectiveis that suchCommissionsmustbe cost effective,“lean and meanmachines”,utilizing steeringcommitteesset up from indigenousresourcestostudyrelevanttopicswith the assistanceof consultants.The regionmustshowcommitmentandachievesuccesson its own, asaprerequisitefor using fundingopportunitieseffectively.57

Securityaspects

Puttingnot too fine a point on it, thesituation thus seemsto be that the bestplanningefforts, supportedand initiated by Nordic donoragencies,concerningthemoststrategicriver basinin the region,and carriedout by theregionalorga-nizationof higheststature,fall considerablyshortof expectations.

This maycomeasa disappointmentto donoragencies,but from a regionalcooperativeandsecuritypoint of view it doesnot necessarilyentail failure. Re-gional cooperationhasnot broken down; the negotiatingtable hasnot beenabandonedfor power politics; criticism comesfrom inside the region,just asmuchasfrom projectreviewers,and it is accompaniedby constructivesugges-tions for how theprocesscouldbe mademoreeffecient.

True, theremaybe somelossof momentumandtime (notunimportant,andalessonfor the future);andtheremaybe somehurt feelings,bothwithin regio-nal officesand donoragencies,but in the absenceof otherinformation, thepre-sentstateof affairsdoesnotyet seemto imply seriouspolitical conflict.

Prospects for Regional IWRM CooperationNo singlefactorhaschangedprospectsfor regionalSADC cooperationon inte-gratedwaterresourcemanagementmorethantheadventof thenewSouth Afri-ca. Themain negativeraison d’être for SADC’s existenceso far, hasnow beco-me the organization’smostpowerful andcompetentmember,bringing bothhopeandcertainfearswith it.

At the first SADC meetingwhereSouthAfrica took part asa member,atLilongwe,Malawi in January1995,diplomaticobserversweremuchimpressedby thestatureandmaturityofthe delegation’swayof handlingits inauguralses-sion. Othershavewitnessedhow SouthAfrican officials weredeterminednot toact as the “big bear” in the new regional context. Conversationsin corridorsprovedthat the South African delegationwasjust asmuchtakenabackby theslightly anarchicway in which SADC proceedingstook place,as othermem-bersmay havefeareda take-overby the newregionalpower.Therewasa fee-ling of newnesson all hands.58

And newnessthereis, also in wateraffairs. South Africa providesacorn-pietely differentpicturefrom therestoftheregionwith regardto bothcapacityand competence;its waterresourcesplanningandmanagementsectoris extre-mely well developed,and hopesarehigh for utilizing thecompetenceavailable

57. Commentby P. Heyns,DWANamibia.

58 InternalForeignOffice 1U2 memoon SADC meetingin Lilangwo, Malawi, January 1995.Nilsson 1994.

Main Study: Conclusion 17

in SouthAfrica for training in otherpartof the region.A starthasalreadybeenmadeby trainingNamibiansin theoperationofweatherservices.59

But thereis anotherside,not to be forgotten.Evenwith thebestintentionsfrom the ANC (African NationalCongress),the legacyof SouthAfrica’s apar-theid past will definethe direction of its development.The countryhasgreatwaterneedsto satisfy,stemmingboth from a long marginalizedmajority in thehomelandsandelsewhere,and from themostadvanced— andwater-demanding— industrialsectorin the region.Althoughan old engineeringdream,the largestcontemporaryongoing water transferschemein the world, the LesothoHig-landsWaterPlan,wasrealizedduring the apartheideraby themeansof powerpolitics, arguablyevenoverthrowingthe governmentof anotherstate,asa me-ansto reachthe endof satisfying thewater needsof SouthAfrica’s industrialheartland,theGauteng(Pretoria-Witwatersrand-Vereeniging)area.

Understandably,theremaybe fearsfrom othercountriesin theregionthatthe waterneedsgeneratedby theexistingandvery powerful structureof SouthAfrican agriculture, industry and economy will prove so overwhelminglystrong, that not even the best intentionsof thenewgovernmentcouldstand inthe way of realizing its water needsat the expenseof othercountries’.Thesefearscentreparticularly on whatwill happenin apost-MandelaSouthAfrica.

Putting too great a focus on risks of international conflict betweencountriesin theregion,however,may also blind observers,within and outsidethe region,to thepotentiallymuchlargerrisksin thelong runof environmental-ly inducedscarcitiescreatingmisery and conflicts within countries,leadingtoconsequenceswhich are very difficult to foreseeat the presenttime. Preciselyfor this reason,however,theydeserveto be heldup at the front of thestageforreview by developmentcooperationpolicy-makers.Much of whatis reviewedin the following appendicieswill be seento underline the seriousnessof theseconcerns.

ConclusionTheneedfor integrated,basinwide,waterresourcemanagementis consideredaprimesecurityobjectivefor theprospectsof SADC regionalcooperation.Anymeasurethat will strengthensuchefforts thereforeoughtto be reviewedfor de-velopmentcooperationsupport.

In the short term, outdatedor non-existentdatamerit support for basichydrological datacollection, necessaryfor creatingor updatingnationalwatermasterplans, aspart of assessingall river basinresources.Any programmedi-rectedat increasingawarenessof waterissuesamongdecision-makersin there-gion deservessupport.Thepossibility of utilizing existingcompetencefrom thenewSouthAfrica for regionalcapacity-buildingought to be fully explored.

Watertransferschemesto ameliorateacutewater shortagefor cities andwater-starvedregionsalreadyareatthe top oftheregionalagenda,and will con-tinue to be sofor the mediumterm,necessitatingregionalnegotiationsandun-derlining theneedfor basinwidemanagement.The most importantsuchregio-nal waterresourcemanagementprogramme,theZACPLAN, hasbeenscrutini-

59 Nilsson 1995.

18 Water arid Security in Southern Africa

zedextensivelyby expertisefrom both within theregion and by externalrevie-wers.Judgingby thesereviews,the principalagencyhandling the programme,SADC ELMS, would benefitfrom institutionalsupport.

Attention on securityaspectsof waterissuesso far hasbeenconcentratedon the risk of watertransferschemescreatingconflicts — political or ultimatelyviolent — betweenstatesin theregion.Themereperceptionof suchrisksis ase-curity threat in its own right, underminingconfidence-creatingmeasuresbet-weencountries.Onthemeritsof availableevidence,however,theregionalcoo-perative framework seemsstrong enough to handle presentaspectsof thisthreat,particularlysinceofficials on all levels from thenewSouth Africa seemvery concernedabouteliminating any groundfor suspicionof regionalgreat-powerambitions.

Furthermore,concentratingon securityin this traditionalinter-statesensemayobscurethepotentiallymuchlargerrisks in the long runofenvironmental-ly inducedscarcitiescreatingmiseryand conflicts within countries,leadingtoconsequenceswhich are very difficult to foresee.Conflicts betweenstatesmayturn out to be amongtheseconsequences,althoughis worthunderliningthatthemostlikely scenariofor suchfutureconflicts to arisewill be throughafailure tomeetthe internal challengesfacinggovernmentsand statesalreadytoday.

Theseriskscanbe mitigatedby cooperation,understanding,trust,identify-ing the expectationsand concernsand by determiningthe potentialof the re-sourcebase,sothatnegotiationcanbe basedon facts.

Developmentcooperationefforts aimedat preparingcountriesin theregionfor a strategyof learning to live with aridity — i.e. using the availablewater,where it is available,to its greatestvalue -- thereforeseemsimperative,aspartof a largerstrategyof preparingfor the inevitablelong-timeandlarge-scalefor-cesof societalchange— with theirinherentcapacityofcreatingbreak-downten-denciesfor thestate— beingat work for thedurationof theforeseeablefuture intheSADC countries.

Appendix I:

Population, Environment and Security:An Overview of the SADC CountriesThepopulationin theelevenSADC countries(Angola,Botswana,Lesotho,Na-mibia, Malawi, Mozambique,Swaziland,SouthAfrica, Tanzania,ZambiaandZimbabwe)numbersabout136 million andis expectedto doublein thenext24years.1Overfive million babieswerebornin southernAfrica in 1993. Theseba-biesneedfood and water,shelterand warmth.As theygrowolder theywill needlandfor fanning,or jobs for wages,andthey will want to havechildrenof theirown. Governmentswill haveobligationsto thesebabiesthroughouttheir lives,providinghealthcare,education,socialservices,roadsand infrastructure,andthemanyothersupportswhich citizensneed.Whenall theseneedsareaddedto-gethertheycancreateasizeabledrawon naturalandfinancialresources.Sooneror later,however,theresourcescannotbe stretchedany further.

Population growth

In southernAfrica, the populationgrowsat threepercentannually,on average,althoughthe rowthratefor different countriesrangesfrom 2.2-3.8percent.Atthis rate,the region’spopulationwill doubleby theyear2018.2

Most peoplein southernAfrica areof child-bearing age, or younger.Inmost countries,over 40 percentof the populationis under 14 yearsof age.Althoughquite high, populationgrowth-ratesarestableor decreasingin six oftheregion’s 11 countries.SouthernAfrica, which containsjust over two percentof the world’s population,is expectedto contributeaboutsix percentof globalpopulation growth betweennow and the year 2050. Infant mortality rates insouthernAfrica havedroppeddramaticallyin the last20 years,andnow, on av-erage,lessthan 1 in 10 babiesbornin theregion die beforetheageof oneyear.Young children do not fare as well, with an averagemortality of 2 in 10 forchildrenunderfive years,althoughthis ratehasalsoimproved.

Land use

Landis still relatively accessiblein mostcountriesin southernAfrica, althoughpopulationdensityandthenumberof peoplean areacansupportvariesdramati-cally from place to place.While peopleneedlandfor agriculture,thepercentagemoving to cities is higher than thebirth ratein mostof theregion.Urbanlandrequirementsfor housingaremuch lessthanin rural areas,andindustrialde-mandfor land is still relatively low.

Theuseof marginalor unsuitablelandfor farmingis increasing,while in-tensepressureon someexisting farmlandoften leavesit completelyexhausted.Thedemandfor landfor cultivation is not only dueto populationpressure,but

1. Exceptwherenotedotherwise,matenalfor this appendixis excerptedandcondensedfromSARDC (SouthernAfrican Research& DocumentationCentre)1994,differentchapters

2 For countrydetails,cf. thenext appendix,“Population Growth andLandScarcity”


also to landdistribution, wherelargeexpansesare farmedcommercially,redu-cingtheamountavailableto small-scale,subsistencefarmers.

Manyareashaveresourceswhicharecommunallyheldandto which thereis openaccess.Traditionalmanagementsystemshavebeenableto protectthese“open-access”resources,but increasedpopulation,coupledwith a free-marketapproach,haserodedtraditional practices.This hasoften createddisruptionswith open-accessresourcessuchasgrazingland,water,fish andtrees.In someareas,thewealthierlivestock-ownershavefencedoff areasof communaliandand havebegundiggingprivatewells. Whengrassor waterbeginto runshort,theymovelivestockto thesefencedareasor waterthemattheirwells, essential-ly “privatizing” communalresources.

Livestockpopulationsnow amountto about45 million cattleand71 milli-on sheepandgoats. However,over the last 10 years,cattlepopulationshavedroppedslightly in sevencountries,while sheepand goatpopulationshavein-creasedsubstantially.This maybe an indirect indicatorof farmers’assessmentsof rangelanddegradation.Sheepandgoatsareoftenbroughtin whenlandis toodegradedto supportcattle,becausetheyarelessselectivefeedersandareabletoeatleavesaswell asgrass.

About 20 percentof southernAfrican soils needssomedegreeof rehabili-tation, and the degradationandlossof productivity is continuing.Most of thedegradationis causedby overgrazing,althoughwherethedegradationis strong,cultivation is equally to blame.Povertycompoundsthe problembecausefar-merscan’tafford to fertilize, leadingto lessvigorousplantgrowthwhich leavessoil moreexposedto erodingrainfall and runoff. Although fertilizer useis gro-wing at a fasterratethannewlandbeingbroughtinto production,a 1990FAOstudyshowedthat soil in theregion is bein,g“mined” for its essentialnutrients.Eachhectareof cultivated land losesan averageof 22 kg of nitrogen,28 kg ofpotassiumand6 kg of phosphorousannually.

Successfultsetse-controlprogrammesareallowing theopeningup of someareas.Although theland appearsto be under-utilized,therearesomeconcerns.Tsetsezonestend to be in nutrient-poorareaswhich quickly becomeinfertileundercultivation. In addition,they areoftenon fragile soils which havebeenprotectedby bushand grasscover.Clearingthis for agriculturewill almostcer-tainly leadto heavysoil-loss.

Anothercomplicatingfactorin the landequationis apossiblesea-levelrisedue to global warming.

Therearefew availableareasleft for agriculturalexpansionoutsideof pro-tectedareasandforestreserves.As morelandis broughtundercultivation, landavailablefor grazingdecreases,forcing pastoralistsonto smaller, lessproducti-ve areas.Rapidurbanizationalso takesland out of agriculturalproduction.InsouthernAfrica, theamountof landcultivated(largelymarginalland)hasincre-asedby only 0.2percenteachyearin the lastdecadeorso.If populationgrowthis considered,theamountof cultivatedlandperpersonhasactuallydroppedby20 percent,from 0.4 hectaresperpersonin 1980 to 0.34 hectaresin 1989.

Appendix I: Population, Environment and Security: An Overview of the SADC Countries 21

Water resources

Thediminishinglandareaavailablefor agriculturalexpansionmeansproduc-tion growth will soonhaveto be achievedby increasingtheamountof yield perhectare,ratherthanincreasingthenumberof hectaresavailable.

Irrigatedfarming is the method that surpassesall othersin potentialpro-ductionper unit area,in the low rainfall partsof southernAfrica. Thisrequireshuge amountsof water.About 60 percentof the total amountof waterusedinthe region— almost20 cubic km of waterin 1993 — is usedfor irrigation.

By world standards,currentwater consumptionper personin southernAfrica is low. In manycountriesin this region,peoplegetby on muchlessthantheWHO targetof 50 litresperpersonper day.

Tradein waterhasbeendiscussedin a SADC document.Forexample,Mo-zambiquehasconsideredgiving up rights to someZambeziriver waterin returnfor accessto morewaterin its drier southernpart.Watertransfersfrom onepartof the region to another,suchastheLesothoHighlandsWaterProject,arelikelyto becomemorecommonplaceandcountrieswith low economicgrowth maybetemptedby thepossibility of profits from saleof water.

As moreland,especiallymarginalland,is broughtinto production,erosionand sedimentationwill increase,unlessmanagementof land-useandcontroloferosionis improved.Not onlys doessedimentationcosttheregionvast amountsof moneyin lostwater-storagecapacity,but manyareasarequite flat, with fewgood potentialdam-sitesleft, so replacingsilted damsmay be difficult or im-possible.

Thereis potentialfor domesticandindustrialrecyclingof water,with somemajor cities, suchasHarareandWindhoek,alreadyrecyclingasignificantpartof theirwastewater.

The“deadstorage”in damsamountsto hugequantitiesof water.LakeKa-nbaalonecontainsmorethan threetimesthequantityof waterconsumedannu-ally in theentire region, yetlittle of it canbe usedwithoutjeopardisingpowergeneration.

Foodsecurity

To meetthe food requirementsof a growing populationin southernAfrica,supplieswill haveto increaseby four to five percenta year.This will be a chal-lenge,sincefood productionperpersondecreasedin all countriesin the regionby anywherefrom 0.7-3.7percenteachyearbetween1979 and 1991 — a totaldrop rangingfrom 8.4-44.4percent.Measuredasdaily requirementsfor foodconsumption,peoplein eight countriesreceiveless than theyshould,rangingfrom 70-99percentof theminimum.

A numberofcountriesare closeto self-sufficiencyin foodproduction,me-asuredby thefood-importdependencyratio (theamountof food importedcom-paredto theamountavailable).Suchstatisticsarenot availablefor all countries,but half thecountriesmeasuredaremore self-sufficientin foodproductionthan15 yearsearlier.

Although manysouthernAfricans are not eatingminimum daily foodre-quirements,theregioncould be self-sufficientin foodproduction.Total netce-realsprodution for the region (excludingNamibia) amountedto a surplusofabout1.6 million tonnesduring the period 1987-89.This wasaccountedfor by


largesurplusesfrom SouthAfrica andZimbabwe,while all othercountrieswerenetimporters.Theoverall level of cerealsurplusdeclinedby six percentfrom asurplusof about1.7 million tonnesbetween1977-79.

