WASTE ISOLATION PILOTPLANT CONTACT HANDLED...

DOE/WIPP-95-2065REVISION 10NOVEMBER 2006

WASTE ISOLATION PILOT PLANTCONTACT HANDLED (CH)WASTE DOCUMENTEDSAFETY ANALYSIS

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WIPP CH DSA DOE/WIPP-95-2065, REV. 10 INDEX

November 2006

CONTENTS

CHAPTER TITLE

ES EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

1 SITE CHARACTERISTICS

2 FACILITY DESCRIPTION

3 HAZARD AND ACCIDENT ANALYSIS

4 SAFETY STRUCTURES, SYSTEMS, AND COMPONENTS

5 DERIVATION OF TECHNICAL SAFETY REQUIREMENTS

6 PREVENTION OF INADVERTENT CRITICALITY

7 RADIATION PROTECTION

8 HAZARDOUS MATERIAL PROTECTION

9 RADIOACTIVE AND HAZARDOUS WASTE MANAGEMENT

10 INITIAL TESTING, IN-SERVICE SURVEILLANCE, AND MAINTENANCE

11 OPERATIONAL SAFETY

12 PROCEDURES AND TRAINING

13 HUMAN FACTORS

14 QUALITY ASSURANCE

15 EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS PROGRAM

16 PROVISIONS FOR DECONTAMINATION AND DECOMMISSIONING

17 MANAGEMENT, ORGANIZATION, AND INSTITUTIONAL SAFETYPROVISIONS


ii November 2006


ACRONYMS


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AA Accident AnalysisAC Administrative ControlACGIH American Conference of Governmental Industrial HygienistsACGLF Adjustable Center-of-Gravity Lift FixtureAHU Air Handling UnitAIS Air Intake ShaftAISC American Institute of Steel ConstructionALARA As Low As Reasonably AchievableANS American Nuclear SocietyANSI American National Standard Institute ARF Airborne Release FractionARM Area Radiation MonitorASME American Society of Mechanical EngineersAWWA American Water Works Association

BDBA Beyond Design Basis AccidentBEU Beyond Extremely UnlikelyBG Building GeneralBLM Bureau of Land ManagementBOP Balance of PlantBR Breathing Rate

CAM Continuous Air MonitorCBFO Carlsbad Field Office (DOE)CCA Compliance Certification ApplicationCD Containers DamagedCEDE Committed Effective Dose EquivalentCFR Code of Federal RegulationsCH Contact HandledCH-TRAMPAC CH Transuranic Waste Authorized Methods Payload ControlCH WAC Contact Handled Waste Acceptance CriteriaCI Container InventoryCMR Central Monitoring RoomCMRO Central Monitoring Room OperatorCMS Central Monitoring SystemCPR Cellulose, Plastic, and Rubber

D&D Decontamination and DecommissioningDAC Derived Air ConcentrationDBA Design Basis AccidentDBE Design Basis EarthquakeDBT Design Basis TornadoDCF Dose Conversion FactorDC Direct CurrentDID Defense-in-DepthDF Design FeatureDOE U.S. Department of EnergyDOT U.S. Department of Transportation

ACRONYMS


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DR Damage RatioDSA Documented Safety Analysis

ECO Engineering Change OrderEFB Exhaust Filter BuildingEG Evaluation GuidelineEIS Environmental Impact StatementEMP Emergency Management ProgramEOC Emergency Operations CenterEPA U.S. Environmental Protection AgencyEPHA Emergency Planning Hazards AssessmentERT Emergency Response TeamEUA Exclusive Use Area

FAA Federal Aviation AdministrationFAS Fixed Air SamplerFGE Fissile Gram EquivalentFHA Fire Hazard AnalysisFLIRT First Level Initial Response TeamFMEA Failure Modes and Effects AnalysisFMEC Factory Mutual Engineering CorporationFSM Facility Shift Manager

GE General EmergencyGET General Employee TrainingGM General ManagerGPDD General Plant System Design Description

HA Hazards AnalysisHMAR Hazards Materials Area RepresentativeHAZOP Hazard and Operability StudyHE Hazard EvaluationHEPA High Efficiency Particulate Air HP Health PhysicsHVAC Heating, Ventilation, and Air ConditioningHWFP Hazardous Waste Facility Permit

IC Initial ConditionID IdentificationICRP International Commission on Radiological ProtectionICV Inner Containment VesselID IdentificationIEEE Institute of Electrical and Electronic EngineersISM Integrated Safety ManagementISMS Integrated Safety Management SystemITV Inspector's Test Valve

JIC Joint Information Center

ACRONYMS


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LCO Limiting Condition for OperationLCS Limiting Control SettingLFL Lower Flammability LimitLPF Leakpath FactorLPU Local Processing UnitLWA Land Withdrawal Act

MAR Material at RiskMCNP Monte Carlo N-Particle CodeMCS Master Control StationMgO Magnesium OxideMHE Mitigated Hazard EvaluationMOC Management and Operating ContractorMOI Maximally Exposed Off-site IndividualMOU Memoranda of UnderstandingMSDS Material Safety Data SheetMSHA Mine Safety and Health AdministrationM&TE Measuring and Test Equipment

NCSE Nuclear Criticality Safety EvaluationNEC National Electric CodeNFPA National Fire Protection Association NIOSH National Institute for Safety and HealthNIST National Institute of Science and TechnologyNMED New Mexico Environment DepartmentNMIMT New Mexico Institute of Mining and Technology NPH Natural Phenomena HazardNUREG Nuclear Regulatory Guide NRC Nuclear Regulatory CommissionNVP Natural Ventilation Pressure

OA Outside AreaOCA Outer Containment AssemblyOCV Outer Containment VesselORNL Oak Ridge National LaboratoryORR Overpack and Repair RoomOSHA Occupational Safety and Health Administration

PA Public AddressPAC Programmatic Administrative ControlPAG Protective Action GuidelinesPCB Polychlorinated BiphenylsPE-Ci Plutonium Equivalent CuriePHA Preliminary Hazard AnalysisPPA Property Protection AreaPPE Personal Protective EquipmentPOC Pipe Overpack ContainerPSAR Preliminary Safety Analysis Report

ACRONYMS


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PSM Process Safety ManagementPu Plutonium

QA Quality AssuranceQAPD Quality Assurance Program Description (WTS)/CBFO

RBA Radiological Buffer AreaRCRA Resource Conservation and Recovery ActRCT Radiological Control Technicianrem roentgen equivalent manREMS Radiation Effluent Monitoring SystemRF Respirable FractionRH Remote HandledRIDS Records Inventory and Disposition ScheduleRMA Radioactive Material Arearpm Revolutions per minute

RS&EM Radiation Safety and Emergency ManagementRWP Radiation Work Permit

SAC Specific administrative controlSAE Site Area EmergencySAR Safety Analysis ReportSC Safety Classscfm Standard Cubic Feet of Air per MinuteSDD System Design DescriptionsSIH Standard Industrial HazardSL Safety LimitSMACNA Sheet Metal and Air Conditioning Contractors National AssociationSME Subject Matter ExpertSMP Safety Management ProgramSR Surveillance RequirementSS Safety SignificantSSCs Structures, Systems, and ComponentsSTD StandardSWB Standard Waste Box

TDOP Ten-Drum OverpackTEDE Total Effective Dose EquivalentTEMA Tube Exchanger Manufacturers AssociationTIM Training Implementation MatrixTLD Thermoluminescent DetectorTLV Threshold Limit Value TMF TRUPACT Maintenance FacilityTRU TransuranicTRUPACT-II Transuranic Package Transporter Model IITSDF Treatment, Storage, and Disposal FacilityTSR Technical Safety Requirements

ACRONYMS


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TWBIR Transuranic Waste Baseline Inventory Report

UA Underground AreaUG UndergroundUPS Uninterruptible Power SupplyUHE Unmitigated Hazard EvaluationUSQ Unreviewed Safety Question

VOC Volatile Organic CompoundWACC Working Agreement for Consultation and CooperationWAC Waste Acceptance CriteriaWAP Waste Analysis Plan

WHB Waste Handling BuildingWIPP Waste Isolation Pilot PlantWTS Washington TRU Solutions LLCWPP Worker Protection ProgramWWIS WIPP Waste Information System

viii November 2006


WIPP CH DSA DOE/WIPP-95-2065, Rev. 10 EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

ES-1 November 2006

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Facility Background and Mission

The United States Department of Energy (DOE) was authorized by Public Law 96-1641 to provide aresearch and development facility for demonstrating the safe permanent disposal of transuranic (TRU)wastes from national defense activities and programs of the United States exempted from regulations bythe U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission. The Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP), located insoutheastern New Mexico near Carlsbad, was constructed an underground repository for disposal of TRUwastes.

In accordance with the 1981 and 1990 Records of Decision,2, 3 the development of the WIPP began with asiting phase, during which several sites were evaluated and the present site selected based on extensivegeotechnical research, supplemented by testing. The U.S. Congress enacted the WIPP Land WithdrawalAct of 1992 (Public Law 102-579)4 to remove the WIPP from resource extraction and other land use thatcould impact the long term confinement of radioactive materials.

CH waste disposal operations began in March 1999. The disposal phase5, 6 consists of receiving,handling, and disposing TRU waste in the underground repository and ends when the design capacity ofthe repository is reached. The WIPP is currently planning to receive remote handled (RH) waste in 2007.

This CH Documented Safety Analysis (DSA) determines the CH safety basis necessary to ensure thesafety of workers, the public, and the environment from the hazards associated with CH waste handlingand disposal operations at the WIPP.

Facility Overview

The WIPP is located in Eddy County in southeastern New Mexico as shown in Figure 1.3-2. The WIPPis located in an area of low population density with no industrial, commercial, institutional, recreationalor residential structures within the WIPP Site Boundary.

The WIPP is designed to receive and handle 500,000 cubic feet per year (ft3/yr) (14,160 cubic meters peryear [m3/yr]) CH waste and 10,000 ft3/yr (283 m3/yr) RH waste. The WIPP facility is designed to have adisposal capacity for TRU waste of 6.2 million ft3 (175,600 m3). The WIPP facility has sufficientcapacity to handle the 250,000 ft3 (7,080 m3 ) of RH waste that was established in the Record ofDecision2 as a total volume.

The WIPP is divided into surface structures, shafts, and subsurface structures as shown in Figure 2.4.3. The WIPP surface structures accommodate the personnel, equipment, and support services required forthe receipt, preparation, and transfer of waste from the surface to the underground. The surfacestructures are located in an area within a perimeter security fence. The primary surface operations at theWIPP are conducted in the Waste Handling Building (WHB), which is divided into the CH wastehandling area, the RH waste handling area, and support areas. The CH waste handling area includes theentrance airlocks, CH bay, a shielded storage room, and CH support facilities.

Vertical shafts, including the waste shaft, the salt handling shaft, the exhaust shaft, and the air intakeshaft, extend from the surface to the underground horizon as shown in Figure 2.4-3. The waste shaft islocated between the CH and RH areas in the WHB.


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The WIPP underground consists of the waste disposal area, construction area, north area, and the wasteshaft station area. Underground ventilation is divided into four separate flow paths in the undergroundsupporting the waste disposal area, the construction area, north area, and the waste shaft station area. The underground ventilation configuration allows mining and disposal operations to proceedsimultaneously. The CH and RH waste disposal area is a 100 acre area on a horizon located 2,150 feetbeneath the surface in a deep, bedded salt formation. Waste is transferred from the surface to thedisposal horizon through the waste shaft using a hoist and conveyance.

A typical disposal panel consists of seven disposal rooms. Each room is 33 feet wide, 13 feet high, and300 feet long. The disposal rooms are separated by pillars of salt 100 feet wide and 300 feet long. Panelentries at the end of each of these disposal rooms are also 33 feet wide and 13 feet high and will be usedfor waste disposal, except for the first 200 feet from the main entries. The first 200 feet are used forinstallation of the panel closure, not disposal. CH waste is disposed of in the rooms and panel entries ofeach room. CH waste arrives to the WIPP is in drum assemblies, SWBs, or TDOPs. Drum assembliesand SWBs are stacked three high, and may be intermixed within rows and columns. TDOPs are placedon the bottom row. Four-packs of 85-gallon drums and three-packs of 100-gallon drums are placed ontop of assemblies of the same type or placed on the top row for stability.

Facility Hazard Categorization

The hazard classification categorization was determined in accordance with DOE-STD-1027-92.7 Thematerial at risk for the determination of the categorization was defined as the maximum radiologicalcontents of a single 55-gallon drum of CH waste at 80 plutonium-239 equivalent curies (PE-Ci). Sincethis inventory exceeds the Hazard Category 2 minimum threshold of 56 Ci for Pu-239, the WIPP iscategorized as a Hazard Category 2 facility.

Safety Analysis Overview

The principal operations at the WIPP involve the receipt and disposal of TRU mixed waste. WIPP CHwaste handling operations considered in this DSA include the following:

• Receipt and disposal of CH waste containers including movement of the CH waste containers byequipment including; forklifts, cranes, waste hoist, and underground transporter

• Waste handling equipment maintenance and operation including refueling and battery charging

• Waste handling, storage, and disposal facilities maintenance

• Inclement weather events (rain, snow, tornado, high wind) impacting waste handling and storagefacilities

• Vehicles (trucks and air craft) impacting the WHB

Hazards associated with normal WIPP operations include mining dangers, rotating machinery, highvoltage, compressed gases, confined spaces, radiological and non-radiological hazardous materials, non-ionizing radiation, high noise levels, mechanical and moving equipment dangers, working at heights,construction, and material handling dangers. Waste handling operations at the WIPP do not involve hightemperature and pressure systems, or electromagnetic fields. Routine occupational hazards are regulatedby DOE prescribed Occupational Safety and Health Administration and by Mine Safety and HealthAdministration standards. Programs for protecting WIPP workers from hazardous materials arediscussed in Chapter 8.

The CH accident analysis complies with the requirements of DOE-STD-3009-948 and DOE-STD-1027-92.7 The accidents selected for quantitative analysis are considered Derivative Design Basis Accidents


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(DBAs), as defined in DOE Standard 3009-94.8 The DBAs are used to evaluate the consequences and the response of WIPP structures, systems, and components (SSCs) to the range of bounding accidentscenarios to which the facility could be subjected. Operational Events are grouped into accidentcategories including operational events, natural phenomena, and external events. Operational eventsinclude fire, explosions, waste container breach due to drop, crush, or puncture, and criticality. Operational, natural, and external initiating events are listed below.

Operational Events

• CH-1 Fire in the WHB

• CH-2 Fire in the UG

• CH-3 Explosion in Waste Container(s)

• CH-4 Explosion External to Waste Containers in WHB

• CH-5 Explosion External to Waste Container in UG

• CH-6 Waste Container(s) Breach Due to Impact in the WHB

• CH-7 Waste Container(s) Breach Due to Impact in the UG

• CH-8 Roof Collapses in the UG

• CH-12 Vehicle Crash Into the WHB

Natural Events

• CH-11 Seismic Event

• CH-10 Tornado/High Winds

• CH-13 Lighting Strikes WHB - Damages Waste Containers

• CH-15 Snow/Ice Load Collapses WHB Roof - Damages Waste Containers

External Events

• CH-9 Aircraft Crash

• CH-14 External Fires Damage WHB and Waste Containers

Criticality is not included as analysis has shown that criticality is incredible at WIPP for waste that meetsthe fissile limits imposed in the TSRs and implemented at generator sites through adherence toDOE/WIPP-02-3122, Transuranic Waste Acceptance Criteria for the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant.9 Someof the preventive features identified in the CH DSA include the Safety Class waste hoist structure andstructural support, waste shaft conveyance, the WHB, and automatic/manual fire suppression system onunderground waste handling equipment, and the Safety Significant waste hoist brake system, and thewater distribution, fire water supply and distribution, and fire suppression sprinkler system. Chapter 4identifies the Safety Class and Safety Significant SSCs and Chapter 5 identifies the credited controls toprevent a release of radiological or hazardous material at WIPP.

Organizations

DOE has the overall responsibility for the design, construction, operation, and decommissioning of theWIPP. Within the DOE, the Assistant Secretary for Environmental Restoration and Waste Management(EM) is responsible for implementing the radioactive waste disposal policy. In 1993, the DOE CarlsbadArea Office, now the Carlsbad Field Office (CBFO), was created to be directly responsible for the WIPP. The CBFO reports to the DOE-EM.


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Sandia National Laboratory is currently responsible for performance assessment of the WIPP incompliance with 40 CFR 191 Subparts B and C.10

Washington TRU Solutions LLC (WTS) is the current MOC. The preparation of this DSA wasdeveloped under direction of WTS, using support services of Washington Safety ManagementSolutions contractors.

Safety Analysis Conclusions

This DSA describes the CH waste handling operations at the WIPP including the waste received, handledand disposed of, the associated hazards, and controls necessary to protect workers, the public, andenvironment. The Safety Basis demonstrates that WIPP can be operated with an acceptable level ofsafety compliant with 10 CFR 830, Subpart B.11

DSA Organization

Revision 10 of the WIPP CH DSA is a 17 chapter document that includes the content required by DOE-STD-3009-94.8


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References for Executive Summary

1. Public Law 96-164, Department of Energy National Security and Military Applications ofNuclear Energy Authorization Act of 1980, December 29, 1979.

2. U.S. Department of Energy, 46 FR 9162, Record of Decision, Waste Isolation Pilot Plant,January 28, 1981.

3. U.S. Department of Energy, 55 FR 256892, Record of Decision, Waste Isolation Pilot Plant,June 22, 1990.

4. Public Law 102-579, Waste Isolation Pilot Plant Land Withdrawal Act, U.S. Congress, October1992 [as amended by Public Law 104-201].

5. DOE/NTP-96-1204, The National Transuranic Waste Management Plan, U.S. Department ofEnergy, Carlsbad Field Office.

6. DOE/EIS-0026-S-2, WIPP Disposal Phase Final Supplemental Environmental Impact Statement,U.S. Department of Energy, Carlsbad Area Office, September, 1997.

7. DOE-STD-1027-92, Hazard Categorization and Accident Analysis Techniques for Compliancewith DOE Order 5480.23, Nuclear Safety Analysis Reports, 1992.

8. DOE-STD-3009-94, Preparation Guide for U.S. Department of Energy Nonreactor NuclearFacility Documented Safety Analyses, Change 3 , March 2006.

9. DOE/WIPP-02-3122, Transuranic Waste Acceptance Criteria for the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant, effective TBD.

10. 40 CFR 191, U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, Environmental Radiation Protection forManagement and Disposal of Spent Nuclear Fuel, High Level and Transuranic Wastes, SubpartB, Environmental Standards for Disposal, July 1994.

11. 10 CFR Part 830, Subpart B, Safety Basis Requirements.


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WIPP CH DSA DOE/WIPP-95-2065, REV. 10 CHAPTER 1

November 2006

SITE CHARACTERISTICS

TABLE OF CONTENTSSECTION PAGE NO.

1.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1-1

1.2 Requirements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1-1

1.3 Site Description . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1-11.3.1 Geography . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1-1

1.3.1.1 WIPP Area . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1-21.3.1.2 Exclusion Area Land Use and Control . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1-3

1.3.1.2.1 Agricultural Uses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1-31.3.1.2.2 Water Use . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1-3

1.3.2 Demography . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1-4

1.4 Environmental Description . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1-81.4.1 Meteorological Conditions for Design and Operating Basis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1-8

1.4.1.1 Precipitation Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1-81.4.1.2 Tornadoes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1-91.4.1.3 Winds . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1-91.4.1.4 Sandstorms . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1-91.4.1.5 Temperature Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1-101.4.1.6 Site Meteorological Tower . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1-10

1.4.2 Hydrology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1-101.4.3 Geology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1-10

1.5 Natural Event Accident Initiators . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1-171.5.1 Earthquakes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1-17

1.5.1.1 Seismic History . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1-171.5.1.2 Seismic Risk . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1-181.5.1.3 Design Basis Earthquake . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1-19

1.5.2 Design Basis Tornado . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1-19

1.6 Man-Made External Accident Initiators . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1-231.6.1 Gas Pipeline Explosion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1-231.6.2 Aircraft Crash . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1-23

1.6.2.1 Military Facilities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1-231.6.2.2 Airports and Aviation Routes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1-23

1.7 Nearby Facilities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1-281.7.1 Extractive Activities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1-281.7.2 Ranching . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1-281.7.3 Farming . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1-281.7.4 Recreation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1-281.7.5 Tourism . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1-281.7.6 Waterways . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1-281.7.7 Land Transportation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1-29

1.7.7.1 Roads and Highways . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1-291.7.7.2 Railroads . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1-29


ii November 2006

1.7.8 Projected Industrial Growth . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1-29

1.8 Validity of Existing Environmental Analysis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1-31

References for Chapter 1 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1-32


iii November 2006


LIST OF FIGURES

FIGURE TITLE PAGE NO.

Figure 1.3-1, Region Surrounding the WIPP Site . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1-5

Figure 1.3-2, WIPP Location in Southeastern New Mexico . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1-6

Figure 1.3-3, WIPP Site Boundary Area . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1-7

Figure 1.4-1A, Terrain Elevations Out to Five Miles from Center of WIPP . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1-12

Figure 1.4-1B, Terrain Elevations Out to Five Miles from Center of WIPP . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1-13

Figure 1.4-1C, Terrain Elevations Out to Five Miles from Center of WIPP . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1-14

Figure 1.4-1D, Terrain Elevations Out to Five Miles from Center of WIPP . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1-15

Figure 1.4-2, Geologic Structures of Southeastern New Mexico . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1-16

Figure 1.5-1, Seismograph Stations in the WIPP Network . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1-22

Figure 1.6-1A, Natural Gas Pipelines and Wells Within Five-Mile Radius . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1-25

Figure 1.6-1B, Explanation to Figure 1.6-1A . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1-26

Figure 1.6-2, Airports and Aviation Routes Adjacent to the WIPP Site . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1-27

Figure 1.7-1, Natural Gas and Oil Wells Within a Ten-Mile Radius . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1-30


iv November 2006


LIST OF TABLES

TABLE TITLE PAGE NO.

Table 1.4-1, Maximum Wind Speeds for Roswell, New Mexico . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1-11

Table 1.4-2, Recurrence Intervals for High Winds in Southeastern New Mexico . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1-11

Table 1.5-1, Richter Scale . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1-20

Table 1.5-2, Modified Mercalli Intensity Scale . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1-21


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1.1 Introduction

This chapter provides information on the location of the WIPP site and the site characteristics to supportassumptions used in the hazards and accident analysis for potential external and natural event accidentinitiators and accident consequences. Included is information on: (1) site geography, (2) demographics,(3) nearby land use, (4) meteorology and (5) seismicity.

1.2 Requirements

The United States (U.S.) DOE was authorized by Public Law 96-164, Department of Energy NationalSecurity and Military Applications of Nuclear Energy Authorization Act of 1980,1 to provide a researchand development facility for demonstrating the safe permanent disposal of TRU wastes from nationaldefense activities and programs of the United States exempted from regulations by the U.S. NRC. Inaccordance with the 1981 and 1990 Records of Decision,2, 3 the development of the WIPP was to proceedwith a phased approach. Development of the WIPP began with a siting phase, during which several siteswere evaluated and the present site selected based on extensive geotechnical research, supplemented bytesting. Information relating to ecology, extractable resources, water and air quality, environmentalradioactivity, surface and ground water hydrology, and geology, necessary to support the long termperformance assessment of the repository, is found in Title 40 CFR Part 191 Compliance CertificationApplication for the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant, DOE/CAO-1996-2184.4

During construction all the federal lands within the WIPP Site Boundary were managed in accordancewith the terms of Public Land Order 64035 and a DOE/U.S. Bureau of Land Management (BLM)Memorandum of Understanding (MOU).6

On October 30, 1992, the WIPP Land Withdrawal Act (LWA), Public Law 102-579, as amended byPublic Law 104-2017 transferred the land from the U.S. Department of the Interior to the DOE. Consistent with the WIPP mission, lands within and around the WIPP Site Boundary are administeredaccording to a multiple land use policy. During operations, the area within the WIPP Site Boundary willremain under federal control.

1.3 Site Description

1.3.1 Geography

The WIPP site is located in Eddy County in southeastern New Mexico (Figure 1.3-1). The center of theWIPP site is approximately 103°47'27" West longitude and 32°22'11" North latitude.

Prominent natural features within five miles (8.0 km) of the center of the WIPP site include LivingstonRidge and Nash Draw, which are located about five miles (8.0 km) west (Figure 1.3-2). LivingstonRidge, the most prominent physiographic feature near the WIPP site, is a northwest facing bluff (about75 ft. or 22.9 m high) that marks the east edge of Nash Draw (a shallow drainage course about five miles[8.0 km] wide).

The Pecos River is about 12 miles (19.3 km) west of the WIPP site at its nearest point. The GuadalupeMountains are about 42 miles (67 km) and the Guadalupe Mountains National Park is about 65 miles(104.5 km) from the WIPP site. The nearest prominent man-made features are oil well drilling andpiping equipment, the city of Loving (with a 2000 population of 1,326) which is 18 miles (29.0 km) westsouthwest, and the city of Carlsbad (with a 2000 population of 25,625) which is 26 miles (41.8 km) west.


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1.3.1.1 WIPP Area

The area of land that lies within the WIPP Land Withdrawal Area forms a square, four miles (6.4 km) ona side. It contains 10,240 acres or 4,146 hectares (16 mi2 or 41.4 km2) including Sections 15-22 and27-34 in Township 22 South, Range 31 East. The area containing the WIPP surface structures issurrounded with a chain link fence and covers about 34 acres or 14 hectares in Sections 20 and 21 ofTownship 22 South, Range 31 East. This fenced area is the WIPP Property Protection Area (PPA). Thelocation and orientation of the WIPP surface structures are shown in Figure 2.4-1. These structuresinclude but are not limited to the Waste Handling Building (WHB) where radioactive waste is receivedand prepared for underground disposal, four shafts to the underground area, the Support Buildingcontaining laboratory and office facilities, showers, change rooms for underground workers, the ExhaustFilter Building, water storage tanks and pump house, trailers and auxiliary buildings for personneloffices, and two warehouses. Support structures outside of the chain link fence include sewagestabilization ponds, a meteorological tower, a communication tower, two mined-rock (salt) piles, andevaporation ponds for managing site runoff.

There are no industrial, commercial, institutional, recreational or residential structures within theWIPP Site Boundary. Access to the WIPP site is provided by two roads that connect withU.S. Highway 62/180, 13 miles (21 km) to the north, and New Mexico Highway 128, 4 miles (6.4 km)to the south. The north access road is used to transport TRU mixed waste from U.S. Highway 62/180 tothe site. The north access road is use by personnel, agents and contractors of the DOE on officialbusiness related to WIPP and personnel, permittees, licensees, or lessees of the BLM. The south accessroad is maintained by Eddy County and multiple use access is allowed.

There are several oil and gas wells around the periphery of the WIPP Site Boundary. One gas pipeline iswithin the WIPP Site Boundary, oriented northeast southwest, and is about 1.2 miles (1.9 km) north ofthe center of the WIPP surface structures at its closest point.

The areas that have been designated as subdivisions within the WIPP Site Boundary are defined belowand depicted in Figure 1.3-3.

The WIPP Land Withdrawal Area forms a square, four miles (6.4 km) on a side and contains10,240 acres (4,146 hectares).

The WIPP PPA is an area of approximately 35 acres (14 hectares) surrounded by a chain link fencetopped with barbed wire.

The WIPP Site Boundary, Exclusive Use Area (EUA), is an area of approximately 290 acres (117hectares) that contains the PPA. It is surrounded by a barbed wire fence, posted no trespassing and isrestricted to DOE use only.

The Off-Limits Area is an area of approximately 1,421 acres (575 hectares) that contains the WIPP SiteBoundary. This area is posted "No Trespassing," but is leased for grazing and hunting is allowed.

The Evaluation Guideline (EG) is applied at the EUA boundary. The EUA boundary is approximately285 meters (m) from the underground ventilation exhaust and 300 meters from the WHB ventilationexhaust. The PPA boundary is the public exclusion and access control point.

A zone, provided between the mined area underground and the WIPP Site Boundary is a minimum ofone mile (1.6 km) wide. This thickness was specified based on recommendations made by Oak RidgeNational Laboratory (ORNL). The ORNL recommendation of one to five miles (1.6 to 8.0 km) for the


1-3 November 2006

size of the zone of intact salt was to preclude unacceptable penetration of the salt formation. The ORNLstated that the actual size of the zone must be based on site dependent factors including drillingoperations, mining operations and salt dissolution rates. This was addressed in SAND 78-1596,Geological Characterization Report,8 where the authors state that the one mile (1.6 km) thickness shouldprovide more than 250,000 years of isolation using very conservative dissolution assumptions.

1.3.1.2 Exclusion Area Land Use and Control

On October 30, 1992, the WIPP LWA7 transferred the land from the U.S. Department of the Interior tothe DOE. Consistent with the WIPP mission, lands within and around the WIPP Site Boundary areadministered according to a multiple land use policy. During operations, the area within the WIPP SiteBoundary will remain under federal control.

The Waste Isolation Pilot Plant Land Management Plan (DOE/WIPP 93-004)9 allows public access tothe WIPP 16-section area up to the DOE EUA for grazing purposes and up to the DOE Off-Limits Areafor recreational purposes. Public access is controlled by the WIPP site 24-hour security force.

The DOE will not permit subsurface mining, drilling, or resource exploration unrelated to the WIPPwithin the WIPP Site Boundary during facility operation or after decommissioning. Mining and drillingfor purposes other than those which support the WIPP are prohibited within the 16 sections by the LWA. This prohibition precludes slant drilling under the WIPP site from within or outside the site, with theexception of existing rights under federal oil and gas leases No. NMNM 02953 and NMNM 02953C,which shall not be affected unless a determination is made to require the acquisition of such leases tocomply with final disposal regulations or with the solid waste disposal act.

Within the PPA, public access is restricted to employees and approved visitors. Within the EUA, accessis restricted to authorized personnel and vehicles. In addition, small areas have been fenced to controlaccess to material storage areas, borrow pits, the sewage stabilization ponds, and biological study plots.

1.3.1.2.1 Agricultural Uses

The five-mile (8.0 km) radius encompasses grazing allotments of three separate ranches. All the landwithin the WIPP Site Boundary except for the EUA (290 acres [117 hectares]) has been leased forgrazing, which is the only significant agricultural activity in the vicinity of WIPP. Grazing operateswithin the authorization of the Taylor Grazing Act of 1934, the Federal Land Policy and ManagementAct, the Public Rangelands Improvement Act of 1978, and the Bankhead-Jones Farm Tenant Act of1973. Portions of two grazing allotments administered by the BLM fall within the Land WithdrawalArea: Livingston Ridge (No. 77027), and Antelope Ridge (No. 77032) (DOE/WIPP 93-004).9 TheSmith Ranch, owned by Kenneth Smith, Inc. of Carlsbad, New Mexico, has lease rights to 2,880 acres(1,166 hectares) within the northern portion of the WIPP Site Boundary. J. C. Mills of Abernathy,Texas, owner of the Mills Ranch, has lease rights to 7,360 acres (2,980 hectares) within the southernportion of the WIPP Site Boundary. The Mills ranch house is located about 3.5 miles (5.6 km) from thecenter of the WIPP site but outside the WIPP Site Boundary.

1.3.1.2.2 Water Use

Uses of surface or groundwater in the vicinity of the WIPP site include several windmills throughout thearea to pump groundwater for livestock, and several ponds to capture runoff for livestock. The WIPP fireand potable water are obtained via 10 inch (25.4 centimeter) water pipeline managed by the city ofCarlsbad.


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1.3.2 Demography

The WIPP site is located in the southeastern part of Eddy County, near Lea County. The populationdensity of Eddy County is 11.63 persons per square mile (4.49 persons /km2); the Lea County populationdensity is 12.69 persons per square mile (4.90 persons/km2) (Census of Population).10 Demographics forthe communities surrounding the WIPP site are listed below, by county.

EDDY COUNTY

Community Population Location Relative to the WIPP SiteArtesia 10,692 53 miles (85.3 km) northwestCarlsbad 25,625 26 miles (41.8 km) westLoving 1,326 18 miles (29.0 km) west-southwest

Total Eddy County 51,658

LEA COUNTY

Community Population Location Relative to the WIPP SiteEunice 2,562 37 miles (59.5 km) eastHobbs 28,657 44 miles (70.8 km) northeast Jal 1,996 45 miles (72.4 km) southeast Lovington 9,471 50 miles (80.5 km) northeast

Total Lea County 55,511


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Figure 1.3-1, Region Surrounding the WIPP Site


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Figure 1.3-2, WIPP Location in Southeastern New Mexico


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Figure 1.3-3, WIPP Site Boundary Area


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1.4 Environmental Description

1.4.1 Meteorological Conditions for Design and Operating Basis

The climate of the region is semiarid, with generally mild temperatures, low precipitation and humidity,and a high evaporation rate. Winds are mostly from the southeast and moderate. In late winter andspring, there are strong west winds and dust storms. During the winter, the weather is often dominatedby a high pressure system situated in the central portion of the western United States and a low pressuresystem located in north-central Mexico. During the summer, the region is affected by a low pressuresystem normally situated over Arizona.11

1.4.1.1 Precipitation Summary

Precipitation is light and unevenly distributed throughout the year, averaging 13 inches (in.)(33 centimeters [cm]) annually.12 Winter is the season of least precipitation, averaging less than 0.6 in.(1.5 cm) of rainfall per month. Snow averages about 5 in. (13 cm) per year at the site and seldomremains on the ground for more than a day at a time because of the typically above-freezing temperaturesin the afternoon. Approximately half the annual precipitation comes from frequent thunderstorms in Junethrough September. Rains are usually brief, but occasionally intense, when moisture from the Gulf ofMexico spreads over the region.11 The WIPP region has about one day of freezing rain or drizzle ayear.16 An ice accumulation of 0.25 in. (0.63 cm) is typical.

At the time the WIPP location was selected, the maximum recorded 24-hour rainfall near the WIPP sitewas 5.65 in. (14.4 cm) in Roswell, in November 1901.14 The maximum recorded 24-hour snowfall was15.3 in. (38.9 cm) in Roswell, in December 1960. The greatest recorded snowfall during a one monthperiod was 23.3 in. (59.2 cm) in February 1905.15 The annual precipitation at the WIPP site was 20.8 in.(52.8 cm) for 2004.13

The 100-year recurrence maximum snow pack for the WIPP region is 10 pounds per square foot (lb/ft2)(0.5 kilo pascal [ kPa]).17 The probable maximum winter precipitation in the WIPP region is taken to bethe probable maximum 48-hour precipitation during the winter months of December through February. The probable maximum winter precipitation for the WIPP region is estimated to be 12.8 in. (32.5 cm) ofrain (i.e., 66 lb/ft2 or 3.2 kPa).18, 19 The snow load for the WIPP region is calculated (ground levelequivalent) to be 27 lb/ft2 (1.3 kPa). Specific roof loads are estimated based on American NationalStandards Institute (ANSI) methodology.17

The region has about 40 thunderstorm days annually. About 87.5 percent of these occur from May toSeptember.14 A thunderstorm day is recorded if thunder is heard, but the thunderstorm record is notrelated to observations of rain or lightning and does not indicate the severity of storms in the region.

Hail usually occurs in April through June and is not likely to develop more than three times a year. During a 39-year period at Roswell, hail was observed 97 times (about 2.5 times a year), occurring nearlytwo thirds of the time between April and June.16 For the 1° square (32° to 33° N by 103° to 104°W)surrounding the WIPP site, hailstones 0.75 in. (1.9 cm) and larger were reported eight times from 1955 to1967 (slightly less than once a year). There were no significant hail storms noted in the Waste IsolationPilot Plant 2004 Site Environmental Report (DOE/WIPP 05-2225).13


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1.4.1.2 Tornadoes

For the period 1916-1958, 75 tornadoes were reported in New Mexico on 58 tornado days.20 Data for1953 through 1976 indicate a statewide total of 205 tornadoes on 152 tornado days,12 or an averageof 9 tornadoes a year on 6 tornado days. The greatest number of tornadoes in one year was 18 in 1972;the least was 0 in 1953. The average tornado density in New Mexico during this period was 0.7 per1,000 square miles (mi.2) or 2,590 square kilometer (km2). Most tornadoes occur in May and June.21 From 1955 through 1967, 15 tornadoes were reported within the 1° square containing the WIPP surfacefacility.22

H.C.S. Thom has developed a procedure for estimating the probability of a tornado striking a givenpoint.23 The method uses a mean tornado path length and width and a site-specific frequency. ApplyingThom's method to WIPP yields a point probability of 0.00081 on an annual basis, or a recurrence intervalof 1,235 years. An analysis by Fujita yields a point tornado recurrence interval of 2,832 years in thePecos River Valley.24

According to Fujita, the WIPP design basis tornado (DBT) with a million year return period has amaximum wind speed of 183 miles per hour (mph) or 294.6 kilometer per hour (km/hr), translationalvelocity of 41 mph (66 km/hr), a maximum rotational velocity radius of 325 ft (99.1 km), a pressure dropof 0.5 pounds per square inch (psi) or 3.4 kilo pascal (kPa), and a pressure drop rate of 0.09 psi persecond (0.62 kPa per second). There have been no tornadoes touch down at the WIPP.

1.4.1.3 Winds

The maximum 1 minute wind speeds recorded at Roswell are shown in Table 1.4-1. The fastest 1 minutewind ever recorded at Roswell was 75 mph (120.7 km/h) from the west in April 1953.25 Windstormswith speeds of 57.6 mph (93 km/hr) or more occurred ten times (during the period between 1955 and1967) about one a year.25 The mean recurrence interval for annual high winds at 30 ft. (9.1 m) above theground in southeastern New Mexico is shown in Table 2.4-2.17, 23 The 100-year recurrence 30 ft. (9.1 m)level wind speed in southeastern New Mexico is 82 mph (132 km/hr). Based on a gust factor of 1.3,28 thehighest instantaneous gust expected once in 100 years at 30 ft. (9.1 m) above grade is 107 mph(172.2 km/h). The vertical wind profile for two 100-year recurrence intervals has been estimated fromthe 30 ft. (9.1 m) values and is presented in Table 1.4-2.

The predominant wind direction at the WIPP site is from the southeast. For accident consequencecalculations, the most current three years of wind speed data are used.

From the WIPP site meteorological tower recorded data, March 2005 had the highest wind speeds of theyear. The highest wind speed measured at the 10 meter level was 39 mph (17.24 meters per second[m/s]) and at the 50 meter level was 46 mph (20.66 m/s).

1.4.1.4 Sandstorms

Blowing dust or sand may occur in the region due to the combination of strong winds, sparse vegetationand the semiarid climate. High winds associated with thunderstorms are frequently a source of localizedblowing dust. Dust storms covering an extensive area occur occasionally and may reduce visibility toless than 1 mi (1.6 km). Winds of 50 to 60 mph (80.5 to 96.6 km/h) and higher may persist for severaldays if the strongest pressure gradients, which are most likely to occur during winter and early spring,become stationary.15 Ten windstorms of 58 mph (93.4 km/h) and greater were reported during 1955-1967within the 1° square in which the WIPP site is located.21 The 2004 site environmental report13 did notreport any significant sandstorms.


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1.4.1.5 Temperature Summary

Temperatures are moderate throughout the year, although seasonal changes are distinct. The meanannual temperature in southeastern New Mexico is 63°F (17.2°C). In the winter (December throughFebruary), night time lows average near 23°F (!5°C), and average maxima are in the 50s. The lowestrecorded temperature at the nearest Class A weather station in Roswell was !29°F (!33.8°C) in February1905. In the summer (June through August), the daytime temperature exceeds 90°F (32.2°C)approximately 75 percent of the time.11 The National Weather Service documented a measurement of122°F (50°C) at the WIPP site as the record high temperature for New Mexico. This measurementoccurred on June 27, 1994. From the 2004 site environmental report,13 the minimum average temperaturerecorded for the WIPP region was 18.1°F (-7.71°C) in December and the maximum high temperaturerecorded was 101.53°F (38.63°C) in June 2004.

1.4.1.6 Site Meteorological Tower

The WIPP site meteorological tower and station is located approximately 1,970 ft. (600m) northeast ofthe WHB. The meteorological station measures and records wind speed, wind direction, and temperatureat elevations of 6.5, 33, and 165 ft. (2, 10, and 50m). The data is measured and recorded continually,then downloaded into a database in fifteen minute averages. The data is validated and certified byCertified Meteorologist which is required for use for atmospheric dispersion calculations.

1.4.2 Hydrology

Surface and ground hydrology information can be found in DOE/CAO-1996-2184.4 There are no majorsurface water bodies located within 10 miles (16 km) of the WIPP site. Several bodies of water includingBrantley Lake and Lake Carlsbad are over 30 miles (48 km) to the north of the WIPP site and are at anapproximate elevation of 3,245 ft. (989 m) and 3,097 ft. (944 m) respectively. The elevation of the WIPPsurface is approximately 3,410 ft. (1039 m) above mean sea level, however, surface runoff from theWIPP site does not flow north. The Pecos River is about 14 miles (22.5 km) west of the WIPP site itsclosest point. In the vicinity of the WIPP site, there are limited occurrences of potable water and severalwater-bearing zones produce poor quality water. In the immediate vicinity of the WIPP site,groundwater above the Salado Formation is commonly of such poor quality that it is not usable for mostpurposes. There is shallow groundwater at the WIPP site. Hydrological characteristics of the WIPP sitedo not pose any operational safety hazards.

1.4.3 Geology

The land surface in the vicinity of the WIPP site is a semiarid, wind blown plain sloping gently to thewest and southwest. Its surface is characterized by an abundance of sand ridges and dunes. The averageslope within a 3 mile (4.8 km) radius is about 50 ft. per mile ( 9.5 m/km) from the east to west. A plot ofterrain profiles from the center of the WIPP site out to 5 miles (8.1 km) is presented in Figure 1.4-1Athrough 1.4-1D for each of the 16 direction sectors.

Some of the tectonic structures of the region are shown in Figure 1.4-2, with the hatched lines indicatingboundaries between the Central Basin Platform, the Midland Basin, and the Delaware Basin and the solidlines indicating pre-Permian age faults. Most of the large scale structures, including the Central BasinPlatform, the Midland Basin, and the Delaware Basin developed from the late Pennsylvanian to earlyPermian time, about 270 million years ago.

The WIPP site is located in the Delaware Basin, a subbasin of the Permian Basin, about 60 miles (97 km)east of the western margin of the Permian Basin. The geologic structure and tectonic pattern of the


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Permian Basin are chiefly the result of large-scale subsidence and uplift during the Paleozoic era (about305 to 225 million years ago). The Permian Basin is divided into subbasins, which passed through theirlast stage of significant subsidence during the late Permian age, about 230 million years ago.

All major tectonic elements of the Delaware Basin were essentially formed before deposition of thePermian evaporites, and the region has been relatively stable since then. Deep-seated faults are rare,except along the western and eastern basin margins, and there is no evidence of young, deep-seated faultsinside the basin. A detailed description of the west Texas and southeast New Mexico geologic structuresand tectonics is contained in Sandia National Laboratories report SAND 78-1596.8

Table 1.4-1, Maximum Wind Speeds for Roswell, New Mexico*

Max Wind Max WindMonth Speed, MPH Month Speed, MPH

January 67 July 66February 70 August 72March 66 September 54

April 75 October 66May 72 November 65**June 73 December 72

* Climates of the States, Vol. 2 - Western States, Roswell, NM, U.S. National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA), Water Information Center, Inc., Asheville, NC, 1974, p. 804. Local Climatological Data, Annual Summary 1985, Roswell, NM, NOAA-ED.

** Occurred more than once.

Table 1.4-2, Recurrence Intervals for High Winds in Southeastern New Mexico*

Speed, mph

Recurrence, years 30' 50' 100' 150'

2 58 62 65 73 10 68 73 81 86 25 72 77 86 91 50 80 86 95 101100 82 88 97 103

*O. G. Sutton, Micrometeorology (McGraw-Hill Book Co., Inc., New York, 1953), p. 238.


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Figure 1.4-1A, Terrain Elevations Out to Five Miles from Center of WIPP


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Figure 1.4-1B, Terrain Elevations Out to Five Miles from Center of WIPP


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Figure 1.4-1C, Terrain Elevations Out to Five Miles from Center of WIPP


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Figure 1.4-1D, Terrain Elevations Out to Five Miles from Center of WIPP


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Figure 1.4-2, Geologic Structures of Southeastern New Mexico


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1.5 Natural Event Accident Initiators

1.5.1 Earthquakes

Tectonic activity was used as a siting criterion for WIPP to ensure that faulting and igneous activity donot jeopardize waste isolation over the long term and to avoid areas where earthquakes could impactfacility design and operations. The location of the WIPP site met both aspects of the siting criterion. Several seismic studies27, 28, 29 were conducted to predict ground motions that the site may be subjected toduring its operational and long-term disposal phases.

This section discusses earthquake magnitude and intensity, the peak acceleration, and recurrence intervalthat define the design basis earthquake (DBE) for WIPP. In this section, earthquake magnitudes arereported in terms of the Richter scale, shown in Table 1.5-1 and intensities are based on the modifiedMercalli intensity scale,30 shown in Table 1.5-2. The results from this section are applied to the seismicdesign of WIPP structures and equipment.

1.5.1.1 Seismic History

Seismic history data is divided into two time frames, before and after the time when instrumentedseismographic data for the region became available.

Seismic information for New Mexico before 1962 was not instrumented and was derived from chroniclesof the effects of earthquakes on people, structures, and surface features. Seismic activity in New Mexicoreported prior to 1962 was mostly limited to the Rio Grande Rift between Albuquerque and Socorro. The pre-1962 earthquake data indicates that twenty earthquakes with maximum reported intensitiesbetween III and VIII on the Modified Mercalli Scale30 have occurred within a 186 miles (300 km) radiusof the WIPP region from 1923 to 1960, with the strongest being the intensity V Valentine, Texas event ofAugust 16, 1931. With the exception of several weak shocks, reported in 1926, 1936, and 1949, felt inCarlsbad, most known earthquakes before 1962 occurred to the west and southwest of the WIPP sitemore than 99 miles (160 km) away. A listing of pre-1962 earthquakes can be found in Table 5.2-1 ofSAND 78-1596.8

Since 1962, seismograph coverage for New Mexico and the WIPP site has become comprehensiveenough to locate the epicenters of the earthquakes occurring in the WIPP site region. Seismographs wereinstalled at WIPP, one on the surface and one in the underground, in 1990. Two seismic events ofmagnitude 5.0 or greater have occurred in the WIPP site region since 1962. The magnitude 5.0Rattlesnake Canyon earthquake occurred on January 2, 1992, with its epicenter 37 miles (60 km) east-southeast of the WIPP site. The Marathon, Texas earthquake with a magnitude of 5.7, occurred onApril 14, 1995. The Marathon earthquake epicenter was approximately 149 miles (240 km) southwest ofthe WIPP site. At a distance of 149 miles (240 km), an event of magnitude 5.7 would produce amaximum acceleration at the WIPP site of less than 0.01 g. Neither earthquake had any effect on theWIPP structures and was not detected by the two site seismographs. Facility inspections after theRattlesnake Canyon earthquake were performed by personnel from the WIPP and the New MexicoEnvironment Department.

Seismicity within 300 km (186 mi) of the WIPP site is currently monitored by seismographs installed andoperated by the New Mexico Institute of Mining and Technology (NMIMT). A network of nineseismograph stations (Figure 2.5-2), continuously monitor the seismographic activity occurring in easternNew Mexico. Data from each station is electronically transmitted to the NMIMT SeismologicalObservatory in Socorro, New Mexico. The recorded data is then compiled into a quarterly report on the


1-18 November 2006

seismicity of the WIPP site by the Geophysical Research Center of NMIMT and sent to WashingtonTRU Solutions LLC.

Based on the four 2005 quarterly seismic reports, the largest magnitude recorded was 3.8 from an eventabout 53 miles (85 km) northwest of the WIPP site. The closest event was a 1.3 magnitude about 32miles (52 km) west northwest of the site. Neither event produced a ground motion at the WIPP sitelarger than 0.01g, and neither had any effect on WIPP structures. A listing of earthquake occurrencesincluding date, time, magnitude, and epicenter location can be found in the earthquake data basemaintained by WP 02-PC.02, Delaware Basin Drilling Surveillance Plan.31

1.5.1.2 Seismic Risk

The seismic risk analysis for WIPP siting, completed in 1978, used procedures32, 33 for the determinationof earthquake probabilistic design parameters. In typical seismic risk analyses, the region of study isdivided into seismic source areas such as the Cental Basin Platform, Rio Grande Rift, and DelawareBasin. Future seismic events are considered equally likely to occur at any location within those areas. For each seismic source area, the rate of occurrence of events above a chosen threshold is estimatedusing the frequency of historical events. The sizes of successive events in each source are assumed to beindependent and exponentially distributed. The maximum possible size of events for each source isdetermined using judgment and the historical record. All assumptions underlying a measure ofearthquake risk derived from this type of analysis are explicit, and a wide range of assumptions may beemployed in the analysis procedure.

Regional studies of earthquakes prior to 1972 in southeastern New Mexico indicate that most of theearthquakes occurred in the Central Basin Platform region near Kermit, Texas, and the area about124 miles (200 km) or more west and southwest of the WIPP site in the Rio Grande Rift. The strongestearthquake event was near Valentine, Texas, in 1931 and the closest was a 1972 magnitude 2.8 eventwith its epicenter approximately 25 miles (40 km) northwest of the WIPP site. The record from regionalstudies of events in the Rio Grande Rift is consistent with the record of Quaternary faulting in that area. Quaternary faults are geologic faults that have occurred within the last three million years or since theend of the Tertiary period.

Seismic instrument studies near the WIPP site since 1974 have recorded additional evidence of theseismic activity for the site and region. The data obtained is similar to that from regional studies; inwhich half of the events occur on the Central Basin Platform while most of the rest occur to the west andsouthwest of the site in the Rio Grande Rift, with some events occurring in the general site region not inassociation with either the Central Basin Platform or the Rio Grande Rift.

The Central Basin Platform data showed that location as the most active seismic area within 186 miles(300 km) of the WIPP site in terms of number of events. The activity is equally likely to occur anywherealong the Central Basin Platform structure without regard to structural details such as pre-Permian buriedfaults. The lack of known Quaternary faults from the seismically active region of the Central BasinPlatform indicates that large magnitude earthquakes have not occurred within the recent geologic past inthe area.

Analysis of the regional and local seismic data indicated that the 1,000-year acceleration is less than orequal to 0.06 gravitational force (g) and the 10,000-year acceleration is less than or equal to 0.1 g for allmodels tried. SAND 78-15968 contains the detailed seismic risk analysis performed for the WIPP siting.


1-19 November 2006

1.5.1.3 Design Basis Earthquake

The term DBE is used for the design of surface confinement structures and components and is equivalentto the design earthquake used in NRC Regulatory Guide 3.24, Guidance on the License Application,Siting, Design, and Plant Protection for an Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installation.34 The DBE issuch that it produces ground motion at the WIPP site with a recurrence interval of 1,000 years.

From SAND 78-1596,8 the most conservative calculated estimate of the 1,000 year acceleration at WIPPis approximately 0.075 g. The geologic and seismic assumptions leading to this 1,000-year peakacceleration include the consideration of a Richter magnitude 5.5 earthquake at the site, a 6.0 magnitudeearthquake on the Central Basin Platform, and a 7.8 magnitude earthquake in the Basin and Rangesubregion. These magnitudes correspond roughly to equivalent epicentral intensity events of VII, VIII,and XI on the Modified Mercalli intensity scale.30 These values, especially the first two, are consideredquite conservative, and the other parameters used in the 0.075 g derivation are also conservativelychosen. For additional conservatism, a peak design acceleration of 0.1 g is selected for the WIPP DBE. The design response spectra for vertical and horizontal motions are taken from NRC Regulatory Guide1.60, Design Spectra for Seismic Design of Nuclear Power Plants,35 with the high-frequency asymptotescaled to this 0.1 g peak acceleration value.

Mine experience and studies on earthquake damage to underground facilities36 show that tunnels, mines,wells, etc., are not damaged for sites having peak accelerations at the surface below 0.2 g.

The DBE is the most severe credible earthquake that could occur at the WIPP site. DBE structures,systems, and components (SSCs) are designed to withstand a free-field horizontal and vertical groundacceleration of 0.1 g, based on a 1,000-year recurrence period, and retain their safety functions.

1.5.2 Design Basis Tornado

From Section 1.4.1.2, New Mexico has an average on nine tornadoes per year with most occurring inMay and June. Although tornados have occurred within the 1° square containing the WIPP surfacefacility, none have touched down at the WIPP site.

H.C.S. Thom developed a method for estimating the probability of a tornado striking a given point.23 Themethod uses a mean tornado path length and width and a site-specific frequency. Applying Thom'smethod to WIPP yields a point probability of 0.00081 on an annual basis, or a recurrence interval of1,235 years. An analysis by Fujita yields a point tornado recurrence interval of 2,832 years in the PecosRiver Valley.24 According to Fujita, the WIPP design basis tornado (DBT) with a million year returnperiod has a maximum wind speed of 183 mph (294.5 km/hr).

The DBT is the most severe credible tornado that could occur at the WIPP site. WIPP DBT SSCs aredesigned to withstand the 183 mph (294.5 km/h) winds generated by the DBT, based on a 1,000,000 yearrecurrence period, and retain their safety function.


1-20 November 2006

Table 1.5-1, Richter Scale

Magnitude

Less than 2 Very Seldom Ever Felt

2.0 to 3.4 Barely Felt

3.5 to 4.2 Felt as a Rumble

4.3 to 4.9 Shakes Furniture; Can Break Dishes

5.0 to 5.9 Dislodges Heavy Objects; Cracks Walls

6.0 to 6.9 Considerable Damage to Buildings

7.0 to 7.3 Major Damage to Buildings; Breaks Underground Pipes

7.4 to 7.9 Great Damage; Destroys Masonry and Frame Buildings

above 8.0 Complete Destruction; Ground Moves in Waves


1-21 November 2006

Table 1.5-2, Modified Mercalli Intensity Scale30

(Abridged)

Intensity

I. Not felt except by a very few under especially favorable circumstances. (I Rossi-Forel scale.)

II. Felt only by a few persons at rest, especially on upper floors of buildings. Delicately suspendedobjects may swing. (I to II Rossi-Forel scale.)

III. Felt quite noticeably indoors, especially on upper floors of buildings, but many people do notrecognize it as an earthquake. Standing motor cars may rock slightly. Vibration like passing oftruck. Duration estimated. (III Rossi-Forel scale.)

IV. During the day felt indoors by many, outdoors by few. At night some awakened. Dishes, windows,doors disturbed; walls make cracking sound. Sensation like heavy truck striking building. Standingmotor cars rock noticeably. (IV to V Rossi-Forel scale.)

V. Felt by nearly everyone; many awakened. Some dishes, windows, etc., broken; a few instances ofcracked plaster; unstable objects overturned. Disturbance of trees, poles and other tall objectssometimes noticed. Pendulum clocks may stop. (V to VI Rossi-Forel scale.)

VI. Felt by all; many frightened and run outdoors. Some heavy furniture moved; a few instances of fallenplaster or damaged chimneys. Damage slight. (VI to VII Rossi-Forel scale.)

VII. Everybody runs outdoors. Damage negligible in buildings of good design and construction; slight tomoderate in well-built ordinary structures; considerable in poorly built or badly designed structures;some chimneys broken. Noticed by persons driving motor cars. (VIII Rossi-Forel scale.)

VIII. Damage slight in specially designed structures; considerable in ordinary substantial buildings withpartial collapse; great in poorly built structures. Panel walls thrown out of frame structures.

Fall of chimneys, factory stacks, columns, monuments, walls. Heavy furniture overturned. Sand andmud ejected in small amounts. Changes in well water. Disturbs persons driving motor cars. (VIII+ to IX Rossi-Forel scale.)

IX. Damage considerable in specially designed structures; well-designed frame structures thrown out ofplumb; great in substantial buildings with partial collapse. Buildings shifted off foundations. Ground cracked conspicuously. Underground pipes broken. (IX Rossi-Forel scale.)

X. Some well-built wooden structures destroyed; most masonry and frame structures destroyed withfoundations; ground badly cracked. Rails bent. Landslides considerable from river banks and steepslopes. Shifted sand and mud. Water splashed (slopped) over banks. (X Rossi-Forel scale.)

XI. Few, if any, structures (masonry) remain standing. Bridges destroyed, broad fissures in ground. Underground pipe lines completely out of service. Earth slumps and land slips in soft ground. Railsbent greatly.

XII. Damage total. Waves seen on ground surfaces. Lines of sight and level distorted. Objects thrownupward into the air.


1-22 November 2006

Figure 1.5-1, Seismograph Stations in the WIPP Network

Seismograph Stations

CBET Carlsbad East Tower DAG Dagger Draw

CL7 Carlsbad Station 7 GDL2 Guadalupe Mountains

CL2B Carlsbad Station 2B HTMS Hat Mesa

CPRX Caprock SSS San Simon Swale

SRH Seven Rivers Hills


1-23 November 2006

1.6 Man-Made External Accident Initiators

1.6.1 Gas Pipeline Explosion

Oil and gas related activities are the commercial operations within five miles of the WIPP site. There arethree potash mines and three chemical processing plants (adjacent to the mines) within five to ten miles(8.0 to 16.1 km) of the WIPP site.

Activities associated with oil and gas exploration, production, and transportation present the most likelyman-made external accident initiators to WIPP because of their proximity to the WIPP site. Figures 1.6-1A and 1.6-1B show the location and related information of each pipeline within five miles(8.0 km) of the site. There are no crude oil pipelines within five miles (8.0 km) of the WIPP site, but.there are four natural gas pipelines in the vicinity of the site. One pipeline is within the WIPP SiteBoundary, oriented northeast to southwest, and is about 1.2 miles (1.9 km) north of the center of theWIPP surface structures at its closest point.

The three potash mines and three potash chemical processing plants located between five and ten miles(8.0 to 16.1 km) of the WIPP site do not present a hazard to WIPP operations.

1.6.2 Aircraft Crash

1.6.2.1 Military Facilities

There are no military facilities within a five mile radius (8.0 km) of the WIPP site. Holloman Air ForceBase is the nearest military facility to the WIPP site and is located 138 miles (222.1 km) to the northwest.

1.6.2.2 Airports and Aviation Routes

There are no airports within a ten-mile (16.1 km) radius of the WIPP site. The nearest airstrip, nowdecommissioned, was 12 miles (19.3 km) north of the site. The nearest commercial airport is CavernCity Air Terminal, 28 miles (45.1 km) west of the WIPP site in Carlsbad. Other airports in the area areEunice (32 miles or 51.5 km east), Carlsbad Caverns Airport (42 miles or 67.6 km southwest), HobbsAirport (42 miles or 67.6 km northeast), Jal Airport (40 miles or 64.4 km southeast), Lovington Airport(50 miles or 80.5 km northeast), and Artesia Airport (51 miles or 82.1 km northwest). The relationshipof these airports to the WIPP site is shown in Figure 1.6-2. The figure also shows the historic airwaysapplicable to WIPP during the siting and design phase.

A study performed in August 200037 documented more current flight information based on input fromlocal Carlsbad airport data, military data, and Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) data. Commercialand general aviation flights into the Carlsbad Airport totaled 3,924 flights per year. Military flights priorto October 2000 were about 965 flights per year and were expected to drop due to changes in U.S. AirForce training plans.

The study summarized FAA information that included sets of air traffic data and flight patterns formilitary, commercial and private aircraft within a five mile radius of the WIPP site. The data indicatedlittle traffic over the WIPP site with heavier traffic to the south. The proximity of the WIPP site to thesouthern border of the country limit the north-south traffic. The restricted airspace associated with theWhite Sands Missile Range to the west of the WIPP site cause east-west traffic to preferentially fly to thenorth or south of the site. The highest number of flights recorded in the data provided was 35 flights in26 hours. This would equate to over 11,570 flights per year. While this is an increase over the nominal30 flights per day during the design phase of the WIPP, the study further calculated the frequency of


1-24 November 2006

aircraft impact to the WIPP site to be 3.6×10-7/year, indicating that the WIPP site's remote locationprotects it from the effects of aircraft accidents.


1-25 November 2006

Figure 1.6-1A, Natural Gas Pipelines and Wells Within Five-Mile Radius


1-26 November 2006

Figure 1.6-1B, Explanation to Figure 1.6-1A

1. El Paso Natural Gas Co., Eunice-Carlsbad Line (LC060762) 12.75" Dia Gas Line, Built 1945,Located 1.125 miles NNW of WIPP. Operating Pressure 721 PSIG, Burial Depth 24".

2. El Paso Natural Gas Co., James "A" No. 1 (NM17321) 4.5"/8.625" Dia Gas Line, Built 1974,Located 2.375 miles WNW of WIPP. Operating Pressure 721 PSIG, Burial Depth 24".

3. El Paso Natural Gas Co., Cabana No. 1 (NM18432) 4.5" Dia Gas Line, Built 1974, Located4.25 miles NW of WIPP. Operating Pressure 721 PSIG, Burial Depth 24".

4. El Paso Natural Gas Co., James "E" No. 1 (NM19974) 4.5" Dia Gas Line, Built 1974, Located4.25 miles NW of WIPP. Operating Pressure 721 PSIG, Burial Depth 24".

5. El Paso Natural Gas Co., El Paso "201" Spur Line (NM20125) 4.5" Dia Gas Line, Built 1974,Located 4.625 miles NW of WIPP. Operating Pressure 721 PSIG, Burial Depth 24".

6. El Paso Natural Gas Co., James "C" No. 1 (RW18344) 6.625" Dia Gas Line, Built 1974,Located 4.625 miles NW of WIPP. Operating Pressure 721 PSIG, Burial Depth 24".

7. El Paso Natural Gas Co., James Ranch Unit No. 1 (NM046228) (RW14190) 4.5" Dia GasLine, Built 1958, Located 3.06125 miles WSW of WIPP. Operating Pressure 721 PSIG, BurialDepth 24".

8. El Paso Natural Gas Co., James Ranch Unit No. 7 (NM26987) 4.5" Dia Gas Line, Built 1976,Located 2.625 miles SW of WIPP. Operating Pressure 721 PSIG, Burial Depth 24".

9. El Paso Natural Gas Co., Arco State No. 1 (RW17822) 6.625" Dia Gas Line, Built 1971,Located 4.625 miles S of WIPP. Operation Pressure 837, Burial Depth 24".

10. El Paso Natural Gas Co., Lateral EE-4 (NM16959/(RW18065) 4.5" Dia Gas Line, Built 1973,Located 3.125 miles SW of WIPP. Operating Pressure 1200 PSIG, Burial Depth 36".

11. Natural Gas Pipeline Co. of America, Lateral EE-6 Built 1974, 4.5" Dia Gas Line, Built 1974,Located 3.2 miles SSW of WIPP. Operating Pressure 1200 PSIG, Burial Depth 36".

12. Natural Gas Pipeline Co. of America, Lateral EE-3 (NM16029) 8.625" Dia Gas Line, Built1972, Located 3.4 miles SSW of WIPP. Operating Pressure 1200 PSIG, Burial Depth 36".

13. Natural Gas Pipeline Co. of America, Lateral EE-7 (NM22471) 4.5" Dia Gas Line, Built 1974,Located 4.7 miles SW of WIPP. Operating Pressure 1200 PSIG, Burial Depth 36".

14. Transwestern Pipeline Co., West Texas Lateral (NM070224) 24" Dia Gas Line, Built 1960,Located 4.5 miles ENE of WIPP. Operating Pressure 1200 PSIG, Burial Depth 30".

15. Transwestern Pipeline Co., West Texas Lateral (NM8722) 30" Dia Gas Line, Built 1969,Located 4.25 miles ENE of WIPP. Operating Pressure 930 PSIG, Burial Depth 30".

16. Transwestern Pipeline Co., Monument Lateral (NM073482) 10" Dia Gas Line, Built 1960,Located 4.5 miles ENE of WIPP. Operating Pressure 930 PSIG, Burial Depth 30".


1-27 November 2006

Figure 1.6-2, Airports and Aviation Routes Adjacent to the WIPP Site

(1 kilometer = 0.62 miles)


1-28 November 2006

1.7 Nearby Facilities

1.7.1 Extractive Activities

Within a five mile (8.0 km) radius from the center of the WIPP LWA, both oil and gas are extractedbelow the Salado formation. The majority of the newer wells produce oil and gas from the BrushyCanyon formation of the Delaware Mountain Group. Gas wells typically produce from the deeperPennsylvanian formations (Atoka, Strawn, and Morrow formations). In late 2004, there were 259 oilwells (some which produce both oil and gas), 20 gas wells, and 17 plugged wells within five miles(8.0 km) of the LWA boundary. The completion of these wells is stratigraphically below the repositoryhorizon. There are likewise an additional 661 oil wells, 45 gas wells, and 88 plugged wells within tenmiles of the LWA boundary (Figure 1.7-1). The plugged wells include both wells that are considered dryholes and wells that are no longer productive and have been permanently sealed.

Besides the oil and gas extractive activities, there are three active potash mines within ten miles (16.1km) of the WIPP LWA. Potash is extracted from the McNutt Potash member which is stratigraphicallyabove the WIPP repository horizon.

1.7.2 Ranching

There are approximately 300 ranches with nominally 2.6 million acres in Eddy County and 2.8 millionacres in Lea County with a nominal 100,000 to 150,000 head of livestock (New Mexico AgriculturalStatistics).38

1.7.3 Farming

There are approximately 160,000 acres (64,750 hectares) of farmland in the Carlsbad resource area. Theprincipal crops grown include cotton, alfalfa, sorghum grains and pecans. There are also minor amountsof vegetables grown.

1.7.4 Recreation

Recreational opportunities in the area of the WIPP site include big and small game hunting, camping,horseback riding, hiking, watching wildlife, and sightseeing.

1.7.5 Tourism

There are two national parks (Guadalupe Mountains and Carlsbad Caverns), a national forest (Lincoln),and two state parks (Living Desert Zoo and Gardens, and Brantley) located within or near Carlsbad. Carlsbad Caverns National Park, 36 miles (58 km) southwest of the WIPP site, has approximately onemillion visitors per year.

1.7.6 Waterways

There are no navigable waterways within a five-mile (8.0 km) radius of the WIPP site. The nearest riveris the Pecos River which is 12 miles (19.3 km) west of the WIPP site.


1-29 November 2006

1.7.7 Land Transportation

1.7.7.1 Roads and Highways

Other than the highways that provide north or south access, only one other highway lies within afive-mile (8.0 km) radius. This is New Mexico Highway 128, which is between four and five miles (6.4to 8.0 km) southwest of the WIPP (Figure 1.3-2). It connects Jal with New Mexico 31, which leads intoLoving and it provides access to Carlsbad. New Mexico Highway 128 is used by ranchers, school buses,potash miners, and by oil and gas company vehicles. Dirt roads in the area are used for ranching, oil andgas maintenance/production activities.

1.7.7.2 Railroads

Except for the rail spur that serves the WIPP site, there are no railroad lines within the five-mile radiusthe site. There are rail lines to Mosaic Corporation Main Plant and Nash Draw operation, and theIntrepid Mining, LLC. Each potash mining operation is located between 6 and 10 miles (9.7 to 16.1 km)of the WIPP site. All railroad lines within the general vicinity of the WIPP site are used specifically totransport potash.

1.7.8 Projected Industrial Growth

Oil and gas production is the only significant economic activity forecast for the future within five miles(8.0 km) of the WIPP site. Active potash mining is occurring within ten miles (16.1 km) of the site. Potash expansion is not firm because of market conditions. No extractive activity is allowed within theLWA area with the exception of Section 31 (the southwest corner section of the LWA area). There iscurrently one gas well, referred to as James Ranch 13, producing from that section below the 6,000 ft..(1,828.8 m) LWA designation. This well was slant drilled from section 6 of Township 23 South. Otherpermit applications for slant drilling into section 31 from outside sections have been denied by the BLM. The other fifteen sections of the LWA area are withdrawn to the center of the earth.


1-30 November 2006

Figure 1.7-1, Natural Gas and Oil Wells Within a Ten-Mile Radius (1 Kilometer = 0.62 Miles)


1-31 November 2006

1.8 Validity of Existing Environmental Analysis

The DOE's Environmental Protection Program (DOE Order 450.1)39 describes the DOE's commitment toenvironmental protection and pledges to implement sound stewardship practices that are protective of theair, water, land and other natural anc cultural resources. The DOE conducts effluent monitoring andenvironmental surveillance to verify that the public and the environment are protected during WIPPoperations, and to ensure operations comply with applicable federal and state requirements.

The WIPP 2004 site environmental report13 provides a description of the WIPP environmental monitoringprogram and the results of that monitoring. Based on environmental reports generated since WIPP wasconstructed, there have been no environmental events that challenge the design basis for the WIPP.


1-32 November 2006

References for Chapter 1

1. Public Law 96-164, U.S. Department of Energy National Security and Military Applications ofNuclear Energy Authorization Act of 1980, December 29, 1979.

2. U.S. Department of Energy, 46 FR 9162, Record of Decision, Waste Isolation Pilot Plant,January 28, 1981.

3. U.S. Department of Energy, 55 FR 256892, Record of Decision, Waste Isolation Pilot Plant,June 22, 1990.

4. 40 CFR Part 191, "Environmental Radiation Protection Standards for Management and Disposalof Spent Nuclear Fuel, High Level and Transuranic Radioactive Wastes"; Subpart B,"Environmental Standards for Disposal," July 2004.

5. Public Land Order 6403, 48 FR 31038, July 6, 1983.

6. Memorandum of Understanding, Bureau of Land Management and the Department of Energy,July 19, 1994.

7. Public Law 102-579, 102nd Congress, Waste Isolation Pilot Plant Land Withdrawal Act,October 30, 1992 [as amended by Public Law 104-201].

8. SAND 78-1596, Geological Characterization Report, Waste Isolation Pilot Plant Site,Southeastern New Mexico; Sandia National Laboratories, Albuquerque, NM, December 1978.

9. DOE/WIPP 93-004, Waste Isolation Pilot Plant Land Management Plan.

10. Census of Population, General Population Characteristics of New Mexico, Bureau of the Census.U.S. Department of Commerce, 2000.

11. DOE/EIS-0026, Final Environmental Impact Statement, Waste Isolation Pilot Plant,U.S. Department of Energy, Carlsbad, NM, 1980.

12. Climatological Data National Summary, National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration(NOAA), 1976.

13. DOE/WIPP 05-2225, Waste Isolation Pilot Plant 2004 Site Environmental Report.

14. Weather Bureau Technical Paper No. 2, Maximum Recorded U.S. Point Rainfall,U.S. Department of Commerce, 1963.

15. Climates of the States, Vol. 2 - Western States, Roswell, New Mexico, U.S. National Oceanicand Atmospheric Administration (NOAA), Water Information Center, Port Washington, NY,1974.

16. Technical Report EP-83, Hail Size and Distribution, U.S. Army, Quartermaster Research andEngineering Center, 1958.


1-33 November 2006

17. ANSI A58.1-1972, Building Code Requirements for Minimum Design Loads in Buildings andOther Structures, Revision of A58.1-1955, American National Standards Institute, Inc., July1972.

18. Hydrometeorological Report No. 33, Seasonal Variations of the Probable MaximumPrecipitation East of the 105th Meridian for Areas from 10 to 1,000 Square Miles and Durationsof 6, 12, 24 and 48 Hours, U.S. Department of Commerce, April1956.

19. Housing and House Finance Agency, Snow Load Studies, Office of the Administrative Divisionof Housing Research, 1956.

20. Technical Paper No. 20, Tornado Occurrences in the United States, U.S. Department ofCommerce, July 1960.

21. Technical Memorandum WBTM FCST 12, Severe Local Storm Occurrence, 1955-1967,Environmental Sciences and Services Administration, U.S. Department of Commerce,Washington, DC, 1969.

22. WASH 1300, Technical Basis for Interim Regional Tornado Criteria, U.S. Atomic EnergyCommission, Washington, DC, May 1974.

23. Monthly Weather Review, Tornado Probabilities, November-December, 1963.

24. SMRP Research Paper No. 155, A Site-Specific Study of Wind and Tornado Probabilities at theWIPP Site in Southeast-New Mexico, Research Project, Department of Geophysical Sciences,University of Chicago, 1978.

25. Environmental Data Service, June 1968, Weather Atlas of the United States (originally titledClimatic Atlas of the United States), reprinted in 1975 by Gale Research Co.

26. DGAF 140, Relations Between Gusts and Average Wind Speeds for Housing LoadDetermination, Daniel Guggenheim, Airship Institute, Cleveland, Ohio, 1946.

27. New Mexico Bureau of Mines and Mineral Resources, Seismicity of Proposed RadioactiveWaste Isolation Disposal Site in Southeastern New Mexico, 1974.

28. New Mexico Institute of Mining and Technology, Report to Sandia National Laboratories,A Report on Seismic Studies of the Los Medanos Area in Southeastern New Mexico, 1978.

29. SAND 80-7096, New Mexico Institute of Mining and Technology, Report to Sandia NationalLaboratories Seismicity in the Area of the Waste Isolation Pilot Project. Released as a SandiaNational Laboratories Report, 1980.

30. Bulletin of the Seismology Society of America, Modified Mercalli Intensity Scale of 1931,Vo.21, No.4, December 1931.

31. WP 02-PC.02, Delaware Basin Drilling Surveillance Plan, July 2004.

32. Proceedings of the Third World Conference on Earthquake Engineering, Santiago, Chile, Vol. A- I, The Major Influences on Seismic Risk, 1969.


1-34 November 2006

33. Journal of the Structural Division, American Society of Civil Engineering, Vol. 101, No. 10,Seismic Risk Analysis of Boston, 1975.

34. U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Guidance on the License Application, Siting, Design, andPlant Protection for an Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installation, Regulatory Guide 3.24,December 1974.

35. U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Regulatory Guide 1.60, Revision 1, Design ResponseSpectra for Seismic Design of Nuclear Power Plants, December 1973.

36. AIME Volume 1, Proceedings of the 1979 RETC, Littleton, CO, Earthquake Damage toUnderground Facilities, Draft, 1979.

37. ITSC-WIPP-2000-01, Rev. 0, Estimate of Aircraft Impact Frequency and Consequences at theWaste Isolation Pilot Plant, August 2000.

38. New Mexico Agricultural Statistics, U.S. Department of Agriculture, New Mexico AgriculturalStatistics Service, Las Cruces, NM, 2002.

39. DOE Order 450.1, Environmental Protection Program, 2003.


November 2006

FACILITY DESCRIPTION

TABLE OF CONTENTSSECTION PAGE NO.

2.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-1

2.2 Requirements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-1

2.3 Facility Overview . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-22.3.1 Facility Design . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-22.3.2 Facility Operations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-4

2.4 Facility Structure . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-52.4.1 Waste Handling Building . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-5

2.4.1.1 Entrance Air Locks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-52.4.1.2 CH Bay . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-62.4.1.3 Shielded Storage Room . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-62.4.1.4 Conveyance Loading Room and Shaft Entry Room . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-62.4.1.5 WHB Support Areas . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-7

2.4.2 Building 412 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-72.4.3 Exhaust Filter Building . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-72.4.4 WIPP Shafts . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-7

2.4.4.1 Shaft and Hoist General Features . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-72.4.4.2 Waste Shaft and Hoist Specific Features . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-8

2.4.5 Underground Facilities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-102.4.5.1 General Design . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-10

2.4.5.1.1 Self-Contained Self-Rescuers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-11|2.4.5.2 Mining Method . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-112.4.5.3 Mined Material . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-122.4.5.4 Interface Between Mining and Waste Disposal Activities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-122.4.5.5 Ground Control Program . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-122.4.5.6 TRU Waste Disposal Area . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-142.4.5.7 Magnesium Oxide Backfill . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-142.4.5.8 Panel Closure . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-152.4.5.9 Geotechnical Monitoring Program . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-16

2.5 CH Waste Handling Process . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-342.5.1 CH Waste Transportation Containers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-34

2.5.1.1 TRUPACT-II . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-342.5.1.2 HalfPACT . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-35

2.5.2 CH Waste Containers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-352.5.2.1 55-Gallon Drums . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-352.5.2.2 85-Gallon Drums . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-352.5.2.3 100-Gallon Drums . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-352.5.2.4 Standard Waste Boxes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-362.5.2.5 Ten-Drum Overpack . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-362.5.2.6 Standard Pipe Overpack . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-362.5.2.7 S100 Pipe Overpack . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-362.5.2.8 S200 Pipe Overpack . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-37


2-ii November 2006

2.5.2.9 S300 Pipe Overpack . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-372.5.3 CH Waste Handling Equipment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-37

2.5.3.1 CH Bay . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-372.5.3.2 Conveyance Loading Room . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-422.5.3.3 Underground . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-42

2.5.4 CH Waste Handling Process . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-432.5.4.1 CH Waste Receiving . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-432.5.4.2 CH Bay . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-442.5.4.3 Conveyance Loading Room . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-452.5.4.4 Waste Shaft Entry Room . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-452.5.4.5 Waste Shaft Station . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-452.5.4.6 Underground CH Waste Disposal Process . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-46|

2.6 Confinement Systems . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-872.6.1 Waste Handling Building . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-872.6.2 Underground . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-872.6.3 Ventilation Systems . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-87

2.6.3.1 Surface Ventilation Systems in Controlled Areas . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-882.6.3.2 WHB CH and RH Waste Handling Area Ventilation Systems . . . . . . . . . . . 2-892.6.3.3 WHB Mechanical Equipment Room Ventilation System . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-902.6.3.4 WHB Waste Shaft Hoist Tower Ventilation System . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-902.6.3.5 Exhaust Filter Building Ventilation System . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-902.6.3.6 Central Monitoring Room Ventilation System . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-912.6.3.7 Underground Ventilation System . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-912.6.3.8 Underground Ventilation Disposal/Mining Air Flows . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-932.6.3.9 Natural Ventilation Pressure . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-94

2.7 Support Systems . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-1062.7.1 Radiation Monitoring System . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-1062.7.2 Fire Protection System . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-107

2.7.2.1 Fire Water Supply and Distribution System . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-1082.7.2.2 Fire Detection and Alarm System . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-1082.7.2.3 Radio Fire Alarm Reporter System . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-1092.7.2.4 Fire Suppression System . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-1092.7.2.5 Fire Protection System Design, Installation, Testing and Maintenance . . . . 2-109

2.8 Utility Distribution Systems . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-1102.8.1 Electrical System . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-110

2.8.1.1 Normal Power Source . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-1112.8.1.2 Backup Power Source . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-1112.8.1.3 Uninterruptible Power Supply . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-1112.8.1.4 Lightning Protection and Grounding . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-1122.8.1.5 Safety Considerations and Controls . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-112

2.8.2 Compressed Air . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-1122.8.3 Plant Monitoring and Communications Systems . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-112

2.8.3.1 Central Monitoring System . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-1132.8.3.2 Plant Communications . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-113

2.9 Auxiliary Systems and Support Facilities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-1182.9.1 Water Distribution System . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-1182.9.2 Sewage Treatment System . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-118


2-iii November 2006

References for Chapter 2 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-119


2-iv November 2006


LIST OF FIGURES

FIGURE TITLE PAGE NO.