According to SADC’s report to UNCED (United Nations Conferenceonthe EnvironmentandDevelopment1992), current datais insufficient to assessthe land’scapacityto supportfuture growth in food production.A factoraffec-ting domesticfoodproductionwill be competition with cashcrops,which areneededfor foreignexchangeearnings.

The only countriesachievingadequategrowth in food productionhaveeitherbroughtnewlandinto cultivationor intensifiedproductionthroughirriga-tion. Irrigation hasbeenbadly managedin somecases,leading to salinizationand alkalinization. Only Angola, Mozambique and Zambia have significantareasof land they could bring into production,much of which is presentlyforested,inaccessibledueto civil wars,or infestedwith tsetse-fly.

Newvarietiesofsorghumandmillet showvastlyincreasedproductionovertraditionalvarietiesduring droughts,andprogrammesareunderwayto encoura-ge theiruseasamorenutritional andlessrisky foodsourcethanmaize.

Thereareseveralpilot projectsand many operatingfish farmsthroughouttheregion,but the costof farmedfish tendsto be prohibitive.As moredamsareconstructedfor watersupply theycanalsobe stockedfor fisheries,ashasoccur-redatKariba,Zimbabwe.

Energy

Althoughenergyconsumptionin southernAfrica is quite low by global stan-dards,percapitafuelwoodconsumptionin theSADC regionis amongthehig-hestin theworld.

As fuelwoodbecomesscarcer,its valuerises,a situationthat may makeiteconomicalin future to plant fuelwood treesto sell. The valueof foodcropsisincreasingat leastasquickly asfuelwood,however,which mitigatesagainsttheplantingof fuelwoodplantations.Theneedfor fuelwoodwill hopefully decrea-seasore poweris madeavailablein rural areas.

Mozambiqe’sCahoraBassa,themassivehydroelecthcprojecton theZam-beziriver downstreamof Zimbabwe’sLake Kariba, is expectedto comebackon streamsoon.It becameoperationalin 1974but wassidelinedby armedcon-flict. While this darnalreadyholdsa tremendousamountof “deadstorage”wa-ter, it will not takemorewaterawayfrom downstreamsourcesto fill it, ormorecapitalto build it, asnewdamswould.

ThesouthernAfrican regionhasvery largecoalreserves,which aremostlyunusedexceptin SouthAfrica and,to a lesserextent,Zimbabwe.Alreadythis iscausinglocalisedpollution in Zimbabweandlarge-scaleair pollution is evidentin SouthAfrica’s easternTransvaal.

EconomicGrowth

Economicgrowthin southernAfrica asa whole is amongthe lowestin theworld. GrossDomesticProduct(GDP)is growingat a slowerpacethanpopula-tion in virtually all southernAfrican countries.In more thanhalf thecountries,economicgrowth declinedduring the 1980s,largelybecauseof defenceexpen-dituresto counterSouthAfrica’s military action. Jobcreationhasnotkeptpace

Appendix I: Population, Environment and Security: An Overview of the SADC Countries 23

with theincreasinglabourforce and percapitaincomedeclinedby anaverageof 1.1 percentannuallyduring thedecade1982-92.

Although statisticssuggestthat economiesare in doldrums in much ofsouthernAfrica, thesefigures maskwhat really takesplace.A significantpro-portionof thecitizensof this regionwork in the informal sector— unrecorded,untaxedand regulatedonly by a commondesirefor at livelihood.

Structural Adjustment Programmes(SAPs)and poverty alleviation

A recentstudy of theenvironmentaleffectof SAPsin Ivory Coast,ThailandandMexico revealedthat environmentalimpactshadnot beenconsidered,andthatunintendedimpacts(both positiveandnegative)hadoccurred.For example,theremovalof subsidies,suchasthoseon commercialenergy,hasusuallyresultedin moreefficientuseof resources;but exportincentiveshaveled to clearingofforestsandothernaturalvegetationfor cultivation,aswell asfanningof increa-singly marginalland. Thereis alsoevidencethat SAPshaveperpetuatedor in-creasedexisting patternsof overexploitationof naturalresources.

Informationon numbersof peoplein absolutepoverty is difficult to getbutstatisticsareavailablefor Botswana,Lesotho,Malawi, NamibiaandSouthAfri-ca. For thosefive countriesthefiguresrangedfrom 49-78percent.A recentstu-dy in southernAfrica alsoconcludedthat SAPsleadto widergapsbetweenrichandpoor.

Lessthanhalf of the populationin the region hasaccessto cleanwater,healthservicesand sanitation.

Debt burden

Foreigndebtcontinuesto climb, at leastdoublingin mostSADC countriesbet-ween1980 and 1991.In somecases,thedebtburdenincreasedby threeor evensix times in that period,althougheconomicresearchshowsboth positiveandnegativeconnectionsbetweendebtlevelsand incomegrowth dependingon thecountriesstudied.Two countrieshaveforeigndebtgreaterthanGDP— Mozam-bique by four timesand Tanzaniaby two. It is notablethat theMozambicango-vernment,in its official reportto theUN Conferenceon Environmentand Deve-lopment(UNCED) said bluntly that it cannotachievesustainabledevelopmentin the short-termbecauseit couldnot yet meetthehumanneedsof its popula-tion.

The needto increaseeconomicoutputwill intensify pressureon southernAfrica’s resources,doubly so beauseeconomicgrowth will not only havetomeet the needsof peopletoday,but also the expandingpopulationover time.Much of theeconomicgrowth strategyis export-driven,with a sizablecompo-nent dedicatedto cashcrops (from tobaccoand coffee to bananasor roses),which canearnconsiderableforeignexchange.

Many volumeshavebeenwrittenaboutthedebtburdenand possiblesolu-tions to it, but it is unlikely that mostsouthernAfrican countheswill be able toadvancein theareasof envrionmentalregulationandmanagementuntil thedebtburdenis reduced.

Thetwo mostobviousresourceswhich will be affectedby the pressuretoincreaseeconomicoutputarelandand water.Landwill be neededto grow food,supportindustry,grazelivestockand, of course,asa placeto build housesand


cities.Waterwill be neededfor basicsurvival,and it is alsoessentialto eachoftheseland-basedactivities.

Risks for armed conflict

Theseedsfor furtherarmedconflict or instability existin this regionasin otherpartsof the world — oftenrelatedto dwindling suppliesof variousnaturalre-sourcesin relationto ever-increasingpopulations.Tensionsoveraccessto waterandothersharedresourcesalreadyexist.RegionalstructuressuchasSADC areestablishingmechanismsto dealwith theseconcerns.

While statisticsvary broadly from country to country, defencespendingrangesfrom about 5-16 percentof annualbudgets.SADC hasexpressedthehope that with the reductionof hostilities in the region,governmentresourcescanbe redirectedto environmentalmanagement,amongotherthings.This so-called“peace-dividend”hasyetto makeits impactfelt, andgiventheweightofdebtin manycountries,it maynotbe possibleto increaseenvrionmentalandso-cial spending.Many counthescontmueto spendhigh proportionsof nationalbudgetson defence,althoughthis will bereassessedin view of thechangedsitu-ation of SouthAfrica.

The new SouthAfricaApartheidcreatedone of the mostenvironmentallydegradedcountriesof theworld. Soil erosionanddesertificationin the over-crowdedhomelandshavebeencoupledwith similar erosionon the mono-culture,profit-orentedwhitefarms. Industrialwealthwasbuilt on dirty, coal-firedelectricity,while two-thirdsof SouthAfricanshavebeendeniedthis basicamenity,orcouldnotaffordit, andthushadto cut downtreesfor cookingandheat.

Waterdistribution,perhapsSouthAfrica’s most preciousresource,is simi-larly skewed.Millions oflitres of watera day aresquanderedin white suburbangardens,while entireAfrican communitiesmay dependon one unreliabletap.Thelackof propersewagefacilities in squatterareasmakesthe watersituationevenworse.

Therewill be enormousenvironmentalbenefitsmerely from thescrappingof the previousapartheidabsurditiesand the implementationof basic recons-truction plans(housing,sewageand sanitation,landredistribution,etc). These“brown” environmentalissuesarethecoreofANC (AfricanNationalCongress)environmentalpolicy.

Appendix II:

SADC Food Security: An Overview 1995(The following material is excerptedfrom the US developmentcooperationagency,USAID, FamineEarlyWarningSystem,FEWS,Specialreport23 Octo-ber 1995:)

TheFEWS/SouthernAfrica office, with the assistanceof thenationalandregio-nal early warning units of the SouthernAfrica DevelopmentCommunity(SADC), recently assessedfood securityconditionsin nine SADC countries:Botswana,Lesotho,Malawi, Mozambique,Namibia,SouthAfrica, Swaziland,Zambia,andZimbabwe.Theassessmentlookedat theimpactof the droughtonthis year’s(1995)harvest,El Niño events,economicconditions,foodavailabili-ty, stocksandcommercialimports,andfoodaid andrelief operations.

Regionaloverview

AcrosssouthernAfrica, thefoodsecuritysituationvariesconsiderably.While aworst-casescenarioin which largenumbersof peopleare threatenedwith star-vation is not likely, the droughthasled to severesocio-economicdisruptionsinsomeareas.Increasedmalnutritionand impoverishmentandliquidationof hou-seholdresourcesarebecomingmorecommon.

The drought-relatedproblemswhich merit theclosestattentionappearinsouthernZambia,northwesternZimbabwe,and to a lesserextentin northernNamibiaandcentralMozambique.If theupcomingrainyseason— whichbeginsin late Octoberor earlyNovember— is not adequate,foodsecurityconditionscould deterioratein the coming monthsin Zambia, Mozambique,and Zim-babwe.

Impactof droughton the 1 994/95harvest:Theassessmentfoundconsiderablevariation in harvestoutcomesacrosstheregion.Threecountries— Botswana,Malawi, andMozambique— actuallyproducedmorecerealsin 1994/95 thantheirfive-year productionaverage.On the otherhand,six countries— Lesotho,Namibia, SouthAfrica, Swaziland,Zambia,and Zimbabwe— fell far short oftheir averageproductionlevels.For thesesix counthes,currentcerealproduc-tion levelsexpressedasapercentageof the long-termaveragerangedfrom 68percentin Zambia,to 64 percentin NamibiaandSwaziland,56 percentin Le-sotho,lessthan50 percentin SouthAfrica, and45 percentin Zimbabwe.

El Niño eventsandcropfailures: Therewasa north-southpatternto theharvestfailure rate,consistentwith El Niño eventsoftenassociatedwith droughtsinsouthernAfrica. In northernZambia,mostof Malawi, andnorthernMozambi-que, areasnormallyoutsidethezoneof negativeEl Niflo influence,cropswereaffectedonly lightly or not at all. Neighbouringareasnormallyaffectedby ElNiño events,however,were greatly affectedandexperiencedsubstantialcropfailures.SouthernZambiaexperiencedseverecrop failure ratesrangingfrom 50to 97 percent.Cropswere alsoseverelyaffectedin manyareasin Zimbabwe,centralMozambique,SouthAfrica, Lesotho,andSwaziland.

Themostclearly identifiabledrought-relatedproblemsareon both sidesofLake Karibain southernZambiaandnorthwesternZimbabwe.Lastyear’srain-


fall in theseareaswas amongthe lowest ever recordedand followed severalyearsof diminished rainfall. In Zimbabwe, the highestlevels of crop failurewere foundin acrescentrunningfrom the northwestto thewestandthento thesouthwest

In SouthAfrica, themostdrought-affectedareasare locatedin the highlyproductivemaizethanglearoundtheNorthern,Gauteng,andFreestates,whichsawsubstantialharvestlosses.In Lesotho,lowland northernandwesternareaswere alsohit by drought,while centralmountainousareaswerehurt asmuchbyearly frostas by droughtIn Swaziland,the most affectedareaswere lowlandveldsandvalleysin the easternhalf of thecountry.

Droughtvs.poverty:In manycases,“emergency”foodneedscanbe tracedtochronicpoverty ratherthandrought.The chronicallyhigh malnutritionratesinmanyof thesecountriesaremore theresultof endemicfood deficits thanasymptomof acutedrought.In manyareas,peoplemaynot haveadequateaccessto foodevenin goodproductionyears.For example,in Malawi largenumbersof peopleareexpectedto receiveemergencyrelief, despitean averageharvest.

Otherareasareperenniallyidentified asdrought-affected,whentheyareal-most always dry. In sucharid-generallynon-agricultural-areas,the effectsofcrop failure will be felt less intensely than in more productiveareas,as localagriculturalproductionaccountsfor arelativelysmall amountof total consump-tion requirementsand coping strategiesarebetter adaptedto the high risk ofcrop failure. Examplesinclude southernNamibia,Botswana,southernMozam-bique,southernZimbabwe,southwesternLesotho,andsoutheasternSwaziland.

Thesefactorspoint to the needto take into accounttheunderlyingcausesof poverty in deciding how to address“drought-related”problems.Interven-tions appropriateto helping a regiondealwith a temporaryproductiondeficitwill generallynot addresslong-termstructuralproblems.

Foodavailability: In mostcountriescoveredin this assessment,foodavailabili-ty at thenationallevel doesnot appearto be problematic.Assumingthat plan-nedor expectedlevelsofcommercialimportsoccurandemergencyfoodaid re-quirementsaremet, theonly gapslikely to leadto problemsarethosein Zambia(over293,000MT) and Mozambique(153,500MT). For Zambia,thekey issueis whetherthecommercialsectorcansuccessfullyimport enoughfood to meetnationalrequirements.Nevertheless,in view of the magnitudeof aggregatere-gional needsfor commercialand food aid, limited regionaland worldwidesupplies,andrelatively high pricesin world markets,all thecountriesarelikelyto find meetingfood needssomewhatharderthannormal.

Different countriesin the regionplanto meet1995/96cerealrequirementsin different ways.The four countriesin the SouthernAfrican CustomsUnion(Botswana,Lesotho,Namibia, and Swaziland)will covera high percentageoftotal requirementsthroughcommercialimports,primarily from SouthAfrica. Alargeuncoveredgap is projectedfor Zambia,while smallergapsareexpectedfor Lesotho,Mozambique,Swaziland,and Zimbabwe.Botswana,Malawi, andNamibia will likely more than covertheir requirementsthroughnormallevelsof commercialimportsand aidflows, asreflectedin thenegativevaluereportedfor theuncoveredgap.

Appendix II: SADC Food Security: An Overview 1995 27

Stocksand commercialimports:The southernAfrican countriesexaminedwillrequire substantial,but manageable,levelsof commercialcerealimports.Zam-bia is a possibleexception,asits ability to import hasbeenconstrainedby theavailability of foreignexchange,high interestrates,andmixed signalsfrom thegovernment,althoughrecentactionsmayeasetheseconstraints.Regionalim-port needsmayexceedwhat is availablefrom SouthAfrica, Kenya, and Tanza-nia, sothat importsfrom otherareas-primarilytheAmericas-will likely bere-quired.

Foodaid and reliefoperations:Relief operationshavegenerallygottenoff to aslow start. Somenationalrelief organizationsarestrugglingto definetheirob-jectives(intendedbeneficiariesanddelivery mechanisms)andobtain therequi-red resources.This patternis particularlyevidentin ZambiaandZimbabwe,thetwo countrieswheredroughthashad thegreatestimpact.Evenso, it appearsthat themosturgentneedsarebeingaddressed.

Plannedor expectedcommercialcerealimportsby the ninecountriestotal2.68 million MT. Overhalf of total imports are destinedfor SouthAfrica andZimbabwewhich are usually surplusproducers.Within the region,only about30 percentoftotal importsplannedhavebeenimported to date.Themajority ofthe importshavebeenin the form of yellow maize from South Africa. SouthAfrica’s role continuesto be complexas it is both a maorexporterof surplusyellow maizestocksto the regionand a large importerof substantialquantitiesof yellow and whitemaizefrom othersources.

Difficulties in monitoring stocksfollowing economicliberalization

Most countriesin theregionareengagedin structuraladjustmentandeconomicreform. Cerealmarketsarebeingliberalized,and the rolesof parastatalmarke-ting boardsredefinedanddiminished.Thesechangesareintendedto encouragetheemergenceof a strong and sustainableprivatesectormarketingsystemandprovide increasedproductionincentivesto farmers.An unintendedresult, ho-wever,is that information on stocksand cerealmarketsis more difficult to ob-tain. In SouthAfrica andZimbabwe,normally theprincipalexportersin there-gion, stockscannow be heldprivatelyandsodo not automaticallyendup in go-vernmenthands.Both governmentscontinueto controlexportsbutdo not havecompleteinformationaboutquantitiesavailablefor exportor otheruses.InZambia,following lastyear’s liberalizationof agriculturalmarketing,a largeshareof total foodstocksis heldby afew largetraders-whocanbe reluctanttorevealstockinformation. In Malawi, thereis uncertaintyabouttheprivate sec-tor’s ability to expandits marketrole, in the wake of the reducedstatusof thegovernmentgrainmarketingboard,ADMARC, in themarketplace.Thevolumeof cross-bordertrade-alwaysdifficult to monitor- compoundsthedifficulty ofmonitoringstocksin theregion.

Severewater situation

SouthernAfrica hasnot fully recoveredfrom theseveredroughtof 1991-1992.Rainfallsincethenhasbeeninsufficient to fully replenishsurfacewaterreser-voirs orrechargeaquifers.After this year’sdrought,anumberof water-relatedproblemswere reportedin the region.Much of southernZambiahasexpe-riencedseverewatershortagesanda numberof peoplein theGwembeValley


arerelocatingto areaswith morereliablewatersources.Wateris beingtruckedinto somerural communitiesin Lesothoand Swaziland.Thereis a criticallyshortsupplyof waterin the majorcommercialandindusthalareaof Manzini-Matsapain Swaziland.In Zimbabwe,theworst-affectedprovincesareMatabe-lelandNorth andMasvingo;45 percentof primary watersourceshavedriedupin someareas.In Malawi, severewatersupplyproblemsin urbancentersled thegovernmentto introducerationing. Shoulddroughtconditionspersistinto theclosingmonthsof 1995, the watersupplysituationwill deterioratesignificantlywithin theregion— affectingseveralmajorurbanareasaswell asmuchof theregion’sruralpopulation.

Concurrently, severalsouthernAfrican counthesare in the processofrestructuringtheirwaterandsanitationsectors.Theirobjectivesare to increasetheautonomyandaccountabilityof urbanwaterandsanitationutilities andpro-motecommunityinvolvementin the managementof rural water supplies.Thisrestructuring,called for by SADC in the aftermathof the 1991-92 drought,iscritical to ensurelonger-termwatersecurityin the region.In theshortterm,ho-wever,theprocesscanslowthe implementationof currentdroughtrelief strate-giesasinstitutionalresponsibilitiesaredetermined.

Appendix III:

SADC Food Security: Country Profiles 1995

(Thefollowing materialis excerptedfrom theUSAID FamineEarly WarningSystem,FEWS, Specialreport23 October1995:)

Botswana

The 1994/95cerealharvest,estimatedat 47,400MT, wasabovethelong-termaverage,but will cover only 13 percentof thecountry’scurrentdomesticcerealrequirements.As in mostyears,thecommercialsectoris expectedto importsuf-ficient cerealsto cover this year’sdomesticcerealshortfallof 249,000MT.

This is the fourth consecutiveyear that the Governmentof Botswana(GOB) hasdeclareda drought.As in previousyears,droughtassistancewill bedeliveredthrough labor-basedrural developmentprojectsand supplementaryfeedingprogramsconductedin schoolsandclinics. TheGOB hassufficient fi-nancialresourcesto ensurethat theseprogramsareimplemented.

Lesotho

National-levelfoodavailability is rarelya problemin Lesotho.Thecloseproxi-mity of SouthAfrica and relatively tight integrationof Lesotho’seconomyandcerealsmarketwith SouthAfrica’s facilitate formal andinformal imports.Therecentofficial harvestestimateshows88,789MT of cerealproduction,a68 per-centincreasefrom earlierestimates,but 44 percentbelow the 10 yearaverage(158,264MT). Therewassubstantialcrop damagefrom droughtin Lesotho’slowlandnorthernand westernareas,wherethebulk of the maizecrop is grown.Lesotho’scommercialcerealimport requirementthis year(177,000MT) is wit-hin thenormal range.

An early declarationof disaster,followed by the rapid productionof adroughtrelief appeal,paid off in gaining donorcommitmentsof food aid. Al-mostall the51,225MT emergencycerealrequirementhasalreadybeenfundedor pledgedby thegovernmentanddonors.More than 529,000peopleareregis-teredto receiveassistance(aswell as13,000children who will receivesupple-mentalfeeding).Relief disthbutionswereto beginin July, but a slowerthanex-pectedregistrationprocesshasheld up implementation.In mid-September,thefirst disthbutionsof severalthousandtonsof grainhadjust begun.Therearenoindicationsyet thatthedelayhashad aseriousimpacton healthor nutrition.

Malawi

Thequality of the 1994/95rainy seasonvariedby regionin Malawi. Northernareasreceivedrelatively goodrains, while southernandcentralareashadmoreerratic and lighter rainfall. Overall, the drought’simpactwasless than incounthesto thesouth.Cerealproductionin 1994/95(1,662,200MT) wasabovethe five-yearaverage.Aggregatefoodavailability doesnot appearto be a pro-blem. Approximately252,000MT of cerealwill haveto be importedby thecommercialsector,not an extraordinaryamountfor Malawi.


TheGovernmentof Malawi estimatesthatnearly2.2 million peoplerequi-re assistance,mostofthemin southernandcentralareas.Food-for-work,vulne-rablehousehold,andchild supplementaryleedingprogramsarebeingplanned.WFP-estimatedrelief requirementsof 45,000 MT are fully coveredby WFPstocksanddonorpledges.

Mozambique

In termsbothof availability andaccess,foodsecurityappearsmore tenuousinMozambiquethanin mostcounthesin the region.A lackof dataanddatagapscausedby yearsof instabilitymakeit difficult to evaluatethesituation.Nevert-heless,existing foodavailability dataarenotencouraging.

Cereal production for the 1994/95 agricultural seasonis estimatedat1,089,000MT. This is well abovethe20-yearaverage(645,620MT), but willmeetonly 67 percentof domesticcerealrequirements.As a result, there is avery largedomesticcerealdeficit (488,000MT) andimport gap(257,000MT)this marketingyear.Thesituationis furthercomplicatedby a lackof economicintegrationstemmingfrom transportdifficulties betweenthenorthernpartof thecountry (with a 367,000 MT cerealsurplus) and the southernpart (with a559,000MT deficit).

WFP estimatesthat an averageof 650,000peoplewill requireemergencyfood assistanceduring the 1995/96 marketing year. This includes between110,000and 160,000recentreturnees(thosearriving too lateto plantfield cropsfor the 1994/95agriculturalseason)andabout455,000drought-affectedpeople(mostly earlierreturnedrefugees,demobilizedsoldiers,and internallydisplacedpopulations).An additional35,000peopleare eligible for communitydevelop-ment food-for-work programsbasedon othercriteria. Approximately 105,000MT of foodarerequiredfor emergencyprograms.This will be more thancove-red by a projected57,300 MT of food aid imports and 73,280MT of locallypurchasedcommodities.Donorshavealsopledgedan additional149,100MT inprogramfoodaid to be distributedthroughcommercialchannels.

Namibia

Although this year’scropproductionwasbelowaverage,mostobserversagreethat the 140,000MT nationalcerealdeficit (for the 1995/96marketingseason)can be filled throughimports by theprivate sector.Thereis also a significantquantity of government-heldcarryovergrainstocks.Plannedadditionalcom-mercialimportsof 72,600MT shouldbe sufficient to covernationalneedsuntilthenextharvestin March/April 1996.

About 10 percentof thepopulation(163,200people)appearto haveinade-quateaccessto food.Thehighestconcentrationof droughtrelief recipientsis inthe six northern-mostregionsof the country. The Governmentof Namibia(GON) has formulatedan emergencyappealrequesting10,000MT of wheat,althoughno donorshaveyetrespondedwith pledgesof assistance.If no pledgesarereceived,theGON will bearthecostof therelief efforts andwill be forcedto makedifficult decisionswith respectto its financialpriorities.

Appendix III: SADC Food Security: Country Profiles 1995 31

SouthAfrica

Therewere substantialharvestlossesin the normally highly productivemaizetriangle aroundtheNorthern,Gauteng,andFreestates.The 1994/95maizehar-vestwasonly 4,227,000MT, abouthalfthe long-termaverage.SouthAfrica hasmore yellow maizethanneededfor domesticuseandwill exportseveralhund-redsof thousandsof tons to its neighbours.At the sametime, it mayimport asmuchas750,000MT ofcereals,includingwhite maize,from outsidetheregion.

Swaziland

In Swaziland,droughthad a widespreadimpacton crops,particularly inlowlandandvalley areasin theeasternhalf ofthecountry.TheGovernmentofSwazilandis revisingdownwardby 10 percentits estimateof areasownto mai-ze which couldleadto a correspondingreductionin its estimateof cerealpro-duction.Cerealproductionis currently estimatedat70,400MT, about32 per-centbelow thelong-termaverageof 102,641MT. Thecommercialimport re-quirementof 75,100MT ofcerealsappearsto bemanageable.

Over90,000peoplewere designatedasfood aid recipientsthrougha rigo-rousscreeningprocess.To meettheseneeds,Swazilandrequestedapproxima-tely 11,900MT of emergencyfood aid, almostall of which wascoveredby do-nor pledges.Relief operationsrecentlybeganandare largely on schedule.Ap-proximately3,000 MT of grain weredistributedin September,with the restofthe relief food to follow in regularmonthlyamounts.Theprogramappearsto befunctioning asexpected.

Zambia

Foodavailability andaccessissuesgivecausefor concernthis yearin Zambia.Zambia’sfinal cropestimateplaces1994/95cerealproductionat 922,500MT,well below the 10-yearaverageof 1,413,298MT. This is the third out ofthe lastfour seasonsthatnationalcerealproductionwaswell belowaverage.Thesouth-ern halfof thecountrywasespeciallyaffectedby poorand erraticrainfall, withcrop failure ratesrangingfrom 50 to 97 percent.Particularlyhard hit wereSouthernProvince(especiallyGwembeValley), WesternProvince,the ruralareasof LusakaProvince(particularly theLuangwaandLuanovalleys), andCentralandEasternprovinces.In thesouthernhalf of thecountry,malnutritionratesare increasingand productiveassetsare beingdepletedasa resultof thecumulativeimpactof successiveyearsof pooranderratic rainfall.

Donorshavepledged75,665MT of foodaid towardestimatedemergencyfoodaid requirementsof 88,000MT. An additional6,150MT of aid, purchasedby theGOZin domesticmarkets,havealreadybeendistributed.

Thepoorharvestresultsled to a largenationalcerealdeficit, estimatedatabout531,000MT. Approximately 40,000MT of non-emergencycommodityassistanceareexpectedand the governmentrecentlypurchased30,000MT ofgrainfrom Tanzaniafor its StrategicGrain Reserve.As a resultoftheliberaliza-tion of cerealmarketsin Zambia,the primaryresponsibilityfor filling there-maining deficit falls on thecommercialsector.After subtractingplannedcom-mercialcerealimportsof 80,000MT (including60,000MT of wheatandrice),about293,000MT areyetto be imported.


While mostanalystsbelievethatthe privatesectoris capableof importingthis additionalquantityof cereals,thereis somequestionasto whethertheywillbe willing to do so. Mixed policy signalsfrom theGOZappearto havedampe-ned privatesectorinterestin importing maize.Otherconstraintsincludelimitedforeignexchange,high nominal interestrates(between45 and50 percent),andlow maizepricesrelativeto thosenecessaryto returna profit. The recentesta-blishmentof a US$25million privatesectorcredit import facility may help tofacilitate commercialimports. The successof this and other initiatives will bemonitoredcloselyin comingmonthsto determinewhetherthecommercialsec-tor will be able to import sufficientcerealsto coverconsumptionneedsuntil thenextharvesL

ZimbabweLike its neighborZambia,Zimbabwealsosufferedfrom severedrought-relatedagriculturalproductionproblems.In thenorthwesternpartof thecountry,rain-fall during the 1994/1995seasonwasnearthelowesteverrecordedandfollo-wedseveralyearsofreducedrainfall. Cerealproductionfell to 985,000MT, 45percentof the long-termaverage.Despitethe productionshortfall,foodavaila-bility is not a greatproblemthis year.Lastyear,Zimbabwedecidedto maintaina very largereserveof almosta million tonsof grain. Whateverthe eventualcostsandbenefitsof that strategy,theselargestockshavelessenedthecountry’sneedto import grain this year.Eventualcommercialimportsmaytotal 200,000MT of maizeand 165,000MT of wheat.So far, about100,000MT of SouthAfrican yellow maizehavebeenimported.

Thereis someobjectiveevidencethat ratesof malnutrition are rising andsome largely anecdotalevidencethat childhood malnutrition-relatedmortalitymay also be increasing.Authorities and otherqualified observersfamiliar withtheseproblemshaveconcludedthat theseissuesarebeingadequatelyaddres-sed.Althoughshortagesof funds to cover transportationcostshavebeena limi-ting factor,relief programsmovedsubstantialamountsto rural areasduringAu-gustandSeptember.As of late September,around 156,000MT of grain(mainlyasgrain loans)hadbeendelivered,about65 percentoftheplannedtotal.

Appendix IV:

Population Growth and Land ScarcityThe SouthernAfrican DevelopmentCommunity’sEnvironmentand Land Ma-nagementSector(SADC ELMS) hasstatedthat the increasingpopulationismultiplying theeffectsof all environmentproblemsin theregion.

Table 1: Population growth insouthernAfrica

Country

1994 1990-95Averageannual

2025 1994

Density

Populationin urbanareas

1990-95

UrbanPopulation(millions)

growht rate(percent)

Population(millions)

per sqkin(persons)

1970 1990growthrate(percent)

Angola 112 28** 247 90 - 28 54Botswana 15 3.5’~ 34 26 8 28 83

Lesotho 20 2.9** 44 66 0 9 20 6 3

Malawi 10 1 3 6~ 24.7 107.3 6 12 6 3

Mozambique 17.5 27* 354 223 6 27 76

Nanubia 20 31* 47 2.4 19 28 52

SouthAfrica 385 22** 654 325 48 59 3.2

Swaziland 09 36* 22 530 - 33 70

Tanzania 31 3 3 8* 84.9 33 3 7 33 7 oZambia 9 8 3 8* 26.3 13.0 30 50 5 6

Zimbabwe 11 0 3 1” 226 28 2 17 28 54

TOTAL 35 8 298 7

Average 30*** 177 427 65****

* growth-rateincreasing,** growth-ratedecreasingor stable, regionalpopulationdoublesinJustunder

24 years, ~“~‘~“~‘ urbangrowth-ratemore thandoubleaveragegrowth-rate(Tablefrom SARDC (SouthernAfncanResearch& DocumentationCentre)1994,Stareofthe Environmentin SouthernAfrica, p 2, basedon theUN populationagency,UNFPA, StateofWorldPopulation1992)

Populationgrowth diminsheseachperson’sshareof the world’s finite arableland, increasingpressurefor foodproductionon eachhectaresuitablefor thetask.Oneway to illustratethis declineand considerits implicationsfor agricul-ture is to explorea land-populationbenchmarknotedby Vaclav Smil.1

Smil arguesthat countrieswith less than 0.07 hectaresof arablelandperpersoncannotfeed theirpopulationssustainablywithout intensiveuseof synt-hetic nitrogen,phosphorusand otherfertilizers.He arrive at this thresholdbyexamininghistory’s most successfultraditional cultivation systems,thoseofeasternAsia, theNile River basin,andthe Netherlands.Otherexpertsarguethatthe minimumamountof landneededpercapitais evengreater.Thebenchmarkwould needto be muchhigherif an American-stylemeat-baseddiet were theglobal norm.