Figure 2.4-1, WIPP Surface Structures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-17

Figure 2.4-1a, Legend for Figure 2.4-1 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-18

Figure 2.4-2, Underground Structures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-19

Figure 2.4-3, Spatial View of the WIPP Site . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-20

Figure 2.4-4, WHB Plan (Ground Floor) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-21

Figure 2.4-5, WHB Plan (Upper Floor) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-22

Figure 2.4-6, WHB (Sections) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-23

Figure 2.4-7, Configuration of CH Waste Unloading TRUDOCKS in the WHB . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-24

Figure 2.4-8, Exhaust Filter Building . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-25

Figure 2.4-9, Waste Shaft and Hoist Arrangement . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-26

Figure 2.4-10, Underground Layout and Ventilation Flow . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-27

Figure 2.4-10A, Ventilation Flow for Panel 4 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-28

Figure 2.4-11, Typical RH and CH TRU Mixed Waste Disposal Configuration . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-29

Figure 2.4-12, Example of Backfill Emplacement in a Disposal Room . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-30

Figure 2.4-13, Example of MgO Super Sack Rack Used With Compacted Waste . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-31

Figure 2.4-14A, Panel Closure . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-32

Figure 2.4-14B, Panel Substantial and Isolation Barriers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-33|

Figure 2.5-1, Truck, TRUPACT-IIs and Trailer . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-48

Figure 2.5-2, CH Waste Handling Process . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-49

Figure 2.5-3, TRUPACT-II . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-50

Figure 2.5-4, HalfPACT . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-51

Figure 2.5-5, Standard 55-Gallon Drum . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-52

Figure 2.5-6, 85-Gallon Drum . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-53

Figure 2.5-7, 100-Gallon Drum . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-54

Figure 2.5-8, Standard Waste Box . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-55

Figure 2.5-9, Ten-Drum Overpack . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-56

Figure 2.5-10, Standard Pipe Overpack . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-57

Figure 2.5-11, Standard Pipe Overpack . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-58

Figure 2.5-12, S100 Pipe Overpack . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-59

Figure 2.5-13, S100 Pipe Overpack Dunnage and Shielding . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-60


2-v November 2006

Figure 2.5-14, S200 Pipe Overpack . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-61

Figure 2.5-15, S200A and S200B Pipe Overpack Shield Inserts . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-62

Figure 2.5-16, S300 Pipe Overpack Assembly . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-63

Figure 2.5-17, S300 Pipe Overpack Shield Insert . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-64

Figure 2.5-18, Typical Overhead Crane . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-65

Figure 2.5-19, TRUDOCK Vent Hood System . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-66

Figure 2.5-20, TRUDOCK Vacuum System . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-67

Figure 2.5-21, Adjustable Center-of-Gravity Lift Fixture . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-68

Figure 2.5-22, SWB Lift Fixture Adapter . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-69

Figure 2.5-23, TDOP Lift Fixture Adaptor . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-70

Figure 2.5-24, SWB Forklift Fixture . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-71

Figure 2.5-25, Facility Pallet . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-72

Figure 2.5-26, Facility Pallet on Conveyance Loading Car . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-73

Figure 2.5-27, CH Underground Transporter . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-74

Figure 2.5-28, Push-Pull Attachment Requiring Forklift Tine Removal . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-75

Figure 2.5-29, Push Pull Attachment Installed on Forklift Tines . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-76

Figure 2.5-30, CH Waste Handling (Surface) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-77

Figure 2.5-31, WHB CH Waste Temporary Storage Area . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-78

Figure 2.5-32, CH Waste Handling (Underground) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-79

Figure 2.5-33, Underground Transportation Routes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-80

Figure 2.5-34, CH Waste Emplacement . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-81

Figure 2.5-35, Arrangement of Typical Waste Stack . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-82

Figure 2.5-36a, Typical CH Waste Emplacement Process . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-83

Figure 2.5-36b, Typical CH Waste Emplacement Process . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-84

Figure 2.5-37, Typical Room Barricade . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-85

Figure 2.5-38, Typical Panel Filled With Waste . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-86

Figure 2.6-1, WHB and TRUPACT Maintenance Facility . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-96

Figure 2.6-1a, WHB CH HVAC Flow Diagram . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-97

Figure 2.6-2, WHB RH HVAC Flow Diagram . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-98

Figure 2.6-2a, WHB RH HVAC Flow Diagram . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-99

Figure 2.6-3, Waste Shaft/Hoist Tower HVAC Flow Diagram . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-100

Figure 2.6-4, EFB HVAC Flow Diagram . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-101

Figure 2.6-5, Support Building CMR HVAC Flow Diagram . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-102

Figure 2.6-6, Underground Ventilation Air Flow Diagram . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-103


2-vi November 2006

Figure 2.6-7, Main Fan and Exhaust Filter System Schematic . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-104

Figure 2.6-8, Typical Bulkhead Design and Components . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-105

Figure 2.8-1, Electrical Distribution System . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-117


2-vii November 2006


LIST OF TABLES


Table 2.2-1, Safety Class and Safety Significant SSC Design Standards . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-2

Table 2.8-1, Diesel Generator Loads . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-115

Table 2.8-2, UPS Loads . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-116


2-viii November 2006



2-1 November 2006


2.1 Introduction

The purpose of this chapter is to provide descriptions of the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP) facilityand processes to support assumptions used in the hazard and accident analyses. This chapter discussesdesign and safety criteria for structures, systems, and components (SSCs) that protect the public,workers, and the environment from hazards posed by WIPP contact handled (CH) waste handlingoperations. This chapter also describes the systems, structures, and components that support CH wastehandling as well as the waste handling process.

2.2 Requirements

The WIPP was designed and constructed according to U.S. DOE O 6430, General Design CriteriaManual for Department of Energy Facilities, draft, dated June 10, 1981,1 and codes and standardsapplicable at the time of construction. Facility modifications designed prior to DOE O 6430 beingsuperceded were designed according to the revision of DOE O 6430 and codes and standards applicableat the time of modification. Present and future modifications will be designed according to DOE O420.1B, Facility Safety2; and DOE O 430.1A, Life-Cycle Asset Management3; and the codes andstandards in DOE G 420.1-1, Nonreactor Nuclear Safety Design Criteria and Explosives Safety CriteriaGuide for use with DOE O 420.1, Facility Safety.4 Codes and standards from DOE G 420.1-1 aresummarized in Table 2.2-1.

SSCs for the original WIPP design were classified as Design Class I, II, and III in the WIPP GeneralPlant Design Description (GPDD)5 and individual system design descriptions (SDDs). Criteria for theselection of Design Class I, II, and III SSCs are identified for historical purposes in the GPDD.5 Basedon DOE G 420.1-1,4 WIPP has replaced design class with functional classification. The WIPP SSCclassifications are as follows:

• Safety Class. Safety Class SSCs are those whose preventive or mitigative function is necessaryto keep radiological material exposure to the public below the off-site evaluation guideline,which is 25 rem (roentgen equivalent man) total effective dose equivalent. The dose estimatesto be compared to it are those received by a hypothetical maximally exposed off-site individualat the site boundary.

• Safety Significant. SSCs not designated as Safety Class, but whose preventive or mitigativefunction is a major contributor to defense in depth (DID) and/or worker safety as determinedfrom hazards analysis. Safety Significant SSC designations based on worker safety are limitedto those whose failure is estimated to result in a prompt worker fatality or serious injuries orsignificant radiological or chemical exposure to workers.

Table 2.2-1 provides codes, standards, and standard practices for Safety SSCs, and these areconsidered for the design of the new or modified SSCs.


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Table 2.2-1, Safety Class and Safety Significant SSC Design Standards

DOE G 420.1-1 SAFETY SIGNIFICANT SAFETY CLASS

Concrete ACI-318 ANSI/ACI-349

Steel AISC-M011 ANSI/AISC-N690

Pressure Vessels ASME Section VIII ASME Section VIII

Piping/Valves ANSI/ASME B31.3/ANSI/ASME B16.5, B31.3

ANSI/ASME B31.3; ANSI-N278.1/ANSI/ASME B16.5, B31.3

Pumps ANSI/API; ANSI/ASME B73.1M,B73.2M; ASME Section VIII; AWWA;Hydraulic Institute Standards

ANSI/API; ANSI/ASME B73.1M, B73.2M; ASMESection VIII; AWWA; Hydraulic Institute Standards

Tanks (Atmos.) ANSI/API-650; AWWA-D100;ANSI/ASME-B96.1

ANSI/API-650; AWWA-D100; ANSI/ASME-B96.1

Heat Exchangers ASHRAE Handbook; ASME Section VIII;TEMA B, C, or R

ASHRAE Handbook; ASME Section VIII; TEMA B,C, or R

Gloveboxes ANSI/ASTM C852; ANS 11.16 ANSI/ASTM C852; ANS 11.16

Ducts/fans SMACNA Manual / ASHRAE Handbook SMACNA Manual/ASHRAE Handbook;ANSI/ANI-59.2

Filtration ASHRAE-52.1;Mil-F-51068F; ANSI/ASME-N509 andN510; DOE NE STD-F3-45

ASHRAE-52.1;Mil-F-51068F; ANSI/ASME-N509 and N510; DOENE STD-F3-45

Cranes CMAA; ANSI/ASME NOG-1;ANSI/ASME B30.2; DOE-STD-1090-96

CMAA Nuclear Sections; ANSI/ASME NOG-1;ANSI/ASME B30.2; DOE-STD-1090-96

Other Equipment ANSI N 14.6; AISC M011 ANSI N 14.6; AISC M011

ElectricalHardware

NFPA 70, 110, and 780; IES LightingHandbook; ANSI C2; ANSI/IEEE C37,-80, -141, -142, -242, -399, -493, and -577

NFPA 70, 110, and 780; IES Lighting Handbook;ANSI C2; ANSI/IEEE C37, -80, -141, -142, -242,-308, -338, -379, -384, -399, -493, -577, and -603

As Applicable toSpecific ElectricalHardware

ANSI/IEEE-323, -334, -336, -344, -381, -382, -383, -420, -450, -484, -535, -628, -649, -650, -833,-934, -944, and -946

I & C Hardware NFPA-70 and -110; ANSI C2;ANSI/ANS-8.3, -N42.18, and -N13.1;ANSI/ASA-Series; ANSI/IEEE-141, -142,-242, -493, and - 1050

NFPA-70 and -110; ANSI C2; ANSI/ANS-8.3,-N42.18, and -N13.1; ANSI-N320 and -N323;ANSI/ASA-Series; ANSI/IEEE-141, -142, -242, -323,-336, -344, -379, -384, -493, and - 1050

Quality Assurance shall be applied in accordance with WP 13-1, Washington TRU Solutions LLC Quality AssuranceProgram Description6; and WP 09-CN3005, Graded Approach to Application of QA Controls.7

The full list of references in this table may be found in Appendix A of DOE G 420.1-14

Safety Class codes and standards are required and Safety Significant codes and standards are recommended.

2.3 Facility Overview

2.3.1 Facility Design

The WIPP site is located in Eddy County in southeastern New Mexico, 26 miles east of Carlsbad asshown in Figure 1.3-1. The land area set aside for the WIPP site is 10,240 acres. The WIPP site islocated in an area of low population density with less than thirty permanent residents living within aten-mile radius. The area surrounding the facility is used primarily for grazing, and development ofpotash, oil, salt, and gas resources. Development of these resources results in a transient population


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(nonpermanent) consisting principally of workers at three potash mines that are located within ten milesof the WIPP site. The largest population center nearest the WIPP site is the city of Carlsbad, 26 miles tothe west, with approximately 25,000 inhabitants. Two smaller communities, Loving, with a populationof approximately 1,300, and Malaga, with a population of approximately 200, are located approximately20 miles southwest of the facility. As the result of the WIPP Land Withdrawal Act of 1992(Public Law 102-579),8 no mineral resource development is allowed within the WIPP Site Boundary,with the exception of existing leases.

The WIPP is designed to receive and handle 500,000 cubic feet per year (ft3/yr) (14,160 cubic meters peryear [m3/yr]) CH waste and 10,000 ft3/yr (283 m3/yr) remote handled (RH) waste. The CH waste will becontained in 55-gallon drums, 100-gallon drums, SWBs, TDOPs, 85-gallon drum overpacks, 55-gallondrums overpacked in SWBs, and pipe containers in 55-gallon drums. The WIPP is designed to have adisposal capacity for transuranic (TRU) waste of 6.2 million ft3 (175,600 m3). The WIPP has sufficientcapacity to handle the 250,000 ft3 (7,080 m3) of RH waste that was established in the Record of Decision(46 Federal Register 9162)9 as a total volume. In addition, the WIPP LWA of 19928 limits the total RHTRU activity to 5.1 million curies.

CH wastes are disposed of in the 100-acre disposal area on a horizon located 2,150 ft beneath the surfacein a deep, bedded salt formation. Waste is transferred from the surface to the disposal horizon throughthe waste shaft using a mine hoist. The disposal phase is currently scheduled to last for 35 years(DOE/NPT-96-1204, National Transuranic Waste Management Plan10; DOE/EIS-0026-S-2, WIPPDisposal Phase Final Supplemental Environmental Impact Statement11).

CH waste disposal began at WIPP in March 1999. Disposal is permanent with no intent to retrieve. Ifrecovery of disposed waste is required in the future, the hazards will be analyzed and designs to protectthe worker, the public and the environment will be developed prior to recovery operations.

The WIPP site is divided into surface structures, shafts, and subsurface structures as shown inFigure 2.4-3. The WIPP surface structures accommodate the personnel, equipment, and support servicesrequired for the receipt, preparation, and transfer of waste from the surface to the underground. Thesurface structures are located in an area within a perimeter security fence. The area within the securityfence is either paved or graveled with minimal vegetation. There is a gravel road along the perimetersecurity fence, which acts as a fire break in the event of a wild land fire. Several features outside theperimeter security fence also serve as fire breaks and include the salt pile to the north, pond areas tocollect rain runoff to the north, east and south, a paved parking area and access road to the west, andberms and the electrical switch yard to the east.

The primary surface operations at WIPP are conducted in the waste handling building (WHB), which isdivided into the CH waste handling area, the RH waste handling area, and support areas. The CH wastehandling area includes the entrance airlocks, CH bay, a shielded storage room, and CH support facilities.

Vertical shafts, including the waste shaft, the salt handling shaft, the exhaust shaft, and the air intakeshaft (AIS), extend from the surface to the underground horizon as shown in Figure 2.4-3. These shaftsare lined from the shaft collar to the top of the salt formation, approximately 850 ft below the surface,and are unlined through the salt formation. The waste shaft is located between the CH and RH areas inthe WHB. It is nominally 19 ft in diameter and is serviced by the waste shaft conveyance and the wastehoist.

The WIPP underground consists of the waste disposal area, construction area, north area, and the wasteshaft station area. Underground ventilation is divided into four separate flow paths in the underground


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supporting the waste disposal area, the construction area (includes areas being mined), north area, and thewaste shaft station area. The layout allows mining and disposal operations to proceed simultaneously.

A typical disposal panel consists of seven disposal rooms. Each room is 33 ft wide, 13 ft high, and 300 ftlong. The disposal rooms are separated by pillars of salt 100 ft wide and 300 ft long. Panel entries at theend of each of these disposal rooms are also 33 ft wide and 13 ft high and will be used for waste disposal,except for the first 200 ft from the main entries. The first 200 ft are used for installation of the panelclosure, not disposal. The panel entries are 20 ft wide by 13 ft high for the intake and 14 ft wide by 12 fthigh for the exhaust.

2.3.2 Facility Operations

The principal operations at WIPP involve the receipt and disposal of TRU mixed waste. A pictorial viewof the CH waste handling process is shown in Figure 2.5-2.

CH waste will be shipped to the WIPP site in shipping packages that have been certified by theU.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC). The shipping packages are transported to WIPP on atrailer hauled by a truck. The waste handling process begins when the truck arrives at the WIPP securitygate. In the vehicle trap at the WIPP security gate, the shipping packages are surveyed for contaminationand shipping documentation is confirmed. The loaded trailer is staged in the parking storage areaadjacent to the WHB. After the CH waste shipping container is inspected for contamination, the loadedshipping container is moved into the WHB and placed on a handling dock. The container is opened,surveyed for radiation and contamination levels, and the waste containers are removed and placed on afacility pallet. Waste containers include 55-gallon drums assembled into seven packs, 85-gallon drumsassembled into four packs, 100-gallon drums assembled into three packs, SWBs, or TDOPs. Wastecontainers are further discussed in Section 2.5.2 of this chapter. The facility pallet is then placed in astorage area or transferred to the conveyance loading car, which moves the facility pallet into the wasteshaft conveyance for transfer to the underground. No more than ten facility pallets, the equivalent oftwenty TRUPACT-II (Transuranic Package Transporter Model II) payloads, of waste is stored in theCH bay.

In the underground, the facility pallet is removed from the waste shaft conveyance, placed on theunderground transporter, and moved to the disposal room. In the disposal room, the containers areremoved from the facility pallet and placed in the waste stack. The empty facility pallet is returned to thesurface for reuse.

The waste received for placement in the WIPP facility must conform with the WIPP CH wasteacceptance criteria, as set forth in DOE/WIPP-02-3122, Contact-Handled Transuranic Waste AcceptanceCriteria for the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant.12 CH waste containers have a maximum surface dose rate of200 millirem per hour (mrem/hr). Containers of waste that are found to be externally contaminated ordamaged will be decontaminated or placed in a larger container (overpacked at the locationcontamination is found or damage occurs), or returned to the generator/shipping facility. Local areacontamination will be isolated and/or decontaminated prior to continuation of the waste handling process.

Analyses in this DSA address CH waste emplacement operations only. RH waste handling andemplacement operations are included in DOE/WIPP-06-3174, Remote-Handled (RH) Waste HandlingDocumented Safety Analysis [RH DSA].13


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2.4 Facility Structure

The WIPP facility is divided into surface structures, shafts, and underground structures as shown inFigures 2.4-1 and 2.4-2. The WIPP surface structures accommodate the personnel, equipment, andsupport services required for receipt, preparation, and transfer of waste from the surface to theunderground. The surface structures are surrounded by a perimeter security fence. The undergroundstructures consist of the waste disposal area, construction area, north area, and the waste shaft stationarea. A spatial view of the WIPP site is shown in Figure 2.4-3. The waste handling surface operations atWIPP are conducted in the WHB, which is divided into the CH waste handling area, the RH wastehandling area, and support areas.

2.4.1 Waste Handling Building

The WHB and its associated systems provide a structure to unload TRU waste from the incomingshipping packages and to transfer that waste to the underground disposal area via the waste shaft. TheWHB is divided into the following areas: the CH waste handling area, the RH waste handling area, theWHB support area, Building 412 (TRUPACT Maintenance Facility [TMF]), and the WHB mechanicalequipment room. The general layout of the WHB is shown in Figures 2.4-4 and 2.4-5, with sectionalviews shown in Figure 2.4-6. The WHB is surrounded by pavement and gravel on all sides and is at least200 ft from the Property Protection Area (PPA) security fence.

The WHB is a steel frame structure with insulated steel siding, and includes portions of the building,such as the hot cell complex, that are constructed of concrete for shielding and structural purposes. TheWHB is constructed in accordance with the requirements for NFPA (National Fire ProtectionAssociation) 220, Standard on Types of Building Construction,14 Type II construction. The WHB acts asa confinement barrier to control the potential for release of radioactive material. Confinement isprovided when the tornado doors are closed. The WHB is designed for the design basis earthquake(DBE) of .1 g (gravitational pull) peak acceleration with a 1,000-year return interval. The WHB isdesigned to withstand the design basis tornado (DBT) with 183 m/h and a translational velocity of 41m/h, a maximum rotational velocity radius of 325 ft, a pressure drop of 0.5 lb/in2 and a pressure drop rateof 0.09 lb/in2/s. The roof of the WHB is designed to withstand a 27 lb/ft2 snow load. The 100-yearrecurrence maximum snow pack for the WIPP region is 10 lb/ft2.

The west wall of the CH bay in the WHB is shared with Building 412. Building 412 is designed towithstand the DBE and DBT and a snow load of 27 lb/ft2. The main lateral force resisting structuralmembers of the Support Building are designed to withstand the DBE and DBT to prevent the SupportBuilding from collapsing on the adjacent WHB. The north wall of the WHB includes masonryconstruction which provides nominally two hours of fire resistance in the event of a Support Buildingfire. The design parameters for the WHB are described in SDD CF00-GC00, Plant Buildings, Facilities,and Miscellaneous Equipment.15 Waste handling areas subject to potential for contamination areprovided with coatings that are easy to decontaminate. The ceiling and wall mounted equipment withinthe WHB is not seismically restrained.

2.4.1.1 Entrance Air Locks

Shipping packages are unloaded from the transport trailers in the parking area on the south side of theWHB and are transferred into the CH bay area through the three entrance airlocks that provide access tothe CH side of the WHB. The WHB ventilation system maintains the interior of the WHB at a pressurelower than the ambient atmosphere to ensure air flows into the WHB, preventing the inadvertent releaseof airborne hazardous or radioactive materials. To assist the WHB ventilation system in maintaining the


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building at a lower pressure than the ambient atmospheric, the doors at each end of the airlock areinterlocked to prevent inadvertent opening of both doors at the same time.

2.4.1.2 CH Bay

The CH bay is used for surface CH waste handling operations. To accommodate the shipping packages,the WHB is equipped with two TRUDOCKS and four overhead cranes for opening and unloading theshipping packages (see Figure 4.2-7). The TRUDOCK 6-ton cranes are designed to hold their load in theevent of a DBE or loss of power. The waste handling equipment is described in SDD WH00, WasteHandling System.16 Each TRUDOCK is designed to accommodate up to two shipping packages. TheTRUDOCK functions as a work platform, providing access to the shipping packages for unloading.

The CH bay also provides space for transferring loaded facility pallets via forklifts to the conveyanceloading room, a shielded holding area, a waste handling equipment battery recharge area, and temporarystorage areas for waste containers. The CH bay also has storage locations for equipment, facility pallets,and shipping package drum pallets. The amount of CH waste temporarily stored in the CH bay of theWHB is the equivalent of ten fully loaded facility pallets with up to seven pallets stored in the northeastcorner of the CH bay, up to one pallet stored in the shielded storage room in the southeast corner of theCH bay, and a pallet at each of the two TRUDOCKs. A facility pallet holds up to four drum assembliesor four SWBs, or two TDOPs, or combinations of waste containers.

2.4.1.3 Shielded Storage Room

The shielded storage room is located in the southeast corner of the CH bay. The room has a usablevolume approximately 19 ft long by 15 ft wide by 15 ft tall surrounded by 2 ft thick reinforced concretewalls, ceiling and floor. The shielded storage room is accessed from the CH bay through heavy steelshield doors. The room is equipped with sprinklers and a smoke detector. The shielded storage room isused for the temporary storage of waste containers with discrepant paperwork, surface contamination, ordiscrepant radiation levels discovered after removal of the waste containers from the shipping package. Discrepant payloads are placed either onto a facility pallet or into the shipping package and stored in theshielded holding area. One facility pallet of waste is stored in the shielded storage room. Ifdiscrepancies cannot be resolved, the waste is returned to the generator site.

2.4.1.4 Conveyance Loading Room and Shaft Entry Room

The conveyance loading room is an air lock, adjacent to the shaft entry room, which contains the wasteshaft collar, used for loading a facility pallet of CH waste containers on the conveyance loading car. Thedoor connecting the conveyance loading room with the CH bay is interlocked with the door connectingthe conveyance loading room with the shaft entry room to maintain the requisite CH bay ventilationdifferential pressure. The shaft entry room has four equipment entry doors that are interlocked such thatonly one can be open. Pivot rails provided at the waste shaft collar are rotated to the horizontal positionwhen loading the conveyance and are rotated vertically when not in use. The pivot rails are interlockedsuch that the conveyance cannot be moved until the pivot rails are out of the way. Fencing with gates areprovided at the shaft collar and the shaft station in the underground to prevent inadvertent access to theshaft. The gates are interlocked such that if a gate is open, the conveyance cannot be moved, or if theconveyance is moving and a gate is opened, the conveyance emergency stop is actuated. With the CHbay/conveyance loading room door (outer airlock door) closed, the conveyance loading car moves fromthe conveyance loading room into the shaft entry room onto the waste shaft conveyance and transfers thepallets to the pallet support stands in the conveyance. Only one facility pallet (the equivalent of twoTRUPACT-II loads consisting of 28 drums, four SWBs, or two TDOPs) is carried at a time. Waste and


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personnel are not transported simultaneously. Waste and other equipment are not transportedsimultaneously.

2.4.1.5 WHB Support Areas

WHB support areas include the waste hoist support areas and the main mechanical equipment roomcontaining the heating, ventilation, and air conditioning (HVAC) equipment. The waste hoist controlroom provides space and equipment necessary for operation of the waste hoist. The main mechanicalequipment room on the second floor of the WHB houses the exhaust fans, high-efficiency particulate(HEPA) filters, and WHB ventilation system controls.

2.4.2 Building 412

Building 412 (the TMF) is located to the west side of the WHB (Figure 2.4-4). Structural portions of thebuilding are designed to withstand the DBE and DBT because of its interface with the WHB. Theequipment within the TMF is not seismically restrained. The TMF is also designed to withstand a snowload of 27 lb/ft2.

2.4.3 Exhaust Filter Building

The Exhaust Filter Building (EFB), containing the HEPA filtration equipment associated with theunderground ventilation system, is adjacent to the exhaust shaft. During normal operations, air is pulledfrom underground areas, up the exhaust shaft, and discharged to the environment without the HEPAfiltration units in service. In the event of an underground radiological event, airflow from theunderground is diverted through the HEPA filtration units located in the EFB to remove airborneradioactive particulates from the air stream. The EFB layout is shown in Figure 2.4-8.

The major areas within the EFB are the filter room and support area. The filter room houses theunderground exhaust HEPA filtration units. The support area includes two mechanical equipment roomshousing the building filtration units, the exhaust fans, the supply air handling units (AHUs), the motorcontrol centers, and the airlock.

2.4.4 WIPP Shafts

The four shafts, the waste shaft, the salt handling shaft, the exhaust shaft, and the AIS, extend from thesurface to the underground horizon as shown in Figure 2.4-3. All shaft construction and miningoperations are in accordance with 30 CFR Part 57, "Safety and Health Standards - Underground Metaland Nonmetal Mines."17 The waste shaft is located between the CH and RH waste handling areas in theWHB. It is nominally 19 ft in diameter and is serviced by a hoist that incorporates a waste shaftconveyance to transport CH and RH wastes from the surface to waste shaft station.

2.4.4.1 Shaft and Hoist General Features

The principal components of each shaft are the liner that extends from the collar to the salt interfaceapproximately 850 ft below the surface, and the key that provides a transition between the liner and thesalt formation. The remainder of each shaft is unlined.

The shaft collars are situated approximately 400 ft above the historic flood plain of the Pecos River andthe collar slab around the shaft, where used, is at a higher elevation than the surrounding ground. Thecollar areas of the salt, waste, and air intake shafts are surrounded with fencing/barriers to preventunauthorized entry and minimize the chance for items falling into the shafts.


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The waste shaft, the salt handling shaft, and the AIS are equipped with conveyances with head framesconstructed of structural steel. The conveyance systems in the shafts and all shaft furnishings aredesigned to resist the dynamic forces of the hoisting operations, and these forces are greater than theseismic forces on the underground facilities. The conveyances in the waste shaft and AIS are guided bysteel cables, guide ropes, and the salt handling shaft conveyance is guided by fixed wooden guides.

The waste, salt handling, and AIS hoists have redundant brake systems designed so that either set ofbrakes can stop a fully-loaded conveyance under all conditions. In the event of a power failure, thebrakes set automatically.

The control system for each hoist can detect malfunctions or abnormal operations, such as overtravel,over-speed, power loss, circuitry failure, or starting in a wrong location, and triggers an alarm for theabnormal operation, and automatically shuts down the hoist.

The salt handling shaft conveyance is used to transport mined salt to the surface and to provide personneltransportation between the surface and the underground. It also acts as a duct for supplying air to themining and disposal areas, and is one route for the power, control, and communications cables. The salthoist's maximum rope speed is approximately 1,800 ft per minute. The salt handling shaft insidediameter is 10 ft for the steel-lined portion, and just under 12 ft for the unlined portion.

The exhaust shaft is used to exhaust air from the underground areas to the surface. The inside diameterof the lined portion of the exhaust shaft is 14 ft. The shaft lining is unreinforced concrete. The exhaustshaft collar does not utilize a building or headframe, and is sealed at the top by a metal elbow, diameterof 14 ft, that directs air to the underground ventilation system fans.

The AIS is used primarily to supply the fresh air to the underground areas and is also used for backupegress of personnel between the surface and the underground horizon. The AIS hoist's maximum ropespeed is approximately 830 ft per minute. The inside diameter of the unreinforced concrete lined upperportion of this shaft is 16 ft.

2.4.4.2 Waste Shaft and Hoist Specific Features

The main purpose of the waste hoist system is for moving radioactive waste between the surface and theunderground. It is also used to transport personnel, material and equipment. The waste hoist tower,which houses the hoist motor and support equipment is located between the CH and RH portions of theWHB and sits over the waste shaft. The waste hoist tower and headframe are designed to withstand aDBE. The waste shaft and hoist arrangement is shown on Figure 2.4-9. The waste hoist is equipped witha control system that detects malfunctions or abnormal operations including overspeed, overtravel, powerloss, circuitry failure, and starting in the wrong direction, and actuates an alarm for the condition andshuts down the hoist. CH and RH waste are transported on the lower portion of the conveyance, belowthe man deck and the maintenance platform. This configuration protects the waste from falling objectsand tornado missiles. Waste and personnel are not transported at the same time.

The inside diameter of the unreinforced concrete-lined upper portion of the waste shaft is 19 ft. Thewaste shaft conveyance (outside dimensions) is approximately 30 ft high by 11 ft wide by 15 ft deep, andcarries a maximum payload of 45 tons. A man deck, approximately 15 ft above the conveyance floor, isprovided for personnel transport. The man deck is enclosed with expanded metal fencing with doorsprovided for access. The man deck can be removed to permit transporting tall and/or heavy loads. Amaintenance work platform is bolted to the top of the outside frame of the conveyance, above the mandeck. The work platform is used during shaft inspections and shaft maintenance. Due to hoist loadlimits, the platform and man deck may need to be removed for RH waste transfer. The main deck of the


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conveyance has embedded rails that are used by the CH conveyance loading car. Because of the 11 ftwidth of the conveyance deck, a facility pallet which is 13 ft long cannot be placed on the conveyance bya forklift. The forklift pockets on a facility pallet are on the long side of the facility pallet as shown in Figures 2.5-25 and 2.5-26. During loading and unloading operations, the waste shaft conveyance issteadied by fixed guides. At the underground waste hoist station, rope stretch is removed by a chairingdevice that supports the weight of the waste shaft conveyance and payload.

The waste hoist is an electrically driven friction hoist. The 600 hp (horsepower) waste hoist motor isdesigned for a maximum operating speed of 13.5 rpm (revolutions per minute). The motor's field isformed by wound poles, and is supplied with a constant direct current obtained from rectifying a 480volt, three-phase supply. The direct current magnitude and direction controls the speed and direction ofthe hoist. The maximum rope speed of the waste hoist is approximately 500 ft per minute. There is onesilicon controlled rectifier power supply to power the hoist. An automatic control circuit can detectelectrical problems with the drive motor and stop the hoist.

The waste hoist brake system can safely stop and hold the waste shaft conveyance without the drivemotor. There are two brakes, mounted approximately 180 degrees apart, on each braking flange of thehoist wheel. These brakes are spring set and are released by hydraulic pressure. Brake switches indicatebrake set, release, and wear. A redundant hydraulic power supply exists to supply hydraulic pressure torelease the brakes. Each hydraulic unit has its own motor, pump, and oil reservoir. There is an automaticswitch over from the primary system to the standby system if the hydraulic pressure decreases below theset point. There is no automatic switch over from the standby system to the primary system. A timedback up pressure relief path exists to set the brakes if for any reason the brake pressure is not releasedwithin a few seconds after the application of the brake set signal.

Hoisting, tail, and guide ropes are provided for the safe operation of the waste shaft conveyance and thecounterweight. The steel hoisting ropes have a diameter of approximately 1-3/8 inches and are suitablefor use with a friction hoist. For the conveyance with the maximum design payload, the factor of safetyof the hoisting ropes is at least 5.9 as determined based on ANSI M 11.1, "American National Standardfor Wire Rope Mines,18 and MSHA - 30 CFR Part 57.19021, "Minimum Rope Strength,"19 according tothe depth of the waste shaft. Both the hoisting ropes and tail ropes have a minimum endurance limit of400,000 loading cycles. The tail ropes have a diameter of approximately 2-1/4 inches and are steel with asynthetic fiber core. The three tail ropes approximately balance the weight of the six hoisting ropes. Thesteel guide ropes have a diameter of approximately 1-3/4 inches. There are four guide ropes for thewaste shaft conveyance and two guide ropes for the counterweight. Tension in these ropes is maintainedby weights on the bottom of the ropes. The size of the weights vary to prevent harmonic vibrationsduring hoist operation.

A waste shaft conveyance and counterweight over-travel arrester system can stop movement if thenormal control system has failed. Four timbers are provided at the tower and the sump regions for boththe waste shaft conveyance and the counterweight to assist in absorbing energy to stop an over travelingwaste shaft conveyance or counterweight. Retarding frames rest in notches either at the top of the woodarresters, in the sump area, or at the bottom of the wood arresters, the tower area. The retarding frameshave knives that cut into the timbers if driven by the waste shaft conveyance or the counterweight.

If the waste shaft conveyance over-travels against the upper crash beams and the hoist ropes fail, safetylugs on the waste shaft conveyance mate with pivoting dogs on the catch gear mounted in the headframeto prevent the waste shaft conveyance from falling if the ropes break. The counterweight catch gearsystem functions in a similar fashion to stop the counterweight from falling. Each catch gear frame ismounted on a hydraulic shock absorber which absorbs energy from a descending waste shaft conveyanceor counterweight. Lever arms are used to raise the pivoting dogs if they are not supporting any weight.


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Emergency stop buttons are provided at the master control station (MCS) and at all control stations toeffect an emergency stop of the hoist. These buttons are operable in all modes of hoist operation, andwhen pressed, open the control power loop and set the hoist brakes. These buttons provide the mostrapid means of bringing the hoist to a stop. A controlled stop button which decelerates the waste shaftconveyance before setting the brakes is also located on the control panel. The controlled stop is a slowerand softer stopping action than the emergency stop.

Eleven signals, two analog and nine contact, are transmitted to the Central Monitoring Room (CMR) forremote monitoring. The analog signals are hoist motor voltage and amperes. The contact signals are"Hoist Operation, Manual"; "Hoist Operation, Semi-Auto"; "Hoist, Abnormal Condition"; "EmergencyStop"; "Men Working in Shaft"; "Waste on Hoist"; "Personnel on Hoist"; "Hoist, Up"; and "Hoist,Down." The waste hoist signaling system consists of bells and lights activated by the operators at theMCS and the control stations.

At the beginning of each operating day, inspections are made on the shaft conveyance, cable attachments,cage doors, and collar doors. The hoist operator visually inspects the hoist drum assembly, pedestal,bearing housings, brakes and brake operations, and all hydraulic pipes for general condition and possibleleaks. Also at the start of each operating day, the various methods of communication between the hoistoperator, top lander, bottom lander, and the shaft conveyance are checked and verified to be operatingcorrectly. The proper operation of the emergency stop tripping logic, limit switches, overtravel, deadmancontrol, position indicator, and braking mechanisms are tested at the start of each operating shift.

The conveyance is operated empty through one round trip at the start of each operating shift. The wasteshaft is inspected weekly to detect cracking, corrosion, deterioration, and water intrusion. Ropeinspections are performed weekly and the entire active length is visually examined for structural damage,corrosion, and proper lubrication. Visual examination for wear and broken wires are made at stresspoints, attachment points, where the rope rests on sheaves, where the rope leaves the drum, at drumcrossovers, and at change-of-layer regions. When any visible condition that results in a reduction of ropestrength is present, the affected portion of the rope is examined more frequently. Additional testing andinspections are identified in SDD UH00,Underground Hoisting.20

2.4.5 Underground Facilities

2.4.5.1 General Design

The underground facilities are located 2,150 ft below the surface and include the waste disposal,construction, north, and waste shaft station areas. The construction and north areas contain the facilitiesto service and maintain underground equipment for mining and waste disposal operations. Theconstruction and north areas are segregated from the waste shaft station and waste disposal areas bybulkheads, overcasts, and airlocks which are constructed of noncombustible materials except for flexibleflashing used to accommodate salt movement. Some mining construction activities may be requiredwithin an active disposal panel, however, these activities can be separated from the disposal processesand areas by schedule or time, ventilation controls, and temporary bulkheads. Underground miningprocedures and cavity dimensions incorporate the results of the salt creep analysis in DOE/WIPP 86-010,Waste Isolation Pilot Plant Design Validation Final Report.21

The underground support facilities and their ventilation flows in the shaft pillar area are shown onFigure 2.4-10. The support facilities on the disposal side provide a maintenance area, a vehicle parkingarea with plug-in battery charging, and a waste transfer station. The support facilities on the constructionside consist of a vehicle parking area, electrical substation, welding shop, offices, materials storage area,emergency vehicle parking alcoves, a diesel equipment fueling station, and a mechanical shop.

WIPP CH DSA DOE/WIPP-95-2065, REV. 10 - Page Chg. CH-2007-002 CHAPTER 2|

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The north area was initially used for evaluating the interaction of simulated waste and thermal sources onbedded salt under controlled conditions. The north area was deactivated in September 1996. Portions ofthis area have been reopened for the permanent disposal of salt mined primarily from Panel 2 and groundcontrol activities and are being maintained open to support a limited experimental program and materialstorage.

The construction area fuel dispensing room is in an alcove off the construction exhaust entry. This fueldispensing room includes pumping facilities for a portable fuel tank. The portable diesel tank hoistingand lowering is done through the waste shaft or the salt handling shaft. Diesel tank hoisting is notperformed at the waste shaft when waste is present and is moved promptly to the storage location. Anautomatic dry chemical fire suppression system, with main and reserve tanks, is provided in the fueldispensing room. Any fire generated smoke and fumes would be exhausted directly to the exhaustventilation system. The underground ventilation system is discussed in Section 2.6.

2.4.5.1.1 Self-Contained Self-Rescuers||

WIPP is required by New Mexico State Mining Law 69-8-16 to provide self-contained self-rescuers|(SCSRs) in the underground. A SCSR must be available for each person in the underground. SCSRs|consist of a compressed oxygen cylinder and a CO2 scrubber. The oxygen cylinders are pressurized to|3000 psi. |

|The SCSRs are stored in metal cache enclosures at predetermined locations throughout the underground. |Portable skids containing some of the SCSRs cache enclosures are used and relocated as necessary. The|remainder of the SCSR cache enclosures are attached to the rib and are not portable.|

|2.4.5.1.2 Trauma Kits|

|Trauma kits are placed in the underground to assist in medical emergencies. They consist of a metal|container approximately 2 ft by 2 ft by 2 ft and include an oxygen (O2) cylinder and assorted trauma|supplies. The O2 cylinders are pressurized to 1100 psi. The trauma kits are placed near the waste shaft|station and toward the southern end of E-140 located such that they are not in the path of vehicular|traffic.|

2.4.5.2 Mining Method

Mining is performed by continuous mining machines. One type of continuous mining machine is a roadheader or boom-type continuous miner operating a milling head. The milling head rotates in line with theaxis of the cutter boom, mining the salt from the face. The mined salt is picked up from the floor by theloading apron. The mined salt is pulled through the miner on conveyers and loaded into one of the haulvehicles.

Another type of continuous mining machine is a drum miner operating with a head that rotatesperpendicular to the axis of the cutter boom, and cuts the salt away from the working face. The minedsalt is pulled through the miner on a chain conveyor and then loaded into a haul vehicle. Prior to miningin new areas, probe holes are drilled to relieve any pressure that may be present. After mining, verticalpressure relief holes are drilled up at the main intersections of drifts and crosscuts.

During and immediately after mining, a sounding survey of the excavation ceilings is made to identifyareas of weakness which might represent safety or stability problems. Routine sounding of the roof,especially in unbolted areas, is commonly performed throughout the life of an opening. Inspection and


2-12 November 2006

maintenance for the underground is described in procedure WP 04-AU1007, Underground OpeningsInspections.22

Hand scaling or removal of salt with the continuous miners, or rock bolting, is accomplished after areasare identified as potentially unstable. Specific work packages are developed for mining and groundcontrol. Mine operations personnel are responsible for mining and ground control.

2.4.5.3 Mined Material

The salt removed during underground mining is brought to the surface by the salt handling shaftconveyance. From the surge pocket, salt is loaded into the 8-ton salt handling skip with a skip measuringand loading hopper, the skip is raised to the surface, and dumped through a chute to surface haulageequipment which transports the salt to the surface salt pile.

2.4.5.4 Interface Between Mining and Waste Disposal Activities

Separate mining ventilation and disposal ventilation circuits are maintained by means of bulkheads,overcasts, and airlocks of noncombustible material, except for flexible flashing used to accommodate saltmovement, in accordance with 30 CFR Part 57.17 The use of noncombustible materials minimizes theeffects of fires in one area of the underground propagating to another area. Air pressure in the miningside is maintained higher than in the disposal side to ensure that any leakage results in air flow to thedisposal side. The underground ventilation system is discussed in Section 2.6. Rooms being mined arewithin the construction circuit, and rooms with active waste emplacement are within the waste disposalcircuit. Any mining necessary in the disposal circuit to address uneven floor or ground control issues isplanned such that it is unlikely to be necessary at the active waste face and is not done in the transportpath when waste is in transit to the disposal room.

2.4.5.5 Ground Control Program

The ground control program at WIPP ensures underground safety from any potential unplanned rock fallfrom the ceiling or walls of openings. From the time an opening is mined and throughout the life of theopening, action is taken to identify and remove or restrain any loose or potentially unsafe ground. Ground control is based on the following:

• Ground stability is maintained as long as access is possible.

• Ground control maintenance efforts increase with the age of the openings.

• Ground control plans are specific but flexible.

• Regular ground control maintenance is required.

The WIPP ground control program uses observational experience and analysis of salt behavior toanticipate future ground support requirements. To provide long-term ground support, WIPP groundcontrol system must accommodate the continuous creep of salt and retain broken fractured rock in theroof or walls. To aid in ground control activities, the WIPP underground is divided into over 100 zones. A database that documents the current status of each underground excavation zone is maintained andincludes the physical state of the zone with respect to geometry, excavation age, ground support, andoperational use.

DOE/WIPP 02-3212, Ground Control Annual Plan for the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant23 addressestechnical aspects of the underground facility which are concerned with the design, construction, andperformance of the subsurface structures and support systems. Each year the ground control annual plan


2-13 April 2007|

is updated to reflect developments in WIPP ground support practices, materials, and any changes inoperational requirements. The ground control annual plan is a living document that keep ground controlpractices at WIPP both current and responsive.

WIPP ground control includes continuous visual inspections of openings, geotechnical monitoring,installation of ground support components, and analysis of ground support component failures. Groundcontrol support systems may vary as different conditions are encountered. Support system may besubjected to longitudinal and lateral loading due to the rock deformation. The anchorage componentsmay undergo lateral deformation due to offsetting along clay seams or fractures and increasing tensileloading.

Visual examinations are performed by underground operations personnel. Procedure WP 04-AU100722

specifies inspections to be performed at the beginning of each shift, weekly, monthly, and annually. Geotechnical field activities include data collection from geotechnical instrumentation, fracture surveys,and observations. Monitoring results are analyzed in comparison with established design criteria, and areutilized in a variety of computer models. Analyses are performed to ensure that rock mass behavior isunderstood and proper ground control measures are instituted. Ground support is designed and specifiedto meet the requirements of 30 CFR Part 57.17 Maintenance activities ensure that ground conditionspresenting a potential hazard are rectified.

Ground support at WIPP includes rock bolts and supplementary systems. The rock bolt systems typicallyused are mechanically-anchored bolts and resin-anchored threaded rods. The supplementary systemsinclude cables with mesh, mats, and trusses. During mining, spot bolting is the typical method of groundcontrol to rectify unstable conditions. Pattern bolting was used in panels 1, 2, 3, and 4, and is anticipatedto be used in subsequent panels. Panel 3 through 8 are not anticipated to remain open as long aspanels 1 or 2. The disposal area access drifts will remain open and operational for a much longer periodthan panels 1 through 8. Materials installed for spot bolting, and pattern support meet the requirementsof 30 CFR Part 57.17 Proper installation is confirmed by safety assessments. MSHA inspectors performindependent inspections, making certain that support construction is performed in accordance withregulations.

Prior to disposing of waste in a panel, the panel has been mined to meet dimensional requirements suchthat waste is stacked the equivalent of three drums high. Ground control measures in an active panel mayinclude removal of rock, bolting, and floor milling in portions of the panel that do not contain waste. |Pattern bolting minimizes the need to remove rock from the ceilings of disposal rooms. Milling the flooris done as needed to ensure the proper room dimensions and to ensure a smoother surface for waste|transport and emplacement. In the event that ground control measures are not sufficient to ensure safety,|rooms may be closed.

The roof beam may be removed by mining if it is a cost-effective alternative to bolting or if the roof ishighly fractured and removal will result in a safer working environment. The roof beam is that portionfrom the roof up to the next competent layer, typically just above the overlying clay and anhydrite layers. This option has been exercised in portions of East-140 south and areas in the north end of theunderground. In the waste disposal area, no removal or remediation of the roof beam is possible after|waste is emplaced.|

|The time expected for the roof beam to contact the waste stack in a panel will vary based on the height of|a room, the closure rate, and the waste stack configuration. The average room height in panel 3 is 13.5 ft|and 16 ft in panel 4. The typical waste stack height for three seven packs of 55-gallon drums and a sack|of MgO is approximately 130 inches. The repository stratigraphy for panels 1, 2, and yet to be mined|panels 7, and 8 are different than for panels 3, 4, 5 (mining in progress) and yet to be mined panel 6. |

WIPP CH DSA DOE/WIPP-95-2065, REV. 10 - Page Chg. CH-2007-001/003 CHAPTER 2|

2-14 April 2007/August 2007|

Roof falls were actually observed in SPDV rooms 1 and 2 and consist of a triangular section of roof|extending nearly the length and width of the room with its apex 7 ft. high.24 SPDV had minimal installed|ground support. If no waste was emplaced in a room, this type of roof failure could be expected for|panels 1, 2, 7, and 8. However, with waste placed in a uniform array as in panels 1 and 2, it is also likely|that ground movement will reduce the distance from the ceiling to the waste stack such that the salt beam|becomes supported by the stack and no fall occurs. The predictions for panels 3, 4, 5, and 6 are that the|roof beam will bow downward and will separate into thinner beams along discontinuous anhydrite layers.|The roof beam could rest on the waste stack or could fall. The extent of the fall would be limited in|thickness by the separation and continuity of a layer. |

|The ground control measures installed in panels 1 through 4 are effective as no roof fall in the openings|of active disposal panels has occurred and no known roof falls have occurred in closed panels to date. |Roof bolts, however, do fail and are expected to fail. For panel 3 and 4, it is expected that 50 percent of|the installed bolts will have failed within 10 years. Bolt failure is based on stratigraphy, when the bolts|were installed after mining an opening, and length of the bolt. A database on roof bolt failures is|maintained and failed bolts in accessible areas are replaced or remediated in a timely manner. |

2.4.5.6 TRU Waste Disposal Area

The disposal area (Figure 2.4-2) provides space for 6.2 million ft3 (176,000 m3) of TRU waste material inTRU waste containers. This area also includes the four main entries and the crosscuts that provideaccess and ventilation. Figure 2.4-11 shows a typical waste container disposal configuration. The mainentries and crosscuts in the repository provide access and ventilation to the disposal area. The mainentries link the shaft pillar/service area with the disposal area and are separated by pillars. The wastedisposal area is designed so that each panel contains seven rooms. The locations of the panels are shownin Figure 2.4-2. The rooms have nominal dimensions of 13 ft high by 33 ft wide by 300 ft long, and areseparated by 100-ft wide pillars. Panel entries are narrower than disposal room dimensions by at least|10 ft.|

Boreholes are used for disposing of RH waste canisters. Boreholes are drilled into the ribs (walls) of the|disposal rooms and entries and are drilled to a length of approximately 17 ft. with a diameter of|approximately 30 in. and located a distance away from the corners of salt pillars that separate disposal|rooms, nominally 34 ft. from the projected corner along the short axis and 26 ft. along the salt pillars. |

The amount of TRU waste in each panel/room is limited by thermal, structural, and physical |considerations, and emplacement is designed not to exceed 10 kW/acre. Based on criticality analysis, a|spacing of 30 in. or greater between centers for RH waste canisters is allowed.? Typical spacing will be 8|ft. center to center for canister emplacement. A shield plug and shield ring provide shielding between the|canister in the borehole and the room.|

2.4.5.7 Magnesium Oxide Backfill

Title 40 CFR §191.14, "Assurance Requirements," Subparagraph (d),25 requires disposal systems to usedifferent types of barriers, engineered and natural, to isolate the wastes from the accessible environment. Title 40 CFR §194.44, "Engineered Barriers,"26 states that disposal systems shall incorporate engineeredbarrier(s) designed to prevent or substantially delay the movement of water or radionuclides toward theaccessible environment. Magnesium oxide (MgO) is used to provide an engineered barrier that decreasesthe solubilities of the actinide elements in TRU waste. MgO essentially consumes carbon dioxide thatwould be produced by microbial consumption of all cellulose, plastic, and rubber (CPR) in the emplacedCH waste.


2-15 April 2007|

WIPP receives the MgO in a woven polypropylene super sack, containing approximately 4,200 lb ofMgO. The super sacks are delivered to the underground using current shaft and material handlingprocesses. Super sacks are handled and placed using the push-pull attachments discussed in Section2.4.5.9. The super sack is a shaped sack which is nominally 61 inches across the flats by 25.5 incheshigh. The super sack is constructed such that it retains its contents for a period of two years afteremplacement without rupturing from its own weight. Should a backfill container be breached, MgO isnonhazardous. Magnesium oxide is an acceptable fire extinguishing agent within the DOE Complexwhere the potential for metal fires is present, such as in glove box operations at generator sites(DOE-STD-1066-99, Fire Protection Design Criteria).27 While the use of MgO in the WIPPunderground is not based on its acceptability as a fire extinguishing agent, in the event of a fire that mayimpact the disposal array, the powdered MgO would tend to suppress a fire within the waste array.

A super sack of MgO is placed on top of each column of waste containers in the disposal array. A typicalemplacement of super sacks is shown in Figure 2.4-12. One super sack of MgO per waste column issufficient to eliminate the carbon dioxide produced from the CPR contained in non-compacted waste. Emplacement of compacted waste will require not only the MgO super sack on each waste column, butadditional MgO in the super sack configuration or other engineering approved configurations due theincreased amount of CPR in the compacted waste. Figure 2.4-13 shows a typical MgO emplacement rackto be used in conjunction with the emplacement of compacted waste.

2.4.5.8 Panel Closure |

Upon completion of waste emplacement in each disposal panel, ventilation in that panel is no longer|necessary. The installation of a panel closure is a requirement of the Hazardous Waste Facility Permit|(HWFP).28 Closure is designed to restrict the flow of volatile organic compounds from a panel once it is|closed and to survive any postulated methane explosion. Panel closure Figure 2.4-14A shows the|approved panel closure that isolates a filled panel from the active portions of the disposal area. The|currently approved panel closure consists of a twelve foot thick block and mortar explosion-isolation|wall and a concrete barrier. At this time only the twelve foot thick block and mortar explosion-isolation|wall is installed in the entries to Panels 1 and 2. Panel closure restricts airflow through a filled panel|such that there is no path for radiological or hazardous releases to propagate to areas outside the panel. |Panel closure also prevents events outside the panel from breaching waste containers within the closed|panel. Panel closure has been shown through analysis to withstand a postulated methane explosion|within the panel from microbial action.29, 30 |

|Figure 2.4-14B shows the substantial and isolation barriers that will be installed in subsequent panels to|monitor gas generation within a filled panel. The substantial barrier consists of run of mine salt or other|suitable non-flammable fill material placed against the waste face such that the height is halfway up the|top tier of waste at the face and extends at least 10 ft beyond the base of the waste array into the panel|entries. Chain link and brattice cloth are secured to the ceiling and substantial barrier to minimize|airflow through the filled panel. These barriers are less restrictive than the panel closure explosion|isolation wall. This arrangement also prevents the top tier of waste from falling. An isolation barrier|(typical bulkhead as shown in Figure 2.6-8) is installed on the entry side of the substantial barrier to|further reduce airflow and prevent human access to the filled panel. The isolation barrier accommodates|tubing for gas sampling and geotechnical monitoring cables which pass between the flashing and salt. |The substantial and isolation barrier protect the waste face from operational events in the entries such as|vehicle collisions, fires, and compressed gas cylinder missiles.|

|While ground movement within a filled panel has the potential to breach waste containers, there are no|expected radiological releases from closed panels. The substantial and isolation barrier restricts airflow|


2-16 April 2007|

through filled panels to minimize the motive force for radioactive or hazardous material transport. |Ground movement over time will further reduce airflow through a filled panel. |

|Gas generation rates in a filled panel are expected to be low, less than 1 percent methane (20 percent of|the lower explosive limit [LEL]) and less than 1 percent hydrogen (25 percent of the LEL) after 5|years.31, 32 If gas generation rates increase or observed ground conditions in the entries indicate future|instability, the mortar explosion-isolation wall can be installed. |

2.4.5.9 Geotechnical Monitoring Program

The safety of the underground excavations has and will continue to be evaluated on the basis of criteriaestablished from actual measurements of rock behavior. The geotechnical monitoring program providesmeasurement of rock mass performance for design validation, routine evaluation of the safety andstability of the excavations, and provides information necessary to predict the short- and long-termbehavior of underground excavations. The criteria are regularly evaluated and modified as more fielddata are collected from the actual performance of the underground openings. The instrumentation foropen panels includes at least one borehole extensometer installed in the roof at the center of eachdisposal room. The roof extensometers monitor the dilation of the immediate salt roof beam and possiblebed separations along clay seams.

Data collection, analyses, and evaluation criteria indicate changes in measured room closure rates overtime, and when those measured room closure rates exceed projected values. Areas where observed ratessignificantly vary from projected values are monitored more closely to determine the cause of thevariance. If the cause is not related to mining activity, additional field investigation is undertaken tocharacterize the conditions. Should the field data indicate that ground conditions are deteriorating,corrective actions are taken. If ground conditions in a disposal room deteriorate and cannot be costeffectively remediated, the room may be closed.

Geologic investigations also include geologic and fracture mapping, and seismic monitoring. Boreholeinspections can detect displacements, fractures, and separations occurring within the strata immediatelysurrounding the excavations. The results of geologic investigations provide continued confidence in theperformance and geology of the site with respect to site characterization.

Geotechnical data and the results of the geotechnical investigations are reported annually in the WIPPgeotechnical analysis reports (DOE/WIPP 06-3177, Geotechnical Analysis Report for July 2004 - June|2005).33 The report describes monitoring programs, geotechnical data collected during the previous year,|and describes the techniques used for data acquisition. The report details the geotechnical performanceof the underground excavations including shafts, and provides an evaluation of the geotechnical aspectsof performance with respect to relevant design criteria.


2-17 November 2006

Figure 2.4-1, WIPP Surface Structures


2-18 November 2006

Figure 2.4-1a, Legend for Figure 2.4-1

2-19

Figure 2.4-2, Underground Structures

2-20

Figure 2.4-3, Spatial View of the WIPP Site

2-21

Figure 2.4-4, WHB Plan (Ground Floor)

2-22

Figure 2.4-5, WHB Plan (Upper Floor)

2-23

Figure 2.4-6, WHB (Sections)

2-24

Figure 2.4-7, Configuration of CH Waste Unloading TRUDOCKS in the WHB

2-25

Figure 2.4-8, Exhaust Filter Building

2-26

Figure 2.4-9, Waste Shaft and Hoist Arrangement

2-27

Figure 2.4-10, Underground Layout and Ventilation Flow

2-28

Figure 2.4-10A, Ventilation Flow for Panel 4

2-29

Figure 2.4-11, Typical RH and CH TRU Mixed Waste Disposal Configuration

2-30

Figure 2.4-12, Example of Backfill Emplacement in a Disposal Room

2-31

Figure 2.4-13, Example of MgO Super Sack Rack Used With Compacted Waste

2-32

Figure 2.4-14A, Panel Closure


2-33 April 2007|

Figure 2.4-14B, Panel Substantial and Isolation Barriers


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2.5 CH Waste Handling Process

This section describes the CH waste handling equipment and process. The CH waste handling processbegins at the security gate of the WIPP facility where CH waste arrives by truck (Figure 2.5-1). Adetailed description of the transportation system is beyond the scope of this CH DSA. A diagram of theCH waste handling process is shown in Figure 2.5-2.

2.5.1 CH Waste Transportation Containers

2.5.1.1 TRUPACT-II

The TRUPACT-II is a stainless steel, polyurethane foam insulated shipping container designed toprovide double containment for shipment of CH waste (Figure 2.5-3). The packaging consists of anunvented stainless steel inner containment vessel (ICV), positioned within an outer containmentassembly (OCA) consisting of an unvented stainless steel outer containment vessel (OCV), a layer ofpolyurethane foam and an outer stainless steel shell. The package is a right circular cylinder with anoutside diameter of approximately 94 inches and 122 inches tall.

The OCA has a domed lid which is secured to the OCA body with a locking ring. The OCV is equippedwith a seal test port and a vent port. The ICV is a right circular cylinder with domed ends.

The TRUPACT-II is certified by the NRC per 10 CFR §71.17, "General License: NRC-ApprovedPackage,"34 and is designed to safely transport transuranic and tritium contaminated materials and wastespackaged in one of the following payload containers: a 55-gallon drum, a 85-gallon drum, a 100-gallondrum, a SWB, a standard pipe overpack, a S100 pipe overpack, a S200 pipe overpack, a S300 pipeoverpack, or a TDOP. The maximum weight of a TRUPACT-II is 19,250 lb when loaded with themaximum allowable contents of 7,265 lb. The maximum gross weight of a payload container and themaximum number of payload containers per package is as follows:

Payload container type Maximum number of containers Maximum weight per container

55-gallon drum 14 (2 seven-packs) 1,000 lb

standard pipe overpack 14 328 lb per 6-inch 547 lb per 12-inch

S100 pipe overpack 14 550 lb



85-gallon drum (short) 8 (2 four-packs) 1,000 lb

100-gallon drum 6 (2 three-packs) 1,000 lb

SWB 2 4,000 lb

TDOP 1 6,700 lb

Through analysis, the TRUPACT-II and HalfPACT, discussed below, are sufficiently robust to withstandthe effects of a tornado born missile should a tornado occur at WIPP (NS-05-001, Safety AnalysisCalculation for CH DSA REV. 10 Source Term, Consequences, and Supporting Information).35


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2.5.1.2 HalfPACT

The HalfPACT, shown in Figure 2.5-4, is a stainless steel and polyurethane foam insulated shippingcontainer, similar to but shorter than the TRUPACT-II. The package consists of an unvented stainlesssteel ICV, positioned within an OCV. The package is a right circular cylinder with an outside diameterof approximately 94 inches and 92 inches tall.

The OCA has a domed lid which is secured to the OCA body with a locking ring. The OCV is equippedwith a seal test port and a vent port. The ICV is a right circular cylinder with domed ends.

The HalfPACT is certified by the NRC per 10 CFR §71.1734 and is designed to safely transporttransuranic and tritium contaminated materials and wastes packaged in one of the following payloadcontainers: a 55-gallon drum, a 85-gallon drum, a 100-gallon drum, a SWB, a standard pipe overpack, aS100 pipe overpack, a S200 pipe overpack, or a S300 pipe overpack. The maximum weight of aHalfPACT is 18,100 lb when loaded with the maximum allowable contents of 7,600 lb. The TDOP istoo large to be transported in a HalfPACT.

2.5.2 CH Waste Containers

CH waste containers approved for disposal at WIPP include DOT Type A, or equivalent, 55-gallondrums, 85-gallon drums, 100-gallon drums, SWBs, TDOPs, and pipe overpacks consisting of pipecomponents in 55-gallon drums. CH waste containers are equipped with filtered vents which allowaspiration, preventing internal pressurization of the container and minimizing the buildup of flammablegas concentrations, and preventing the escape of any radioactive particulates. Waste drums areassembled into drum assemblies consisting of seven-packs of 55-gallon drums, four-packs of 85-gallondrums, three-packs of 100-gallon drums.

2.5.2.1 55-Gallon Drums

The standard 55-gallon (U.S. Department of Transportation [DOT]-17C and DOT-17H) metal drum,shown in Figure 2.4-5, is a DOT Type 7A or equivalent, steel fabricated drum with a maximum grossweight of 1,000 lb, the 17C drum is approximately 0.065-in.-thick and the 17H drum is approximately0.05-in.-thick, both are constructed with a lap welded bottom and numerous lid configurations. Astandard 55-gallon drum has a gross internal volume of approximately 7.35 ft3.


The 85-gallon drum, shown in Figure 2.5-6, is a DOT Type 7A or equivalent, steel fabricated drum,approximately 0.065-in.-thick, and constructed similar to the 55-gallon drum. The 85-gallon drum isused primarily for overpacking contaminated 55-gallon drums. The 85-gallon drum has a gross internalvolume of approximately 11.4 ft3. There are two sizes of 85-gallon drums (CH-TRAMPAC, NRCDocket Nos. 71-9218 and 71-9279).36 The short 85-gallon drum is 35 inches tall with a diameter of29.75 inches. The tall 85-gallon drum has a height of 40.25 inches with a diameter of 28.88 inches. Onlythe short 85-gallon drums can be transported in a TRUPACT-II, while the HalfPACT can transport bothtypes of 85-gallon drums.


The 100-gallon metal drum shown in Figure 2.5-7, is a DOT Type A or equivalent, steel fabricated drumwith a maximum gross weight of 1,000 lb. The 100-gallon drum may be either direct loaded or loaded


2-36

with compacted 55-gallon drums. The 100-gallon drum has a gross internal volume of approximately13.4 ft3.

2.5.2.4 Standard Waste Boxes

The SWB shown in Figure 2.5-8, is a DOT Type A or equivalent, steel fabricated box with a lap weldedbottom, and an internally flanged bolted closure lid. The weight of an empty SWB is approximately680 lb, and the maximum gross weight of a loaded SWB is 4,000 lb. Four threaded couplings, two oneach side of the SWB with the lifting clips, are installed in the flange for inserting a filter to provideprotection from particulate leakage during shipment or build-up of internal pressure. A SWB has aninternal volume of nominally 66.4 ft3.

2.5.2.5 Ten-Drum Overpack

The TDOP, shown in Figure 2.5-9, is a DOT Type A or equivalent welded steel right circular cylinder,approximately 74 inches tall and a diameter of 71 inches. An empty TDOP weighs approximately 1,600lb and has a maximum loaded weight of 6,700 lb. A bolted lid on one end is removable, sealing isaccomplished by clamping a neoprene gasket between the lid and the body. Filter ports are located nearthe top of the TDOP. A TDOP may contain up to ten standard 55-gallon drums or one SWB. TDOPsmay be used to overpack drums or SWBs containing CH waste or be direct loaded with CH waste. ATDOP has an internal volume of nominally 155 ft3.

2.5.2.6 Standard Pipe Overpack

The standard pipe overpack consists of a stainless steel pipe component surrounded by cane fiberboardand plywood dunnage within a standard DOT Type A or equivalent 55-gallon drum with a rigidpolyethylene liner and lid. The pipe container provides three significant control functions with regard towaste materials: (1) criticality control, (2) shielding, and (3) containment of waste material.

The pipe component, shown in Figures 2.5-10 and 2.5-11, is a stainless steel, cylindrical pipe with aclosed bottom cap and a bolted stainless steel lid sealed with a butyl rubber O-ring. The pipe componentis approximately 2 ft long, and is available with either a 6 inch or a 12 inch diameter. The pipecomponent shall be vented through a filter. The pipe component is centered in the standard 55-gallonvented steel drum with cane fiberboard and plywood packing material.

The pipe component and pipe overpack weights are as follows:

Size Pipe ComponentMaximum Content

Weight Lb

Pipe ComponentMaximum Gross

Weight Lb

Pipe OverpackMaximum Gross

Weight Lb

6 inch diameter pipecomponent

66 lb 153 lb 328 lb

12 inch diameter pipecomponent

225 lb 407 lb 547 lb

2.5.2.7 S100 Pipe Overpack

The S100 pipe overpack shown in Figures 2.5-12 and 2.5-13, is a neutron shielded container. It differsfrom the standard pipe overpack primarily in that most of the cane fiberboard dunnage is replaced with


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neutron shielding material. In addition, neutron shielding material is placed within the pipe component,above, below, and around the payload.

The S100 pipe overpack consists of a 6 inch pipe component surrounded by neutron shielding material onthe sides and by cane fiberboard and plywood dunnage on the top and bottom, within a 55-gallon drumwith a rigid polyethylene liner and lid. It is placed within the drum, using the same type of canefiberboard and plywood dunnage below the lower surface and above the upper surface of the pipecomponent. The space around the sides of the pipe component is filled with water extendedpolyester/polyethylene composite neutron shielding or an equivalent shielding material. To provideshielding for the top and bottom of the pipe component, rigid high-density polyethylene plugs are placedabove and below the payload inside the pipe component. A rigid high-density polyethylene shield sleeveis placed between the two end plugs. The S100 pipe overpack is intended for the shipment of sealedneutron sources.


The S200 pipe overpack shown in Figures 2.5-14 and 2.5-15, is a gamma shielded container. It differsfrom the standard pipe overpack through the addition of a gamma shield insert located by dunnage insidethe pipe component. It is intended for the shipment of transuranic waste forms with high gammaenergies. The gamma shield insert is a lead two-component assembly consisting of a cylindrical bodywith an integral bottom cap and a detachable lid. The shield insert is available in two sizes. The overalldimension of the S200-A shield insert is nominally 10.1 inches in diameter and 10.6 inches tall. Theoverall dimensions of the S200-B shield insert is 9.3 inches in diameter and 17.8 inches tall. The pipecomponent is positioned using cane fiberboard and plywood dunnage within a 55-gallon drum with arigid polyethylene liner and lid.


The S300 pipe overpack, shown in Figures 2.5-16 and 2.5-17, is a neutron shielded container. It differsfrom the standard pipe overpack through the addition of neutron shielding within the pipe component. Itis intended for the shipment of sealed neutron sources. The neutron shield insert is a two part assemblyconsisting of a cylindrical body and stepped lid. The insert fits within and fills the 12 inch pipecomponent and is held in place by the lid of the pipe component. The shield insert is made from solid,high density polyethylene and has a wall thickness of approximate four inches.

2.5.3 CH Waste Handling Equipment

2.5.3.1 CH Bay

TRUDOCK 6-Ton Crane

Each TRUDOCK is serviced by two 6-ton overhead cranes that are used to transfer the shipping packageOCV and ICV lids to their individual support stands, and the payload waste containers to the facilitypallet. The cranes are identical having a single girder, underhung bridge, trolley, and wire rope hoist asshown in Figure 2.5-18. The two cranes at each TRUDOCK share the rails that the bridges travel along. Either crane can service either end of the TRUDOCK and are prevented from colliding with each otherthrough limit switch interlocks. If the interlocks are activated on either crane, the interlocks must bemanually reset before the cranes can be operated.

Each crane is controlled by its individual radio frequency transmitter or backup pendant control. TheTRUDOCK 6-ton cranes are designed to hold their load in the event of a DBE or loss of power


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(WH00 SDD).16 Overhead cranes used in waste handling operations are certified to lift their ratedcapacity, and load tested to 125 percent of maximum rated lift. The crane control system allows theoperator to lift and transfer the load to the location of the facility pallet. The cranes use speciallydesigned lifting and load balancing fixtures including the adjustable center-of-gravity lift fixture(ACGLF), the SWB lifting assembly, the TDOP lifting assembly and short and long lift leg sets.

TRUDOCK Exhaust System

Each TRUDOCK has an exhaust system with two working stations, and each station consists of twosubsystems: (1) the TRUDOCK vent hood system, and (2) the TRUDOCK vacuum system. Bothsubsystems are routed through industrial grade HEPA filters before entering the CH bay exhaust system,which is also HEPA filtered, before discharging to the atmosphere (see Figures 2.5-19 and 2.5-20).

The TRUDOCK vent hood system consists of an enclosure which is installed over the ICV lid and theshipping package body before the lid is removed. The enclosure is connected to the exhaust systembefore the lid is removed, thus ensuring that any potential radioactive contamination is passed through anindustrial grade HEPA filter system.

The TRUDOCK vacuum system is used to evacuate the shipping package OCV or ICV to pull the outeror inner lid down to assist in lid removal. The vacuum system inlet is connected by flexible tubing, usingquick disconnect fittings, to the appropriate ICV or OCV vent port tool. A radiation assessment filter inthe inlet line is used when evacuating the ICV.

Space Frame Pallet Assemblies

Two types of space frame pallet assemblies, more commonly called payload or drum pallets, are used inCH waste shipments. A payload pallet supports the drum payloads contained in a TRUPACT II andHalfPACT, and interface with the adjustable center-of gravity lift fixture (ACGLF) during payloadremoval from the transportation package. Both are constructed of aluminum and resemble a spokedwagon wheel with a thin aluminum sheet welded to one side. Both types have a diameter ofapproximately 63 in., are approximately 3 in. thick., have a working load limit of 7600 lbs., and havemultiple lifting pockets that interface with the lift legs of the ACGLF.

One type of payload pallet is used under drum payloads has three lifting pockets of the same design andspacing as the OCA and ICV lids. Three guide tubes pass through the drums and align with the liftingpockets to guide the (long) lifting legs of the ACGLF when removing the waste packages. The weight ofthe pallet is about 136 lb.

A second type of payload pallet, used for HalfPACT payloads of 85-gal. drums, has four lifting pocketsof the same design as the OCA and ICV lids. This type of payload pallet interfaces with the HalfPACTfour-drum pallet lifting device discussed below and weighs about 147 lb.

Adjustable Center-of-Gravity Lift Fixture

The ACGLF is used with a TRUDOCK 6-ton crane to lift the OCV and ICV lids, an empty ICV, or thepayload waste containers out of the TRUPACT-II. The ACGLF has a lift capacity of 10,000 lb andweighs approximately 2,500 lb (see Figure 2.5-21). The ACGLF is designed as follows:

• The lower strongback assembly, a carbon steel lifting beam structure, has three revolving joints,120 degrees apart, to which the lift legs are attached.


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• Three linear actuators mounted on the underside of the lower strongback, provide the linearmotion for each of the lift leg revolving mechanisms which connect the lift legs to the load.

• Two rotating balance weights are mounted on a circular upper plate assembly. The rotatingbalanced weights are attached to two counter-rotating ring gears which are independentlydriven.

• Two 1/4 hp, 115 VAC (volts alternating current), single-phase gear motors drive the counter-rotating ring gears that position the rotating balance weights around the circumference of theupper plate assembly.

• Three short lift legs lift the OCV and ICV lids, empty ICV, or SWBs when lifted with an SWBlift fixture adapter, and three long lift legs lift a 14-drum payload pallet. The bottom of the liftlegs are designed to engage a horizontal lifting bar in the lifting pockets of the OCV and ICVlids, SWB lift fixture adapter, and drum shipping pallet when the lift leg is rotated into position. The ACGLF also includes three electrical actuator motors and arms to rotate the lift legs intotheir locking lift positions. The control system has limit switches with lights to indicate thateach lift leg has rotated to attach to the lifting pins.

• Two tilt sensors provide X and Y axis tilt indication of the ACGLF.

• Two balance weight position sensors continuously provide the position of each of the tworotating balance weights.

• A single point lifting shackle is mounted in the center of the ACGLF for attachment to the crane.

• One portable control console provides operator controls and indicators to monitor the balancecondition of the load, and to compensate, if necessary, for load imbalance by repositioning thetwo counterweights.

Non-adjustable Center of Gravity Lift Fixture

This fixture is similar to the ACGLF in function except that it has no capability for balancing the load. Itcan be used as a backup for the ACGLF, if no ACGLF is available, to lift the OCV and ICV lids, entireICV, and payload waste containers (pallet with 14 drums, or two SWBs strapped together). The fixturehas a lift capacity of 10,000 lb, and a weight of 600 lb.

HalfPACT Four-Drum Pallet Lifting Device

The HalfPACT four-drum pallet lifting device is designed to lift four 85-gallon drums on a single pallet. Four legs connect the lifting device to the pallet. The ACGLF interfaces at three points with liftingsockets at the top of the lifting device. Four linkages connect the three ACGLF connector legs to thelifting device legs. The linkages allow the lifting device legs to be controlled by the ACGLF. Eachlifting device leg may be actuated by either the linear actuator residing on the ACGLF or the handlelocated on each ACGLF leg turning sleeve. The HalfPACT four-drum pallet lifting device has a ratedload of 10,000 lb. It may be lifted by an ACGLF at the three attachment points or by the clevis located inthe center of the device.


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Standard Waste Box Lift Fixture Adapter

The SWB lift fixture adapter (Figure 2.5-22) is designed to interface between the ACGLF and the SWB. Its frame is made from square steel tubing. The three lifting pockets on the top of the fixture are locatedon a circle of 56 inches in diameter to match the positioning of the three legs of the ACGLF. The SWBlift fixture adapter has a rated lifting capacity of 7,500 lb and weighs approximately 334 lb.

Ten-Drum Overpack Lift Fixture Adaptor

The TDOP lift fixture adaptor is made from square steel tubing and is reinforced with a 7-gauge steelplate. It consists of three legs spaced 120 degrees apart with a latch assembly on the end of each leg. The latch hinge center lines are located on a 35 inch radius from the center of the assembly. In-boardfrom the latches are sections of schedule 80 pipe welded vertically to the assembly tubing in which holesare drilled horizontally and cold rolled steel pins are welded in place. These lift pockets are located on acircle of 56 inches in diameter to match the positioning of the three legs of the ACGLF. The latchassemblies, which mate with the three lifting clips on the TDOP, are engaged with the latch handles, andare locked in place with ball lock pins. The TDOP lift fixture adaptor has a rated lifting capacity of7,000 lb and weighs 300 lb (see Figure 2.5-23).

TDOP Upender

The TDOP upender is used to support the recovery of a damaged SWB for overpacking it in a TDOP. The TDOP must be laid horizontally to allow a forklift to insert the SWB. The TDOP must then bereturned to the vertical position to allow installation of the TDOP lid. The TDOP upender providescradle rotation of 90 degrees through the use of a mechanical chain and double reduction gear driven byan electric motor. The upender has a rated maximum capacity of 8,000 lb and a gross weight of 5,920 lb. Based on commercial industrial equipment commonly used to rotate large rolls of sheet metal or paper,the upender has a table sized to accommodate the TDOP. The table has a urethane coated Vee blockwith tie down straps to prevent a TDOP from rolling while being transported on the upender. Theupender is bolted to a CH facility pallet prior to use to provide stability and to allow transporting with a13-ton electric forklift on the surface, an underground transporter, or the 20-ton forklift underground.

A warning beacon and horn mounted on the control enclosure activates a few seconds prior to movementof the cradle. End of travel limit switches automatically stop the cradle in either the full up or full downpositions. Overtravel limit switches and hard mechanical stops prevent the cradle from rotating beyondthe full up or full down positions.

Surface Waste Handling Forklifts

Forklifts are used to handle CH waste on the surface and the underground. Battery powered 13-tonelectric forklifts are used on the surface. These forklifts are used to unload the shipping packages fromtheir transportation trailers and move them through the WHB airlocks to support stands located in thepockets of the TRUDOCKS in the CH bay. They are also used to move and transfer facility pallets, withor without a load of waste containers, between the CH bay, the storage areas, and the conveyance loadingcar. Each of the 13-ton electric forklifts have a maximum lift height of 96 inches. The forklifts' driveunits are battery powered DC motors. The 13-ton electric forklifts are equipped with blunt tines toprevent waste container puncture. The forklifts can operate for eight hours before the batteries have tobe recharged. Each forklift has a high volume hydraulic pump unit that supplies the power for lift, tilt,and side shift of the forks. A separate hydraulic unit supplies power for braking and steering. Thecapacity of the hydraulic fluid reservoir is approximately 27 gallons.


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A 6-ton electric forklift is also used in the CH bay. It has a hydraulically operated side-shift positionerfor shifting the load to the right or left. The capacity of the hydraulic fluid reservoir is approximately21 gallons. Either standard type forks or specially designed fixtures can be attached to the positioner forlifting different loads. The forklift is battery powered with a maximum lift height of 118 inches. The6-ton electric forklift can operate for 8 hours before requiring a recharge of the batteries. It can beoperated with different attachments as listed below:

• A push/pull rack fixture with a drum handler to lift and move seven-packs of waste drums

• A single or double drum handling device

• An SWB forklift fixture to lift and move individual SWBs

• Two forks for lifting loads

The CH waste handling 13-ton electric forklifts are designed and constructed such that the combustiblematerials including electrical components, batteries, and hydraulic reservoir and lines, are segregatedfrom each other by metal barriers sufficient to prevent fire that may originate on the forklift frompropagating to other parts of the forklift.