1 As referredtoby Engelman& LeRoy 1995,p 23f.


The 0.07-hectarebenchmarkis not a fixed lower limit to the land’shuman“carrying capacity”,a termsomeecologistsuseto suggestthemaximumpopu-lation of anyspeciesthat an ecosystemor areacansupport.Differencesin landquality, farmercapabilitiesand the possibility of externalsourcesof food com-plicatetherelationship.Nonetheless,the0 07-hectarebenchmarkis acrossing,a transitionto thevulnerability of dependenceon intensivemoderninputs.Thetransitionis permanentwithout laterexpansionsof arablelandor decreasesinpopulationsize. In light of the 0.07-hectarebenchmarkof arablelandscarcity,estimatesof past,presentandfuturepercapitaavailability of arablelandaroundthe world suggestreasonfor concern.(In the table below, the pomtsat whichsomeSADC countrieswill passthis benchmarkfigure hasbeenhighlighted.)

Table 2: Population & Availability of Arable Land Per Personin SADC Countries, 1990,2025& 2050

1990 1990 1990 2025 2025 2050 2050Total arable

ountrylandbycountry

(thousandsof hectares)

Population(thousands)

Per capitacropland(hectares)





Angola 3400 9194 037 26619 013 41182 008

Botswana 1 380 1 276 1 08 2980 046 3 996 0.35

Lesotho 340 1 792 0 19 4 172 0 08 5 586 0.06

Malawi 1 670 9 367 0 18 22 348 0.07 33 658 005

Mozambique 3 130 14 187 0.22 35 139 009 52 145 0.06

Namibia 662 1 349 049 3 049 022 4 163 0.16

South Afnca 13174 37066 036 70951 0.19 90129 0.15

Swaziland 158 744 021 1647 010 2176 0.07

Tanzania 3 367 25 600 0 13 62 894 0.05 91132 0.04

Zambia 5268 8150 0.65 19130 028 27173 0.19

Zimbabwe 2812 9903 028 19631 0 14 26 622 0 11

(Basedon datafrom Engelman& LeRoy 1995, in turn basedon UN 1994 mediumprojectionfor population.Ambleland for Swazilandfrom HumanDevelopmentReport1994 All projectionsassumeconstantvaluefor arablelandat1990 levels.Cf. texL)

Arablelandvalueswere heldconstantat 1990 levelswhencalculatingprojectedpopulation-landrationsfor 2025 and beyond.In actuality,of course,they willchangeover time — probablydecreasingin mostcountrieswhile expandingin afew. But thereis no reliableway to predicthow theseflureswill changein eachcountry,andthechangesarenot expected1.0 be significant.

While certaincountriesin Africa havethe potential to expandthe areaoflandundercultivation, suchgainsare likely to be offset by lossesdue to landdegradationand conversionof croplandto nonfarmuses.On balance,the bestcompromiselies in assumingconstantvaluesfor arableland, especiallyconsi-deringthenearconsensusthat mostof theworld’s futurefoodwill beproducedon today’sfarmland.2

2. Engelman& LeRoy1995,p 42

Appendix V:

Water and the Environment:An overview of the SADC countries(This appendixis excerptedandcondensedfrom SARDC, SouthernAfrican Re-search& DocumentationCentre,1994;mainlypp. 181-206)

Threeof theregion’s 11 countriesfaceinadequaefreshwatersupplieswithin 30years— Botswana,Namibiaand SouthAfrica. All haveseenthedark shadowofextremewaterscarcitywithin the lastdecade.Waterdemandis projectedto riseatalmostthreepercentannuallyuntil at leasttheyear2020.Governmentsin theregionarerespondingby lookingfor waysto managewaterfairly andcoopera-tively.

Freshwaterecosystems

Almost 13 percentof theSADC region,excludingSouthAfrica, is madeup offreshwaterecosystems,knownaswetlands;and much of therural settlement(which comprisesabout60 percentof the population)is concentratedthere.Freshwaterwetlandscan be divided into four main types: lakes,rivers (inclu-ding floodplains),dams(which convertstretchesof ariver into artificial lakes);andpalustrineareas(swamps,marshes,fens,bogsanddambos).

Freshwaterfish arepartof wetlandsecosystemsandarean importantsour-ceof proteinthroughoutmostof southernAfrica. Fishcatchesarelargestin ma-jor lakesand dams.

In a recentjoint study,SADC andtheWorld ConservationUnion (IUCN)concludedthatwetlandsthroughoutthe regionarethreatenedby avarietyof hu-man activities. The study recommendeda plan of action within a regionalframework,basedon nationalinitiatives.

Lakes

Thereare few large,deep,natural lakesin theregion.ThelargestaretheRift-valley lakes— Victoria,TanganyikaandMalawi. The lasttwo aretheworld’s se-condandthirddeepest.Most lakesin the regionareshallowdueto the landsca-pe. The Rift-valley lakes havelargenumbersof uniquespeciesof fish andplantsbecausethey are isolatedfrom other freshwatersystems.The deepest,LakeTanganyikais 20 million yearsold andhas1,300species— of which morethan 500 arefoundnowhereelse.LakeMalawi has250speciesof fish, thehig-hestnumberin theworld, and 90 percentof theseareendemic.

Shallowlakesalso makea substantialcontributionto fisheries,butcandryup, ashappenedto lakesXau, Lianibzi and Ngami in Botswana,which havebeendry since1982.Therearealsothe“sodalakes”suchasLake ManyarainTanzania,which havehigh salt levels and relatively alkaline water. Pansarevery shallow,often seasonal,bodiesof water found in arid zonessuchas thenama-karooandsoutherndry savanna,andareusuallyslat. Sodalakesand pansfurnisha uniquehabitat,and theirunusualcollectionsof species,suchashugeflocks of flamingos,areoftenconservedfor tourism.The Makgadikgadipanin


Botswanaand Etoshapanin Namibia areexamples.They aresometimesminedfor saltor sodaash,asin Botswana’sSowapan.

Fisheries

Thelargelakesarequite productivein fish and providealmostall of theinlandcommercialand subsistencecatchesin theregion,almost500,000tonnesperyear.Somelakesareshowingsignsof overfishing,including ‘Victoria andMala-wi, two of theregion’slargestproducerscf fish. At present,southernAfrica’slake-fishdo not facemany seriousenvironmentalproblems.Themain problemrelatesto transplantingof speciesfrom onelaketo another.The“Lake Tangany-ika sardine”(alsoknown askapenta)wasbroughtinto Lake Kariba and nowprovidesthemajorityofthefish catch,about21,000tiyr, althoughsomeexpertsquestionwhetherthis is sustainable.Theintroductionof sardinesinto LakeMa-lawi hasbeendiscouragedbecausescientiststhink thatthis couldleadto theex-unctionof otherfish species.This recommendationis basedon theexperienceswith theNile perchin LakeVictoria.

Sedimentationis havinga negativeeffect on thefisheriesof theRift-valleylakes.In LakeMalawi, increasedsedimentationat the mouthsof inflowing ri-vershasreducedfisheriesdueto disturbanceofspawningareasorhigh levelsofsedimentin the water.Theinvasionof somesouthernAfrican lakesby waterhy-acinthhasresultedin majorchangesin fish habiat.Malawi, South Africa, Tan-zania,Zambiaand Zimbabweall haveproblemswith the weed.

Rivers

Thelargestis the Zambeziriver, fed by tributariesin eight countries,whichdrainsaboutone-fifthof the region.Manyof therivers are shared,running tho-nighseveralcountriesor actingasbordersbetweenthem — including the Cune-ne, Limpopo, Orange,Ruvuma,Zaire andZambezi.The flow of permanentri-verscan vary dramaticallybeweenwet and dry seasons.Zambia’sKafue river,for example,at low flow can be just two percentof the amountat high flow.Thereare no permanentriversbetweentheCuneneand Orangerivers,whichmarkthenorthernandsouthernbordersof t4amibia.

Floodplains

Floodplainsare very productivefish environments.Severalthousandtonnesoffish areharvestedannuallyfrom Barotse(part of the Zambezi)and Kafue ofZambia,which yield about 11,000tiyr. FAO estimatesthat 50,000peopleinAngolaareseasonallyemployedin the floodplain fisheries,especiallyin theZambezi-riverheadwatersof thecentralplateau.TheOkavangoriver and flood-plainsaretheonly significantareasfor freshwaterfish in BotswanaandNami-bia.

In recentyears, the large dams,suchas Kariba and CahoraBassaon theZambezi,and Kafue on the Kafue river, and a numberof smallerdams,havehad a dramaticimpact on floodplain ecology.Low rainfall andincrasingwaterdemandarecausingthe shrinkingof somefloodplains onceusefulfor fish pro-duction.

Appendix V Water and the Environment: An overview of the SADC countries 37

Fisheries

Significant fishing takesplacein theShireriver of Malawi and the Kafue ofZambia.Thelower Shireproduced10,000tonnesof fish in 1986, andhaspoten-tial to producemorebuthasbeenhit hardby a water-hyacinthinfestation.FisharecaughtthroughouttheZambezisystem— on floodplains,in reservoirsandontheriver and its tributaries.The Limpopo is a largeriver, but it containsfewfish. Cuneneand Orangerivers do notaccountfor muchof theannualcatcheseither,althoughtheCunenehasthepotentialto produce5,000tonnesannually.

Dams

Watertendsto flow throughdamsmorequickly thanlakes,butslower thanna-turalrivers. The Karibadamreducedtheflooding of theZambeziriver by 25percent,affectingimportantfloodplain areassuchasManaPoolsin ZimbabweandMarromeuplainsin Mozambique,asdid theCahoraBassadam.

In additionto benefitsfrom electricityand/orirrigation, a damnormally in-creasesfish-yields over those from the previously free-runningriver, thoughspeciesdiversity usuallydecreases.

In 1962, shortlyafterfilling up, almostaquarterof Lake Karibawascove-red by Kariba weed. This hasdeclinedas the initial flush of nutrients fromdrownedvegetationsslowed.

If thegatesof a damareatthetop, suchasfor hydroelectricgeneration,thewaterdischargewill be warm, with low levelsof silt and a tendencyto causedownstreamerosion(“silt-hungry”). Most of the reservoir’slife is foundin theupperlayer,sowaterreleasedfrom thereprovidesexcessnutrientsdownstream,in the form of vegetation,comparedto theoriginal river system.Waterreleasedfrom thebottom (asin damsusedfor irrigation or watersupply) is cold,silt-la-den,nutrient-richandoxygen-poor.Theheavysilt loadfrom the lowerlayercansmotherdownstreamlife forms.As with lakes,poisonousgasescanform at thebottom.

A largeamountof dam-waterevaporates.More thana quarterof theavera-ge inflow to Maputo’smain reservoir,PequenosLibombos,evaporates.Annualevaporationfrom Lake Kariba is abouteightcubickilometresperyear.

CahoraBassaandKaribaaretheonly majordamsthatare importantto thefisheriesof southernAfrica, with Kariba providing about90 percentof Zim-babwe’sfish-yield.Most of the fish areof a few types,however,and damstendto supporta low diversity of fish species.

Otherwetlands

Therearea numberof internationallyknownmarshesin southernAfrica, suchas the Okavangodeltaand Kafue flats. Oneof the most common types ofmarshyareain theregionis thedambo— ameadowgrazingland, ormorepreci-sely,a seasonallywaterloggedgrass-covereddepression,taking up asmuchas10 percentof centralsouthernAfrica, includingpartsof Angola, Malawi, Mo-zambique,South Africa, Zambiaand Zimbabwe.theyarefoundin river head-watersandalongstreambanks,butcanalsooccurindependetof adrainagesys-tem.Damboswereoncethoughtto be like sponges,absorbingwater,thenrelea-sing it slowly, in the classic“swamp” form foundin temperatecountries.Butstudiesshowtheyareactuallygroundwaterdischargezones.Dambosrepresentextensivewet-zonesduring thedryseason.Theyarea goodsourceof grazing


andallow thecultivation of maize, riceor vegetables.Theycan be degradeth-roughdraining,cultivationof too largean area(studiesshowabout30 percentissafe)and especiallyoverbrazing.

Thereare no figures for southernAfrica alone,but Africa as a whole isthoughtto havelost about30 percentof its wetlandarea.Botswana’sOkavangodelta, aWorld HeritageSite, is theonly largeinternalsourceof waterin this aridcountry.While Botswanahascommitteditself not to developthedelta,aspopu-lationsandwaterdemandsincrease,it maybe theonly placeto look. Otherwet-landsfacesimilardangers.

Sourcesof fresh water

Water managementdiffers considerably,from highly managedin Botswana,NamibiaandSouth Africa (eachhasa NationalWaterMasterPlan) to largelyunmanagedin areasof armedconflict suchasAngola. Somecountries,suchasTanzania,haveoutdatedNationalWaterMasterPlans.

Rainfall

Generallyareasreceivingless than600 mm of rain annuallycannotproducecropsunlessthereis somesupplementrywater.About 500 mmis consideredtheminimum. In southernAfrica, an averageof 85 percentof therain will evapora-

te againunderthe heatof the sunand/ordry winds. The waterthat remainsamountsto about600 Cu kmlyr (roughly four times thetotalvolume of Lakeka-ciba)of which360 cu km/yr is feasiblefor use.

Evaporation

The high ratesfo evaporationleavesonly 3-15 percentof therainfall to runoff.Evaporationdoesnot normallyexceedrainfall in the savannazone.In the Kga-lagadi,whentheweatheris hotanddry, the first 5 mm of rain evaporatesbeforeit penetratesthesurfaceof thesand.

A largeamount of water is lost throughevaporationfrom plants(evapo-transpiration).TheOkavangodeltais a goodexample.About 150 cu km of wa-ter flows into thedeltaannually,1five times the amountconsumedin theentiresouthernAfrican region eachyear. Of this, 95 percentevaporatesor evapo-transpirates.Cutting treescanincrasethe minimum flow of streamsin the dryseason(baseflow).Onestudyconcludedthat removalof miombowoodlandsinZimbabwe’scommunalareasreducedevapotranspirationand may havecontri-butedto reactivationof somedambosystems.

Burningof vegetationcanincreasethe minimumflow of streamsin moun-tain catchmentsby reducingevapotranspiration.Intensivegrazingto keepgrassshort may incrasethis baseflow for the samereason, while trampling andgroundcompactionfrom high cattlenumberscandecreasethe baseflow.Someyearsaftertheprohibition of grazingin the centralareaofTanzania,watersupp-lies becamemore reliable, streamsbeganto flow during the dry seasonandwells whichusedto dryup beganyielding wateryear-round.

Conversionof indigneousforeststo plantationsof fast-growingpine andeucalyptusincreasesevapotranspirationratesand reducesthe dry-seasonflow

1. P. Heyns,DWA (Depamnentof WaterAffair;) Namibia states that thecorrect figure is 10cu km of water.Pendmga resolutionof whatthesefiguresinclude,botharegiven.

Appendix V: Water and the Environment: An overview of the SADC countries 39

of streams.In the temperate-forestzoneof South Africa, treeplantationshavesignificantly reducedavailablegroundwaterand streamfiow.this hasled to theindtroductionof a permit systemfor commercialafforestationbasedon runoffreduction.Themaximumallowablereductionis 10 percentin someareas,downto zeroin others.No more thanthree-quartersof a permittedareacan be plan-ted.

Humanactivity

A studyinto the dischargesof the upperSaveriver in Zimbabwe,found thatmeanannualstream-flowhad incrasedby almostone-thirdbetweenthemid-1950sand thelate 1970s.Theincreasewasattributedto morerapidrunoffcau-sedby areductionin naturalwoodlandandothervegetationcover.

An areathat losesone-thirdof its rain to runoff mayreceive600 mmlyr,but will retainonly 400 mm/yr in thegroundwhereit is availablefor plants.thelesswater that penetratesthe soil, the lower the groundwaterrecharge.For pe-ople,plantsand wild animalsin an ecozone,morerunoff meansless waterun-lessit canbe storedby somemeanssuchasin adam.

Surfacewaters

Thesurfacewatersarethesamewetlandsthat providehabitatfor aquaticplantsand animals,and the potentialfor competitionbetweenthesedifferent rolesisquite high.

Surfacesourcesprovidewater directly, through reservoirs,and aspart ofthe water-supplyinfrastructure.Rivers and lakes furnish direct water supplyonly locally — in spiteof thevastquantitiesof watertheyhold.