The external structure of the CH waste handling 13-ton electric forklift is constructed with 1.5 in. thickmetal walls which protect the hydraulics, motor, motor controls, and the batteries from damage due tocollision that could initiate a fire that involves the combustible material. Similarly, the internal design ofthe CH waste handling 13-ton electric forklifts provide 0.5 in. thick metal partitions that separate thebatteries from the motor, motor controls, hydraulics, seat cushions, and solid rubber tires. The hydrauliccylinders that allow the forklift to pick up a load are mounted behind the forklift carriage such that thecylinders are not damaged during use. The peak operating temperature of the electrical componentsassociated with the 13-ton forklifts have a peak operating temperature that does not exceed 150 degreesF. The hydraulic fluid used in the waste handling electric forklifts has a flashpoint greater than 400degrees F.31

SWB Forklift Fixture

A SWB forklift fixture is used in the CH bay to lift and move SWBs with a 6-ton electric forklift. TheSWB forklift fixture is a welded steel frame designed to be mounted and supported on the front side of a6-ton forklift carriage from which the lifting forks have been removed. The fixture has a rated load of4,000 lb designed specifically for lifting SWBs, and weighs 360 lb. (see Figure 2.5-24)

Facility Pallets

Facility pallets shown in Figure 2.5-25, are fabricated steel units 13 ft. long and 9 ft. wide. Facilitypallets are designed to accommodate two stacks of two-high seven-packs, two stacks of two-high SWBs,two stacks of two-high four-packs of 85-gallon drums, two stacks of two high three-packs of 100-gallondrums, two TDOPs, or combinations of waste containers. Facility pallets have a rated load of 25,000 lb. Since the maximum TRUPACT-II load is 7,265 lb, two TRUPACT-II payloads may be placed on afacility pallet. The maximum HalfPACT load is 7,600 lb. Load management of the facility pallet isrequired when placing full HalfPACT payloads on a pallet to prevent exceeding the facility pallet loadcapacity.

Fork pockets in the long side of the pallet allow the facility pallet to be lifted while preventing directcontact between waste containers and forklift tines. This arrangement reduces the potential for punctureaccidents. The location of the fork pockets prevent the facility pallet from being positioned on the wastehoist conveyance main deck which is 11 ft. wide.


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Miscellaneous Equipment

Other equipment used in the CH bay to support waste handling or maintenance activities include twobattery powered floor sweepers and a battery powered scissor lift.

2.5.3.2 Conveyance Loading Room

The conveyance loading car, approximately 13 ft. long and 7.5 ft. wide, is an electric vehicle thatoperates on rails. The conveyance loading car travels through multiple doors and gates before it can bemoved into the waste shaft conveyance. The car is designed with a flat bed that has adjustable heightcapability, and is used to transfer facility pallets on or off the pallet support stands in the waste shaftconveyance by raising and lowering the bed (see Figure 2.5-26). The conveyance loading car platform isequipped with two pintles spaced to match corresponding openings in the bottom of the facility pallet, toprevent the pallet from sliding or moving off the conveyance loading car. The lift height of thejackscrews that lift the conveyance loading car platform is approximately 8 inches. The jackscrews aredesigned to move together as they are driven by a single motor. Should any of the jackscrews fail suchthat the conveyance loading car lifting platform is tilted, the angle would not be enough to cause thewaste containers to dislodge from the facility pallet.

2.5.3.3 Underground

The underground waste handling and emplacement equipment consists of diesel-powered forklifts andattachments and the diesel powered transporter.

Underground Transporter

The underground transporter is a diesel-powered tractor trailer with an articulating frame steering system(Figure 2.5-27). The transporter has two sections; (1) a front section consisting of the tractor cab anddiesel engine, and (2) the rear section consisting of a flat bed trailer with a ball screw driven pallettransfer system mounted in the middle of the bed. The pallet transfer system is designed to handle a loadof 28,000 lb. The tractor has a fully hydraulic power steering system with a direct drive hydraulic pump,an orbital valve operated by the steering wheel, and two steering cylinders located at the articulated joint. The hydraulic fluid reservoir capacity is 20 gallons. The underground transporter includes a 50-gallonfuel tank and an automatic/manual dry chemical fire suppression system that can be manually actuated.

The automatic/manual fire suppression system on the underground transporter is comprised of detectioncapability, a compressed gas cartridge that, when actuated, fluidizes the fire suppressant powder andforces the powder to the distribution network. The system is equipped with a control module thatincludes system status lights to indicate normal and trouble conditions.

The axle brakes are air over hydraulic disc brakes with a dual master cylinder and separate circuits forthe front and rear brakes. There is also a drive line disc brake which is used as a parking brake. Thebrake automatically sets on low air pressure. The brake can also be set manually from the tractor cab. The underground transporter attaches the pallet mover to the facility pallet and pulls the facility palletonto the transporter trailer. During transport to the underground disposal room, the facility pallet issecured to the transporter trailer with the pallet mover hook and side rails prevent side to side movement.


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Underground Waste Handling Forklifts

There are two 6-ton diesel forklifts in the underground, which can be equipped with push/pullattachments. The 6-ton diesel forklifts equipped with push/pull attachments capable of handling 8,500 lbare provided to lift and transport waste containers and backfill super sacks. The forklift-attachmentcombination handles the following combinations on slipsheets: a single drum assembly, a single SWB, asingle TDOP, a stack of two drum assemblies, a stack of two SWBs, or a single backfill super sack. Theattachments can be removed if the forklift is required for other tasks. The 6-ton diesel forklifts have a 24gallon hydraulic fluid reservoir and a 37 gallon diesel fuel tank. The battery is a 12 volt lead acid batterythat is enclosed in the engine compartment.

A 7.5-ton diesel forklift is used in the underground to handle and emplace approved configurations ofMgO super sacks associated with compacted waste. The 7.5-ton forklift can be equipped with push/pullattachments, has a 24 gallon hydraulic fluid reservoir, a 37 gallon diesel fuel tank and a 12 volt lead acidbattery that is enclosed in the engine compartment.

Diesel forklifts used for underground waste handling are equipped with automatic/manual dry chemicalfire suppression capability which can also be manually actuated. The automatic/manual fire suppressionsystem on the forklifts has the same features as those on the underground transporter.

Push-Pull Attachments

The push-pull attachments shown in Figures 2.5-28 and 2.5-29, are used with a 6-ton forklift to removethe CH waste containers from the underground transporters and emplace the waste in the waste stack. The push-pull attachment shown in Figure 2.5-29 is used to place the backfill super sacks on top of thewaste stacks and is installed on the forklift tines. The push-pull attachment shown in Figure 2.5-28 isconnected to the forklift front carriage, which requires the removal of the forklift tines. Both types ofattachments have a gripper which grips the edge of the slip sheet on which the waste containers sit, and alinkage assembly to pull or push the waste containers onto or off the platen. After the 6-ton forklift haspulled the waste containers from the transporter and moved the waste containers to the emplacementlocation, the push-pull attachment pushes the waste containers into position after the forklift haspositioned the platen to the proper height.

2.5.4 CH Waste Handling Process

2.5.4.1 CH Waste Receiving

The CH waste handling process is controlled by procedure WP 05-WH1011, CH Waste Processing,38 andassociated operating procedures. As each CH waste shipment arrives at the security gate of the PPA, theshipment documentation is inspected and verified to ensure that the waste delivered matches thatapproved in the WIPP Waste Information System (WWIS) for disposal at WIPP, a security inspection isperformed, and the initial radiological survey is completed. If the inspections or survey reveal anydiscrepancy, any actions taken will be in accordance with approved procedures.

Following turnover of the shipping documentation, the driver transports and parks the trailer on the southside of the WHB in the designated parking area within the PPA and unhooks the transporter. Finalexternal contamination surveys are performed once the loaded trailer is parked. After unloading, emptyshipping packages are loaded on the trailer and returned to the security yard receiving area followingradiological surveys and release.


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The shipping packages are unloaded from trailers outdoors using 13-ton electric forklifts (Figure 2.5-30),transported through one of three entrance airlocks which are designed to maintain differential pressure inthe WHB, and placed in a vacant TRUDOCK. Electric forklifts are used for CH waste handlingoperations on the surface and in the WHB. This minimizes the impact of diesel exhaust particulates onthe WHB HEPA filters and prevents diesel related fires in the WHB. Each airlock is sized toaccommodate a shipping package on a 13-ton electric forklift. The WHB ventilation system maintainsthe interior of the WHB at a pressure lower than the ambient atmosphere to ensure air flows into theWHB, preventing the inadvertent release of airborne hazardous or radioactive materials. To assist theWHB ventilation system in maintaining the building at a lower pressure than the ambient atmospheric,the doors at each end of the entrance airlocks are interlocked to prevent inadvertent opening of bothdoors at the same time.

2.5.4.2 CH Bay

After the shipping package is placed in a TRUDOCK, the (Figure 2.5-31) TRUPACT-II or HalfPACTOCV tamper seal is first removed. During OCV lid removal, a vacuum may be applied to the outer lidvent port to compress the lid toward the vessel body, enabling the locking ring to rotate, unlocking thelid. During this process, the atmosphere between the ICV lid and OCV lid is vented through industrialgrade HEPA roughing filters. The underside of the OCV lid and top of the ICV lid are surveyed forcontamination. The OCV lid is removed and placed in an adjacent lay-down area with the aid of theTRUDOCK 6-ton crane and the ACGLF.

The vacuum pull process is repeated for the ICV lid and a radiological assessment filter is attached to thevent port tool, upstream of the industrial grade HEPA roughing filter. The radiological assessment filteris subsequently checked for radioactive contamination. The TRUDOCK vent hood system is attached tothe ICV lid, and the lid raised. The TRUDOCK vent hood system consists of vent hood assembly,industrial grade HEPA filter assembly, fan to provide forced air flow, ductwork, and a flexible hose. TheTRUDOCK vent hood system provides atmospheric control and confinement of airborne radioactivematerial and minimizes personnel exposure to volatile organic compounds (VOCs). The air from thevent hood is monitored by an alpha continuous air monitor (CAM) prior to passing through the roughingfilter. The air is then released to the WHB return air ducts.

Prior to moving the ICV lid aside, contamination surveys under the vent hood are performed on the ICVlid and accessible waste container surfaces. If no contamination is detected, the vent hood is removed,and the ICV lid set aside using the same overhead bridge crane and lifting fixture. Additionalcontamination surveys are performed on the waste containers. If no contamination is detected, theTRUDOCK 6-ton crane is used to remove and transfer the shipping package payload to the prepositionedfacility pallet. A typical TRUPACT-II contains fourteen and a typical HalfPACT contains seven55-gallon drums that are stretch wrapped or banded together into seven-packs. Each seven-pack, orassembly, sits on a molded slip sheet made of high density polyethylene. A second slip sheet is placed ontop of the seven-pack, and the entire assembly is held together by stretch wrap or banding.

Final contamination surveys are conducted, and the identification numbers of the waste containers arerecorded for transfer to the inventory tracking system. For inventory control purposes, CH wastecontainer identification numbers are verified against the shipping documentation. Any inconsistenciesare resolved with the generator before CH waste is emplaced. The shipping package and wastecontainers are shipped back to the generator if the inconsistencies cannot be resolved. Waste containersawaiting resolution of discrepancies are stored in the shielded storage area of the CH bay. A damagedwaste container is overpacked.


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The loaded facility pallet is transported, using a 13-ton electric forklift, to the northeast area of the CHbay for normal storage. This storage area, which is shown in Figure 2.5-31, is marked to indicate thelateral limits of the storage area. A maximum of seven loaded facility pallets of waste may be stored inthe northeast corner of the CH bay. An additional facility pallet of waste may be stored in the shieldedstorage room and at each TRUDOCK. At the TRUDOCKs, the waste can be stored either on a facilitypallet or in the shipping package. A minimum aisle space of 44 inches is maintained between facilitypallets to allow unobstructed movement of fire-fighting personnel, spill-control equipment, anddecontamination equipment that may be used in the event of an off-normal event.

A derived waste storage area is shown in Figure 2.5-31 on the north wall of the CH bay, is used forcollecting derived waste from waste handling processes in the WHB. Drums or an SWB can be used toaccumulate derived waste. The maximum volume allowed to be stored in the derived waste storage areais approximately 65.4 ft3 (1.85 m3).

Normal operations for receipt and emplacement of drum assemblies containing CH waste do not includeremoval of empty drums received as dunnage in the drum assembly. Normal operations do not involveopening of waste containers. Drum assemblies consisting entirely of empty drums are dispositioned inthe most cost-efficient manner, but are typically returned to generator sites.

After the waste containers are removed from the shipping package, a final radiological survey andmaintenance inspection are performed on the package, and the unit is prepared for reuse. When theshipping package is ready for reuse, it is removed from the WHB, loaded on a trailer, and prepared fordeparture to a generator site.

2.5.4.3 Conveyance Loading Room

A facility pallet of waste containers is moved by forklift into the conveyance loading room and placed onthe conveyance loading car. Two sets of doors are provided in the conveyance loading room, one setseparates the room from the CH bay and the other set separates the room from the waste shaft entry roomcontaining the waste shaft collar. The doors are interlocked such that only one set may be opened at atime. The waste shaft entry room doors must be opened and the CH bay doors closed prior to moving aloaded conveyance loading car to the waste shaft conveyance.

2.5.4.4 Waste Shaft Entry Room

Pivot rails provided at the waste shaft collar are rotated to the horizontal position when loading the wasteshaft conveyance and are rotated vertically when not in use. The pivot rails are interlocked such that thewaste shaft conveyance cannot be moved until the pivot rails are out of the way. Fencing with gates arelocated at the shaft collar and the waste shaft station to prevent inadvertent access to the shaft. The gatesare interlocked such that the conveyance cannot move with a gate open, and if the conveyance is inmotion when a gate is opened, he emergency stop is actuated. With the conveyance loadingroom/CH bay airlock door closed, the conveyance loading car moves the facility pallet onto the wastehoist cage and transfers the pallet to the pallet support stand in the waste hoist cage. Only one loadedfacility pallet consisting of four drum assemblies, four SWBs, or two TDOPs is carried at a time. Thewaste hoist lowers the waste containers to the waste shaft station at the disposal horizon. Personnel arenot carried on the waste shaft conveyance when waste is being transferred.

2.5.4.5 Waste Shaft Station

When the waste shaft conveyance has stopped at the waste shaft station, the shaft station gates areopened and the underground transporter backs up to the waste shaft conveyance. The facility pallet is

WIPP CH DSA DOE/WIPP-95-2065, REV. 10 - Page Chg. CH-2007-001\003 CHAPTER 2|

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pulled onto the underground transporter trailer as shown in Figure 2.5-32. The underground transportermoves the facility pallet of waste containers to the waste disposal room via the transportation routeshown in Figure 2.5-33. A procedurally controlled transport notification system alerts personnel thatwaste is being transported. Personnel and other non-waste handling vehicles are required to move to acrosscut or leave the disposal path/area to minimize the likelihood of collisions with the transporter whilemoving waste in the underground.

2.5.4.6 Underground CH Waste Disposal Process|

At the waste disposal room, the waste containers are removed from the underground transporter using a6-ton diesel forklift with a push-pull attachment and placed in the disposal face. The forklift attachmentis used to lift, move, and emplace individual drum assemblies (seven-packs, four-packs, and three-packs),TDOPs, or SWBs. The CH waste containers are stacked as shown in Figure 2.5-34, with drumassemblies, SWBs, and TDOPs intermixed. For stability, 85-gallon drums in four-pack assemblies and100-gallon drums in three-pack assemblies are typically placed on the top row of the waste stack or onlike assemblies, and TDOPs are typically placed on the bottom row as shown in Figure 2.5-35. After thewaste containers are removed from the facility pallets and the shipping package pallets, the pallets arereturned to the surface for reuse.

The waste is emplaced in each room of a panel until the panel is full. When the panel is full, the panelclosure system is installed. Panels 9 and 10 may also be used to reach the full authorized capacity of6.2 million ft3. Panels 1 and 2 have been filled and isolated with an explosion-isolation wall. Once a|waste disposal panel is mined and any initial ground control established, ventilation control equipment isconstructed at the exit of each disposal room to control ventilation during waste emplacement. Room 7 isthe first room in a panel to be filled with waste because it is the room farthest from the main access.

When combined CH and RH operations take place in a panel, RH emplacement boreholes are typically|drilled into the ribs of rooms in advance of disposal operations. A ventilation control point consisting of|a bulkhead with a ventilation regulator is also installed in each room. The ventilation control point may|also include man doors or vehicle doors. For CH waste emplacement, shown in Figures 2.5-36a and b,|the ventilation control point is typically installed on the exhaust side room. The ventilation control point|may be located as necessary to allow RH equipment or RH waste movement to access boreholes in intake|and exhaust portions of a room. Typically RH waste emplacement preceeds CH waste emplacement to|preclude CH waste from blocking RH borehole access.|

|CH waste emplacement starts at the exhaust side of an active disposal room and proceeds through the|room to the intake, as shown in Figures 2.5-36a and b. The sequence of RH emplacement varies in order|to minimize RH equipment moves due to its size. When the room is full, brattice cloth and chainlink|barricades shown in Figure 2.5-37 are installed to isolate a filled room from the ventilation system. This|process is repeated for the remaining rooms until the panel is filled as shown in Figure 2.5-38. |

|When a panel is filled, the panel closure system or substantial and isolation barriers are constructed in the|entries to the filled panels. Based on previous panels to-date, it is anticipated it will take approximately 2|to 2.5 years to complete waste emplacement in a panel. Panel closure, in accordance with the Closure|Plan in the HWFP28, is typically completed within 180 days from the last waste emplacement in a panel.|

2.5.5 Process Interruptions

The CH waste handling process interruptions fall into two categories, routine and emergency/abnormal.


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2.5.5.1 Routine Interruptions

Routine process interruptions include scheduled maintenance, unscheduled maintenance, and plantinspections. Actions taken during routine process interruptions are conducted in accordance withestablished procedures. Plant parameters are monitored to ensure that radiological or hazardous materialreleases do not occur.

2.5.5.2 Emergency/Abnormal Interruptions

Emergency interruptions are those process interruptions due to operational accidents, man-made externalevents, or natural events that include earthquakes, severe weather, and fires.

Normal plant operations may be suspended following an earthquake. If the earthquake is of sufficientmagnitude (i.e., seismic event of 0.015 g or greater acceleration), inspection of structures and equipmentis required prior to resuming normal operations. The length of the interruption will depend upon theresults of the inspection.

Normal plant operations may be suspended during a tornado or a high wind condition warning. Atornado or high wind condition warning is based on information provided by the National WeatherService or local observation. If a severe weather emergency condition occurs at the WIPP site,inspections of structures and equipment may be required prior to resuming normal operations. Thelength of the interruption depends on the results of the inspection.

Normal plant operations may be suspended in the event of a fire. The occurrence of a fire may requireevacuation of personnel and response by appropriate emergency personnel. After extinguishing the fire,the area will be surveyed, controls will be established to mitigate any problems, and the area returned tonormal operations.

Abnormal interruptions include unplanned and unexpected change in a process condition or variableadversely affecting safety, security, environment, or health sufficient to require stopping waste handlingor putting waste handling on hold for greater than four hours.

In the event of abnormal interruptions, waste handling or any other site activity is stopped and placed in asafe condition. For example, the loss of off-site power affects all site electrical equipment. Anysuspended load is maintained as-is until power is returned. When power returns, loads are lowered. Allcranes and hoists hold their loads on loss of power. A manually started backup power supply dieselsupplies selected loads as described in Section 2.8.1.2. Some equipment has uninterruptible or batterybackup for loss of power such as the central monitoring system (CMS) and the underground CAMs.


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Figure 2.5-1, Truck, TRUPACT-IIs and Trailer


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Figure 2.5-2, CH Waste Handling Process


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Figure 2.5-3, TRUPACT-II


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Figure 2.5-4, HalfPACT


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Figure 2.5-5, Standard 55-Gallon Drum


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Figure 2.5-6, 85-Gallon Drum


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Figure 2.5-7, 100-Gallon Drum


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Figure 2.5-8, Standard Waste Box


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Figure 2.5-9, Ten-Drum Overpack


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Figure 2.5-10, Standard Pipe Overpack


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Figure 2.5-11, Standard Pipe Overpack


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Figure 2.5-12, S100 Pipe Overpack


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Figure 2.5-13, S100 Pipe Overpack Dunnage and Shielding


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Figure 2.5-14, S200 Pipe Overpack


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Figure 2.5-15, S200A and S200B Pipe Overpack Shield Inserts


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Figure 2.5-16, S300 Pipe Overpack Assembly


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Figure 2.5-17, S300 Pipe Overpack Shield Insert


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Figure 2.5-18, Typical Overhead Crane


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Figure 2.5-19, TRUDOCK Vent Hood System


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Figure 2.5-20, TRUDOCK Vacuum System


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Figure 2.5-21, Adjustable Center-of-Gravity Lift Fixture


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Figure 2.5-22, SWB Lift Fixture Adapter


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Figure 2.5-23, TDOP Lift Fixture Adaptor


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Figure 2.5-24, SWB Forklift Fixture


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Figure 2.5-25, Facility Pallet


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Figure 2.5-26, Facility Pallet on Conveyance Loading Car


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Figure 2.5-27, CH Underground Transporter


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Figure 2.5-28, Push-Pull Attachment Requiring Forklift Tine Removal


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Figure 2.5-29, Push Pull Attachment Installed on Forklift Tines


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Figure 2.5-30, CH Waste Handling (Surface)


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Figure 2.5-31, WHB CH Waste Temporary Storage Area


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Figure 2.5-32, CH Waste Handling (Underground)


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Figure 2.5-33, Underground Transportation Routes


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Figure 2.5-34, CH Waste Emplacement


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Figure 2.5-35, Arrangement of Typical Waste Stacks


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Figure 2.5-36a, Typical CH Waste Emplacement Process


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Figure 2.5-36b, Typical CH Waste Emplacement Process


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Figure 2.5-37, Typical Room Barricade


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Figure 2.5-38, Typical Panel Filled With Waste


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2.6 Confinement Systems

The WIPP confinement systems consist of static and dynamic barriers that prevent or minimize:

• The spread of radioactive and hazardous materials within occupied and unoccupied processareas.

• The release of radioactive and hazardous materials in facility effluents during normal operationand process interruptions.

• The release of radioactive and hazardous materials resulting from DBAs including severenatural events and man-made events.

Static barriers are structures that confine contamination by their physical presence, and dynamic barriersthat control the airborne radioactive material. For WIPP, static barriers include waste containers,building structures, the underground repository, and HEPA filtration systems. Dynamic barriers consistof the surface and underground ventilation systems that maintain pressure differentials ensuring air flowis from areas of lower to higher contamination potential. The primary confinement is the waste containerand the secondary confinement consists of the WHB and the underground. The WHB is designed towithstand the effects of tornados, high winds, and earthquake, and the underground is unaffected by theseevents. WIPP confinement systems meet the requirements of DOE O 420.1B.2


The WHB is a static barrier that provides secondary confinement should a waste container breach. TheWHB houses the WHB ventilation system that maintains a static pressure differential between theprimary confinement barriers, the waste containers, and the environment. To assist the ventilationsystem, airlocks are provided between separate areas where pressure differentials are necessary and areelectrically interlocked. The WHB ventilation system HEPA filters provides the final barrier for airborneparticulates. The WHB is designed to withstand the DBE and DBT.

2.6.2 Underground

The underground disposal area is a static barrier that provides secondary confinement should a CH wastecontainer breach. Secondary confinement also includes the underground bulkheads, overcasts, andairlocks that separate the disposal and waste shaft ventilation circuits from the other ventilated areas ofthe underground. The bulkheads, overcasts, and airlocks are constructed of noncombustible material,except for the flexible flashing used to accommodate salt movement, in accordance with 30 CFR Part57.17 The underground ventilation system includes differential pressure control such that air leakage isfrom non-waste area to the disposal area. The effluent from the underground can be directed throughHEPA filters located on the surface, near the top of the exhaust shaft, to mitigate any accidentalradiological releases from the underground.

2.6.3 Ventilation Systems

The WIPP ventilation systems are designed to provide a suitable environment for personnel andequipment during plant operations, and to provide radiological control during postulated waste handlingaccidents and process interruptions. Ventilation systems are used for space heating and cooling. TheWIPP ventilation systems serve surface and underground facilities and are designed to meet theemissions limitations in DOE O 5400.5, Radiation Protection of the Public and the Environment,39 usingthe following guidelines:


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• Transfer and leakage air flow is from areas of lower to areas of higher potential forcontamination.

• In building areas that have a potential for contamination, a negative pressure is maintained tominimize the spread of contaminants.

• Consideration is given to the temporary disruption of normal air flow patterns due to scheduledand unscheduled maintenance operations by providing dual trains of supply and exhaustequipment. Ventilation systems are provided with features to reestablish designed airflowpatterns in the event of a temporary disruption. Ducts that carry potentially contaminated airare routed away from occupied areas.

Systems are designed so that some components can be taken out of service for maintenance while thesystem continues to operate as designed.

2.6.3.1 Surface Ventilation Systems in Controlled Areas

There are independent ventilation systems for each of the following areas:

• Waste hoist tower including the hoist maintenance room

• CH waste handling area

• RH bay including the FCLR, HEPA filter gallery, and upper hot cell operating gallery

• RH upper and lower hot cell including crane maintenance room and transfer cell.

• WHB mechanical equipment room

• EFB

The waste hoist maintenance room is located in the second floor of the waste hoist tower. Theventilation system that serves this area is not expected to contain or become contaminated withradioactive material as the air is ultimately exhausted down the waste shaft to the combined undergroundexhaust.

The WHB and EFB ventilation systems are once through systems, with fresh air supply intakes locatedaway from the exhaust vents, designed to provide confinement barriers with HEPA filters providing thecapability to limit releases of airborne radioactive contaminants. Exhaust air recirculation systems havebeen installed, not operational at this time, on the ventilation systems for the CH waste handling area, theRH bay, and the EFB. The recirculation systems have dampers located between the HEPA filters exhaustand the building exhaust vent to allow HEPA filtered, conditioned air to be re-circulated into theventilation system supply intake. The recirculation systems will be manually controlled from the CMRbut will automatically convert to once through upon receipt of a air borne contamination alarm. Theventilation systems provide pressure differentials that are maintained between building interior zones andthe outside environment which controls potentially contaminated air. The WHB ventilation systemscontinuously filter the exhaust air from waste handling areas to reduce the potential for release ofradioactive effluents to the environment.

Airlocks for ventilation differential pressure control are electrically interlocked and are provided in thefollowing locations:

• At entrances to potentially contaminated areas to maintain a static barrier


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• Between areas of large pressure differences to provide a pressure transition and to eliminatehigh air velocity

• Between areas where pressure differentials must be maintained

• To minimize air movement from the WHB to the waste shaft

The ventilation systems include instrumentation to the following operating parameters:

• Pressure drop across each prefilter and HEPA filter bank

• Air flow rates at selected points

• Pressure differentials surrounding areas of high potential for contamination levels

The operation of the supply and exhaust fans is controlled by interlocks to maintain differential pressuresbetween rooms. The WHB exhaust fans and controls can be supplied by backup power in the event thatnormal power is interrupted.

2.6.3.2 WHB CH and RH Waste Handling Area Ventilation Systems

The CH and RH waste handling areas are supplied by separate, independent ventilation systems, shownon schematic flow diagrams, Figures 2.6-1 through 2.6-3. The RH portion of the WHB has twoventilation systems, one for the RH bay and the other for the hot cell complex. Each system maintainspressure differential between areas of low potential for airborne radioactive material and those of higherpotential. The RH bay ventilation system has HEPA filters located in the WHB mechanical equipmentroom, while the hot cell complex ventilation system HEPA filters are located in a room adjacent to thelower hot cell. The hot cell ventilation system ensures that the upper hot cell remains at a lower staticpressure than other RH areas of the WHB. The ventilation supply and exhaust systems for each WHBsubsystem supply air to the rooms of the areas served. Each supply air handling unit consists of filters,cooling coils, heating elements, fans with associated duct work, and controls to condition the supply airmaintaining the design temperature during winter and summer. Fan operating status, filter bank pressuredrops, and static pressure differentials are monitored in the CMR. Excess filter pressure drop and loss offlow alarm in the CMR. The filtration system consists of prefilters and HEPA filters sized in accordancewith design air flows utilizing industry standards for maximum efficiency.

The WHB supply and exhaust fans are designed and interlocked to maintain building pressure negativewith respect to atmospheric pressure and maintain the design air flow pattern. During normal operation,if the operating exhaust/supply fan fail, the corresponding supply/exhaust fan is stopped. The standbytrain is started automatically and can also be started manually. In the CH waste handling area, the design of the battery charging area exhaust system limits the buildupof hydrogen to less than four percent as a result of battery recharging operations, and the charging areahas a separate exhaust system with prefilters and HEPA filters. The ventilation system is designed withtwo 100 percent capacity exhaust fans each able to remove air from high points in the forklift batteryrecharging area at a rate sufficient to maintain hydrogen concentration below the lower explosive limits.

During opening of a CH waste shipping package, the TRUDOCK vent hood system locally exhaustsheadspace gas and potential airborne-particulate contamination through an industrial grade HEPA filterprior to exhausting air into the WHB ventilation exhaust.


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The Station C effluent sampling system continuously samples the air discharged from the WHB exhaustvent downstream of HEPA filtration.

Tornado dampers, constructed to withstand the DBE and DBT, are installed in all HVAC inlet andexhaust openings in the WHB. Tornado dampers are also located in the ventilation exhaust in the threeentrance airlocks to the CH bay. Dampers installed in the air intakes open in the same direction as thenormal airflow and close automatically to prevent reversal of flow. Dampers in exhaust air openingsopen against the direction of normal airflow and are held open by springs. When tornado pressure on theopen damper blades overcomes the spring tension, the blades close. In the event of a tornado, the WHBtornado dampers will automatically close to prevent the outward rush of air caused by a rapid drop inatmospheric pressure. Damper closure mitigates damage to HEPA filters from a potential high.differential pressure.

In case of an off-site power failure, the capability exists to selectively switch one exhaust fan to thebackup power system in order to continue to exhaust air in the designed flow pattern.

Sufficient remote instrumentation is provided enabling the operator to monitor equipment from the CMR. The monitored parameters include fan operating status, filter bank pressure drop, and static pressuredifferential in areas of the WHB. Filter differential pressure is displayed locally as well as in the CMRvia the CMS. An alarm for a pressure drop indicating filter replacement is needed actuates at apredetermined level across the HEPA filters. For those HEPA filters which are on-line continuously inthe WHB, the CMS monitors prefilter and HEPA filter pressure differential.

Instruments and system components are accessible for, and will be subject to, periodic testing andinspection during normal plant operation.

All nuclear grade HEPA filter banks are tested for conformance with ANSI N510, Standard for Testingof Nuclear Air Cleaning Systems,40 and have a 99.97 percent removal efficiency (SDD HV00, Heating,Ventilation and Air Conditioning System).41

2.6.3.3 WHB Mechanical Equipment Room Ventilation System

The mechanical equipment room is maintained at a pressure slightly below atmospheric to minimizeleakage of room air, which may contain airborne radioactive contaminants. Negative pressure ismaintained by the same exhaust fan systems that exhaust air from the CH and RH waste handling areas.

2.6.3.4 WHB Waste Shaft Hoist Tower Ventilation System

The ventilation system provides filtration of supply air, unit heaters to prevent equipment from freezing,and a unit cooler to provide supplementary cooling of equipment in summer. Exhaust air flow is downthrough the tower and into the waste shaft, where it combines with incoming air from the waste shaftauxiliary air intake tunnel as shown in Figure 2.6-3.

A pressurization system serves the airlock to the crane maintenance room and pressurizes the airlockpreventing the release of potentially contaminated air from the crane maintenance room to the accesscorridor.

2.6.3.5 Exhaust Filter Building Ventilation System

A schematic flow diagram of the EFB ventilation system is shown in Figure 2.6-4. The EFB supports theoperation of the underground ventilation system and contains the underground ventilation system HEPA


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filters. The function of the ventilation system in the EFB, major components, operating characteristics,safety considerations, and controls, are similar to the CH waste handling area in the WHB. Each supplyair handling unit in the EFB consists of prefilters, an electric heating coil, and a fan to condition the air,as required to maintain the design temperature. The EFB ventilation system exhausts air from allpotentially contaminated areas of the building through two filter housings, each containing a bank ofprefilters and two stages of HEPA filters, and two exhaust fans before discharging to the atmosphere. The EFB exhaust air is discharged to the underground exhaust duct so that it can be monitored forairborne radioactive contaminants.

2.6.3.6 Central Monitoring Room Ventilation System

The CMR is located in the Support Building. The CMR ventilation system provides a suitableenvironment for personnel occupancy under normal and HEPA filtration operation and maintains aslightly positive pressure in the CMR. The CMR has features to allow its use during both normal andemergency conditions including two-hour fire walls, redundant ventilation systems, supply and exhaustsystems capable of being manually connected to the backup electrical power system, and a manual shiftto HEPA filtration of intake air. Major components of the CMR HVAC system include supply airhandling units that contain fans, cooling coils, filters, air cooled condensing units, and duct heaters, andexhaust-return fans, booster fans, HEPA filter units, instrumentation, and controls. The CMR is servedby two 100 percent capacity air handling units. One is in service and one is in standby status. Thestandby unit will automatically start in the event the operating unit fails. The schematic air flow diagramfor the CMR HVAC system is shown in Figure 2.6-5.

2.6.3.7 Underground Ventilation System

The underground ventilation system serves the WIPP underground to provide acceptable workingconditions and a life-sustaining environment during normal operations and off normal events includingwaste handling accidents. In the event of a breach of waste containers the underground ventilationsystem provides confinement of radioactivity. The underground ventilation system is designed as anexhausting system that maintains the working environment below atmospheric pressure (Figures 2.6-6and 2.6-7). The design and operation of the underground ventilation system meets or exceeds the criteriaspecified by 30 CFR Part 5717 and the New Mexico Mine Safety Code for All Mines.42 The undergroundmine ventilation is designed to supply sufficient quantities of air to all areas of the repository. Operationof diesel equipment in the underground is subject to minimum air flow requirements for each piece ofequipment operated.

Underground ventilation is divided into four separate flow paths supporting the waste disposal area, theconstruction area, north area, and the waste shaft station. The waste disposal, construction and northareas receive their air supply from common sources, the AIS and the salt handling shaft. The wastedisposal area receives its supply air from the construction supply air at West 30 and South 1000 as shownin Figure 2.4-10. The waste shaft station receives its air supply from the waste shaft and associatedauxiliary air intake and is separated from the other three circuits by bulkheads, overcasts, and airlocks. The bulkheads, overcasts, and airlocks are of noncombustible construction except for flexible flashingused to accommodate salt movement. All four air circuits combine near the exhaust shaft, which acts asthe common discharge from the underground.

A pressure differential is maintained between the construction circuit and the waste disposal circuit toensure that any leakage is towards the disposal circuit. The pressure differential is produced by thesurface fans in conjunction with the underground air regulators. Pressure differentials across selectedbulkheads between ventilation circuits are monitored from the CMR.


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The underground ventilation system consists of six centrifugal exhaust fans, three main fans in thenormal flow path and three smaller fans in the filtration flow path, two identical HEPA filter assembliesarranged in parallel, isolation and back draft dampers, filter bypass arrangement, and associatedductwork.

The main fans are used during normal operation to provide a nominal underground flow of 425,000 scfm(standard cubic feet of air per minute). One main fan can be operated to provide a nominal flow of260,000 scfm. The main fans are located near the exhaust shaft. The smaller filtrations fans are rated at60,000 scfm each and are located at the EFB. During filtration operations only one filtration fan is inservice and all other main and filtration fans are stopped and isolated. Any one of the three filtration fansis capable of delivering 100 percent of the design 60,000 scfm flow rate with the HEPA filters at theirmaximum pressure drop. Two of the three filtration fans can also be operated, with the HEPA systembypassed, to provide other underground ventilation requirements, when needed.

The underground ventilation system is operated as follows:

Normal Mode - During normal operation, five different levels of ventilation can be established to providefive different air flow quantities.

• Normal Ventilation: Two main exhaust fans operating to provide a nominal flow of425,000 scfm unfiltered

• Alternate Ventilation: One main exhaust fan operating to provide a nominal flow of260,000 scfm unfiltered

• Reduced Ventilation: Two filtration fans operating as ventilation fans to provide a nominal flowof 60,000 scfm each unfiltered

• Minimum Ventilation: One filtration fan operating as a ventilation fan to provide a nominal flowof 60,000 scfm unfiltered

• Maintenance Ventilation: Simultaneous operation of one or two main ventilation fans with oneor two of the filtration fans in support of flow calibration and maintenance activities

Filtration Mode - This mode mitigates the consequences of a waste handling accident by providing aHEPA filtered air exhaust path from the underground and also reducing the air flow. Filtration isactivated automatically on a high radiation signal from one of the CAMs in the exhaust of the activedisposal room, or manually by the CMR operator, through the CMS, when notified of a waste handlingevent underground. During shift to filtration the main exhaust fans are shut down and their associatedisolation dampers close slowly, between 60 and 90 seconds, to minimize the effects of any pressure pulseback through the system.

In the filtration mode, the underground exhaust air passes through two identical filter assemblies. Eachfilter assembly consists of two banks of prefilters and two banks of HEPA filters arranged in series; and,each assembly will handle 50 percent of the filtered mode air flow or nominally 30,000 cfm (cubic feetper minute) each. The filters remove airborne radioactive particulates that may result from a breach ofwaste containers before the air is discharged through the exhaust stack to the atmosphere.

The operating status of the exhaust fans are displayed in the CMR and provisions to switch to filtrationare provided. An alarm for excessive pressure drop across the filters is actuated at a predetermined level. Filter differential pressure is displayed locally and in the CMR. Instruments and system components are


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accessible for periodic testing and inspection during normal plant operation. Under normal operatingconditions, the ventilation system functions continuously. Operation of the underground ventilationsystem is detailed in the WP 04-VU series facility operations procedures.43

If the normal flow of 425,000 scfm is not available, underground operations may proceed, but the numberof activities that can be performed in parallel may be limited depending on the quantity of air available. The underground ventilation system filtration fans can be connected to the backup power supply, one at atime, in the event that normal power is lost. Changeover to backup power is manual, although, the fanisolation dampers fail to the filtration position on loss of power.

The bulkheads, overcasts, airlocks and ventilation regulators within bulkheads used to segregate theunderground ventilation circuits are made of noncombustible material, except for flexible flashing usedto accommodate salt movement, in accordance with 30 CFR Part 57,17 and can support the maximumpressure differential that could occur under normal operating conditions. These structures are designed,installed, and maintained in such a manner to accommodate ground deformation due to salt creep. Bulkheads and airlocks are constructed by erecting framing of rectangular steel tubing and screwinggalvanized sheet metal to the framing. Figure 2.6-8 shows a typical bulkhead with an air flow regulatorinstalled. To accommodate salt creep, bulkheads and airlocks use telescoping extensions, attached to theroof and flexible flashing attached to the salt to provide a seal.

Approximately 140,000 actual cfm is normally supplied to the disposal area and is adequate to supplythree active rooms in a panel during operations.

Approximately 35,000 scfm is required in each active room in a panel. This quantity of air supports thepersonnel and diesel equipment expected to be operating in the area, and meets or exceeds the minimumair velocity of 60 fpm (ft per minute) per disposal room as specified in the WIPP Mine Ventilation Plan(00CD-0001).44 Disposal rooms that are filled and isolated, or rooms that are not in use do not require aspecific airflow.

Air is routed through the individual disposal rooms within a panel using underground bulkheads and airregulators. Ventilation is maintained only in active rooms within a disposal panel. Once a disposal roomis filled, it is closed against entry and isolated from the mine ventilation system by constructingbarricades at each end, as shown in Figure 2.5-37. Barricades typically consist of chainlink that is boltedto the salt and covered with brattice cloth. There is no requirement to ventilate filled rooms. After allrooms within a panel are filled, the panel will be closed, using a closure system described in Section2.5.4.4.

2.6.3.8 Underground Ventilation Disposal/Mining Air Flows

The waste is unloaded from the waste hoist at the waste shaft station. From there it is moved eastthrough S-400 to E-140, then south through E-140, then east or west through the cross drift leading to theactive disposal panel where it is disposed.

The fresh air from the waste shaft flows through S400 to the exhaust shaft with some diverted into E-140and returned to S-400 by ducts and fans. Supply air from the air intake shaft and the salt handling shaftflows south through W-30 until it is split at W-30/S-1000 by a bulkhead and regulator. The wastedisposal supply air flows through E-140, into the active disposal panel, through the active disposal roomand returns to the exhaust shaft via E-300. The construction supply air flows through W-30 to the panelbeing mined, ventilates the working face (where the continuous miner is excavating salt), flows out of thepanel through a regulator that routes the construction exhaust air to the exhaust shaft via E-300 andthrough W-170 where it merges with the disposal area exhaust air. The construction and disposal supply


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air drifts (W-30 and E-140) are separated from each other by bulkheads and airlocks, the disposal exhaustair (E-300) and supply air (E-140) are separated from each other by bulkheads and overcasts, while theconstruction supply air drift (W-30) and exhaust air drift (W-170) are separated from each other bybulkheads. Hot work or work involving the use of flammable gas or flammable compressed gas cylindersis not performed in E-140, nor at any bulkhead or overcast in or adjacent to E-140 during waste handling.

Currently, with waste disposal occurring in panel 3 and panel 4 in the construction (mining) ventilation circuit, an overcast in E-300 at S-3080 allows the disposal supply air to be directed towards the panel 3waste face through S-3080, disposal supply air drift for panel 3. A bulkhead in E-140 at S-3300 blocksthe disposal supply air from entering panel 4, forcing it into S-3080. South of the overcast (in E-300 atS-3200), a regulator allows a portion of the construction exhaust air into the disposal exhaust through theovercast in E-300 at S-3080, with the remainder of the construction exhaust air directed into W-170. Apictorial of this underground ventilation configuration is shown in Figure 2.4-10.

When mining is completed in panel 4, panel 4 will be added to the disposal ventilation circuit andremoved from the construction ventilation circuit. Mining will begin in panel 5 which is located in theconstruction ventilation circuit. In order to accomplish the changes in ventilation circuits, severalchanges in bulkheads, regulators, and overcasts will occur. The bulkhead in E-140 at S-3300 will beremoved to allow disposal supply air into S-3650 and a bulkhead installed in S-3650 at E-50 to blockpanel 5 construction exhaust air from entering panel 4. The regulator in E-300 at S-3300 will be removedand a regulator installed in S-3310 at E-50. An overcast will be installed in S-3310 at E-140. Theregulator in S-3310 at E-50 will allow a portion of panel 5 construction exhaust air into the disposalexhaust air circuit. The overcast will separate the construction exhaust air from the disposal supply air inE-140. A pictorial of this underground ventilation configuration is shown in Figure 2.4-10A.

2.6.3.9 Natural Ventilation Pressure

The air flow in the underground is normally driven by the negative pressure induced by the main fans. There can be a second pressure resulting from the difference in density between the air entering andleaving the repository which can influence air flow. This phenomenon is called the natural ventilationpressure (NVP). It is experienced on days when outside temperatures are either very hot or very cold.

Hot Weather NVP - During hot weather, the air going down to the underground is warmer and lessdense than the air returning from the underground. This lighter air has a natural tendency to resist beingdrawn down into the repository. Hence in hot weather there is negative NVP which opposes the fanpressure. This reduces the flow down the AIS and salt handling shaft. It also reduces the differentialpressures between the waste shaft station, waste disposal area, and the other areas. The air in the wasteshaft will be cooler than that in the AIS and salt handling shaft, which further reduces the waste shaftstation to West-30 differential pressure.

Under ordinary operating conditions, the pressure in West-30 is higher (less negative), than the pressureat the waste shaft station in South-400. On very hot days, exceeding 100°F, the reduction of thisdifferential pressure caused by the negative NVP can result in the pressure in South-400 being higherthan in West-30. Without corrective actions, this would allow air flow from the waste shaft station to theconstruction air circuit.

Cold Weather NVP - During cold weather, the air going down to the underground is colder and denser,heavier, than the air returning from the underground. This denser, colder air has a natural tendency tosink down the AIS and salt handling shaft. In cold weather there is a positive NVP which augments thefan pressure. This increases the air flow down the intake shafts, reduces the fan suction pressure,constant flow control, and increases the differential pressure between the waste shaft station, waste


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disposal area, and the other areas. On extreme cold weather days, a portion of the air entering theunderground through the AIS and salt handling shaft may be the result of a positive NVP. This air isentering the repository without the aid of the mechanical fans. The fans in turn reduce their operatingpressure because they are receiving a sufficient and constant volume of air. Up-casting of the air in thewaste shaft can occur if the situation is not corrected.

The air feeding the waste shaft comes primarily from the auxiliary air intake tunnel, partly from leakageinto the waste hoist tower, and partly from the WHB. The result is that the air feeding the waste shafttends to be warmer than the surface air feeding the AIS. The reduction in fan pressure, coupled with thewarmer air in the waste shaft is only under alternate, reduced, and minimum ventilation modes.

Administrative action is required to adjust the underground ventilation configuration to avoid reverseflow in the waste shaft. They include:

• Start second main exhaust fan (normal ventilation)

• Open the regulator to the waste shaft station

• Cover the AIS and/or the salt handling shaft on the surface

• Close the regulators to the construction, waste disposal and north circuits

A pressure chamber has been constructed at bulkhead 74-B-309 on the west side of the waste shaftstation to ensure that leakage from the waste shaft station to the construction ventilation circuit does notoccur. The pressure chamber is manually activated whenever waste handling is occurring in the wasteshaft and/or waste shaft station, and differential pressure between South-400 and West-30 is low. Thechamber is pressurized by six high-pressure fans. The fans are operated in various combinations toprovide the air flow necessary to maintain the pressure buffer. As a secondary backup system, pressurewill be supplied by an actuated valve on a plant air pressurized line. The valve will be controlled toregulate the flow of air into the chamber and maintain pressure differentials. The pressure inside thechamber is monitored to ensure that it is sufficient to prevent air flow reversal even if the differentialpressure from South-400 to West-30, which is also monitored, is in the wrong direction or positive NVPis sufficient to cause waste shaft reversal. Bulkhead 74-B-309 is constructed of metal.


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Figure 2.6-1, WHB and TRUPACT Maintenance Facility


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Figure 2.6-1a, WHB CH HVAC Flow Diagram


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Figure 2.6-2, WHB RH HVAC Flow Diagram


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Figure 2.6-2a, WHB RH HVAC Flow Diagram


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Figure 2.6-3, Waste Shaft/Hoist Tower HVAC Flow Diagram


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Figure 2.6-4, EFB HVAC Flow Diagram


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Figure 2.6-5, Support Building CMR HVAC Flow Diagram


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Figure 2.6-6, Underground Ventilation Air Flow Diagram


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Figure 2.6-7, Main Fan and Exhaust Filter System Schematic


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Figure 2.6-8, Typical Bulkhead Design and Components


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2.7 Support Systems

2.7.1 Radiation Monitoring System

The radiation monitoring system includes five subsystems to ensure radiation protection of plantpersonnel and the surrounding environment under normal operation, off-normal events, and recoveryfrom off-normal events. The subsystems are the CAM system, the fixed air sampling (FAS) system, thearea radiation monitoring (ARM) system, the radioactive effluent air monitoring (REMS) system, and theplant vacuum system. The radiation monitoring system is described in system design description SDDRM00, Radiation Monitoring.45

Signals are provided to the CMS to provide continuous display or log alarm status for selected radiationmonitors. Status of the plant vacuum system is also available at the CMR. CAMs located on theTRUDOCKs are operated when CH waste containers are being removed from the shipping container. Inthe underground, CAMs sample air exhausted from an active RH or CH emplacement room and caninitiate a shift to filtration should airborne radiation be detected.

ARMs are only installed in the RH portion of the WHB. FASs are installed throughout the WHB and atselected locations in the underground. FASs in the WHB are connected to plant vacuum and theunderground FASs have their own local vacuum pumps.

The plant vacuum system provides a centrally located vacuum source that is used to draw air throughfilters that collect potentially radioactive particulates. The system supplies the vacuum source for CAMsand FASs located in the CH and RH waste handling areas of the WHB and Support Building. The CAMsand FASs not connected to the plant vacuum system are equipped with their own vacuum pumps. Thevacuum system operating pumps and parameters are displayed in the CMR.

REMS are installed on the WHB ventilation exhaust downstream of the HEPA filters (Station C), and onthe underground ventilation system exhaust both upstream (Station A) and downstream (Station B) of theHEPA filters. The REMS consist of sampling equipment including a pump, flow controller, sampleholder, and delivery piping. Station C is located on the second floor of the WHB. Station C samples theWHB exhaust downstream of the HEPA filters associated with both the RH and CH portions of thebuilding. The underground exhaust effluent monitoring system is composed of Station A and Station B. Station A is located over the underground ventilation system exhaust elbow at the surface and samplesusing probes that extend 21 ft below the elbow in the exhaust shaft. Station B samples from a pointdownstream from the underground ventilation system main fans and HEPA filters. Figure 2.4-8 showsthe location of both Station A and Station B. Station A contains three sampling skids each splitting thesample and directing the air into three air samplers per skid. Station B contains two sampling skids eachsplitting the sample and directing the air into three air samplers per skid. The effluent samplers collectperiodic confirmatory particulate samples from the total volume of air being discharged to demonstratecompliance with the mandated regulatory requirements contained in 40 CFR Part 191, Subpart A;46 and40 CFR Part 61, Subpart H.47


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2.7.2 Fire Protection System

The WIPP fire protection system is designed to ensure personnel safety, mission continuity, and propertyconservation. Building designs incorporate features for fire prevention. The plant design meets theimproved risk level of protection defined in DOE O 420.1B2 and satisfies applicable sections of theNFPA codes, DOE Orders, and federal codes described in WSMS-WIPP-06-0001, Fire Hazard AnalysisWaste Isolation Pilot Plant.?

The WIPP fire protection system design, as described in SDD FP00, Fire Protection System,49

incorporates the following features:

• Most buildings and their support structures are protected by fixed, automatic fire suppressionsystems designed to the individual hazards of each area. The WHB, Support Building, andTMF have wet pipe sprinkler systems. The TMF sprinklers are supplied by the WHB sprinklersystem.

• Noncombustible construction, fireproof masonry construction, and fire resistant materials areused whenever possible.

• Fire separations are installed where required because of different occupancies per the UniformBuilding Code.

• In multistory buildings, vertical openings are protected by enclosing stairways, elevators,pipeways, electrical penetrations, etc., to prevent fire from spreading to upper floors. The wastehoist tower is an exception and has an open path from the hoist tower to the bottom of the wasteshaft to accommodate the hoist ropes.

• A combustible loading control program is in place to minimize the accumulation ofcombustibles within the WHB, the area between the Support Building and the WHB, the wastetransport path in the underground, and the active waste disposal room.

• The area within the Property Protected Area security fence is either paved or graveled withminimal vegetation. A gravel road parallels the Property Protected Area perimeter securityfence, which acts as a fire break in the event of a wild land fire. Several features outside theperimeter security fence also serve as fire breaks and include the salt pile to the north, pondareas to collect rain runoff to the north, east and south, a paved parking area and access road tothe west, and berms and the electrical switch yard to the east.

The WHB and underground exhaust ventilation systems which remove hot fire gases, toxic contaminants,explosive gases, and smoke are designed with a high fire integrity.

The components of the electrical service and distribution system are listed by Underwriters Laboratories,or approved by the Factory Mutual Engineering Corporation (FMEC), and are installed to minimizepossible ignition of combustible material and maximize safety.

Adequate provisions for the safe exit of personnel are available for all potential fire occurrences withevacuation alarm signals provided throughout occupied areas. Building evacuation plans help ensure thesafe evacuation of building occupants during emergency conditions. The WIPP emergency managementprogram, as set out in WP 12-9, WIPP Emergency Management Program,50 contains the undergroundemergency procedures, the underground evacuation routes, and the designated assembly areas.


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Additionally, firefighting support is available from the Hobbs and Carlsbad, New Mexico, firedepartments.

The WIPP fire protection system consists of four subsystems: • Fire water supply and distribution system

• Fire suppression system

• Fire detection and alarm system

• Radio fire alarm reporter system

2.7.2.1 Fire Water Supply and Distribution System

The fire water supply and distribution system consists of two fire pumps and a pressure maintenance(jockey) pump located in the water pump house shown on Figure 2.4-1, and a compound loop yarddistribution system. One fire pump is electric motor driven and the other pump is diesel engine driven. Both pumps are rated for 1,500 gallons per minute at 125 psi (pounds per square inch). The system isrequired to provide fire water at a rate of 1,500 gallons per minute for two hours for a total of180,000 gallons. All major components of the fire water supply and distribution system are UL-listedand FMEC-approved.

The fire water supply system receives its normal water supply from one of two on-site 180,000 gallonsground-level storage tanks, which are part of the water distribution system. The second tank supplieswater to the domestic/utility water system, which is a separate system from the fire water supply system. The domestic/utility water tank reserves approximately 100,000 gallons of water for use as fire water ifthe need arises. Utilization of the domestic/utility tank water by the fire water supply system is achievedby the installation of a suction piping spool piece.

Operation of the two fire pumps and the jockey pump is controlled by distribution system pressurechanges. The pumps are arranged for sequential operation. Under normal conditions, the jockey pumpoperates to maintain the designed system static pressure. Should there be a demand for fire water whichexceeds the capacity of the jockey pump, the fire water demand should cause the system pressure to dropwhich automatically starts the electric fire pump. If the jockey and electric fire pumps cannot maintainsystem pressure, the diesel pump automatically starts.

The yard compound loop distribution system serves all areas of the site by suppling fire water to allfacilities containing a sprinkler system and to the fire hydrants, located at approximately 300-ft intervals,throughout the site. The system contains numerous sectionalizing and control valves, which are locked,and visually checked monthly.

2.7.2.2 Fire Detection and Alarm System

The fire detection and alarm system consists of multiple systems, each utilizing most or all of thefollowing components: heat sensing fire detectors, smoke detectors, sprinkler system water flow alarmdevices, manual fire alarm systems, control panels, and audible and visual warning devices. A completedescription of the type of fire suppression system provided at each WIPP surface structure and theunderground is provided in the WIPP Fire Hazard Analysis Report? and the SDD-FP00.49


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2.7.2.3 Radio Fire Alarm Reporter System

The radio fire alarm reporter system provides fire alarm and system trouble annunciations in the CMRfor structures not connected to the CMS local processing units. This system consists of radio transmittersthat transmit alarm and trouble signals via an FMEC signal to a central base station/receiver.

2.7.2.4 Fire Suppression System

The fire suppression system consists of several different fire extinguishing systems or equipment thatservice the surface buildings and facilities and the underground areas. These may include any one ormore of the following fire extinguishing capabilities: automatic wet pipe sprinkler system, fire hoseconnections, automatic dry and wet chemical extinguishing systems, and portable fire extinguishers. Theautomatic wet pipe sprinkler system is the primary suppression system for fire protection at the WIPP sitefor surface structures.

The availability of fire-protection water at each sprinkler system is routinely checked as part of thesurveillance requirement for each system. Should the fire-protection water distribution system becomeunavailable, adequate measures (e.g., stopping all potential fire-initiating activities at the affectedbuildings and implementing fire watches) are taken to provide a reduced risk of a large fire. Thesuppression system is operable in the absence of electric power due to the heat-rated fusible-linkactuation of the sprinkler heads in the facilities and the diesel driven pump that is part of the fire watersupply and distribution system. The fire suppression system and the fire water supply and distributionsystem are not designed to withstand the effects of a DBE or DBT. The WHB is supplied by three risers,one in the overpack and repair room, one in the RH portion of the WHB and one in the CH bay. TheTMF receives its fire water supply from the suppression portion of the WHB.

The fire suppression system inside the WHB and the Support Building includes the main drain,instrumentation, an alarm valve, a water flow detection device, a water motor gong, an isolation valve,and a fire department connection, distribution piping with installed fusible sprinklers, valving, and aninspectors test connection. A portion of the CH bay is supplied from the portion of the suppressionsystem in the overpack and repair room. The TMF, supplied from the suppression system in the WHB, isequipped with distribution piping with installed fusible sprinklers, valving, a flow switch, an inspectorstest connection, and an isolation valve and associated drain.

Sprinkler systems are maintained full of water and pressurized by the fire water distribution system. When a fire occurs, the heat produced will cause one or more sprinklers in the area to actuate causingwater to flow. The sprinkler system will continue to flow until it is shut off manually.

The underground does not have a distributed fire suppression system, however, all diesel powered mobileequipment is equipped with hand-held fire extinguishers and an onboard dry chemical fire suppressionsystem. Mobile electrical equipment such as golf carts have hand-held fire extinguishers. For dieselpowered waste handling equipment, the fire suppression system is automatic with manual initiationcapability. Mining equipment has the manual system with the automatic system installed on selectedpieces of equipment. The underground fuel station, located in the construction exhaust entry, has anautomatic dry chemical system installed.

2.7.2.5 Fire Protection System Design, Installation, Testing and Maintenance

The following NFPA standards apply at WIPP:


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• The fire water supply and distribution system is designed, installed, tested, and maintainedaccording to NFPA 20, Standard for the Installation of Centrifugal Fire Pumps51; NFPA 24,Standard for the Installation of Private Fire Service Mains and Their Appurtenances52; andNFPA 25, Standard for the Inspection, Testing, and Maintenance of Water-Based FireProtection Systems.53

• The automatic wet pipe sprinkler systems are designed, installed, tested, and maintained inaccordance with NFPA 13, Standard for the Installation of Sprinkler Systems,54 and NFPA 25.53

• The dry and wet chemical fire suppression systems are designed, installed, tested and maintainedin accordance with NFPA 17, Standard for Dry Chemical Extinguishing Systems,55 and 17A,Standard for Wet Chemical Extinguishing Systems,56 respectively.

• The fire detection and alarm systems are designed, installed, tested, and maintained inaccordance with NFPA 70, National Electrical Code,57 and NFPA 72, National Fire Alarm CodeHandbook.58

• The radio fire alarm reporter system is designed, installed, tested, and maintained in accordancewith NFPA 7258 and NFPA 1221, Standard for the Installation, Maintenance, and Use ofEmergency Services Communications Systems.59

2.8 Utility Distribution Systems

2.8.1 Electrical System

The WIPP electrical system is designed to provide normal and backup power, grounding for electricallyenergized equipment and other plant structures, lightning protection for the plant, and illumination for theWIPP surface and underground.

WIPP has standard industrial electrical distribution equipment including medium voltage switchgear andbuses; medium voltage to low voltage step-down unit substations; motor control centers; smalldistribution transformers and panels; relay and protection circuitry; station batteries along withassociated synchronous inverters; diesel generators; and the cabling, enclosures, and other structuresrequired to locate and interconnect these items.

The electrical system is designed to supply power at the following nominal bus voltages:

• 13.8 kVAC (kilovolt alternating current), three-phase, three-wire, 60-Hz - Power supply for themain plant substation, underground switching stations, and surface and underground unitsubstation transformers.

• 4.16 kVAC, three-phase, three-wire, 60 Hz (hertz) - Power supply for the main exhaust fan drivemotors.

• 2.4 kVAC, three-phase, three-wire, 60 Hz - power supply for the drive motor for the motor-generator set, which provides the backup supply for the salt handling shaft drive motor.

• 480/277 VAC, three-phase, four-wire, 60 Hz - power supply for motor control centers, the AISdrive motor, solid state direct current converter systems for the salt handling and waste hoists,underground filtration fans, lighting and power distribution transformers.


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• 120/208 VAC, three-phase, four-wire, 60 Hz - power supply for lighting, utilization equipment,instrumentation, communications, control systems, and small motor-driven equipment.

• 120/208 VAC, three-phase, four wire, 60 Hz - uninterruptible power supply for control andinstrumentation which must be continuously energized under all plant operating modes.

2.8.1.1 Normal Power Source

The WIPP normal power is from a public utility company which supplies electrical power from their115 kV Potash/Kerrmac Junction open wire transmission line from the north and Whitten/Jal substationopen wire line from the south. The north line is approximately 9 miles long, while the south line isapproximately 19 miles long. The Potash Junction and Whitten substations each have two feeders frommultiple generating stations and loss of one generating source does not interrupt power to the WIPP site.

The utility substation at the WIPP site is located east of the PPA. Area substations are located at thevarious surface facilities. Underground conduits, cable duct banks, and buried cables connect the plantsubstation with the area substations.

2.8.1.2 Backup Power Source

In case of a loss of utility power, backup power to selected loads can be supplied by either of the two on-site 1,100 kW (kilowatt) diesel generators. The generators provide reliable 480-VAC power to theloads listed in Table 2.8-1. Backup power is fed through buses A and B (Figure 2.8-1). Each of thediesel generators can furnish power for preselected CMS loads, to operate the AIS hoist for undergroundpersonnel evacuation, and other selected backup loads in accordance with procedures in the WP 04-EDseries facility operations procedures.60 The on-site total fuel storage capacity is sufficient for theoperation of one diesel generator at full load for one day, and additional fuel supplies are readilyavailable within a few hours by tank truck allowing on-line refueling and continued operation.

Facility operations personnel manually start the diesel generators within 30 minutes of loss of normalpower. The diesel generators can be started from either the control panel on each diesel or from theCMR. Only one diesel may be loaded at a time (Air Quality Permit No. 310-M-2).61 Monitoring of thediesel generators and associated breakers is possible at the CMR, thus providing the ability to energizeselected loads from the backup power source, in sequence, without exceeding generator capacity.

The diesel generators and their load center are located outside between the Safety and EmergencyServices Building and EFB. A backup 480-VAC indoor switchgear is located in the main electrical roomin the Support Building. Area substations are located at various surface facilities.

Operation of backup power supplies and the selection of loads is addressed in the WP 04-ED seriesfacility operations procedures.60

2.8.1.3 Uninterruptible Power Supply

The central UPS, located in the Support Building, provides transient-free, reliable 120/208-VAC powerto the essential loads, listed in Table 2.8-2, in the Support Building and WHB. This ensures continuouspower to the radiation detection system for airborne contamination and area radiation monitoring, localprocessing units (LPUs), computer room, CMR, and primary analytical chemistry laboratory instruments,even during the interval between the loss of off-site power and initiation of backup diesel generatorpower. Additional UPSs provide transient-free power to strategically located LPUs for the radiationmonitoring system on the surface, in selected areas in the exhaust shaft, and underground passages and


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waste disposal areas. In case of loss of AC power input to the UPSs, the dedicated batteries can supplypower to a fully loaded UPS for 30 minutes.

2.8.1.4 Lightning Protection and Grounding

The WIPP lightning protection system uses the plant ground system and consists of lightning arresterslocated at select substations and a lightning dissipation system. The lightning dissipation system usespole mounted arrays, which encircle the WIPP fenced area and umbrella arrays, which are mounted ontop or select facilities and hoist headframes. Dissipation arrays are installed over the hoist head framesand WHB. Hemisphere arrays are installed over the EFB and also over the salt shaft and AIS headframes. A conical array is installed over the waste hoist tower. Roof arrays are located along the outerrim of the WHB and between supports on the site perimeter lamp poles. The arrays between siteperimeter lamp poles provide protection to the transportation packages in the parking area prior to beingmoved into WHB for further waste handling activities. The arrays associated with the WHB and wastehoist tower not only protect personnel but protect the waste containers from damage due to a lightningstrike.

The WIPP grounding system uses a resistive grounded electrical system and consists of groundingresistors, a direct buried surface site ground grid, bare copper underground facility ground, facilityground rings, facility ground conductors, ground buses, equipment grounding conductors, bonding andgrounding electrodes. The grounding associated with the utility switch yard is separate from the WIPPsite plant grounding. The lightning protection and grounding systems are discussed in further detail inSDD ED00, Electrical System Design Description.62

2.8.1.5 Safety Considerations and Controls

Failure of the normal distribution system or any of its components will not affect safe conditions of theWIPP facilities. Upon loss of normal off-site power, the EFB isolation valves fail to the filtration mode. The simplified single-line diagram for the normal and manually switched backup loads is shown inFigure 2.8-1.

2.8.2 Compressed Air

The compressed air system is considered BOP. The system is diverse in the types and sizes ofcompressors used, and redundancy is provided for the main plant air compressors, salt hoist house, andthe underground. All are electrically driven except for the diesel powered backup compressor in theunderground.

The WHB and EFB have air dryers. The plant air system ends at these dryers and the instrument airsystem begins. Instrument air is supplied to selected doors in the WHB. Instrument air is used to operatedampers and control systems for the underground ventilation system and HVAC systems in the EFB.

2.8.3 Plant Monitoring and Communications Systems

The plant monitoring and communications systems include on-site and plant-to-off-site coverage and aredesigned to provide immediate instructions to ensure personnel safety, facility safety and security, andefficient operations under normal and emergency conditions. Plant monitoring and communicationssystems include the following:

• CMS


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• Plant communications

– Touch tone phones

– Mine pager phones

– Plant public address (PA) system including alarms and the site notification system

– Radio

– Underground Evacuation Signal System

2.8.3.1 Central Monitoring System

The CMS collects and monitors real time site data, automatically and manually, during normal andemergency conditions. The underground and surface data monitored by the CMS is gathered, processed,stored, logged, and displayed. The data is collected continuously from approximately 1,500 remotesensors.

The CMS is a computer-based monitoring and control system. It is used for real time site data acquisi-tion, display, storage, alarm and logging and for the control of site components. The CMS monitorsselected components from the following systems:

• Radiation monitoring equipment and effluent sampling stations.

• Electrical power distribution status, including backup diesel operation.

• Fire detection and alarm system.

• Ventilation system, including damper position, fan status, flow measurement, and filterdifferential pressure.

• Meteorological data, including wind speed and direction, temperature, and barometric pressure.

• Facility systems, including air compressors, vacuum pumps, and water storage tank levels.

The CMS has five operator work stations, including an engineer's work station, which display: alarms,status, trends, graphics, and interactive operations. There are two operator work stations and anengineer's work station located in the CMR, two operator work stations in the computer room, and theCMS backup operator work station is located in the security control room. The CMS electronic datastorage devices are located in the computer room adjacent to the CMR. The CMS sources of ACelectrical power include an UPS, with a minimum of 30 minutes' backup power, and the diesel generatorused to power priority loads (including the CMR).

2.8.3.2 Plant Communications

The touch-tone phone system includes a private automatic branch exchange network providingconventional on-site and off-site telephone services. Major uses of this subsystem include the reportingof occurrences (DOE O 231.1A, Environment, Safety and Health Reporting)63 and communicationsbetween the CMR and other plant or security personnel or the Emergency Operations Center (EOC).

The mine pager phones are an independent, hard-wired, battery-operated system for communicationsthroughout the underground and between the surface and underground. Mine pager phones are locatedthroughout the underground and in surface structures to support daily operations and emergencies.


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Surface locations include, but are not limited to the hoists, the CMR and the facility shift manager's deskin the Support Building, and the EOC and the mine rescue room of the Safety Building.

The plant PA and alarm systems provide for the initiation of surface and underground evacuation alarmsand PA announcements from the CMR and local stations. The plant PA and alarm systems includes thesite-wide PA and intercom installations and the site notification system for remote locations. Thesealarms are supplied with backup power if the off-site power supply fails. The PA system master controlconsole is located in the CMR, with paging stations located in the Support Building, WHB, water pumphouse, Guard and Security Building, salt shaft hoist house and headframe, EFB, Safety Building,Engineering Building, warehouse, shops, and underground.

The underground evacuation signal is separate from the public address system and includes electric hornsand strobe lights. An underground evacuation signal is initiated automatically by an underground firealarm signal via the CMS or manually by the CMR operator or from pushbuttons in the salt handlingshaft hoist house and waste shaft hoist control room. The underground evacuation signal is reset fromany of the three manual pushbutton stations.

Radio includes two-way and paging on-site and off-site radio systems. These systems include basestations in the CMR, security control room, emergency operations center, and mobile and portable units.

The plant communication equipment is not designed to withstand the effects of a DBE or DBT.


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Table 2.8-1, Diesel Generator Loads

Manually Switched Backup

Loads kW Remarks

Uninterruptible power system CMS WHBCAMs

72 Priority backup loads.

CMR HVAC system utilities 20 Priority backup loads.

Fire protection systems in the WHB andSupport Building

30 Battery power is provided in fireprotection system until the dieselgenerator is started and loaded.

Fire pump 160

Communications systems 16

Guard & Security Building 35

AIS hoist (if necessary for undergroundevacuation)

330 The diesel generators load isreduced to 900 kW prior tooperating the AIS hoist.

WHB lighting 45

WHB cranes 80 After the diesel generator is startedcranes are energized as required toland their loads.

WHB vacuum pumps 50

Main air compressors (1-200 hp) 160

Underground exhaust fans (1-235 hp) 188 Priority backup loads.

WHB fans 100 Priority backup loads.

Underground experiments by offsitecontractors

400

Safety & Emergency Services Building 10 Priority backup load.


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Table 2.8-2, UPS Loads

LOAD ON CENTRAL UPS

C Radiological monitoring system (ARM and CAM)

C Central monitoring system - CMS equipment in the SupportBuilding and WHB

C Communication system in WHB and Support Building

C Seismic trip in WHB

C Network computers and equipment in the Support Buildingcomputer room

Total connected load

Running load88 kW

30 kW

Loads on Individual UPS Units

C CMS equipment in facilities other than WHB and SupportBuildings

C Selected surface and underground radiological monitoringunits

C Emergency Operations Center and Safety and EmergencyServices Facility Guard and Security Building

C Safety communication and alarm system in facilities otherthan WHB and Support Building

Total independent backup system load 66 kVAC


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Figure 2.8-1, Electrical Distribution System


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2.9 Auxiliary Systems and Support Facilities

2.9.1 Water Distribution System

The water distribution system is designed to receive water from a commercial water department,transport the water to the WIPP site, provide storage for the required reserve of fire water, chlorinate andstore domestic water, and distribute domestic water for use by site personnel and processes. The waterpump house contains the fire water pumps, the domestic water pumps, and the water chlorinationequipment.

2.9.2 Sewage Treatment System

The sewage treatment facility is a zero-discharge facility consisting of two primary settling lagoons, twopolishing lagoons, and three evaporation basins. The entire facility is lined with synthetic liners and isdesigned to dispose of domestic sewage as well as site generated brine waters from observation wells andthe dewatering of mine shafts.


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1. DOE O 6430, General Design Criteria Manual for Department of Energy Facilities, June 10,1981, draft (For reference only, superceded by DOE O 420.1 B and DOE O 430.1A).

2. DOE O 420.1B, Facility Safety, December 2005.

3. DOE O 430.1B, Real Property Asset Management, September 2003.

4. DOE G 420.1-1, Nonreactor Nuclear Safety Design Criteria and Explosives Safety CriteriaGuide for use with DOE O 420.1, Facility Safety, March 2000.

5. GPDD, General Plant Design Description (GPDD).

6. WP 13-1, Washington TRU Solutions LLC Quality Assurance Program Description

7. WP 09-CN3005, Graded Approach to Application of QA Controls.

8. Public Law 102-579, Waste Isolation Pilot Plant Land Withdrawal Act, U.S. Congress,October 1992 [as amended by Public Law 104-201].

9. 46 Federal Register 9162, Record of Decision, Waste Isolation Pilot Plant, U.S. Department ofEnergy, January 28, 1981.

10. DOE/NTP-96-1204, National Transuranic Waste Management Plan.

11. DOE/EIS-0026-S-2, WIPP Disposal Phase Final Supplemental Environmental Impact Statement,September, 1997.

12. DOE/WIPP 02-3122, Contact-Handled Transuranic Waste Acceptance Criteria for the WasteIsolation Pilot Plant, Rev. 4.0, December 2005.

13. DOE/WIPP-06-3174, Remote-Handled (RH) Waste Handling Documented Safety Analysis.

14. NFPA 220, Standard on Types of Building Construction.

15. Plant Buildings, Facilities, and Miscellaneous Equipment (CF00-GC00) System DesignDescription (SDD).

16. Waste Handling System (WH00) System Design Description (SDD).

17. 30 CFR Part 57, "Safety and Health Standards - Underground Metal and Nonmetal Mines,"8th edition, 1994.

18. ANSI M11.1, "American National Standard for Wire Rope Mines.'

19. MSHA- 30 CFR §57.19021, "Minimum Rope Strength"

20. Underground Hoisting System Design Description (SDD-UH00).

21. DOE/WIPP 86-010, Waste Isolation Pilot Plant Design Validation Final Report.


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22. WP 04-AU1007, Underground Openings Inspections.

23. DOE/WIPP 02-3212, Ground Control Annual Plan for the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant.

24. DOE/WIPP 93-033, The Current Bases for Roof Fall Prediction at WIPP and a Preliminary|Prediction for SPDV Room 2, October 1993.|

25. 40 CFR §191.14, Subparagraph (d), "Assurance Requirements," December 1993.

26. 40 CFR §194.44, "Engineered Barriers," February 1996.

27. DOE-STD-1066-99, Fire Protection Design Criteria.|

28. Hazardous Waste Facility Permit No. NM4890139088-TSDF, issued by the New Mexico|Environment Department (as amended).|

|29. DOE/WIPP 96-2150, Detailed Design Report for an Operational Phase Panel Closure System,|

1996.||

30. Design Report for a Revised Panel Closure System at the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant, Revision 1,|RockSol Consulting Group, Inc., October 2002.|

|31. Letter Golder Associates, Inc. to Washington TRU Solutions LLC, “Early Time Generation of|

Methane and Hydrogen in Filled Panels at the WIPP”, November 30, 2006.||

32. Letter Washington TRU Solutions LLC, “Estimation of Hydrogen Generation Rates from|Radiolysis in WIPP Panels”, July 2006.|

33. DOE/WIPP 06-3177, Geotechnical Analysis Report for July 2004 - June 2005, April 2006.|

34. 10 CFR §71.17, "General License: NRC-Approved Package," January 2004.

35. NS-05-001, Safety Analysis Calculation for CH DSA Rev. 9 Source Term, Consequences, andSupporting Information, March 2005.

36. CH-TRAMPAC, Rev. 2, NRC Docket Nos. 71-9218 and 71-9279, September 2004

37. ECO 11676, 13-Ton CH Forklift Fire Evaluation, November 2006

38. WP 05-WH1011, CH Waste Processing.

39. DOE O 5400.5, Change 2, Radiation Protection of the Public and the Environment,January 1993.

40. ANSI N 510, Standard for Testing of Nuclear Air Cleaning Systems.

41. SDD HV00, Heating, Ventilation and Air Conditioning System (HV00).

42. New Mexico Mine Safety Code for All Mines, 1990.

43. WP 04-VU, WIPP series Facility Operations Procedures.


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44. 00CD-0001, WIPP Mine Ventilation Plan.

45. SDD RM00, Radiation Monitoring (RM00).

46. 40 CFR Part 191, "Environmental Standards for the Management and Disposal of Spent NuclearFuel, High-Level and Transuranic Wastes"; Subpart A, "Environmental Standards forManagement and Storage."

47. 40 CFR Part 61, "Environmental Protection Agency Regulations on National Emission Standardsfor Hazardous Air Pollutants"; Subpart H, "National Emission Standard for RadionuclideEmissions from Department of Energy (DOE) Facilities."

48. WSMS-WIPP-06-0001, Fire Hazard Analysis Waste Isolation Pilot Plant, Rev. 0, May 2006.

49. SDD FP00, Fire Protection System (FP00).

50. WP 12-9, WIPP Emergency Management Program.

51. NFPA 20, Standard for the Installation of Centrifugal Fire Pumps

52. NFPA 24, Standard for the Installation of Private Fire Service Mains and Their Appurtenances.

53. NFPA 25, Standard for the Inspection, Testing, and Maintenance of Water-Based FireProtection Systems.

54. NFPA 13, Standard for the Installation of Sprinkler Systems.

55. NFPA 17, Standard for Dry Chemical Extinguishing Systems.

56. NFPA 17A, Standard for Wet Chemical Extinguishing Systems.

57. NFPA 70, National Electrical Code.

58. NFPA 72, National Fire Alarm Code Handbook.

59. NFPA 1221, Standard for the Installation, Maintenance, and Use of Emergency ServicesCommunications Systems.

60. WIPP WP 04-ED series facility operations procedures.61. Air Quality Permit No. 310-M-2.

62. SDD ED00, Electrical System (ED00).

63. DOE O 231.1A, Environment, Safety and Health Reporting.


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3-i November 2006

HAZARD AND ACCIDENT ANALYSIS

TABLE OF CONTENTS

SECTION PAGE NO.

3.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3-1

3.2 Requirements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3-2

3.3 Hazard Analysis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3-33.3.1 Methodology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3-3

3.3.1.1 Hazard Identification . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3-43.3.1.1.1 Facility Sections . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3-43.3.1.1.2 Information Gathering . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3-53.3.1.1.3 Screening of Standard Industrial Hazards . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3-6

3.3.1.2 Hazard Evaluation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3-73.3.2 Hazard Analysis Results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3-13

3.3.2.1 Hazard Identification . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3-133.3.2.2 Hazard Categorization . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3-203.3.2.3 Hazard Evaluation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3-20

3.3.2.3.1 Planned Design and Operational Safety Improvements . . . . . . . . 3-223.3.2.3.2 Defense in Depth . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3-223.3.2.3.3 Worker Safety . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3-233.3.2.3.4 Environmental Protection . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3-233.3.2.3.5 Accident Selection . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3-23

3.4 Accident Analysis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3-243.4.1 Methodology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3-24

3.4.1.1 Receptors . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3-243.4.1.2 Source Term . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3-253.4.1.3 Dispersion Modeling . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3-313.4.1.4 Consequence . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3-323.4.1.5 Off-Site Radiological/Nonradiological Evaluation Guideline . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3-33

3.4.2 Design Basis Accidents . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3-343.4.2.1 CH-1 – Fire in the WHB . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3-34

3.4.2.1.1 Scenario Development . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3-343.4.2.1.2 Source Term Analysis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3-353.4.2.1.3 Consequence Analysis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3-353.4.2.1.4 Comparison to Guidelines . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3-363.4.2.1.5 Summary of Safety Class SSCs and TSR Controls . . . . . . . . . . . 3-36

3.4.2.2 CH-2 – Fire in the UG . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3-373.4.2.2.1 Scenario Development . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3-373.4.2.2.2 Source Term Analysis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3-373.4.2.2.3 Consequence Analysis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3-383.4.2.2.4 Comparison to Guidelines . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3-383.4.2.2.5 Summary of Safety Class SSCs and TSR Controls . . . . . . . . . . . 3-39

3.4.2.3 CH-3 – Explosion in Waste Container(s) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3-413.4.2.3.1 Scenario Development . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3-413.4.2.3.2 Source Term Analysis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3-41


3-ii November 2006

3.4.2.3.3 Consequence Analysis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3-413.4.2.3.4 Comparison to Guidelines . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3-413.4.2.3.5 Summary of Safety Class SSCs and TSR Controls . . . . . . . . . . . 3-41

3.4.2.4 CH-4 – Explosion External to Waste Containers in WHB . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3-423.4.2.4.1 Scenario Development . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3-423.4.2.4.2 Source Term Analysis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3-423.4.2.4.3 Consequence Analysis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3-423.4.2.4.4 Comparison to Guidelines . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3-423.4.2.4.5 Summary of Safety Class SSCs and TSR Controls . . . . . . . . . . . 3-43

3.4.2.5 CH-5 – Explosion External to Waste Containers in UG . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3-433.4.2.5.1 Scenario Development . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3-433.4.2.5.2 Source Term Analysis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3-433.4.2.5.3 Consequence Analysis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3-443.4.2.5.4 Comparison to Guidelines . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3-443.4.2.5.5 Summary of Safety Class SSCs and TSR Controls . . . . . . . . . . . 3-44

3.4.2.6 CH-6 – Waste Container(s) Breach Due to Impact in the WHB . . . . . . . . . . . 3-453.4.2.6.1 Scenario Development . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3-453.4.2.6.2 Source Term Analysis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3-453.4.2.6.3 Consequence Analysis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3-463.4.2.6.4 Comparison to Guidelines . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3-463.4.2.6.5 Summary of Safety Class SSCs and TSR Controls . . . . . . . . . . . 3-46

3.4.2.7 CH-7 – Waste Container(s) Breach Due to Impact in the UG . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3-463.4.2.7.1 Scenario Development . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3-463.4.2.7.2 Source Term Analysis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3-473.4.2.7.3 Consequence Analysis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3-483.4.2.7.4 Comparison to Guidelines . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3-493.4.2.7.5 Summary of Safety Class SSCs and TSR Controls . . . . . . . . . . . 3-49

3.4.2.8 CH-8 – Roof Fall During Waste Emplacement and After the Panel is Filled|. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3-50


3.4.2.9 CH-9 – Aircraft Crash . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3-513.4.2.9.1 Scenario Development . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3-513.4.2.9.2 Source Term Analysis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3-523.4.2.9.3 Consequence Analysis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3-523.4.2.9.4 Comparison to Guidelines . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3-523.4.2.9.5 Summary of Safety Class SSCs and TSR Controls . . . . . . . . . . . 3-52

3.4.2.10 CH-10 – Tornado/High Winds . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3-523.4.2.10.1 Scenario Development . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3-523.4.2.10.2 Source Term Analysis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3-533.4.2.10.3 Consequence Analysis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3-533.4.2.10.4 Comparison to Guidelines . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3-533.4.2.10.5 Summary of Safety Class SSCs and TSR Controls . . . . . . . . . . . 3-53

3.4.2.11 CH-11 – Seismic . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3-533.4.2.11.1 Scenario Development . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3-533.4.2.11.2 Source Term Analysis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3-543.4.2.11.3 Consequence Analysis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3-553.4.2.11.4 Comparison to Guidelines . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3-55


3-iii November 2006

3.4.2.11.5 Summary of Safety Class SSCs and TSR Controls . . . . . . . . . . . 3-553.4.2.12 CH-12 – Vehicle Crash Into the WHB . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3-55

3.4.2.12.1 Scenario Development . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3-553.4.2.12.2 Source Term Analysis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3-563.4.2.12.3 Consequence Analysis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3-563.4.2.12.4 Comparison to Guidelines . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3-563.4.2.12.5 Summary of Safety Class SSCs and TSR Controls . . . . . . . . . . . 3-56

3.4.2.13 CH-13 – Lightning Strikes WHB - Damages Waste Containers . . . . . . . . . . . 3-563.4.2.13.1 Scenario Development . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3-563.4.2.13.2 Source Term Analysis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3-563.4.2.13.3 Consequence Analysis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3-573.4.2.13.4 Comparison to Guidelines . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3-573.4.2.13.5 Summary of Safety Class SSCs and TSR Controls . . . . . . . . . . . 3-57

3.4.2.14 CH-14 – External Fires Damage WHB and Waste Containers . . . . . . . . . . . . 3-573.4.2.14.1 Scenario Development . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3-573.4.2.14.2 Source Term Analysis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3-583.4.2.14.3 Consequence Analysis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3-583.4.2.14.4 Comparison to Guidelines . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3-583.4.2.14.5 Summary of Safety Class SSCs and TSR Controls . . . . . . . . . . . 3-59

3.4.2.15 CH 15 – Snow/Ice Load Collapses WHB Roof - Damages Waste Containers. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3-59


3.4.3 Beyond Design Basis Accidents . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3-60



3-iv November 2006


LIST OF TABLES


Table 3.4-1 - Design Basis Accident Consequence Results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3-64

Table A-2 - CH Waste Handling Waste Handling Building Hazard ID Table . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3-79

Table A-3 - CH Waste Handling Underground Hazard Identification Table . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3-87

Table A-4 - Event Categories for Hazard Review . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3-94

Table A-5 - Hazard Sources and Potential Events . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3-95

Table A-6 - Frequency Evaluation Levels . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3-97

Table A-7 - Consequence Evaluation Levels for Hazard Receptors . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3-98

Table A-8 - Qualitative Risk Bins . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3-99

Table A-9 - Hazard Evaluation for CH On-Site Transportation Route . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3-100

Table A-10 - Hazard Evaluation for CH Waste Handling Building . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3-111

Table A-11 - Hazard Evaluation for CH Waste Handling Underground . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3-128

Table A-12 - CH Waste Handling Process - Building General . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3-155

Table A-13 - Site Worker MHE Summary for Risk Rank I and II Events (evaluated at 100 m) . . . . 3-157

Table A-14 - Facility Worker MHE Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3-176


3-v November 2006


LIST OF FIGURES


Figure 3.3-1 - Hazard and Accident Analysis Flow Chart . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3-69

Figure 3.4-1 - 285 Meter Radius from Closest Point of Exclusive Use Area Boundary . . . . . . . . . . . . 3-70


3-vi November 2006



3-1 November 2006


3.1 Introduction

This chapter (1) identifies the potential hazards resulting from contact-handled (CH) transuranic (TRU)waste handling and disposal normal operations at the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP), and (2)assesses those hazards to evaluate abnormal, internal operational, external, and natural events that coulddevelop into accidents. The hazard analysis (HA) (1) considers the complete spectrum of accidents thatmay occur and qualitatively analyzes the accident annual occurrence frequency, and the resultantpotential consequences to the public, workers, WIPP operations, and the environment; (2) identifies andassesses associated preventive and mitigative features for defense-in-depth (DID); and (3) identifies asubset of accidents to be quantitatively evaluated in the accident analysis (AA). The AA evaluates theseaccidents against the Evaluation Guideline(EG) of 25 rem for the off-site public to verify the adequacy ofthe preventive and mitigative systems to protect the public.

The methodology and requirements of Title 10 Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) Part 830,1 and itsimplementing standards U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) Standard (STD) DOE-STD-1027-922 andDOE-STD-3009-943 were used in the development of this chapter. Items discussed in this chapterinclude:

• Description of the methodology for and approach to hazard and AA.

• Identification of hazardous materials and energy sources present by type, quantity, form, andlocation.

• Facility hazard categorization in accordance with DOE-STD-1027-92.2

• Identification in the HA of the spectrum of potential accidents in terms of qualitativeconsequence and frequency estimates.

• AA of design basis accidents (DBAs) identified in the hazards analysis.

Title 10 CFR Part 8301 prescribes the use of a graded approach for the effort expended in preparingsafety analysis and the level of detail presented. The graded approach requires a more rigorous and morethoroughly documented assessment for complex, higher-hazard facilities than for simpler, lower-hazardfacilities since grading is a function of both hazard potential and complexity. The WIPP is a disposalfacility of low complexity but has a high hazard category due to the radionuclide inventory of the wastecontainers processed for disposal. Quantitative analysis was used to evaluate risk to the public ascompared to the EG of 25 rem from DOE-STD-3009-94.3 Quantitative and qualitative methods wereused in evaluating risk to workers. The WIPP analysis complies with DOE requirements and providessufficient detail to demonstrate adequate protection of the public, workers and the environment.


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3.2 Requirements

The standards, regulations, and DOE Orders used to develop this documented safety analysis (DSA) arelisted below. Only portions of the listed documents are relevant to the development of this DSA namely,those that cover hazard identification and evaluation, safety analysis, risk classification, and operationalcontrols.

• 10 CFR Part 830, "Nuclear Safety Management"1

This rule governs the conduct of DOE contractors, DOE personnel, and other personsconducting activities (including providing items and services) that affect, or may affect, thesafety of DOE nuclear facilities. This rule specifies the DSA requirements for nuclearfacilities.

• DOE Order 420.1 B, Facility Safety4

This order addresses operational controls dealing with natural phenomena hazardsmitigation, fire protection, general design criteria, and criticality safety.

• DOE-STD-3009-94, Preparation Guide for U.S. Department of Energy Nonreactor NuclearFacility Documented Safety Analyses Reports3

This standard addresses hazard identification/evaluation and safety analysis by providingguidance on the analysis techniques, level of detail, and criteria.

• DOE-STD-1027-92, Hazard Categorization and Accident Analysis Techniques forCompliance with DOE Order 5480.23, Nuclear Safety Analysis Reports.2

This standard provides a uniform method for facility hazard categorization and insight intothe graded approach for DSA development, especially in hazard assessment and AAtechniques.

• DOE-STD-1186-2004, Specific Administrative Controls.

This standard provides guidance applicable to Administrative Controls (AC) that areselected to provide preventive and/or mitigative functions for specific accident scenarios,and which, also have safety importance equivalent to engineered controls that would beclassified as Safety Class (SC) or Safety Significant (SS) if the engineered controls wereavailable and selected.

• DOE G 421.1-2, Implementation Guide for Use in Developing Documented Safety Analysesto Meet Subpart B of 10 CFR 830.5

This guide provides guidance in meeting the provisions for DSAs defined in that subpart.The guidance describes the analytical methods, documentation requirements, and safetycommitments that go into the development of a comprehensive safety basis and DSA.

• DOE G 423.1-1, Implementation Guide for Use in Developing Technical SafetyRequirements6


3-3 November 2006

This guide provides guidance in identifying important safety parameter and developing thecontent for the technical safety requirements (TSRs) that are required by 10 CFR §830.205.

3.3 Hazard Analysis

Hazards associated with normal WIPP operations include mining dangers, rotating machinery, highvoltage, compressed gases, confined spaces, radiological and nonradiological hazardous materials,ionizing and non-ionizing radiation, high noise levels, mechanical and moving equipment dangers,working at heights, construction, and material handling dangers. Waste handling operations at the WIPPdo not involve high temperature and pressure systems, or electromagnetic fields. Routine occupationalhazards are regulated by DOE-prescribed Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) andMine Safety and Health Administration (MSHA) standards. Programs for protecting WIPP workers fromhazardous materials are discussed in Chapter 8.

HA provides a comprehensive assessment of facility hazards and accident scenarios that could produceundesirable consequences for workers and the public. Hazards analysis is divided into three mainparts: (1) Hazard identification (ID) of the potential hazards associated with CH waste handlingoperations; (2) an unmitigated hazard evaluation (UHE) for the CH waste handling process; and (3)mitigated hazard evaluation (MHE). Hazard ID and UHE for the WIPP CH waste handling process,presents a comprehensive evaluation of potential process related, natural events, and man-made externalhazards that can affect the public, workers, and the environment. Personnel participating in the hazardID and UHE included personnel from the WIPP waste handling operations, the facility operationsorganization, the radiological control organization, nuclear safety, system engineers, and consultants withexperience in the process. As part of the UHE, events requiring further quantitative AA are identified, aswell as identification of potential preventive and mitigative features that are candidates for controlselection. In the AA and MHE, those events requiring further analysis are quantitatively analyzed for thepublic and site workers and qualitatively analyzed for facility workers. Ultimately the controls areselected for protection of the public and workers.

This chapter also provides the hazard categorization of the WIPP.

3.3.1 Methodology

This section presents methodology used to identify and characterize hazards and to perform a systematicevaluation of accidents. A flowchart representing the HA methodology described below is provided onFigure 3.3-1. Hazards existing at the WIPP were identified and standard industrial hazards (SIHs) werescreened out in accordance with the hazard ID methodology described in Section 3.3.1.1. The results ofthe hazard ID process are presented in Appendix A, Tables A-1 through A-3.

The HE, as described in Section 3.3.1.2, consists of the UHE and the MHE. The scope of the UHEincludes events involving hazards identified in, but not screened out as SIH, in the hazard ID process. The UHE uses results from hazard ID to create the UHE tables. The WIPP specific UHE is presented inAppendix A, Tables A-9 through A-12, sorted by event category (e.g., fire, explosion, impact) andfacility section in accordance with criteria provided in Appendix A, Tables A-4 and A-5. Assumptions,initial conditions (ICs), material at risk (MAR), and potential causes for each event are specified, then aqualitative evaluation of each event is performed in which the frequency and consequence are assessed inaccordance with criteria provided in Appendix A, Tables A-6 and A-7. The combination of thefrequency and consequence assessment results in identifying the degree of risk the event posed to thepublic, on-site worker, and facility worker by identifying a risk bin in accordance with guidance providedin Appendix A, Table A-8. Additionally, potential features available to prevent or mitigate the event are


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documented on the UHE tables. The final task associated with the UHE is identifying the events thatrequire further evaluation in the MHE for events posing a significant risk to workers and in AA (seeSection 3.4 of this chapter) for events posing a significant risk to the public. A significant risk to areceptor group is identified as an event whose frequency and consequence results in it being assigned toRisk Bins I or II on the UHE table. Events with high consequence but characterized as being in Risk BinIII are also considered to pose a significant risk and are carried forward for further evaluation in MHEand AA (Section 3.4) as applicable.

The MHE was used for identifying and verifying the effectiveness of the controls selected to prevent ormitigate events posing significant risk to the on-site and facility workers. The scope of the MHEincluded all events identified in the UHE that required further evaluation. Though not required for MHE,quantitative analysis was performed for events requiring further evaluation to compute the radiologicaldose to the on-site worker located 100 meters or greater from the release point. For the facility workerthe MHE was done on a qualitative basis. If event consequences indicated that functional classificationfor systems, structures, and components (SSCs) that either prevented or mitigated consequences werewarranted, those controls were selected and documented on MHE summary tables for the site worker andfacility worker, Appendix A, Tables A-13 and A-14, respectively. WIPP procedure WP 09-CN3023,WIPP Functional Classification for Design,7 identifies 100 rem to the worker as the consequence forrequiring consideration for functionally classifying an SSC as SS. Any event in the UHE with a risk of Ior II to the worker resulted in the identification of SS SSCs and/or ACs, as appropriate, for workerprotection. Any event in the UHE with a risk of III but with high consequence was also evaluated andany controls necessary for worker protection were included in Tables A-13 and A-14. A qualitativeassessment of the effectiveness of these controls is documented on the site worker and facility workerMHE summary tables.

3.3.1.1 Hazard Identification

Hazard ID is a comprehensive, systematic process by which facility hazards (hazardous materials andenergy) are identified, recorded, and screened. Hazard ID is divided into three steps: (1) division of thefacility into "facility sections," (2) information gathering, and (3) screening for SIHs. The term facility"section" is used in the assessment process to distinguish from facility "segments" as defined inDOE-STD-1027-92.

3.3.1.1.1 Facility Sections

For the purposes of hazard ID and evaluation, the CH waste handling process was addressed in facilitysections based on waste handling areas and the activities performed in those areas. The sectionsestablished are as follows:

Outside Area (OA) This section includes the waste on-site transportation route from the securityentry gate to the WIPP to the parking area on the south side of the wastehandling building (WHB). Two transport routes from the security gate to theparking area are included, one that accesses the parking area from the east sideof the WHB and one from the west side of the WHB.

Waste HandlingBuilding (WHB)

This section includes the CH bay, the airlocks on the south side of the CH bay,the conveyance car loading room, and the waste shaft conveyance loading roomat the top of the waste shaft, and waste hoist tower.


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Underground (UG) This section includes the waste shaft, the waste shaft conveyance, and all areasof the WIPP underground.

Building General (BG) An additional section to address those events that have the potential to affect allthree sections described above.

3.3.1.1.2 Information Gathering

The information gathering process included physical walk-downs, information walk-downs, anddiscussions with subject matter experts (SMEs). The physical walk-down, guided by WIPP facilityexperts, consisted of a comprehensive tour of the CH waste handling areas, and included detaileddiscussions of the layout and activities conducted in those areas. Information walk-downs included areview of the available facility description and inventory information, supporting operational safetystudies, and consultations with system engineers and process experts. The radiological inventoryavailable to contribute to event consequences for the UHE is discussed in Section 3.3.2.1 of this chapterfor different CH waste container types. The number of containers available to be damaged is based onthe WHB storage limits imposed by the Hazardous Waste Facility Permit (HWFP),8 including permitmodifications. The main hazardous constituent of concern in CH waste is beryllium in the form of finesor shavings. Waste containers are not deliberately opened at WIPP. Using the principles of co-detection,any hazardous material release from breached waste containers will be accompanied with a radiologicalrelease. The potential preventive and mitigative features identified in the UHE to prevent or mitigateradiological consequences from accidents also prevent or mitigate consequences from a release ofberyllium fines and shavings.

Hazard ID methodology assigns a unique item number for each facility hazard, the hazard energy sourceor material, whether the hazard exists at the facility or in a particular facility section, a description characterizing each hazard, and finally a screening as to whether the hazard is or is not considered a SIH. The results of the WIPP hazard ID activities are documented in Appendix A, Tables A-1 through A-3.

Using the results of the information gathering process, including walk-downs and interviews withknowledgeable personnel, the assessment team created a comprehensive list of all expected hazards. Useof hazard ID tables provides a comprehensive listing of generic facility hazards. A hazard ID table hasfive columns that include the following information:

Item – A specific number provided for each facility hazard.

Hazard Energy Source or Material – This is a checklist of potential hazards that may be in the facility. Alarge general list is provided to allow the table to be used for a variety of facilities and to help ensurecompleteness in the identification process.

Exists – This is used to document whether the hazard exists in the particular facility section. Each itemin the list requires either a "Yes" or a "No" response.

Description – This column is used to characterize each hazard for the purposes of providing theassessment team and reviewers an understanding of the hazard. The location of the hazard in sufficientdetail to locate the hazard within the facility section, quantities, and any other clarifying information maybe included in this column.

Standard Industrial Hazard (SIH) Screening – This column is used to identify those items that are or arenot screened as SIH, as discussed below.


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3.3.1.1.3 Screening of Standard Industrial Hazards

SIHs are defined as hazard sources (material or energy) or events involving hazards routinelyencountered by the general public or in general industry and construction, and for which nationalconsensus codes and/or standards exist to govern handling or use without the need for special analysis todefine safety design and/or operational parameters. SIHs are evaluated to the extent that they act asinitiators and contributors to events that result in a radiological or hazardous material release. Eachidentified hazard is screened based on material/energy types and quantities. Hazards that are screened asSIHs are documented as such in the "SIH Screening" column of Appendix A, Tables A-1 through A-3.

The following characteristics are used to determine hazards that are considered SIHs and routinelyaccepted hazards:

• The hazard is controlled by OSHA regulations or national consensus standards (e.g.,American Society of Mechanical Engineers, American National Standards Institute, NationalFire Protection Association, Institute of Electrical and Electronic Engineers, NationalElectric Code), where these standards are adequate to define special safety requirements,unless in quantities or situations that initiate events with serious impact to the public orworkers.

• Hazards such as noise, electricity, flammable materials, welding operations, small quantitiesof chemicals that would likely be found in homes or general retail outlets, and hazardousmaterials transported on the open road in Department of Transportation (DOT) specifiedcontainers are considered to be common hazards encountered in everyday life.

Examples of common hazards/standard industrial hazards include:

• Specific materials (e.g., lead and asbestos) that have their own control program

• Thermal energy sources (potential for burns [e.g., welding equipment])

• Electrical shock hazards

• Gas cylinders transported and stored in DOT configuration

• Personnel pinches, trips, falls, slips, etc.

• Confined space hazards

• Hazards typically found in office areas

• Routine industrial or construction noise

These hazards are evaluated only to the extent that they act as initiators and contributors to events thatresult in a radiological or chemical release. Each identified hazard is screened based on material/energytypes and quantities.

Hazards that do not meet the appropriate screening criteria for identification as an SIH are carriedforward to the HE process and are so noted in the Hazard ID tables. Hazards that are screened as SIHsare documented as such in the "SIH Screening" column of the Hazard ID table. No further considerationis given to screened hazards except in cases where the hazard could act as an initiator/contributor to anevent that releases radiological or chemical material.


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3.3.1.2 Hazard Evaluation

The UHE follows Hazard ID. The purpose of the UHE is to ensure a comprehensive assessment offacility hazards and focus attention on those events that pose the greatest risk to the public and theworkers. Event categorization, identification of event cause(s), assignment of event frequency andunmitigated consequence level, and identification of potential mitigative and preventive features are tasksperformed during UHE.

Selection of UHE Method

The flowchart in Figure 5.3 of "Guidelines for Hazard Evaluation Procedures"9 provides a method forselecting a specific assessment technique. Using the flowchart, the technique used in the UHE for CHwaste handling at WIPP was selected with the following criteria:

• The study is for regulatory purposes

• No specific HE method is required

• This is not a recurrent review

• Expected results are a list of specific accident situations

• The results will not be part of a quantitative risk assessment

• The process is operating

• Human errors are a concern but not the greatest concern

• Accidents are most likely to be single failure events

Application of these criteria to the figure results in various potential analysis methods for performing theUHE including: what-if, what-if/checklist, preliminary hazard analysis, failure modes and effectsanalysis, and hazard and operability study. The failure modes and effects analysis method was removedfrom consideration since it is primarily used for analyzing mechanical systems and active components inan electrical system. The hazards evaluation team selected a hybrid approach that incorporated elementsof the what-if/checklist and preliminary hazard analysis methods. This method was selected based on itswidespread use and DOE acceptance at other TRU waste handling/storage facilities in the DOE complex. The what-if/checklist method uses brainstorming to identify a broad spectrum of accidents incombination with the detailed and comprehensive structure provided by using a systematic hazard ID andevent category checklist. Additionally, the use of a tabular accident recording form (adapted from thepreliminary hazard analysis technique) provides for the effective listing and presentation of accidentsalong with their causes, hazard category, risk assessment and potential preventive and mitigative features.

Scope of the CH Waste Handling Assessment

The scope of the CH waste handling UHE examined:

• The WIPP CH waste handling operations including waste receipt, handling (includingremoving waste containers from TRUPACT-IIs and HalfPACTs, transporting wastecontainers to the underground disposal area), waste emplacement, and support activities(e.g., equipment maintenance, and mining and ground control activities in the underground).

• Natural phenomena (e.g., earthquakes, tornadoes, straight-winds).

• External events (e.g., aircraft and vehicular impact).


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• Consideration of the spectrum of possible events for a given hazard in terms of bothfrequency and consequence levels (e.g., from a small localized fire to a large propagatedfire).

The assessment does not address:

• Hazards screened as SIHs.

• Willful acts, such as sabotage.

Assumptions and Initial Conditions

Prior to and while performing the UHE, assumptions and initial conditions (ICs) are identified to formthe basis for the event evaluation. Some assumptions are statements of fact and some are features orconditions that must be true for the UHE to be valid. Assumptions are general statements that governboundaries of the analysis, but do not necessarily require protection to ensure the validity of the analysis. ICs identify those features or conditions that are used as an analysis reference baseline during anevolving design or to clarify a point of analysis that might otherwise be unstated. ICs may oftendelineate specific conditions that are part of normal facility operations and which have an impact on thehazard analysis. As such, ICs are normally established and documented prior to, or during the HEprocess, when events are postulated and evaluated.

In general, ICs may inherently credit specific inventory information or passive design features such as thefacility construction in the prevention of, or reduction in, the frequency of certain accidents. ICs requireprotection to ensure the validity of the analysis. The specific ICs used for the WIPP UHE are presentedin Section 3.3.2.3.

Unmitigated Hazard Evaluation

The UHE is performed to determine the risks (frequencies and consequences) involved with the facilityand its associated operations without regard for preventive or mitigative design features or programs.Figure 3.3-1 shows a flow chart for hazard evaluation and AA. Unmitigated refers to the determinationof the frequency and consequences without taking credit for preventive or mitigative features other thanthe specified ICs. While no credit is taken for any controls, the laws of physics are obeyed. The UHE is a qualitative evaluation of facility hazards and identifies those events of greatest concern to public andworker safety. The qualitative evaluation results that pose the greatest risk to the public or workers arequantitatively (for public and site workers) evaluated and documented in NS-05-001, WIPP CH DSARevision 9 Source Term, Dose Consequence and Supporting Information.10 The quantitative analysisresults are used to select the controls to ensure protection of the public and site workers. Controls forfacility workers (workers within 100 meters) are determined from a qualitative evaluation.

Information related to the UHE is collected and organized in HE tables. A separate table is developed foreach facility section. Hazard evaluation tables then serve as input for a subsequent MHE in a completeHA. Information in the HE tables include:

• Event number and category

• Event description including location of the event, hazardous material release mechanism,amount of hazardous material at risk, ICs, and hazard source

• Causes


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• Unmitigated Risk

- Frequency Level- Consequence Level- Risk Bin

• Preventive Features

- Design Features - Administrative Controls

• Mitigative Features

- Design Features- Administrative Controls

Additional detail and pertinent methodology information regarding each of the HE table headings for theUHE are as follows:

Event Number and Category

In the HE tables, events are identified by a unique sequential reference consisting of a combination ofletters and numbers. The first two (or three) letters represent the facility section (i.e. WHB for WasteHandling Building), the first number represents the event category as described below, and the secondnumber (following the hyphen) represents the event sequential number.

Events are categorized according to the nature of the event. A standard list of event categories is given inAppendix A, Table A-4, along with a general description of the consequence mechanism. The first fivecategories are for internally initiated events, which are typically process-related events. The final twocategories are externally initiated events (i.e., events whose initiators are beyond the facility's directcontrol). The categories are as follows:

• Fire

• Explosion

• Loss of containment/confinement

• Direct radiological/chemical exposure

• Nuclear criticality

• External hazards

• Natural phenomena

Event Description

A brief description of a postulated event is provided in this column and includes a description of theevent (including event progression information), location, the release mechanism (e.g., thermal release,pressurized release, impact) or other consequence mechanism (e.g., direct exposure), and the MAR. Additionally, ICs applicable to the event and hazard source (e.g., type of hazardous material released) areidentified.


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Using the hazard ID tables as a basis, event scenarios are developed for each facility section where apotential exists for a release of hazardous energy and/or material. Appendix A, Table A-5, provides alink between the hazard groups in the hazard ID table with potential events that may be caused by thehazard. This table is used as an aid in identifying potential events and is not meant to be comprehensiveor to limit the scenario development. The full character of the hazard is considered when developingevent descriptions.

The scenarios cover the spectrum of possible events for a given hazard, from small consequence, highfrequency events to reasonable worst-case, low frequency events. Unlike "worst-case," "reasonableworst-case" does not necessarily consider every parameter in its most unfavorable state. Follow-onevents, such as a fire following a seismic event or aircraft impact, are identified and evaluated to ensurethe entire spectrum of possible events are addressed. Events typically progress to and result in a releaseof radiological and hazardous material.

Causes

A cause specifically states the failure, error, operational, and/or environmental condition that initiates theprogression of occurrences leading to a release of hazardous material. Causes need to be clearlyidentified to support event frequency evaluation. The Hazard ID tables are used as a guide in developingspecific causes for release events.

Unmitigated Risk

This portion of the table documents the frequency determination, consequences, and resultant risk withno credit given for preventive or mitigative features other than ICs.

Frequency Level Event frequency evaluation is a predominantly qualitative process (although somesemiquantitative estimates may be used) that involves assigning a frequency levelto each event in the UHE tables. An event is defined as the progression ofoccurrences necessary to release hazardous material (i.e., from initiator to the pointof release). The term "unprevented" is used to designate a release event frequencyderived during the UHE before preventive features are credited to reduce the eventfrequency. Frequency levels, based on Table 3-4 in DOE-STD-3009-94,3 aresummarized in Appendix A, Table A-6.

Frequency information is derived from generic initiator database documents,existing safety documentation, facility expert opinion, or historical accident data. The frequency level is recorded in the UHE tables according to the letteringscheme given in Appendix A, Table A-6. Considering the sources, methods, anduncertainty associated with a frequency estimate, erring in the conservativedirection from best-estimate values accommodates uncertainties in frequencylevels. When evaluating event frequency, credit is taken only for items identifiedas ICs.


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Consequence Level Event consequences are documented by specifying the impact on the receptors. For UHE purposes, consequences are defined as the doses or exposures, at receptorlocations, that have been determined without taking credit for barriers or controlsthat could reduce those consequences. Consequences are a function of the typeand characteristics of the hazard, the quantity of hazardous material released, therelease mechanism, relative location of the release, and relevant transportcharacteristics. Consequences are determined from (1) engineering judgment, (2)existing safety documentation, and/or (3) qualitative assessment. Much likefrequency evaluation, erring in the conservative direction from best-estimatevalues accommodates uncertainties. During unmitigated consequencedetermination, neither design features (DFs) or administrative controls (ACs) arenot credited for mitigation. DFs include engineered structures, systems, andcomponents (SSCs). ACs include procedures and programs. The only exception iswhere an IC prevents consequences (e.g. TRUPACT-II and HalfPACT design).

UHE consequences are qualitatively evaluated at various receptor locations to assess health effectsassociated with the postulated event. Appendix A, Table A-7, provides the radiological and chemicalconsequence levels for the receptor locations specified below, using the maximally exposed individual ateach receptor location. Receptors and their locations are as follows:

Facility Worker Workers in the immediate area of the hazard and those workers in the same areawho may not be aware of the hazardous condition. Radiological doses or chemicalexposures for the worker are estimated qualitatively.

On-Site Worker Individuals outside the structure or immediate area of the hazard but within the siteboundary. For evaluation purposes, these workers are located outside the lastpossible barrier from the hazard and at the worst possible location. Radiologicaldoses or chemical exposures are estimated qualitatively for the receptor at adistance of 100 meters.

Public Everyone outside the site boundary. (See Section 3.4 for a discussion on publicaccess to WIPP)

The UHE is concerned with the maximally exposed individual at each of the receptor locations. Whenevaluating event consequences in the UHE, credit is taken only for items identified as ICs.

Risk Bin

The objective of risk binning is to focus attention on those events that pose the greatest risk to the public,on-site workers and facility workers. Higher risk events are candidates for additional analysis. Usingevent frequency and consequence levels, events are "binned" according to the matrix given inAppendix A, Table A-8, to assess relative risk for each of the receptor locations.


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Potential or Available Controls

PreventiveFeatures

Potential or existing preventive features are identified as part of the UHE. Preventivefeatures are those expected to reduce the frequency of a hazardous event (up to the pointof release). The identification of such features is made without regard to any possiblepedigree of the feature. These include engineered features of SSCs and ACs operatingindividually or in combination.

Preventive features are listed in the UHE tables, and are subdivided into design and ACsfor each event. This list of potential controls is used for final control selection that arerelied on to reduce the frequency of the postulated release events.

MitigativeFeatures

Mitigative features are those expected to reduce the consequences of a hazardous event. The identification of such features is made without regard to any possible pedigree of thefeature such as procurement level or current classification. Mitigative features must becapable of withstanding the environment of the event. These include DFs and ACs. operating individually or in combination.

Mitigative features are listed in the UHE tables, and are sub-divided into administrativeand design features for each event. This list of potential controls is used for final controlselection that are relied on to reduce the consequences of the postulated release events.

Event Selection

Event selection is the process of identifying the events that require further evaluation in MHE and AA. Events are identified for further evaluation based on the risk for each of the receptors. A significant riskto a receptor group was identified as an event whose frequency and consequence resulted in it beingassigned to Risk Bins I or II on the UHE table. Events with high consequence (i.e., challenge to EG orworker criteria) but characterized as being in Risk Bin III were also considered to pose a significant riskand were also carried forward for further evaluation in MHE and AA as applicable. Any events with riskthat falls in Risk Bin IV do not require safety features and are not carried forward to AA or to the MHE. Using the principles of co-detection, any hazardous material release from breached waste containers willbe accompanied with a radiological release. Hence the risk binning for radiological consequence willencompass any hazardous material consequences.

Mitigated Hazard Evaluation

An MHE was performed to demonstrate that adequate prevention and mitigation features are selected toreduce the unmitigated event risk to the on-site and facility worker groups (See Figure 3.3-1). For eventsthat pose significant risk for the on-site worker, quantitative analyses is documented in NS-05-001.10 Events that pose significant risk or consequences for the facility worker were qualitatively identified. For each of these events, controls that protect the on-site and facility worker groups by preventing (i.e.,reducing the frequency of) the event or mitigating the consequences of the event were selected. Thecontrols selected were generally taken from the list of potential controls identified in the UHE, but insome cases new controls were identified and selected during the MHE process. After control selection,another qualitative assessment was performed to determine the effectiveness of the controls in preventingor reducing the consequence of the event. The results of MHE for the on-site and facility workers aredocumented in Appendix A, Tables A-13 and A-14, respectively. The selection of controls for on-siteand facility worker protection include safety significant (SS) SSCs, specific ACs (SACs), andprogrammatic ACs.


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3.3.2 Hazard Analysis Results

As discussed in Section 3.3.1, the HA consists of hazard ID and HE. This section provides a discussionand summarizes the results of the work performed specific to the CH waste handling process at WIPP toensure completeness and compliance with the methodology presented in Section 3.3.1. Input used in thedevelopment of this HA was derived from physical walk-downs, information walk-downs, discussionswith SMEs, facility inventories, and existing safety analyses and operational safety studies.

3.3.2.1 Hazard Identification

WIPP has been receiving CH waste since March 1999 and has experienced no operational events,external events, or natural events that have resulted in a breach of waste containers. A general summaryof hazards, by type, and the hazards identified for WIPP are included in the hazard ID tables inAppendix A, Table A-1 through A-3.

Division of the WIPP facility - For the purposes of hazard ID and HE, surface and underground wastehandling areas are grouped into sections based on the activities conducted in each section. The sectionsestablished are as follows:

OA On-Site Transportation Route - includes waste transportation path from the security gateto the south side of the WHB from either the east or west.

WHB Waste Handling Building

UG Underground

BG Building General - includes the OA, WHB, and UG for hazards that could be common toall three sections.

Facility walk-downs - Facility walk-downs performed for Hazard ID included both physicalwalk-downs and informational walk-downs. The physical walk-downs consisted of a tour of the wastehandling areas. The informational walk-downs included a review of the available facility description andinventory information and consultations with facility experts. The hazard ID Tables A-1 through A-3 documented the results of the facility walk-downs. The tables identify the hazardous material and energysources applicable to the facility section including clarifying information. A summary of the hazards ispresented below:

Electrical Hazards

Electrical hazards present throughout the waste handling areas including the transportation route from thesecurity gate to the parking area on the south side of the WHB. General electrical hazards includeswitchgear, transformers, transmission lines or cable runs, wiring, electrical equipment, motors, batterybanks, light fixtures, and service outlets. Other electrical hazards that may be found in specific sectionsinclude portable generators, heaters, and power tools. Electrical hazards may be initiators for fire andexplosion events.

Thermal Hazards

Thermal hazards occur in the facility sections and typically include electrical equipment, wiring,welding, and engine exhaust. Heaters may be found in specific facility sections. Thermal hazards may beinitiators for fire and explosion events.


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Pyrophoric Material

The facility sections for WIPP do not contain any known pyrophoric materials. CH waste containing pyrophoric materials are prohibited through the DOE/WIPP-02-3122, Contact-Handled TransuranicWaste Acceptance Criteria [CH WAC] for the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant.14 For the purpose of hazardID and UHE, it is initially assumed that there are no controls on CH waste content and that pyrophoricmaterial could exist and result in spontaneous combustion within a waste container or be contributors tofires and explosions.

Open Flame

Welding or cutting torches are used in conjunction with maintenance activities.

Flammables

The WIPP facility sections contain fuel and grease associated with equipment operated in the section,paint, paint cleaning and decontamination solvents, and satellite waste accumulation areas that maycontain materials susceptible to spontaneous combustion. Flammable hazards are contributors for fireevents.

Combustibles

The WIPP facility sections contain wood pallets, crates, plywood, paper associated with work activities,plastic signs, plastic containers, tarps, personal protective equipment, and petroleum based combustibles(e.g., grease, hydraulic fluid, diesel fuel). The CH waste drum assemblies include plastic slipsheets andreinforcement plates and shrink wrap around the drums. The magnesium oxide (MgO) supersacks aremade of reinforced nylon and are surrounded by cardboard reinforcement. These combustible materialsmay be contributors for fire events.

Chemical Reactions

There are no chemical reaction sources identified for WIPP operations. For the purpose of Hazard IDand UHE, it is assumed that there are no controls on CH waste content and that chemical reactions couldoccur that result in spontaneous combustion within a waste container or be contributors to fires andexplosions.

Explosive Materials

In addition to gases that may be generated by chemical reactions, WIPP facility sections containexplosive materials in the form of hydrogen associated with facility equipment batteries and generationof hydrogen associated with battery charging stations. Small explosive charges are also used in theunderground to set anchor bolts for supporting piping or cables. For the purpose of hazard ID and UHE,it is assumed that there are no controls on CH waste content and that chemical reactions could occur thatresult in explosive materials being generated. Explosive materials are contributors to explosion events.No large explosions are postulated in filled panels due to long term gas generation from microbial action|or radiolysis as the lower explosive limit (LEL) will not be reached for over 20 years, which exceeds the |operational phase of WIPP.22, 23 Localized single drum explosion due to gas generation is considered|subsequent to filling a panel. |


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Kinetic Energy

As part of normal operation and maintenance, the WIPP facility sections contain sources of kineticenergy including vehicles, motors, power tools, moving parts associated with equipment (e.g., belts,bearings), and movement of material via forklift or crane. Other kinetic energy hazards identified includegears, grinders, fans, drills, presses, shears, and saws. Kinetic energy hazards can be initiators for loss ofconfinement events.

Potential Energy (Pressure)

The WIPP facility sections contain sources of potential energy in the form of pressure includingpressurized gas bottles, pressure vessels such as a nitrogen accumulator, and compressed air andpressurized water piping systems. For the purpose of hazard ID and UHE, it is assumed that there are nocontrols on CH waste content and that CH waste containers could be pressurized as the result of gasgeneration inside the container. Pressurized containers or systems can be an initiator for loss ofconfinement events.

Potential Energy (Height/Mass)

The WIPP facility sections include hazards related to elevated equipment that could contribute toaccidents involving drops or falls. These include cranes/hoists, elevated doors, elevated work surfaces,man-lifts, scaffolds, and ladders. These hazards may be initiators for loss of confinement events.

Flooding Sources

The WIPP facility sections include water sources that could result in internal flooding. Sources includefire water, domestic water, water tanks used for dust control, barrels of water awaiting sample results,and periodic load testing that may involve the use of water weights. These hazards are considered aspotential contributors to events involving flooding.

Physical Hazards

The WIPP facility sections include sources of physical hazards, such as sharp edges, pinch points,tripping hazards, confined spaces, and temperature extremes. These physical hazards may result in aninjury to the worker but not a breach of waste containers.

Radiological Material

The WIPP facility sections include radiological material associated with CH waste and sources used inthe calibration of radiation monitoring equipment. Radiological material is part of the MAR for eventsthat result in a breach of waste containers.

Hazardous Material

The WIPP facility sections include hazardous materials including lead associated with batteries, oxygencylinders, and other hazardous materials associated with maintenance and poisons such as insecticides. Hazardous material is also associated with the CH waste (e.g. beryllium, lead, mercury, polychloridebyphenols [PCBs]. Hazardous material in the waste is included in the MAR for events that result in abreach of waste containers. Using the principles of co-detection, any hazardous material release frombreached waste containers will be accompanied with a radiological release.


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Ionizing Radiation Sources

The WIPP facility sections include potential ionizing radiation sources. The primary ionizing radiationsource is the radiological material in the CH waste. Ionizing radiation sources are potential initiators fordirect exposure events.

Non-Ionizing Radiation Sources

Non-ionizing radiation sources identified in the WIPP facility sections include the bar code readers usedto record/identify waste containers and lasers used for mining or surveying.

Criticality

Nuclear criticality safety evaluations (NCSE) for the WIPP have documented that it is not credible for aninadvertent criticality to occur at the WIPP in either the TRUPACT-II, HalfPACT, or in the wastehandling, storage, and disposal configurations because of fissile and special moderator/reflector masslimits imposed by the CH WAC14 and implemented at generator sites through waste characterizationprograms. For the purposes of hazard ID and UHE, it is assumed that there are no controls on CH wastecontent and that a criticality could occur.

Non-facility Events

There is a potential of the WIPP facility sections to be impacted by events that are initiated at a locationexternal to the facility. The events of concern include aircraft crashes, explosions, and fires. These mayinvolve transportation accidents or events that occur in other WIPP structures and propagate to the areasused for handling CH waste. These non-facility events are identified and addressed in the hazard ID andUHE tables.

Vehicles in Motion

WIPP facility sections, where CH waste handling activities occur, have the potential to be affected byvarious vehicles in motion. These include equipment being used for maintenance, forklifts, vehicles otherthan those used for waste handling and transport, and heavy construction equipment. Thesevehicle-in-motion events are potential initiators for external events that result in loss of confinement, fire,or explosion.

Natural Phenomena

WIPP facility sections, where CH waste handling activities occur, have the potential to be adverselyaffected by natural phenomena hazards (NPH) including earthquakes, heavy rain that results in localizedflooding, lightning, hail, snow, straight winds, tornadoes, and seasonal temperature extremes. NPHevents are assumed to be potential initiators for events resulting in a breach of waste containers.

Screening of Standard Industrial Hazards - SIHs screened during the Hazard ID typically includeelectrical, thermal, kinetic energy, potential energy (pressure and height/mass), physical, andnon-ionizing radiation. The thermal and electrical hazards were present due to equipment found in thefacility, but are commonly accepted hazards. The screening eliminated consideration for burns andelectrical shock to the worker. However, these thermal and electrical hazards were carried forward to theHE as potential initiators for events that could release hazardous material.


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The kinetic energy concern focuses linear or rotational motion, and acceleration or deceleration. Thisincludes mobile equipment including cranes, forklifts, and other vehicles, and fans, motors, and electricor pneumatic tools. The potential energy hazard involves sources of pressure, and height/mass. Sourcesof pressure include such equipment as coiled springs, gas bottles, pressurized systems (e.g., air), andpressure vessels. Sources of hazards related to height and mass include such equipment such as cranesand hoists, elevated doors, lifts, elevated work surfaces, scaffolds and ladders, floor pits, and facilitystructures. The physical hazards are pinch points during material movement, tripping hazards, andtemperature extremes in summer and winter. These were screened as SIHs since they are addressed byOSHA standards and site safety requirements. Hazardous materials screened were dusts, insecticides andcarbon monoxide buildup from diesel equipment used in the underground. These materials are of typesand quantities in everyday use by the general public, or are addressed by OSHA standards and site safetyrequirements and do not represent unique hazards.

Radiological Parameters for Consequence Analysis - The curie content of CH waste used inconsequence analysis for potential accidents that could result from the CH waste handling process at theWIPP was determined from DOE/CAO-95-1121, U.S. Department of Energy Waste Isolation Pilot PlantTransuranic Waste Baseline Inventory Report [TWBIR],11 and DOE/WIPP 91-058, RadionuclideInventory for the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant.12 The TWBIR provided estimated volumes of CH wastefrom DOE generator sites and identified waste streams by final waste form and radionuclideconcentration, expressed in terms of PE-Ci/55-gallon drum. The TWBIR further listed the major TRUisotopes that contribute to the PE-Ci content in each waste stream. The transuranic isotopes found inwaste containers are the result of various plutonium (Pu) processes with specific mixes or radionuclidedistributions. DOE/WIPP 91-05812 listed Pu-mixes and the associated isotopic weight distributionsproduced by generator sites throughout the complex.12

Using the mass limit of 200 fissile gram equivalent (FGE) for 55-gallon drums, and 325 FGE for SWBs,the Pu-mixes identified in DOE/WIPP 91-058,12 and scaled to PE-Ci for 55-gallon drums, an 80 PE-Cilimit for a 55-gallon drum was established by enveloping most waste streams identified in the TWBIR bya factor of five. Transportation limits were considered when establishing the curie input for siteconsequence analysis involving drums and SWBs. Fissile mass limits for transportation restricts a single55-gallon drum (also applies to a 85- and 100-gallon drum) to 200 FGE and SWB to 325 FGE, directloaded with CH TRU waste. The fissile limit for the inventory of the TRUPACT-II and HalfPACT is325 FGE. The direct loaded drum and SWB radionuclide inventory is established by converting thefissile mass limit for the container to PE-Ci (16.9 PE-Ci for a drum and 27.4 PE-Ci for a SWB). Fordrums, the PE-Ci value was multiplied by a factor of five, and rounded down to 80 PE-Ci. For a seven-pack of drums, the PE-Ci limit is 560 PE-Ci. SWBs were assigned the same value as drums.

The maximum radionuclide drum content of 80 PE-Ci encompasses over 99 percent of the waste volumecontaminated from Pu-239 and Pu-238 operations. Approximately 86 percent of the volume for all wasteforms, including the predominant heterogeneous, uncategorized metal, and combustible waste formsaverage less than 8 PE-Ci, and 70 percent average less than 3.0 PE-Ci. Overpacks consist of thefollowing: pipe overpack containers (POCs), SWB overpacks, TDOP overpacks and 85gal/100gal drumoverpacks. Overpacking involves placing waste containers into larger containers. Overpacks havehigher PE-Ci limits than direct loaded waste containers because of the double container arrangement. However, out of approximately 68,000 drums disposed in the underground, approximately 1,900 havebeen overpacks (not including POCs) and none of these have exceeded 80 PE-Ci and 95 percent havebeen 30 PE-Ci or less. There have been approximately 23,000 POCs disposed in the underground andnone of these have exceeded 80 PE-Ci and 95 percent have been 30 PE-Ci or less. Solidified/vitrifiedwaste has a higher PE-Ci limit than direct loaded waste containers because solidified/vitrified waste isnot damaged by fire or explosions. Overpacked and solidified/vitrified waste configurations were alsoconsidered in the UHE and AA.


3-18 November 2006

The following MAR values are used in the consequence analysis for the UHE:

• Single 55-gallon waste drum 80 PE-Ci

• Seven-pack of 55-gallon drums 560 PE-Ci

• One SWB or TDOP 560 PE-Ci

• Solidified/vitrified waste container 1,800 PE-Ci

• Overpacked waste containers - 55-gallon drums overpacked in 85-gallon or100 gallon drums, or 85-gallon drums overpacked in 100-gallon drums.

1100 PE-Ci

• Overpacked waste assemblies - four-packs of 85-gallon overpacked drums,three-packs of 100-gallon drums, SWBs and TDOPs overpacking drumsand a TDOP overpacking a SWB.

1200 PE-Ci

• Pipe Overpack Containers (POCs) including either 6-in. or 12-in. pipecomponents, or S100, S200, or S300 pipe components

1800 PE-Ci

These PE-Ci values are based on Pu-239. Larger drums are assumed to have the same radiologicalcontents as a 55-gallon drum. TDOPs have the same radiological content SWBs. TRUPACT-IIpackages may contain fourteen 55-gallon drums, eight 85-gallon drums, six 100-gallon drums, twoSWBs, or a single TDOP. The HalfPACT packages may contain one drum assembly or one SWB. Seven-packs of 55-gallon drums are used for the UHE.

Hazardous Constituents

The UHE is performed assuming no control on waste characteristics other than the curie content and thenumber of waste containers either allowed by the WIPP Hazardous Waste Facility Permit (HWFP)8 orrequested permit modifications. The waste restrictions of the permit are ultimately credited as controlsfor worker protection as shown in Tables A-13 and A-14. The HWFP8 lists the hazardous waste, asdefined in 40 CFR Part 261, Subparts C and D, Identification and Listing of Hazardous Waste,13 that maybe present with TRU waste from defense-related operations, which results in TRU mixed waste. Themost common hazardous constituents in the TRU mixed waste consist of metals (e.g., cadmium,chromium, lead, mercury, selenium, silver, and lead), solidified sludges, cemented laboratory liquids,waste from decontamination and decommissioning activities, and halogenated and non-halogenatedvolatile organic compounds (e.g., from solvents used to clean metal surfaces prior to plating, polishing,or fabrication, to dissolve other compounds, or as coolants). Concentrations of 29 VOCs in theheadspace gases have been calculated and is summarized in the HWFP.8 The most prevalent VOCsobserved in the headspace gases are methylene chloride and carbon tetrachloride. Other hazardousconstituents which appear as co-contaminants in TRU waste, and which are of interest in fire scenarios,include asbestos, beryllium, and polychlorinated biphenyls (PCBs).

There are no EGs for chemical consequence during accidents. Using the principles of co-detection, anyhazardous material release from breached waste containers will be accompanied with a radiologicalrelease. Hence the risk binning for radiological consequence will encompass any hazardous materialconsequences.


3-19 November 2006

CH Waste Acceptance Criteria

To ensure that waste accepted for disposal at WIPP meets criteria imposed by the HWFP, theU.S. Environmental Protection Agency Compliance Certification Decision, the Land Withdrawal Act andthe Certificates of Compliance for the TRUPACT-II and HalfPACT, the contents of every container ofwaste shipped to WIPP must meet the certification requirements contained in the CH WAC.14 The CHWAC14 specifies the fissile limits and waste content restrictions, and acceptable container types to betransported to and disposed of at WIPP. The CH WAC14 requires the generator sites to prepare a wastecertification program that lists the methods and techniques used for determining compliance with the CHWAC14 and associated quality criteria. The generator site programs must meet the requirements found inthe WIPP Waste Analysis Plan (WAP), Attachment 1 to the HWFP.8 The HWFP 8 and the CH WAC14

prohibit liquid waste, explosives, compressed gases, oxidizers, and pyrophorics. The following waste isunacceptable for shipment to the WIPP:

• Waste that exceeds 200mrem/hr on contact

• Ignitable, reactive, and corrosive waste

• Liquid wastes (all waste must meet the CH WAC14 criteria regarding residual liquid content)

• Compressed gases

• Incompatible waste (waste must be compatible with backfill, seal and panel closure materials,container, and shipping package materials as well as with other waste)

• Headspace-gas VOC concentrations resulting in average annual emissions not protective of humanhealth and the environment

• Wastes with EPA codes not listed in the HWFP8

The CH WAC14 further restricts liquid waste and limits residual liquid to less than one percent by volumeof the external container. The absence of these wastes is confirmed by real time radiography, visualexamination, and headspace gas analysis. Waste streams identified to contain incompatible materials ormaterials incompatible with waste containers cannot be shipped to WIPP unless they are treated toremove the incompatibility. If new hazardous waste codes are identified during the characterizationprocess, those wastes cannot be accepted for disposal at the WIPP until an HWFP 8 modification has beensubmitted to and approved by the New Mexico Environmental Department.

Waste containers are limited to 55-, 85-, and 100-gallon drums, SWBs, TDOPs or pipe overpackconfigurations. The details of each waste container is discussed in Chapter 2 of this DSA. The CHWAC14 also requires that waste containers are vented through individual particulate filters, allowing anygases that are generated by radiolytic and microbial processes within a waste container to escapepreventing over pressurization.


3-20 November 2006

3.3.2.2 Hazard Categorization

The hazard categorization for the WIPP, based on the CH waste handling process was developed inaccordance with DOE-STD-1027-92.2 The hazard category for a nonreactor nuclear facility isdetermined by the unmitigated release of radiological material from the facility. The material is thencompared against threshold quantities identified in Attachment 1 of the DOE-STD-1027-92.2 The WIPPhazard categorization does not assume segmentation.

The CH direct loaded waste container radionuclide inventory susceptible to an accidental release is80 PE-Ci for 55-, 85-, and 100-gallon drums and 560 PE-Ci in SWBs and TDOPs. Since this quantityexceeds the Hazard Category 2 minimum threshold of 56 Ci for Pu-239, the WIPP is categorized as aHazard Category 2 facility.

3.3.2.3 Hazard Evaluation

As part of the UHE for the CH waste handling process at WIPP, the basic assumptions and ICs areestablished to define the facility and the areas of the facility being evaluated. Assumptions are generalstatements that govern boundaries of the analysis and for WIPP are generally driven by the overall DOETRU waste program. The ICs identify those features or conditions that are used as an analysis referencebaseline to clarify a point of analysis that might otherwise be unstated. ICs delineate specific conditionsthat are part of normal facility operations and have an impact on the hazard analysis. For WIPP, ICs aretaken from the design basis, transportation limits for waste, and the HWFP.8 The ICs require TSRprotection to ensure the validity of the analysis. The assumption for the CH UHE is:

• CH waste is to be disposed of at the WIPP facility.

The ICs for the CH waste handling UHE include:

• Waste arrives at WIPP packaged in TRUPACT-II or HalfPACT shipping casks that meet DOTTYPE B requirements and are NRC approved casks.

• The waste inventory in the outside area is based on a modification to the HWFP 8 to increase theinventory in the outside area from 12 to 50 TRUPACT-IIs or HalfPACTs. A HalfPACT is treatedas a TRUPACT-II even though it holds less than a TRUPACT-II. TRUPACT-IIs and HalfPACTsare not opened until they are inside the CH bay of the WHB. In the WHB, the inventory is limitedto 18 facility pallets in the CH bay and four TRUPACT-IIs or HalfPACTs at the TRUDOCKs, withno more than seven pallets of waste stored in the northeast corner of the CH bay, no more thanseven pallets of waste stored in the southwest corner of the CH bay, no more than five pallets ofwaste stored near airlock 107, and one facility pallet in the shielded storage room. A facility palletholds four drum assemblies, 4 SWBs, or two TDOPs or a combination of containers. Waste inclosed shipping casks is not damaged due to the robustness of the shipping casks.

• Waste containers are not opened at WIPP.

• Waste disposal occurs at approximately 2,150 feet (ft) underground.

• Only diesel or electric powered vehicles are used in the WIPP underground.

• The WHB is of noncombustible construction.

WIPP CH DSA DOE/WIPP-95-2065, REV. 10 - Page Chg. CH-2007-001 CHAPTER 3 |

3-21 April 2007 |

• Only electric powered vehicles are used in the CH portion of the WHB.

• Waste is transported to the underground by way of the waste shaft only and only one facility palletcan be transported on the waste shaft conveyance.

• |A panel closure explosion-isolation wall is installed in the entries of Panels 1 and 2. A substantial |and isolation barrier is installed in the entries to panel 3 and subsequent panels once the panels are |filled. |

|In the HE tables in Appendix A, Tables A-9 through A-12, events are identified by a unique sequentialreference consisting of a combination of letters and numbers. The first two or three letters represent thefacility section (e.g., WHB for Waste Handling Building). The first number represents the event types asdescribed below and the second number (following the hyphen) represents the event sequential number. The event types include:

1. Fire

2. Explosion

3. Loss of containment/confinement

4. Direct radiological/chemical exposure

5. Nuclear criticality

6. External hazards

7. Natural phenomena

The comprehensive evaluation identified events associated with hazardous material and energy sources. The results of these activities are documented in Appendix A, Tables A-9 through A-12, which providepostulated events associated with the hazard sources and an unmitigated evaluation of each event interms of frequency, consequence, and risk. Frequency estimates for each of the events postulated arebased on engineering judgment or existing studies. Frequency estimates qualitatively account for theimpact ICs may have on individual events. In addition to the event development, potential controls thatmight reduce the frequency or lessen the consequences of an event were identified for each event. Thecontrols identified are presented in the HE tables in Appendix A, Tables A-9 through A-12, along withindication as to their preventive or mitigative function, and whether the controls are administrative innature or design features.

Event selection is the process of identifying the events that require further evaluation in MHE and AA. Events are identified for further evaluation based on the risk for each of the receptors based onAppendix A, Table A-8. Using the results of the UHE process, the events requiring further evaluationwere identified. The events requiring further analysis grouped by their event type are as follows:

Fire Event numbers - WHB1-1, WHB1-2, WHB1-3, WHB1-4, WHB1-5, UG1-1,UG1-2, UG1-3A, UG1-3B, UG1-4, UG1-5 |

Explosion Event numbers - WHB2-1, WHB2-2, WHB2-3, WHB2-4, UG2-1, UG2-2,UG2-3, UG2-5A, UG2-5B |

Loss of containment/confinement

Event numbers - WHB3-1, WHB3-2, WHB3-3, WHB3-5, WHB3-6, UG1-6,UG2-6, UG3-1A, UG3-1B, UG3-3A, UG3-3B, UG3-4, UG3-5, UG3-6, UG3-7, |UG3-8, UG3-9, UG3-10


3-22 November 2006

Direct exposure Event numbers - None identified based on risk

Nuclear criticality Event numbers - OA5-1, WHB5-1, UG5-1

External hazards Event numbers - OA6-4, WHB6-1, WHB6-2, WHB6-3, UG6-2, BG6-1

Natural phenomena Event numbers - OA7-2, OA7-3, WHB7-1, WHB7-2, WHB7-3, WHB7-4,WHB7-5, WHB7-6, WHB7-7, UG7-4, UG7-5, BG7-1

Each of these events was further evaluated in NS-05-001.10 The basis for the MAR used for theevaluation of these events is described in Section 3.4.1.2. Public and worker safety are the traditionalfocus of HEs. These events are evaluated against the worker protection requirements inDOE-STD-3009-94.3 The potential controls are based on several considerations, including selectingSSCs over ACs, passive features over active features, prevention over mitigation, selection of controlsthat are closest to the hazard, and selection of controls that may be effective for multiple events. Theeffectiveness of the controls and ease of control implementation is also considered. The evaluation forworker protection is shown in Appendix A, Tables A-13 and A-14, which indicate controls chosen forfunctional classification as SS and ACs to be included in the TSRs.

3.3.2.3.1 Planned Design and Operational Safety Improvements

There are no planned improvements at this time.

3.3.2.3.2 Defense in Depth

As an approach to facility safety, DID has extensive precedent in nuclear safety philosophy. It builds inlayers of defense against release of hazardous materials so that no one layer by itself, no matter howgood, is completely relied upon. This includes protection of the barriers to avert damage to the plant andto the barriers themselves. It includes further measures to protect the public, workers, and theenvironment from harm in case these barriers are not fully effective.

The first layer of DID typically involves barriers to contain uncontrolled hazardous material or energyrelease. The second layer of DID typically involves preventive systems to protect those barriers and thethird typically involves systems to mitigate uncontrolled hazardous material or energy releases uponbarrier failure.

During the hazard evaluation process potential preventive and mitigative features were identified for eachevent in Tables A-9 through A-12. The features are either design or administrative in nature. Thefeatures that are credited for prevention or mitigation of each event are identified in Table A-13 or A-14for site and facility worker protection or in Section 3.4 AA for protection of the public. The remainder ofthe preventive and mitigative features for a specific event identified in the hazard evaluation tablesprovide DID for that event. Not all available design or administrative features are credited. Controlswere selected based on providing the greatest worker protection and additional controls were selected ifthey prevented/mitigated different initiators for events in the same areas.

Safety Significant SSCs

SS SSCs and ACs were chosen to provide worker protection and significant contribution to DID. Theseselections are indicated Tables A-13 and A-14. The SS SSCs are described and evaluated in Chapter 4,carried forward to Chapter 5, and are protected in the TSRs. The ACs are carried forward to Chapter 5and protected in the TSRs


3-23 April 2007 |

TSRs

TSRs are derived in Chapter 5. TSRs are derived in Chapter 5. TSRs impose controls to protect theSSCs, ACs, ICs, and design features that provide protection of the public, the worker, or provide asignificant contribution to DID. The barriers and preventive and mitigative features to control releasesfrom waste containers represent a menu of controls without regard to functional classification.

3.3.2.3.3 Worker Safety

The UHE for CH waste handling identified a number of waste handling process hazards that couldpotentially result in worker exposure to radiological and hazardous materials, or worker injury. Reduction of the risk to workers from accidents is accomplished at WIPP primarily by design featuresand controls that reduce the frequency or consequences of hazardous events, or both. This is consistentwith (1) 10 CFR §830.205, "Technical Safety Requirements"16; (2) the DID philosophy; and (3) thephilosophy of Process Safety Management (PSM), as published in 29 CFR §1910.119, "Process SafetyManagement of Highly Hazardous Chemicals."17

Potential preventive and mitigative design features and ACs for each postulated deviation were identifiedin the in the UHE Tables A-9 through A-12 in Appendix A. Any event in the UHE with a risk of I or IIto the worker resulted in the identification of SS SSCs and/or ACs, as appropriate, for worker protectionThose SSCs or controls that are credited to prevent or mitigate worker consequences from accidents areidentified in Appendix A, Tables A-13 and A-14. Any event in the UHE with a risk of III but with highconsequence was also evaluated and any controls necessary for worker protection were included inTables A-13 and A-14. A qualitative assessment of the effectiveness of these controls is documented onthe site worker and facility worker MHE summary tables. Events with multiple initiators and multiplecontrols are annotated within the UHE tables to link the preventive/mitigative design feature and AC tothe specific cause. Those events that resulted in different consequences for different initiators are notedin NS-05-004.10

3.3.2.3.4 Environmental Protection

The potential for airborne radiological releases in the event that waste containers are breached is theprimary concern with respect to CH waste handling, storage, and disposal operations. The potential forradiological releases is minimized by the those preventive and mitigative design features and ACsidentified in Appendix A Tables A-13 and A-14 and the SC controls identified in Section 3.4 of thischapter. The features that provide DID also provide environmental protection. Additional protectionfrom hazardous materials and waste is described in Chapter 8 of this DSA.

3.3.2.3.5 Accident Selection

From Section 3.3.2.3, the events from the UHE requiring AA, grouped based on the event type, are asfollows:

Fires Event numbers - WHB1-1, WHB1-2, WHB1-3, WHB1-4, WHB1-5, UG1-1,UG1-2, UG1-3A, UG1-4, UG1-5 |

Explosion Event numbers - WHB2-3, WHB2-4, UG2-1, UG2-5A |

Loss of containment/ confinement

Event numbers - WHB3-3, WHB3-5, WHB3-6, UG1-6, UG2-6, UG3-1A, |UG3-3A, UG3-3B, UG3-4, UG3-5, UG3-6, UG3-8, UG3-9, UG3-10 |


3-24 November 2006

Nuclear criticality Event numbers - OA5-1, WHB5-1

External hazards Event numbers - OA6-4, WHB6-1, WHB6-2, WHB6-3, WHB6-4, UG6-2, BG6-1

Natural phenomena Event numbers - WHB7-1, WHB7-2, WHB7-3, WHB7-4, WHB7-5, WHB7-6,WHB7-7, UG7-3, UG7-4, UG7-6 (consequences for UG7-5 are the same as UG7-6, however the likelihood of UG7-5 is extremely unlikely. Therefore, the risk didnot warrant accident analysis), BG7-1

3.4 Accident Analysis

This section quantitatively analyzes the postulated accident scenarios selected as discussed in Section 3.3and tabulated in Appendix A. The selected CH accidents are considered DBAs as defined inDOE-STD-3009-94.3 These DBAs are used to estimate the response of WIPP SSCs to the range ofaccident scenarios that bound the envelope of accident conditions to which the facility could be subjectedand evaluate accident consequences. The purpose of the AA is to identify SC SSCs and TSRs necessaryto maintain accident consequences such that the accident EG criteria of 25 rem for the off-site public isnot exceeded or significantly challenged. To establish SC SSCs and or TSR controls, the accidentconsequences are analyzed for the maximally exposed off-site individual (MOI) located at the WIPPExclusive Use Area (EUA) boundary. The EUA is within the site boundary and is used in lieu of the siteboundary because the public has unrestricted access up to the EUA boundary.

The models and assumptions used in the analysis for determining the amount of radioactivity released tothe environment and the extent of exposure to the MOI are provided in the following sections. Activityreleases to the environment are given for each postulated accident. Committed Effective DoseEquivalents (50-year CEDE) were calculated for the MOI.

The radioactive material in the CH waste that has the potential to be released to the off-site environmentis contained within the waste container. Physical properties and assumptions for CH waste containerinventories used in this analysis are presented in Section 3.3.2.3.

The conservatism in the safety analysis assumptions overestimated rather than underestimated potentialconsequences. This is consistent with DOE-STD-3009-943 and provides a reasonable assurance that thesafety envelope of the facility is defined, the design of the facility is adequate, and the TSRs derived willprovide for the protection of the public, the worker, and the environment.

The CH HA includes operational, natural phenomena, and external events. Operational events are binnedinto three major accident categories, fire, explosions and breach of waste container. Breaches of wastecontainers may occur due to drops, punctures, or crushes. Waste container drops are evaluated based onthe energy involved due to drop height. Due to the differences in release and dispersion mechanisms,accidents of each category are evaluated in the surface and underground areas of the facility.

3.4.1 Methodology

3.4.1.1 Receptors

The WIPP Land Management Plan (DOE/WIPP 93-004)18 allows access to the WIPP 16-section area upto the EUA shown in Figure 1.3-2. Although analyses are traditionally conducted for an MOI at thefacility site boundary, the assumed location of the MOI for this analysis is at the closest point of publicaccess, or the EUA. The closest distance to the EUA boundary from the underground exhaust shaft ventor the WHB is approximately 935 ft (285 m) as shown in Figure 3.4-1.


3-25 November 2006

3.4.1.2 Source Term

The following equation from DOE Handbook (HDBK) 3010-94, Airborne Release Fractions/Rates andRespirable Fractions for Nonreactor Nuclear Facilities,19 reflects the calculation for source term:

Q = MAR * DR * ARF * RF * LPF

where:

Q = The Source Term (Ci or mg)

MAR = Material At Risk - The maximum amount and type of material present that may beacted upon with the potentially dispersive energy source (Ci or mg).

DR = Damage Ratio - The DR is that fraction of the MAR actually impacted by the accidentcondition.

ARF = Airborne Release Fraction - The fraction of radioactive material actually impacted bythe accident condition that is suspended in air.

RF = Respirable Fraction - Fraction of the airborne radioactive particles that are in therespirable size range (i.e., less than 10 :m in aerodynamic equivalent diameter).

LPF = Leakpath Factor - The LPF is the cumulative fraction of airborne material that escapesto the atmosphere from the postulated accident.

The quantity MAR is calculated as the quantity (container inventory [CI] * containers damaged [CD]),where CI is the waste container radiological inventory, and CD is the number of containers breachedduring the accident.

The resulting equation is:

Q = CI * CD * DR * ARF * RF * LPF (3-1)

Each of the source term variables is dependent upon the accident under consideration. The conservatismin each of the variables is consistent with DOE-STD-3009-94.3

Material at Risk (MAR)

DOE-STD-3009-943 states that the source term should represent a reasonable maximum for a givenprocess or activity. As described in Section 3.3.2.1, the maximum drum radionuclide inventory for directloaded waste containers is 80 PE-Ci with a maximum of 560 PE-Ci in a drum assembly (seven-pack of55-gallon drums) and the maximum direct loaded SWB or TDOP radionuclide inventory is 560 PE-Ci. For solidified/vitrified waste and POCs the maximum radiological inventory for any waste container is1,800 PE-Ci. The limit for undamaged drums overpacked in drums, SWBs or TDOPs is 1,100 PE-Ci peroverpacked drum not to exceed 1,200 PE-Ci per assembly. The containers damaged are determined ineach specific accident scenario. The actual radionuclide inventory of waste containers received at WIPPis typically much lower than the direct loaded waste container limits.

NS-05-00110 analyzes each event with direct loaded 55-gallon drum seven-pack configurations, SWBs,solidified/vitrified and overpack containers. The most bounding case was selected as the basis forcontrol selection. In most cases the assumption of a full inventory of drum in drum overpacks bounds theMAR contribution from direct loaded containers because of the significantly higher radionuclideinventory even though these overpacks have lower damage ratios and are not susceptible to unconfinedburning.


3-26 April 2007|

The MHE/AA is based on the bounding consequences of direct loaded or all four assemblies on a facilitypallet being an overpack. This is a conservative basis considering that out of 68,000 containers in theunderground, approximately 36 percent have been overpacks but 95 percent of these have been POCswhich are not susceptible to fires and explosions. Therefore when POCs are excluded, all otheroverpacks constitute no more than 3 percent of the total inventory currently disposed. A significantincrease in the ratio of overpacks to direct loaded containers is not expected in which case considering100 percent of future receipts as overpacks is a bounding basis which eliminates the need for specificcontrols to protect inventory assumptions for MHE/AA.

Damage Ratio (DR)

From DOE-STD-3009-94,3 damage ratio (DR) is that fraction of material actually impacted by theaccident conditions. Waste containers are damaged by fires, explosions, and loss of confinement eventsthat include drops, punctures and crushes. The DRs assigned to each event and its basis is explained inNS-05-001.10 The following summarizes the DRs assigned for each type of event:

Fires

Waste containers are postulated to burn in two ways:

• Unconfined burning - Lid loss occurs, exposing the contents to the atmosphere and with heat inputfrom the initial fire, the drum contents burn. A fraction of the radioactive particulate containedwithin the drum is lost into the fire plume and is distributed by the plume.

• Confined burning - Lid loss does not occur. The gasket or seal is thermally degraded by the fireand loss of containment occurs as heated air and pyrolysis products escape from the drum at the lidseal.

Based on RFP-5098, Safety Analysis and Risk Assessment Handbook33 and WHC-SD-SQA-ANAL-501,Fire Protection Guide for Waste Drum Storage Arrays34 a damage ratio of 1.0 is assigned for those wastecontainers burning in an unconfined manner and a damage ratio of 0.5 is assigned for those burningconfined.

The DR assigned to direct loaded drums exposed to fire events is 1.0 for those in which the lid is ejectedand 0.5 for those which only encounter seal failure. For drums experiencing lid loss a fraction of thedrum waste contents will be ejected and burn unconfined. The waste remaining in the drum willcontinue to burn as confined combustible material. The DR for direct loaded SWBs and TDOPs is 0.5with confined burning. The DR for waste overpacked in drums, SWB or TDOPs is 0.1 with confinedburning. POCs and waste containers with solidified/vitrified waste are not damaged by fires.

Explosions

Two waste container explosions types are evaluated. An internal deflagration within a waste containerand an external deflagration in close proximity to the waste containers. Based on HNF-19492, RevisedHydrogen Deflagration Analysis,21 the internal deflagration results in a total damage ratio of 1.0 with 5percent of the material ejecting from the waste container. In filled panels, waste containers do not|experience lid loss or material ejection due to the presence of MgO or other waste containers on top of |each container. Gas generation rates in a filled panel are expected to be low, less than 1 percent methane|(20 percent of the lower explosive limit [LEL]) and less than 1 percent hydrogen (25 percent of the LEL)|after 5 years.22, 23|

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Direct loaded waste containers subjected to external explosions are given a DR of 1.0. Drumsoverpacked in drums, SWBs, or TDOPs do not eject their lids and only 95 percent burns in a confinedmanner. Solidified/vitrified waste and POCs are not damaged.

Loss of Confinement Events

CH waste containers are breached by collision impacts, drops, crushes, and punctures.

Collision Impacts - CH direct loaded drums involved in vehicle collisions in the WHB are given a DR of0.1 based on EM Guidance on Analysis and Control of TRU Waste Accidents.20 The guidance states thatlow speed vehicle impact such as a forklift is given a DR of 0.1. There are two exceptions to this DR. One is for an external vehicle collision into the WHB resulting in the damage of waste containers. If thevehicle has enough energy to breach the WHB wall it is not considered a low speed impact. For thisevent (WHB6-2) a DR of 1.0 is used. The other exception is for vehicle collisions in the underground. These events are given a DR of 1.0 due to the large size and speed of the vehicles. A damage ratio of0.05 is used for high speed/large vehicle side impacts to POC based on TD-SWO-012. For qualified low-speed impacts SWBs and overpacked drums are given half the DR of direct loaded drums (0.05). POCsand solidified/vitrified waste is not damaged.

Drops -Waste container drops are characterized by three categories:

• Drops less than 4 ft - The waste containers are certified to meet the requirements for DOT Type Aor equivalent and do not release their contents when dropped a distance of 4 ft or less. The DR fordrops less than or equal to 4 ft is zero.

• Drops greater than 4 ft but less than 13 meters - Based on EM Guidance onAnalysis and Control of TRU Waste Accidents,20 direct loaded drums dropped from heights <13meters are assigned a damage ratio of 0.1. SWBs and overpacked drums are given a DR of half thatof direct loaded drums (0.05). POCs and solidified/vitrified waste is not damaged.

• Drops greater than 13 meters - Direct loaded waste containers and drums overpacked in drums,SWBs, or TDOPs are given a DR of 1.0. This includes the waste hoist drop which is nominally2,150 ft. POCs and solidified/vitrified waste is also given a damage ratio of 0.5.

Crushes - Crush of waste containers occurs when objects fall on them. This occurs from falling objectsin the WHB or the underground, and collapse of the WHB or an underground mined room. For fallingobjects or other waste containers in the WHB, a DR of 0.5 is assigned for direct loaded drums. SWB,TDOPs, and drums overpacked in drums are given a DR of 0.25. POCs and solidified/vitrified waste arenot damaged. For object of slabs of mined salt falling onto waste containers, a DR of 1.0 is assigned fordirect loaded drums. SWB, TDOPs, and drums overpacked in drums are given a DR of 0.5. POCs andsolidified/vitrified waste are not damaged. For collapse of the WHB and an underground mined room, a |DR of 0.1 is assigned for direct loaded drums, 0.05 for SWBs, drums overpacked in drums, and TDOPs. |POCs and solidified/vitrified waste are not damaged. A DR of 0.1 is also used for crush due to salt |convergence. |

Punctures - Punctures occur either from forklift tines, ejected roof bolts, wind-borne missiles, or |compressed gas cylinder missiles, including self-contained self-rescuers (SCSRs)/trauma kits with O2 |bottles. For forklift tine and roof bolt punctures, direct loaded is given a DR of 0.1. SWB, TDOPs, and |drums overpacked in drums are given a DR of 0.05. POCs are assigned a DR of 0.01 andsolidified/vitrified waste is not damaged. For compressed gas cylinders and wind-borne missiles directloaded waste, SWBs, TDOPs, and overpacked drums are given a DR of 1.0 unless the gas cylinder is the |


3-28 April 2007\August 2007|

size of a SCSRs or trauma kit O2 bottle, in which case a DR of 0.05 is assigned. POCs and solidified|vitrified waste is not damaged by compressed gas missiles. |

Airborne Release and Respirable Fractions

Bounding values for the ARFs and the RFs for events in which the waste container contents are subjectedto burning/heat are based on DOE-HDBK-3010-94.19 Only combustible contents are assumed in eventsinvolving the burning or heating of waste containers. The ARF for burning of combustible wastecontainer contents, confined to the container, is 5.0E-04 and RF of 1.0. For combustible contentsreleased from the waste container (unconfined) during fire/heating events, the ARF is 1.0E-02 with a RFof 1.0. Although the waste received at WIPP may contain plastics and cellulose, this bounding ARF andRF are used for all fire consequence assessment.

The ARF for contaminated materials in a waste container that are subjected to impact (drop, puncture, orcrush) and breach of the waste container is 1.0E-03. The RF is 0.1 except for drops down the wasteshaft, in which case the RF is 1.0 because the event would cause an energetic release of the materials. Both values are based on DOE-HDBK-3010-94.19

The total ARF*RF, for direct loaded waste subjected to an internal explosion (deflagration) of in thewaste container is taken from HNF-19492, Revised Hydrogen Deflagration Analysis.21 Values forARF*RF in HNF-1949221 are based on experimental results in which the amount of waste materialejected from a drum in which a hydrogen explosion occurs was determined to be proportional to thehydrogen concentration in the drum at the time of the explosion. Conclusions from experimental resultswere that 5 percent of the MAR would be ejected by the explosion and of that, 18 percent would burnunconfined with an ARF*RF of 3.0E-0221 (50 percent cellulosic and 50 percent plastic). The other82 percent of the ejected waste (unburned) would be subjected to forces that could remove contaminationfrom the waste with an ARF*RF of 1.0E-03. The waste remaining in the drum after the explosion(95 percent of MAR) will continue to burn as confined combustible material with an ARF*RF of5.0E-04.19

Based on RFP-5098, Safety Analysis and Risk Assessment Handbook33 flammable gas explosions externalto waste container are given an ARF of 5.0E-03 and a RF of 3.0E-01.