Riverflow

The averageannualflow of the Zambeziriver at Katima Mulilo, Namibia, is 41

cu km/yr, but this figure hidesthe real situation— averageNovemberflow isabout300 cubic metresper second,increasingto 3,800cu rn/s in April. If eachof thesemomentaryflows continuedfor ayear theywould resultin anannual

flow of 9 cukm/yr and114 cukmlyr respectively.Almost all of the rivers in the region are actuallyseasonal,only flowing

whensufficientrainfall occursandceasingto flow for partof theyear.Manyareephemeral,and may flow only afteran abnormallyheavyrain, once in severalyears.TheZambeziriver appearsto havealong-termhigh- andlow-flow cycle,and is currentlyin a low-flow period,which scientistssaywill likely continuefor severalmoreyears.

Many of the rivers in southernAfrica carry high loadsof sediment,duemainly to poorland-managementpractices.About 120 million tonnesof silt gointo SouthAfrican rivers eachyear. In Malawi, incrasingsilt loadshavecausedrivers to meandermorethanusualandto flood theirbanksmoreoften,washingawayriver-bankcrops.

As watersupplybecomesan issue,the managementof internationalriverswill increasein importance.Virtually all of the majorrivers in Mozambique,Namibiaand Swazilandrise in other countries.Upstreamactionson any rivercanhavetremendousdownstreamimpactssuchasdecreasedwaterflows, incre-asedsiltationandpollution, orblocking of fish migration.This canbe apotenti-al sourceof conflict, andhasstimulatedtheestablishmentof a numberof inter-


nationalwatercommissions,suchasthose betweenNamibiaandSouth Africa,LesothoandSouthAfrica, andAngola and Namibia.

Table 1: Major River basinsand flows in southern Africa

River Flow (cu km)* Countries

Zaire 1174 Angola.Zaire,Zambia

Zambezi 212 Angola, Botswana,Malawi, Mozambique,Nami-bia,Tanzania,Zambia,Zimbabwe

Lilongwe 29 Malawi

Cuanza 26 Angola

Rufiji 26 Tanzania

Kilombero - 14 Tanzania

Orange 12 Lesotho,Namthia,SouthAfricaShire 11 Malawi, Mozambique

Kafue 10 Zambia

Luangwa 8 Mozambique,Zambia

Okavango 8 Angola.,Botswana.,NamibiaLuno 7 Mozambique

Cunene 7 Angola, Namibia

Limpopo 5 Botswana,Mozambique,SouthAfrica, Zimbabwe

Save 5 Mozambique,Zimbabwe

(Source:FAO, Source Bookfor the InlandFishery Resources ofAfrica, FAO,Rome,1990)* Other figures for the flow of theseflyersaregivenby othersources,mostnotably the

Zambezi,which is quotedby P Heyns,DWA Nanubia,ashavinga flow of iOOcu km.

Importanceofdams

Thereareafew, very largedamsin southernAfrica primarily intendedfor hy-dropowergeneration— Kariba, CahoraBassaand KafueGorge.But therearemore than300 mediumsizeddamsandthousandsof small onesusedfor urbanandrural water-supply,livestockwateringandirrigation. SouthAfrica hasover500,000dams,while Zimbabwehasabout8,000.Botawanahasabout300, lar-gely for livestock, althoughadditionalstoragehasbeenaddedto allow for irri-gation. Namibiahas 13 majorstate-darnsandanother500 small farm-dams.

In Swaziland,wherethereareno supplydams,waterrationingis becomingcommonduring thedry months.

Damscollectahugeamountofrunoff. In SouthAfrica, farm damshavere-ducedrunoffby up to 40percentin the OrangeandUpperBreederivers.Largehydroelectric dams, which releasewater only through the top, hold vastamountsof water (known as“dead storage”)which cannotbe used directlythoughit doesserveashabitatto fish. LakeKaribahas114 cukm of deadstora-ge, equivalentto almost 20 percentof the entire region’s annualrunoff. Thisunusablewater is worth US$130,000million in terms of Botswana’swatercosts.

Conflict can occur over hydroelectricsupply and other usesof water. InTanzania,the nationalelectricity authority, TANESCO, hasaccusedupstream


irrigation schemesof deprivingits hydro damsof waterandhasdemandedclo-sureof theirrigation schemes.

Silting of damsis amajorconcernin southernAfrica andgenerallyresultsfrom soil erosion,oftencausedby poorland-usepractices.Siltationcancut theusefullife of a damby onequarter,with somemajordamssilting up in lessthan20 years.Damsarea major investmentandanything which shortenstheir liferepresentsa largecost to the investors.High silt-loads also wearaway power-generatingequipment,further eroding investments.A surveyof 120 dams in

Zimbabwe’sMasvingoprovinceshowedalmosttwo-thirdswere over half fullof silt and othersup to 100 percentsilted.

Siltationin SouthAfrica is bettermonitoredthan in mostothercountriesinthe region,and someideaof theregionalextentof sedimentationcanbe inter-pretedfrom thatcountry’s figures. In high-erosionareas,damslose capacityatthe rate of 10 percenteachdecade.Following the constructionof two largedamsin the Orangeriver catchment,for example,theamountof sedimentcar-ried to seadroppedfrom 35 million tonnesin 1935 to lessthan 20 mfflion ton-nesdue to sedimentbeing trappedin the dams.The cost of constructingnewdamsto replacestoragecapacitylost to siltation in South Africa is estimatedatbetweenR100 million and R200 million per year (US$36million and US$72million).

Lakesandmarshes

While rivers canbe usedto feedreservoirs,lakesare usefulwatersourcesonlyto thosenearby.This is especiallytrueof the Rift-valley lakes,which areat amuchlower altitude than thesurroundingarea.AlthoughLakeMalawi takesup20.4 percentof thecountry,mostMalawiansrely on othersourcesof water.Thelargelakesand damsin southernAfrica arelargely a future resource,requiringvastfundsto developaswatersourcesto meetlong-termneeds.

The marshyareasof southernAfrica are not major water sourceseither.The provide an importantwater-purificationfunction. Severalschemesare inplace or being developedto use marshy areasas natural sewage-treatmentplants.

Groundwater

Groundwateris very importantthroughoutsouthernAfrica during the dry sea-sonandyear-roundin thearid zones.Thedepthat which wateris found increa-sesfrom 30 m in theeastto over 100m towardstheKgalagadi.Someboreholesareasdeepas600 m. Waterquality variesgreatly— especiallythe level of dis-solvedsolids thatmakewatersalty.Groundwateris protectedfrom evaporation,somuchlesswateris lost thanfrom dams,andit is morereliable— providedit isusedsustainably,i.e. if abstractionis notmore thanwhatis replacedby rainfalloverthe long term.

Groundwateris themain sourceof waterfor manyruralpeoplethroughouttheregion,cateringfor about80 percentof thehumanandanimalpopulationsinBotswanaandat least50 percentin Namibia. Botswanahasabout15,000bore-holes of which 45 percentareworking. About 130,000boreholeshave beendrilled in Namibiabut only about32,000arepresentlyused.Zimbabwehasdril-led about 35,000 boreholesand Tanzaniahas more than 4,000. Malawi has

42 Waterand Securityin SouthernAfrica

about9,700in additionto 4,000hand-dugwells. SouthAfrica hasa hugenum-berof boreholes;estimatessuggest30,000-80,000aredrilled eachyear.~

Natural recharge

Many seasonalrivers provideagood,reliablesourceof groundwaterbecausetheyarereplenishedregularly. Dry riverbedsin Botswanaoften haveaquifersunderthem which arerechargedafterheavyrains. Thesehavelimited amountsof waterbut a goodchanceof recharge.

Groundwaterin arid regionscan be salty. This is especially true of oldgroundwaterwhich, over thousandsof years,hasslowly disslovedsalts fromthe surroundingrolck or soil. Generally,a low concentrationof dissolvedsolidsindicatesrecentrecharegeof an aquifer,althoughthis is notalwaysthecase.Onthe basisof poorwater-qualityin thedeepaquifersundermuchof the Kgala-gadi basin it was thoughtthegroundwatertherewas all “fossil”, from a muchrainierperiod 10,000-15,000earsago. Evidencenow suggeststhat most aqui-fers under the Kgalagadi are being recharged,with conclusive evidenceorrecharegeasrecentlyas40 yearsago.

An importantfactorslowing downrechargeis the amountof silt carriedinthe wateraftera rain, which clogstheporesin the soil. By constructinga largedamto catchrainwater,allowing thesilt to settle,and thenreleasingthewatertohuge infiltration areas,Namibianshopeto increasethenaturalrechargerateofthehugeOmdelaquifer.

Oncea confinedaquiferhasbeendepletedthe spaceswheregroundwateroncewascaneasilycollapse,permanentlydecreasingthecapacityto storewa-

ter again.Irrigation accountsfor over three-quartersof groundwaterusedin South

Africa, and mostfarms currently using groundwaterfor irrigation are runningshort.

Pollution

Oncegroundwateris pollutedby sewage,it canremainpolluted along time —

dependingon the typeof soil, therateof ground-waterrechargeandtheamountof sewagebeingadded.Groundwaterpollution in Botswanais causedby sewa-ge andbacteria,usuallyvia leakagefrom pit-latrinesandcattleconcentrationsnearboreholes,or from poorly sitedor badlybuilt wells.

Boreholepumpingcanalsocontaminategroundwaterby suckingsalty wa-

ter into theborehole.Scientistswarn that moderatepumpingof coastalaquifesin Tanzaniacould pull seawaterinto thefreshwateraquifers.

The Zambian copper-minespump groundwaterout of the mines anddischargeit into theKafue river. Theriver dischargeabovetheminesis 0.84 Curn/s and below the mines is 3.74 cu mIs, an increaseof more than four times.Groundwaterpumping of this enormity depletes supplies, while peopledownstreamhavecometo dependon this increasein year-roundflow and wifihaveproblemsadjustingwhenthe minesclose.

2 The figuregiven hereby thesourceexcerpted(SARDC 1994) is hardto beheve,asporn-tedoutby P. Heyns, DWANamibia, smce it amountsto more than 100 holesputdownperday If the figure refers to meters drilled, andif eachborehole is 100 m deep,thefigure isacceptable,evenif it still meansmorethanoneboreholebemgputdownperday.


Demandfor groundwaterin southernAfrica is increasingandwill continueto increase,aswill demandfor waterfrom all sources.Yet despitetheimportan-ce of groundwaterfor many peoplein the region there is a generalfeelingamongwatermanagersin all countriesthat dataon groundwateris insufficientandrecord-keepinginadequate.Suppliesand their quality arenot really knownexceptin specificcases,levelsof usageare only estimates,recharegeratesarepartially knownandprocessesare debated.Effectsof variousindustrieson wa-ter quality andquantity remainslargely speculative.Even thenumberof bore-holesandweills arelargelyestimates.

Demand for freshwater

Increasingwaterdemandis a crucialconcernin southernAfrica becauseof theincreasinghumanpopulationandassociateddemandfor resources,especiallyfood. In water-scarceNamibia,for example,demandfor state-suppliedwaterincreasedfrom 37 million cubic metresperyearin 1970 to 95 mcmlyr in 1993,an averageof 4.2 percentper yearandwill abovethepopulationgrowthrateofthreepercent.

Environment

Environmentaldemandis the waterneededfor lakes,floodplains,estuaries,ri-vers,marshyares,parksand vegetationgrowth,andit is by far the highestofany sector.

Waterengineersoften considerall waterasavailablefor humanuse,alt-houghanenvironmentalconsciousnessis beginningto developin which naturalresourcesand their water quantity/quality needs are taken into account.Namibia’sOanobdam,for example,wasspecificallyconstructedto allow peri-odic releaseof waterfor ecologicalpurposesin theephemeralOanobriver to si-mulateflooding and maintainriverinewoodlandgrowth.

Irrigation

Themain useof waterby far is irrigatedagricultureand changesin irrigationdemandill havethegreatesteffecton overall waterdemand.

In SouthAfrica, theregion’sbiggestirrigator, only one percentof theagri-cultural land is irrigated,but is produces30 percentof the valueof agriculturalproduction.

Irrigation accountsfor almostthree-quartersof all waterused.Of this about60 percentof thewateris wasted,notonly throwingawaya valuableresource,bu causingseriousenvironmentalproblems.Theseinclude soil poisoningtho-rugh salinizationand waterloggingof land. Bilharziaand malariacanbecomecommonproblems.

Onepotentialareafor expansionof a traditionalform of irrigation is dam-bo agriculture.While dambos(meadowgraxing landsor seasonallywaterlog-ged grass-covereddepressions)can be overexploited,researchhasshown thatup to 30 percentof onecanbe cultivatedwithout any significantenvironmentalimpact.Dambocultivationdoesnot requirespecializedequipment,nordoesitinvolve lossor wastageof waterassociatedwith mechanicalirrigation. Current-ly, legislation prohibitsdambocultivation in counthessuchasZimbabwe,butwith careful monitoring to preventdegradation,theseresourcesmight provide

44 Water andSecurityin SouthernAfrica

extensiveirrigation potentialwhile building on local knowledge— without re-quiringexpensiveandoften inappropriatetechnology.

SouthernAfrica hasan estimated9.1 million hectaresof land wherepro-ductivity could be improvedthrough irrigation. About 1.8 million hectaresarealreadyunderirrigation. Of the 11 countries,eightusemorewaterfor irrigationthanall otherusescombined.

South Africa estimatesthat irrigated agricultureshould be able to achievethe samelevels of productionwith 25 percentless water. Other studiesshowmuchgreaterlevelsofefficiencyare possible.

Irrigation is oftenusedto grow cropswith low economicvalue.In SouthAfrica, 80 percentof the irrigatedcrops,suchasgrainor pasture,arelow value.This uneconomicuse of water normally requiressome form of agriculturalsubsidy.

National agriculturalpolicies often promoteirrigation to grow more foodfrom thesameamountofland,asin thecaseof SouthAfrica, TanzaniaandZim-babwe.Waterfor irrigation is commonlysuppliedat lower thancost of supplyto encourageagriculturaldevelopment.This canleadto inefficient useandveryhigh demand,which may not be economic.Demandfrom existing irrigationschemesin Zimbabweis greaterthansupply.

Irrigation createsa hugedrain on limited watersupplies.This leadssomewater economiststo questionwhy irrigation, which createsa strain on water-supply infrastructures,is subsidizedto grow low-valuecrops.

Botswanain 1991 decideit couldafford to irrigate only wherethereis nootherpossibleusefor the water.This hasmeantgiving up thegoalof foodself-sufficiencyin favourof food security.

Table 2: Current and projected water demand (cu km/yr)

Countr’1993

Demand1993

lmgation2020

I)emand2020

IrrigationTotal

Available

Angola 1335 0350 2757 0750 78000Botswana 0 129 0020 0.336 0047 0.230

Lesotho 0.118 0070 0268 0160 2.490Malawi 1.135 0.795 2.578 1820 4240Mozambique 1 967 1.308 3 210 3.000 132 000

Namibia 0.265 0108 0.538 0 248 0740

South Africa 19 295 9 615 30.168 12 674 28.470

Swaziland 0.454 0.310 0511 0331 1 160

Tanzania 5 374 4 560 12 220 10.450 44.000

Zambia 0.994 0690 2 192 1.580 60.000Zimbabwe 2.524 2.175 5.737 4980 7860

TOTAL 33.590 19981 60.515 36.120 359.190

Total Availablehasbeencalculatedas60 percentof theAbsoluteTotal, theamounthydrologists assumeasavailable for humanuse.Countries where demandin 2020 willsurpasstotal available have beenhigh-hghted.(Source. Heyns, P. “Water Demandand Supply Management”, in SARDC, 1994, p 197)


Population

Oneflow unitsequals1 million cmlyr. Wheretheration of populationto flowunits exceeds600, stressbeginsto appear;above 1,000 thereis invariablychro-mc watershortage;andabove2,000thereis extremewaterscarcity.

SouthernAfrica, whichhasa populationof 136 million, hasabout360,000flow units available.The overall ratio of population to flow units in southernAfrica is about360, not aproblem,but,with thepopulationdoublingin justun-der 24 years, theratio will be 720 by 2016 and over 1,000 by 2030. In otherwords, at currentpopulation gowth rates,this regionwill experiencechronicwater-shortageby 2030.And thesecalculationsdo notconsiderthat somepartsof theregionhavemuchloweraccessto wate thanothers.

Both currentdemandand projecteddemandare estimates.Many water-usescannotbe monitoredcosteffectively,especiallyin rural areas.

Conservationandwatermanagement

Thedemandfor wateris till largely relatedto irrigation,which makesup almosttwo-thirdsof currentdemandandnearlyhalf of demandprojectedfor the year2020.

Waterconservationis not a systematicpracticeanywherein the region,ex-ceptfor occasionalcampaignsduring droughts.Botswana’sMoupule powersta-ton is dry-cooledto savewater.Industresin SouthAfrica havebegunto imple-ment water conservation,with notable successby the state electrical utilityESKOM, which has built two air-cooledgeneratingplants, saving up to 30mcm/yr.

Thereis one potentialsourceof waterthat increasesaswater-useincreases.Thatis wastewater,or “return flow”, asplannerscall it.

Somecitieshavealreadyrecognizedthe valueof recyclingreturn flow. InNamibia,Windhoekrecyclesabout13 percentof its wastewater for domesticconsumption.Harare,Zimbabwe,recyclesabout10 percent(18 mcmlyr) andhasplansto increasethis to 20 percent,at leastpartly due to governmentpolicyon fundingmajorwater-supplyprojects.Thepolicy requiresthat20 percentof acity’s wastewaterbe recycledbeforefunding for newprojectsis madeavaila-ble. South Africa recyclesreturn flow for industrial and irrigation use,but notfor domesticconsumption.

Consultantsestimatethat90 percentof waterusedin Gaborone,Botswana,is returnedto thesewers.If this approximatefiguresholds for othermajorcen-tres thenthereis a substantialvalueof waterliterally going down the drainth-roughouttheregion.Gaboroneplansto re-use38 mcm/yrof treatedsewageby2020,equivalentto 60 percentof return flow. Using afigureof 7,201 mcmlyrofdomesticand industrial water-usethroughouttheregion,a recyclingrateof 20percentwould save1,440mcmlyr. Long-termstudiesin Namibiaindicateno in-creasein water-bornediseasesresultingfrom incorporationofrecycledwater inwater-supplies.

The term “catchmentmanagement”is being usedmore frequently,deno-ting the needto considerall activities in eachriver or streambasin, all watersourcesand wetlands,and the ways all thesethingsinteract.The lackof suchmanagementhas,for example,led to damsbeingsitedin areasof high erosion

46 Water andSecurityin SouthernAfrica

with no direct programmeto promoteor require proper upstreamland hus-bandry,leading to high siltation rates.

Waterharvesting

Water-harvestinghasbeenstudiedin Botswanain an experimentthatdivertedwaterfrom a tiny streambasin to a field, usingearth-ridgesup to half-a-metrehigh. In this system,the areausedfor haniestingwaterwasup to 50 timesthesizeof the growing area.Thedownstreamenvironmentalimpactsof removingthewaterfrom thestreamhavenotbeenstudied.

Rooftops havebeenusedin arid urban areas.It is currently practisedinBotswana’ssmallerurbancentres,andwaseffectivein Bulaway,Zimbabwe,inhelping to stretchlimited water-suppliesduring thedisastrous1991-92drought.

The World ResourcesInstitute sayswater-harvestingcould increaseagri-culturalproductionin sem-aridandsub-humidAfrica on 10 million hectaresofland in theshort-termand50 million hectaresover the long-term.

Appendix VI:

Surface Water Management in Arid Regions(Excerptedand condensedfrom amanuscriptmadeavailableto SIDA by PieterHeyns,Departmentof WaterAffairs, Namibia)

In Namibiathereis adistinctrainy seasonbetweenOctoberandApril and adryperioddruing therestof theyear.Therainfall in thesummeris scarceanderra-tic. In Namibia themeanannualrainfall is usuallybetween4 and25 times lessthan the potentialmeanannualevaporation.Within thebordersof Namibiathereareno perennialrivers, only ephemeralrivers.Theserivers flow during therainy seasonif, and only whenit rainsenough.Themeanannualrainfall overaperiodof time is usuallymadeup of a largenumberof yearswith low rainfalland only oneortwo yearswith very high rainfall. Only 2 percentof therainfallin Namibiais availableasrunoffbecausealmost 83 percentof the rainfall eva-poratesshortly after precipitationand the balanceinfiltrates the driedoutground.

Thesocalledantecendentfactorsmeansthat evenayearof goodrainsmaynot produceany appreciablerunoff, if it was precededby a yearof good rain,becausetheincreasedamountof vegetationwill reducerunoff.

Damscan be operatedfor highefficiency (with reducedproductionduringdry years)or high reliability (with low yield in rspectto water).This is becausethehigh evaporation.High reliability, meansbeingableto collectenoughwaterto bridgeseveraldry years.This meanshigh evaporationlosses.High efficiencyin wateruse,meansusing thewaterwhenit is there,but cutting backon produc-tion (e.g.mining) duringperiodswhenthereis little water.

If severaldams,in differentcatchmentareas,areusedin conjunctionto mi-mmizeevaporationlosses,efficiencywill be increased.

If damsarecombinedwith groundwater,it meansthat groundwatercanbeoverpumpedduring dryyears,andleft to recuperateduring wet years,whenthe-re will be enoughwaterin thedams.

Thesystembecomesevenmoreefficientif integratedwith waterfrom pe-rennial sources,suchastheOkavango.

In Namibiathreedamshavebeenbuilt andmterconnectedto suply watertothe industrializedWindhoek-Okahandjacomplex.

Thewaterfrom theOkavangoRiver will be very expensivewater,but mi-nitially it will not be necessaryto suppplywateratall times.Theadditionalwa-terwill servesasan insurancepolicy which makesit possibleto usethe lessex-pensivewaterof the damsat higherrisks of failure andthereforegettingmorewaterout of them.

Recyclingis encouragedbuthasonly beenimplementedwith greatsuccessin caseswherethe industryhasto pay to full economiccostof the watersupp-lied. TheRossingUraniumMine in theNanubDesertis an excellentexamplewhereaninitial daily consumptionof 30,000cumof freshwaterhasbeenredu-cedto 10,000cumldayasaresultof thereuseofindustrialeffluent.

Appendix VII:

Population Growth and Water ScarcityA basicunderstandingof waterrequirementsin southernAfrica for the comingdecadeswill be gainedfrom calculatingper capitaavailabilityof waterasare-sultof populationincreases:

Table 1: Annual RenewableFresh Water Availability, percapitawater availability and population pressureonwater availability in SADC Countries, 1990,2025& 2050

Total annual Population Percapitawater Populationpressure

renewable fresh availability on wateravailability Waterscarcitywater available index*

(cubic 1cm) (thousands) (cubicm) (people/mcum,year)

Country 1990 2025 2050 1990 2025 2050 1990 2025 2050 1990 2025 2050

Angola 158 9 194 26 619 41182 17 185 5 936 3 837 58 168 261 1 2 2

Botswana 18 i276 2980 3996 14107 6040 4505 71 166 222 1 2 2

Lesotho 4 1 792 4 172 5 586 2 232 959 683 448 1 043 1 397 2 4 4

Malawi 9 9367 22348 33658 961 403 267 1041 2483 3740 4 5 5

Mozambique 58 14187 35139 52145 4088 1651 1 112 245 606 899 2 3 3

Nanubia 9 1349 3049 4163 6672 2952 2162 150 339 463 2 2 2

SouthAfrica 50 37066 70951 90129 1349 705 555 741 1419 1803 3 4 4

Swaziland 7 744 1647 2176 9355 4226 3199 106 235 311 2 2 2

Tanzania 76 25 600 62 894 91132 2969 1 208 834 337 828 1199 2 3 4

Zambia 96 8 150 19 130 27 173 11 779 5 018 3 533 85 199 283 1 2 2

Zimbabwe 23 9903 19631 26622 2323 1172 864 431 854 1157 2 3 4*Index 1 = Adequate; 2 = Quality anddry seasonproblems,3 = Water stress; 4 = Absolutescarcity;5 = Water bamer.

Values3-5highlighted(Calculatedfrom Engelman& LeRoy 1993, revised1995 Populationfigures from UN 1994mediumprojection.Waterscarcityindexfrom Falkenmark1993: <100= 1, 100-600= 2, 600-1,000= 3, 1,000-2,000=4, >2,000= 5)

This table forms the basisfor commentsmadeon countries’waterprospectsmadein the mapon the cover of this study.

A noteon the reliability ofdata in this,andall thefollowing, tables

Almost all figures in the literaturefor total annualrenewablefreshwateravailableseemto comefrom investigationsmadein the seventiesby Belyaev,InstituteofGeography, USSR. He compiled data on water resource from modelsusing otherdata, suchas areaunder irrigatedagrculture,livestock populatons,andprecipitation,where necessaryDatafrom smallcountries andcountresin andandsemi-aridzonesare less reliable than arethose for larger andwettercountries. The annualaveragefi-gures hide large seasonal, interannual, and long-termvanations.Whenno dataareprovided for annualriver flows to or from other countries, theannual internal rene-wable water resourcesfiguremay includetheseflows.

The very unsatisfactory state of basicdatafor wateravailability in thesouthernAfrican region would seem to merit development assistance support to basic hy-drological investigations, particularly if programmes are designedaspart of anindigenous capacity- building process.

Appendix VII: Population Growth and Water Scarcity 49

Furtherunderstandingwill be gainedfrom plotting the degreeof withdrawalofavailableresources,andthesocietaluseof thesewithdrawals:

Table 2: Fresh water withdrawal by country and sector, SADC countries

(Gleick 1993, p 374-375)

AU data, except for Botswana and SouthAfrica, comefrom the work by Belya-ev commentedabove.

Note the low degreeof mobilization in all countriesexceptSouth Africa,andthehigh degreeof actuallymobilizedwatergoing to agriculture.

Note also the misleadingcharacterof data,sincethe amountof waterco-ming from rivers going in or out of thecountry (thus in practicebeing countedseveraltimesasan asset)is notnoted.Theonly countryfor whichsuchdataaregiven is Botswana,where 17 of the18 cu km of availablewater in factcomesfrom rivers flowing from othercountries.

In the table on the next page,the importanceof this featurewill be seenmoreclearly.There,I havetried to makeprojectionsof thedegreeof mobiliza-tion of availablewaterresourcesnecessaryin orderto sustainrequirementsoffoodproductionfor growingpopulations.In countrieswherethenecessaryde-greesof mobilization turn out to be very high, it will indicateaneedto utilizesharedwaterresources,particularlyrivers flowing into thecountryfrom anothercountry.

Thefollowing table triesto capturefuturewaterrequirementsasaresultofthe demandsof agriculture,combinedwith populationincreases.At the baseofthesecalculationslie socalledH-values,aconceptexcerptedfrom Falkenmark1993.

(Oneunit of H correspondsto theamountof waterrequiredfor sustainingbasicdrinking waterand sanitationneeds,and equals100 llcap,d. It is thusan-otherwayof expressingpercapitawateruse.Actualwithdrawalstodayaretypi-cally below 3H, atthehighest7H in SouthAfrica.)

Country

Totalannual

renewablefresh wateravailable

(cubickm)

Yearofdata

Totalannual

fresh waterwithdrawal(cubickin)

Fractionwithdrawn

(percent)

Per capitawithdrawal(cumper

personandyear)

Domesticuse

(percent)

Industrialuse

(percent)

Agriculturaluse

(percent)

Angola 158 1987 048 0 43 14 10 76

Botswana 18 1980 009 1 98 5 10 85

Lesotho 4 1987 0.05 1 34 22 22 56Malawi 9 1987 0 16 2 22 34 17 49

Mozambique 58 1987 076 1 53 24 10 66

Namibia 9 1987 [nd] 2 77 6 12 82

SouthAfrica 50 1970 9 20 18 404 16 17 67Swaziland 7 1987 0 29 4 414 5 2 93

Tanzania 76 1970 048 1 36 21 5 74

Zambia 96 1970 036 0 86 63 11 26

Zimbabwe 23 1987 1 22 5 129 14 7 79

50 Waterand Securityin Southern Africa

For purposesof comparison,the first column of H-valuesrepresenttheto-tal annualrenewablefreshwateravailable,expressedasH-units. ThegenerallyhigherH-values in the projectionsareadoptedfrom Falkenmark’s(1993) ap-proximationthatself-sustainingagriculturewould demandalevel of watermo-bilization correspondingto 20H in LesothoandNamibia,and 1OH in Botswana,Mozambique,Malawi and Zimbabwe.To this mustbe addedthe requirementsof big citiesandindustry which demandalot of waterlocally.

Table 3: Projections for degreeof mobilization of water resources,necessaryfor self-sustainingagriculture2025 & 2050

Country Latestavailabledata Projectionfor 2025 Projectionsfor 2050

Totalannualrenewablefreshwateravailable

(cubickm)

Ex-pressedas H-value

Present.

mobth-ration

(percent)

Popu-lation

(thou’s)

Hvalue

Totalannualwith-drawal(cu km)

Necess-aiy

mobth-ration

(percent)

Popu-lation

(thou’s)

Hvalue

Totalannualwith-

drawal(cukm

Necess-ary

mobili-zation

(percent)

Angola 158 1 2 0 26 619 10 10 6 41182 10 15 10

Botswana 18 2.7 1 2980 10 1 6 3 996 10 1 8

Lesotho 4 09 1 4172 20 3 76 5586 20 4 101

Malawi 9 0.6 2 22348 10 8 91 33658 10 12 137

Mozambique 58 15 1 35 139 10 13 22 52 145 10 19 33Naimbia 9 2.1 2 3 049 20 2 25 4 163 20 3 34

SouthAfrica 50 111 18 70951 10 26 52 90129 10 33 66

Swaziland 7 113 4 1647 10 1 9 2176 10 1 11Tanzania 76 10 1 62894 10 23 30 91132 10 33 44

Zambia 96 24 0 19130 10 7 7 27173 10 10 10Zimbabwe 23 35 5 19631 10 7 31 26622 10 10 42

Valueswherethenecessarydegreeof mobilization turns out tobegreaterthan 20 percenthighlighted.(Lastavailabledatafrom Gleick 1993,pp 374-375,expressedas H-valuecalculatedfrom same Populationvaluesinprojectionsfrom UN 1994mediumprojection H-valuesin projectionsfrom Falkenmark1993)

Falkenmark notes that at degreeof mobilization realistic for SADCcountrieswould be 20 percent.More than50-60percentis probablyphysicallyimpossibledue to the thirstof theatmosphere(damsandreservoirswill evapo-rate).Thetheoreticallyderivedvaluesabove20 percentofmobilizationtherefo-re have beenhighlighted. They would imply massivewater transfers’ fromabroad,or — morerealistically— increasingneedsto import food, and/oraradi-caflywater use regime, i.e. learningto live with aridity.

Ratherthanasprojections,the valueof theoreticalexercisessuchasthisthusservethepurposeof indicating thatwater andfood securityproblemsmaybecomeacute in severalcountries(highlighted) not capturedby earlier, moresimplistic, projections of shrinking per capita availability asa resultofjust po-pulationincreases.

1. ForSouthAfrica 2050,asanexample,theamountnecessaryto import theoreticallywouldamountto 10 percentof the Zambezi’sflow at theoutlet,or anamountas largeasthecom-binedflow of boththeOrangeandLimpoponversThis is clearly unrealistic

Appendix VIII:

Shared ‘RiversTable 1: International river basinssharedbetweenSADC states

Riverbasin Basinstates Specialfeatures

Buzi Two smallerhydropowerinstallationsinMozambique.Oneof thedamsalsousedforirrigation.

Potentialhydroelectricpowercapacityof 2,400MW Fourdamsin Angola(someofthemdiverting water to Ruacana power station, 240 MW, in Nanubia).Feasabilitystudyof Epupa Dam (415 MW,Nanubia)initiated

Low anderraticrunoff 40 damsbuilt to provide water for agriculture andlivestock tojustunderhalfofNamibia’spopulation.Groundwater in the basinto salinefor humanoranimalconsumption.Waterdivertedfrom theCuneneto theCuvelai No agreementbetweenAngola and Namibiaon theCuvelai.