Leakpath Factor

A LPF of 1.0 is used for all releases from the WHB. Based on WIPP-05-0001 Evaluation of Leak Path|Factor for the WIPP Underground37, no reduction in unmitigated LPF has been given for underground|releases in the active disposal areas except the underground roof collapse. The roof collapse is given a|LPF of 0.1 due to the encapsulation of the release by the fallen roof. |

|Panels 1 and 2 have explosion isolation walls installed that prevent airflow within a filled panel such that|radiological releases within the closed panel have no motive force or pathway to propagate from the|closed panel. The LPF for closed panels is 0.0. Subsequent panels will have a substantial and isolation|barrier installed in the panel entries such that airflow within a filled panel is minimal. Based on PLG-|1167, Analysis of Roof Falls and Methane Gas Explosions in Closed Rooms and Panels38, airflow|leakage of 0.04 occurs through rooms closed with chainlink and brattice, such that a conservative LPF of|0.1 is assigned to panels with substantial and isolation barriers. An additional LPF of 0.1 is assigned for|roof fall events for panels 7 and 8 occurring in a filled panel due to the reduced pathway from fallen salt,|such that the total LPF for roof fall is 0.01. |


3-29 April 2007 |

The following table summarizes the damage ratio (DR), ARF, and RFs used for each type of event included in the unmitigated consequence |analysis:

DR, ARF, and RF Summary

Event Type Waste Container/Configuration

DR ARF RF

External Fire33 Direct Loaded 1.0 or 0.5 (confinedburning)

0.33 (non-confinedburning) and 0.67(confined burning)

5.0E-04 (confinedburning)

1.0E-02 (non-confined burning)or 5.0E-04(confined burning)

1.0 (confined andnon-confined)

POCs No damage NA NA

Overpacked Waste,SWBs and TDOPs

0.1 (confinedburning)



Solidified Waste No damage NA NA

Internal WasteContainer Fire33

Direct Loaded 0.5 (confinedburning)









Flammable GasExplosion33

Direct Loaded 0.1 5.0E-03 3.0E-01



0.1 5.0E-03 3.0E-01


Internal WasteContainerExplosion21

(After panels are |filled no unconfined |burning is expected) |

Direct Loaded 1.0 (0.5 ejected with18% non-confinedburning and 82%non-burningrelease, and 0.95confined burning)

3.0E-02 (ejectedburn ARF1.0E-03 (ejectednon-burn ARF)5.0E-04 (confinedburning)

1.0




5.0E-04 1.0



3-30 April 2007 |

Drops/Spills (dropsless than 13meters)20




0.05 1.0E-03 1.0E-01


Waste Hoist Drop Direct Loaded 1.0 1.0E-03 1.0E+00

POCs 0.5 1.0E-03 1.0E-01


1.0 1.0E-03 1.0E+00

Solidified Waste 0.5 1.0E-03 1.0E-01

Forklift TinePuncture33

Direct Loaded 0.1 1.0E-03 1.0E+00

POCs 0.01 2.0E-03 3.0E-01


0.05 1.0E-03 1.0E+00


Roof bolt puncture| Direct Loaded| 0.1| 1.0E-03| 1.0E+00||POCs| 0.01| 1.0E-03| 1.0E+00||Overpacked Waste,|SWBs and TDOPs|

0.05||

1.0E-03| 1.0E+00|

|Solidified Waste| No damage| NA| NA|

Vehicle Collision low speedimpact20




0.05 1.0E-03 1.0E-01


Vehicle Collision high speed/largevehicle impact


POCs 0.05 1.0E-03 1.0E-01


1.0 1.0E-03 1.0E-01


Compressed GasCylinder /WindBorne Missiles33




1.0 1.0E-03 1.0E-01



3-31 August 2007 |

Self-Contained |Self-Rescuers/ |Trauma Kit O2 |Bottles |

Direct Loaded |0.05 |1.0E-03 |1.0E-01 ||POCs |No damage |NA |NA ||Overpacked Waste, |SWBs and TDOPs |

0.05 |1.0E-03 |1.0E-01 |

|Solidified Waste |No damage |NA |NA |

Objects falling fromunderground roof




0.5 1.0E-03 1.0E-01


Underground RoofCollapse38




0.1 1.0E-03 1.0E-01


Lightning Strike Direct Loaded 1.0 or 0.5 (confinedburning)

0.33 (non-confinedburning) and 0.67(confined burning)


1.0E-02 (non-confined burning)or 5.0E-04(confined burning)

1.0 (confined andnon-confined)







Collapse of WHB33 Direct Loaded 0.1 1.0E-03 1.0E-01



0.1 1.0E-03 1.0E-01


3.4.1.3 Dispersion Modeling

Nuclear Regulatory Guide (NUREG) 1.145, Atmospheric Dispersion Models for Potential AccidentConsequence Assessments at Nuclear Power Plants,24 methodology was used to develop the atmosphericdispersion coefficients to assess accidental releases from the WIPP underground exhaust shaft and theWHB exhaust vent. NUREG 1.14524 provides an NRC acceptable methodology to determinesite-specific relative concentration values, P/Q, and the model reflects experimental data on diffusion


3-32 November 2006

from releases at ground level at open sites and from releases at various locations on reactor facilitybuildings during stable atmospheric conditions with low wind speeds.

The relative concentration value or the atmospheric dispersion coefficient (P/Q) is the time integratednormalized air concentration at the receptor. It represents the dilution of an airborne contaminant due toatmospheric mixing and turbulence. It is the ratio of the average contaminant air concentration at thereceptor to the contaminant release rate at the release point. It is used to determine the doseconsequences for a receptor based on the quantity released (i.e., the source term), atmosphericconditions, and the distance to the receptor of interest.

The P/Q values in this DSA are generated using a computer program called GXQ(WHC-SD-GN-SWD-30002, GXQ Program Users Guide).25 The GXQ program has been verified toproduce P/Q values consistent with NUREG 1.14524 methodology. The GXQ program used WIPP sitespecific three-year averaged meteorological data obtained at the site meteorology tower. All GXQatmospheric dispersion coefficients are generated using the methods described in the NUREG 1.14524

regulatory position 3, as recommended in DOE-STD-3009-94.3 The fire modeling credits 1 cm/secdeposition velocity.

Two types of release models are provided in NUREG 1.145:24 (1) releases through vents or otherbuilding penetrations, and (2) stack releases. All release points or areas that are effectively lower than2.5 times the height of adjacent solid structures are typically considered nonstack releases. However,NUREG1.14524 provides for stack modeling in such cases where it can be demonstrated that the verticalvelocity of the effluent plumes will be maintained during the course of the accident. In the unmitigatedunderground events, the underground exhaust fans are assumed to continue to run during the course ofthe accident maintaining a vertical velocity of the plume. Therefore, releases from underground eventsare assumed to be a stack release from an elevation equivalent to the actual height of the undergroundexhaust fan ducts instead of a ground level release. Continued operation of ventilation for undergroundevents results in higher consequences to the MOI because without ventilation flow a release from theunderground would be greatly reduced. WHB events were considered to be nonstack (ground level)releases. For high wind and tornado events, only 10% of the 95th percentile P/Q is used.33

The following summarizes the P/Q values used:

Receptor P/Q FireEvents

P/Q Non-fireEvents

Receptor P/Q FireEvents

P/Q Non-fireEvents

WHB onsiteworker

3.79E-03 5.00E-03 Underground onsiteworker

5.56E-04 5.52E-04

WHB Public(MOI)

3.36E-04 3.99E-04 Underground Public(MOI)

2.44E-04 2.58E-04

3.4.1.4 Consequence

Consequence assessment calculations are determined for the MOI located at the EUA boundary and theon-site worker (328 ft [100 m]) for releases from the WHB and the underground exhaust shaft vent. Atmospheric transport is the only significant release and exposure pathway during normal operations andaccident conditions during the disposal phase. Based on the site characteristics information in Chapter 1,surface water and groundwater transport from normal or accidental releases of radioactive material is notconsidered. Human exposure pathways from the airborne radioactive material include inhalation, airimmersion, ingestion, and ground shine. Radiological dose consequences, utilizing a dose conversionfactors (DCF) from International Commission on Radiological Protection (ICRP) Publication 68, Dose


3-33 November 2006

Coefficients for Intakes of Radionuclides by Workers26, and ICRP Publication 72, Age-Dependent Dosesto Members of the Public from Intake of Radionuclides,27 are calculated assuming the inhalation pathwayin CEDE and using Equation 3-5. Previous revisions of the DSA used ICRP 28, The Principles andGeneral Procedures for Handling Emergency and Accidental Exposures of Workers28 and ICRP 30,Limits for Intakes of Radionuclides by Workers29 for DCFs but this revision has transitioned to the use ofICRP 68/72 to be in agreement with current practices. External (ground shine and air immersion) andingestion dose calculations are not performed due to their minimal contribution to the Total EffectiveDose Equivalent (TEDE). CEDE will be reported as the dose consequences for each of the accidentsevaluated. The calculated dose in CEDE is then compared to the MOI radiological EG of 25 rem. Themain hazardous constituent of concern in CH waste is beryllium in the form of fines or shavings. Usingthe principles of co-detection, any hazardous material release from breached waste containers will beaccompanied with a radiological release. Radiological consequence will encompass any hazardousmaterial consequences.

Source term and consequence calculations for each postulated accident was performed and documentedin NS-05-001.10 Results of these calculations are presented in Table 3.4.1 and described in thedescriptions of the DBAs. To assess the potential releases of radiological material the followingequation was utilized:

Radiological Releases

D = Q * P/Q * BR * DCF (3-5)

where:

D = Radiological dose CEDE (rem)Q = Radiological Source Term (Ci) P/Q = Atmospheric dispersion coefficients calculated for specific distances (s/m3).BR = Breathing rate for standard man (m3/sec) International Commission on Radiological

Protection Report No.23 (Report of the Task Group on Reference Man)30 Light activity5.3 gallons/min (20.0 liters/min or 3.33 E-04 m3/sec)

DCF = Dose Conversion Factor (rem/Ci) Internal Dose Conversion Factors for Calculation ofDose to the Public (Pu-239 Type M CEDE Inhalation Class 1.85E+08 rem/Ci)27

3.4.1.5 Off-Site Radiological/Nonradiological Evaluation Guideline

The EG is 25 rem TEDE. The dose estimates to be compared to it are those received by a hypotheticalMOI at the WIPP EUA boundary. Unmitigated release dose calculations for comparison against the EGare used to determine whether the potential level of hazard in the specific facility section warrants SCSSC designation.3 The EG is generally accepted as a value indicative of no significant health effects(i.e., low risk of latent health effects and no risk of prompt health effects). For the purposes of thisanalysis, SC controls are designated for unmitigated consequences that challenge the EG. If unmitigatedconsequences to the public exceeds 15 rem, it is judged to challenge the EG. This is a reasonable valuebased on the level of conservatism in the analysis and the location of WIPP relative to the general public.Specific examples of the conservatism include:

• The MAR used in the analysis is conservative as discussed in Section 3.3.2. The actual radionuclideinventory of waste containers received at WIPP is much lower than the analyzed waste containerlimits.

• Fire scenarios use instantaneous release as opposed to delayed release fractions.

WIPP CH DSA DOE/WIPP-95-2065, REV. 10 - CH Page Chg. 2007-001 CHAPTER 3|

3-34 April 2007|

• Use of bounding RFs/ARFs

• Use of a LPF = 1.0 for both unmitigated and mitigated consequences except as explained in 3.4.1.2|above.|

• Use of minimum distance to the EUA boundary rather than the site boundary.

3.4.2 Design Basis Accidents

3.4.2.1 CH-1 – Fire in the WHB

3.4.2.1.1 Scenario Development

Unmitigated Accident Initiation

Five events were identified in the UHE that represented significant risk to the public for fire in the WHB:

• Small Fire (WHB1-1)

• Full Room Fire (WHB1-2)

• Multi-Room Fire (WHB1-3)

• Fire Starts within a Waste Container (WHB1-4)

• Electric Forklift Fire (WHB1-5)

WHB1-1 – The small fire in the WHB is caused by the malfunction or overheating of electricalequipment. This subsequently ignites nearby combustibles.

WHB1-2 and 1-3 - Because of the ICs (noncombustible construction of the WHB and inventory storagelocations), the UHE postulated that a maximum of seven pallets of waste would be impacted by a fire inthe CH bay of the WHB. Based on WSMS-WIPP-05-0004, WIPP WHB Fire Severity Calculations,31 theWHB CH bay does not develop into a fully involved fire which is simultaneous burning of the WHBcombustibles. The postulated fire is a burning 13-ton electric forklift with a facility pallet loaded withwaste in close proximity to other waste in the WHB. WHB1-4 – A fire spontaneously ignites and burns within a single waste container. The fire does notpropagate to any other surrounding waste containers.

WHB1-5 – A 13-ton electric forklift fire occurs away from the stored waste in the WHB. It is postulatedto damage the forklift payload only. This consists of one facility pallet.


3-35 November 2006

3.4.2.1.2 Source Term Analysis

Unmitigated Scenario

WHB1-1 – The source term for this event is developed in NS-05-001.10 One direct loaded drumassembly results in the highest consequence for this event and consists of 560 PE-Ci. Using the firesource term methodology in RFP-5098, Safety Analysis and Risk Assessment Handbook33 andWHC-SD-SQA-ANAL-501, Fire Protection Guide for Waste Drum Storage Arrays,34 the followingvalues were developed: It is assumed all the waste containers burn in a confined manner experiencingseal failure with a DR of 0.5 and an ARF*RF of 5.0E-04. No credit is taken for filtration or deposition,resulting in a LPF of 1.0. The total source term for this event is 1.40E-01 PE-Ci.

WHB1-2 and WHB1-3 – The source term for these events are developed in NS-05-001.10 Direct loadedSWBs result in the highest consequence for this event. Based on WSMSC-06-0003, FHA Fire ScenarioSupporting Calculation,32 the MAR is 8 SWBs at 560 PE-Ci each for a total of 4480 PE-Ci. All thedrums experience seal failure and burn in a confined manner with a DR of 0.5 and an ARF*RF of5.0E-04. No credit is taken for filtration or deposition, resulting in a LPF of 1.0. The total source termfor this event is 1.12E+00 PE-Ci.

WHB1-4 – The source term for this event is developed in NS-05-001.10 A direct loaded SWB results inthe highest consequence for this event. The MAR is 1 SWB at 560 PE-Ci. Using the fire source termmethodology in RFP-5098, Safety Analysis and Risk Assessment Handbook33 the following values weredeveloped: It is assumed the drum burns in a confined manner with a DR of 0.5 and an ARF*RF of 5.0E-04. No credit is taken for filtration or deposition, resulting in a LPF of 1.0. The total source term for thisevent is 1.40E-01 PE-Ci.

WHB1-5 – The source term for this event is developed in NS-05-001.10 Direct loaded SWBs result in thehighest consequence for this event. The MAR is 4 SWBs at 560 PE-Ci each for a total of 2240 PE-Ci. Using the fire source term methodology in RFP-5098, Safety Analysis and Risk Assessment Handbook33

and WHC-SD-SQA-ANAL-501, Fire Protection Guide for Waste Drum Storage Arrays,34 the followingvalues were developed: It is assumed all the waste containers burn in a confined manner experiencingseal failure with a DR of 0.5 and an ARF*RF of 5.0E-04. No credit is taken for filtration or deposition,resulting in a LPF of 1.0. The total source term for this event is 5.60E-01 PE-Ci.

Safety Class Mitigated Scenario

WHB1-2 and WHB1-3 – Implementation of the controls identified in Section 3.4.2.2.5 prevents theseevents from occurring. Therefore, a safety class mitigated scenario is not required

3.4.2.1.3 Consequence Analysis


WHB1-1, WHB1-4, and WHB1-5 – The consequences of these events are computed in NS-05-00410 anddocumented in Table 3.4-1. The consequences to the MOI at the EUA boundary for these events do notchallenge or exceed the EG.

WHB1-2 and WHB1-3 – The consequences of these events were computed in NS-05-00410 anddocumented in Table 3.4-1. The consequences to the MOI at the EUA boundary for these eventschallenge the EG.


3-36 November 2006


WHB1-2 and WHB1-3 – Implementation of the controls identified in Section 3.4.2.2.5 prevents theseevents from occurring. Therefore, the consequences of these events do not challenge or exceed the EG.

3.4.2.1.4 Comparison to Guidelines

The unmitigated consequence for events WHB1-1, WHB1-4, and WHB1-5 do not challenge or exceedthe EG. Therefore no SC controls are required.

The unmitigated consequence of events WHB1-2 and WHB1-3 challenge the EG. Therefore, SC controlsare required to prevent or mitigate the consequences of these events to an acceptable level below thecriteria. Implementation of the controls identified in Section 3.4.2.1.5 prevent these accidents fromoccurring.

3.4.2.1.5 Summary of Safety Class SSCs and TSR Controls

Credited SSC or TSR Control Safety Function

WHB1-2 and WHB1-3 -Design Feature:Noncombustible construction of WHB

CH waste handling 13-ton electric forklift - designed andconstructed such that the hydraulic fluid is segregatedfrom potential ignition sources (batteries, motor, andmotor contactors separated from each other andhydraulic fluid), and that the body of the forklift isdesigned and constructed to withstand collisions suchthat electrical components and hydraulic components arenot damaged.

(AC) Combustible Loading Control Program - WHB- When waste is outside of closed TRUPACT-IIs orHalfPACTs, only electric powered equipment shall beallowed in the CH bay.- No more than three pallets of fiberboard slip sheets andone pallet of polyethylene slip sheets shall be stored inthe CH bay. Pallets of slip sheets must not be stackedand a 10 ft separation distance shall be maintainedbetween each slip sheet pallet and between slip sheetpallets and stored waste. Transient combustibles shallnot be stored closer than 10 ft. from waste or pallets ofslip sheets. No more than one gallon oflubricants/denatured alcohol may be at each TRUDOCKlocation. - Flammable compressed gas cylinders are prohibited inthe CH bay unless all waste containers are inside closedTRUPACT-IIs or HalfPACTs. The limitation does notapply to packages covered by DOT Exemption DOT-E-7607.

Prevents fire propagation into and withinthe building.

Prevents a forklift fire from becominglarge enough to damage waste containersin the WHB.

Minimize potential and size of fires bycontrolling the amount of combustiblematerial in the WHB and TMF, controlcombustible loading in the WHB to withinthe assumptions of the fire analysis. Prevents continuity of combustiblematerial and prevents a pool fire largeenough to damage waste in the CH bay.

Prevents explosions due to release offlammable gas in the WHB while wastecontainers are not protected by transportation containers.


3-37 April 2007 |

3.4.2.2 CH-2 – Fire in the UG


Unmitigated Scenario Initiation

The following five fire events were identified in the UHE as representing significant risk to the public:

• Fire in Disposal Path (UG1-1)

• Fire in an Active Disposal Room (UG1-2) |

• Fire in Waste Array during Waste Emplacement (UG1-3A) |

• Fire in Construction/Mining Circuit (UG1-4)

• Fire in North Ventilation Circuit (UG1-5)

The following describes the initiation and progression of the unmitigated fire scenarios in theunderground evaluated in this section.

UG1-1, UG1-4, and UG1-5 – A fire is started in the disposal path by the spill and ignition of diesel fuelfrom vehicles in the disposal path, or in a non-waste handling area and enters the disposal path, in theimmediate vicinity of a waste transporter carrying CH waste. The facility pallet of CH waste is engulfedin the fire causing damage to waste containers, resulting in a release to the public via the undergroundexhaust ventilation system.

UG1-2 and UG1-3A – A fire is started near the waste face in the active disposal room by the spill and |ignition of diesel fuel from vehicles inside the disposal room. CH waste containers being positioned inthe disposal array and waste containers in the disposal array are assumed to be exposed to the fire. Thisresults in damage to waste containers and a release to the public via the underground exhaust ventilationsystem.



UG1-2 and UG1-3A – The source term for these events is developed in NS-05-00110 and are identical |prior to filling a panel. Direct loaded drums result in the highest consequence for these events. The |bounding MAR for these events prior to filling a panel is three columns (nine seven packs of direct |loaded drums) of waste in the disposal array and two on the forklift (6,160 PE-Ci). This MAR waspostulated in the UHE and is based on the potential size of a diesel pool fire that could occur at the faceof the waste array. Using the pool fire source term methodology in RFP-509833 andWHC-SD-SQA-ANAL-50134 the following values were developed: fifty eight drums (75 percent of theinvolved inventory) burn confined with seal failure only; six drums (25 percent of the outer drums of thetop tier exposed to the direct flame impingement) experience lid loss and burn in an unconfined manner. The drums that burn confined and experience seal failure only have a DR of 0.5 with an ARF*RF of5.0E-04. One third of the material from the containers experiencing lid loss is ejected and burnsunconfined with a ARF*RF 1.0E-02. The remaining waste in the containers experiencing lid loss burnsconfined with an ARF*RF of 5.0E-04. No credit is taken for filtration or deposition; therefore, the LPFis 1.0. This results in a source term of 2.90E+00 PE-Ci.

UG1-1, UG1-4, and UG1-5 – The source term for these events is developed in NS-05-00110 and areidentical. Direct loaded waste containers are the bounding waste container configuration for these


3-38 April 2007 |

events. Based on the UHE, the MAR for these events is the entire payload of a facility pallet, four seven-packs (2,240 PE-Ci). Using the pool fire source term methodology in RFP-509833 andWHC-SD-SQA-ANAL-50134 the following values were developed: three drums experience lid loss witha DR of 1.0. This is derived from only the top two rows of drums which are exposed to direct flameimpingement (total of twelve drums with 25 percent experiencing a lid loss). One third of the materialfrom containers experiencing lid loss is ejected from the containers and burns unconfined with anARF*RF of 1.0E-02. The remaining waste in the containers experiencing lid loss burn confined in thecontainers with an ARF*RF of 5.0E-04. Twenty-one drums (75 percent of the total inventory)experience seal failure with a DR of 0.5. The contents of these containers burn confined to thecontainers with an ARF*RF of 5.0E-4. No credit is taken for filtration or deposition; therefore, the LPFis 1.0. This results in a source term of 1.29E+00 PE-Ci.


UG1-1, UG1-2, UG1-3A, UG1-4, and UG1-5 – Implementation of the controls identified in Section|3.4.3.3.5 prevents consequences from these events. Therefore, a mitigated source term is not developed.



UG1-2, UG1-3A – The consequences of these events are computed in NS-05-00110 and documented on|Table 3.4-1. Based on a stack release from the UG, the MOI at the EUA would receive a dose for theseevents that exceeds the EG.

UG1-1, UG1-4, and UG1-5 – The consequences of these events are computed in NS-05-00110 anddocumented on Table 3.4-1. Based on a stack release from the UG, the MOI at the EUA would receive adose for these events that challenges the EG.


UG1-2, UG1-3A – Implementation of the controls identified in Section 3.4.2.2.5 prevents consequences|from these events. Therefore, the consequences of these events do not challenge or exceed the EG.

UG1-1, UG1-4, and UG1-5 – Implementation of the controls identified in Section 3.4.2.2.5 preventsconsequences from these events. Therefore, the consequences of these events do not challenge or exceedthe EG.


The unmitigated consequence of a fire in a disposal room (UG1-2 and UG1-3) exceeds the EG and theunmitigated consequence of fires in the disposal path (UG1-1, UG1-4, and UG1-5) challenge the EG.Therefore, SC controls are required to prevent or mitigate the consequences of these events.

Underground ventilation filtration was considered as a mitigative control for underground fires. Filtration operation of the ventilation system, described in Chapter 2, Section 2.6.3.7 of this DSA,reduces ventilation flow rates to a level that reduces the underground worker chances for safe evacuationfrom the underground. Therefore controls that prevent fires were selected instead of mitigative controls.


3-39 November 2006



UG1-2 and UG1-3A |

(SSC) Automatic/manual fire suppression system on thediesel powered waste handling equipment.

(AC) Waste Handling Restrictions- Use of a spotter when vehicles are within 75 ft of thewaste array.- No non-waste handling vehicles in the active disposalroom during waste handling

(AC) Combustible Loading Control Program - DisposalRoom:- Only diesel and electric powered vehicles are used in theunderground- No use of flammable gas/liquid or flammablecompressed gas cylinders in the active disposal roomduring waste handling.- No hot work within 75 ft of the waste without a firewatch- No lube truck in active disposal panel- No non-waste handling equipment within 75 ft of wasteface without a fire watch- No storage of flammable gas/liquid or flammablecompressed gas cylinders in the active disposal room.

Prevents small fires associated with wastehandling vehicles including fuel lineleaks or the engine from becoming largefires with the potential to impact wastecontainers.

Prevent fires resulting from collisionsbetween vehicles and prohibitscombustible/flammable material storagein areas with the potential to impactwaste, controls use of combustibles andflammable compressed gas cylinders inthe proximity of the waste and prohibitsthe underground vehicle with the largestfuel inventory from close proximity towaste.

UG1-4 and UG1-5

(AC) Combustible Loading Control for the Disposal Path- No storage of flammable gas/liquid or flammablecompressed gas cylinders near the panel supplyventilation overcast and no construction work involvingflammable gas/liquid or flammable compressed gascylinders between the disposal panel supply overcast andthe construction bulkhead to the south in East 300 duringwaste handling operations. When panel 4 is added to thedisposal path no construction work involving flammablegas/liquid or flammable compressed gas cylinders isallowed between the overcast at E-140/S-3310 and theconstruction bulkhead to the west of this overcast in S-3310 during CH waste handling operations.- No storage of flammable gas/liquid or flammablecompressed gas cylinders between the AIS and South1000 in West 30 or within 100 ft of bulkhead 303 on theNorth ventilation side, and no use in these locations

Prevents fires by prohibiting activitiesand storage of flammable compressed gascylinders in areas adjacent to the disposalpath.


3-40 November 2006

during CH waste handling operations

UG1-1(SSC) Automatic/manual fire suppression system on thediesel powered waste handling equipment.

(AC) Waste Handling Restrictions- A spotter is required when moving CH waste with CHwaste handling vehicles.

(AC) Combustible Loading Control Program - DisposalPath- Only diesel and electric powered vehicles are used in theunderground- When waste is in transit, vehicles not performing wastehandling operations shall be moved to a cross-cut and besecured until the waste transporter has passed and isgreater than 75 ft away. Vehicles that have becomedisabled (excluding the lube truck) may be in the disposalpath but must be secured along the wall of the disposalpath. - Transporters loaded with waste in the underground shallmaintain greater than 75 ft separation distance betweenthem.- No storage of combustibles or flammable compressedgas cylinders in the disposal path- No flammable gas/liquid or flammable compressed gascylinders shall be used in the disposal path during wastehandling operations- The lube truck is prohibited from the disposal pathwhile waste is in transit from the waste shaft station to theactive disposal room- No storage of flammable gas/liquid or flammablecompressed gas cylinders near the panel supplyventilation overcast and no construction work involvingflammable gas/liquid or flammable compressed gascylinders between the disposal panel supply overcast andthe construction bulkhead to the south in East 300 duringwaste handling operations. When panel 4 is added to thedisposal path no construction work involving flammablegas/liquid or flammable compressed gas cylinders orflammable compressed gas cylinders is allowed betweenthe overcast at E-140/S-3310 and the constructionbulkhead to the west of this overcast in S-3310 during CHwaste handling operations.- No storage of flammable gas/liquid or flammablecompressed gas cylinders between the AIS and South1000 in West 30 or within 100 ft of bulkhead 303 on theNorth ventilation side, and no use in these locationsduring CH waste handling operations

Prevents small fires associated with wastehandling vehicles including fuel lineleaks or the engine from becoming largefires with the potential to impact wastecontainers.

Remaining controls prevent firesresulting from collisions betweenvehicles and prohibitscombustible/flammable material storagein areas with the potential to impactwaste, controls use of combustibles andflammable compressed gas cylinders inthe proximity of the waste and prohibitsthe underground vehicle with the largestfuel inventory from close proximity towaste.


3-41 April 2007 |

3.4.2.3 CH-3 – Explosion in Waste Container(s)



The following events were identified in the UHE as representing a risk to the public:

Explosion in a waste container in the WHB (WHB2-4)

Explosion in a waste container in the underground during transport or in an active panel |(UG2-5A) |

WHB2-4 and UG2-5A – Flammable gas generation in a waste container could result in hydrogen |concentration reaching the lower flammability limit (LFL) in the container headspace. An ignitionsource is assumed to be present resulting in an explosion within the waste container. The waste remainsconfined in the container and burns.



WHB2-4, UG2-5A – The source term for these events is developed in NS-05-001.10 A drum overpacked |in a drum is the bounding waste container configuration for these events. The MAR for a drumoverpacked in a drum is 1,100 PE-Ci. Based on HNF-19492, Revised Hydrogen Deflagration Analysis,21

the MAR burns confined in the waste container with an ARF*RF of 5.0E-04. No credit is taken forfiltration or deposition; therefore, the LPF is assumed to be 1.0. The source term for this event is5.50E-01 PE-Ci.



WHB2-4, UG2-5A – The consequence of these events were computed in NS-05-00110 and documented |on Table 3.4-1. The consequence to the MOI at the EUA boundary for these events does not challenge orexceed the EG. Therefore, no SC controls are required.


The consequence of the unmitigated scenario does not challenge or exceed the EG. Therefore, no SCcontrols are required.


No SC SSCs or TSR controls are required based on the consequences of this event.


3-42 November 2006

3.4.2.4 CH-4 – Explosion External to Waste Containers in WHB



The following explosion event, which occurs external to the waste containers, was identified in the UHEas representing significant risk to the public:

• Flammable Gas Explosion (WHB2-3)

WHB2-3 – This event is assumed to be caused by the accumulation of a flammable concentration of gas,from leaking compressed flammable gas cylinders in the WHB, that is subsequently ignited. Thepressure/shock waves created by the explosion are postulated to cause damage to waste containers stagedon a facility pallet in the WHB. The damage results in release of radioactive material to the environmentas no credit is taken for the building structure or its ventilation system.



WHB2-3 – The source term for this event is developed in NS-05-001.10 Drums overpacked in drums arethe bounding waste container configuration for this event. The MAR for this event is assumed to be theinventory of two facility pallets consisting of eight four-packs of overpacked drums (9,600 PE-Ci). TheDR for this event is 0.1 with an ARF*RF value of 1.5E-03. No credit is taken for WHB ventilation,filtration or deposition resulting in a LPF of 1.0. The total source term for this event is 1.44E+00 PE-Ci.


WHB2-3 – Implementation of the controls specified in Section 3.4.2.4.5 prevent this event fromoccurring; therefore, a source term for a SC mitigated scenario has not been developed.


The consequences of this event were computed in NS-05-00110 and documented in Table 3.4-1. Based onground release dispersion, the consequence to the MOI at the EUA boundary for event WHB2-3 exceedsthe EG.


The unmitigated consequences of event WHB2-3 exceeds the EG. Therefore, SC controls are required toprevent or mitigate this event.


3-43 April 2007 |



(AC) Combustible Loading Control Program -Waste Handling Building- When waste containers are outside of closedTRUPACT-IIs or HalfPACTs only electricallypowered vehicles are allowed in the CH Bay.

- Flammable compressed gas cylinders areprohibited in the CH Bay when waste is outsideof a closed TRUPACT-II or HalfPACT. (Thislimitation does not apply to packages covered byDOT Exemption DOT-E-7607).

Reduces the likelihood and severity of fireswithin the WHB that have the potential to impactwaste.

Prevents explosions due to release of flammablegas in the WHB while waste containers are notprotected by the transportation containers.

3.4.2.5 CH-5 – Explosion External to Waste Containers in UG



The following explosion event, which occurs external to the waste containers, was identified in the UHEas representing significant risk to the public:

• Flammable Gas Explosion in the Disposal Path or Active Disposal Room (UG2-1) |

UG2-1 – Flammable gas leakage into the underground disposal transport route or disposal panelaccumulates and reaches the LFL. An ignition source is assumed to be present and ignites the flammablegas. The explosion pressure and shock waves impact the columns of waste at the face of the disposalarray resulting in a breach of waste containers.



UG2-1 – The source term for this event is developed in NS-05-001.10 Drums overpacked in drums arethe bounding waste container configuration for this event. The MAR is eleven four-packs of overpackedwaste, which represent all three columns of waste (nine four-packs) and two four-packs from theunderground transporter, for a total of 13,200 PE-Ci. For event UG2-1A it is assumed that the maximum |activity from waste containers is released for a DR of 0.1. The ARF*RF is 1.5E-03 for impact to wastecontainers. No credit is taken for ventilation or filtration; therefore, the assumed LPF is 1.0. The totalsource term for this event is 1.98E+00 PE-Ci.


UG2-1 – Implementation of the controls specified in Section 3.4.2.5.5 prevents this event from occurring;therefore, a source term for a SC mitigated scenario has not been developed.


3-44 November 2006



UG2-1 – The consequences of these events were computed in NS-05-00110 and documented in Table3.4-1. The consequence of UG2-1 exceeds the EG for dose to the MOI.


UG2-1 – This event is prevented by the implementation of the controls specified in Section 3.4.2.5.5;therefore, the consequences of a mitigated scenario are not calculated.


UG2-1 – The unmitigated consequence of this event exceed the EG. Therefore, SC controls are requiredto prevent or mitigate this event and are specified in Section 3.4.2.5.5.



UG2-1(AC) - Combustible Loading Control Program: - No flammable gas/liquid or flammable compressed gas cylindersstored in disposal path or active disposal room.- No use of flammable gas/liquid or flammable compressed gascylinders in disposal path or active disposal room during wastehandling- No use of flammable gas/liquid or flammable compressed gascylinders in active disposal room without a fire watch- No storage of flammable gas/liquid or flammable compressedgas cylinders near the panel supply ventilation overcast and noconstruction work involving flammable gas/liquid or flammablecompressed gas cylinders between the disposal panel supplyovercast and the construction bulkhead to the south in East 300during waste handling operations. When panel 4 is added to thedisposal path no construction work involving flammablegas/liquid or flammable compressed gas cylinders is allowedbetween the overcast at E-140/S-3310 and the constructionbulkhead to the west of this overcast in S-3310 during CH wastehandling operations.- No storage of flammable gas/liquid or flammable compressedgas cylinders between the AIS and South 1000 in West 30 orwithin 100 ft of bulkhead 303 on the North ventilation side, andno use in these locations during CH waste handling operations

Prevents the potential for a gasexplosion in the disposal room ordisposal path due to introductionof flammable compressed gassources to the room, the disposalpath or areas adjacent to thedisposal path that could impactwaste containers during transportfrom the waste shaft station tothe active disposal room.


3-45 November 2006

3.4.2.6 CH-6 – Waste Container(s) Breach Due to Impact in the WHB



Three events were postulated in the UHE that represented significant risk for impacting and breachingwaste containers in the WHB.

• Forklift Punctures Waste Container (WHB3-3)

• Compressed Gas Missile (WHB3-5)

• Forklift Collides with Waste Containers (WHB3-6)

WHB3-3 – This event postulates the puncture of waste containers while being processed due to operatorerror or equipment failure. Two waste containers are impacted.

WHB3-5 – This event postulates a compressed gas cylinder missile impacting waste containers. Onewaste assembly is impacted.

WHB3-6 – The bounding unmitigated impact and breach event is a Forklift Collides with WasteContainers (WHB3-6). This event assumes a forklift carrying a fully loaded facility pallet collides withanother loaded facility pallet sitting at a TRUDOCK or in the storage area. Six waste assemblies areimpacted. Due to the extension of the pallet beyond the waste containers the raised pallet on the forkliftcollides with the two lower four-packs of overpacked waste on the staged facility pallet. This results inthe puncturing of the lower level containers and toppling of the containers on the upper level. The upperlevel waste containers on the forklift (two four-packs) are also assumed to fall.



WHB3-3 – The source term for this event is developed in NS-05-00110 Drums overpacked in drums arethe bounding waste container configuration for this event. The MAR for this event is two overpackeddrums each containing 1,100 PE-Ci for a total of 2,200 PE-Ci. A DR of 0.05 is assigned based on theDOE Office of Environmental Management Guidance on Safety Analysis and Control Selection forTransuranic Waste Operations.20 The ARF*RF for this event is 1.0E-3. No credit is taken fordeposition, ventilation or filtration, thus a LPF of 1.0 is assumed. The resulting source term for thisevent is 1.1E-01 PE-Ci.

WHB3-5 – The source term for this event is developed in NS-05-00110 Drums overpacked in drums arethe bounding waste container configuration for this event. The MAR for this event is one overpackedwaste assembly containing 1,200 PE-Ci. A DR of 1.0 with an ARF*RF for this event is 1.0E-4. Nocredit is taken for deposition, ventilation or filtration, thus a LPF of 1.0 is assumed. The resulting sourceterm for this event is 1.2E-01 PE-Ci.

WHB3-6 – The source term for this event is developed in NS-05-001.10 POCs are the bounding wastecontainer configuration for this event. The MAR for this event is two POC drum assemblies (25,200 PE-Ci). The UHE postulated eight waste assemblies would be involved, however, only six assembliesare impacted with only two damaged. The two lower level seven-packs on the staged facility pallet aredamaged (crushed) with a DR of 0.05. The two upper level seven-packs on the staged pallet and the two


3-46 April 2007|

upper level seven-packs on the forklift fall but are not damaged. The ARF*RF for this event is 1.0E-4. No credit is taken for deposition, ventilation or filtration, thus a LPF of 1.0 is assumed. The resultingsource term for this event is 1.26E-01 PE-Ci.



WHB3-3, WHB3-5 and WHB3-6 – The consequence of these events were computed in NS-05-00110 anddocumented in Table 3.4-1. The consequences to the MOI for these events do not challenge the EG.


The unmitigated consequences of these events do not challenge or exceed the EG. Therefore, SCcontrols are not required.


No SC SSCs or TSR controls are required based on the consequences of this event.

3.4.2.7 CH-7 – Waste Container(s) Breach Due to Impact in the UG



The following events were postulated in the UHE as representing significant risk for impacting andbreaching waste containers in the UG.

• Objects Fall from UG Ceiling on Waste in Transit (UG3-1A)|

• Transporter Collision in Disposal Path (UG3-4)

• Multi-Transporter Collision (UG3-5)

• Vehicle Collides with Disposal Array (UG3-6)

• Waste Ejected from Waste Conveyance (UG3-8)

• Waste Hoist Failure (UG3-9)

• Nonflammable Compressed Gas Cylinder Missile Breaches Waste Container (UG3-10)

• Waste Hoist Failure due to Fire in the Hoist Tower (UG1-6)

• Waste Hoist Failure due to Explosion in Hoist Tower (UG2-6)

• Equipment or Material Dropped Down Waste Shaft (UG6-2)

UG6-2 – This event assumes a loaded facility pallet is inadvertently dropped down the waste shaft andcollides with another loaded facility pallet on the waste shaft conveyance. The collision results in breachof waste containers on both facility pallets and a radioactive release to the environment.

UG3-9 – This event assumes a mechanical/structural failure of the waste hoist which results in materialdropping down the waste shaft.


3-47 April 2007 |

UG1-6 and UG2-6 – Either a fire in the waste hoist tower (UG1-6) or an explosion in the waste hoisttower (UG2-6) could be an initiators for UG3-9.

UG3-8 – This event assumes a failure of the waste hoist braking system which causes the conveyance toaccelerate upward due to the difference in weight between the loaded conveyance with four wasteassemblies and the waste hoist counterbalance weight. The loaded conveyance crashes into the headframe. Upon impact the waste containers on the waste conveyance are dislodged and fall approximately20 ft to the floor of the conveyance loading room.

UG3-1A – This event assumes either objects suspended on the walls or roof of the waste transport path |or a large slab of salt becomes dislodged from the walls or roof in the underground disposal path and fallon the underground waste transporter loaded with CH waste while in transit to the underground disposalarea.

UG3-4 – This event assumes the underground waste transporter loaded with CH waste collides withequipment or the walls of the transport path during transit to the underground disposal areas.

UG3-5 – This event assumes an underground waste transporter loaded with CH waste collides withanother waste transporter loaded with CH waste while in transit to the underground disposal area.

UG3-6 – This event assumes that the waste transporter, other underground mobile equipment, or a non-waste handling vehicle collides with the CH disposal array.

UG3-10 – This is event assumes waste containers are breached due a compressed gas cylinder missileimpact.



UG6-2, UG3-9, UG2-6, and UG1-6 – The source term for UG6-2, UG3-9, UG2-6 and UG1-6 isdeveloped in NS-05-001.10 The source term for UG6-2 bounds UG3-9, UG2-6, and UG1-6. Drumsoverpacked in drums are the bounding waste container configuration for these events. The MAR forUG6-2 is eight four-packs (9,600 PE-Ci). It is assumed that all waste containers are crushed upon impactwith the underground, resulting in a DR of 1.0. No credit is taken for filtration or deposition, resultingin a LPF of 1.0. The ARF*RF assumed for this event is 1.0E-03. This results in a total source term of9.60E+00 PE-Ci.

UG 3-8 – The source term for UG3-8 is developed in NS-05-001.10 The bounding waste containerconfiguration for this event is drums overpacked in drums. The MAR is four drum assemblies ofoverpacked waste (4,800 PE-Ci). The waste containers are assigned a DR of 1.0. No credit is taken forfiltration or deposition, resulting in a LPF of 1.0. The ARF*RF assumed for this event is 1.0E-04. Thisresults in a total source term of 4.80E-01 PE-Ci.

UG3-1A – The source term for UG3-1A is developed in NS-05-001.10 The bounding waste container |configuration for this event is drums overpacked in drums. The MAR is four drum assemblies ofoverpacked waste (4,800 PE-Ci). The waste containers are assigned a DR of 0.5. No credit is taken forfiltration or deposition, resulting in a LPF of 1.0. The ARF*RF assumed for this event is 1.0E-04. Thisresults in a total source term of 2.4E-01 PE-Ci.


3-48 April 2007 |

UG3-4 – The source term for this event is developed in NS-05-00110 Drums overpacked in drums are thebounding waste container configuration for this event. The MAR is 4,800 PE-Ci. This is derived fromthe entire payload of the underground waste transporter (four four-packs). Two of the four-packs areassumed to be crushed by a side impact from the collision and are assigned a DR of 1.0. Two of the four-packs are postulated to fall from the underground waste transporter and are assigned a DR of 0.05 theDOE Office of Environmental Management Guidance on Safety Analysis and Control Selection forTransuranic Waste Operations.20 No credit is taken for filtration or deposition, resulting in a LPF of 1.0. The ARF*RF assumed for this event is 1.0E-04. This results in a total source term of 2.52E-01 PE-Ci.

UG3-5 – The source term for this event is developed in NS-05-00110 Drums overpacked in drums are thebounding waste container configuration for this event these events. The MAR is 9,600 PE-Ci. This isderived from the entire payload of two underground waste transporters (eight four-packs). Four of thefour-packs are assumed to be crushed by a side impact from the collision and are assigned a DR of 1.0. Four of the four-packs are postulated to fall from the underground waste transporter and are assigned aDR of 0.05. No credit is taken for filtration or deposition, resulting in a LPF of 1.0. The ARF*RFassumed for this event is 1.0E-04. This results in a total source term of 5.04E-01 PE-Ci.

UG3-6 – The source term for this event is developed in NS-05-001.10 Drums overpacked in drums arethe bounding waste container configuration for this event. The MAR is 13,200 PE-Ci. This is derivedfrom three columns of waste from the waste array (nine four-packs) and half the underground wastetransporter payload (two four-packs). Because of the configuration of the hexagonal disposal array andprofile of underground vehicles that could collide with the waste face, the waste containers in twocolumns of waste in the array are postulated to be crushed and assigned a DR of 1.0 and one column ofwaste is crushed with a DR of 0.5. The waste containers that fall are assigned a DR of 0.05. No credit istaken for filtration or deposition, resulting in a LPF of 1.0. The ARF*RF for this event is 1.0E-04. Thisresults in a total source term of 9.12E-01 PE-Ci.

UG3-10 – The source term for this event is developed in NS-05-001.10 Drums overpacked in drums arethe bounding waste container configuration for this event. The MAR is one four-pack containing 1,200PE-Ci. The DR is 1.0 and the ARF*RF is 1.0E-04. The resulting source term in 1.2E-01PE-Ci.


UG6-2, UG3-9, UG2-6, and UG1-6 – The controls specified in Section 3.4.2.7.5 will prevent these eventsfrom occurring. Therefore a mitigated source term was not developed.

UG3-1A, UG3-4, UG3-5, UG3-6, UG3-8 and UG3-10 – No mitigated scenario is required for these|events because the consequences do not challenge or exceed the EG.



UG6-2, UG3-9, UG2-6, and UG1-6 – The consequences of these events are computed in NS-05-00110 andare also documented on Table 3.4-1. The unmitigated consequence of these events exceed the EG andrequires SC controls.

UG3-1A, UG3-4, UG3-5, UG3-6, UG3-8 and UG3-10 – The consequences for these events were|computed in NS-05-00110 and documented on Table 3.4-1. The unmitigated consequence for theseevents do not challenge or exceed the EG therefore SC controls are not required.


3-49 April 2007 |


UG6-2, UG3-9, UG2-6, and UG1-6 –The controls specified in Section 3.4.2.7.5 will prevent theconsequences from these events. A fire in the waste hoist tower (UG1-6) and an explosion in the wastehoist tower (UG2-6) could be initiators for event UG3-9.

UG3-1A, UG3-4, UG3-5, UG3-6, UG3-8 and UG3-10 – The unmitigated consequence for these events |do not challenge or exceed the EG. Therefore, a SC mitigated scenario is not required.


UG6-2, UG3-9, UG2-6, and UG1-6 – The unmitigated consequence of these events exceeds the EG. Therefore, SC controls are required. Implementation of the controls specified in Section 3.4.2.7.5prevents the consequences of these events.

UG3-1A, UG3-4, UG3-5, UG3-6, UG3-8 and UG3-10 – The unmitigated consequence for these events |do not challenge the EG.



Events UG6-2 and UG3-9(AC) Toplander control of conveyance loading area Approves entry of loads into the waste shaft

collar area and also approves entry of loads ontothe waste shaft conveyance through control of thegate at the waste shaft collar.

(SSC) Waste hoist structure and structural supportincluding the waste hoist head frame, waste shaftconveyance, counterweight, ropes, waste hoistdrum, and waste hoist tower

The waste hoist head frame and drum support thecounterweight, waste shaft conveyance andropes. The six ropes support the counterweightand waste shaft conveyance. The structuralsupport for the waste hoist head frame and drumis provided by the waste hoist tower.

(SSC) Waste shaft conveyance The waste shaft conveyance is designed such thatonly one facility pallet can be transported at atime and the material deck is below the man decksuch that waste is protected from falling objects.

Event UG1-6 and UG2-6(AC) Combustible Loading Control - WHB- Flammable gas or flammable compressed gascylinders are not stored in the waste hoist tower. Flammable gas or flammable compressed gascylinders is not used in the waste hoist tower whenwaste is being transported on the waste shaftconveyance.

Prevents explosions/fires in the waste hoist towerthat could result in damage to the waste hoistduring transport of waste on the waste shaftconveyance.


3-50 April 2007 |

- No more than 1 gallon of solvents in the wastehoist tower. Used hydraulic fluid/lubricants areremoved from the waste hoist tower after hoistmaintenance and prior to handling waste on thewaste shaft conveyance.

Prevents fires in the waste hoist tower whenwaste is being transported on the waste shaftconveyance.

3.4.2.8 CH-8 – Roof Fall During Waste Emplacement and After the Panel is Filled|



Event UG3-3A, Roof fall during transport of CH waste or in the active CH disposal room, assumes the|roof in an active disposal room collapses and crushes waste containers in the disposal room. The|resulting radiological release represents a risk to the public. |

Event UG3-3B, Crush of Waste Containers in a Filled Panel, assumes the roof collapse in a filled panel|and subsequent crush of waste containers or long term crush of waste containers due to salt creep. The|resulting radiological release represents a risk to the public.|



UG3-3A – The source term for this event is developed in NS-05-001.10 Based on the UHE, the MAR for|this event is one third of the room inventory based on PLG 116738. Since the inventory of an|underground disposal room is approximately 1,714 waste assemblies, the MAR with the highest|consequences for this event is 572 four packs of overpacked waste. This results in a MAR of 686,400|PE-Ci. The DR is assumed to be 0.05. It is assumed that the fallen roof encapsulates and contains most|of the release resulting in a LPF of 0.1. The ARF*RF assumed is 1.0E-04. The total source term is|3.43E-01 PE-Ci. |

UG3-3B – Based on geotechnical interpretation of salt behavior in mine openings, salt creep is observed|long before roof fall occurs. The mass of the salt and distance it falls affects the damage to waste. The|consequence for this event was calculated in two ways. One calculation is applicable to waste disposed|in panels 7 and 8. This would also be applicable to panels 1 and 2 except that they are closed. |Regardless of whether the roof falls or containers breach due to creep, the source term for this event is|conservatively estimated to be twice the MAR for event UG3-3A. Drums overpacked in drums are the|bounding waste container configuration for this event. This results in a MAR of 1,372,800 PE-Ci. The|DR is assumed to be 0.05. It is assumed that the salt movement or salt from a fallen roof encapsulates|and contains most of the release resulting in a LPF of 0.1. The LPF is further reduced by the presence of|the substantial and isolation barrier for a total LPF of 0.01. The ARF*RF assumed is 1.0E-04. The total|source term is 6.86E-02 PE-Ci. |

|The second calculation is applicable to waste disposed in panels 3, 4, 5, and 6. The source term for these|panels is conservatively estimated to be twice the MAR for event UG3-3A. Drums overpacked in drums|are the bounding waste container configuration for this event. This results in a MAR of 1,372,800 PE-Ci. |The DR is assumed to be 0.005. The LPF is 0.1. The ARF*RF assumed is 1.0E-04. The total source|term is 6.86E-02 PE-Ci. |

|


3-51 April 2007 |


UG3-3A – A safety class mitigated source term has not been developed since the consequences do not |challenge or exceed the EG. |

UG3-3B – A safety class mitigated source term has not been developed since the consequences do not |challenge or exceed the EG. |



UG3-3A – The consequence of this event was computed in NS-05-00110 and documented on Table 3.4-1. |The unmitigated consequences of event UG3-3A do not challenge or exceed the EG. Therefore, SC |controls are not required. |

UG3-3B – The consequence of this event was computed in NS-05-00110 and documented on Table 3.4-1. |The consequences do not challenge or exceed the EG. Therefore, SC controls are not required. |


UG3-3A – The consequence of this event was computed in NS-05-00110 and documented on Table 3.4-1. |The consequences do not challenge or exceed the EG. Therefore, SC controls are not required. |

UG3-3B – The consequence of this event was computed in NS-05-00110 and documented on Table 3.4-1. |The consequences do not challenge or exceed the EG. Therefore, SC controls are not required. |


The unmitigated consequences of these events do not challenge or exceed the EG. Therefore, SC |controls are not required. |


No SC SSCs or TSR controls are required based on the consequences of this event. |

3.4.2.9 CH-9 – Aircraft Crash


Evaluation of a possible aircraft crash is required by DOE-STD-3009-94.3 The possibility of an aircraftcrash into the WHB was identified as part of the UHE as event WHB6-3, an aircraft crash into the WHB,and BG6-1, an aircraft crashes into the waste hoist tower with fuel going down the waste shaft, andOA6-4 an aircraft crashes into parked TRUPACT-IIs and HalfPACTs.

As discussed in Chapter 1 of this CH DSA, two federal ten-mile-wide airways (one jet route and onelow-altitude route) pass within five miles of the WIPP. Traffic data show that the combined traffic isabout 32 instrument flight rule flights per day. There are no airports or approaches within a five-mileradius of the WIPP. The nearest airstrip to WIPP, now no longer in use, is twelve miles north of the site. The nearest commercial airport is 28 miles to the west in Carlsbad. The closest military air base isHolloman Air Force Base, located 138 miles NW of the site.


3-52 November 2006

DOE-STD-3014-96, Accident Analysis for Aircraft Crash into Hazardous Facilities,39 provides criteriafor the development of frequencies of aircraft accidents used in analyses for nuclear power plants and forcrash frequency contributions associated with airport operations (takeoffs and landings), and federalairway activity. Using DOE-STD-3014-96, the total aircraft hazard probability (combined airway andairport) at the WIPP site is 3.6E-07/yr and is documented in ITSC-WIPP-2000-01, Estimate of AircraftImpact Frequency and Consequences at the WIPP.40


The frequency of the aircraft crash accident scenario is beyond extremely unlikely; therefore, source termdevelopment is not required.


Not Applicable


Not Applicable


Not Applicable

3.4.2.10 CH-10 – Tornado/High Winds



Three natural phenomena events involving tornadoes and high wind were postulated in the UHE toimpact the WHB and result in a breach of waste containers in the WHB or underground. Theconsequence from these events represent a significant risk to the public.

• Tornado Strikes WHB - Damages Waste Containers (WHB7-4)

• High Winds Damage Waste Containers in WHB (WHB7-5)

• High Winds Damage Waste Hoist Tower (UG7-6)

WHB7-4 and WHB7-5 – The UHE postulated breach of waste containers due to high winds or thoseassociated with the DBT. The WIPP DBT has a maximum wind speed of 183 mi (284.5 km) per hourincluding effects of suction vortices, a translational velocity of 41 mi (65.9 km) per hour, a tangentialvelocity of 124 mi (200 km) per hour, a 325 ft (99 m) radius of maximum wind, pressure drop of 0.5lb/in.2 (351.5 kg/m2), and rate of pressure drop of 0.09 lb/in2 (63.3 kg/m2) per sec, with a mean recurrenceinterval of 1,000,000 years (SMRP No. 155, A Site-Specific Study of Wind and Tornado Probabilities atthe WIPP Site in Southeast New Mexico.41 For this event the WHB is postulated to collapse damaging theentire inventory of the WHB CH bay.

UG7-6 – The UHE postulated high winds striking the waste hoist tower, resulting in structural failure andsubsequent breach of waste containers on the waste shaft conveyance. Consequences for UG7-5 are the


3-53 November 2006

same as UG7-6, however the likelihood of UG7-5 is extremely unlikely. Therefore, the risk did notwarrant accident analysis.



WHB7-4 and WHB7-5 – The source term for WHB7-4 and WHB7-5 is developed in NS-05-001.10 Drums overpacked in drums are the bounding waste container configuration for this event. The UHEpostulated all 72 waste assemblies in the WHB would be impacted by the tornado or high wind event. The MAR is 86,400 PE-Ci. The DR is assigned a value of 0.1. No credit is taken for filtration ordeposition resulting in a LPF of 1.0. The ARF*RF assumed is 1.0E-04. The total source term is8.64E-01 PE-Ci.

UG7-6 – The source term is developed in NS-05-001.10 Drums overpacked in drums are the boundingwaste container configuration for this event. The UHE postulated four drum assemblies on the wasteshaft conveyance would be impacted by this event. The MAR is 4,800 PE-Ci. The DR is assigned avalue of 1.0. No credit is taken for filtration or deposition resulting in a LPF of 1.0. The ARF*RFassumed is 1.0E-03. The total source term is 4.8E+00 PE-Ci.


The unmitigated consequence for these events do not challenge the EG therefore a SC mitigated sourceterm was not developed.



WHB7-4, WHB7-5 and UG7-6 – The consequences for these events were computed in NS-05-001,10 anddocumented in Table 3.4-1. The unmitigated consequences for these events do not challenge or exceedthe EG.


WHB7-4, WHB7-5 and UG7-6 – The unmitigated consequences for these events do not challenge orexceed the EG; therefore, SC controls are not required.


No SC SSCs or TSR controls are required to prevent or mitigate tornados or high wind events in theWHB or underground.

3.4.2.11 CH-11 – Seismic



Three seismic events were postulated in the UHE that represented significant risk for impacting andbreaching waste containers in the WHB.


3-54 November 2006

• Earthquake (BG7-1)

• Earthquake with Fire (WHB7-2)

• Earthquake Impacts Hoist (UG7-3)

BG7-1, WHB7-2, and UG7-3 – The DBE is the most severe credible earthquake expected to occur at theWIPP site and is based on a 1,000-year return interval. The maximum ground acceleration for the DBEis 0.1 g in both the horizontal and vertical directions. The WIPP site does not have gas pipelines or otherpassive fuel sources that could create large fires. Nevertheless, a follow-on fire is postulated to occur forevent WHB7-2.

The DBE could disrupt the process of unloading or moving waste containers. Unloading the wasteinvolves the TRUDOCK 6-ton crane and waste movement involves the 13-ton electric forklift andconveyance loading car. The DBE could result in a breach of up to eighteen facility pallets of wastestored in the CH bay awaiting transfer to the underground. The greatest number of containers at risk atany time are those located in the designated storage areas in the northeast corner of the CH bay, in thesouthwest corner of the CH bay, or near airlock 107.



WHB7-2 – The source term for this event is developed in NS-05-004.10 The UHE postulated the full CHinventory in the WHB would be impacted by the seismic event. Drums overpacked in drums are thebounding waste container configuration for this event. The MAR for this event is based on eighteenfacility pallets in the WHB CH bay containing 4,800 PE-Ci each for a total of 86,400 PE-Ci. A DR of0.1 and an ARF*RF assumed is 1.0E-04 for the initial breach. The follow-on fire source term derivationfor these events is described as event WHB6-2. No credit is taken for ventilation filtration or deposition,therefore, the assumed LPF is 1.0. The total source term for these events is 1.00E+00 PE-Ci.

UG7-3 – The source term for this event is developed in NS-05-004.10 Drums overpacked in drums arethe bounding waste container configuration for this event. The MAR for this event is based on onefacility pallet payloads for a total of 4,800 PE-Ci. A DR of 1.0 and an ARF*RF assumed is 1.0E-03. Forthis seismic event there is no postulated follow-on fire. No credit is taken for ventilation filtration ordeposition, therefore, the assumed LPF is 1.0. The total source term for this event is 4.8E+00 PE-Ci.

BG7-1 – The source term for this event is developed in NS-05-004.10 Drums overpacked in drums are thebounding waste container configuration for this event. The MAR for this event is based on the entireinventory of the WHB CH bay (86,400 PE-Ci) and one facility pallet payload on the waste shaftconveyance (4,800 PE-Ci) for a total of 91,200 PE-Ci. The waste container in the CH bay are assigned aDR of 0.1 and the waste containers on the waste hoist are assigned a DR of 1.0. The ARF*RF for theWHB is 1.0E-04. The ARF*RF for the waste hoist is 1.0E-03. For this seismic event there is nopostulated follow-on fire. No credit is taken for ventilation filtration or deposition, therefore, theassumed LPF is 1.0. The total source term for this event is 5.66E+00 PE-Ci.


WHB7-2 and BG7-1 – The WHB is designed to withstand the DBE, therefore the entire inventory of theWHB is not at risk. However, the restraints securing the ductwork, piping, electrical distribution, etc, tothe WHB ceiling are not seismically qualified. Because of the combustible loading control in the WHBno follow-on fire is postulated for this mitigated case. The bounding waste container configuration in the


3-55 November 2006

mitigated scenario is drums overpacked in drums. Based on an evaluation of the location of wastecontainers with respect to overhead duct and piping, four drums from two drum assemblies on the toprow of waste are damaged from ductwork and 32 drums from 32 different top row drum assemblies aredamaged from overhead piping. The waste containers in the Shielded Storage Room and those in transitto the underground will not be damaged. The MAR for this event is 39,600 PE-Ci. The DR of 0.1 isassigned for ductwork falling on the drums and a DR of 0.05 is assigned for piping falling on the drums. The ARF*RF assumed is 1.0E-04. The LPF of 1.0 is assumed based on taking no credit for filtration ordeposition. The total source term is 2.2E-01 PE-Ci.



WHB7-2, UG7-3, and BG7-1 – The consequence of these events is computed in NS-05-00110 anddocumented in Table 3.4-1. Based on ground release dispersion, the consequence to the MOI at the EUAboundary for WHB 7-2 challenges the EG and UG7-3 and BG7-1exceed the EG.


WHB7-2, UG7-3, and BG7-1 – The consequence of these events is are computed in NS-05-00110 anddocumented in Table 3.4-1. The consequence of this event does not challenge or exceed the EG.


The unmitigated consequence of events WHB7-2, UG7-3, and BG7-1 exceed the EG. Therefore, SCcontrols are required. Implementation of the controls specified in Section 3.4.2.11.5 prevents theseevents.


Credited SSCs or Controls Safety Function

WHB7-2, UG7-3, and BG7-1

(SSC) WHB, TMF, and Support Building designed to withstand amaximum ground acceleration of 0.1 g with a 1,000 year returninterval.

Prevents WHB roof collapseduring a seismic event.

3.4.2.12 CH-12 – Vehicle Crash Into the WHB



WHB6-1 – The UHE postulated that a vehicle in the parking area runs into the south, east, or west wallof the CH bay in the WHB and damages waste containers adjacent to the wall, representing a significantrisk to the public.


3-56 November 2006



The consequence of this event is computed in NS-05-001.10 Drums overpacked in drums are thebounding waste container configuration for this event. Due to the expected size of vehicles that couldrealistically impact the south, east, or west wall of the CH bay in the WHB, it is postulated that twofacility pallets containing four four-packs are damaged. The MAR for this event is 4,800 PE-Ci. Theanalysis assumed a DR 1.0 and an ARF*RF of 1.0E-4. No credit was taken for filtration or depositionresulting in a LPF of 1.0. This results in a total source term of 4.80E-01 PE-Ci.


The consequences of this event are computed in NS-05-00110 and documented on Table 3.4-1. Theconsequence of a vehicle crash into the WHB does not challenge or exceed the EG.


This event does not challenge the EG, therefore no SC controls are required.


This event does not challenge the EG, therefore no SC controls are required.

3.4.2.13 CH-13 – Lightning Strikes WHB - Damages Waste Containers


Two events were postulated in the UHE that represented significant risk for impacting and breachingwaste containers in the WHB or on the waste hoist in the underground due to lightning strike.

• Lighting strike in the WHB (WHB7-3)

• Lightning strike in the underground (UG7-4)

WHB7-3 and UG7-4 – The UHE postulated events in which a lightning strike to the WHB or the wastehoist structure propagates to waste containers in the WHB or on the waste hoist. The lightning isassumed to breach waste containers and result in a radioactive release.



WHB7-3 and UG7-4 – The source term for these events is developed in NS-05-001.10 Direct loadeddrums are the bounding waste container configuration for these events. The UHE postulated one wasteassembly is impacted with only one drum damaged. The MAR is 80 PE-Ci. Based on RFP-509833 andWHC-SD-SQA-ANAL-501,34 the DR is 1.0 with the one drum experiencing ignition and lid loss suchthat one third of drum contents are ejected with an ARF*RF of 1.0E-02 and the remaining two thirdsburn confined with an ARF*RF of 5.0E-04. No credit is taken for filtration or deposition, resulting in aLPF of 1.0. The total source term for this event is 2.91E-01 PE-Ci.


3-57 November 2006


WHB7-3 and UG7-4 – The consequences for these events do not challenge or exceed the EG, therefore aSC mitigated source term was not developed.


WHB7-3 and UG7-4 – The consequences of these events are computed in NS-05-00410 and documentedin Table 3.4-1. The unmitigated consequence to the MOI at the EUA boundary for these events do notchallenge or exceed the EG.


WHB7-3 and UG7-4 – Safety class SSCs or TSR controls are not required for these events; therefore,consequence analysis for SC mitigated scenario has not been developed.


These events do not challenge the EG, therefore no SC controls are required.


These events do not challenge the EG, therefore no SC TSR controls are required.

3.4.2.14 CH-14 – External Fires Damage WHB and Waste Containers


The UHE postulated two fire events initiated outside of the WHB that propagate to the WHB causingdamage to and radioactive release from waste containers:

• External Fire Propagates to WHB (WHB6-2)

• Wildland Fire (WHB7-1)

WHB6-2 – The UHE postulated that fires external to the WHB, but within the PPA, could propagate tothe WHB causing damage to waste containers housed in the building and a release path to theenvironment. This event includes fires that propagate from the RH bay, the TMF and the outside parkingarea to the CH bay.

WHB7-1 – This event postulates that a wildland fire, external to the PPA, could cause the WHB to catchfire which would result in damage to waste containers.


3-58 November 2006


WHB6-2 – The source term for this event is developed in NS-05-001.10 Direct loaded drums result inthe highest consequence for this event. The MAR for this event is one seven-pack of direct loadeddrums containing 560 PE-Ci. Using the fire source term methodology in RFP-5098, Safety Analysisand Risk Assessment Handbook33 and WHC-SD-SQA-ANAL-501, Fire Protection Guide for WasteDrum Storage Arrays,34 the following values were developed: the affected waste containers areassumed to experience seal failure with a DR of 0.5 and an ARF*RF of 5.0E-04. No credit is taken forfiltration or deposition, resulting in a LPF of 1.0. The total source term for this event is 1.4E-01 PE-Ci.

WHB7-1 – The source term for this event is developed in NS-05-001.10 Drums overpacked in drumsare the bounding waste container configuration for this event. The MAR for this event is eight seven-packs of direct loaded drums at 560 PE-Ci each, for a total of 4,480 PE-Ci. Using the fire source termmethodology in RFP-5098, Safety Analysis and Risk Assessment Handbook33 andWHC-SD-SQA-ANAL-501, Fire Protection Guide for Waste Drum Storage Arrays,34 the followingvalues were developed: the affected waste containers are assumed to experience seal failure with a DRof 0.5 and an ARF*RF of 5.0E-04. No credit is taken for filtration or deposition, resulting in a LPF of1.0. The total source term for this event is 1.12E+00 PE-Ci.



WHB6-2 – The consequences of this event are computed in NS-05-00410 and documented in Table3.4-1. The unmitigated consequence to the MOI at the EUA boundary for this event does not challengeor exceed the EG.

WHB7-1 – The consequences of this event are computed in NS-05-00410 and documented in Table3.4-1. The unmitigated consequence to the MOI at the EUA boundary for this event challenges the EG.


WHB7-1 – Implementation of the controls specified in Section 3.4.2.14.5 prevent this event fromoccurring; therefore, a source term for a SC mitigated scenario has not been developed.


WHB6-2 – This event does not challenge the EG, therefore, no SC SSCs or TSR controls are requiredfor these events.

WHB7-1 – The unmitigated consequence of this event exceeds the EG. However, implementation ofthe controls specified in Section 3.4.2.14.5 prevents consequences from this event.


3-59 November 2006



WHB7-1

Design Feature: Noncombustible constructionof the WHB

Prevents fires from propagating into the CH bayof the WHB from areas outside the WHB or CHbay.

3.4.2.15 CH 15 – Snow/Ice Load Collapses WHB Roof - Damages Waste Containers


The UHE postulated two events involving hail and snow that could damage the WHB and also damagewaste containers resulting in a radiological release.

• Hail damages the WHB roof and impacts waste containers (WHB7-6)

• Snow/ice accumulation on WHB roof damages structure and impacts waste containers (WHB7-7)

WHB7-6 – The UHE postulated a WHB roof failure caused by the static load of accumulated hail. Thedebris from the roof collapse is postulated to cause damage to waste containers.

WHB7-7 – The UHE postulated a WHB roof failure caused by the static load of accumulated snow/ice. The debris from the roof collapse is postulated to cause damage to waste containers. .



WHB 7-6 and WHB7-7 - The source term for this event is developed in NS-05-001.10 Drumsoverpacked in drums are the bounding waste container configuration for these events. The UHEpostulated all eighteen facility payloads (72 four-packs) in the WHB would be impacted by collapse ofthe building resulting from snow or hail loading. The MAR is 86,400 PE-Ci. The DR is assigned avalue of 0.1. The ARF*RF assumed is 1.0E-04. The LPF of 1.0 is assumed based on taking no creditfor filtration or deposition. The total source term is 8.64E-01 PE-Ci.


WHB7-6 and WHB7-7 - Implementation of the controls specified in Section 3.4.2.15.5 prevent thisevent from occurring; therefore, a source term for a SC mitigated scenario has not been developed.



The consequences of these events are the same and are computed in NS-05-00110 and documented onTable 3.4-1. The unmitigated consequence of these events challenge the EG.


3-60 November 2006


The unmitigated consequence of these events challenge the EG. Implementation of the controlsspecified in Section 3.4.2.15.5 prevents the any consequences from this event.


The unmitigated consequences of events WHB7-6 and WHB7-7 challenge the EG. However, thedesign feature specified in Section 3.4.2.15.5 prevents the any consequences from this event.


Credited SSCs or Controls Safety Function

(SSC) The WHB is designed to withstand a 27 lb/ft2 snowload. The design basis snowload is 10 lb/ft2 with a 100year return interval.

Prevents WHB roof collapse due toloading from snow or ice.

3.4.3 Beyond Design Basis Accidents

As explained in DOE-STD-3009-43 beyond design basis accidents (BDBA) are those accidents withmore severe conditions or equipment failures than are estimated for the corresponding DBA.

An aircraft crash could impact the entire inventory of waste in the WHB, concurrent with waste beingtransferred to the underground on the waste shaft conveyance. Through analysis performed in ITSC-WIPP-2000-01,40 aircraft crash is shown to be BEU and therefore, no consequences are developedfor this event.

The DBA evaluated in Section 3.4.2.1 (Fire in the WHB) was limited to the consequences from theburning of a single forklift in the WHB. A full room/multiple room fire in the WHB caused by either afire in the Support Building propagating to the WHB or a multiple forklift fire is considered to be BDBA. In the case of a fire initiated in the Support Building it would not lead to a full/multi room fire asdetermined in the Fire Severity Analysis.31 Temperatures are low in the WHB such that combustion ofwaste drums will not occur. Even if a forklift with sufficient fuel loading were to ignite a second forklift,the resulting flame temperatures and flame height could breach the building roof and further reduce thealready low building temperature so the full inventory of waste would not burn. Multiple forkliftsburning is judged to be incredible based on the fact that, if a fire were to be initiated on a forklift, thetime to achieve the heat release to ignite the second forklift would be on the order of 10 to 15 minutes. Itis not credible to assume that the second fork lift would be driven to the source of the fire so thatadditional waste could be exposed to the fire. Additionally, the size/footprint of the forklifts whilehandling facility pallets would preclude the presence of two forklifts being in simultaneous proximity tothe point of fire initiation. The residual risk of considering this event as BDBA is low (risk bin III) basedon the beyond extremely unlikely frequency and increasing the consequences in Section 3.4.2.1 by thenumber of forklifts involved (approximately 59 rem to the MOI from each additional forklift).


3-61 November 2006


1. 10 CFR Part 830, "Nuclear Safety Management," January 10, 2001.

2. DOE-STD-1027-92, Hazard Categorization and Accident Analysis Techniques forCompliance with DOE Order 5480.23, Nuclear Safety Analysis Reports, Change NoticeNo. 1, September 1997.

3. DOE-STD-3009-94, Preparation Guide for U.S. Department of Energy Nonreactor NuclearFacility Documented Safety Analyses, Change Notice No. 3, 2006.

4. DOE Order 420.1B, Facility Safety

5. DOE G 421.1-2, Implementation Guide for Use in Developing Documented Safety Analyses toMeet Subpart B of 10 CFR 830, October 24, 2001.

6. DOE G 423.1-1, Implementation Guide for Use in Developing Technical Safety Requirements,October 24, 2001.

7. WP 09-CN3023, WIPP Functional Classification for Design

8. Hazardous Waste Facility Permit No. NM4890139088-TSDF, issued by the New MexicoEnvironment Department, October 27, 1999.

9. Guidelines for Hazard Evaluation Procedures, 2nd Edition, Center for Chemical ProcessSafety of the American Institute of Chemical Engineers, ISBN 0-8169-0491-X.

10. NS-05-001, WIPP CH DSA Revision 10 Source Term, Dose Consequence and SupportingInformation, Rev. 0, June 2006.

11. DOE/CAO-95-1121, U.S. Department of Energy Waste Isolation Pilot Plant TransuranicWaste Baseline Inventory Report [TWBIR], Revision 3, December 1995.

12. DOE/WIPP 91-058, Radionuclide Inventory for the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant, Rev. 0,October 11, 1993.

13. 40 CFR Part 261, "Identification and Listing of Hazardous Waste"

14. DOE/WIPP-02-3122, Rev.4.0, Contact-Handled Transuranic Waste Acceptance Criteria forthe Waste Isolation Pilot Plant, December 2005.

15. DOE/WIPP-95-2065, Rev. 8, WIPP Contact Handled (CH) Waste Documented SafetyAnalysis, June 2004.

16. 10 CFR §830.205, "Technical Safety Requirements"

17. 29 CFR §1910.119, "Process Safety Management of Highly Hazardous Chemicals." ENV-003,Hazardous Stored TRU Waste Source Terms for the RWMC's TSA, 1990.

18. DOE/WIPP 93-004, Waste Isolation Pilot Plant Land Management Plan


3-62 April 2007|

19. DOE-HDBK-3010-94, Change Notice 1, Airborne Release Fractions/Rates and RespirableFractions for Nonreactor Nuclear Facilities, U.S. Department of Energy, Washington, D.C.,December 1994

20. DOE Memorandum, DOE Office of Environmental Management Guidance on Safety Analysisand Control Selection for Transuranic Waste Operations, February 17, 2006.

21. HNF-19492, Revised Hydrogen Deflagration Analysis.|

22. Letter Golder Associates, Inc. to Washington TRU Solutions LLC, “Early Time Generation of|Methane and Hydrogen in Filled Panels at the WIPP”, November 30, 2006.|

|23. Letter Washington TRU Solutions LLC, “Estimation of Hydrogen Generation Rates from|

Radiolysis in WIPP Panels”, July 2006.|

24. NUREG 1.145, Rev. 1, Atmospheric Dispersion Models for the Potential AccidentConsequence Assessments at Nuclear Power Plants, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission,Washington, D.C., November 1982.

25. WHC-SD-GN-SWD-30002, GXQ Program Users Guide, Westinghouse Hanford Company,Rev. 1, May 19, 1995.

26. ICRP Publication 68, Dose Coefficients for Intakes of Radionuclides by Workers, January1995.

27. ICRP Publication 72, Age-Dependent Doses to Members of the Public from Intake ofRadionuclides, International Commission on Radiological Protection, 2001.

28. ICRP Publication 28, The Principles and General Procedures for Handling Emergency andAccidental Exposures of Workers, June 1977.

29. ICRP Publication 30, Limits for Intakes of Radionuclide by Workers, July 1978.

30. ICRP Report No. 23, Report of the Task Group on Reference Man, International Commissionon Radiological Protection, Pergamon Press, NY, 1974.

31. WSMS-WIPP-05-0004, WIPP WHB Fire Severity Calculations, March 2005.

32. WSMSC-06-0003, FHA Fire Scenario Supporting Calculation, March 2006.

33. RFP-5098, Safety Analysis and Risk Assessment Handbook, Revision 4, December 2002.

34. WHC-SD-SQA-ANAL-501, Fire Protection Guide for Waste Drum Storage Arrays, HughesAssociates, Inc., September 1996.

35. HNF-14741, Solid Waste Operation Complex Master Documented Safety Analysis, Revision3, December 2005.

36. ECO 11229, Hydrogen Generation from Battery Charging Station in WHB

37. WIPP-05-0001 Evaluation of Leak Path Factor for the WIPP Underground|


3-63 April 2007 |

38. PLG-1167, Analysis of Roof Falls and Methane Gas Explosions in Closed Rooms and Panels, |August 1997. |

39. DOE-STD-3014-96, Accident Analysis for Aircraft Crash into Hazardous Facilities, October1996.

40. ITSC-WIPP-2000-01, Revision 0, Estimate of Aircraft Impact Frequency and Consequencesat the WIPP, August 2000.

41. SMRP No. 155, A Site-Specific Study of Wind and Tornado Probabilities at the WIPP Site inSoutheast New Mexico, Department of Geophysical Sciences, T. Fujita, University ofChicago, February 1978 and its Supplement of August 1978.

42. DOE/WIPP 04-2225, Waste Isolation Pilot Plant Site Environmental Report


3-64 April 2007|

Table 3.4-1 - Design Basis Accident Consequence Results

DBA # DBA TitleDSA

SectionUHE Event #

UnmitigatedConsequence

(Rem)

MitigatedConsequence

(Rem)Comments

CH-1 Fire in theWHB

3.4.2.1 WHB1-1WHB1-2WHB1-3WHB1-4WHB1-5

Small FireFull Room FireMulti-Room FireWaste Container Fire Forklift Fire

2.923.223.22.9

11.6

N/AN/AN/AN/AN/A

Events WHB1-2 and WHB1-3are prevented by the controls inSection 3.4.2.1.5.

CH-2 Fire in theUnderground

3.4.2.2 UG1-1 UG1-2 UG1-3A |

UG1-4

UG1-5

Fire in Waste Disposal Path Fire in Waste Disposal Room Fire in Waste Array During|Waste Emplacement|Fire in Construction/Mining |Ventilation CircuitFire in North VentilationCircuit

19.4>25 rem>25 rem

19.4|

19.4

PreventedPreventedPrevented

Prevented

Prevented

Events UG1-1, UG1-2, UG1-3,UG1-4 and UG1-5 are preventedby controls specified in Section3..4.2.2.5.

CH-3 Explosion inWasteContainers

3.4.2.3 WHB2-4UG2-5A|

|

Waste Container ExplosionWaste Container ExplosionDuring Transport or in Active|Panel|

13.58.7

N/AN/A

These events have identicalsource terms; however, thedifference in consequencesreflect different dispersioncharacteristics for the WHB andUG.

CH-4 ExplosionExternal toWasteContainers inWHB

3.4.2.4 WHB2-3 Flammable Gas Explosion >25 rem Prevented WHB2-3 is the boundingexternal explosion in the WHB. Prevented by controls specifiedin Section 3.4.2.4.5.



DBA # DBA TitleDSA

SectionUHE Event #


(Rem)


(Rem)Comments

3-65 April 2007|

CH-5 ExplosionExternal toWasteContainers inUG

3.4.2.5 UG2-1

|

Flammable Gas ExplosionDuring Transport or in Active |Room |

>25 rem

|

Prevented UG2-1A is the bounding external |explosion in the UG. Preventedby controls specified in Section3.4.2.5.5

CH-6 WasteContainer(s)Breach Due toImpact in theWHB

3.4.2.6 WHB3-3 WHB3-5

WHB3-6

Forklift Punctures WasteContainersCompressed Gas Bottle(Missile) Impacts WasteContainersForklift (Transporting WasteContainers) Collision

2.7

3.0

3.1

N/A

N/A

N/A



DBA # DBA TitleDSA

SectionUHE Event #


(Rem)


(Rem)Comments

3-66 April 2007|

CH-7 WasteContainer(s)Breach Due toImpact in theUG

3.4.2.7 UG3-1A|

UG3-4|

UG3-5

UG3-6

UG3-8UG3-9UG3-10

UG1-6

UG2-6

UG6-2

Objects Fall from UG Ceilingand Damage WasteContainers During Transport|or in an Active Disposal|Room|Waste Transporter Collision|

Vehicle Collides withDisposal ArrayWaste Containers EjectedDuring Transport to UGWaste Hoist Failure Nonflammable CompressedGas Cylinder MissileWaste Hoist Failure due toFire Waste Hoist Failure due toExplosionEquipment or MaterialDropped Down Waste Shaft

3.8

|4.0

8.0

14.5

7.6>25 rem

1.9

>25 rem

>25 rem

>25 rem

N/A

|N/A

N/A

N/A*

N/APrevented

NA

Prevented

Prevented

Prevented

UG3-9, UG1-6, UG2-6, andUG6-2 are prevented by thecontrols identified in Section3.4.2.7.5

CH-8 Roof Collapsesin the UG

3.4.2.8 UG3-3A|

|UG3-3B|

Roof Fall During Transport|or in Active Disposal Room|

|Crush of Waste Containers in|a Filled Panel|

>25 rem

|1.1 rem|

Prevented

|NA|

UG3-3 is prevented by thecontrols identified in Section3.4.2.8.5Crush was calculated two ways|and resulted in the same|consequence of 1.1 rem |



DBA # DBA TitleDSA

SectionUHE Event #


(Rem)


(Rem)Comments

3-67 November 2006

CH-9 Aircraft Crash 3.4.2.9 OA6-4WHB6-3BG6-1

Aircraft Crash in OAAircraft Crash into WHBAircraft Crash into WHBHoist Head Frame (fuel downshaft to UG)

N/AN/AN/A

N/AN/AN/A

Frequency of an aircraft crash atWIPP is BEU based onITSC-WIPP-2000-01 and is anexternal event. Therefore,further analysis not required.

CH-10 Tornado/HighWinds

3.4.2.10 WHB7-4

WHB7-5

UG7-6

Tornado Strikes WHB -Damages Waste ContainersHigh Winds Damage WasteContainers in the WHBHigh Winds Damage WasteHoist Tower

2.1

2.1

7.6

N/A

N/A

NA

CH-11 Seismic 3.4.2.11 BG7-1WHB7-2UG7-3

EarthquakeEarthquake with FireEarthquake Impacts Hoist

>25 rem20.8

>25 rem

PreventedPreventedPrevented

Prevented by controls specifiedin Section 3.4.2.11.5.

CH-12 Vehicle Crashinto the WHB

3.4.2.12 WHB6-1 Vehicle Collides with WHB 11.8 N/A

CH-13 LightningStrikes WHB -Damages WasteContainers

3.4.2.13 WHB7-3

UG7-4

Lightning Strikes WHB - Damages Waste ContainersLightning Strikes WasteHoist with Waste in Transit

6.0

4.4

N/A

N/A

CH-14 External FiresDamage WHBand WasteContainers

3.4.2.14 WHB6-2

WHB7-1

External Fire Propagates toWHBWildland Fire

2.9

23.2

N/A

Prevented

Prevented by controls specifiedin Section 3.2.4.14.5



DBA # DBA TitleDSA

SectionUHE Event #


(Rem)


(Rem)Comments

3-68 November 2006

CH15 Snow/Ice LoadCollapses WHBRoof -Damages WasteContainers

3.4.2.15 WHB7-6

WHB7-7

Hail Load Collapses WHBRoof - Damages WasteContainers

Snow Load Collapses WHBRoof - Damages WasteContainers

21.2

21.2

Prevented

Prevented

Prevented by controls specifiedin Section 3.2.4.15.5


3-69 November 2006

Figure 3.3-1 - Hazard and Accident Analysis Flow Chart


3-70 November 2006

Figure 3.4-1 - 285 Meter Radius from Closest Point of Exclusive Use Area Boundary


3-71 November 2006

Appendix AHazard Analysis Tables


3-72 November 2006

ItemHazard Energy Source or

MaterialExists(Y/N)

DescriptionSIH

Screening

1 Electrical

1.1 Battery banks Y 13 ton electric forklift for offloadingTRUPACT-IIs and HalfPACTs fromtransport trailer and transportingTRUPACT-II into WHB, and electric golfcarts used by maintenance or waste handlingpersonnel may be in the CH parking area

N

1.2 Cable runs Y Power to gate, heat pumps, etc. Y

1.3 Diesel generators Y Backup diesel generators, Buildings 255.1and 255.2Diesel fire pump in Pumphouse, Building456

N

1.4 Electrical equipment Y Vehicle trap gate is operated using anelectric motor, communication equipmentantennas and towers, light posts

N

1.5 Heaters Y Vehicles, heat pumps N

1.6 High voltage (> 600V) Y Substations N

1.7 Locomotive, electrical N NA

1.8 Motors Y Vehicle trap gate N1.9 Power tools Y Power tools N

1.10 Pumps N NA

1.11 Service outlets, fittings N NA

1.12 Switchgear Y Substations 254.1, 254.2, 254.3, 254.4,254.7, 254.9

N

1.13 Transformers Y Substations 254.2, 254.2, 254.3, 254.4,254.7, 254.9

N

1.14 Transmission lines N NA

1.15 Wiring/underground wiring Y Power supply to buildings, buried electricaldistribution

Y

1.16 Other Y Lightning Dissipation Array, street lights Y

2 Thermal

2.1 Boilers N NA

2.2 Bunsen burner hot plates N NA

2.3 Electrical equipment Y At vehicle trap, Substations 254.1, 254.2,254.3, 254.4, 254.7, 254.9

N

2.4 Electrical wiring Y At vehicle trap, Substations 254.1, 254.2,254.3, 254.4, 254.7, 254.9

N

2.5 Engine exhaust Y N

2.6 Furnaces N NA

2.7 Heaters Y Vehicles, heat pumps, Substations 254.1,254.2, 254.3, 254.4, 254.7, 254.9

N



MaterialExists(Y/N)

DescriptionSIH

Screening

3-73 November 2006

2.8 Lasers N NA

2.9 Steam lines N NA

2.10 Welding surfaces Y Maintenance activities N

2.11 Welding torch Y Maintenance activities N

2.12 Other Y Chillers N

3 Pyrophoric Material

3.1 Pu and U metal fines N NA

3.2 Other N NA

4 Open Flame

4.1 Bunsen burners N NA

4.2 Welding/cutting torches Y Maintenance activities N

4.3 Other Y Smoking, matches N

5 Flammables

5.1 Cleaning/decontaminationsolvents

Y Vehicle trap is main entry point for allmaterials entering site.

N

5.2 Flammable gases Y Vehicle trap is main entry point for allmaterials entering site.

N

5.3 Flammable liquids Y Diesel powered trailer jockey used foron-site movement of the TRUPACT-IItrailers. Diesel powered transport vehiclesare used to deliver loaded trailers to theparking area.

N

5.4 Gasoline Y Vehicle trap is main entry point for allmaterials entering site, onsite fueling stationwith gasoline and diesel in-ground tanks.

N

5.5 Natural gas N NA

5.6 Nitric acid soaked rags(spontaneous combustion)

N NA

5.7 Nitric acid and organics N NA

5.8 Paint/paint solvent Y Maintenance activities and vehicle trap ismain entry point for all materials enteringsite

N

5.9 Propane N NA

5.10 Spray paint Y Maintenance activities and vehicle trap ismain entry point for all materials enteringsite

N

5.11 Other N NA



MaterialExists(Y/N)

DescriptionSIH

Screening

3-74 November 2006

6 Combustibles

6.1 Paper/wood products Y Associated with records and vehicle trap ismain entry point for all materials enteringsite

N

6.2 Petroleum based products Y Vehicles, forklifts, and other equipment maycontain lubricating oils, fuels, hydraulicfluid, etc.

N

6.3 Plastics Y Slipsheets staged in stacks in the parkingarea prior to use, vehicles, pallets andgeneral supplies.

N

6.4 Other Y Tumbleweeds N

7 Chemical Reactions

7.1 Concentration N NA

7.2 Disassociation N NA

7.3 Exothermic N NA

7.4 Incompatible chemicalmixing

N NA

7.5 Uncontrolled chemicalreactions

N NA

8 Explosive Material

8.1 Caps N NA

8.2 Dusts N NA

8.3 Dynamite N NA

8.4 Electric squibs N NA

8.5 Explosive chemicals N In accordance with WIPP CH WAC NA

8.6 Flammable gases Y Acetylene N

8.7 Hydrogen Y Hydrogen may be present in the wastecontainers

N

8.8 Hydrogen (batteries) Y Lead acid batteries are used in vehicles andforklifts Hydrogen from battery chargers whencharging batteries

N

8.9 Nitrates N NA

8.10 Peroxides N NA

8.11 Primer cord N NA

8.12 Propane Y Two seven gallon tanks inside thedecontamination trailer.

Y

8.13 Other Y Hilti charges N



MaterialExists(Y/N)

DescriptionSIH

Screening

3-75 November 2006

9 Kinetic (Linear andRotational)

9.1 Acceleration/deceleration Y Trailer jockey, trucks, forklifts used toload/unload transporters may collide.

N

9.2 Bearings Y Associated with vehicles Y

9.3 Belts Y Associated with vehicles Y

9.4 Carts/dollies Y Electric carts, dollies Y

9.5 Centrifuges N NA

9.6 Crane loads (in motion) Y Maintenance activities N

9.7 Drills Y Maintenance activities Y

9.8 Fans Y Heat pumps, chiller fans Y

9.9 Firearm discharge Y From site boundary N

9.10 Forklifts Y Used to off load TRUPACT-IIs andHalfPACTs from transport trailer

N

9.11 Gears Y Vehicle trap gate Y

9.12 Grinders Y Maintenance activities Y

9.13 Motors – electric Y Vehicle trap gate, heat pumps, chillers Y

9.14 Power tools Y Maintenance activities Y

9.15 Presses shears N NA

9.16 Rail cars N Rail tracks are inactivated. NA

9.17 Saws Y Maintenance activities Y

9.18 Vehicles Y N

9.19 Vibration Y Vehicles Y

9.20 Other: Lifter Y Diesel powered equipment duringmaintenance activities.

N

Other: Hand tools Y Pneumatic tools used to connectTRUPACT-IIs and HalfPACTs to the trailer.

Y

10 Potential (Pressure)

10.1 Autoclaves N NA

10.2 Boilers N NA

10.3 Coiled springs N NA

10.4 Furnaces N NA

10.5 Gas bottles Y Vehicle trap is main entry point for allmaterials entering site, bottles containedwithin HAZMAT facility, bottles at southside of Building 452

N

10.6 Gas receivers N NA

10.7 Pressure vessels Y Vehicle trap is main entry point for allmaterials entering site

N



MaterialExists(Y/N)

DescriptionSIH

Screening

3-76 November 2006

10.8 Pressurized system (e.g., air) Y Compressed air lines used in waste handlingand maintenance activities.Fire water distribution, fire water tanks, e.g.fire hydrants.Domestic water lines.

Y

10.9 Steam headers and lines N NA

10.10 Stressed members N NA

10.11 Other N Portable fire extinguishers NA

11 Potential (Height/Mass)

11.1 Cranes/hoists Y Maintenance activities N

11.2 Elevated doors N NA

11.3 Elevated work surfaces Y Steps into vehicles, work platform on trailerjockey, and elevated cab on trailer jockey.

Y

11.4 Elevators N NA

11.5 Lifts Y Vehicle trap is main entry point for allmaterials entering site

Y

11.6 Loading docks N NA

11.7 Mezzanines N NA

11.8 Floor pits N NA

11.9 Scaffolds and ladders Y Maintenance activities Y

11.10 Stacked material Y Rack for Supersacks – 3 ft highSlipsheets, stored one pallet high – 3 ½ to 4ft high

Y

11.11 Stairs N NA

11.12 Other N Cable pull box covers near road NA

12 Flooding Sources

12.1 Domestic water Y Y

12.2 Fire suppression piping Y Y

12.3 Process water N NA

12.4 Other Y Portable water tanks to provide dust control,approximately 500 gallons, refilling area onsurface

Y

13 Physical

13.1 Sharp edges or points Y While loading and offloading the potential toimpact the TRUPACT-II with forklift tinesexists, guardrails, fenceposts

Y



MaterialExists(Y/N)

DescriptionSIH

Screening

3-77 November 2006

13.2 Pinch points Y Connecting and disconnecting the trailer.Installing and removing TRUPACT-IItiedowns.Spotters are present when loading andoffloading the TRUPACT-IIs andHalfPACTs from the trailers.

Y

13.3 Confined space N NA

13.4 Tripping Y Air lines for pneumatic tools are stretchedbetween the building and the trailerspresenting a tripping hazard.

Y

13.5 Other N NA

14 Radiological Material

14.1 Radiological material Y Waste container contents N

15 Hazardous Material

15.1 Asphyxiates Y High-wattage waste is purged with nitrogengas. Liquid nitrogen tanks.

Y

15.2 Bacteria/viruses N NA

15.3 Beryllium and compounds Y There may be beryllium contaminatedmaterials in some waste containers

N

15.4 Biologicals Y Sanitary waste truck Y

15.5 Carcinogens N NA

15.6 Chlorine and compounds N NA

15.7 Corrosives Y Vehicle batteries N

15.8 Decontamination solutions N NA

15.9 Dusts and particles Y May be packaged in TRU waste bags insidethe TRU waste containers

N

15.10 Fluorides N NA

15.11 Hydrides N NA

15.12 Lead Y Vehicle batteries Y

15.13 Oxidizers Y Compressed oxygen N

15.14 Poisons (herbicides,insecticides)

Y Periodic grounds maintenance Y

15.15 Other Y Cryogenic gases (e.g., nitrogen) N

16 Ionizing Radiation Sources

16.1 Contamination Y Waste container contents N

16.2 Electron beams N NA

16.3 Radioactive material Y Waste container contents N

16.4 Radioactive sources N NA

16.5 Radiography equipment N NA



MaterialExists(Y/N)

DescriptionSIH

Screening

3-78 November 2006

16.6 X-ray machines N NA

16.7 Other N NA

17 Non-Ionizing Radiation

17.1 Lasers Y Lasers used in survey equipment or levels Y

17.2 Other Y Bar code readers used to identify wastecontainers

Y

18 Criticality

18.1 Fissile material Y Waste container contents N

19 Non-Facility Events

19.1 Explosion Y Vehicles outside PPA and EUA fence N

19.2 Fire Y Wildland fire N

19.3 Power outage Y Y

19.4 Other Y Firearms, hunters N

20 Vehicles in Motion(external to facility)

20.1 Airplane Y N

20.2 Crane/hoist Y Maintenance activities N

20.3 Forklifts Y N

20.4 Heavy constructionequipment

Y Maintenance activities N

20.5 Helicopter Y N

20.6 Train N NA

20.7 Truck/car Y ContractorsDOTMaintenance ActivitiesSalt handling dump trucks

N

21 Natural Phenomena

21.1 Earthquake Y N

21.2 Flood Y Localized flooding N

21.3 Lightning Y N

21.4 Rain/hail Y N

21.5 Snow/freezing weather Y N

21.6 Straight wind Y N

21.7 Tornado Y N


3-79 November 2006

Table A-2 - CH Waste Handling Waste Handling Building Hazard ID Table

ItemHazard Energy Source

or MaterialExists(Y/N)

DescriptionSIH

Screening

1 Electrical

1.1 Battery banks Y Forklifts, four small portable UPSs for usewith the swipe counting equipment in CHbay of the WHB. Scissor lift with onboardbattery chargers.

N

1.2 Cable runs Y Four cable runs for the ACGLF located onthe TRUDOCKS.Battery chargers for electric forklift.Cable for conveyance loading cart.

Y

1.3 Diesel generators N NA

1.4 Electrical equipment Y Overhead cranes, forklifts, Tennelecs(counting equipment), vacuum pumps atthe TRUDOCKs, lighting throughout theWHB, 480 to 120 VAC panels, HVACequipment, booster fans on TRUDOCKs. Two air movers (comfort fans). Four CMSLPUs. Standard office equipment in wastehandling field office in the CH bay. ACGLFs.

N

1.5 Heaters Y Wall mounted N

1.6 High voltage (> 600V) Y Waste Hoist N


1.8 Motors Y Fans, vacuum pumps, motors associatedwith airlock roll-up doors. Conveyanceloading car, cranes

N

1.9 Power tools Y Vacuum pumps N

1.10 Pumps Y Hydraulic pumps associated with forklifts Y

1.11 Service outlets, fittings Y Y

1.12 Switchgear Y Motor control centers in adjoining room,Overpack and Repair Room, second floorWaste Hoist switchgear

N

1.13 Transformers Y Transformers in CH bay 480 to 120 VAC,Overpack and Repair Room and secondfloor. Distribution panels and motorcontrol centers, second floor Waste Hoistswitchgear

N

1.14 Transmission lines N NA

1.15 Wiring/undergroundwiring

Y Cabling and wiring in conduit. Powercords for the Tennelecs and portable fans. Cables for portable CAMs, UPS, andcomputer equipment.

Y





DescriptionSIH

Screening

3-80 November 2006

1.16 Other Y UPS on the TRUDOCK for CAMs. Portable CAMs

N

2 Thermal

2.1 Boilers N NA


2.3 Electrical equipment Y N

2.4 Electrical wiring Y N

2.5 Engine exhaust N Only electric forklift used in CH bay. NA

2.6 Furnaces N NA

2.7 Heaters Y Wall mounted N

2.8 Lasers N NA


2.10 Welding surfaces Y Isolated modifications with fire watch asneeded not to be performed during wastehandling. Not at TRUDOCKS duringwaste handling.

N

2.11 Welding torch Y N

2.12 Other Y Battery charging station. Weldingequipment.

N


3.1 Pu and U metal fines Y Pu and U oxides may be present in thewaste; waste is predominatelycontaminated material, material is notpyrophoric. Trace quantities permitted byWAC.

N

3.2 Other N NA

4 Open Flame


4.2 Welding/cutting torches Y Incidental use to maintenance N

4.3 Other N NA

5 Flammables

5.1 Cleaning/decontamination solvents

Y Denatured alcohol used to clean parts priorto sealing TRUPACT-IIs and HalfPACTs.

N

5.2 Flammable gases Y Incidental use to maintenance N

5.3 Flammable liquids Y Denatured alcohol used to clean parts priorto sealing TRUPACT-IIs and HalfPACTs.

N

5.4 Gasoline N NA






DescriptionSIH

Screening

3-81 November 2006

5.6 Nitric acid soaked rags(spontaneouscombustion)

N NA


5.8 Paint/paint solvent Y Incidental use to maintenance N

5.9 Propane N NA

5.10 Spray paint Y Incidental use to maintenance N

5.11 Other Y P10 gas cylinders (used in ventilated areas) N

6 Combustibles

6.1 Paper/wood products Y Procedures, forms, controlled copylocation, printers, fax machines, woodpallets of plastic and cardboard slipsheets,radiological filters.

N

6.2 Petroleum based products Y Plastic slipsheets, stretch wrap, payloadreinforcement sheets. Lubricants used todisassemble/reassemble the shipping casks. Vehicles, forklifts, and other equipmentmay contain lubricating oils, fuels,hydraulic fluid, etc.

N

6.3 Plastics Y Plastic slipsheets, stretch wrap, payloadreinforcement sheets. Vehicles, forklifts,and other equipment may containlubricating oils, fuels, hydraulic fluid, etc.

N

6.4 Other Y Lint-free rags. Dow Corning vacuumgrease and nickel never seize. Officefurnishings and equipment.

N




7.3 Exothermic N NA


N NA


N NA


8.1 Caps N NA

8.2 Dusts N NA

8.3 Dynamite N NA


8.5 Explosive chemicals N In accordance with the WIPP CH WAC. NA





DescriptionSIH

Screening

3-82 November 2006

8.6 Flammable gases Y Maintenance activities (e.g., acetylene) N

8.7 Hydrogen Y Hydrogen may be present in the wastecontainers

N

8.8 Hydrogen (batteries) Y Lead acid batteries used in vehicles andforklifts. Hydrogen from battery chargerswhen charging batteries

N

8.9 Nitrates N NA

8.10 Peroxides N NA


8.12 Propane N NA

8.13 Other N NA

9Kinetic (Linear andRotational)

9.1 Acceleration/deceleration Y Floor scrubbers, forklifts, scissor lift, andother vehicles

N

9.2 Bearings Y Bearings are used throughout the process. Bearings are used in motors, conveyors,and other equipment.

Y

9.3 Belts Y Associated with vehicles Y

9.4 Carts/dollies Y Electric golf carts to pick up ratchet straps. Conveyance loading rail car. Gas bottledollies.

N


9.6 Crane loads (in motion) Y Four 6-ton overhead bridge cranes. Usedto lift the TRUPACT-II lids and the wastedrums.

N

9.7 Drills Y Cordless drills to drill out TRUPACT-IIlock ring inserts when waste containers arenot present. Incidental maintenance.

Y

9.8 Fans Y Comfort fans to facilitate air movementwithin the CH bay.

Y

9.9 Firearm discharge N NA

9.10 Forklifts Y Collision or mechanical failure. N

9.11 Gears Y Counterbalances moved by gear system. Y

9.12 Grinders Y Incidental to maintenance. Y

9.13 Motors – electric Y TRUDOCK exhaust fans, ACGLF, roll-updoor motors, crane motors, portablecomfort fans

Y

9.14 Power tools Y Maintenance activities. N





DescriptionSIH

Screening

3-83 November 2006

9.15 Presses shears N NA

9.16 Rail cars N NA

9.17 Saws Y Maintenance activities. Y

9.18 Vehicles Y Floor scrubbers, forklifts, scissor lift, andother vehicles could collide or impactwaste drums.

N

9.19 Vibration Y Vehicles Y

9.20 Other N NA



10.2 Boilers N NA

10.3 Coiled springs Y Conveyance loading room door, vehicleairlock outer doors.

Y

10.4 Furnaces N NA

10.5 Gas bottles Y Nitrogen and helium compressed gas usedfor leak testing and P10 used in theportable counter.

N


10.7 Pressure vessels N NA

10.8 Pressurized system (e.g.,air)

Y Compressed air, fire suppression systems,fire water distribution, domestic water.

Y


10.10 Stressed members Y Crane rails. Y

10.11 Other Y Portable fire extinguishers. N


11.1 Cranes/hoists Y Four cranes used for assembly/disassemblyof TRUPACT-IIs and HalfPACTs andlifting payload.

N

11.2 Elevated doors Y Rollup and tornado doors. N

11.3 Elevated work surfaces Y TRUDOCKs N

11.4 Elevators Y Waste Hoist Tower personnel elevator. See Underground Hazard ID for WasteHoist information.

N

11.5 Lifts Y Forklifts, crane, scissor lifts. N

11.6 Loading docks Y TRUDOCKs N

11.7 Mezzanines Y Floor elevations around Waste Shaft. N

11.8 Floor pits Y Site generated waste room and collectiontrenches in WHB.

Y





DescriptionSIH

Screening

3-84 November 2006

11.9 Scaffolds and ladders Y Rolling ladder for inspection ofTRUPACT-II lids, two secondary ladderson south end of each TRUDOCK foremergency egress

Y

11.10 Stacked material Y Containers stacked on facility pallets,facility pallets, dunnage, MgO, slipsheets,empty MgO racks

N

11.11 Stairs Y TRUDOCK and stairwells Y

11.12 Other N NA

12Internal FloodingSources

12.1 Domestic water Y Y

12.2 Fire suppression piping Y Y


12.4 Other Y Portable water tanks to provide dustcontrol, approximately 500 gallons.

Y

13 Physical

13.1 Sharp edges or points Y Various edges and points associated withequipment and facilities in the CH bay

N

13.2 Pinch points Y Cargo lids, TRUDOCK gates, and ratchetstraps

Y

13.3 Confined space N NA

13.4 Tripping Y Stairs, ladders, cables, facility pallets, rails Y

13.5 Other N NA


14.1 Radiological material Y Waste container contents N


15.1 Asphyxiates Y High-wattage waste shipments are purgedwith nitrogen, liquid nitrogen tanks.

Y


15.3 Beryllium andcompounds

Y There may be beryllium contaminatedmaterials in some waste containers.

N

15.4 Biologicals Y Sanitary waste tank. Y

15.5 Carcinogens N NA


15.7 Corrosives Y Lead acid batteries in vehicles. Y

15.8 Decontaminationsolutions

Y Incidental to routine decontamination. Y





DescriptionSIH

Screening

3-85 November 2006

15.9 Dusts and particles Y May be packaged in TRU waste bagsinside the TRU waste container.

N


15.11 Hydrides N NA

15.12 Lead Y Lead acid batteries in vehicles Y

15.13 Oxidizers Y Compressed oxygen N


N NA

15.15 Other N NA

16Ionizing RadiationSources

16.1 Contamination Y Waste container contents. N


16.3 Radioactive material Y Waste container contents. N

16.4 Radioactive sources Y Sources used are small activity sourcesused in counting equipment source checks.

Y



16.7 Other N NA


17.1 Lasers Y Low energy laser levels for maintenance ornew installations.

Y

17.2 Other Y Bar code readers used to identify wastecontainers.

Y

18 Criticality

18.1 Fissile material Y Waste contains fissile material. N


19.1 Explosion N NA

19.2 Fire Y Wildland fire. N

19.3 Power outage Y N

20 Vehicles in Motion

20.1 Airplane Y NA

20.2 Crane/hoist Y Four cranes used for assembly/disassemblyof TRUPACT-IIs and HalfPACTs andlifting payload

N

20.3 Forklifts Y N


N NA





DescriptionSIH

Screening

3-86 November 2006

20.5 Helicopter Y N

20.6 Train N NA

20.7 Truck/car Y Salt handling dump trucks. N

20.8 Other Y Scissor lift N


21.1 Earthquake Y N

21.2 Flood Y N

21.3 Lightning Y N

21.4 Rain/hail Y N

21.5 Snow/freezing weather Y N


21.7 Tornado Y N


3-87 November 2006

Table A-3 - CH Waste Handling Underground Hazard Identification Table

Item Hazard Energy Sourceor Material

Exists(Y/N)

Description SIHScreening

1 Electrical

1.1 Battery banks Y Mine phone, lights, transporter, forklift,UPS in LPU at Waste Hoist Station, firealarm box, hoist phone, charger for batteryoperated tow vehicle, scissor lift withonboard battery chargers.

N

1.2 Cable runs Y Down drift E-140. 13.8 kV down shaft N

1.3 Diesel generators Y Diesel mobile generator to power miner N

1.4 Electrical equipment Y 13.8 kV power skids, Substation #2 northof bulkheads E-140, power panels,distribution panels, LPU at Waste HoistStation, portable power centers, electriccart charging areas, Marietta Miner (480VAC)

N

1.5 Heaters Y Portable power centers, Connex buildings N

1.6 High voltage (> 600V) Y Substation 13.8 kV to 480 VAC, portablepower centers energized in haul routeEMICO Miner (950 volts)DOSCO Miner (950 volts)

N


1.8 Motors Y N

1.9 Power tools Y Hand tools N

1.10 Pumps Y Sump pumps N

1.11 Service outlets, fittings Y Power skids in alcoves up to 120 to 480VAC.

N

1.12 Switchgear Y None in waste transport route N

1.13 Transformers Y Portable power centers, utility skid N

1.14 Transmission lines Y Down drift E-140. 13.8 kV down shaft N

1.15 Wiring/undergroundwiring

Y N

1.16 Other N NA

2 Thermal

2.1 Boilers N NA


2.3 Electrical equipment Y 13.8 kV power skids, Substation #2 northof bulkheads in E-140, power panels,distribution panels, LPU at Waste HoistStation, portable power centers.

N

2.4 Electrical wiring Y Throughout underground. 13.8 kV downshafts.

N




Exists(Y/N)


3-88 November 2006

2.5 Engine exhaust Y The vehicles and forklifts in the areaproduce engine exhaust.

N

2.6 Furnaces N NA

2.7 Heaters Y Portable power centers, space heaters inConnex buildings.

N

2.8 Lasers Y No class 4. Y


2.10 Welding surfaces Y Maintenance activities. N

2.11 Welding torch Y Maintenance activities. N

2.12 Other N NA


3.1 Pu and U metal fines Y Pu and U oxides may be present in thewaste; waste is predominatelycontaminated material, material is notpyrophoric. Trace quantities permitted byCH WAC.

N

3.2 Other Y Smoking, matches. N

4 Open Flame


4.2 Welding/cutting torches Y Maintenance activities. N

4.3 Other N NA

5 Flammables

5.1 Cleaning/decontaminationsolvents

Y Maintenance shop. N

5.2 Flammable gases Y Acetylene. N

5.3 Flammable liquids Y Diesel, lubricating oil and hydraulic fluid,maintenance shop materials.

N

5.4 Gasoline N NA


5.6 Nitric acid soaked rags(spontaneous combustion)

N NA


5.8 Paint/paint solvent Y Incidental use as needed. N

5.9 Propane N NA

5.10 Spray paint Y Incidental use as needed. N

5.11 Other N NA




Exists(Y/N)


3-89 April 2007 |

6 Combustibles6.1 Paper/wood products Y Wood guides in the salt handling shaft.

Wood timber for Waste Hoist crash beams,procedures, packaging.

N

6.2 Petroleum based products Y Vehicles, forklifts, and other equipmentmay contain lubricating oils, fuels,hydraulic fluid, MgO sacks, etc.

N

6.3 Plastics Y Brattice cloth, rubber flashing or gasketmaterial for bulkheads.

N

6.4 Other N NA




7.3 Exothermic N NA


N NA


N NA


8.1 Caps N NA

8.2 Dusts N NA

8.3 Dynamite N NA


8.5 Explosive chemicals N In accordance with WIPP WAC. NA

8.6 Flammable gases Y Acetylene. N

8.7 Hydrogen Y Hydrogen may be present in the wastedrums. Long term gas generation in a |filled panel due to radiolysis. |

N

8.8 Hydrogen (batteries) Y Lead acid batteries used in vehicles andforklifts. Hydrogen from battery chargerswhen charging batteries.

N

8.9 Nitrates N NA

8.10 Peroxides N NA


8.12 Propane N NA

8.13 Other Y Hilti charges. Long term gas generation |(methane) due to microbial action |

N




Exists(Y/N)


3-90 August 2007|


9.1 Acceleration/deceleration Y Underground equipment, scissor lifts andhoists.

N

9.2 Bearings Y Associated with vehicles and shaftconveyances. Bearings are used in motors,conveyors, and other equipment.

Y

9.3 Belts Y Associated with vehicles. Y

9.4 Carts/dollies Y Electric carts, hand push carts. N


9.6 Crane loads (in motion) Y Waste Hoist, maintenance boom truck,A-frame hoist in maintenance shop.

N

9.7 Drills Y Roof bolters, jackleg drills, probe-holedrill, remote handled borehole machine.

N

9.8 Fans Y Ventilation fans from 400 south to thebulkhead, ductwork with associated fan.

Y

9.9 Firearm discharge N NA

9.10 Forklifts Y N

9.11 Gears Y Waste transporter. N

9.12 Grinders Y Incidental maintenance. Y

9.13 Motors – electric Y Electric mining equipment. Y

9.14 Power tools Y Ground control, maintenance. Y

9.15 Presses shears Y Fabrication shop. Y

9.16 Rail cars Y Flatcars to transport materials. N

9.17 Saws Y Maintenance shop, chain saws to cutguides.

Y

9.18 Vehicles Y Electric carts, forklifts, scissor lifts, towcart, diesel equipment, water truck.

N

9.19 Vibration Y Vehicles, roof bolt operations. Y

9.20 Other Y 5-ton crane.3-ton crane in fabrication shop.

N



10.2 Boilers N NA

10.3 Coiled springs N NA

10.4 Furnaces N NA

10.5 Gas bottles Y Acetylene, oxygen, nitrogen forexperiment purging, self-contained self-|rescuers, and trauma kit O2 bottles.|

N




Exists(Y/N)


3-91 April 2007\August 2007 |


10.7 Pressure vessels Y Automatic/manual fire suppressionsystems on equipmentAccumulators at waste shaft station forchairing device.

N

10.8 Pressurized system (e.g.,air)

Y 90 psi compressed air line. N


10.10 Stressed members Y Roof bolts, rails at waste shaft station arede-stressed periodically.

N

10.11 Other Y Portable fire extinguishers Y |


11.1 Cranes/hoists Y Waste Hoist, maintenance boom truck. N

11.2 Elevated doors N NA

11.3 Elevated work surfaces Y Back of transporter, two lift trucks forelevated work.

N

11.4 Elevators N Conveyances are not considered elevators. See 11.12, Other.

NA

11.5 Lifts Y Back of transporter, two lift trucks forelevated work, scissor lift.

N

11.6 Loading docks N NA

11.7 Mezzanines N NA

11.8 Floor pits Y Waste shaft, salt handling shaft, andexhaust shaft sumps.

N

11.9 Scaffolds and ladders Y N

11.10 Stacked material Y Waste containers, supersacks, roof boltsstaged for installation.

N

11.11 Stairs Y CAM work platforms. Y

11.12 Other Y Roof and walls of passages (roof fall and |salt creep). |Waste conveyance.Waste conveyance counterweight.Salt shaft conveyance.

N

12 Internal FloodingSources

12.1 Domestic water N NA

12.2 Fire suppression piping Y Waste Hoist Tower. N


12.4 Other Y Portable water tanks to provide dustcontrol, approximately 500 gallons.

Y




Exists(Y/N)


3-92 November 2006

13 Physical

13.1 Sharp edges or points Y Forklift to stage MgO, Loron (push/pulldevice), MgO racks sharp corners.

N

13.2 Pinch points Y Transporters, Load Haul Dump vehicles,ratchet straps.

Y

13.3 Confined space Y Boreholes. Y

13.4 Tripping Y Mining environment, uneven floor. Y

13.5 Other N NA


14.1 Radiological material Y Waste container contents. N


15.1 Asphyxiates Y Nitrogen for experiments in north end. Y


15.3 Beryllium and compounds Y There may be beryllium contaminatedmaterials in some waste containers.

N

15.4 Biologicals Y Porta-potties. Y

15.5 Carcinogens Y Diesel exhaust fumes. Y


15.7 Corrosives Y Lead acid batteries in vehicles. Y

15.8 Decontamination solutions N NA

15.9 Dusts and particles Y Salt dust particles, may be packaged inTRU waste bags inside the TRU wastecontainer.

Y


15.11 Hydrides N NA

15.12 Lead Y Lead acid batteries in vehicles. Y

15.13 Oxidizers Y Compressed oxygen. N


N NA

15.15 Other: Cryogenics Y Nitrogen at experiments. Y

16 Ionizing RadiationSources

16.1 Contamination Y Waste container contents. N


16.3 Radioactive material Y Waste container contents. N

16.4 Radioactive sources Y Sources used are small activity sourcesused in counting equipment source checks.

Y





Exists(Y/N)


3-93 November 2006


16.7 Other N NA


17.1 Lasers Y Lasers used in mining. Y

17.2 Other Y Bar code readers used to identify wastecontainers

Y

18 Criticality

18.1 Fissile material Y Waste contains fissile material. N


19.1 Explosion N NA

19.2 Fire Y Diesel fire, maintenance shop fire. N

19.3 Power outage Y N

20 Vehicles in Motion

20.1 Airplane Y N

20.2 Crane/hoist Y Waste Hoist, maintenance boom truck,A-frame hoist in maintenance shop.

N

20.3 Forklifts Y Mining and Underground Operationsforklifts.

N


Y Mining equipment used for groundsupport, installation of ventilation barriers,used for closure activities, haulageequipment to carry excess salt, bobcats,.

N

20.5 Helicopter N NA

20.6 Train N NA

20.7 Truck/car Y Electric golf carts, fire truck, ambulance,lube trucks.

N

20.8 Other Y Scissor lift. N


21.1 Earthquake Y N

21.2 Flood Y N

21.3 Lightning Y N

21.4 Rain/hail N NA

21.5 Snow/freezing weather N NA


21.7 Tornado Y N


3-94 November 2006

Table A-4 - Event Categories for Hazard ReviewEventCat

Event Type Consequence/Release Mechanism

E-1 Fire Consequences typically due to inhalation/ingestion of released hazardousmaterial. Release of material is due to thermal effects on the material orthe material container.

E-2 Explosion Consequences typically due to inhalation/ingestion of released hazardousmaterial. Release of material is due to explosion or impact from missile(s)produced by the explosion. (Note: explosion includes detonations anddeflagrations.)

E-3 Loss ofContainment/Confinement

Consequences typically due to inhalation/ingestion of released hazardousmaterial. Release of material is due to impacts (including dropping) on thematerial or material containment and energetic failures due tooverpressurization.

E-4 DirectExposure

Consequences typically due to direct exposure to a hazard (contactchemical exposure, radionuclide shine).

E-5 NuclearCriticality

Consequences typically due to direct exposure and release of fissionproducts.

E-6 ExternalHazards

Consequences typically due to inhalation/ingestion of released hazardousmaterial.

E-7 NaturalPhenomena

Consequences typically due to inhalation/ingestion of released hazardousmaterial.


3-95 November 2006

Table A-5 - Hazard Sources and Potential Events

GroupNo.

Hazard EnergySource or Material

GroupPotential Events by Category

1 Electrical E-1 – In combination with combustible/flammable materialE-2 – In combination with explosive material

2 Thermal E-1 – In combination with combustible/flammable materialE-2 – In combination with explosive material

3 Pyrophoric Material E-1 – Pyrophoric fire; could serve as ignition source for larger firesE-2 – In combination with explosive material

4 Open Flame E-1 – In combination with combustible/flammable materialE-2 – In combination with explosive material

5 Flammables E-1 – In combination with ignition source

6 Combustibles E-1 – In combination with ignition source

7 Chemical Reactions E-1 – Fire or other thermal effectE-2 – Explosion or overpressurizationE-3 – Toxic gas generation

8 Explosive Material E-2 – In combination with ignition sourceE-3 – Missiles (in combination with ignition source)


E-3 – Impacts, acceleration/deceleration, missiles

10 Potential (Pressure) E-3 – Impacts, missiles

11 Potential(Height/Mass)

E-3 – Impacts (falling objects), dropping

12 Internal FloodingSources

E-3 – Ground/surface water runoff

13 Physical E-3 – Puncture, dropping

14 Radiological Material All Events – Potentially releasable material

15 Hazardous Material All Events – Potentially releasable material

16 Ionizing Radiation E-4 – Direct exposure to worker

17 Non-IonizingRadiation

E-1 – Potential for thermal effects in combination withcombustible/flammable materialE-2 – Potential thermal effects in combination with explosivematerial

18 Criticality E-5 – Criticality


Table A-5 - Hazard Sources and Potential Events

GroupNo.

Hazard EnergySource or Material

GroupPotential Events by Category

3-96 November 2006

19 Non-Facility Events E-6 – External Events. Could lead to any event category (E-1through E-5)

20 Vehicles in Motion(external to facility)

E-6 – External Events. Could lead to any event category (E-1through E-5)

21 Natural Phenomena E-7 – NPH Events. Could lead to any event category (E-1 throughE-5)


3-97 November 2006

Table A-6 - Frequency Evaluation Levels

Frequency Level Abbreviation Frequency Qualitative Description

Anticipated A f $ 10-2/year Events that might occurseveral times during thelifetime of the facility

Unlikely U 10-4 # f < 10-2/year Events not anticipated duringthe lifetime of the facility

Extremely Unlikely EU 10-6 # f < 10-4/year Events that will probably notoccur during the lifetime ofthe facility

Beyond ExtremelyUnlikely

BEU f < 10-6/year All other events


3-98 November 2006

Table A-7 - Consequence Evaluation Levels for Hazard Receptors

ConsequenceLevel

PublicShortest distance to

unrestricted public access

On-SiteIndividuals outside theoccupied area of thehazard but in the site

boundary

WorkerIndividuals immediately

adjacent to, or in, theoccupied area of the

hazard

High

Considerable off-siteimpacts

Radiological:C $ 25 rem TEDE

Chemical:C $ ERPG-2

Considerable on-siteimpacts

Radiological:C $ 100 rem TEDE

Chemical:C $ ERPG-3

Prompt death, seriousinjury, or significant

radiological or chemicalexposure

Moderate

Minor off-site impactsRadiological:

25 > C $ 1 rem TEDEChemical:

ERPG-2 > C $ ERPG-1

Considerable on-siteimpacts

Radiological:100 > C $ 25 rem TEDE

Chemical:ERPG-3 > C > ERPG-2

Low

Negligible off-siteimpacts

Radiological:C < 1 rem TEDE

Chemical:C < ERPG-1

Minor on-site impactsRadiological:

C < 25 rem TEDEChemical:

C < ERPG-2

< High


3-99 November 2006

Table A-8 - Qualitative Risk Bins

Frequency Level Y

Consequence Level \

BeyondExtremelyUnlikely

ExtremelyUnlikely

Unlikely Anticipated

High III II I I

Moderate IV III II I

LowIV IV III III


3-100 November 2006

Table A-9 - Hazard Evaluation for CH On-Site Transportation Route

EventNo.

Event Description Causes

Freq.Level

Consequence Level Risk BinPotential Preventive Features Potential Mitigative Features

Unprev Unmitigated Unmit

OA1-1 Fire on diesel tractor or trailer jockey impactsTRUPACT-II or HalfPACTs

Location: In parking area or in transit to parking area

Release Mechanism: None

MAR: Waste material contained in three fully loadedTRUPACT-IIs, two waste assemblies per TRUPACT-II, 3,360 PE-Ci (direct loaded), 7,200 PE-Ci(overpacked), 75,600 PE-Ci (POCs orsolidified/vitrified)

IC: Waste arrives at WIPP in TRUPACT-II orHalfPACT Type B containers which are designed towithstand fires.

Hazard Source: Radioactive material, beryllium

1. Electric short2. Electrical failure3. Mechanical

failure4. Flammable liquid

leak, ignition offumes

5. Vehicle collisioncreates spark andignites nearbycombustiblematerials

U RadiologicalFac. Worker – LowSite Worker – LowPublic – Low

ChemicalFac. Worker – LowSite Worker – LowPublic – Low

IIIIIIIII

IIIIIIIII

Design:Paved and graveled PPA preventsfire propagation

Administrative:1. Designated smoking areas2. Combustible loading controlprogram3. Periodic equipment inspectionand preventive maintenance

Design:None

Administrative:1. Emergency response procedures 2. Alert, notification and protective

actions3. Trained workers (workers trained

to evacuate in emergencysituations)

4. WIPP fire brigade and externalfirefighting support

5. Hand held fire extinguisher ontrailer jockey

OA1-2 Electric forklift fire during offloading or duringtransport of TRUPACT-II or HalfPACT into the WHBcauses damage to transportation container andbreaches drums internal to the container.

Location: Parking area



IC: Waste arrives at WIPP in TRUPACT-II orHalfPACT Type B containers which are designed towithstand fires.


1. Electric short2. Electrical failure3. Mechanical failure4. Flammable liquidleak, ignition offumes (by engine orexhaust heat)5. Vehicle collisioncreates spark andignites nearbycombustible materials

U RadiologicalFac. Worker - LowSite Worker - LowPublic - Low


IIIIIIIII

IIIIIIIII

Design:None

Administrative:1. Preventive maintenanceprogram on waste handlingforklifts2. Qualified operators

Design:None

Administrative:1. Emergency response procedures2. Alert, notification and protective



4. Fire extinguisher on forklift5. WIPP fire brigade and external

firefighting support



EventNo.


Freq.Level



3-101 November 2006

OA2-1 Ignition of fumes from transport vehicle fuel results inan explosion with subsequent missiles that impactTRUPACT-II or HalfPACTs and breaches wastecontainers.




IC: Waste arrives at WIPP in TRUPACT-II orHalfPACT Type B containers which are designed towithstand impact.


1. Heat sources orspark from varioussources ignitesleaking fuel



IIIIIIIII

IIIIIIIII

Design:Use of diesel fueled transportequipment

Administrative:1. Periodic equipment inspectionand preventive maintenance2. Use of approved wastehandling equipment only

Design:None

Administrative:1. Emergency response procedures2. Alert, notification and protectiveactions3. Trained workers (workers trainedto evacuate in emergency situations)4. WIPP fire brigade and externalfirefighting support

OA2-2 Battery explosion on the transport vehicle producesmissiles that impact TRUPACT-II or HalfPACTs andresult in a breach of waste containers internal to thetransportation container.




IC: Waste arrives at WIPP in TRUPACT-II orHalfPACT Type B containers designed to withstandimpact.


1. Batterymalfunction2. Electricalequipment on vehiclemalfunctions andgenerates a spark thatignites hydrogengenerated by thevehicle battery3. Heat sources fromvarious sources ignitegases from battery



IIIIIIIII

IIIIIIIII

Design:Vented battery compartments

Administrative:1. Preventive maintenanceprogram for onsite mobileequipment including periodicinspections of onsite electricalequipment 2. Preventive maintenance on thetransport vehicles 3. Combustible loading controlprogram

Design:None

Administrative:1. Emergency response procedures2. Alert, notification and protectiveactions3. Trained workers (workers trainedto evacuate in emergency situations)



EventNo.


Freq.Level



3-102 November 2006

OA3-1 TRUPACT-II or HalfPACT is dropped duringmovement activities

Location: In parking area


MAR: Waste material contained in one fully loadedTRUPACT-II, 1,120 PE-Ci (directed loaded), 2,400PE-Ci (ovepacked), 25,200 PE-Ci (POCs or solidified/vitrified)

IC: Waste arrives at WIPP in TRUPACT-II orHalfPACT Type B containers designed drops of 30 ftwith no breach.


1. Operator error2. Equipmentmalfunction (e.g.,lifting mechanismfailure)

A RadiologicalFac. Worker - LowSite Worker - LowPublic - Low

ChemicalFac. Worker - LowSite Worker - LowPublic - Low

Note: For this event,it is assumed that thedrop could occurfrom the trailer orfrom the forklift.

IIIIIIIII

IIIIIIIII

Design:Robust forklift design

Administrative:1. Trained drivers and trainedonsite vehicle drivers2. Periodic forklift inspection andpreventive maintenance

Design:None

Administrative:1. Emergency response procedures2. Alert, notification, and protectiveactions3. Trained workers ( workers trainedto evacuate in emergency situations)

OA3-2 Transport equipment accident during movement ofTRUPACT-II or HalfPACT (e.g., transport vehiclecarrying TRUPACT-II or HalfPACT collides withanother vehicle)



MAR: Waste material contained in six fully loadedTRUPACT-II, 6,720 PE-Ci (directed loaded), 14.400PE-Ci (ovepacked), 151,200 PE-Ci (POCs or solidified/vitrified)



1. Operator error2. Equipmentmalfunction(e.g., brake failure)



IIIIIIIII

IIIIIIIII

Design:None

Administrative:1. Spotters used during handlingoperations2. Qualified operators3. Periodic forklift inspection andpreventive maintenance

Design:None

Administrative:1. Emergency response procedures2. Alert, notification, and protectiveactions3. Trained workers (workers trainedto evacuate in emergency situations)



EventNo.


Freq.Level



3-103 November 2006

OA3-3 Vehicle collides with transport equipment

Location: In transit from gate to parking area


MAR: Waste material contained in three fully loadedTRUPACT-IIs, 3,360 PE-Ci (direct loaded), 7,200 PE-Ci (overpacked), 75,600 PE-Ci (POCs orsolidified/vitrified)



1. Operator error2. Equipment

malfunction



IIIIIIIII

IIIIIIIII

Design:None

Administrative:1. Trained drivers and trainedonsite vehicle drivers2. Qualified operators3. Periodic onsite vehicleinspection and preventivemaintenance

Design:None


OA3-4 Forklift impacts and damages TRUPACT-II orHalfPACT with lifting tines resulting in a breach ofwaste containers

Location: In parking area


MAR: Waste material contained in two fully loadedTRUPACT-IIs, 2,240 PE-Ci (direct loaded), 4,800 PE-Ci (overpacked), 50,400, PE-Ci (POCs orsolidified/vitrified)

IC: Waste arrives at WIPP in TRUPACT-II orHalfPACT Type B containers designed to withstandimpact


1. Operator error2. Equipmentmalfunction



Note: This eventassumes that the innercontainer will not bebreached by theimpact as theTRUPACT-II andHalfPACT isdesigned to withstanddrops of 3 ft onto aspike with no breach.

IIIIIIIII

IIIIIIIII

Design:None

Administrative:1. Spotters used during handlingoperations2. Periodic forklift inspection andpreventive maintenance3. Qualified operators

Design:None

Administrative:1. Emergency response procedures 2. Alert, notification and protectiveactions3. Trained workers (workers trainedto evacuate in emergency situations



EventNo.


Freq.Level



3-104 November 2006

OA3-5 Mechanical failure of equipment components (e.g.,fans, belts) produces a missile that impactstransportation container and results in a breach



MAR: Waste material contained in one fully loadedTRUPACT-II, 1,120 PE-Ci (directed loaded), 2,400PE-Ci (ovepacked), 25,200 PE-Ci (POCs or solidified/vitrified)



1. Failure ofcomponents due tocorrosion,degradation, vibrationor stress



IIIIIIIII

IIIIIIIII

Design:None

Administrative:1. Periodic inspection andpreventive maintenance oftransportation equipment andwaste handling equipment

Design:None


OA4-1 Direct exposure to radiation in excess of anticipatedlevels


Release Mechanism: NA

MAR: NA

IC: None

Hazard Source: Ionizing radiation

1. Waste exceedslimits for CH wasteimposed by the LandWithdrawal Act2. Waste shifts intransit


ChemicalFac. Worker - NASite Worker - NAPublic - NA

IIIIIIIII

NANANA

Design:None

Administrative:1. Waste generator'scharacterization program mustensure that the waste meets therequirements for CH waste priorto shipment2. Radiation protection programincluding surveys to minimizepotential for workers to beexposed to high radiation

Design:None

Administrative:1. Trained workers2. Radiation protection program



EventNo.


Freq.Level



3-105 November 2006

OA4-2 Exposure to surface contamination on theTRUPACT-II or HalfPACT


Release Mechanism: Open pathway

MAR: NA

IC: None

Hazard Source: Radioactive material

1. TRUPACT-II orHalfPACT damagedin transit2. Mishandling atgenerator site resultsin contamination onsurface ofTRUPACT-II orHalfPACT



IIIIIIIII

NANANA

Design:None

Administrative:1. Frequent inspections while intransit verifies integrity ofTRUPACT-II or HalfPACT2. Radiation protection program3. Receipt inspection ofTRUPACT-II or HalfPACT4. Surveillance and maintenanceprogram (ensures integrity ofTRUPACT-II and HALFPact)5. Qualified operators

Design:None

Administrative:1. Radiation protection program2. Trained workers

OA5-1 Nuclear criticality in the TRUPACT-II or HalfPACT



MAR: NA

IC: Waste arrives at WIPP in TRUPACT-II orHalfPACT Type B containers.

Hazard Source: Fissile material, radiation

1. No limits on fissilemass in TRUPACT-IIor HalfPACT

EU RadiologicalFac. Worker - HighSite Worker - LowPublic - Low

ChemicalFac. Worker - NASite Worker - NAPublic -NA

IIIVIV

NANANA

Design:Metal waste containers

Administrative:1. Fissile mass limits areestablished in the CH TRAMPACfor the TRUPACT-II andHalfPACT. TRUPACT-II andHalfPACT Safety Analysis Reportshows that the transportationpackage is subcritical under theworst case accident conditionencountered during transport.

Design:None

Administrative:1. Emergency response procedures



EventNo.


Freq.Level



3-106 November 2006

OA6-1 External fire propagates to engulf the TRUPACT-II orHalfPACT resulting in damage



MAR: Waste material contained in 50 fully loadedTRUPACT-IIs, two waste assemblies per TRUPACT-II, 56,000 PE-Ci (direct loaded), 120,000 Pe-Ci(overpacked), 1,260,000 PE-Ci (POCs orsolidified/vitrified)

IC: Waste arrives at WIPP in TRUPACT-II orHalfPACT Type B containers designed to withstandfire


1. External vehiclefire2. Fire involvingstaged equipment fire(e.g., combustiblematerials)3. Fire in adjacentfacility or structure(e.g., HAZMATfacility)4. Cigarettes ormatches droppedwhile lit ignitecombustible materialin area. Firepropagates to outsidearea



IIIIIIIII

IIIIIIIII

Design:1. Paved transport roads andparking area limits potential forexternal fire to reach theTRUPACT-II or HalfPACT insidethe PPA.

Administrative:1. Emergency response includingoffsite fire response (Hobbs andCarlsbad) to prevent external firefrom propagating to PPA.2. Combustible loading controlprogram.

Design:None


OA6-2 External vehicle (e.g., Euclid dump truck) collideswith TRUPACT-II or HalfPACT






1. Operator error2. Equipmentmalfunction(e.g., brake failure,stuck accelerator)



IIIIIIIII

IIIIIIIII

Design:None

Administrative:1. Vehicle operator qualification

program2. Qualified operators3. Periodic vehicle inspection

and preventive maintenance4. Ten mph speed limit inside

PPA

Design:None




EventNo.


Freq.Level



3-107 November 2006

OA6-3 External explosion with subsequent missiles impactsTRUPACT-II or HalfPACT resulting in a breach




IC: Waste arrives at WIPP in TRUPACT-II orHalfPACT Type B containers designed to withstandimpact


1. Vehiclemalfunction resultingin an explosion onnearby road



IIIIIIIII

IIIIIIIII

Design:No gas pipelines in the PPA

Administrative:1. Designated area for flammablegas cylinder storage2. Paved and graveled PPAprevents fire propagation

Design:None


OA6-4 Aircraft crashes into parking area, impactsTRUPACT-II and generates a follow-on fire

Location: Parking area

Release Mechanism: Impact, breach, and thermalrelease




1. Pilot error2. Aircraft power orcontrol malfunction

EU RadiologicalFac. Worker - HighSite Worker - HighPublic - High

ChemicalFac. Worker - HighSite Worker - HighPublic - High

IIIIII

IIIIII

Design:WIPP is located in a remote areathat is not on a direct flight pathfor normal air traffic.

Administrative:None

Design:1. Robust TRUPACT-II designwould be expected to limit damageand release

Administrative:1. Emergency response procedures2. Alert, notification and protectiveactions3. Trained workers (workers trainedto evacuate in emergency situations)4. WIPP fire brigade and externalfirefighting support.



EventNo.


Freq.Level



3-108 November 2006

OA6-5 Vehicle collision with follow-on fire




IC: Waste arrives at WIPP in TRUPACT-II orHalfPACT Type B containers designed to withstandimpact and fires.


1. Operator error2. Equipmentmalfunction(e.g., brake failure,stuck accelerator)



IIIIIIIII

IIIIIIIII

Design:None

Administrative:1. Preventive maintenanceprogram on site vehicles.2. Qualified operators

Design:None


OA6-6 Puncture of TRUPACT-II or HalfPACT due to firearmdischarge



MAR: Waste material contained in one fully loadedTRUPACT-II, 1,120 PE-Ci (directed loaded), 2,400PE-Ci (ovepacked), 25,200 PE-Ci (POCs or solidified/vitrified),



1. Errant shot fromhunter in areaadjacent to WIPP site- multiple land usearea activities aroundthe facility



IIIIIIIII

IIIIIIIII

Design:None

Administrative:1. Signs posted at EUA to notifythe public to prevent huntingbeyond the EUA boundary 2. Trained security force

Design:1. Robust design of TRUPACT-IIwould be expected to minimizedamage




EventNo.


Freq.Level



3-109 November 2006

OA7-1 Lightning strikes TRUPACT-IIs or HalfPACTs






1. Severe weather orthunderstormgenerates lightningthat results in damageto the TRUPACT-IIor HalfPACT (directstrike or secondaryimpact)



Note: This eventassumes that theshipping casksustains minimaldamage from thephysical impact of thelightning, but that norelease would beexpected.

IIIIIIIII

IIIIIIIII

Design:1. Lightning dissipation systeminstalled on perimeter lighting andtall structures along transport pathfrom the security gate to theparking area.2. Transportation packagesremain on the trailers in theparking area and are not storedeven temporarily on the ground.

Administrative:None

Design:None

Administrative:1. Emergency response procedures 2. Alert, notification and protectiveactions3. Trained workers (workers trainedto seek shelter during severe weatherconditions)

OA7-2 Tornado produced missiles breach TRUPACT-IIs orHalfPACTs




IC: Waste arrives at WIPP in TRUPACT-II orHalfPACT Type B containers. Hazard Source: Radioactive material, beryllium

1. Severe weatherand thunderstorms.



IIIIIIIII

IIIIIIIII

Design:1. Robust design of shipping caskwill withstand the impact of a PC4missile.

Administrative:1. Procedures for inclementweather response

Design:None

Administrative:1. Emergency response procedures2. Alert, notification and protectiveactions3. Trained workers (workers trainedto seek shelter during severe weatherconditions)



EventNo.


Freq.Level



3-110 November 2006

OA7-3 High wind produced missiles breach TRUPACT-IIs orHalfPACTs






1. Inclement weatherincluding severe windstorms



IIIIIIIII

IIIIIIIII

Design:Robust design of shipping caskwill withstand the impact of a PC4missile.

Administrative:None

Design:None

Administrative:1. Emergency response procedures 2. Alert, notification and protectiveactions3. Trained workers (workers trainedto seek shelter during severe weatherconditions)

OA7-4 Heavy rains result in shallow flooding of outside areaand impacts the TRUPACT-II or HalfPACTs




IC: Waste arrives at WIPP in TRUPACT-II orHalfPACT Type B containers and are designed towithstand water in-leakage


1. Severe weather/heavy thunderstorms



IIIIIIIII

IIIIIIIII

Design: 1. Water run-off and drainagesystem around the WIPP site

Administrative:1. Maintenance of berms andstorm water drainage system2. Procedures for inclementweather response

Design:None

Administrative:1. Emergency response procedures2. Trained workers (workers trainedto seek shelter during severe weatherconditions)



EventNo.


Freq.Level



3-111 November 2006

OA7-5 Hail impacts TRUPACT-IIs or HalfPACTs




IC: TRUPACT-II or HalfPACT Type B containersdesigned to withstand impact


1. Severe weather/hail-producingthunderstorms



IIIIIIIII

IIIIIIIII

Design:None

Administrative:1. Procedures for inclimateweather response

Design:None

Administrative:1. Emergency response procedures 2. Alert, notification and protectiveactions3. Trained workers (workers trainedto seek shelter in severe weatherconditions)

OA7-6 Wildland fire propagates to the outside area andimpacts TRUPACT-IIs or HalfPACTs




IC: TRUPACT-II or HalfPACT Type B containersdesigned to withstand fire


1. Lightning2. Cigarettes ormatches dropped(outside siteboundary) while lit -ignite vegetation andresults in a fire thatpropagates to WIPPsite3. Campfire invicinity of WIPPignites vegetation andresults in a fire thatpropagates to WIPPsite



IIIIIIIII

IIIIIIIII

Design:1. PPA is paved and graveled andsurrounded by a dirt road thatparallels the security fenceprevent fires from impactingshipping containers

Administrative:1. Combustible control program 2. Vegetation control alongaccess road to the WIPP 3. Memorandum ofunderstanding with externalagency which extinguishes firebefore fire reaches the PPA

Design:None

Administrative:1. Emergency response procedures2. Alert, notification, and protectiveactions3. Trained workers (workers trainedto evacuate in emergency situations) 4. Combustible loading controlprogram5. WIPP fire brigade and externalfirefighting support


3-112 November 2006

Table A-10 - Hazard Evaluation for CH Waste Handling Building

EventNo.


Freq.Level

Consequence LevelRiskBin Potential Preventive Features

Potential Mitigative Features


WHB1-1 Small fire

Location: WHB CH bay


MAR: One seven-pack 560 PE-Ci (directloaded), 1,200 PE-Ci (ovepacked), 12,600 PE-Ci (POCs or solidified/vitrified

Initial Conditions: Only electric poweredvehicles are allowed in the CH portion of theWHB; the WHB is of noncombustibleconstruction


1. Malfunction ofelectrical equipment (e.g.,power tools, forklift,wiring) generates a sparkand ignites nearbyflammable or combustiblematerial (e.g., cleaningsolvents, flammablegases)2. Overheating ofelectrical equipment (e.g.,electrical equipment,heaters)3. Hotwork

A Radiological:Fac. Worker - HighSite Worker - ModeratePublic - Moderate

Chemical;Fac. Worker - HighSite Worker - ModeratePublic - Moderate

III

III

Design1. Electrical installation that meetsNEC.2. Noncombustible construction ofthe WHB

Administrative:1. Work control process2. Hot work program 3. Preventive maintenance programon electrical equipment. 4. Combustible loading controlprogram for the WHB includingflammable gas/liquid or flammablecompressed gas cylinder control

Design:1. WHB ventilation system2. WHB fire suppression system

Administrative:1. Emergency response procedures2. Alert, notification, and protectiveactions3. Trained workers (workers trainedto evacuate in emergency situations)4. Combustible loading controlprogram5. WIPP fire brigade and externalfirefighting support



EventNo.


Freq.Level




3-113 November 2006

WHB1-2

Full room fire (CH bay)


Release Mechanism: Thermal release

MAR: Seven facility pallets of waste,15,680 PE-Ci (direct loaded), 33,600 PE-Ci(overpacked), 352,800 PE-Ci (POCs orsolidified/vitrified)



1. Malfunction ofelectrical equipment (e.g.power tools, forklift,wiring, electric forklift)generates a spark andignites nearby flammableor combustible material(e.g., cleaning solvents,flammable gases)2. Spontaneouscombustion of oily rags3. Overheating ofelectrical equipment (e.g.,electrical equipment,heaters)4. Hotwork5. Forklift collisionresults in hydraulic leakand fire.

U RadiologicalFac. Worker - HighSite Worker - HighPublic - Moderate

ChemicalFac. Worker - HighSite Worker - HighPublic - Moderate

IIII

IIII

Design1. Noncombustible construction ofthe WHB including shieldedstorage room with three ft thickconcrete walls and ceiling2. 13-ton electric forklift design -Forklift hydraulic fluid segregatedfrom ignition sources. Thebatteries, motor, and motorcontactors are separated from eachother and from the hydraulicreservoir by thick metal partitions.The body of the forklift has thickmetal walls that protect theelectrical and hydraulic componentsfrom damage due to collisions. Forklift hydraulic fluid withflashpoint greater than 400 degreesF.

Administrative:1. Work control process2. Hot work program 3. Preventive maintenance programon electrical equipment4. Combustible loading controlprogram for the WHB includingflammable gas/liquid or flammablecompressed gas cylinder controland control of number of slipsheetpallets allowed in the CH bay (minimizes quantity of combustiblematerial that is available forignition)


Administrative:1. Emergency response procedures2. Alert, notification, and protectiveactions 3. Trained workers (workers trainedto evacuate in emergency situations)4. Combustible loading controlprogram for the WHB5. WIPP fire brigade and externalfirefighting support



EventNo.


Freq.Level




3-114 November 2006

WHB1-3 Multi-Room Fire






1. Malfunction ofelectrical equipment (e.g.,power tools, forklift,wiring, electric forklift)generates a spark andignites nearby flammableor combustible material(e.g., cleaning solvents,flammable gases)2. Spontaneouscombustion of oily rags3. Overheating ofelectrical equipment(e.g., electricalequipment, heaters)4. Fire from adjoiningstructure (SupportBuilding or TMF)propagates to CH bay 5. Hotwork



IIII

IIII

Design1. Noncombustible construction ofthe WHB including shieldedstorage room with three ft thickconcrete walls and ceiling2. 13-ton electric forklift design -Forklift hydraulic fluid segregatedfrom ignition sources. Thebatteries, motor, and motorcontactors are separated from eachother and from the hydraulicreservoir by thick metal partitions.The body of the forklift has thickmetal walls that protect theelectrical and hydraulic componentsfrom damage due to collisions. Forklift hydraulic fluid withflashpoint greater than 400 degreesF. Administrative:1. Work control process2. Hot work program 3. Preventive maintenance programon electrical equipment4. Combustible loading controlprogram for the WHB and TMFincluding flammable gas/liquid orflammable compressed gas cylindercontrol and control of number ofslipsheet pallets allowed in theWHB (minimizes quantity ofcombustible material that isavailable for ignition)

Design:1. WHB and Support Building firesuppression system 2. WHB ventilation system

Administrative:1. Emergency response procedures2. Alert, notification, and protectiveactions3. Trained workers (workers trainedto evacuate in emergency situations)4. Combustible loading controlprogram for the WHB5. WIPP fire brigade and externalfirefighting support.



EventNo.


Freq.Level




3-115 November 2006

WHB1-4 Waste container fire



MAR: 80 PE-Ci, (direct loaded drum), 560 PE-Ci (direct loaded SWB or TDOP), 1,100 PE-Ci(overpacked drum or SWB), 1,800 PE-Ci (POC)

Initial Conditions: None


1. No controls on wastecontent sent to WIPP 2. Spontaneouscombustion

A RadiologicalFac. Worker - HighSite Worker - ModeratePublic - Moderate

ChemicalFac. Worker - HighSite Worker - ModeratePublic - Moderate

III

III

Design:None

Administrative:1. Pyrophorics and explosives areprohibited in CH waste approvedfor disposal at WIPP and implemented at generator sites priorto shipment in accordance with theCH WAC14

2. Vent required on each wastecontainer and implemented atgenerator site in accordance withthe CH WAC14

Design:1. WHB fire suppression system2. WHB ventilation system

Administrative:1. Emergency response procedures2. Alert, notification, and protectiveactions3. Trained workers (workers trainedto evacuate in emergency situations)4. Combustible loading controlprogram for the WHB5. WIPP fire brigade and externalfirefighting support

WHB1-5 Electric forklift fire while transporting wastecontainers



MAR: One facility pallet or four seven-packs,2,240 PE-Ci (direct loaded),4,800 PE-Ci(overpacked), 50,400 PE-Ci (POCs orsolidified/vitrified)

Initial Conditions: Only electric poweredvehicles are allowed in the CH portion of theWHB


1. Electrical equipmenton vehicle malfunctionsand generates a spark thatignites combustiblematerial on the vehicle2. Mechanical failuregenerates heat (friction)3. Hydraulic leak nearignition source4. Forklift collisionresults in hydraulic leakand fire.



IIII

IIII

Design:1. 13-ton electric forklift design -Forklift hydraulic fluid segregatedfrom ignition sources. Thebatteries, motor, and motorcontactors are separated from eachother and from the hydraulicreservoir by thick metal partitions.The body of the forklift has thickmetal walls that protect theelectrical and hydraulic componentsfrom damage due to collisions. Forklift hydraulic fluid withflashpoint greater than 400 degreesF. Administrative:1. Periodic inspections of wastehandling equipment2. Preventive maintenance program3. Qualified operators


Administrative:1. Emergency response procedures2. Alert, notification, and protectiveactions3. Trained workers (workers trainedto evacuate in emergency situations)4. Combustible loading controlprogram in WHB 5. WIPP fire brigade



EventNo.


Freq.Level




3-116 November 2006

WHB2-1 Battery explosion on the forklift producesmissiles that impact waste containers


Release Mechanism: Impact and breach

MAR: One facility pallet or four seven-packs,2,240 PE-Ci (direct loaded), 4,800 PE-Ci(overpacked), 50,400 PE-Ci (POCs orsolidified/vitrified)



1. Battery malfunction2. Electrical equipmenton vehicle malfunctionsand generates a spark thatignites hydrogengenerated by the vehiclebattery3. Heat sources fromvarious sources ignitegases from battery



IIIIIIIII

IIIIIIIII

Design:1. Vented battery compartment onwaste handling forklifts

Administrative:1. Periodic inspections of wastehandling equipment2. Preventive maintenance program3. Qualified operators4. Only metal waste containers thatmeet DOT Type 7A requirements orequivalent are approved fordisposal at WIPP. Requirement isimplemented at generator sites inaccordance with the CH WAC.

Design:1. WHB ventilation system


WHB2-2 Explosion at battery charging station






1. Electrical equipmentmalfunctions andgenerates a spark thatignites hydrogengenerated by the batteries2. Maintenance activity



IIIIIIIII

IIIIIIIII

Design:1. Battery charging stationventilation system2. Vented battery compartment3. Battery charging systemdesigned per NEC and NFPAstandards4. Large volume of CH bay

Administrative:1. Preventive maintenance programfor charging station2. Qualified operators3. Procedure controls prohibitcharging without ventilation4. Only metal waste containers thatmeet DOT Type 7A requirements orequivalent are approved fordisposal at WIPP. Requirement isimplemented at generator sites inaccordance with the CH WAC.





EventNo.


Freq.Level




3-117 November 2006

WHB2-3 Flammable gas explosion and impact to wastecontainers



MAR: Two facility pallets or eight seven-packs, 4,480 PE-Ci (direct loaded), 9,600 PE-Ci(overpacked), 100,800 PE-Ci (POCs orsolidified/vitrified)



1. Malfunction ofelectrical equipmentgenerates a spark andignites nearby flammablegas2. Leaking acetylenebottle from maintenanceactivities is ignited byelectrical spark3. Alcohol used to cleanTRUPACT-II orHalfPACT matingsurfaces ignites4. Hydrogen inTRUPACT-II ofHalfPACT due to highwattage waste

A RadiologicalFac. Worker - HighSite Worker - HighPublic - High


.

III

III

Design:1. Gas bottle design2. Regulator and manifold design

Administrative:1. Combustible Loading ControlProgram - WHB - Flammable compressed gascylinders are prohibited in the CHbay unless all waste containers areinside closed TRUPACT-II orHalfPACT containers. (Thislimitation does not apply topackages covered by DOTExemption DOT-E-7607)- Limits denaturedalcohol/lubricants to no more than 1gal at each TRUDOCK2. Hot work program3. Waste handling procedurerequires venting the shipping caskinner containment vessel (ICV)through a HEPA filter prior toopening the ICV lid.

Design:1. WHB ventilation system2. Large volume of CH bay


WHB2-4 Waste container explosion


Release Mechanism: Internal explosion

MAR: 160 PE-Ci, (two direct loaded drums),1,120 PE-Ci (two direct loaded SWB or TDOP),2,200 PE-Ci (two overpacked drum or SWB),3,600 PE-Ci (two POCs)



1. Explosive gasgeneration inhigh-wattage wastecontainers combined withinternal ignition source2. No control on wastecontents

A RadiologicalFac. Worker - HighSite Worker - HighPublic - Moderate


III

III

Design:None

Administrative:1. Waste containers approved fordisposal at WIPP are required to bevented. Pyrophorics and explosivesare prohibited in CH wasteapproved for disposal at WIPP. These requirements areimplemented at generator sites priorto shipment in accordance with theCH WAC.

Design:1. WHB ventilation system2. WHB provides confinement




EventNo.


Freq.Level




3-118 November 2006

WHB3-1 Loss of confinement due to dropping wastecontainers when removing them from theshipping cask or dropping items on them


Release Mechanism: Breach due to crush

MAR: One facility pallet or four seven-packs,2,240 PE-Ci (direct loaded), 4,800 PE-Ci(overpacked), 50,400 PE-Ci (POCs orsolidified/vitrified)

Initial Conditions: TRUPACT-II and HalfPACTdesigned to withstand impact


1. Airlock doors fall onshipping cask duringmovement into the WHBor roll-up door toconveyance car loadingroom drops on wastecontainers2. Adjustable Center ofGravity Lift Fixture(ACGLF) failure dropsICV lid on wastecontainers or drops thewaste containers duringremoval from the shippingcask3. TRUDOCK cranefailure4. Operator error

A RadiologicalFac. Worker - HighSite Worker - Low Public - Low

ChemicalFac. Worker - HighSite Worker -LowPublic - Low

IIIIIII

IIIIIII

Design:1. CH bay cranes designed to holdload on loss of power or during aseismic event.2. ACGLF and four-pack liftfixture are designed to hold load. 3. Roll-up doors have two cables tosupport the door, arecounterweighted, and fail as is onloss of power4. Space frame pallet assembliesand lift pins are load bearing forlifting drum assemblies5. SWB lifting straps are loadbearing (4 straps, failure of anysingle strap will not result in adropped load)

Administrative:1. Qualified operators2. Preventive maintenance program3. Preoperational checks on wastehandling equipment prior to use4. Spotters used during handlingoperations5. Inspections on lift fixtures andlift straps





EventNo.


Freq.Level




3-119 November 2006

WHB3-2 Waste containers dropped during movementwith a forklift resulting in damage to containers






1. Operator error2. Forklift failure

A RadiologicalFac. Worker - HighSite Worker - LowPublic - Low

ChemicalFac. Worker - HighSite Worker - LowPublic - Low

IIIIIII

IIIIIII

Design:1. Forklift designed for anticipatedloads

Administrative:1. Qualified operators2. Preventive maintenance program3. Spotters used during handlingoperations4. Preoperational checks on wastehandling equipment prior to use5. Waste containers required to beDOT Type 7A or equivalent. Thisrequirement is implemented atgenerator sites in accordance withthe WIPP WAC



WHB3-3 Forklift impacts and punctures waste containerswith tines



MAR: Two drums from two different seven-packs, 160 PE-Ci (direct loaded) or 3,600 PE-Ci(POC) or 2,200 PE-Ci (overpacked)



1. Operator error2. Forklift brake failure



III

III

Design:1. Blunt tines on forklift

Administrative:1. Qualified operators 2. Spotters used during waste handling operations3. Preventive maintenance program4. Preoperational checks on wastehandling equipment prior to use


Administrative:1. Emergency response procedures 2. Alert, notification, and protectiveactions3. Trained workers (workers trainedto evacuate in emergency situations)



EventNo.


Freq.Level




3-120 November 2006

WHB3-4 Loss of confinement removal of wastecontainers from the TRUPACT-II or HalfPACT


Release Mechanism: Open pathway

MAR: Internal contamination



1. Worker error2. Generator siteoversight3. Load shifting duringtransit



IIIIIIIII

IIIIIIIII

Design:1. Vent hood and associatedventilation used when unloadingTRUPACT-II and HalfPACT

Administrative:1. Waste handling procedurerequires use of a vent hood duringTRUPACT-II unloading2. Qualified operators



WHB3-5 Compressed gas bottle becomes a missile thatimpacts TRUPACT-II, HalfPACT, or wastecontainers



MAR: One seven-pack at 560 PE-Ci (directloaded) or 1,200 PE-Ci (overpacked), 12,600PE-Ci (POCs or solidified/vitrified

Initial Conditions: Waste arrives inTRUPACT-II or HalfPACT which is designedto withstand impacts


1. Worker error whilehandling compressed gasbottles2. Bottle is impactedwhile unrestrained



III

III

Design:None

Administrative:1. Procedures for safe handling andstorage of compressed gas bottles 2. Workers trained in handlingcompressed gas bottles3. Nonflammable compressed gascylinder control limits the numberof compressed gas cylinders in theCH bay





EventNo.


Freq.Level




3-121 November 2006

WHB3-6 Forklift collides with stored waste






1. Operator error2. Equipmentmalfunction (e.g., brakefailure)



III

III

Design:None

Administrative:1. Qualified operators2. Waste handling restrictionrequires use of a spotter whenmoving waste with a forklift3. Periodic forklift inspection andpreventive maintenance


Administrative:1. Emergency response procedures2. Alert, notification, and protectiveactions3. Trained workers (facility workerstrained to evacuate in emergencysituations)

WHB4-1 Direct exposure to radiation in excess ofanticipated levels



MAR: None



1. Radiation level ofmaterial in containersexceeds requirementsfor CH waste

2. Waste shifts duringtransport



IIIIIIIII

NANANA

Design:None

Administrative:1. CH waste required to be less than200 mrem on contact. Requirementis implemented at the generatorsites prior to shipment inaccordance with the WIPP WAC2. Radiation protection program3. Qualified operators

Design:None

Administrative:1. Emergency response2. Radiation protection program



EventNo.


Freq.Level




3-122 November 2006

WHB5-1 Criticality in CH bay



MAR: NA


Hazard Source: Fissile material; radiation

1. No limits on fissilemass or specialmoderators or reflectors



IIIVIV

NANANA

Design:None

Administrative:1. Waste containers required to bemetal; fissile mass andmoderator/reflector mass limits bycontainer type are establishedthrough WIPP criticality safetyevaluations; these requirements areimplemented at generator sites priorto shipment to WIPP in accordancewith the WIPP WAC2. Waste handling restrictions specify stacking configuration inthe CH bay


Administrative:1. Emergency response procedures

WHB6-1 Vehicle collision with the WHB damages theWHB and impacts waste containers






1. Operator error2. Equipment

malfunction (e.g.,brake failure, stuckaccelerator)



Note: Either the south oreast side of the CH bayis vulnerable to beingbreached by an errantvehicle, but not bothsides at the same time

IIII

IIII

Design:1. WHB designed such that theshielded storage room has 3 ft.thick concrete walls and remainderof CH bay is protected on the northby the north rooms of the WHB andthe waste hoist tower, on the east bythe RH portion of the WHB and onthe west by the TMF

Administrative:1. Qualified operators 2. Preventive maintenance programon site vehicles3. Waste handling restriction torequire barricades along the outsideportion of the WHB south wallbetween airlock 100 and the TMF ifwaste is stored in the southwestcorner of the CH bay

Design:None.

Administrative:1. Emergency response procedures2. Alert, notification, and protectiveactions 3. Trained workers (workers trainedto evacuate in emergency situations)



EventNo.


Freq.Level




3-123 November 2006

WHB6-2 External fire damages the WHB and impactswaste containers






1. External vehicle fire2. Fire involving stagedequipment fire 3. Fire in adjacent facilityor structure 4. Cigarettes or matchesdropped while lit ignitecombustible material invicinity of WHB andpropagates to WHB5. Diesel poweredequipment operating inthe TMF near thecommon TMF/CH baywall or in the RH bay nearthe common RH/CH wallcatches fire.

U RadiologicalFac. Worker - HighSite Worker - ModeratePublic - Moderate


IIIII

IIIII

Design:1. PPA is paved and graveled andsurrounded by a dirt road along thesecurity fence and preventsexternal fire from reaching theWHB2. Noncombustible construction ofthe WHB

Administrative:1. WHB combustible loadingcontrol program requires that dieselpowered equipment maintain astandoff distance of 15 ft whenoperating near the commonTMF/CH bay wall or the RH/CHbay wall when waste is stored in thesouthwest or northeast corner,respectively, of the CH bay, or posta fire watch. 2. Periodic equipment inspectionand preventive maintenance3. WIPP fire brigade response

Design:1. WHB and Support Building firesuppression system

Administrative:1. Emergency response procedures2. Alert, notification and protectiveactions3. Trained workers (workers trainedto evacuate in emergency situations)4. WIPP fire brigade and externalfirefighting support5. Combustible loading control program

WHB6-3 Aircraft crashes into WHB


Release Mechanism: Impact and thermalrelease

MAR: Eighteen facility pallets of waste,40,320 PE-Ci (direct loaded), 86,400 PE-Ci(overpacked), 907,200 PE-Ci (POCs orsolidified/vitrified)



1. Pilot error2. Aircraft power orcontrol malfunction


ChemicalFac. Worker -High Site Worker - HighPublic - High

IIIIII

IIIIII

Design:1. WIPP is in a remote area that isnot on a direct flight path fornormal air traffic.

Administrative:None

Design:WHB fire suppression system mayprovide some mitigation

Administrative:1. Emergency response procedures2. Alert, notification, and protective



4. WIPP fire brigade and externalfirefighting support

5. WHB combustible loading control program limits extent offollow-on fire



EventNo.