At leastsix damsin SouthAfrica Transferof waterto theOhfantsin theLimpopobasinfor coolingof powerstationsin theEaternTransvaal.Diversionsin Swazilandfor irriga-tion. Tnparutecommissionhas not been functioning well, but the bilateralcommissionbetweenSouthAfrica andSwaziland,aswell asthe Komati Basin WaterAuthonty(KOBWA) establishedby thecomnussionare functioning

Limpopo BotswanaMozambiqueSouthAfricaZimbabwe

Maputo Mozambique Five damsin SouthAfrica, four in Swaziland,andone in MozambiqueSouthAfricaSwaziland

Botswana Partlyephemeral, unimportantas internationalriver systemNo agreementsZimbabwe

Very little known aboutdevelopment ofCubangoandCuito in Angolasincecivil war.Onedamin ephemeralOmatakoriver in Nanubiato supplyWmdhoek.Major diversi-ons from Okavangoto Namibiawill benecessaryby 2005 Onedam in BotswanatosupplyOrapadiamondmine.Proposeddevelopmentplans in Botswanashelvedaftercritical IIJCN report 1992 Permanenttripartitecomnussionestablished1994Mostdevelopedriver in SADC region. More than 24 largedamsin SouthAfrica, live inNamibiaandtwo inLesotho.Largestproject theLesothoHighandsWaterProject(LHWD) diverting water to South Africa; royalties to be paid toLesothofor fifty years.DownstreamcountryNamibiahasonly saidOK to phaseI of theproject BorderlineconflictbetweenSouthAfnca/Nanubiasolved recently.IrrigationschemeonNanubian/SouthAfricantemtoryregulatedin specialtreaty Internaldiversions in SouthAfrica viathe85 km (longestin theworld) Orange-FishTunnel to EasternCapeProvinceandothertransfersin andout of thebasinmaybecomesourcesof conflict

Pungué Mozambique No significantdevelopmentmadeorplanned.Zimbabwe

Ro’vuma Malawi No significant developmentmadeor plannedMozambiqueTanzania

MozambiqueZimbabwe

Cunene AngolaNanubia

Cuvelai AngolaNamibia

Incomati MozambiqeSouthAfricaSwaziland

Fourdamsin Botswana,onein Mozambique,26 In SouthAfnca,andninein Zim-babwe

Nata

Okavango AngolaBotswanaNamibia

Orange BotswanaLesothoNanubiaSouthAfrica

(Source:Manuscript draft toSIIDA by P Heyns,Departmentof WaterAffairs, Nanubia)


Table 1: International river basinsshared betweenSADC states

River basin Basinstates Specialfeatures

Save MozambiqueZimbabwe

Oneof the mostimportantnversm easternZimbabweandMozambique.Morethansevenmajordamsforhouseholduse,irrigation andmining in Zimbabwe High siltloadsfromerosiondueto changingland-usepatterns.Developmentplans in Zimbabwewill mean less water for Mozambique. Inteniational WaterCommissionproposed.

Umbeluzi MozambiqueZimbabwe

Two dams m Swaziland,onein Mozainbique No immediatefuturedevelopmentplans.

Zambezi AngolaBotswanaMalawiMozambiqueNanubiaTanzaniaZambiaZimbabwe

LargestAfrican nver flowing into theIndian Ocean Supportsmorethan 26 millionpeople.Wateravailability exceedsdemandat present,butmaychangedueto increasedpopulation,needfor irrigatedfood production(mainreason),higherstandardof livingandenvironmentalneeds.Two damsin Malawi, five in Zambiaandtwelve in Zim-babwe.Hydropowerpotential20,000MW;about4,500MWinstalled.Largesthydropo-werworks atVictonaFalls,KafueGorge,Kanba,Cahora Bassa and theKamuzuBarrage.Futureplans includeKatombore(upstreamof theVictoria Falls), BatokaGorge andDevil’s Gorge (betweenVictoria FallsandLakeKanba),MupataGorge(bet-weenKaribaandCahoraBassa)Otherdevelopmentprojects.10,000hasugarcarepro-jectin theEasternCapnviin Namibia,BulawayoWaterDiversionProjectin Zimbabwe,anddiversionat Kazungulato SouthAfrica by 2020.(Lastprojectsofquestionableeco-nomic viability)

(SourceManuscriptdraft to SIDA by P Heyns,Departmentof WaterAffairs, Nanubia)

*

This informationcould also be viewedin anotherway, i.e. to seehow manyin-ternationalriver basins,commonto SADC countries,fall within eachcountry:

Table 2: Internationalriver basinsshared betweenSADC states

Number ofBasinstate basins

Angola

Botswana

Lesotho 1 Orange

Malawi

Mozambique

Namibia

South Africa

Swaziland

Tanzania

Zambia 1 ZambeziZimbabwe

(Source:Manuscriptdraft to SIDA by P. Heyns,Departmentof WaterAffairs, Nanubia)

Tablessuchastheseare oftenusedfor pointing out an inherentlyconflict-gene-ratingsituation.It couldalsomeanfurther incentivesfor conflict-resolvingcoo-peration,givena functional regional framework and a confidence-building con-text. Seemaintext for furthercomments.

Nameof nverbasincovered

5 Cunene, Cuvelai,Okavango, Zaire, Zambezi

5 Limpopo,Nata,Okavango,Orange,Zambezi

2 Rovuma,Zambezi9 Buzi, Incomati,Limpopo,Rovuma,Save,Maputo,

Pungu&Umbeluzi,Zambezi

5 Cunene,Cuvelai,Okavango,Orange

4 Incomati,Limpopo,Maputo, Orange

3 Incomati,Maputo,Umbeluzi2 Rovuma,Zambezi

6 Buzi, Limpopo,Nata,Pungué, Save, Zainbezi

Appendix IX:

Major Water Transfer Schemes

(Excerptedandcondensedfrom SARDC specialreportsSR21 921209;Arne-strand1993; interview with Nils Kellgren,BITS. This overview is provisionaland in needof substantialamendment.)

Angola:

Averagerainfall over 1,500 mm a yearandadequatesuppliesof wateron anallon-widebasis.Underno pressureto embarkon waterdevelopmentprojects.Angola is thesourceof boththeZambeziRiver andtheOkavangoRiver sharedwith Botswana,andtheCuneneRiver sharedwith Namibia.It hasavery strate-gic positionandplaysacrucialrole in the region,but virtually nothingis knownaboutwatermanagementinsidaAngola,dueto thecivil war.

Botswana:

Two-thirdsof thecountry,coveredby theKalahari Desert,hasno surfacewatersupplies.By 2020 demandwill double.Botswanais ultimately planning tosupply its majorcitieswith waterfrom the ChobeRiver,which is a tributary tothe Zambezi River.

Lesotho:Hasabundantwater resources.Its meanannualrainfall is over 1800 mm. Thecompensationsystemin LHWP hasbeendescribedasthe mostgenerousinAfrica. But aprominentBasothochief viewsit asthe declineofanationand thesurrenderof sovereigntybecauseit takesawaytheonly wealthLesothohas.

Thewatertransferredfrom Lesothoto SouthAfrica via the LHWP will gothroughtunnelsunderthe mountainson its way to SouthAfrica.

Malawi:

Thecountry’s waterpositionseemssecure.But it will not be easyto harnesswaterfrom LakeMalawi for industrialand domesticusebecause it is very lowlying andnextto it is avery high plateau.Malawi hasplans for a Shire High-landsWaterProjectwhich couldstartafter an environmentalimpactssessment.It will primarily be usedfor watenngsom29,000hectaresof land.A canalwillcarry waterfrom the KamuchiraFalls. Theprojectwill be constructedoveraperiodof 20 years.

Namibia:

Diamondand uraniummining andirrigation arethemajorwaterusers,butevenbasicrequirementsexceedthenaturallyavailablewaterin most areas. UnderSouth African rule construction of the EasternNationalWaterCarrier(ENWC)was started. This is a more than 750 km long water carrier comprising pipelinesandcanals,which will eventuallyconnecttheOkavangoriver to thecentralaridregion.Thecompletedportion hasa 200 km canalwhich hasbeenadeathtrap

54 Water and Security in SouthernAfrica

for wild animals.Thesituationis managedby pat.rolingthecanalandassistinganimalsto getout.

Namibia wantsto divert water from theOkavangoanda 302 km long canalfrom Omatako to Grootfontein is already complete.The final phaseinvolvesconnecting the canal to Okavango river which feedsthe internationallyacclai-medOkavangodelta. Thevolume of waterwhich will be abstractedis claimedto be relatively small (4 cum/s).

On the border-river betweenAngola and Namibia, the Cunene,a newhydropowerinstallation is planned.A pre-feasabilitystudy hasbeencarriedoutby NORAD. Thereareseveralviewsabouttheproposedproject: It is perceivedthat one of the lastof Africa’s indigenouspopulations,the Himbas,will beaf-fected.Severalrarespeciesof fish risk extinction.TheCunenewill be driedoutduringpartof theyeardownstreamof thedam.Thishappensalsoundernormalconditionsdueto thevariability in seasonalrunoff.With thedamgeneratinghy-dropowerand regulating the river flow, it is claimedthat conditionsin factwillbe improved.

Both countrieshavewater rights to the river, and the installation will bebuilt asa joint project.

South Africa:

Expectedto outgrowits water supply by 2020. Currentdamcapacityin thecountryis 50,000mcumlyr.An additional2,200mcumlyr will be divertedfromLesothos’sSengu-Orangeriver to theVaal in SouthAfrica.

Thre project, LHWP, will cost R8. 1 billion, and involves the constructionof fourmajordams,atunnelandhydroelectricpowerstations.Thewaterwill beusedin the mines and factoriesof the Gautengarea,South Africa’s industrialheartland.

Evenwith the LHWP shortageswill occurin SouthAfrica within thefirstquarterof thenextcentury.To makeup thedifferenceSouthAfrica haspropo-sedanotherambitiouswater plan, the ZambeziAqueduct,which is intendedtodraw waterover 1,200 km from the ZambeziRiver at KazungulathroughBot-swanato Pretoria.

Swaziland:

Dependson thegoodwill of neighboursas its rivers originatein SouthAfrica,who hasalreadydammedthemajorrivers.Thefuturewill dependon whetherornot therivers thatrun throughit arenotexcessivelydammedin its neighbouringcountries.

Tanzania:

Enoughwaterto meetits presentneeds.Working on a river sourcesprotectionproject.TheRufiji River BasinDevelopmentProjectis anotherTanzanianpro-ject designedto swell thesupplyofenergyandwaterfor irrigation.Whencom-pleteit shouldgeneratesome4,000megawattsand providewaterto over threemillion peopleliving in theareafor agriculture.

Appendix IX: Major Water Transfer Schemes 55

Zambia:Plansin the New EconomicRecoveryProgramma(1989-1993)providesfor161 damsand 650 km of canalsin theBagweulu,LukangaandZambezibasins.Some205 km havealreadybeenbuilt for irrigation anddomestic use.

Zimbabwe:

Waterconsumptionis expectedto doublein thenext20 years.Two damsarebe-mg proposedon theSaveRiverin theeasternpartof thecountryto supplywaterfor irrigation in Zimbabwe’sfertile low veld. Zimbabweis planningto usetheZambeziRiver for “all” majorcities.

Industrialdevelopmentin Zimbabwe’ssecondlargestcity, Bulawayo,hasbeenhandicappedby waterscarcity.TheMatabelelandZambeziWaterProjecthasbeenproposed.It will carry waterfrom the ZambeziRiver to Bulawayo.Theestimatedcoststandsat Z$l,650mbut so far only Z$7m hasbeenreceivedby the project trustees.

ZimbabweandZambiaare planning to constructa hydroelectricschemeatBatokaGorgeupstreamof LakeKariba.

Appendix X:

The lnternat~onaI IWRM Policy FrameworkTheconclusionsof themainmeetingsleadingup to thepresentconsensuson in-tegratedwaterresourcesmanagementand developmentprogrammesonwaterareexcerptedin orderto ensurethat all relevantaspectswill be coveredby theresearchprocesssuggestedin the “ResearchProposal”.

The overriding frameworkfor managinginternationallysharedwaterre-sources,theHelsinkiRules,is reviewedin thefollowing appendix.

Copenhagen1991

Thegroundworkfor the presentframeworkwaslaid at this “Informal Consulta-tion on IntegratedWaterResourcesDevelopmentandManagementpreparedandsupportedby theNordicCountries”.Two importantprinciplesweresingledout: (1) Waterandlandresourcesshould be managedat thelowestappropriatelevels.(2)Watershouldbe considered as an economicgood,with avaluereflec-ting its mostvaluablepotentialuse.In addition,the role of internationalagen-ciesanddonorsto supportdevelopingcountriesin creatingan “enablingenvi-ronment” wasstressed.This shouldincludemechanismsto channeldonorsup-port to local levelsin developingcountries.

Dublin 1992

Thenumberof guiding principleswas increasedto four — the socalledDublinPrinciples— atthis pre-UNCED“InternationalConferenceon WaterandtheEn-vironment”:

(1) Effectivemanagementshouldlinl~landandwaterusesacrossthewholeof acatchmentareaor groundwateraquifer. (2) Waterdevelopment andmana-gementshould be basedon a participatoryapproach,involving users,plannersandpolicymakersat all levels; decisionsto be takenat the lowestappropriatele-vel. (3) Theneedto adressthecrucial fact that womenplay acentralpart in theprovision,managementand safeguardmgwater, but that this role seldomhasbeenreflectedin institutionalarrangements,requirespositivepoliciesto addresswomen’sspecific needsand to equip and empowerwomento participateat alllevels in waterresourcesprogrammes,including decision-makingand imple-mentation,in waysdefinedby them. (4) Waterhasaneconomicvaluein all itscompetingusesandshouldbe recognizedasan economicgood.

The conferencepointed to the needfor similar watermanagementinstitu-tional arrangementsin all countriessharingariver basinorgroundwaterresour-ces.Thethreatof global climatechange,andthechallengesposedby managingit, wasstressedasimportantalsofrom a watermanagementpoint of view. Ca-pacity building will requirean enablingenvironmentin terms of institutionalandlegalarrangements.

UNCED 1992Waterissuesaretreatedin aspecialchapterof Agenda21 (theall-encompassinginternationalaction plangoverningtheplanningeffortsof individual nationson

Appendix X: The International IWRM Policy Framework 57

environmentallyrelatedissues)adoptedatthe 1992Rio Conference.It is treatedhere by relating the outcomeof later meetingsaddressingissuesraisedbyAgenda21.

Noordwijk 1994At this “Ministerial Conferenceon Drinking Water andEnvironmentalSanita-tion”, dedicatedto implementingtheUNCEDAgenda21, it wasconcludedthatTheInternationalDrinking WaterSupply andSanitationDecade(1981-1990)resultedin aproportionalincreasein coverage,butmadeonly amarginalimpactin reducingthetotal numberof unservedpeople.Themain reasonswereidenti-fied aspopulationgrowth, lackof political support,limited mobilizationof re-sourcesfor infrastructureprojectsparticularlyin urbanareas,pooroperationandmaintenanceof installedsystems,and,in anumberof cases,inadequateat-tentionto small-scale,low-costapproacheswherethesewould havebeenmoreappropriatethanlargeinfrastructureprojects.

OECD/DAC 1994At this “DevelopmentAssistanceCommitteeMeetingon WaterResourcesMa-nagement”1theconsensusreachedin Dublin 1992, Rio de Janeiro1992 andNoordwijk 1994wasconfirmed;WaterResourceManagement(WRM) to be theoperative concept.

Donors were asked to preparethemselvesfor long-term committments,systematicallychecktheirdevelopmentassistanceprogrammesfor the applica-tion of theDublin Principles,andto createa“learningculture” in which succes-ses and failures in WRM are sharedwithin and betweendonor agenciesandwith recipient countries.The needfor environmentaleconomistsand genderstudies was reconfirmed.

OECDIDAC 1995

Themeetingaddeda newelementto therequirementsfor waterresourcesma-nagement,viz, theneedfor memberstatesto dedicatethemselvesto conflictpreventionandresolution,addingthe importanceof developmentassistanceinthepreventiveaspectsof this work.Theneedto concentrateefforts on theareasof humanrights and democracywasparticularlystressed,aswasmeasurestoincreaseprospectsoffoodsecurity.

The InternationalConventionto Combat Desertification,INCD

Adoptedin June1994,theInternationalConventionto CombatDesertification,INCD, is now in theprocessof beingratified. Of particularimportancefrom aSADC regionalwaterresourcemanagementperspective,aretheRegionalIm-plemenationAnnexfor Africa, andan additionalresolutionfor UrgentActionfor Africa, included in the convention.Ensuring that OECD and Africancountrieswill work togetherto implementthe resolutionfor urgentaction,is lis-ted asaparticularlycritical step in thefurtherprocess.