Freq.Level




3-124 November 2006

WHB6-4 Loss of all AC power



MAR: Eight waste assemblies 4,480 PE-Ci(direct loaded), 9,600 PE-Ci (overpacked),100,800 PE-Ci (POCs or solidified/vitrified)



1. Storm2. Electrical fire3. Brownout4. Utility error

A RadiologicalFac. Worker - HighSite Worker - HighPublic - Moderate

ChemicalFac. Worker - HighSite Worker -HighPublic - Moderate

III

III

Design:1. Redundant electrical feeds toWIPP from electrical grid 2. Building electrical feed anddistribution system designed toconform with NEC and NFPAstandards3. TRUDOCK cranes hold loadduring loss of power

Administrative:None

Design:1. Backup diesel generators to powerselected loads

Administrative:1. Emergency response procedures 2. Alert, notification, and protectiveactions3. Trained workers (workers aretrained to respond to abnormalsituations)

WHB7-1 Wildland fire damages the WHB and impactswaste containers






1. Lightning2. Cigarettes or matchesdropped (outside siteboundary) while lit -ignite vegetation andresults in a fire thatpropagates to WIPP site3. Campfires in vicinityof WIPP ignite vegetationand results in a fire thatpropagates to WIPP site



IIII

IIII

Design:1. PPA is paved and graveled andsurrounded by a dirt road along thesecurity fence to provide separationbetween the WHB and low profilevegetation 2. Noncombustible construction ofthe WHB

Administrative:1. Combustible loading controlprogram - includes vegetationcontrol along access road to WIPP2. External agency fire fightingresponse

Design:1. WHB fire suppression system

Administrative:1. Emergency response procedures2. Alert, notification, and protectiveactions 3. Trained workers (workers trainedto evacuate in emergency situations) 4. Combustible loading controlprogram 5. External agency fire fightingresponse.



EventNo.


Freq.Level




3-125 November 2006

WHB7-2 Earthquake with fire damages the WHB andimpacts waste containers






1. Falling objects damagewaste containers.2. Falling objects orbuilding movementdamages electricalequipment that results infire



IIII

IIII

Design:1. WHB designed to withstand aDBE; main lateral force resistingmembers of the Support Buildingand TMF are designed to withstandthe DBE2. TRUDOCK cranes designed tohold their load during a DBE

Administrative: 1. Combustible loading controlprogram in WHB preventscontinuity of combustible material

Design:1. Fire suppression system inbuilding may provide somemitigation if still operating followingthe DBE2. WHB ventilation system tornadodampers close on a seismic event toprovide confinement.

Administrative:1. Emergency response procedures2. Alert, notification, and protectiveactions 3. Trained workers (workers trainedto evacuate in emergency situations) 4. Combustible loading controlprogram 5. WIPP fire brigade and externalfirefighting support

WHB7-3 Lightning strikes the WHB breaching thebuilding and damaging waste containers






1. Thunderstorms; severeweather


ChemicalFac. Worker -High Site Worker - ModeratePublic - Moderate

III

III

Design:1. WHB grounding and lightningprotection system is designed toprevent building damage fromlightning strike.

Administrative:1. Preventive maintenance programon building ground and lightningprotection system


Administrative:1. Procedures designating responseto oncoming severe weather2. Emergency response procedures 3. Alert, notification, and protectiveactions4. Trained workers (workers trainedto seek appropriate shelter in the caseof severe weather)



EventNo.


Freq.Level




3-126 November 2006

WHB7-4 Tornado damages the WHB and impacts wastecontainers





Hazard Source: Radioactive material

1. Tornado generateswind driven missiles thatdamage waste containers

EU RadiologicalFac. Worker - HighSite Worker - ModeratePublic - Moderate


Note:WHB is not designed towithstand tornado driven missiles

IIIIIIII

IIIIIIII

Design:1. WHB including tornadodampers is designed to withstandDBT; The lateral force resistingmembers of the TMF are designedto withstand the DBT to prevent itfrom damaging the WHB

Administrative:1. Procedures designating responseto oncoming severe weather

Design:1. WHB tornado dampers close ondifferential pressure associated withtornados

Administrative:1. Procedures designating responseto oncoming severe weather 2. Emergency response procedures3. Alert, notification, and protectiveactions4. Trained workers (workers trainedto seek appropriate shelter in the caseof a tornado event)

WHB7-5 High winds damage WHB and impacts wastecontainers






1. Extreme windsgenerate wind drivenmissiles that damagewaste containers

U RadiologicalFac. Worker - HighSite Worker - ModeratePublic - Moderate


IIIII

IIIII

Design:1. WHB designed to withstand the110 mph wind

Administrative:1. Procedures designating responseto oncoming severe weather

Design:None

Administrative:1. Procedures designating responseto oncoming severe weather 2. Emergency response procedures3. Alert, notification, and protectiveactions4. Trained workers (workers trainedto seek appropriate shelter in the caseof inclement weather)



EventNo.


Freq.Level




3-127 November 2006

WHB7-6 Hail damages WHB roof and impacts wastecontainers






1. Severe weather, hail-producingthunderstorm



IIII

IIII

Design:1. WHB designed to withstand27 lb/ft2 snow/ice loading

Administrative:1. Procedures that specifyresponse to severe winter weather

Design:1. WHB ventilation system.

Administrative:1. Procedures designating responseto oncoming severe weather 2. Emergency response procedures 3. Alert, notification, and protectiveactions 4. Trained workers (workers trainedto seek appropriate shelter in the caseof severe weather)

WHB7-7 Snow/ice accumulation on WHB roof damagesstructure and impacts waste containers






1. Severe weather resultsin accumulation of snowand ice



IIII

IIII

Design:1. WHB designed to withstand27 lb/ft2 snow/ice loading

Administrative:1. Procedures specify response tosevere winter weather


Administrative:1. Procedures designating responseto oncoming severe weather 2. Emergency response procedures 3. Alert, notification, and protectiveactions 4. Trained workers (workers trainedto seek appropriate shelter in the caseof severe weather)


3-128 November 2006

Table A-11 - Hazard Evaluation for CH Waste Handling Underground

EventNo.


Freq.Level




UG1-1 Fire in waste disposal path (from the waste shaftstation to the active disposal room) and damageswaste containers in transit

Location: Underground



Initial Conditions: Waste is handled anddisposed 2,150 ft underground


1. Malfunction ofelectrical equipmentincluding electric miningequipment generates aspark and ignites nearbyflammable or combustiblematerial2. Vehicle collision withelectrical equipment3. Vehicle fire from fuel orhydraulic line leaks4. Ignition of nearbycombustibles from droppedcigarettes or matches orelectrical sparks5. Spontaneouscombustion of oily rags6. Hotwork (e.g., welding,cutting torch, grinding)7. Spontaneous ignition ofwaste inside in a wastecontainer8. Collision betweenvehicles in the disposalpath resulting in fire



III

III

Design:1. Electrical system design complieswith 30 CFR 56/57 and NEC2. Automatic/manual firesuppression system on wastehandling vehicles

Administrative:1. Waste handling restrictions to: -require 75 ft standoff distancebetween waste handling equipmentand non-waste handling equipment inthe disposal path- require a spotter when movingwaste- access control in E-300 duringwaste handling 2. Combustible Loading ControlProgram including:- Flammable gas/liquid andflammable compressed gas cylindercontrol

Design:1. Hand held fire extinguisher onunderground vehicles2. Automatic/manual firesuppression system on wastehandling vehicles3. Manual fire suppression systemon mining equipment4. Underground ventilationsystem

Administrative:1. FLIRT response2. Emergency responseprocedures3. Alert, notification, andprotective actions4. Trained workers (workerstrained to evacuate in emergencysituations) 5. Miner rescue team response



EventNo.


Freq.Level




3-129 November 2006

UG1-1cont

Fire in waste disposal path (from the waste shaftstation to the active disposal room) and damageswaste containers in transit

- The lube truck is prohibited fromthe disposal path while waste is intransit from the waste shaft station tothe active disposal room3. Preventive maintenance program4. Hot work program5. Pyrophoric and explosive materialprohibited in waste approved fordisposal at WIPP. Requirementimplemented at generator sites inaccordance with the WIPP WAC 6. Qualified operators ensures thatthe CMR operator(s) and operationspersonnel in the undergroundperforming waste handlingoperations communicate and take theappropriate actions in the event of afire in the underground such that theCMR operator(s) blocks the shift tofiltration of underground ventilationuntil personnel are out of danger.This requirement also ensures thatoperations personnel in theunderground take the necessaryimmediate actions to notify the CMRand proceed to a safe location.



EventNo.


Freq.Level




3-130 April 2007|

UG1-2 Fire in an active waste disposal room|



MAR: Eleven waste assemblies 6,160 PE-Ci(direct loaded), 13,200 PE-Ci (overpacked),138,600 PE-Ci (POCs or solidified/vitrified)



1. Malfunction ofelectrical equipmentincluding electric miningequipment generates aspark and ignites nearbyflammable or combustiblematerial2. Vehicle fire from fuel orhydraulic line leaks3. Ignition of nearbycombustibles from droppedcigarettes or matches orelectrical sparks4. Spontaneouscombustion of oily rags5. Hotwork (e.g., welding,cutting torch, grinding)6. Spontaneous ignition ofwaste inside in a wastecontainer7. Collision betweenvehicles in the disposalroom resulting in fire

A RadiologicalFac. Worker - HighSite Worker - High Public - High


Note:This event assumes thatthe fire may impact aportion of the containerson the face of the array

III

III

Design:1. Electrical system design complieswith 30 CFR Parts 56/57 and NEC2. Automatic/manual firesuppression system on wastehandling vehicles

Administrative:1. Waste handling restrictions to: -prevent nonwaste handling vehiclesin the disposal room during wastehandling - require a spotter when vehicles arewithin 75 ft of the waste array- access control in E-300 duringwaste handling3. Qualified operators ensures thatthe CMR operator(s) and operationspersonnel in the undergroundperforming waste handlingoperations communicate and take theappropriate actions in the event of afire in the underground such that theCMR operator(s) blocks the shift tofiltration of underground ventilationuntil personnel are out of danger.This requirement also ensures thatoperations personnel in theunderground take the necessaryimmediate actions to notify the CMRand proceed to a safe location.4. Preventive maintenance program





EventNo.


Freq.Level




3-131 April 2007|

UG1-2cont

Fire in an active waste disposal room |5. Combustible loading controlprogram including:- only diesel or electric poweredvehicles are used in the underground. - flammable gas/liquid andflammable compressed gas cylinderuse and storage control- No lube truck in active disposalroom - No non-waste handling equipmentwithin 75 ft of waste face without afire watch6. Hotwork program7. Pyrophoric and explosive materialprohibited in waste approved fordisposal at WIPP. Requirementimplemented at generator sites inaccordance with the CH WAC.



EventNo.


Freq.Level




3-132 April 2007|

UG1-3A| Fire in waste array during active waste|emplacement|



MAR: 1,714 waste assemblies or ~12,000drums - contents of one room - 960,000 PE-Ci(direct loaded), 2,056,800 PE-Ci (overpacked),21,600,000 PE-Ci (POCs or solidified/vitrified)



1. Malfunction ofelectrical equipmentincluding electric miningequipment generates aspark and ignites nearbyflammable or combustiblematerial2. Vehicle fire from fuel orhydraulic line leaks3. Ignition of nearbycombustibles from droppedcigarettes or matches orelectrical sparks4. Spontaneouscombustion of oily rags5. Hotwork (e.g., welding,cutting torch, grinding)6. Spontaneous ignition ofwaste inside in a wastecontainer7. Vehicle collision withthe waste array resulting infire



IIIIII

IIIIII

Design:1. Electrical system design complieswith 30 CFR Parts 56/57 and NEC2. Automatic/manual firesuppression system on wastehandling vehicles

|Administrative:1. Waste handling restrictions to: -prevent nonwaste handling vehiclesin the disposal room during wastehandling - require a spotter when vehicles arewithin 75 ft of the waste array- access control in E-300 duringwaste handling3. Qualified operators4. Preventive maintenance program5. Combustible loading controlprogram including:- only diesel or electric poweredvehicles are used in the underground. - flammable gas/liquid andcompressed gas cylinder use andstorage control- no lube truck in active disposalroom - no non-waste handling equipmentwithin 75 ft of waste face without afire watch6. Hotwork program7. Pyrophoric and explosive materialprohibited in waste approved fordisposal at WIPP. Requirementimplemented at generator sites inaccordance with the CH WAC.





EventNo.


Freq.Level




3-133 April 2007|

UG1-3B |Fire in a filled panel ||

Location: Underground ||

Release Mechanism: Thermal release ||

MAR: One waste container - 80 PE-Ci (direct |loaded), 560 PE-Ci (direct loaded SWB), 1,100 |PE-Ci (overpacked), 1,800 PE-Ci (POCs or |solidified/vitrified) |

|Initial Conditions: Substantial and isolation |barrier is installed in entries to panel 3 and |subsequent panels |

|Hazard Source: Radioactive material, beryllium |

1. Spontaneous ignition of |waste inside in a waste |container |

|

EU |Radiological |Fac. Worker - Moderate |Site Worker - Low |Public - Low |

|Chemical |Fac. Worker - Moderate |Site Worker - Low |Public - Low |

|Note |Substantial and isolation |barrier minimize airflow |within a filled panel. |

|III |III |III |

||

III |III |III |

|

Design: |None |

|Administrative: |1. Pyrophoric and explosive material |prohibited in waste approved for |disposal at WIPP. Requirement |implemented at generator sites in |accordance with the CH WAC. |

|

Design: |1. MgO sacks on top of each |waste column prevent lid loss |

||

Administrative: |1. Radiation Protection Program |

|

UG1-3C |Fire in a filled panel ||


Release Mechanism: Thermal release ||


|Initial Conditions: Panel closure explosion/ |isolation wall is installed in entries to panel 1 |and 2 |


|

1. Spontaneous ignition of |waste inside in a waste |container |

|

EU |Radiological |Fac. Worker - None |Site Worker - None |Public - None |

|Chemical |Fac. Worker - None |Site Worker - None |Public - None |

|Note |Panel closure prevents |airflow through a filled |panel, prevents |radiological releases |within the closed panel |from propagating to |areas outside the panel |and prevents events |outside the panel from |breaching waste |containers within the |closed panel. |

|

|NA |NA |NA |

||

NA |NA |NA |

|

Design: |None |

|Administrative: |None |

Design: |None |


|



EventNo.


Freq.Level




3-134 November 2006

UG1-4 Fire in construction/ mining ventilation circuitimpacts waste containers






1. Malfunction ofelectrical equipmentgenerates a spark andignites flammable orcombustible material2. Overheating of electricalequipment 3. Vehicle fire4. Cigarettes or matchesdropped while lit - ignitecombustible material 5. Spontaneouscombustion of oily rags6. Hotwork (e.g., welding,cutting torch, grinding)



III

III

Design:1. Electrical system design complieswith 30 CFR Parts 56/57 and NEC2. Bulkheads, airlocks, and overcaststhat segregate themining/construction area from thedisposal area and waste shaft stationare made of noncombustiblematerials

Administrative:1. Qualified operators2. Preventive maintenance program3. Combustible loading controlprogram including:- only diesel or electric vehicles areused in the underground - use and storage control offlammable gas/liquid or flammablecompressed gas cylinders4. Hotwork program

Design:1. Hand held fire extinguisher onunderground vehicles2. Fire suppression system atdiesel fueling station 3. Fire suppression on miningequipment4. Underground ventilationsystem

Administrative:1. FLIRT response2. Emergency responseprocedures3. Alert, notification, andprotective actions4. Trained workers (workerstrained to evacuate in emergencysituations) 5. Mine rescue team response



EventNo.


Freq.Level




3-135 November 2006

UG1-5 Fire in north ventilation circuit propagates andimpacts waste containers






1. Malfunction ofelectrical equipmentgenerates a spark andignites nearby flammableor combustible material2. Overheating of electricalequipment 3. Vehicle fire4. Cigarettes or matchesdropped while lit - ignitenearby combustiblematerial 5. Spontaneouscombustion of oily rags6. Hotwork (e.g., welding,cutting torch, grinding)



III

III

Design:1. Electrical system design complieswith 30 CFR Parts 56/57 and NEC2. Bulkheads, airlocks, and overcaststhat segregate themining/construction area from thedisposal area and waste shaft stationare made of noncombustiblematerials

Administrative:1. Qualified operators2. Preventive maintenance program3. Combustible loading controlprogram including:- only diesel or electric vehicles areused in the underground - use and storage control offlammable gas/liquid or flammablecompressed gas cylinders4. Hotwork program

Design:1. Hand held fire extinguisher onunderground vehicles2. Fire suppression on miningequipment3. Underground ventilationsystem


UG1-6 Fire in the waste hoist tower results in rope orbrake failure causing uncontrolled conveyancemovement and breach of waste containers






1. Malfunction ofelectrical equipmentgenerates a spark andignites flammable orcombustible material2. Overheating of electricalequipment 3. Vehicle fire4. Spontaneouscombustion of oily rags5. Hotwork (e.g., welding,cutting torch, grinding)



III

III

Design1. Redundant failsafe brakes2. Six ropes that hold the waste shaftconveyance and counterweight3. WHB fire suppression system inwaste hoist tower extinguishes firebefore ropes or brakes are affected.

Administrative:1. Preventive maintenance program2. Combustible loading controlprogram including use and storagecontrol of flammable gas/liquid andflammable compressed gas

3. Hotwork program

Design:WHB fire suppression system

Administrative:1. Emergency responseprocedures2. Alert, notification, andprotective actions3. Trained workers (Workerstrained to evacuate in emergencysituations)4. Combustible loading controlprogram for the WHB5. WIPP fire brigade and externalfirefighting support



EventNo.


Freq.Level




3-136 April 2007|

UG2-1 Flammable gas explosion and impact to wastecontainers in the disposal path or active disposal|room



MAR: Eleven waste assemblies 6,160 PE-Ci(direct loaded), 13,200 PE-Ci (overpacked),138,600 PE-Ci (POCs or solidified/vitrified)



1. Ignition of nearbyflammable gas or compressed gas.2. Hotwork (e.g., welding,cutting torch, grinding)

A RadiologicalFac. Worker - HighSite Worker - ModeratePublic - High

ChemicalFac. Worker - HighSite Worker - ModeratePublic - High

III

III

Design:1. Electrical system design complieswith 30 CFR Parts 56/57 and NEC2. Underground ventilation system

Administrative:1. Combustible loading controlprogram including use and storagecontrol of flammable gas/liquid andflammable compressed gas2. Hotwork program

Design:1. Underground ventilation system2. Large volume of undergrounddisposal path and disposal room


UG2-2 Battery explosion on underground vehiclesimpacts waste



MAR: Four waste assemblies, 2,240 PE-Ci(direct loaded), 4,800 PE-Ci (overpacked),50,400 PE-Ci (POCs or solidified/vitrified)



1. Battery malfunction2. Electrical equipment onvehicle malfunctions andgenerates spark that igniteshydrogen generated by vehicle battery



IIIIIII

IIIIIII

Design:1. Underground ventilation system2. Battery enclosed in ventedcompartment

Administrative:1. Preoperational checks on wastehandling equipment prior to use2. Preventive maintenance program3. Only metal waste containers thatmeet DOT Type 7A or equivalentrequirements are acceptable fordisposal at WIPP. This requirementis implemented at generator sites inaccordance with the CH WAC. 4. Waste handling restrictions thatrequires a standoff distance greaterthan 75 ft. between the CH wastetransporter loaded with waste andother underground vehicles andprevents non-waste handling vehiclesin the disposal room during wastehandling.

Design:1. Hand held fire extinguisher onunderground vehicles2. Fire suppression onunderground mining and wastehandling equipment3. Underground ventilationsystem




EventNo.


Freq.Level




3-137 November 2007

UG2-3 Explosion at battery charging station impactswaste containers



MAR: Four waste assemblies, 2,240 PE-Ci(direct loaded), 4,800 PE-Ci (overpacked),50,400 PE-Ci (POCs or solidified/vitrified



1. Electrical equipmentmalfunctions and generatesa spark that igniteshydrogen generated by thebatteries2. Ignition from cigarettesor matches



IIIIIII

IIIIIII

Design:1. Underground ventilation systemprevents a flammable gasconcentration2. Enclosed vented batterycompartment3. Battery charging system designedper NEC and 30CFR56/57.

Administrative:1. Preventive maintenance program2. Only metal waste containers thatmeet DOT Type 7A or equivalentrequirements are acceptable fordisposal at WIPP. This requirementis implemented at generator sites inaccordance with the CH WAC.

Design:1. Hand held fire extinguisher onunderground vehicles2. Fire suppression onunderground mining and wastehandling equipment3. Underground ventilationsystem


UG2-4 Ignition of explosive hardware used forinstallation of ventilation barriers (Hilti spadgun cartridges) impacts waste containers



MAR: Four waste assemblies, 2,240 PE-Ci(direct loaded), 4,800 PE-Ci (overpacked),50,400 PE-Ci (POCs or solidified/vitrified



1. Open flame or fireinvolves cartridges andresults in explosion



IIIIIIIII

IIIIIIIII

Design:1. Small charge associated withexpansion anchors

Administrative:1. Hot work permit2. Work control program includinglimiting the number of charges toonly that needed for the job

Design:1. Underground ventilationsystem




EventNo.


Freq.Level




3-138 April 2007|

UG2-5A| Waste container explosion resulting fromignition of hydrogen gas accumulated withinwaste container during transport or in an active|panel|



MAR: 160 PE-Ci, (two direct loaded drums),1,120 PE-Ci (two direct loaded SWB or TDOP),2,200 PE-Ci (two overpacked drum or SWB),3,600 PE-Ci (two POCs)



1. Explosive gasgeneration waste containerscombined with internalignition source

A RadiologicalFac. Worker - HighSite Worker - LowPublic - Moderate

ChemicalFac. Worker - HighSite Worker - LowPublic - Moderate

IIIII

IIIII

Design:None

Administrative:1. Pyrophoric and explosive materialprohibited in waste approved fordisposal at WIPP. Requirementimplemented at generator sites inaccordance with the WIPP WAC2. Waste containers approved fordisposal at WIPP are required to bevented; requirement implemented atgenerator sites in accordance with theCH WAC



UG2-5B| Waste container explosion in a filled panel||

Location: Underground||

Release Mechanism: Impact and breach||

MAR: One waste container - 80 PE-Ci (direct|loaded), 560 PE-Ci (direct loaded SWB), 1,100|PE-Ci (overpacked), 1,800 PE-Ci (POCs or|solidified/vitrified)|

||

Initial Conditions: Substantial and isolation|barrier is installed in entries to panel 3 and|subsequent panels|

|Hazard Source: Radioactive material, beryllium|

1. Long term gas|generation from radiolysis|or microbial action|

EU| Radiological|Fac. Worker - Moderate|Site Worker - Low|Public - Low|

|Chemical|Fac. Worker - Moderate|Site Worker - Low|Public - Low|

|Note|Substantial and isolation|barrier minimize airflow|within a filled panel. |

|II|III|III|

||

II|III|III|

Design:|None|

|Administrative:|1. Pyrophoric and explosive material|prohibited in waste approved for|disposal at WIPP. Requirement|implemented at generator sites in|accordance with the WIPP WAC|

Design:|None|

|Administrative:|1. Radiation Protection Program|



EventNo.


Freq.Level




3-139 April 2007|

UG2-5C |Waste container explosion in a filled panel ||


Release Mechanism: Impact and breach ||


|Initial Conditions: Panel closure explosion- |isolation wall installed in entries to panel 1 and |2 |


1. Long term gas |generation from radiolysis |or microbial action |

EU |Radiological |Fac. Worker - None |Site Worker - None |Public - None |



|NA |NA |NA |

||

NA |NA |NA |

Design: |None |


Design: |None |




EventNo.


Freq.Level




3-140 April 2007|

UG2-6 Explosion in the waste hoist tower results inrope or brake failure causing uncontrolledconveyance movement and breach of wastecontainers






1. Ignition of nearbyflammable gas or compressed gas.2. Hotwork (e.g., welding,cutting torch, grinding)



III

III

Design1. Redundant brakes on waste hoist,one set can hold load2. Six ropes that hold the waste shaftconveyance and counterweight

Administrative:1. Qualified operators2. Preventive maintenance program3. Combustible loading controlprogram including use and storagecontrol of flammable gas/liquid andflammable compressed gas4. Hotwork program

Design:WHB fire suppression system

Administrative:1. Emergency responseprocedures2. Alert, notification, andprotective actions3. Trained workers (Workerstrained to evacuate in emergencysituations)4. Combustible loading controlprogram for the WHB5. WIPP fire brigade and externalfirefighting support

UG3-1A| Objects (e.g., crane load, electrical cables,compressed air piping, ventilation ductwork,roof bolts) fall from ceiling and damage wastecontainers in an active room/panel|



MAR: One facility pallet or four wasteassemblies, 2,240 PE-Ci (direct loaded), 4,800PE-Ci (overpacked), 50,400 PE-Ci (POCs orsolidified/vitrified)



1. Equipment supportfailure

2. Corrosion3. Shift in salt 4. Operator error



IIIII

IIIII

Design:1. Electrical system design andinstallation complies with 30 CFRParts 56/57 and NEC2. Expansion bolts used to anchoritems to salt walls, floors, and ceiling

Administrative:1. Ground control and geotechnicalmonitoring2. Preventive maintenance program





EventNo.


Freq.Level




3-141 April 2007|

UG3-1B |Roof bolts eject from room/panel ceiling after |panel is filled and puncture waste containers |

|Location: Underground |

|Release Mechanism: Impact and breach |

|MAR: 50 waste containers 4,000 PE-Ci (direct |loaded drums), 28,000 PE-Ci (SWBs), 30,000 |PE-Ci (overpacked), 90,000 PE-Ci (POCs or |solidified/vitrified) |



1. Roof bolt failure |A |Radiological |Fac. Worker - Moderate |Site Worker - Low |Public - Low |

|Chemical |Fac. Worker - Moderate |Site Worker - Low |Public - Low |


|I |

III |III |

||

I |III |III |

|

Design: |None |


Design: |None |

|Administrative: |1. Radiation Protection Program |

UG3-1C |Roof bolts eject from room/panel ceiling after |panel is filled and puncture waste containers |

|Location: Underground |

|Release Mechanism: Impact and breach |

|MAR: 50 waste containers 4,000 PE-Ci (direct |loaded drums), 28,000 PE-Ci (SWBs), 30,000 |PE-Ci (overpacked), 90,000 PE-Ci (POCs or |solidified/vitrified) |

|Initial Conditions: Panel closure explosion- |isolation wall installed in entries to panel 1 |and 2 |


1. Roof bolt failure |A |Radiological |Fac. Worker - None |Site Worker - None |Public - None |



|NA |NA |NA |

||

NA |NA |NA |

|

Design: |None |


Design: |None |




EventNo.


Freq.Level




3-142 April 2007|

UG3-2 Bulkhead doors close and impact waste beingtransported along the disposal path


Release Mechanism: Impact breach




1. Operator error2. Malfunction of doorcontrol system



IIIIIIIII

IIIIIIIII

Design:1. Bulkhead doors are designed toopen and close slowly2. Facility pallet extends beyond thewaste containers such that the doorswould hit the pallet and not the waste3. Electrical system design andinstallation complies with 30 CFRParts 56/57 and NEC4. Cargo netting and tie-down strapsprevent waste from being dislodgedfrom facility pallet

Administrative:1. Preventive maintenance program2. Spotters used during wastehandling operations



UG3-3A| Roof fall during transport of CH waste or in theactive CH disposal room



MAR: 4,000 drums (320,000 PE-Ci direct|loaded), 572 SWBs (320,320 PE-Ci), 572 four|packs (686,400 PE-CI overpacked)|

|



1. Unstable ceiling inunderground

U RadiologicalFac. Worker - HighSite Worker - Low |Public - Moderate|

ChemicalFac. Worker - HighSite Worker - Low |Public - Moderate|

IIII|II|

IIII|II|

Design:1. Roof bolts used as necessary tosupport the ceilings undergroundopenings

Administrative:1. Geotechnical monitoring andground control program2. Preventive maintenance program3. Underground ground inspectionsat the start of each shift


|




EventNo.


Freq.Level




3-143 April 2007|

UG3-3B |Crush of waste containers in a filled panel ||



MAR: 8,000 drums (640,000 PE-Ci direct |loaded), 1,144 SWBs (640,640 PE-Ci), 1,144 |four packs (1,372,800 PE-CI overpacked) |



1. Long term salt creep |2. Roof fall |

|

A |Radiological |Fac. Worker - Moderate |Site Worker - Low |Public - Moderate |

|Chemical |Fac. Worker - Moderate |Site Worker - Low |Public - Moderate |


|I |

III |I |

||

I |III |I |

|

Design: |None |


Design: |None |

|Administrative: |1. Radiation Protection Program |

UG3-3C |Crush of waste containers in a filled panel ||



MAR: 8,000 drums (640,000 PE-Ci direct |loaded), 1,144 SWBs (640,640 PE-Ci), 1,144 |four packs (1,372,800 PE-CI overpacked) |

|Initial Conditions: Panel closure explosion- |isolation wall installed in entries to panel 1 |and 2 |


1. Long term salt creep |2. Roof fall |

A |Radiological |Fac. Worker - None |Site Worker - None |Public - None |



|NA |NA |NA |

||

NA |NA |NA |

|

Design: |None |


Design: |None |




EventNo.


Freq.Level




3-144

UG3-4 Single transporter collision in the disposal pathimpacts waste containers


Release mechanism: Impact and breach




1. Operator error2. Equipment malfunction(e.g., brake failure)



IIIII

IIIII

Design:None

Administrative:1. Qualified operators2. Preventive maintenance program3. Waste handling restrictions to: - prevent nonwaste handling

vehicles in the disposal pathduring waste handling

- require a spotter when vehiclesare within 75 ft of the waste array

- access control in E-300 duringwaste handling



UG3-5 Collision in the disposal path involving multiplewaste transporters and impact to wastecontainers






1. Operator error2. Equipment malfunction



IIIII

IIIII

Design:None

Administrative:1. Qualified operators2. Preventive maintenance program3. Waste handling restrictions to: -prevent nonwaste handling vehiclesin the disposal path during wastehandling - require a spotter when vehicles

are within 75 ft of the waste array- access control in E-300 during

waste handling





EventNo.


Freq.Level




3-145 April 2007 |

UG3-6 A vehicle collides with disposal array


Release Mechanism: Impact or puncture andbreach

MAR: Thirteen waste assemblies (three columnsof waste plus one facility pallet), 7,280 PE-Ci(direct loaded ), 15,600 PE-Ci (overpacked),163,800 PE-Ci (POCs or solidified/vitrified)



1. Operator error2. Equipment malfunction3. Forklift control systemmalfunction - forklift tinesor corners of the push-pulldevice impact wastecontainers

A RadiologicalFac. Worker - HighSite Worker - Low |Public - Moderate

ChemicalFac. Worker - HighSite Worker - Low |Public - Moderate

IIII |I

IIII |I

Design:1. Panel closure, substantial and |isolation barrier |

Administrative:1. Qualified operators2. Preventive maintenance program3. Waste handling restrictions to:- prevent nonwaste handling

vehicles in the disposal pathduring waste handling

- require a spotter when vehiclesare within 75 ft of the waste array

- access control in E-300 duringwaste handling



UG3-7 Waste containers are dropped during handlingor while in transit from transporter using theforklift



MAR: Two waste assemblies 1,120 PE-Ci(direct loaded), 2,400 PE-Ci (overpacked),25,200 PE-Ci (POCs or solidified/vitrified)



1. Operator error2. Forklift malfunction(e.g., lifting mechanismfailure)



IIIIIII

IIIIIII

Design:None

Administrative:1. Qualified operators2. Waste handling restrictionrequires the use of a spotter whenmoving waste3. Preventive maintenance programon waste handling forklifts





EventNo.


Freq.Level




3-146

UG3-8 Waste containers are ejected during transport tounderground






1. Waste hoist brakesystem failure

U RadiologicalFac. Worker - HighSite Worker - Low Public - Moderate

ChemicalFac. Worker - HighSite Worker - Low Public - Moderate

Note: This eventassumes the waste drumsare ejected, strike theupper portion of thewaste conveyance thenfall to the waste collarsurrounding the shaft.

IIIIII

IIIIII

Design:1. Waste hoist has redundant fail-safe brakes2. Conveyance counterweight3. Electronic and mechanicalemergency stopping devices4. Cargo netting and tie-down straps

Administrative:1. Preoperational checks of the

waste hoist brakes2. Preventive maintenance program

Design:1. Underground ventilationsystem2. Conveyance and counterweightovertravel arrester system(retarding frames, crash beams,pivot dogs)3. Fence at the waste shaft collarprevent waste containers fromfalling down the shaft

Administrative:1. Waste handling restriction toprohibit transport of personnel andwaste at the same time2. FLIRT response3. Emergency responseprocedures4. Alert, notification, andprotective actions5. Trained workers (workerstrained to evacuate in emergencysituations) 6. Mine rescue team response



EventNo.


Freq.Level




3-147 April 2007 |

UG3-9 Waste shaft conveyance falls to bottom of theshaft resulting in a breach of waste containers






1. Waste hoist brakesystem failure or failure ofthe hoist ropes2. Waste hoist structurefails and causes loadedconveyance to fall to thebottom of the shaft.3. Waste hoist structurefails and falls on top ofwaste4. Failure of theconveyance structure tosupport the loaded facilitycask.

U RadiologicalFac. Worker - HighSite Worker - High Public - High

ChemicalFac. Worker - HighSite Worker - High Public - High

III

III

Design:1. Waste hoist and structural supportis designed to handle design basisload and the hoist is designed to holdload during loss of power.2. Waste shaft conveyance andcounterweight is supported by sixropes.3. The waste hoist has redundantfail-safe brakes.4. Waste hoist counterweight

Administrative:1. Preventive maintenance programand shaft inspection.2. Waste hoist structural integrity program for hoist, conveyance, andWHB structural support of the hoist.

Design:1. Underground ventilationsystem2. Conveyance and counterweightovertravel arrester system(retarding frames, crash beams)

Administrative:1. Waste handling restriction toprohibit transport of personnel andwaste at the same time2. FLIRT response3. Emergency responseprocedures4. Alert, notification, andprotective actions5. Trained workers (workerstrained to evacuate in emergencysituations) 6. Mine rescue team response

UG3-10 Compressed gas bottle becomes a missile thatimpacts waste containers






1. Worker error whilehandling compressed gasbottles2. Bottle is impacted whileunrestrained



IIIII

IIIII

Design:1. Panel closure |

Administrative:1. Procedures for safe handling andstorage of compressed gas bottles 2. Workers trained in handlingcompressed gas bottles3. Nonflammable compressed gascylinder control limits the number ofcompressed gas cylinders in the CHbay

Design:1. Underground ventilationsystem2. Substantial closure and |isolation barrier |

Administrative:1. Emergency responseprocedures2. Alert, notification, andprotective actions3. Trained workers (workerstrained to evacuate in emergencysituations)



EventNo.


Freq.Level




3-148 August 2007|

UG3-11| Self-contained self-rescuers or trauma kit O2|bottles become a missile that impacts waste|containers|

|Location: Underground|

|Release Mechanism: Impact and breach|

|MAR: One drum at 80 PE-Ci (direct loaded) or|1,100 PE-Ci (overpacked), 1800 PE-Ci (POCs|or solidified/vitrified|

|Initial Conditions: Waste is handled and|disposed 2,150 ft underground|

|Hazard Source: Radioactive material, beryllium|

1. Vehicle collision with|storage rack|

A| Radiological|Fac. Worker - Low|Site Worker - Low|Public - Low|

|Chemical|Fac. Worker - Low|Site Worker - Low|Public - Low|

|

|III|III|III|

||

III|III|III|

Design:|1. None|

|Administrative:|1. None|

Design:|Underground ventilation system|

|Administrative:|1. Trained underground qualified|personnel|

UG4-1 Direct exposure to radiation in excess ofanticipated levels



MAR: NA



1. Waste exceeds therequirements for CH waste 2. Waste shifts duringtransport



IIIIIIIII

NANANA

Design:None

Administrative:1. CH waste required to be less than200 mrem on contact. Requirementis implemented at the generator sitesprior to shipment in accordance withthe CH WAC2. Radiation protection program3. Qualified operators

Design:None

Administrative:1. Trained workers (workerstrained to evacuate in emergencysituations)2. Radiation protection program



EventNo.


Freq.Level




3-149 November 2006

UG5-1 Criticality in underground



MAR: NA


Hazard Source: Fissile material, radiation

1. No limits on fissile massor special moderators orreflectors



IIIVIV

NANANA

Design:Metal waste containers

Administrative:1. Criticality safety program thatrequires waste containers required tobe metal; fissile mass andmoderator/reflector mass limits bycontainer type are establishedthrough WIPP criticality safetyevaluations; these requirements areimplemented at generator sites priorto shipment to WIPP in accordancewith the WIPP WAC2. Waste disposal configuration iscontrolled by waste handlingprocedure and requires that waste isstacked no greater than three drumshigh in disposal area (TDOPs are astall as two stacked drums and TDOPsare stacked only in the verticalposition, SWBs are stacked with thelongest dimension in the horizontalposition)





EventNo.


Freq.Level




3-150 November 2006

UG6-1 Loss of AC power results in drop of wastecontainers





Hazard: Radioactive material, beryllium

1. Storm2. Electrical fire3. Brownout4. Utility error



(Note: Loss of power tothe underground is notan accident initiator forany other undergroundevent)

IIIII

IIIIII

Design:1. Waste hoist designed to hold loadduring loss of power

Administrative:None

Design:1. Backup diesel generatorsprovide power for selected loads


UG6-2 Waste dropped down waste shaft while waste isin transit to the underground and damages wastecontainers






1. Personnel error2. Equipment failure

U RadiologicalFac. Worker - HighSite Worker - HighPublic - High


III

III

Design:1. Fence around waste shaft collar2. Pivot rails and car stop prevent uncontrolled movement of theconveyance loading car into the shaft3. Facility pallet is too long to fitinto the cage if carried by a forkliftinstead of the conveyance loadingcar. Administrative:1. Top lander approves entry ofloads onto the waste shaftconveyance through control of thegate at the waste shaft collar2. Qualified operators 3. Waste handling restrictionrequires that the waste shaftconveyance is at the collar before theconveyance loading car loaded withwaste is moved into the area at thetop of the waste shaft.





EventNo.


Freq.Level




3-151 November 2006

UG6-3 Flooding from manmade source goes downwaste shaft and impacts waste in transit or at thebottom of the shaft





1. Fire suppressiondischarge in WHB - waterruns into waste shaft2. Load testing of cranes inWHB with water weights(approximately 140 tons) -weights rupture and waterflows down waste shaft



IIIIIIIII

IIIIIIIII

Design:1. Two sets of airlock doors aroundwaste shaft2. Waste transported on the wasteshaft conveyance below the mandeck3. Waste shaft sump over 100 ftdeep

Administrative:1. Qualified operators2. Work control process

Design:1. Three sets of airlock doorsaround waste shaft2. Waste is transported on thewaste shaft conveyance below theman deck.3. Waste shaft sump is over 100 ftdeep.


UG6-4 Loss of underground ventilation



MAR: N/A

Initial Conditions: N/A

Hazard Source: Radioactive materials,beryllium

1. Power failure2. Mechanical failure3. Operator error



IIIIIIIII

IIIIIIIII

Design:1. Redundant fans that supportnecessary airflow underground2. Underground electrical feed anddistribution system designed toconform with NEC and 30CFR56/57

Administrative:1. Qualified operators2. Preventive maintenance program

Design:1. Backup diesel generatorsprovide power for limitedventilation airflow

Administrative:1. Emergency responseprocedures2. Alert, notification, andprotective actions3. Trained workers ( workerstrained to evacuate in emergencysituations)



EventNo.


Freq.Level




3-152 November 2006

UG7-1 Flooding from rain drainage into the waste shaftwhile waste is being transported or is at thebottom of the waste shaft on a loadedtransporter



MAR: Two facility pallets or eight seven-packs,4,480 PE-Ci (direct loaded), 9,600 PE-Ci(overpacked), 100,800 PE-Ci (POCs orsolidified/vitrified)



1. Severe weatherincluding extreme rainfall



IIIIIIIII

IIIIIIIII

Design:1. Three sets of airlock doors aroundwaste shaft2. Waste is transported on the wasteshaft conveyance below the mandeck3. Waste shaft sump is over 100 ftdeep4. WIPP site berms and waterrunnoff system

Administrative:None

Design:1. Three sets of airlock doorsaround waste shaft2. Waste is transported on thewaste shaft conveyance below theman deck.3. Waste shaft sump is over 100 ftdeep.


UG7-2 Wildland fire causes combustion products toenter the underground ventilation system airsupply and results in damage to waste


Release Mechanism: Thermal




1. Lightning2. Cigarettes or matchesdropped (outside siteboundary) while lit, ignitevegetation, and results in afire that propagates toWIPP 3. Campfire in vicinity ofWIPP ignites vegetationand results in a fire thatpropagates to WIPP



Note: In this event, thewildland fire producescombustion productsthat could be drawn intothe undergroundventilation system airsupply.

IIIIIIIII

IIIIIIIII

Design:1. PPA is paved and graveled andsurrounded by a dirt road thatparallels the security fence preventfires from impacting shippingcontainers

Administrative:1. Combustible loading controlprogram outside PPA - includesvegetation control along access roadto WIPP2. Fire department and externalagency response extinguish firebefore it could reach the facility

Design:None

Administrative:1. Emergency responseprocedures2. Alert, notification, andprotective actions3. Trained workers (workerstrained to evacuate in emergencysituations) 4. Combustible loading controlprogram in vicinity of outside area5. WIPP fire brigade and externalfirefighting support



EventNo.


Freq.Level




3-153 November 2006

UG7-3 Earthquake impacts waste containers on wasteshaft conveyance or at the bottom of the wasteshaft on a loaded transporter.



MAR: One facility pallets or eight seven-packs,2,240 PE-Ci (direct loaded), 4,800 PE-Ci(overpacked), 50,400 PE-Ci (POCs orsolidified/vitrified)



1. Earthquake results infalling debris whichdamages electricalequipment generatingsparks and arcing thatignite adjacentcombustibles

U RadiologicalFac. Worker - HighSite Worker - HighPublic - High


.

III

III

Design:1. Waste hoist brakes hold themaximum design load in a DBE2. WHB is designed to withstand theDBE3. Waste is transported on the wasteshaft conveyance below the mandeck

Administrative:1. Waste handling restriction thatprevents transport of personnel orother materials on the waste shaftconveyance when transporting waste2. Combustible loading controlprogram

Design:1. Portable extinguishersavailable


UG7-4 Lightning strikes the waste hoist head frameduring waste transit and damages waste


Release Mechanism: Electrical arcing




1. Severe weather/thunderstorm generateslightning that strikes thewaste hoist tower and propagates down metalframework



IIIII

IIIII

Design:1. Lightning protection system onthe waste hoist tower 2. WHB and waste hoist tower steelframe structure is grounded

Administrative:1. Preventive maintenance programincluding periodic inspection oflightning protection system andgrounding

Design:None




EventNo.


Freq.Level




3-154 November 2006

UG7-5 Tornado damages waste hoist tower and impactswaste containers on waste shaft conveyance






1. Tornado generates winddriven missiles

EU RadiologicalFac. Worker - HighSite Worker - LowPublic - Moderate


Note: This eventassumes damage towaste containers onlywhile the containers arein transit to theunderground.

IIIVIII

IIIVIII

Design:1. Waste shaft is protected by wasteshaft tower, and CH and RH side ofthe WHB such that a missile wouldhave to enter the shaft vertically toimpact waste2. Waste shaft conveyance isdesigned such that the material deckis below the mandeck

Administrative:None

Design:1. Waste hoist tower steel framestructure and siding absorb energybefore a wind driven missile coulddamage waste


UG7-6 High winds damage waste hoist tower andimpacts waste containers on waste shaftconveyance






1. Extreme winds U RadiologicalFac. Worker - HighSite Worker - LowPublic - Moderate

ChemicalFac. Worker -HighSite Worker - LowPublic -Moderate

Note: This eventassumes damage towaste containers onlywhile the containers arein transit to theunderground.

IIIIII

IIIIII

Design:1. Waste shaft protected by wastehoist tower, and CH and RH side ofthe WHB such that a missile wouldhave to enter the shaft vertically toimpact waste

Administrative:None

Design:1. Waste hoist tower steel framestructure and siding absorb energybefore a wind driven missile coulddamage waste



3-155 November 2006

Table A-12 - CH Waste Handling Process - Building General

EventNo. Event Description Causes

Freq.Level

Consequence Level Risk Bin Potential Preventive FeaturesPotential

Mitigative FeaturesUnprev Unmitigated Unmit

BG6-1 Aircraft crashes into WIPP and impacts theparking area on the south side of the WHB, theWHB, and the waste hoist head frame engulfingthe areas impacted with aircraft fuel includingfuel spilling down waste shaft impacting waste intransit or waste on a loaded transporter at thebottom of the shaft

Location: Outside area, CH bay, Underground


MAR: Eighteen facility pallets of waste,40,320 PE-Ci (direct loaded), 86,400 PE-Ci(overpacked), 907,200 PE-Ci (POCs orsolidified/vitrified) and fifty fully loadedTRUPACT-IIs in parking area, two wasteassemblies per TRUPACT-II, 56,000 PE-Ci(direct loaded), 120,000 PE-Ci (overpacked),1,260,000 PE-Ci (POCs or solidified/vitrified)



1. Pilot error2. Aircraft power or

control systemmalfunction



IIIIII

IIIIII

Design:1. WIPP is in a remote area that isnot on a direct flight path fornormal air traffic

Administrative:None

Design:1. Fire suppression system in WHBmay provide some mitigation if stilloperating following the event2. Paved parking area (limits extentof follow-on fire)

Administrative:1. Emergency response procedures2. Alert, notification, and protectiveactions3. Trained workers (workers trainedto evacuate in emergency situations) 4. WIPP fire brigade and externalagency fire fighting support.


Table A-12 - CH Waste Handling Process - Building General

EventNo. Event Description Causes

Freq.Level

Consequence Level Risk Bin Potential Preventive FeaturesPotential

Mitigative FeaturesUnprev Unmitigated Unmit

3-156 November 2006

BG7-1 Earthquake impacts facility, results in damage towaste containers and breach

Location: Outside area, CH bay, Underground

Release Mechanism: Impact and Breach


AND one facility pallet or four waste assemblies,2,240 PE-Ci (direct loaded), 4,800 PE-Ci(overpacked), 50,400 PE-Ci (POCs orsolidified/vitrified) on the waste shaftconveyance

AND fifty fully loaded TRUPACT-IIs in parkingarea, two waste assemblies per TRUPACT-II,56,000 PE-Ci (direct loaded), 120,000 PE-Ci(overpacked), 1,260,000 PE-Ci (POCs orsolidified/vitrified)

Initial Conditions: TRUPACT-II or HalfPACTType B containers designed to withstand impact


1. Seismic activity U RadiologicalFac. Worker - HighSite Worker - HighPublic - High


Note: This eventassumes that theearthquake willimpact all of the areasaddressed in thearea-specific tables tosome degree and isnot followed by a fire. Seismic eventsfollowed by fires areaddressed inarea-specific tables.

III

III

Design:1. WHB and TMF designed towithstand the DBE; lateral forceresisting members of the SupportBuilding designed to withstand the DBE to prevent damage to theWHB2. Waste hoist and TRUDOCKcranes designed to hold theirmaximum design load in a DBEand on loss of power

Administrative:None

Design:1. WHB ventilation system if it isstill operating following the event

Administrative:1. Emergency response procedures2. Alert, notification, and protectiveactions3. Trained workers (workers trainedto evacuate in emergency situations) 4. WIPP fire brigade and externalagency fire fighting support.


3-157 November 2006

Table A-13 - Site Worker MHE Summary for Risk Rank I and II Events (evaluated at 100 m)

Event

Unmitigated

Credited SSC or AC Safety Functions

Mitigated

CommentsFreq. Conseq. Freq. Conseq. RiskBin

OA6-4Aircraft crash

EU High See comment. NA NA NA NA See Section3.4.2.9 - aircraftcrash notcredible

OA7-2Tornadoproducedmissilesimpact

TRUPACT-IIsor HalfPACTs

U Low TRUPACT-II and HalfPACT design TRUPACT-II and HalfPACT capable of withstandingtornado missiles

Prevented NA NA See Section3.4.2.10 -TRUPACT-IIand HalfPACTcapable ofwithstandingtornado missilesas documented inNS-05-001.10

OA7-3High winds

producemissiles that

impactTRUPACT-IIsor HalfPACTs

A Low TRUPACT-II and HalfPACT design NA Prevented NA NA See Section3.4.2.10 -TRUPACT-IIand HalfPACTcapable ofwithstandingtornado missilesas documented inNS-05-001.10

WHB1-1Small Fire

A Moderate (SSC) - WHB and Support Building fire suppressionsystem

(AC) - Combustible loading control program for theWHB and TMF including flammable gas/liquid andflammable compressed gas cylinder control andcontrol of number of slipsheet pallets allowed in theCH bay and control of transient combustibles nearwaste and slip sheets

(AC) - Emergency response

Minimizes the release by reducing WHB temperatureduring large fire such that minimal damage to wastecontainers occurs and/or prevents spread of fire fromadjacent areas

Minimize potential and size of fires by controlling theamount of combustible material in the WHB and TMF

Ensures worker is trained to respond to abnormal eventssuch as fires, spills, or other waste container breaches,such that inhalation of radioactive material isminimized

Prevented NA NA WHB firesuppressionsupplies TMF



Event

Unmitigated


Mitigated


3-158 November 2006

WHB1-2Full room fire

(CH bay)

U High (SSC) - 13-ton electric forklift design - Forklifthydraulic fluid segregated from ignition sources. Thebatteries, motor, and motor contactors are separatedfrom each other and from the hydraulic reservoir bythick metal partitions. The body of the forklift hasthick metal walls that protect the electrical andhydraulic components from damage due to collisions.

(SSC) - WHB fire suppression system

(AC) - Combustible loading control program for theWHB and TMF including flammable gas/liquid andflammable compressed gas control; only electricpowered equipment is allowed in the CH bay whenwaste is outside a closed TRUPACT-II or HalfPact; nomore than three pallets of fiberboard slip sheets andone pallet of polyethylene slip sheets shall be stored inthe CH bay. Pallets of slip sheets must not be stackedand a 10 ft separation distance shall be maintainedbetween each slip sheet pallet and between slip sheetpallets and stored waste. Transient combustibles shallnot be stored closer than 10 ft from waste or pallets ofslip sheets. No more than one gallon oflubricants/denatured alcohol may be at eachTRUDOCK location; also when waste is stored in thesouthwest corner of the CH bay, diesel poweredequipment used in the TMF shall maintain a 15 ftstandoff distance from the common wall between theCH bay and TMF or a fire watch is posted with thediesel equipment being operated; when waste is storedin the northeast corner of the CH bay, diesel poweredequipment used in the in the RH bay shall maintain a15 ft standoff distance from the common wall betweenthe CH bay and RH bay or a fire watch is posted withthe diesel equipment being operated.


Prevents a fire on the forklift from becoming largeenough to damage CH waste containers in the WHB.

Prevents a fire in the WHB from propagating to the CHbay or within the bay

Prevents small fires from becoming larger fires with thepotential to impact waste containers; prevents firesassociated with the operation of diesel poweredequipment in the TMF or RH bay from propagating tothe CH bay and impacting stored waste; preventscontinuity of combustible material and prevents a poolfire large enough to damage waste in the CH bay.


Prevented NA NA WHB firesuppressionsystem suppliesTMF



Event

Unmitigated


Mitigated


3-159 November 2006

WHB1-3Multi-

room fire


(SSC) - WHB and Support Building fire suppressionsystem




Prevents a fire in the Support Building, TMF, or otherroom in the WHB from propagating to the CH bay orwithin the bay

Prevents small fires from becoming larger fires with thepotential to impact waste containers; prevents firesassociated with the operation of diesel poweredequipment in the TMF or RH bay from propagating tothe CH bay and impacting stored waste; preventscontinuity of combustible material and prevents a poolfire large enough to damage waste in the CH bay.





Event

Unmitigated


Mitigated


3-160 November 2006

WHB1-4Waste

container fire

A Moderate (AC) - Vent required on each waste container andimplemented at generator site in accordance with theCH WAC14

(AC) - Pyrophorics and explosives are prohibited inCH waste approved for disposal at WIPP and implemented at generator sites prior to shipment inaccordance with the CH WAC14

Prevents flammable gas pressure buildup concentrationin waste container

Eliminates ignition sources in waste containers

Prevented NA NA

WHB1-5Electric

forklift firewhile

transportingwaste

containers



(AC) - Combustible loading control program for theWHB and TMF including flammable gas/liquid andflammable compressed gas control; only electricpowered equipment is allowed in the CH bay whenwaste is outside a closed TRUPACT-II or HalfPact; nomore than three pallets of fiberboard slip sheets andone pallet of polyethylene slip sheets shall be stored inthe CH bay. Pallets of slip sheets must not be stackedand a 10 ft separation distance shall be maintainedbetween each slip sheet pallet and between slip sheetpallets and stored waste. Transient combustibles shallnot be stored closer than 10 ft from waste or pallets ofslip sheets.



Prevents a fire in the WHB from propagating within thebay

Prevents small fires from becoming larger fires with thepotential to impact waste containers;


Prevented NA NA



Event

Unmitigated


Mitigated


3-161 November 2006

WHB2-3Flammable

gas explosionand impact to

wastecontainers

A High (AC) - Combustible Loading Control Program - WHB - Flammable compressed gas cylinders are prohibitedin the CH bay unless all waste containers are insideclosed TRUPACT-II or HalfPACT containers. (Thislimitation does not apply to packages covered by DOTExemption DOT-E-7607)- Limits alcohol to no more than 1 gal at eachTRUDOCK- No flammable gas or flammable compressedflammable gas cylinders are stored in or along theexternal walls of the WHB, the Support Building, orTMF Facility or in the area between the WHB andSupport Building

Prevents explosions due to release of flammable gas inthe WHB while waste containers are not protected byshipping casks

Prevented NA NA

WHB2-4Waste

containerexplosion

A High (AC) - Vent required on each waste container andimplemented at generator site in accordance with theCH WAC14

(AC) - Pyrophorics and explosives are prohibited inCH waste approved for disposal at WIPP and implemented at generator sites prior to shipment inaccordance with the CH WAC14

Prevents pressurization of the waste container due togas generation


Prevented NA NA

WHB3-3Forklift

PuncturesWaste

Containers

A Moderate (AC) - Waste handling restriction requires use of aspotter when waste is being moved

(AC) - Qualified operators


Prevents forklift collisions with wastethat could result in a breach of waste containers

Ensures operators are qualified to properly operate thewaste handling equipment during normal operations andto properly respond to off-normal operations


Prevented NA NA



Event

Unmitigated


Mitigated


3-162 November 2006

WHB3-6Forklift

collides withstored waste

A Moderate (AC) - Qualified operators

(AC) - Waste handling restriction requires use of aspotter when moving waste with a crane or forklift


Ensures operators are trained to properly operate thewaste handling equipment during normal operations andto properly respond to off-normal operations

Prevents collisions that could result in a breach of wastecontainers


U Low III

WHB6-1Vehicle

collision withthe WHB

damages theWHB and

impacts wastecontainers

U High Design Feature:

WHB designed such that the shielded storage roomhas 3 ft. thick concrete walls and remainder of CH bayis protected on the north by the north rooms of theWHB and the waste hoist tower, on the east by the RHportion of the WHB and on the west by the TMF

(AC) - Waste handling restriction requires barricadesto be in place along the outside south wall of the WHBbetween airlock 103 and the TMF when waste isstored in the southwest corner of the CH bay

Prevents vehicle crash into the CH bay and damagingwaste

NA NA NA



Event

Unmitigated


Mitigated


3-163 November 2006

WHB6-2External FirePropagates to

WHB

U Moderate Design Feature:

Noncombustible construction of the WHB

PPA is paved and graveled and surrounded by a dirtroad


(AC) - Combustible Loading Control Program - WHBand TMF - requires that diesel powered equipmentmaintain a standoff distance of 15 ft when operatingnear the common TMF/CH bay wall or the RH/CHbay wall when waste is stored in the southwest ornortheast corner, respectively, of the CH bay, or post afire watch.


Prevents fires from propagating into the WHB

Prevents a fire from propagating into the WHB

Prevents fire in the Support Building from becominglarge enough to damage waste containers in the CH bayof the WHB

Prevents fires from propagating within the WHB orfrom the TMF to the WHB



WHB6-3Aircraft

crashes intoWHB

followed byfire

EU High See comments NA NA NA NA See Section3.4.2.9 -Aircraftcrash notcredible

WHB6-4Loss of all AC

power andimpact to

wastecontainers

A High Design Feature:TRUDOCK cranes hold their load during loss ofpower

Prevents uncontrolled drop of waste containers Prevented NA NA



Event

Unmitigated


Mitigated


3-164 November 2006

WHB7-1Wildland Firedamages theWHB and


U High Design Feature:PPA is paved or graveled and surrounded by a dirtroad


(AC) - Combustible Loading Control Program forWHB and TMF


Provides separation between WHB and wildland fires inlow profile vegetation surrounding the WIPP site

Prevents small fires from becoming larger fires that canimpact waste

Prevents continuity of combustible material in the WHBand TMF



WHB7-2Earthquake

with firedamages theWHB and


U High Design Feature - WHB designed to withstand a DBE;main lateral force resisting members of the SupportBuilding and TMF are designed to withstand the DBE



Prevents collapse of the WHB, Support Building andTMF and damage to waste during a DBE

Prevents continuity of combustible material in the WHBand TMF


Prevented NA NA

WHB7-3Lightningstrikes the

WHBbreaching thebuilding and

damagingwaste

containers

A Moderate Design Feature:WHB grounding and lightning protection system

Prevents lightning strikes from damaging the WHB andwaste

Prevented NA NA



Event

Unmitigated


Mitigated


3-165 November 2006

WHB7-5High windsdamage theWHB and

impact wastecontainers

U High Design Feature:WHB and TMF are designed to withstand the 110MPH winds with a 1000 year return frequency


Prevents WHB collapse due to high winds


Prevented NA NA

WHB7-6 Hail damagesWHB roof andimpacts waste

containers

U High Design Feature:WHB designed for 27 lb/ft2 snow/ice loading.

Prevents WHB collapse due to hail accumulation Prevented NA NA

WHB7-7Snow/ice

accumulationWHB roofdamages

structure andimpacts waste

containers

U High Design Feature:WHB designed for 27 lb/ft2 snow/ice loading

Prevents WHB collapse due to snow/ice accumulation Prevented NA NA



Event

Unmitigated


Mitigated


3-166 November 2006

UG1-1Fire in wastedisposal path

(from thewaste shaft

station to theactive disposal

room) anddamages

wastecontainers in

transit

A Moderate Design Features:Non-flammable construction of undergroundbulkheads, overcasts, and airlocks

(SSC) Fire suppression system on diesel poweredwaste handling equipment

(AC) - Combustible Loading Control Programincluding:- No storage of flammable gas/liquid or flammablecompressed gas cylinders near the panel supplyventilation overcast and no construction workinvolving flammable gas/liquid or flammablecompressed gas cylinders between the disposal panelsupply overcast and the construction bulkhead to thesouth in East 300 during waste handling operations. When panel 4 is added to the disposal path noconstruction work involving flammable gas/liquid orflammable compressed gas cylinders is allowedbetween the overcast at E-140/S-3310 and theconstruction bulkhead to the west of this overcast in S-3310 during CH waste handling operations.- No storage of flammable gas/liquid or flammablecompressed gas cylinders between the AIS and South1000 in West 30 or within 100 ft of bulkhead 303 onthe North ventilation side, and no use in theselocations during CH waste handling operations

Provides separation between construction ventilationcircuit and disposal circuit or construction circuit andwaste shaft station

Prevents small fires on diesel powered waste handlingequipment from becoming large fires that can impactwaste

Prevents introduction of fire sources to disposal areasfrom construction areas, restricts use and prohibitsstorage of combustible materials and flammablecompressed gas, and prevents vehicle collisions thatcould result in fire

Prevented NA NA



Event

Unmitigated


Mitigated


3-167 November 2006

UG1-1Fire in wastedisposal path(continued)

- No storage of combustibles or flammable gas/liquidor flammable compressed gas cylinders in transportroute- No flammable gas/liquid or flammable compressedgas cylinders shall be used in the disposal path duringwaste handling operations - The lube truck is prohibited from the disposal pathwhile waste is in transit from the waste shaft station tothe active disposal room- Only diesel or electric powered vehicles is allowedin the underground

Waste handling restrictions to:- require 75 ft standoff distance between wastehandling equipment and non-waste handlingequipment in the disposal path- require a spotter when moving waste- access control in E-300 during waste handling


Prevents collisions that result in fire

Minimizes the number of people in the release flowpath

Mitigates event by ensuring prompt reporting of eventto CMR and appropriate actions commenced tominimize personnel exposure to the release



Event

Unmitigated


Mitigated


3-168 April 2007|

UG1-2Fire in an|

active waste|disposal roomimpacts waste

containers

A High (SSC) Automatic/manual fire suppression system onthe diesel powered waste handling equipment.

(AC) - Waste Handling Restrictions including:- Personnel restricted in East 300 in undergroundduring waste handling

- Use of a spotter when vehicles are within 75 ft of thewaste array - No non-waste handling vehicles in the activedisposal room during waste handling

(AC) Combustible Loading Control Program -Disposal Room: - Only diesel and electric powered vehicles are usedin the underground - No use of flammable gas/liquid or flammablecompressed gas cylinders in the active disposal roomduring waste handling. - No hot work within 75 ft of the waste without a firewatch - No lube truck in active disposal panel - No non-waste handling equipment within 75 ft ofwaste face without a fire watch - No storage of flammable gas/liquid or flammablecompressed gas cylinders in the active disposal room.


Prevents small fires associated with waste handlingvehicles including fuel line leaks or the engine frombecoming large fires with the potential to impact wastecontainers

Minimizes the number of people in the release flowpath

The controls prevent fires resulting from vehiclecollisions and prohibits combustible/flammable materialstorage in areas with the potential to impact waste,controls use of combustibles and flammable compressedgas cylinders in the proximity of the waste and prohibitsthe underground vehicle with the largest fuel inventoryfrom close proximity to waste


Prevented NA NA



Event

Unmitigated


Mitigated


3-169 April 2007|

UG1-3A |Fire in wastearray during |active waste |

emplacement |

EU High (SSC) Automatic/manual fire suppression system onthe diesel powered waste handling equipment

(AC) Waste Handling Restrictions- Personnel restricted in East 300 in undergroundduring waste handling - Use of a spotter when vehicles are within 75 ft of thewaste array - No non-waste handling vehicles in the activedisposal room during waste handling

(AC) Combustible Loading Control Program -Disposal Room: - Only diesel and electric powered vehicles are usedin the underground - No use of flammable compressed gas in the activedisposal room during waste handling - No hot work within 75 ft of the waste without a firewatch - No lube truck in active disposal panel - No non-waste handling equipment within 75 ft ofwaste face without a fire watch - No storage of flammable gas/liquid or flammablecompressed gas cylinders in the active disposal room.


Prevents small fires associated with waste handlingvehicles including fuel line leaks or the engine frombecoming large fires with the potential to impact wastecontainers Minimizes the number of people in the release flowpath

The controls prevent fires resulting from vehiclecollisions and prohibits combustible/flammable materialstorage in areas with the potential to impact waste,controls use of combustibles and flammable compressedgas cylinders in the proximity of the waste and prohibitsthe underground vehicle with the largest fuel inventoryfrom close proximity to waste


Prevented NA NA



Event

Unmitigated


Mitigated


3-170 November 2006

UG1-4Fire in

construction/mining

ventilationcircuit impacts

wastecontainers

A Moderate Design Features:Non-Flammable construction of undergroundbulkheads, overcasts, and airlocks

(AC) - No construction work involving flammablegas/liquid or flammable compressed gas cylindersbetween the disposal panel supply overcast and theconstruction bulkhead to the south in East 300 duringwaste handling operations. When panel 4 is added tothe disposal path no construction work involvingflammable gas/liquid or flammable compressed gascylinders is allowed between the overcast at E-140/S-3310 and the construction bulkhead to the west of thisovercast in S-3310 during CH waste handlingoperations.

(AC) - No construction using flammable gas/liquid orflammable compressed gas cylinders at bulkhead 309during waste handling operations

(AC) - No storage of flammable gas/liquid orflammable compressed gas cylinders gas between theAIS and South 1000 in West 30

Provides separation between construction ventilationcircuit and disposal circuit or construction circuit andwaste shaft station

Prevents introduction of fire sources to disposal areasfrom construction areas

Prevents introduction of fire sources to disposal areasfrom construction areas

Prevents introduction of fire sources to disposal areas.

Prevented NA NA|

UG1-5Fire in northventilation

circuitpropagates

and impactswaste

containers

A Moderate Design Features:Non-Flammable construction of undergroundbulkheads, overcasts, and airlocks

(AC) - No storage of flammable gas/liquid orflammable compressed gas cylinders within 100 ft ofbulkhead 303 on the North ventilation side

Provides separation between construction circuit andwaste shaft station

Prevents introduction of fire sources to disposal areas

Prevented NA NA|



Event

Unmitigated


Mitigated


3-171 November 2006

UG1-6Fire in thewaste hoist

tower resultsin rope or

brake failurecausing

uncontrolledconveyance

movement andbreach of

wastecontainers

A High (SSC) - Waste hoist structure and structural supportincluding the waste hoist head frame, waste shaftconveyance, counterweight, waste hoist drum, redundant ropes and brakes

(SSC) - Waste hoist tower firesuppression system

(AC) - Combustible Loading Control Program:- No storage of flammable gas or flammablecompressed gas cylinders in the waste hoist tower. Nouse of flammable gas or flammable compressed gas inthe waste hoist tower when waste is being transportedon the waste shaft conveyance- No more than 1 gallon of solvents in the waste hoisttower for hoist maintenance. Used hydraulicfluid/lubricants are removed from the waste hoisttower after hoist maintenance and prior to handlingwaste on the waste shaft conveyance.


Prevents uncontrolled drop of loaded waste conveyancedown the waste shaft

Extinguishes fire before ropes or brakes are damaged

Prevents fires in the waste hoist tower with the potentialto damage the waste hoist when waste is beingtransported on the waste shaft conveyance


Prevented NA NA No consequencesare expectedfrom the firealone, but if notextinguished thefire could be aninitiator forUG3-9



Event

Unmitigated


Mitigated


3-172 April 2007|

UG2-1Flammable

gas explosionand impact to

wastecontainers in|the disposal|

path or active|disposal room|

A Moderate (AC) - Combustible Loading Control Program -Disposal Path and Disposal Room - No flammable gas/liquid or flammable compressedgas cylinders stored in disposal path or disposal room - No use of flammable gas/liquid or flammablecompressed gas cylinders in disposal path duringwaste handling - No use of flammable gas/liquid or flammablecompressed gas cylinders in active disposal roomwithout a fire watch - No storage of flammable gas/liquid or flammablecompressed gas cylinders near the panel supplyventilation overcast and no construction workinvolving flammable gas/liquid or flammablecompressed gas cylinders between the disposal panelsupply overcast and the construction bulkhead to thesouth in East 300 during waste handling operations. When panel 4 is added to the disposal path noconstruction work involving flammable gas/liquid orflammable compressed gas cylinders is allowedbetween the overcast at E-140/S-3310 and theconstruction bulkhead to the west of this overcast in S-3310 during CH waste handling operations.- No storage of flammable gas/liquid or flammablecompressed gas cylinders between the AIS and South1000 in West 30 or within 100 ft of bulkhead 303 onthe North ventilation side, and no use in theselocations during CH waste handling operations

(SSC) - Underground Ventilation

Prevents a flammable gas explosion from impactingwaste and prevents introduction of fire sources todisposal areas from construction area.

Prevents flammable gas concentration fromaccumulating in the underground.

Prevented NA NA



Event

Unmitigated


Mitigated


3-173 April 2007|

UG2-6Explosion in

the waste hoisttower results

in rope orbrake failure

causinguncontrolledconveyance


wastecontainers


Waste hoist brakes

(AC) - Combustible Loading Control Program:- No storage of flammable gas or flammablecompressed gas cylinders in the waste hoist tower. Nouse of flammable gas or flammable compressed gas inthe waste hoist tower when waste is being transportedon the waste shaft conveyance. No more than 1 gallonof solvents may be stored in the waste hoist tower.



Prevents uncontrolled drop of a loaded wasteconveyance down the shaft

Prevents explosions/fires in the waste hoist tower withthe potential to damage the waste hoist when waste isbeing transported on the waste shaft conveyance


Prevented NA NA

UG3-3A |Roof collapsesand damages

wastecontainers

U Moderate (AC) - Weekly ground inspection(AC) - Ground Control and Geotechnical MonitoringProgram

Prevents roof fall event in an active disposal room bydetecting conditions that indicate instability andinitiating action to repair or close the room

Prevented NA NA



Event

Unmitigated


Mitigated


3-174 November 2006

UG3-9Waste shaftconveyance

falls to bottomof the shaft

resulting in abreach of

wastecontainers

U High (SSC) - Waste hoist structure and structural supportincluding the waste hoist head frame, waste shaftconveyance, counterweight, ropes, waste hoist drum,and waste hoist tower

(SSC) - Waste hoist tower firesuppression system


Prevents uncontrolled drop of loaded waste conveyancedown the waste shaft. The head frame and hoist drumsupport the counterweight, waste shaft conveyance andropes. The structural support for the waste hoist headframe is provided by the waste hoist tower



Prevented NA NA Six ropesprovided, eachcapable ofsupportingmaximum load. UG1-8 could bean initiator forthis event.

UG6-2Waste

dropped downshaft whilewaste is in

transit to theundergroundand damages

wastecontainers

U High Design Features: - Waste conveyance loading car - Fence around waste shaft collar - Waste hoist headframe

(AC) - Toplander approves entry of loads onto thewaste shaft conveyance through control of the gate atthe waste shaft collar

(AC) - Waste moved on facility pallets only

(AC) - Waste handling restriction requires that theconveyance be at the waste shaft collar before waste ismoved into the area at the top of the waste shaft.

Prevents waste pallet from inadvertently entering wasteshaftDefined restricted area around waste shaft and preventsuncontrolled access to the shaftFacility pallet on forklift will not fit past waste shaftcage supports

Prevents a load from inadvertently entering waste shaft

Prevents moving an individual seven-pack or SWB tothe waste shaft

Prevents a load from inadvertently entering the wasteshaft

Prevented NA NA



Event

Unmitigated


Mitigated


3-175 November 2006

UG7-3Earthquake

impacts wastecontainers onwaste shaft

conveyance orat the bottomof the wasteshaft on a

loadedtransporter

U High Design Features:WHB including waste hoist tower are designed towithstand the DBE

Waste hoist brakes hold the load on a DBE or loss ofpower

(SSC) - Waste hoist structure and structural supportincluding the waste hoist head frame, waste shaftconveyance, counterweight, waste hoist drum, redundant ropes and brakes

(SSC) - Waste hoist tower fire suppression system


Prevents collapse of the waste hoist tower



Ensures worker is trained to respond to abnormal eventssuch as fires, spills, or other waste container breaches,such that inhalation of radioactive material isminimized.

Prevented NA NA

BG6-1Aircraft Crash

EU High None NA NA NA NA See Section3.4.2.9 - aircraftcrash notcredible

BG7-1Earthquake

impactsfacility, resultsin damage to

wastecontainers and

breach

U High Design features:WHB designed to withstand the DBE. The lateralforce resisting members of the TMF and SupportBuilding are designed to withstand the DBE to preventthem from collapsing on the WHB

Waste hoist and TRUDOCK cranes are designed tohold their load during the DBE or on loss of power


Prevents collapse of the WHB and impact to wastecontainers

Prevents dropping waste containers


Prevented NA NA


3-176 November 2006

Table A-14 - Facility Worker MHE Summary

Event

Unmitigated


Mitigated

CommentsFreq. Conseq. Freq. Conseq.

RiskBin

OA5-1Criticality

EU High Criticality Safety Program Protects assumptions for nuclear criticality safetyevaluations (NCSE) that shows criticality intransport containers not credible

BEU High III See DSA Chapter 6

OA6-4Aircraft Crash

EU High See comment. NA NA NA NA See Section 3.4.2.9 - aircraftcrash not credible

OA7-2Tornadoproduces

missiles thatbreach

TRUPACT-IIsor HalfPACTs

U Low TRUPACT-II and HalfPACT design TRUPACT-II and HalfPACT capable ofwithstanding tornado missiles

Prevented NA NA See Section 3.4.2.10 -TRUPACT-II and HalfPACTcapable of withstandingtornado missiles asdocumented in NS-05-00110

OA7-3High Winds

A Low TRUPACT-II and HalfPACT design TRUPACT-II and HalfPACT capable ofwithstanding tornado missiles

Prevented NA NA See Section 3.4.2.10 -TRUPACT-II and HalfPACTcapable of withstandingtornado missiles asdocumented in NS-05-00110

WHB1-1Small Fire

A Moderate (SSC) - WHB and Support Building fire suppressionsystem

(AC) - Combustible loading control program for theWHB and TMF including flammable gas/liquid andflammable compressed gas control and control ofnumber of slip sheet pallets allowed in the CH bay andcontrol of transient combustibles near waste and slipsheets


Minimizes the release by reducing WHBtemperature during large fire such that minimaldamage to waste containers occurs and/orprevents spread of fire from adjacent areas

Minimize potential and size of fires bycontrolling the amount of combustible material inthe WHB and TMF

Ensures worker is trained to respond to abnormalevents such as fires, spills, or other wastecontainer breaches, such that inhalation ofradioactive material is minimized

Prevented NA NA WHB fire suppressionsupplies TMF



Event

Unmitigated


Mitigated


RiskBin

3-177 November 2006

WHB1-2Full Room

Fire(CH bay)





Prevents a fire on the forklift from becominglarge enough to damage CH waste containers inthe WHB.

Prevents a fire in the Support Building, TMF, orother room in the WHB from propagating to theCH bay or within the bay

Prevents small fires from becoming larger fireswith the potential to impact waste containers;prevents fires associated with the operation ofdiesel powered equipment in the TMF or RH bayfrom propagating to the CH bay and impactingstored waste; prevents continuity of combustiblematerial and prevents a pool fire large enough todamage waste in the CH bay.





Event

Unmitigated


Mitigated


RiskBin

3-178 November 2006

WHB1-3Multi-Room

Fire






Prevents a fire in the Support Building, TMF, orother room in the WHB from propagating to theCH bay or within the bay

Prevents small fires from becoming larger fireswith the potential to impact waste containers;prevents fires associated with the operation ofdiesel powered equipment in the TMF or RH bayfrom propagating to the CH bay and impactingstored waste; prevents continuity of combustiblematerial and prevents a pool fire large enough todamage waste in the CH bay.





Event

Unmitigated


Mitigated


RiskBin

3-179 November 2006

WHB1-4Waste

container fire

A High (AC) - Vent required on each waste container(implemented at generator site per CH WAC)14

(AC) - Explosive or other ignitable sources prohibitedin waste containers (implemented at generator site perCH WAC)14

Prevents flammable gas buildup in wastecontainer


Prevented NA NA

WHB1-5Electric

forklift firewhile

transportingwaste

containers



(AC) - Combustible loading control program for theWHB and TMF including flammable gas/liquid andflammable compressed gas control; only electricpowered equipment is allowed in the CH bay whenwaste is outside a closed TRUPACT-II or HalfPact; nomore than three pallets of fiberboard slip sheets andone pallet of polyethylene slip sheets shall be stored inthe CH bay. Pallets of slip sheets must not be stackedand a 10 ft separation distance shall be maintainedbetween each slip sheet pallet and between slip sheetpallets and stored waste. Transient combustibles shallnot be stored closer than 10 ft from waste or pallets ofslip sheets.



Prevents a fire in the WHB from propagatingwithin the bay

Prevents small fires from becoming larger fireswith the potential to impact waste containers;


U Low III



Event

Unmitigated


Mitigated


RiskBin

3-180 November 2006

WHB2-3Flammable gasexplosion and

impact towaste

containers

A High (AC) - Combustible Loading Control Program - WHB - Flammable compressed gas cylinders are prohibitedin the CH bay unless all waste containers are insideclosed TRUPACT-II or HalfPACT containers. (Thislimitation does not apply to packages covered by DOTExemption DOT-E-7607)- Limits alcohol to no more than 1 gal at eachTRUDOCK- No flammable gas or flammable compressedflammable gas cylinders are stored in or along theexternal walls of the WHB, the Support Building, orTMF or in the area between the WHB and SupportBuilding

Prevents explosions due to release of flammablegas in the WHB while waste containers are notprotected by transportation containers

Prevented NA NA

WHB2-4Waste

containerexplosion

A High (AC) - Vent required on each waste container(implemented at generator site as required by the CHWAC)14

(AC) - Explosive or other ignitable sources prohibitedin waste containers (implemented at generator site asrequired by the CH WAC)14

Prevents gas pressure buildup concentration inwaste container


Prevented NA NA

WHB3-1Loss of

confinementdue to

droppingwaste

containerswhen

removing themfrom the

shipping caskor dropping

items on them

A High Design Feature - TRUDOCK cranes designed to holddesign loads

ACGLFs and four-pack lift fixture are designed to holddesign loads

Space frame pallet assemblies and lift pins are loadbearing for lifting drum assemblies

(AC) - Preoperational checks on waste handlingequipment


Prevents loads from being dropped Prevented NA NA



Event

Unmitigated


Mitigated


RiskBin

3-181 November 2006

WHB3-2Waste

containersdroppedduring

movementwith a forklift

resulting indamage to

wastecontainers

A High (AC) - Waste handling restriction requires use of aspotter when waste is being moved



Prevents loads from being dropped

Ensures operators are qualified to properlyoperate the waste handling equipment duringnormal operations and to properly respond to off-normal operations


U Low III

WHB3-3Forklift

PuncturesWaste

Containers

A High (AC) - Waste handling restriction requires use of aspotter when waste is being moved



Prevents forklift collisions with wastethat could result in a breach of waste containers

Ensures operators are qualified to properlyoperate the waste handling equipment duringnormal operations and to properly respond to off-normal operations


Prevented NA NA

WHB3-5Compressed

gas bottlebecomes amissile that

impactsTRUPACT-IIsor HalfPACTs

or wastecontainers

A High (AC) - Non-flammable compressed gas cylindercontrol limits the number of cylinders in the CH bay tofour cylinders


Minimizes the potential for improper handling orstorage of compressed gas bottles


U Low III



Event

Unmitigated


Mitigated


RiskBin

3-182 November 2006

WHB3-6Forklift

transportingwaste

containerscollides withstored waste

A High (AC) - Qualified operators

(AC) - Waste handling restriction requires use of aspotter when waste is being moved


Ensures operators are trained to properly operatethe waste handling equipment during normaloperations and to properly respond to off-normaloperations

Prevents collisions that could result in a breach ofwaste containers


U Low III

WHB5-1Criticality

EU High (AC) - Criticality Safety Program Protects assumptions for NCSE that showscriticality in the WHB not credible


WHB6-1Vehicle Crash

into WHB

U High Design Feature - WHB designed such that the shieldedstorage room has 3 ft. thick concrete walls andremainder of CH bay is protected on the north by thenorth rooms of the WHB and the waste hoist tower, onthe east by the RH portion of the WHB and on the westby the TMF

(AC) - Waste handling restriction requires barricadesto be in place along the outside south wall of the WHBbetween airlock 100 and the TMF when waste is storedin the southwest corner of the CH bay

Prevents vehicle crash into the CH bay anddamaging waste

Prevented NA NA



Event

Unmitigated


Mitigated


RiskBin

3-183 November 2006

WHB6-2External FirePropagates to

WHB

U High Design Feature - Noncombustible construction of theWHB

PPA is paved and graveled and surrounded by a dirtroad


(AC) - Combustible Loading Control Program - WHBand TMF - requires that diesel powered equipmentmaintain a standoff distance of 15 ft when operatingnear the common TMF/CH bay wall or the RH/CH baywall when waste is stored in the southwest or northeastcorner, respectively, of the CH bay, or post a firewatch.