1. Membersof theDevelopmentAssistanceCommitteearethe 21 largestindustrialcountriesplus the Commissionof theEC, with the IMF, UNDPand the World Bankas permanentobservers

Appendix XI:

The Helsinki RulesThe Helsinki rules, derived from a 1966 International Law Association study, at

its simplest say that eachbasin-statehastheright to a reasonableandequitableshareof thewaterin the basin,and that maximumbenefitshouldbeachievedwith minimumdisadvatageto otherstates,,The rulesfurtherstipulatethat onestatecannotbepreventedfrom using waterjust soanothercanhaveit availablein thefuture; andthat existing reasonableusescancontinueunlessit is shownthattheusemustbe modified to accomodaleacompeting,incompatibleuse.

(Thefollowing commentson interpretationsand problemsof therulesareexcerptedand condensedfrom a manuscriptmadeavailableto Sida by PeterHeyns,DepartmentofWaterAffairs, Namibia:)An importantprincipleof theHelsinki Rulesis that eachbasinstateis entitled,within its own territory, to areasonableandequitablesharein thebeneficialusesof thewatersof an internationaldrainagebasin.

It shouldbe notedthatthe Helsinki Rulesareexactlywhatit says:theyarerules andnot fixed principleswhich arealaw unto all. It only formsguidelinesasabasisfor discussion.

The principleof equitablesharing doesnotmeanthat eachstatemustne-cessarilyreceivean equalsharein theuseofthewater,but theeconomicandso-cial needsof eachbasin statemustbe takeninto considerationand the maxi-mum benefit, with minimum disadvantage,should be provided to eachbasinstate.

A beneficialuseneednot be the most productiveuse to which the watermaybe put, nor needit to utilize the mostefficientmethodsknownin order toavoid waste and ensuremaximum utilization. However,in its applicationthepresentrulesarenotdesignedto fosterwaste,but to hold eachstateto a duty ofefficiency thatis commensuratewith its financialresources.

Different, andpotentially conflict-creating,principlescompetefor the interpretationof the Helsinkimles

Theprincipleof equitableapportionmentor equitableutilization maynotensurethemostbeneficialdevelopmentof the basins,while Its parallel, independentdevelop-ment by eachof thebasinstatemay, in additionto causingconflictsamong them,proveeconomicallywasteful.Hencetheso called“theory of communityof inte-rests” in the sharedwatersconsidersthat thewater systemas a hydrologicalunitoughtto bemanagedasanintegratedwhole

Equitableutilization (or apportionment)meansthat eachbasinstatehasa nght, un-der internationallaw, to utilize thewatersof thebasin It is entitled to a reasonableandequitablesharein the beneficialusesof thewaters.Equitableutilization meansthat considerationbegivento the legitimaterightsof all interestedstates.

Equitableutilization is a generalprinciple of internauonajwater law whichstatesthat whileeachstateenjoyssovereigncontrolwithin its ownboundarieswhereinter-nationaldrainagebasinsareconcerned,it may not exercisesuchcontrol over theproportionsof suchbasins,locatedwithin its territorywithout taking into accountofeffectsuponotherbasinstatesThis is anappropriateprinciple for all caseswhichcall for the balancingof needsandbenefitsof onestateagainstharmdoneto theother.

Appendix XII:

Existing AgreementsThereareapproximately22 major agrementsbetweenthe elevendifferentSADC statesconcerningjoint cooperationin variousfields, including water.Theseagreementscanbe divided into four majorgroups:Generalagreementswherewatermaycomein asapart; watermattersof commoninterestbut notspecificriver basings;river basins;andspecificprojectsor schemeson an inter-nationalriver. In someareastheinstitutionscreateddoesnot functionwell, andin othercasesno agreementsfor joint cooperationon sharedwatercoursesys-temshasbeenestablishedat all.

Table I: SADC Agreementsin existencepertainingto shared water resources

Name Year Countries Content Assessment

ANJCC 1990 Angola Umbrellainstitution,largenumber FunctionalAngolan-NamibianJointCorn- Namibia of issues,including watermissionof Cooperation

PJTC 1990 Angola Cuneneriver Basin.Major priorityPermanentJointTechnicalCorn- Namibta is the EpupaDamhydroelectricmission power scheme

JCA 1990 Angola Operationof the regulatingdamat FunctionalJointOperatingAuthority Namibia Goveandthe Ruacanahydropo-

werinfrastructure

OKACOM 1994 Angola (New)PermanentOkavangoRiverBasin BotswanaWaterCommission Namibia

LBPTC 1986 Botswana Not functioningLunpopoBasinPermanentTech- Mozambique well, needsrevivalmcalCommittee SouthAfrica

Zimbabwe

JPTC 1989 Botswana LimpopoRiver andits tributariesJoint PermanentTechicalCom- South Africa in BotswanaandSouthAfrica, upnuttee to theconfluenceof theShashe

River andtheLimpopo

JPWC 1990 Botswana Developmentandutilizationof FunctionalJoint PermanentWaterCommis- Namibia waterresourcesof commoninte-sion rest.,particularlyOkavangoRiver

andtheKwando-Linyanu-Choberiver system

JPTC 1986 Lesotho Advisory andmonitoringcapacityJoint PermanentTechnicalCorn- SouthAfrica in constructionof LesothoHigh-mission landsWaterProject(LHWP)

LFIDA 1986 Lesotho Parastatalsubordinatedto JPTC, FunctioningwellLesothoHighlandsDevelopment responsiblefor LHWPm LesothoAuthonty

(Source:Manuscnptdraft to SIDA by P. Heyns, Departmentof WaterAffairs, Namibia)

60 Waterand Security in Southern Africa

Table 1: SADCAgreementsin existencepertaining to sharedwater resources

TCTATrans-CaledonTunnel Authority

JCCJoint.Comnussionof Cooperation

PCCPermanentCommission of Coo-perationPJCCPermanentJoint.Commission ofCooperation

JPTWCJoint.PermanentTechnicalWaterCommission

JPTCTripartitePermanentTechnicalCommittee

Permanent Water Commlssion*

JIAJointhrigationAuthority

KOBWAKomati basinwaterauthonty

ZP~A*

ZambeziRiver AuthorityCouncil

SARCCUSSouthernAfricanRegionalCom-missionfor theConservationandUtihzationofthe Soil

SADCSouthernAfrican DevelopmentCommunity

1986 SouthAfrica

1992 MalawiTanzania

1982 MalawiZambia

1984 MalawiMozambique

1991 MozambiqueSwaziland

1983 MozambiqueSouthAfricaSwaziland

1992 NamibiaSouthAfrica

1992 NaniibiaSouthAfrica

1991 SouthAfncaSwaziland

1987 ZambiaZimbabwe

1948 AngolaBotswanaLesothoMalawiMozambiqueNarnibiaSouthAfricaSwaziland

1992

Parastatalsubordinatedto JPTC;responsiblefor LHWP in SouthAfrica

Umbrellainstitution, doesnot

mentionwaterspecificallyUmbrellainstitution; doesnotmentionwaterspecifically.

Umbrellainstitution, doesnotmentionwaterspecifically

Orangenverbasin

Establishedby theTreaty on theVioolsdnftandNoordoewer Joint.IrrigationScheme(VNJIS)onbothsidesof theOrangeRiver

Constructionof theKomati RiverBasinDevelopmentProject

HydroelectricinstallationsatLakeKanba Planningof thehydro-powerfacilities at BatokaGorge

Tenstandingcommittees,oneofwhich is for WaterResourcesManagement;dealswith a widespectrumof water related matters

Water matters falls under theFood,Agncultureand NaturalResourcesSector,basedinHarare,Zimbabwe

Not functioningwell

Not functioning

well

Not functioningwell

Water comnutteevery active

* Two other draftproposalsconcerningtheZambeziRiverBasinandthe OrangeRiver Basinareunder discussionbetweentherespectivebasin states.

Name Year Countries Content AssessmentFunctioningwell

Techmcaladviser on water matters Not functiomngof commoninterest well

Jointwaterschemeson Lrnipopo, HasnotfuntionedIncomatiandMaputo. well in the past

Functionssatisfac-

tonly

Functionswell

(Source:Manuscnpt.draft to SIDA by P Heyns,Department.of Water Affairs, Namibia)

Appendix XIII:

SADC RWRM Programmes(Excerptedandcondensedfrom an articleby Egil Skofteland,WaterResourcesAdvisor, SADC ELMS CoordinationUnit, in Splash,Vol. 10, No. 1, 1994)

Oneof themajorissuesidentified is theneedto coordinateeffortswithin a ra-pidly increasingnumberofregionalwaterresourcemanagement(RWRM) pro-grammes.Thefollowing list outlinesthemostimportantof thoseprogrammes.

Zambezi River System Action Plan — ZACPLAN

(SADC ProjectAAA.7.3). Adoptedby SADC in 1987, it consistedof 19 pro-jects(ZACPROs),with 8 projectsgroupedas“category1” and 11 projectideasas“category2”.

The SADC Environmentand Land ManagementSector(ELMS) wasen-trustedwith the responsibilityfor executingand coordinatingthe programme,assistedby a committeeof focal pointsfrom all SADC memberStates(later tobecomethe ELMS Water ResourcesSub-Committee,responsiblefor advisingELMS on all regionalwaterresourcesissues).To date,funding hasbeensecu-red for thefollowing projects:

ZACPRO 1: inventoryof existin andpotentialdevelopment,evaluationof theenvrionmentalimpactof majorprojects,and initiation of a basin-widdeexchangeof information.

ZACPRO2: developmentof regionallegislation necessaryfor themanagementof theZambeziand minimumnationallegislationrequiredby ripananStatesforenforcement.

ZACPRO5: developmentof a basin-wideunified monitonngsystemrelatedtowater quality andquantity.

ZACPRO6 (phase 1): developmentof an integratedwaterresourcesmanage-mentplanfor theZambeziRiver Basin.

In general,progressadmittedlyhasbeenslow. ZACPROs 1 and 5 (inventory,informationexchange,monitoring) haveonly partly achievedtheirobjectives.However,ZACPRO2 (regionalandnationallegislation)hasmadegreatstri-des,with its proposed“Protocolon SharedWatercourseSystemsin the SADCregion”,expectedto be officially adoptedin August 1995. Coveringall mterna-tional river basinsin theregion,theProtocolconstitutesa very importantsteptowardscommittingmemberStatesto regionalcooperationin waterresourcesmanagement.

With the launching of ZACPRO 6 (integratedWRM) in 1993 (whichstrengthensELMS with two waterresourcesspecialistsandadvancedcomputerequipment),ZACPLAN is regainingmomentum.Completion of Phase1 isscheduled for April, 1995.

Regional Hydrological AssessmentProject — SSAHAP

(SADC ProjectAAA.7.2). A regionalreport,publishedin December1990.Amain conclusionis that theperformanceof hydrological data collection agen-


ciesis moreoftenconstrainedby organisationaland administrativeproblemsthan by technicaldifficulties. Securityproblems,restrictedbudgets,shortageofskilled manpower,and old, decrepitequipmentarecommonproblemsin there-gion. As aconsequence,thehydrologicalnetworkandhydrologicaldatacollec-tion havedeterioratedconsiderably,and in somecountreisarenearlynon-exis-tent.

The SSAHAP reportconcludedthat ihere is little the countriescan do tomitigatesuchproblems,beyondcontinuing to seekexternalassistance.

HydrologicalCycleObservingSystemfor SADC — HYCOS-SADC

(SADC ProjectAAA.7.9). Themostpromisingfollow-up of theSSAHAP.

Regional Hydroelectric Programme

(SADC ProjectAAA.3.4). Phase 1 completed in 1991. The final report agrees inprinciple that a future reginal hydrological centre would most likely be underthe jurisdiction of ELMS. Phase 2 will develop forecasting/operation models formajor hydropower developments in the Zambezi Basin upstream of CahoraBassa (one alternative being Batoka Gorge).

Water ResourcesPlanning for SADC

(SADC ProjectAAA.7. 10). Fundinghasyet to besecured.Regionalenvrion-mentally soundstrategies.Promoteawarenessof issues relating to water deve-lopmentand amangementamongdecision-makersin theregion.

SARP Region Water SectorAssessment

Fundedandrecentlyinitiatedby USAID, coversthe SADC countries,SouthAfrica and Zaire. Objectives: to determine what organisational strucutre existswithin the Southern African region and how water resources can be effectivelycoordinated on a regional basis as opposed to a country basis, and to prioritizespecific projects worthy of financial support.

SouthernAfrica FRIENDProject

Southern Africa’s Flow Regimes from International Experimental and NetworkData (FRIEND) project. Organized within the framework of UNESCO’sInter-nationalHydrological Programme.Launchedin 1993,coordinatedby theUni-versityof DaresSalaam,Tanzania.Includesall SADC countries(exceptAngo-la)andSouth Africa. Resources from UNESCO,Ireland, ODA(UK), and SouthAfrica.

Rationale for Water SectorCapacity Assistance

A projectideapresentedto ELMS in 1993 by the Water Resources Branch ofUNDESD.Objective: to facilitate the development and execution of an agreedstrategy for capacity building in the water sector at the national and regional le-vels.

Appendix XIV:

AbbreviationsAIWPCITECCNRETCSDDANIDADWAECEIAELMSEMINWAFANRFINNIDAGDPHYCOS-SADCilviFIEJCNIUCN-ROSA~VRMJPTCLHWPMZWPNCSNEAPNGONORADOECDOECD/DACPJTCPRWBCPTCPWvRWRMSADC

SADCCSADC ELMSSAPSARDCSEISSAHAPSIDAUNCEDUNDPUNEPWRMWWFZACPLANZACPROZAMCOMZRA

African InlandWatersProgramme(subprogrammeof EMINWA)Centrefor InternationalTechnicalandEducationalCooperationCentreforNaturalResources,Energyand Transport(defunctUN body)Commissionfor SustainableDevelopment(follow-up of UNCED)DanishInternationalDevelopmentAgencyDepartmentof Water AffairsEuropeanCommunityEnvironmentalImpact.AssessmentEnvironmentandLandManagementSector(ofSADC, Maseru,Lesotho)EnvironmentallySoundManagementof InlandWaters(UN)Food, AgricultureandNaturalResourcesFinnishInternationalDevelopmentAgencyGrossDomestic ProductHydrologicalCycleObservingSystemfor SADCInternationalMonetaryFundWorld ConservationUnion (InternationalUnion for theConservationof Nature)IUCN Regional Office for SouthernAfrica (Harare,Zimbabwe)IntegratedWaterResourceManagementJointPermanentTechnicalCommissionLesothoHighlandsWaterProjectMacabelelandZambeziWaterProjectNationalConservationsStrategyNationalEnvironmentalAction PlanNon-governmentalOrganizationNorwegianAgency for InternationalDevelopmentOrganizationfor EconomicCooperationandDevelopmentThe OECDDevelopment Assistance CommitteePermanentJointTechnicalCommissionPermanent.River BasinWaterCommissionProductionThroughConservationPretona-Witwatersrand-Vereenigrng(industrialcentrein Transvaal,SouthAfrica)Regional WaterResourceManagementSouthernAfrican DevelopmentCommunity (Angola,Botswana,Lesotho,Malawi,Mozambique,Namibia,SouthAfrica, Swaziland,Tanzania,Zambia,Zimbabwe)SouthernAfrican DevelopmentCoordinationConference(now SADC)SADCEnvironmentandLandManagementSector(Maseru,Lesotho)StructuralAdjustmentProgramme(of the IMF)SouthernAfrican Research& DocumentationCentre(Harare,Zimbabwe)StockholmEnvironmentInstituteSub-SaharaiiAfrica HydrologicalAssessmentProjectSwedishInternationalDevelomentCooperationAgencyUmtedNations Conference on Environment andDevelopmentUnitedNations Development ProgrammeUrn tedNations EnvironmentProgrammeWater Resource ManagementWorld Wildlife FundZambeziRiver System Action PlanPrOjectwithin ZACPLANZambeziRiver Basin Water CommissionZambezi River Authority (Lusaka,Zambia)

Appendix XV:

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