Prevents fires from propagating into the WHB

Prevents a fire from propagating into the WHB

Prevents fire in the Support Building frombecoming large enough to damage wastecontainers in the CH bay of the WHB

Prevents fires from propagating within the WHBor from the TMF to the WHB


Prevented NA NA WHB fire suppression systemsupplies TMF

WHB6-3Aircraft Crash

EU High None NA BEU High III See Section 3.4.2.9 - aircraftcrash is not credible

WHB6-4Loss of all AC

power andimpact to

wastecontainers

A High Design Feature - TRUDOCK cranes hold their loadduring loss of power

Prevents uncontrolled drop of waste containersPrevented NA NA



Event

Unmitigated


Mitigated


RiskBin

3-184 November 2006

WHB7-1Wildland firedamages theWHB and


U High Design Feature - PPA is paved and graveled andsurrounded by a dirt road


(AC) - Combustible Loading Control Program - WHBand TMF


Provides separation between WHB and lowprofile vegetation surrounding the WIPP site

Minimizes the release by reducing WHBtemperature during large fire such that minimaldamage to waste containers occurs and/orprevents spread of fire from adjacent areas

Minimize potential and size of fires bycontrolling the amount of combustible material inthe WHB and TMF


Prevented NA NA

WHB7-2Earthquake

with firedamages theWHB and


U High Design Feature - WHB designed to withstand a DBE;main lateral force resisting members of the SupportBuilding and TMF are designed to withstand the DBE

TRUDOCK cranes hold their load during a DBE



Prevents collapse of the WHB, Support Buildingand TMF and damage to waste during a DBE

Prevents dropping a load during removal of wastecontainers from a shipping container

Prevents continuity of combustible material inthe WHB and TMF


Prevented NA NA MHE reevaluated event asBEU. Event is bounded byearthquake alone due to nogas pipelines or other passivesources of fuel that couldcreate large fires following aseismic event.

WHB7-3Lightningstrikes the

WHBbreaching thebuilding and

damagingwaste

containers

A High Design Feature:WHB grounding and lightning protection system

Prevents lightning strikes from damaging theWHB and waste

Prevented NA NA



Event

Unmitigated


Mitigated


RiskBin

3-185 November 2006

WHB7-4Tornado

damages theWHB and


EU High Design Feature:WHB including tornado dampers is designed towithstand DBT; The lateral force resisting members ofthe TMF are designed to withstand the DBT to preventit from damaging the WHB


Prevents WHB collapse if subjected to designbasis tornado. WHB is not designed to withstandwind generated missiles


Prevented NA NA

WHB7-5High windsdamage theWHB and

impact wastecontainers

U High Design Feature:WHB including tornado dampers and TMF aredesigned to withstand the 110 MPH winds with a 1000year return frequency


Prevents WHB collapse due to high winds


Prevented NA NA

WHB7-6 Hail damagesWHB roof andimpacts waste

containers

U High Design Feature:WHB designed for 27 lb/ft2 snow/ice loading.

Prevents WHB collapse due to hail accumulation Prevented NA NA

WHB7-7Snow/ice

accumulationWHB roofdamages

structure andimpacts waste

containers

U High Design Feature:WHB designed for 27 lb/ft2 snow/ice loading

Prevents WHB collapse due to snow/iceaccumulation

Prevented NA NA



Event

Unmitigated


Mitigated


RiskBin

3-186 November 2006

UG1-1Fire in wastedisposal path

A High Design Features:Non-Flammable construction of undergroundbulkheads, overcasts, and airlocks

(SSC) - Fire suppression system on diesel poweredwaste handling equipment

(AC) - Combustible Loading Control Programincluding:- No storage of flammable gas/liquid or flammablecompressed gas cylinders near the panel supplyventilation overcast and no construction workinvolving flammable gas/liquid or flammable betweenthe disposal panel supply overcast and the constructionbulkhead to the south in East 300 during wastehandling operations. When panel 4 is added to thedisposal path no construction work involvingflammable gas/liquid or flammable compressed gascylinders is allowed between the overcast at E-140/S-3310 and the construction bulkhead to the west of thisovercast in S-3310 during CH waste handlingoperations.- No storage of flammable gas/liquid or flammablecompressed gas cylinders between the AIS and South1000 in West 30 or within 100 ft of bulkhead 303 onthe North ventilation side, and no use in theselocations during CH waste handling operations- No storage of combustibles or flammable gas/liquidor flammable compressed gas cylinders in transportroute- No flammable gas/liquid or flammable compressedgas cylinders shall be used in the disposal path duringwaste handling operations - The lube truck is prohibited from the disposal pathwhile waste is in transit from the waste shaft station tothe active disposal room- Only diesel or electrically powered vehicles are usedin the underground

Provides separation between constructionventilation circuit and disposal circuit or construction circuit and waste shaft station.

Prevents small fires on diesel powered wastehandling equipment from becoming large firesthat can impact waste

Prevents introduction of fire sources to disposalareas from construction areas, restricts use andprohibits storage of combustible materials andflammable compressed gas, and prevents vehiclecollisions that could result in fire

Prevented NA NA



Event

Unmitigated


Mitigated


RiskBin

3-187 November 2006

UG1-1Fire in wastedisposal path(continued)

(AC) Waste handling restrictions to:- require 75 ft standoff distance between wastehandling equipment and non-waste handlingequipment in the disposal path- require a spotter when moving waste- access control in E-300 during waste handling


(SSC) - Underground ventilation


Prevents collisions that result in fire

Minimizes the number of people in the releaseflow path

This requirement ensures that the CMRoperator(s) and operations personnel in theunderground performing waste handlingoperations communicate and take the appropriateactions in the event of a fire in the undergroundsuch that the CMR operator(s) blocks the shift tofiltration of underground ventilation untilpersonnel are out of danger. This requirementalso ensures that operations personnel in theunderground take the necessary immediateactions to notify the CMR and proceed to a safelocation.

Provides fresh air for worker evacuation

Mitigates event by ensuring prompt reporting ofevent to CMR and appropriate actionscommenced to minimize personnel exposure tothe release.



Event

Unmitigated


Mitigated


RiskBin

3-188 April 2007|

UG1-2Fire in an|

active waste|disposal room

A High (SSC) Automatic/manual fire suppression system onthe diesel powered waste handling equipment.

(AC) Waste Handling Restrictions- Personnel restricted in East 300 in undergroundduring waste handling

- Use of a spotter when vehicles are within 75 ft of thewaste array - No non-waste handling vehicles in the activedisposal room during waste handling

(AC) Combustible Loading Control Program -Disposal Room: - Only diesel and electric powered vehicles are used inthe underground - No use of flammable gas/liquid or flammablecompressed gas cylinders in the active disposal roomduring waste handling - No hot work within 75 ft of the waste without a firewatch - No lube truck in active disposal panel - No non-waste handling equipment within 75 ft ofwaste face without a fire watch - No storage of flammable gas/liquid or flammablecompressed gas cylinders in the active disposal room

Prevents small fires associated with wastehandling vehicles including fuel line leaks or theengine from becoming large fires with thepotential to impact waste containers Minimizes the number of people in the releaseflow path

The controls prevent fires resulting fromcollisions between vehicles and prohibitscombustible/flammable material storage in areaswith the potential to impact waste, controls use ofcombustibles and flammable compressed gascylinders in the proximity of the waste andprohibits the underground vehicle with the largestfuel inventory from close proximity to waste

Prevented NA NA



Event

Unmitigated


Mitigated


RiskBin

3-189 April 2007|

UG1-2Fire in an |

active waste |disposal room(continued)




This requirement ensures that the CMRoperator(s) and operations personnel in theunderground performing waste handlingoperations communicate and take the appropriateactions in the event of a fire in the undergroundsuch that the CMR operator(s) blocks the shift tofiltration of underground ventilation untilpersonnel are out of danger. This requirementalso ensures that operations personnel in theunderground take the necessary immediateactions to notify the CMR and proceed to a safelocation.

Provides fresh air for worker evacuation

Mitigates event by ensuring prompt reporting ofevent to CMR and appropriate actionscommenced to minimize personnel exposure tothe release



Event

Unmitigated


Mitigated


RiskBin

3-190 April 2007|

UG1-3 A| Fire in waste|array during|Active Waste|Emplacement|

EU High (SSC) Automatic/manual fire suppression system on|the diesel powered waste handling equipment

(AC) Waste handling restrictions including:|- Personnel restricted in East 300 in underground

during waste handling

- Use of a spotter when vehicles are within 75 ft of thewaste array

- No non-waste handling vehicles in the activedisposal room during waste handling

(AC) Combustible Loading Control Program -Disposal Room:- Only diesel and electric powered vehicles are used in

the underground- No use of flammable gas/liquid or flammable

compressed gas cylinders in the active disposal roomduring waste handling

- No hot work within 75 ft of the waste without a firewatch

- No lube truck in active disposal panel- No non-waste handling equipment within 75 ft of

waste face without a fire watch- No storage of flammable gas/liquid or flammable

compressed gas cylinders in the active disposal room

Prevents small fires associated with wastehandling vehicles including fuel line leaks or theengine from becoming large fires with thepotential to impact waste containers Minimizes the number of people in the releaseflow path

The controls prevent fires resulting fromcollisions between vehicles and prohibitscombustible/flammable material storage in areaswith the potential to impact waste, controls use ofcombustibles and flammable compressed gascylinders in the proximity of the waste andprohibits the underground vehicle with the largestfuel inventory from close proximity to waste

EU NA NA||||||



Event

Unmitigated


Mitigated


RiskBin

3-191 April 2007|

UG1-3AFire in wastearray during |Active Waste |Emplacement |(continued)


(SSC) - Underground Ventilation


Ensures that the CMR operator(s) and operationspersonnel in the underground performing wastehandling operations communicate and take theappropriate actions in the event of a fire in theunderground such that the CMR operator(s)blocks the shift to filtration of undergroundventilation until personnel are out of danger. Thisrequirement also ensures that operationspersonnel in the underground take the necessaryimmediate actions to notify the CMR andproceed to a safe location.

Defense in depth SSC to provide fresh air forworker evacuation

Mitigates event by ensuring prompt reporting ofevent to CMR and appropriate actionscommenced to minimize personnel exposure tothe release

UG1-3B&C |Fire in a Filled |

Panel |

EU |Moderate |(SSC) Panel closure ||

(SSC) Substantial and isolation barrier ||

(AC) Radiation Protection Program |||||

(AC) - Explosive or other ignitable sources prohibited |in waste containers |

Prevents a release from a filled panel ||

Minimizes a release from a filled panel. ||

Mitigates consequence to worker by providing |local radiation monitoring during work in filled |panel entries with substantial and isolation |barriers |

|Eliminates ignition sources in waste containers |

EU |Low |IV ||



Event

Unmitigated


Mitigated


RiskBin

3-192 November 2006

UG1-4Fire in

construction/mining

ventilationcircuit impacts

wastecontainers


(AC) - No construction work involving flammablegas/liquid or flammable compressed gas cylindersbetween the disposal panel supply overcast and theconstruction bulkhead to the south in East 300 duringwaste handling operations

(AC) - No construction using flammable gas/liquid orflammable compressed gas cylinders at bulkhead 309during waste handling operations

(AC) - No storage of flammable gas/liquid orflammable compressed gas cylinders between the AISand South 1000 in West 30

Provides separation between constructionventilation circuit and disposal circuit or construction circuit and waste shaft station

Prevents introduction of fire sources to disposalareas from construction areas

Prevents introduction of fire sources to disposalareas from construction areas

Prevents introduction of fire sources to disposalareas

Prevented NA NA

UG1-5Fire in northventilation

circuit impactswaste

containers


(AC) - No storage of flammable gas/liquid orflammable compressed gas cylinders within 100 ft ofbulkhead 303 on the North ventilation side

Provides separation between construction circuitand waste shaft station

Prevents introduction of fire sources to disposalareas

Prevented NA NA



Event

Unmitigated


Mitigated


RiskBin

3-193 November 2006

UG1-6Fire in thewaste hoist

tower resultsin rope or

brake failurecausing

uncontrolledconveyance


wastecontainers



(AC) Combustible Loading Control Program:- No storage of flammable gas or flammable

compressed gas cylinders in the waste hoist tower. - No use of flammable gas or flammable compressed

gas cylinders in the waste hoist tower when waste isbeing transported on the waste shaft conveyance.

- No more than one gallon of solvents may be storedin the waste hoist tower for waste hoist maintenance. Used oil/hydraulic fluid is removed from the wastehoist tower after hoist maintenance and prior tohandling waste on the waste shaft conveyance.


Prevents uncontrolled drop of loaded wasteconveyance down the waste shaft

Extinguishes fire before ropes or brakes aredamaged

Prevents explosions/fires in the waste hoist towerwith the potential to damage the waste hoistwhen waste is being transported on the wasteshaft conveyance

Prevents fires in the waste hoist tower with thepotential to damage the waste hoist when waste isbeing transported on the waste shaft conveyance.


Prevented NA NA No consequences areexpected from the fire alone,but if not extinguished the firecould be an initiator forUG3-9



Event

Unmitigated


Mitigated


RiskBin

3-194 April 2007|

UG2-1Flammable gasexplosion and

impact towaste

containers in|the disposal|

path or active|disposal room|

A High (AC) Combustible Loading Control Program: - No flammable gas/liquid or flammable compressed

gas cylinders stored in disposal path- No use of flammable gas/liquid or flammable

compressed gas cylinders in disposal path duringwaste handling

- No use of flammable gas/liquid or flammablecompressed gas cylinders in active disposal roomwithout a fire watch

- No storage of flammable gas or flammablecompressed gas cylinders near the panel supplyventilation overcast and no construction workinvolving flammable gas/liquid or flammablecompressed gas cylinders between the disposal panelsupply overcast and the construction bulkhead to thesouth in East 300 during waste handling operations. When panel 4 is added to the disposal path noconstruction work involving flammable gas/liquid orflammable compressed gas cylinders is allowedbetween the overcast at E-140/S-3310 and theconstruction bulkhead to the west of this overcast inS-3310 during CH waste handling operations.

- No storage of flammable gas/liquid or flammablecompressed gas cylinders between the AIS andSouth 1000 in West 30 or within 100 ft of bulkhead303 on the North ventilation side, and no use inthese locations during CH waste handling operations


Prevents a flammable gas explosion fromimpacting waste and prevents introduction of firesources to disposal areas from construction areas

Prevents flammable gas concentration fromaccumulating in the underground

Prevented NA NA

UG2-2Battery

explosion onunderground

vehiclesimpacts waste

A High (AC) - Only metal waste containers that meet DOTType 7A or equivalent requirements are acceptable fordisposal at WIPP. This requirement is implemented atgenerator sites in accordance with the CH WAC.

(AC) - Waste handling restrictions require a standoffdistance greater than 75 ft. between the CH wastetransporter loaded with waste and other undergroundvehicles and prevents non-waste handling vehicles inthe disposal room during waste handling.

Withstand low energy missile impact withoutbreach

Minimizes impact to waste from non-wastehandling equipment

U Low III Though a battery explosioncan occur, the missilesgenerated by the explosion(primarily plastic and leadprojectiles) would not beexpected to producesignificant damage to themetal waste containers.



Event

Unmitigated


Mitigated


RiskBin

3-195 April 2007|

UG2-3Explosion at

batterycharging

station impactswaste

containers

A High (SSC) - Underground ventilation

(AC) - Only metal waste containers that meet DOTType 7A or equivalent requirements are acceptable fordisposal at WIPP. This requirement is implemented atgenerator sites in accordance with the CH WAC.

Prevents flammable gas concentration fromaccumulating in the underground

Withstand low energy missile impact withoutbreach

U Low III Though a battery explosioncan occur, the missilesgenerated by the explosion(primarily plastic and leadprojectiles) would not beexpected to producesignificant damage to themetal waste containers.

UG2-5A |Waste

ContainerExplosion

during |transport or in |an active panel |

A High (AC) - Vent required on each waste container

(AC) - Explosive or other ignitable sources prohibitedin waste containers

Prevents gas pressure buildup concentration inwaste container


Prevented NA NA

UG2-5B&C |Waste |

container |explosion from |

long term |generation of |explosive gas |

in a waste |container in a |filled panel |

EU |Moderate |(SSC) Panel closure ||


(AC) Radiation Protection Program |||||

(AC) - Explosive or other ignitable sources prohibited |in waste containers |




|Eliminates ignition sources in waste containers |

EU |Low |III ||



Event

Unmitigated


Mitigated


RiskBin

3-196 April 2007|

UG2-6Explosion in

the waste hoisttower results

in rope orbrake failure

causinguncontrolledconveyance


wastecontainers


Waste hoist brakes

(AC) - Combustible Loading Control Program:- No storage of flammable gas or flammable

compressed gas cylinders in the waste hoist tower. No use of flammable gas or flammable compressedgas cylinders in the waste hoist tower when waste isbeing transported on the waste shaft conveyance. No more than 1 gallon of solvents may be stored inthe waste hoist tower.



Prevents uncontrolled drop of a loaded wasteconveyance down the shaft

Prevents fires in the waste hoist tower with thepotential to damage the waste hoist when waste isbeing transported on the waste shaft conveyance


Prevented NA NA

UG3-1A|Objects FallFrom Ceilingand Damage

WasteContainers in|

an Active|Panel|

A High (AC) - Ground control and geotechnical monitoringprogram


Minimizes likelihood of falling objects from theoverhead by frequent monitoring and inspections

Ensures worker is trained to respond to abnormalevents such as fires, spills, or other wastecontainer breaches, such that inhalation ofradioactive material is minimized.

EU Low IV

UG3-1B&C|Roof bolts|eject from|room/panel|ceiling after|

panel is filled|and puncture|

waste|containers|

A|||||

Moderate| (SSC) Panel closure||

(SSC) Substantial and isolation barrier||

(AC) Radiation Protection Program|||

Prevents a release from a filled panel||

Minimizes a release from a filled panel.||

Mitigates consequence to worker by providing|local radiation monitoring during work in filled|panel entries with substantial and isolation|barriers|

|

A| Low| III|



Event

Unmitigated


Mitigated


RiskBin

3-197 April 2007|

UG3-3A | Roof fall |

during |transport of |

CH waste or in |the active CH |disposal room |

Roof |Collapses |

U High (AC) - Weekly ground inspection(AC) - Ground Control Program

Prevents roof fall event in an active disposalroom by detecting conditions that indicateinstability and initiating action to repair or closethe room.

Prevented NA NA

UG3-3B&C | Crush of |

waste |containers in a |

filled panel |

A |Moderate |(SSC) Panel closure ||


(AC) Radiation Protection Program |||




|

A |Low |III ||

UG3-4Single

transportercollision in thedisposal pathimpacts waste

containers

A High (AC) - Waste handling restriction requires use of aspotter when moving waste

(AC) - Waste handling restriction requires non-wastehandling equipment to maintain greater than 75 ftstandoff distance from the waste transporter

(AC) - Personnel restricted in East-300 in undergroundduring waste handling.

(AC) -Emergency response

Prevents a collision between waste handling andnon-waste handling equipment during wastehandling operation.


Minimizes the number of people in the releaseflow path reducing potential for radiologicalexposure.


Prevented NA NA



Event

Unmitigated


Mitigated


RiskBin

3-198 November 2006

UG3-5Collision inthe disposal

path involvingmultiple waste

transportersand impact to

wastecontainers

A High (AC) - Waste handling restriction requires use of aspotter when moving waste

(AC) - Waste handling restriction requires non-wastehandling equipment to maintain greater than 75 ftstandoff distance from the waste transporter

(AC) - Personnel restricted in East-300 in undergroundduring waste handling.


Prevents the potential for a collision betweenwaste handling and non-waste handlingequipment during waste handling operation.


Minimizes the number of people in the releaseflow path reducing potential for radiologicalexposure.


U Low III

UG3-6Vehicle

collides withthe disposal

array


(SSC) - Panel closure, substantial and isolation barrier|

(AC) - Waste handling restrictions:- Require use of a spotter when vehicles are operatedwithin 75 ft of the disposal array- Prohibit non-waste handling vehicles in the activedisposal room during waste handling



Directs airflow away from the worker

Prevents collisions with the disposal array facethat could result in a breach of waste containers


Ensures operators are trained to properly operatethe waste handling equipment during normaloperations and to properly respond to off-normaloperations.

Prevented NA NA



Event

Unmitigated


Mitigated


RiskBin

3-199 April 2007 |

UG3-7Waste

ContainersDropped




Directs airflow away from the worker


Ensures operators are trained to properly operatethe waste handling equipment during normaloperations and to properly respond to off-normaloperations.

U Low III

UG3-8Waste

ContainersEjected During

Transport toUG

U High (SSC) - Waste hoist brakes

(SSC) - Fence at the waste shaft collar

(AC) - Waste hoist brake performance


Prevents uncontrolled movement of the wastehoist

Prevents waste containers from falling down thewaste shaft.

Ensures brakes operate properly prior totransporting waste


U Low III

UG3-9Waste shaftconveyance

falls to bottomof the shaft

resulting in abreach of

wastecontainers

U High (SSC) - Waste hoist structure and structural supportincluding the waste hoist head frame, waste shaftconveyance, counterweight, waste hoist drum, redundant ropes and brakes






Prevented NA NA UG1-8 could be an initiatorfor this event.



Event

Unmitigated


Mitigated


RiskBin

3-200 August 2007|

UG3-10Compressed

gas bottlebecomes amissile that


A Moderate (AC) - No compressed gas cylinders shall be stored atthe bottom of the waste shaft, in the disposal path, orin the active disposal room. (except for fire|extinguishers, SCSRs, and trauma kit O2 bottles) |


Minimizes the potential for improper handling orstorage of compressed gas bottles


U Low III

UG5-1Criticality

EU High (AC) - Criticality Safety Program Protects assumptions for NCSE that showscriticality in underground not credible


UG6-1Loss of AC

power resultsin drop of

wastecontainers

A High Design Features: Waste hoist brakes designed to hold load on loss ofpower

Prevents an uncontrolled drop of wastecontainers

Prevented NA NA

UG6-2Waste dropped

down shaftwhile waste isin transit to theundergroundand damages

wastecontainers

U High Design Features: - Waste conveyance loading car - Fence around waste shaft collar - Waste hoist headframe

(AC) - Toplander approves entry of loads onto thewaste shaft conveyance through control of the gate atthe waste shaft collar

(AC) - Waste moved on facility pallets only

(AC) - Waste handling restriction requires that theconveyance be at the waste shaft collar before waste ismoved into the area at the top of the waste shaft.

Prevents waste pallet from inadvertently enteringwaste shaftDefined restricted area around waste shaft andprevents uncontrolled access to the shaftFacility pallet on forklift will not fit past wasteshaft cage supports

Prevents a load from inadvertently entering wasteshaft

Prevents moving an individual seven-pack orSWB to the waste shaft

Prevents a load from inadvertently entering thewaste shaft

Prevented NA NA



Event

Unmitigated


Mitigated


RiskBin

3-201 November 2006

UG7-3Earthquake

impacts wastecontainers onwaste shaft

conveyance orat the bottomof the wasteshaft on a

loadedtransporter

U High Design Features:WHB including waste hoist tower are designed towithstand the DBE

Waste hoist brakes hold the load on a DBE or loss ofpower

(SSC) - Waste hoist structure and structural supportincluding the waste hoist head frame, waste shaftconveyance, counterweight, waste hoist drum, redundant ropes and brakes



Prevents collapse of the waste hoist tower




Prevented NA NA

UG7-4Lightningstrikes thewaste hoisthead frame

during wastetransit and

damages waste

A High Design Features:Lightning protection system on waste hoist tower andgrounding

Prevents damage to waste hoist and structurefrom lightning strikes and impact to waste

Prevented NA NA

UG7-5Tornado

damages wastehoist towerand impacts

wastecontainers onwaste shaftconveyance

EU High Design Features: Waste shaft conveyance is designed with the materialdeck below the man deck.

WHB including tornado dampers is designed towithstand the DBT

Waste is protected by man deck

Prevents damage to waste from tornados

Prevented NA NA



Event

Unmitigated


Mitigated


RiskBin

3-202 November 2006

UG7-6High winds

damage wastehoist towerand impacts

wastecontainers on

the waste shaftconveyance

U High Design Features: Waste shaft conveyance is designed with the materialdeck below the man deck.

WHB including tornado dampers is designed towithstand the DBT

Waste is protected by man deck

Prevents damage to waste from tornados

Prevented NA NA

BG6-1Aircraft Crash

EU High None NA NA NA NA See Section 3.4.2.9 - aircraftcrash is not credible

BG7-1Earthquake

impactsfacility, resultsin damage to

wastecontainers and

breach

U High Design features:WHB designed to withstand the DBE. The lateralforce resisting members of the TMF and SupportBuilding are designed to withstand the DBE to preventthem from collapsing on the WHB

Waste hoist and TRUDOCK cranes are designed tohold their load during the DBE or on loss of power


Prevents collapse of the WHB and impact towaste containers

Prevents dropping waste containers


Prevented NA NA


4-i November 2006

SAFETY STRUCTURES, SYSTEMS, and COMPONENTS

TABLE OF CONTENTS

SECTION PAGE NO.

4.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4-1

4.2 Requirements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4-1

4.3 Safety Class Systems, Structures, and Components . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4-14.3.1 Waste Hoist Structure and Structural Support . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4-1

4.3.1.1 Safety Function . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4-14.3.1.2 System Description . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4-24.3.1.3 Functional Requirements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4-24.3.1.4 System Evaluation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4-24.3.1.5 Controls (TSRs) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4-2

4.3.2 Waste Handling Building . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4-34.3.2.1 Safety Function . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4-34.3.2.2 System Description . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4-34.3.2.3 Functional Requirements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4-34.3.2.4 System Evaluation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4-34.3.2.5 Controls (TSRs) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4-3

4.3.3 Waste Shaft Conveyance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4-44.3.3.1 Safety Function . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4-44.3.3.2 System Description . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4-44.3.3.3 Functional Requirements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4-44.3.3.4 System Evaluation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4-44.3.3.5 Technical Safety Requirements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4-4

4.3.4 Underground CH Waste Handling Equipment Automatic/Manual Fire Suppression System. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4-4

4.3.4.1 Safety Function . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4-44.3.4.2 System Description . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4-44.3.4.3 Functional Requirements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4-54.3.4.4 System Evaluation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4-54.3.4.5 Technical Safety Requirements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4-5

4.3.5 CH Waste Handling 13-Ton Electric Forklifts . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4-54.3.5.1 Safety Function . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4-54.3.5.2 System Description . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4-54.3.5.3 Functional Requirements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4-64.3.5.4 System Evaluation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4-64.3.5.5 Technical Safety Requirements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4-6

4.4 Safety-Significant Structures, Systems, and Components . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4-74.4.1 Water Distribution, Fire Water Supply and Distribution, and Fire Suppression Systems

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4-74.4.1.1 Safety Function . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4-74.4.1.2 System Description . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4-74.4.1.3 Functional Requirements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4-84.4.1.4 System Evaluation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4-84.4.1.5 Technical Safety Requirements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4-8


4-ii November 2006

4.4.2 Waste Handling Building . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4-84.4.2.1 Safety Function . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4-84.4.2.2 System Description . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4-84.4.2.3 Functional Requirements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4-94.4.2.4 System Evaluation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4-94.4.2.5 Controls (TSRs) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4-9

4.4.3 Waste Hoist Brakes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4-94.4.3.1 Safety Function . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4-94.4.3.2 System Description . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4-104.4.3.3 Functional Requirements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4-104.4.3.4 System Evaluation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4-104.4.3.5 Controls (TSRs) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4-10

4.4.4 Property Protection Area . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4-114.4.4.1 Safety Function . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4-114.4.4.2 System Description . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4-114.4.4.3 Functional Requirements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4-114.4.4.4 System Evaluation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4-114.4.4.5 Controls (TSRs) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4-11

4.4.5 Bulkheads, Overcasts, and Airlocks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4-114.4.5.1 Safety Function . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4-114.4.5.2 System Description . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4-114.4.5.3 Functional Requirements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4-114.4.5.4 System Evaluation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4-124.4.5.5 Controls (TSRs) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4-12

4.4.6 Six-Ton TRUDOCK Cranes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4-124.4.6.1 Safety Function . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4-124.4.6.2 System Description . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4-124.4.6.3 Functional Requirements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4-124.4.6.4 System Evaluation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4-124.4.6.5 Controls (TSRs) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4-12

4.4.7 Fence Around Waste Shaft Collar . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4-134.4.7.1 Safety Function . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4-134.4.7.2 System Description . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4-134.4.7.3 Functional Requirements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4-134.4.7.4 System Evaluation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4-134.4.7.5 Controls (TSRs) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4-13

4.4.8 Conveyance Loading Car . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4-134.4.8.1 Safety Function . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4-134.4.8.2 System Description . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4-134.4.8.3 Functional Requirements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4-134.4.8.4 System Evaluation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4-134.4.8.5 Technical Safety Requirements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4-14

4.4.9 Facility Pallet . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4-144.4.9.1 Safety Function . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4-144.4.9.2 System Description . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4-144.4.9.3 Functional Requirements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4-144.4.9.4 System Evaluation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4-144.4.9.5 Technical Safety Requirements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4-14

4.4.10 Waste Hoist Head Frame . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4-154.4.10.1 Safety Function . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4-154.4.10.2 System Description . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4-15


4-iii November 2006

4.4.10.3 Functional Requirements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4-154.4.10.4 System Evaluation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4-154.4.10.5 Technical Safety Requirements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4-15

4.4.11 Underground Ventilation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4-154.4.11.1 Safety Function . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4-154.4.11.2 System Description . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4-154.4.11.3 Functional Requirements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4-164.4.11.4 System Evaluation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4-164.4.11.5 Technical Safety Requirements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4-17

4.4.12 Lift Fixtures and Space Frame Pallet Assemblies . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4-174.4.12.1 Safety Function . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4-174.4.12.2 System Description . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4-174.4.12.3 Functional Requirements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4-174.4.12.4 System Evaluation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4-174.4.12.5 Technical Safety Requirements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4-18

4.4.13 Panel Closure/Substantial and Isolation Barrier . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4-184.4.13.1 Safety Function . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4-184.4.13.2 System Description . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4-184.4.13.3 Functional Requirements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4-184.4.13.4 System Evaluation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4-184.4.13.5 Technical Safety Requirements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4-20

4.5 Specific Administrative Controls . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4-204.5.1 Criticality Safety Program . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4-20

4.5.1.1 Safety Function . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4-204.5.1.2 SAC Description . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4-204.5.1.3 Functional Requirements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4-214.5.1.4 SAC Evaluation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4-224.5.1.5 Technical Safety Requirements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4-23

4.5.2 Waste Characteristics Control . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4-234.5.2.1 Safety Function . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4-234.5.2.2 SAC Description . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4-234.5.2.3 Functional Requirements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4-244.5.2.4 SAC Evaluation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4-244.5.2.5 Technical Safety Requirements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4-25

4.5.3 Combustible Loading Control Program - Waste Handling Building . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4-254.5.3.1 Safety Function . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4-254.5.3.2 SAC Description . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4-254.5.3.3 Functional Requirements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4-254.5.3.4 SAC Evaluation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4-264.5.3.5 Technical Safety Requirements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4-26

4.5.4 Waste Handling Restrictions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4-274.5.4.1 Safety Function . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4-274.5.4.2 SAC Description . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4-274.5.4.3 Functional Requirements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4-274.5.4.4 SAC Evaluation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4-284.5.4.5 Technical Safety Requirements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4-29

4.5.5 Combustible Loading Control Program - Disposal Path . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4-294.5.5.1 Safety Function . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4-294.5.5.2 SAC Description . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4-294.5.5.3 Functional Requirements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4-29


4-iv November 2006

4.5.5.4 SAC Evaluation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4-304.5.5.5 Technical Safety Requirements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4-31

4.5.6 Combustible Loading Control Program - Active Disposal Room . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4-314.5.6.1 Safety Function . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4-314.5.6.2 SAC Description . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4-314.5.6.3 Functional Requirements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4-314.5.6.4 SAC Evaluation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4-324.5.6.5 Technical Safety Requirements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4-32

4.5.7 Ground Control Program . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4-324.5.7.1 Safety Function . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4-324.5.7.2 SAC Description . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4-324.5.7.3 Functional Requirements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4-334.5.7.4 SAC Evaluation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4-334.5.7.5 Technical Safety Requirements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4-34

4.5.8 Waste Hoist Brake Performance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4-344.5.8.1 Safety Function . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4-344.5.8.2 SAC Description . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4-344.5.8.3 Functional Requirements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4-344.5.8.4 SAC Evaluation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4-354.5.8.5 Technical Safety Requirements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4-35

4.5.9 Nonflammable Compressed Gas Cylinder Control . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4-354.5.9.1 Safety Function . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4-354.5.9.2 SAC Description . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4-354.5.9.3 Functional Requirements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4-364.5.9.4 SAC Evaluation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4-364.5.9.5 Technical Safety Requirements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4-36

4.5.10 Qualified Operators . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4-364.5.10.1 Safety Function . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4-364.5.10.2 SAC Description . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4-364.5.10.3 Functional Requirements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4-374.5.10.4 SAC Evaluation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4-374.5.10.5 Technical Safety Requirements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4-38

4.5.11 Toplander Control . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4-394.5.11.1 Safety Function . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4-394.5.11.2 SAC Description . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4-394.5.11.3 Functional Requirements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4-394.5.11.4 SAC Evaluation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4-404.5.11.5 Technical Safety Requirements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4-40



4-v November 2006


LIST OF TABLES

TABLE PAGE NO.

Table 4.3-1 Safety Class SSCs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4-43Table 4.4-1 Safety Significant SSCs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4-45Table 4.5-1 Specific Administrative Controls . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4-49


4-vi November 2006



4-1 November 2006


4.1 Introduction

This chapter provides details on those structures, systems, and components (SSCs) that are designated assafety class (SC) or safety significant (SS) for the WIPP CH waste handling process. The purpose ofselecting SC and SS SSCs is to provide protection to the public and workers by identifying those SSCsthat are most important to preventing or mitigating postulated events. The selection of SC and SS SSCsis made based on the preventive and mitigative features identified in the hazard and accident analysis in Chapter 3 of this DSA. SC SSCs are discussed in Section 4.3 and listed on Table 4.3-1; SS SSCs arediscussed in Section 4.4 and listed on Table 4.4-1. Those specific administrative controls that provide asafety function equivalent to a SC or SS SSC are discussed in Section 4.5 and listed on Table 4.5-1. Thescope of this chapter includes the following:

• Description of the SC and SS SSCs and SACs for WIPP including the required safety functions

• Identification of the functional requirements necessary for the safety SSCs and SAC to perform theirsafety functions and the general conditions caused by postulated accidents under which the safetySSCs or SAC must operate

• Identification of the performance criteria necessary to provide reasonable assurance that thefunctional requirements will be met

• Identification of initial conditions that are SSCs and require TSR coverage

4.2 Requirements

This chapter was prepared in accordance with the format, content, and graded approach guidelines foridentifying safety SSCs in accordance with Title 10 CFR Part 830, Subpart B, "Safety BasisRequirements"1; DOE-STD-3009-94, Preparation Guide for U.S. Department of Energy NonreactorNuclear Facility Documented Safety Analysis2; and DOE G 421.1-2, Implementation Guide for Use inDeveloping Documented Safety Analyses to Meet Subpart B of 10 CFR 830 3; and DOE-STD-1186-2004,Specific Administrative Controls.

4.3 Safety Class Systems, Structures, and Components

Safety Class SSCs are those SSCs whose preventive and/or mitigative function is necessary to keepradiological exposure to the public from challenging the off-site evaluation guideline. The guidelinespecifies a value of 25 rem total effective dose equivalent to a maximally exposed member of the publicbe used as the threshold for identifying SC SSCs and, as explained in Section 3.4.1.5, greater than 15 remhas been used as the unmitigated consequence level which is considered to challenge the off-siteevaluation guideline. The waste handling building (WHB) and waste hoist structure and structuralsupport are designated SC. The underground diesel powered CH waste handling equipmentautomatic/manual fire suppression system is also designated as SC. The SC SSCs are summarized inTable 4.3-1.

4.3.1 Waste Hoist Structure and Structural Support

4.3.1.1 Safety Function

The design and construction of the waste hoist structure and structural support ensures that the wasteshaft conveyance will not fall into the waste shaft in an uncontrolled manner during normal operations ora design basis earthquake.


4-2 November 2006

4.3.1.2 System Description

These features are described in Section 2.4.4 and consist of the waste hoist head frame, waste shaftconveyance, counterweight, ropes, waste hoist drum, and structural support provided by the waste hoisttower.

4.3.1.3 Functional Requirements

The waste hoist load bearing components are designed with sufficient safety factor to ensure that thehoist load bearing components will not fail under maximum loading conditions coincident with designbasis natural events. The structural support to the waste hoist load bearing components is also designedwith sufficient safety factor to support the waste hoist load bearing components under maximum loadingcondition.

4.3.1.4 System Evaluation

The Underground Hoisting SDD (UH00),5 discusses the design and functional requirement for the wastehoist.

The hoist head frame structure, the conveyance, the conveyance ropes, and counterweight are designed towithstand the loads associated with normal operations, emergency conditions, and the design basisnatural events. The ropes have at least a 5.9 factor of safety against maximum design payload and aminimum endurance of 400,000 cycles.

The conveyance was designed for the vertical load combination of dead load, maximum payload, andforces transmitted from the hoisting ropes and tail ropes during normal operation. The allowable stressfor all the steel members and connections are limited to 25 percent of American Institute for SteelConstruction-allowable stresses to allow for accelerations, decelerations, impact loading and fatigue.

The ropes are designed to remain intact in the event that the brakes fail. The counterweight, which isalso attached to the ropes propels the conveyance into the overtravel arresters in the hoist head frame.

The counterweight is sized to minimize the torque required to control the system across the range ofpayloads the conveyance will carry. When carrying CH waste, the conveyance is lighter than thecounterweight to ensure that in case of power and brake failure, the conveyance will tend to rise in thewaste shaft when loaded with the maximum allowed CH load.

The waste hoist was load tested to its design load after initial installation. Subsequently, weeklyinspections on the ropes and attachments, periodic electromagnetic testing of the ropes to detect ropedegradation, and the static brake test ensure the continued integrity of the waste hoist system. Periodicwaste shaft conveyance inspections are performed to monitor any degradation for structural integrity.

4.3.1.5 Controls (TSRs)

Programmatic controls include configuration management and the Unreviewed Safety Question (USQ)process for any design change. In addition, a waste hoist structure and structural integrity supportprogram shall be established that determines the periodic inspections, tests, and/or maintenance activitiesand periodicity for those activities that are needed to maintain the integrity of the load bearingcomponents associated with the waste hoist.


4-3 November 2006



The design and construction of the WHB and lateral force resisting members of the TMF and SupportBuilding prevents those structures from structural failure during the design basis earthquake (DBE) thatcould result in a breach of waste containers. The roof of the WHB is designed and constructed towithstand the design basis snow/ice loading to prevent the building from collapsing and breaching wastecontainers. The noncombustible construction of the WHB prevents fire propagation into and within thebuilding.


The WHB is described in Sections 2.4.1 and 2.6.1. The design of the WHB is documented in the SDDCF00-GC00, WIPP Plant Buildings, Facilities, and Miscellaneous Equipment.6


The WHB is required to withstand the DBE postulated for the WIPP of 0.1 g peak acceleration with a1,000-year return interval such that the building structure does not collapse in a DBE and damage wastecontainers. The main lateral force resisting structural members of the TMF and Support Building aredesigned to withstand the DBE to prevent those structures from collapsing on the adjacent WHB. Theroof of the WHB is designed to withstand a 27 lb/per square foot (ft2) snow load. The WHB is requiredto meet NFPA 220, Standard on Types of Building Construction,7 Type II construction such that firesoutside the building or within the building do not propagate and damage waste containers outside ofclosed shipping casks.


As stated in Chapter 2 of this DSA and the SDD CF00-GC006, the WHB is designed for the DBE of 0.1 g(acceleration of gravity) peak acceleration with a 1,000-year return interval. The roof of the WHB isdesigned to withstand a 27 lb/ft2 snow load. The 100-year recurrence maximum snow pack for the WIPPregion is 10 lb/ft2.

The west wall of the CH bay in the WHB is shared with the TMF. The Support Building is locatedimmediately to the north of the CH portion of the WHB. The main lateral force resisting structuralmembers of the TMF and Support Building are designed to withstand the DBE to prevent those structuresfrom collapsing on the adjacent WHB. The TMF is also designed for a snow load of 27 lb/ft2.

The noncombustible construction of the WHB prevents fires from propagating within the building. Thecombustible loading control program for the WHB supplements the non-combustible construction of theWHB such that there is no continuity of combustible material against the external wall of the building orinternal to the building to support fire propagation. The drawings and specifications associated with theWHB, Support Building, and TMF specify the building materials that are consistent with the designrequirements.


These components are passive design features. The TSR controls require the configuration and changecontrol processes that invoke the USQ process for a review of all structural design changes to the WHB,the TMF, and the Support Building.


4-4 November 2006

4.3.3 Waste Shaft Conveyance


The waste shaft conveyance is designed and constructed such that only one facility pallet can betransported at a time and that the material deck is below the man deck such that waste is protected fromfalling objects and tornado missiles.


The waste shaft conveyance is described in Section 2.4.4.2.


Ensure by passive design that the waste shaft conveyance carries only one facility pallet.


The waste shaft conveyance is designed such that it interfaces with the conveyance loading car whichtransfers the facility pallet with waste to chairs on the conveyance. The waste shaft conveyance onlyaccommodates one facility pallet.

4.3.3.5 Technical Safety Requirements

This structure is a passive design feature that is already designated SC in Section 4.3.1. The TSRcontrols require the configuration and change control processes that invoke the USQ process for a reviewof any design changes to the waste shaft conveyance.

4.3.4 Underground CH Waste Handling Equipment Automatic/Manual Fire SuppressionSystem


The automatic/manual fire suppression system on each piece of underground diesel powered CH wastehandling extinguishes vehicle fires associated with fuel or hydraulic line leaks or the vehicle engine suchthat those fires do not breach waste containers.


The underground CH waste handling equipment automatic/manual fire suppression system provides a drychemical fire suppressant available to extinguish vehicle fires associated with fuel line leaks and thevehicle engine. A general description of the systems is described in Section 2.5.3.3 and 2.7.3.4. Thesystem is comprised of electric powered detection capability, and a compressed nitrogen gas cartridgethat, when actuated, fluidizes the fire suppressant powder and forces the powder to the distributionnetwork. The system is equipped with a control module that includes system status lights to indicatenormal and trouble conditions, and a provision to test the status lights.

The system automatically actuates when the detection circuit shorts due to heat generated by fire causingcurrent to a squib. The squib is an electrically actuated component containing a small charge of powderwhich forces a pin to puncture the cap/seal on the compressed nitrogen gas cartridge. The gas is directedvia tubing to the fire suppressant container where the suppressant is fluidized and dispersed into the


4-5 November 2006

distribution piping. The system also has a manual capability that bypasses the squib such that the manualactuator forces the pin to break the cap/seal on the compressed gas nitrogen cartridge.

The control module includes status lights that indicate that the system is not discharged and that thedetection circuit is functioning properly. The control module is mounted such that the operator of thewaste handling equipment can see the system status indication.


The underground diesel powered CH waste handling equipment must be equipped with a fire suppressionsystem that automatically actuates and provides fire suppression sufficient to prevent a fire associatedwith the fuel line leaks and the engine from developing into a large fire.


The underground waste handling equipment automatic/manual fire suppression system is designed,installed, tested, and maintained according to the National Fire Protection Association (NFPA) StandardsNFPA 17, Standard for Dry Chemical Extinguishing Systems.8 The guidance provided in DOE G 420.1-1, Nonreactor Nuclear Safety Design Criteria and Explosives Safety Criteria Guide for use with DOE O420.1, Facility Safety,9 does not specify requirements for dry chemical extinguishing systems. Theinstalled system on each piece of diesel powered waste handling equipment meets the requirements for mobile equipment described in NFPA 17.


The TSRs will contain limiting conditions of operation with respect to underground CH waste handlingequipment automatic/manual fire suppression availability to prevent damage to waste containers in theunderground disposal path or active disposal room. Periodic surveillance will be performed to ensuresystem operability.

Should the underground CH waste handling equipment automatic/manual fire suppression becomeunavailable for the vehicle selected for use, the TSRs define the necessary actions to reduce the risk offires with the potential to breach waste containers in the underground.

4.3.5 CH Waste Handling 13-Ton Electric Forklifts


The design and robust construction of the CH waste handling 13-ton electric forklifts used in the WHB issuch that a fire associated with the forklift will not become large enough to damage CH waste containersin the WHB.


The CH waste handling 13-ton electric forklifts used in the WHB are described in Chapter 2 of this DSA. The forklifts are designed and constructed such that the combustible materials including electricalcomponents, batteries, and hydraulic reservoir and lines, are segregated from each other by metal barrierssufficient to prevent fire that may originate on the forklift from propagating to other parts of the forklift.

The external structure of the forklift is constructed with 1.5 in. thick metal walls which protect thehydraulics, motor, motor controls, and the batteries from damage due to collision that could initiate a fire


4-6 November 2006

involving the combustible material. Similarly, the internal design of the CH waste handling 13-tonelectric forklifts provide 0.5 in. thick metal partitions that separate the batteries from the motor, motorcontrols, hydraulics, seat cushions, and solid rubber tires. The hydraulic cylinders that allow the forkliftto pick up a load are mounted behind the forklift carriage such that the cylinders are not damaged duringuse. The peak operating temperature of the electrical components associated with the 13-ton forkliftshave a peak operating temperature that does not exceed 150 degrees F. The hydraulic fluid used in thewaste handling electric forklifts has a flashpoint greater than 400 degrees F.11


The CH waste handling 13-ton electric forklifts shall be designed and constructed such that the hydraulicfluid is segregated from potential ignition sources. The batteries, motor, and motor contactors areseparated from each other and from the hydraulic reservoir by thick metal partitions. The body of theforklift has thick metal walls that protect the electrical and hydraulic components from damage due tocollisions.


The construction and operating parameters of the CH waste handling 13-ton electric forklifts wereevaluated in ECO 11676.11 The electric forklift fire evaluated in the fire hazards analysis did not creditthe segregation of combustible materials on the forklift such that the most credible fire would besignificantly less than the 9.5 megawatt fire postulated.

The batteries and the hydraulic reservoir are the largest combustible loads on the forklift, which aresegregated from each other by thick metal walls. The batteries are located in a metal compartmentbehind the cab above the hydraulic reservoir such that a fire associated with the batteries will belocalized and will not effect on the hydraulic portion of the forklift. Similarly, the motor contactors arelocated in the cab next to the driver which is surrounded by a metal cover. An electrical malfunctionassociated with the contactors will not affect the hydraulic portion of the forklift, the motor or thebatteries. The motor is located below the cab and the battery compartment, which is segregated fromboth by thick metal plates. An electrical malfunction of the motor resulting in a fire will remain localizedand have no effect on the batteries or the contactors. A portion of the hydraulic system runs through thesame compartment as a resistor associated with the motor, however, the peak motor and resistoroperating temperatures are less than 150 degrees F and the flashpoint of the hydraulic fluid greater than400 degrees F. A hydraulic leak will not result in a fire.

The thick metal external walls of the forklift protect the batteries, motor, motor contactors, and hydraulicreservoir from damage due to collision. Further, the forklifts have a maximum speed of eight miles perhour and typically are driven much slower in the CH bay due to the limited space available to operate. Based on engineering judgement, a collision would not sufficiently damage the 1.5 in. thick constructionto initiate a fire in the CH waste handling 13-ton electric forklift.

Based on the forklift design, construction and operating characteristics, a forklift collision will not resultin a fire and will not likely result in a hydraulic leak. A hydraulic leak on the forklift will not result in afire and a fire on the forklift due to electrical malfunction will not result in a fire large enough to damageCH waste containers.


The CH waste handling 13-ton electric forklift design and construction are passive design features. The


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TSR controls require the configuration and change control processes that invoke the USQ process for aphysical change to the CH waste handling 13-ton electric forklifts.

4.4 Safety-Significant Structures, Systems, and Components

The SS SSCs are those SSCs that are not designated as SC but whose preventive or mitigative functionins a major contributor to worker safety as determined from the hazards analysis. The SS SSCs arespecified in Chapter 3 in Tables A-13 and A-14, and discussed in the following sections. The SS SSCsare summarized in Table 4.4-1, including the safety functions, accident events from Chapter 3 uponwhich the SS designation is based, functional requirements, and performance criteria judged to requireTSR coverage.

4.4.1 Water Distribution, Fire Water Supply and Distribution, and Fire Suppression Systems


The safety function of the water distribution, fire water supply and distribution, and fire suppressionsystems in the WHB and Support Building is to prevent small fires from becoming large fires and toreduce the likelihood that a fire in the Support Building or TMF will propagate to the WHB.


The portions of the Water Distribution System, Fire Water Supply and Distribution System, and FireSuppression System addressed here are those associated with the WHB (including the waste hoist tower),the TMF, and the Support Building.

A general description of the fire water supply and distribution system is contained in Section 2.7.3. TheSS portion of the water distribution system includes a 180,000-gallon water storage tank dedicated tosupplying fire water. The SS portion of the fire water supply and distribution system includes oneelectric and one diesel fire pump each rated for 1,500 gallons per minute at greater than 105 psi, a jockeypump to maintain system pressure, and a yard distribution system. The SS portion of the system alsoincludes the supply risers and valving up to the flange after the piping enters the WHB and the SupportBuilding. The WHB is supplied by three risers, one in the Overpack and Repair Room (ORR), one in theRemote Handled portion of the WHB and one in the CH bay. The TMF receives its fire water supplyfrom the CH bay riser. The waste hoist tower and a portion of the CH bay receives fire water from theriser in the ORR.

The SS portion of the fire suppression system inside the WHB and the Support Building includes themain drain, instrumentation, an alarm valve, a water flow detection device, a water motor gong, anisolation valve, a fire department connection, distribution piping with installed fusible sprinklers,valving, and an inspectors test connection. The TMF, supplied from the suppression system in theWHB, is equipped with distribution piping with installed fusible sprinklers, valving, a flow switch, aninspectors test connection, and an isolation valve and associated drain. The suppression system includespressure relief valves to protect the piping from high pressures due to pressure surges and thermalexpansion of the trapped water.

Sprinkler systems are maintained full of water and pressurized by the fire water supply and distributionsystem. When a fire occurs, the heat produced will cause one or more sprinklers in the area to actuatecausing water to flow. The sprinkler system will continue to flow until it is shut off manually.


4-8 November 2006


The fire water supply and distribution system and fire suppression system within the TMF, WHB, andSupport Building must automatically actuate and provide fire suppression sufficient to keep any fire fromdeveloping into a large fire. The fire suppression system and the fire water supply and distributionsystem are not designed to withstand the effects of a DBE or design basis tornado (DBT).


The fire water supply and distribution system is designed, installed, tested, and maintained according tothe National Fire Protection Association Standards NFPA 20, Standard for the Installation of CentrifugalFire Pumps20; NFPA 24, Standard for the Installation of Private Fire Service Mains and TheirAppurtenances21; and NFPA 25, Standard for the Inspection, Testing, and Maintenance of Water-BasedFire Protection Systems.22 The automatic wet pipe sprinkler systems are designed, installed, tested, andmaintained in accordance with NFPA 13, Standard for the Installation of Sprinkler Systems23 andNFPA 25.22

The fire suppression system is capable of performing its safety function in the absence of electric powerdue to the heat-rated fusible-link actuation of the sprinkler heads in the facilities and the diesel drivenpump that is part of the Fire Water Supply and Distribution System. The characteristics of this systemare documented in the Fire Protection System (FP00) SDD.24


The TSRs will contain limiting conditions of operation with respect to fire water supply, distribution andfire suppression availability to prevent/mitigate damage to waste containers stored in the WHB, or intransit to or on the waste hoist, from fires originating in either the WHB, the TMF, or the SupportBuilding. Periodic surveillance and maintenance in accordance with NFPA 2522 will be performed toensure system reliability, including pressure checks, flow testing, water supply level, interlock testing,control of valve lineups, diesel fuel quantity, and verification of automatic functions.

Should the fire water supply and distribution system or the fire suppression system in the WHB, TMF, orSupport Building become unavailable, the TSRs will define the necessary actions to provide a reducedrisk of fires with the potential to breach waste containers in the WHB.



The design and construction of the WHB and lateral force resisting members of the TMF and SupportBuilding prevents those structures from structural failure during the design basis tornado (DBT) and highwinds that could result in a breach of waste containers. The WHB is not credited to withstandwind/tornado-driven missiles. The WHB includes a lightning protection system to dissipate lightningsuch that waste containers inside the building are protected from a lightning strike that could result in awaste container breach.


The WHB and its lightning protection and grounding system is described in Chapter 2 of this DSA.


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The WHB, including the waste hoist tower, is designed to withstand (1) a design basis tornado (DBT)with a 183-mile-per-hour (mph) wind speed at a 1,000,000-year return frequency, (2) straight winds witha wind speed of 110 mph with a 1,000-year return frequency. The WHB, including the waste hoisttower, is designed to withstand a translational velocity of 41 miles per hour, a maximum rotationalvelocity radius of 325 ft, a pressure drop of 0.5 pounds per square inch (lb/in.2) and a pressure drop rateof 0.09 lb/in.2/s. The WHB is not designed to withstand wind or tornado driven missiles. The WHB isnot designed to withstand penetration by wind driven missiles.

The main lateral force resisting members of the Support Building and the TRUPACT MaintenanceFacility are designed to withstand the DBT.

The WHB is grounded and has a lightning protection system.


The WHB, including the waste hoist tower, is primarily constructed of metal. Not only is the WHBconnected to the plant ground system, but the WHB is equipped with lightning protection provided by alightning dissipation system also connected to the plant ground. A conical array is installed over thewaste hoist tower. Roof arrays are located along the outer rim of the WHB. The arrays associated withthe WHB and waste hoist tower not only protect personnel but protect the waste containers from damagedue to a lightning strike.

The WHB is designed to withstand the DBT with 183 miles per hour winds and a translational velocityof 41 miles per hour, a maximum rotational velocity radius of 325 ft, a pressure drop of 0.5 pounds persquare inch (lb/in.2) and a pressure drop rate of 0.09 lb/in.2/s. The WHB is not designed for wind-borneor DBT driven missiles. The west wall of the CH bay in the WHB is shared with the TMF. The TMF isdesigned to withstand the DBT. The main lateral force resisting structural members of the SupportBuilding are designed to withstand the DBT to prevent the Support Building from collapsing on theadjacent WHB.

The design of the WHB is documented in the SDD CF00-GC00, WIPP Plant Buildings, Facilities, andMiscellaneous Equipment.6


The structures and structural members identified in Section 4.4.2.4 above are passive design features. The TSR controls require the configuration and change control process that invokes the USQ process fora review of any changes to building grounding or the lightning dissipation system and WHB structuraldesign.

4.4.3 Waste Hoist Brakes


The waste hoist brakes are designed and constructed to prevent the uncontrolled movement of the wasteshaft conveyance upon loss of power or loss of hydraulic pressure.


4-10 November 2006


The waste hoist brakes are described in Chapter 2 of this DSA and in SDD UH005. There are two sets ofbrakes mounted approximately 180 degrees apart on each braking flange of the hoist wheel. The brakecalipers are mounted to provide a braking surface on both sides of the friction wheel brake discs. Thebrake material is held against the wheel disc by a series of cupped washer springs. The brakes arenormally engaged except when the conveyance is in motion. The brakes are released by applyinghydraulic pressure to a piston that compresses the springs which in turn moves the brake pads away fromthe brake disc. The brake pads return to the "set" position when the hydraulic pressure is released fromthe piston. The springs set the brakes.


The waste hoist brakes shall stop movement of the waste shaft conveyance upon loss of power or loss ofhydraulic pressure under all hoist operations including maximum speed and maximum load at anylocation along the shaft. The waste hoist brakes shall stop the fully loaded waste shaft conveyance underall emergency stop conditions. The brakes shall be designed and constructed with sufficient redundancysuch that one set of brakes may fail and the remaining brakes are capable of stopping the waste shaftconveyance when the conveyance carries the maximum payload at the maximum hoisting depth.


The waste hoist brake system must be energized to release both independent sets of brakes. During lossof power, the brakes fail safe to the engaged position. Either set of brakes is capable of holding the fullyloaded waste shaft conveyance.

A series of tests are performed on the waste hoist brakes at the beginning of each shift before the hoist isput into service. The emergency stop test verifies that the hoist motor shuts down and the brakes remainset. A static brake test ensures that the brakes are fully engaged by increasing amps on the hoist drivemotor and verifying that the drum does not move. The brake dump valves test is also performed to ensureoperation of the normal emergency braking system. Testing is accomplished with the hoist initially resetand stopped. The pushbutton is depressed and held, and hoist movement is attempted. If the system isoperating properly, the brakes will set soon after the brake fluid pressure rises above 1,200 psi duringbrake release. The motor torque will then operate against the brakes, similar to the action of a staticbrake test. When the brake dump valves test pushbutton is released after a successful test, the hoist willtrip off-line.

The emergency brake valves test pushbutton is used to perform a static test of the operation of theemergency brake solenoid valves. This test is similar to the static brake test.


The TSRs will require an AC to perform preoperational checks on the waste hoist brakes at the beginningof each shift, prior to placing the waste hoist in service.


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4.4.4 Property Protection Area


The Property Protection Area (PPA) at the WIPP maintains a physical separation between the WHB andthe indigenous low profile vegetation surrounding the site to prevent wildland fires from propagating tothe WHB.


The PPA, described in Chapter 2 of this DSA, is surrounded by fencing to prevent public intrusion toareas where the majority of WIPP operations take place. The PPA is paved and graveled to separatestructures within the PPA from the indigenous low profile vegetation surrounding the site, whichminimizes the likelihood of a wildfire spreading to the WHB.


The PPA shall provide a separation (firebreak) between the vegetation outside the PPA and the WHBinside the PPA. The PPA shall be free of vegetation sufficient to prevent a wildland fire or fire externalto the PPA from propagating into the PPA and affecting the WHB.


The PPA is surrounded by fencing to prevent public intrusion and inadvertent degradation ormodification of the area without WIPP authorization. The area within the PPA is either paved orgraveled. The gravel and paved surface maintains a physical separation greater than 200 ft between theWHB and the indigenous low profile vegetation surrounding WIPP, which prevents a wildland fire fromspreading to the WHB.


This design feature is passive. The TSR controls require the configuration and change control processesthat invoke the USQ process for a review of design changes that affect the PPA.

4.4.5 Bulkheads, Overcasts, and Airlocks


Bulkheads, overcasts, and airlocks provide separation between the construction ventilation circuit,disposal circuit, and waste shaft station, and prevent the effects to CH waste from fires outside thedisposal path in the underground.


The bulkheads, overcasts, and airlocks are described in the Section Chapter 2 of this DSA. They are usedto direct airflow in the underground and ensure that the disposal path and active disposal roomventilation are segregated from other areas in the underground.


Bulkheads, overcasts, and airlocks shall be constructed of noncombustible material.


4-12 November 2006


The bulkheads, overcasts, and airlocks used to segregate the underground ventilation circuits are made offire resistant material and can support the maximum pressure differential that could occur under normaloperating conditions. These structures are designed, installed, and maintained in such a manner toaccommodate ground deformation due to salt creep.


These components are passive design features. The TSR controls require the configuration and changecontrol processes that invoke the USQ process for a review of design changes that affect bulkheads,overcasts, and airlocks and their locations.

4.4.6 Six-Ton TRUDOCK Cranes


The design of the six-ton TRUDOCK cranes prevents dropping waste containers or dropping items onwaste containers that could result in a breach and release of radiological material.


The six-ton TRUDOCK cranes are described in Chapter 2 of this DSA.


The six-ton TRUDOCK cranes shall be designed and constructed to hold their load during the DBE orloss of power.


The six-ton TRUDOCK cranes are designed to hold their load in the event of a DBE or loss of power. The construction of the TRUDOCK cranes is such that the bridge and trolley of each crane has amechanical interface that prevents either from becoming dislodged in the event of an earthquake. Thebrakes associated with each crane are normally set and requires electric power to overcome the springpressure and allow the brakes to be disengaged to allow crane movement. Proper operation of theTRUDOCK cranes is verified through preoperational checks prior to handling waste.


The program for Conduct of Operations ensures that waste handling equipment selected for useundergoes preoperational checks that are completed prior to using the equipment for waste handlingoperations. Preventive maintenance as part of the Maintenance Program also ensure the TRUDOCKcranes operate as designed. The configuration and change control processes invoke the USQ process forchanges to the TRUDOCK cranes.


4-13 November 2006

4.4.7 Fence Around Waste Shaft Collar


The fence around the waste shaft collar defines a restricted area around the waste shaft and preventsuncontrolled access to the shaft.


As discussed in Chapter 2 of this DSA, the collar area of the waste shaft is surrounded with fencing thatprevents unauthorized entry into the waste shaft and minimizes the chance for items falling into the shaft.


A barrier to prevent inadvertent access to the waste shaft shall be installed around the waste shaft.


Objects falling into the shaft have the potential to damage items in the shaft, the shaft itself, or items atthe bottom of the shaft. The effectiveness of the fence around the waste shaft collar is demonstratedthrough daily use of the waste hoist and weekly shaft inspections. The shaft inspections are performed toensure the integrity of the shaft and items suspended from the walls of the shaft.


The programmatic Conduct of Operations control includes daily inspections and verification of properoperation of the fence. The programmatic configuration and change control process ensures that a USQdetermination is performed for design changes to the fence around the waste shaft collar.

4.4.8 Conveyance Loading Car


The conveyance loading car design prevents a pallet of waste from inadvertently entering waste shaft.


The conveyance loading car is described in Chapter 2 of this DSA.


Design features of the conveyance loading car shall ensure that if the car loaded with waste is movedtowards the waste shaft when the conveyance is not present, the pallet containing waste will not fall intothe shaft.


The conveyance loading car platform is equipped with pintles spaced to match corresponding openings inthe bottom of the facility pallet, to prevent the pallet from sliding or moving off the conveyance loadingcar. It has a low center of gravity and low horsepower drive motors. The rear wheels are not powered.


4-14 November 2006

The car will "high center" if the front wheels are driven into the waste shaft without the conveyancepresent. Once the front wheels drop into the shaft there is no more motive force to propel the car further.


These components are passive design features. The TSR controls require the configuration and changecontrol processes that invoke the USQ process for any design changes to or that affect the conveyanceloading car.

4.4.9 Facility Pallet


The facility pallet performs the following:

• Prevents impact to waste containers from bulkhead doors.

• Is sized such that it can only fit on the waste shaft conveyance such that the long dimension of thepallet parallels the conveyance chairs that support the pallet during transfer of CH waste from theWHB to the underground.


The facility pallets are described in Chapter 2 of this DSA.


The facility pallet shall be designed and constructed to perform the following:

• Prevent damage to containers by inadvertent closure of bulkhead doors during undergroundtransport between the waste shaft and the disposal room.

• Prevent it from being loaded onto the waste shaft conveyance by any method other than theconveyance loading car such that it cannot be inadvertently dropped into the waste shaft


Figure 2.5-25 shows the general arrangement of the facility pallet. The facility pallet is designed to accommodate the waste containers as they are removed from the TRUPACT-II or HalfPACT, provide aplatform to transfer waste containers to the waste hoist conveyance with the conveyance loading car, andto provide a platform to transfer waste containers from the waste shaft conveyance to the undergroundtransporter for continued transit to the disposal room.


These components are passive design features. The TSR controls require the configuration and changecontrol processes that invoke the USQ process for a review of any design changes to the facility pallet.


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4.4.10 Waste Hoist Head Frame


The waste hoist head frame prevents loading a pallet into the waste shaft unless it is loaded using theconveyance loading car.


The waste hoist head frame is constructed of structural steel and supports the hoist operating machineryas well as the load of the conveyance, the load on the conveyance, the counterbalance weights, thehoisting ropes and the counterbalance and guide ropes. The head frame dimensions are larger than theconveyance dimensions, but are not sufficiently wide to allow a forklift loaded with a pallet of CH wasteto inadvertently approach the waste shaft with the conveyance out of place. The conveyance isspecifically designed to accommodate the conveyance loading car with a pallet of CH waste.


The waste hoist headframe shall be designed and constructed such that a facility pallet will not fit intothe waste shaft if an attempt is made to place it there using a forklift.


The opening in the waste hoist head frame is smaller than the wider dimension of the facility pallet. Theonly way the facility pallet can be carried by a forklift is with the forklift lifting it from the "long" side. The facility pallet on a forklift will not fit past the waste shaft cage supports as determined fromdrawings 41-D-011-W1, Rev. J, Waste Handling Facilities Facility Pallet Assembly and 31-U-002-014,Rev. D, Waste Shaft 312 Conveyance 31-H-003 General Arrangement.


This structure is a passive design feature that is already designated SC in Section 4.3. of this DSAchapter. The TSR controls required for this structure include configuration and change control processesthat invoke the USQ process for any changes to the waste hoist head frame.

4.4.11 Underground Ventilation


The underground ventilation system shall be designed and operated to ensure that in the event of a wastecontainer breach, airflow is directed away from workers and towards the disposal array. Undergroundventilation also ensures there is sufficient airflow to facilitate evacuation of underground workers in theevent of underground fires.


Because the disposal area at WIPP is in a mine with vertical shaft access, WIPP is required to meet30CFR56/57/58 and Part 62, Federal Mine Safety and Health Regulations for Metal/Nonmetal Mines.27 Without ventilation, waste handling operations do not start or resume until ventilation is operating.


4-16 November 2006

As discussed in Chapter 2 of this DSA, underground ventilation is divided into four separate flow pathssupporting the waste disposal area, the construction area, north area, and the waste shaft station. Thewaste disposal, construction and north areas receive their air supply from common sources, the air intakeshaft and the salt handling shaft. The waste disposal area receives its supply air from the constructionsupply air. The waste shaft station receives its air supply from the waste shaft and an associatedauxiliary air intake and is separated from the other three circuits by bulkheads and airlocks. All four aircircuits combine near the exhaust shaft, which acts as the common discharge from the underground.

Five different levels of ventilation as described in Chapter 2 of this DSA can be established to supportunderground activities. Various combinations of fans can be used to achieve the required airflow tosupport activities in the underground.

Under normal operating conditions, the ventilation system functions continuously. If the normal flow isnot available, underground operations may proceed, but the number of activities that can be performed inparallel may be limited depending on the quantity of air available. For waste handling in the undergroundto occur, a minimum of 42,000 actual cubic feet per minute (acfm) airflow is required in the active wasteemplacement room and a minimum of 12,000 acfm is needed in the waste shaft ventilation circuit.

Air is routed through the active disposal room within a panel using underground bulkheads and airregulators. Once a disposal room is filled, it is closed against entry and isolated from the mineventilation system by constructing barricades at each end. Filled rooms are not ventilated. Theventilation path for the waste disposal circuit is separated from the construction side by means ofbulkheads, overcasts, and airlocks.


The underground ventilation system shall be designed to provide sufficient airflow to direct airflow awayfrom workers during waste handling in the event of a waste container breach. Sufficient airflow mustalso be maintained to facilitate evacuation of underground workers in the event of underground fires. This required airflow is 12,000 actual cubic feet per minute (acfm) in the waste shaft ventilation circuitas measured on the waste shaft side of regulator 74-B-308 and 42,000 acfm in the active disposal room.


The underground ventilation system is designed, installed, tested, and maintained to meet30CFR56/57/58 and Part 62, Federal Mine Safety and Health Regulations for Metal/Nonmetal Mines.27 The system is typically in continuous operation. If ventilation is lost due to a power outage or equipmentmalfunction when personnel are in the underground, ventilation is quickly restored or personnel arerequired to exit the underground. If ventilation is lost during a backshift, weekend, or holiday whenpersonnel are not present, the system is placed in service and verified to be properly functioning prior toresuming normal work activities in the underground. The functional requirements stated in 4.4.11.3 areverified prior to performing CH waste handling operations in the underground. If ventilation is lostduring waste handling, the diesel powered waste handling equipment in use is secured until ventilation isestablished and the required airflows verified. The measurements are taken with portableinstrumentation. The ability of the system to supply the required airflows is verified through continuousoperation of the system and periodic test and balance of the underground ventilation system. Theoperation of the system is procedurally controlled. Adjustment of regulators in the underground toachieve desired airflows is performed by underground operations personnel who are trained in theoperation of the equipment.


4-17 November 2006


The TSRs contain limiting conditions of operation that specifies the actions that are required shouldunderground ventilation become inoperable. Periodic surveillance will be performed to ensure systemoperability.

4.4.12 Lift Fixtures and Space Frame Pallet Assemblies


Automatic center of gravity lift fixtures (ACGLFs,) four-drum pallet lifting device, SWB lift fixtureadapter, the TDOP lift fixture adapter, and space frame pallet assemblies are designed to preventdropping of waste containers when removing waste drums, SWBs, or TDOPs from shipping casks.


The ACGLF is used with a TRUDOCK 6-ton crane to lift the OCV and ICV lids, an empty ICV, or thepayload waste containers out of the TRUPACT-II. The ACGLF has a lift capacity of 10,000 lb andweighs approximately 2,500 lb.

The four-drum pallet lifting device is designed to lift four 85-gallon drums on a single pallet. Four legsconnect the lifting device to the pallet. The ACGLF interfaces at three points with lifting sockets at thetop of the lifting device. Four linkages connect the three ACGLF connector legs to the lifting devicelegs. The linkages allow the lifting device legs to be controlled by the ACGLF. Each lifting device legmay be actuated by either the linear actuator residing on the ACGLF or the handle located on eachACGLF leg turning sleeve. The four-drum pallet lifting device has a rated load of 10,000 lb. It may belifted by an ACGLF at the three attachment points or by the clevis located in the center of the device.

The SWB lift fixture adapter is designed to interface between the ACGLF and the SWB and has a ratedlifting capacity of 7,500 lb.

The TDOP lift fixture adaptor is designed to interface between the ACGLF and the TDOP, and has arated lifting capacity of 7,000 lb.

The space frame pallet assembly is a device that supports waste drums such that drums can be lifted fromthe shipping cask and placed on a facility pallet. The pallet assembly interfaces with lifting tubes thatmate with the pallet and the ACGLF


ACGLFs, four-drum pallet lifting device, SWB lift fixture adapter, the TDOP lift fixture adapter, andspace frame pallet assemblies and lift pins shall be designed to hold design basis load.


The use of the lift fixtures is defined and controlled through waste handling procedures. The liftingequipment is designed for the specific loads and is load tested prior to placing in service and undergoesonsite testing to ensure that the interface between lift fixtures and the ACGLF does not introduceinterferences such that a load could be dropped. The lifting equipment is periodically inspected forindications of structural degradation such that it can be taken out of service, repaired, and tested prior to


4-18 April 2007|

returning to service. Any structural modifications to the lifting equipment requires a load test prior toreturning to service.


These components are passive design features that are maintained through the programmatic control forequipment maintenance, and the configuration and change control processes that invoke the USQ processfor a review of any design changes to the lift fixtures.

|4.4.13 Panel Closure/Substantial and Isolation Barrier|

|4.4.13.1 Safety Function|

|Panel closures prevent radioactive and hazardous material releases from a filled panel. Substantial and|isolation barriers minimize radioactive and hazardous material releases from a filled panel. Panel closure|or the substantial and isolation barrier protect the waste face from operational events such as fires,|explosions, collisions and impact. |

4.4.13.2 System Description||

After a waste disposal panel has been filled with waste, ventilation to the panel is no longer needed. |Chapter 2 of this DSA identifies designs for panel closures that eliminate airflow from the panel. |Chapter 2 also identifies a design for installation of a panel isolation and substantial barrier that reduces|airflow to a negligible amount, but does not eliminate airflow entirely. Panels 1 and 2 have a 12 ft. thick|explosion/isolation wall currently installed. The explosion/isolation wall is of masonry block and mortar|construction, with no penetrations, and is keyed into the walls, floor, and ceiling of the panel entries. To|allow for additional monitoring of gases that could be generated within a panel due to long term|radiolysis and microbial action within the waste, a substantial and isolation barrier will be installed in|subsequent panels. The substantial barrier consists of run of mine salt or other suitable non-flammable|fill material that is piled up against the waste face followed by a metal bulkhead and flexible flashing that|can move with salt creep. The bulkhead prevents human access. Tubing for gas monitoring and cables|for geotechnical monitoring passes through the flashing and the salt. The barrier provides support to the|face to keep waste containers from toppling in the event of roof fall or salt creep. The substantial and|isolation barrier minimizes airflow in the closed panel. If the actual gas generation rates in a filled panel|are less than theoretical predictions, the more robust panel closure may not be installed. |

|4.4.13.3 Functional Requirements|

|Panel closure or, a substantial and isolation barrier shall be installed in the entries of filled panels. Panel|closures are constructed to prevent radioactive and hazardous material releases from a filled panel. |Substantial and isolation barriers are constructed to minimize airflow within a filled panel. |

|4.4.13.4 System Evaluation|

|The primary purpose of panel closure is to isolate the waste in a filled panel such that humans and the|environment are protected from breach of waste containers that could occur from long term ground|movement and gas generation. The designs for panel closures described in Chapter 2 of this DSA|effectively seal the filled panel from airflow, prevent human intrusion to the waste from activities in the|mine, and protect humans and the environment from any event that may occur within the closed panel. |

|


4-19 April 2007|

Based on historic data and observed ground movement in open excavations in the WIPP underground, |roof fall is not expected during the period of time that a panel is being mined and subsequently used for |waste disposal. Because of the waste characteristic and container configuration for waste approved for |disposal, fires and explosions due to gas generation within the waste is of minimal concern during active |waste emplacement. The explosion wall portion of panel closure was installed within 180 days of |declaring panels 1 and 2 filled. During the installation of the explosion walls, geotechnical monitoring |and ground control activities continue in the panel entries. Since closure, geotechnical monitoring and |ground control activities continue to be performed near the explosion walls that are accessible in the |underground, and will continue until access is no longer needed. |

|Filled panels with an installed closure do not release radioactive or hazardous materials to occupied areas |of the underground. There are no ignition sources in closed panels as the electrical installations are |removed as panels are filled and the geotechnical cables are cut and abandoned in place prior to panel |closure installation. The waste containers have no pressurized containers or pyrophoric material within |the waste. Panel closure has been shown through analysis as discussed in Chapter 2 of this DSA to |withstand over-pressurization events within the panel due to long term gas generation. For panels with |the substantial and isolation barrier, fires and explosions from gas generation are not expected as the |lower explosive limit for hydrogen and methane will not be reached. Waste container breach due to gas |generation in portions of the panel away from the entries are not expected to propagate beyond the local |area. Any gas generation in waste containers near the panel entries is not expected to result in a fire or |explosion as the residual airflow will provide dilution. Further, the geotechnical monitoring cables are |low voltage/amperage and are not a significant ignition source, and as the ground closes around the |waste, the volume of air to support combustion is continuously decreasing. Chapter 2 of this DSA also |discussed the expected gas generation rates from radiolysis and microbial action within the waste. |Further, PLG-116711 states that after 5 years the concentration of methane of 1% (or 20% of the LEL) is |very conservative and based on the actual panel conditions would be expected to be an order of |magnitude lower than the 1%. Even at the conservative estimates of gas generations, the amounts of |hydrogen and methane would remain below the LEL such that an explosion would not occur if the |installation of the explosion isolation wall were delayed. |

|The substantial and isolation barrier to be installed in Panel 3 does not seal the panel from air flow, but |will minimize airflow and protect the waste face from operational activities associated with gas |monitoring. During the time that gas monitoring is performed, geotechnical monitoring will continue, |and ground controls activities will continue in the panel entries up to the barriers to ensure a safe |environment for workers performing the monitoring. The disposal room dimensions are nominally 13 ft. |high by 33 ft. wide by 300 ft. long. The waste array consists of waste container assemblies in a nested |hexagonal arrangement such that the columns of waste occupy approximately 31 of the 33 ft., accounting |for the diameter of the waste containers, sacks of MgO, and irregularities in spacing between columns of |waste. The waste columns are approximately 130 inches or 10.8 ft. high. The average room height in |panel 3 is 13.5 ft. If the expected salt creep is a much as 4.5 in/year, it would take 8 years for the salt to |rest on the waste stack. The ground control measures in panels 1 through 4 are effective as no roof fall in |active panels has occurred and no roof falls are known to have occurred in closed panels. |

|Analysis contained in report PLG-1167, Analysis of Roof Falls and Methane Gas Explosions in Closed |Rooms and Panels11, concluded that roof falls within closed rooms away from the waste face did not |present a significant safety risk as those affected waste containers would experience axial crushing and |the fallen salt and MgO would act as a barrier to radioactive material being released from a breached |waste container. Further, as each room was filled, chain link and brattice was installed at the room entry |and exit to segregate the filled room from the disposal path ventilation circuit. The limited airflow due to |leakage will not provide significant transport of radioactive material should a waste container breach |occur in filled rooms. The substantial barrier provides support to the waste face such that damage to |


4-20 April 2007|

drums from ground movement is minimized and drums do not fall from the waste face. The salt and the|isolation barrier bulkhead also minimize airflow from the filled panel.|

|4.4.13.5 Technical Safety Requirements|

|The panel closure or substantial and isolation barriers are passive design features. The TSR controls|require the configuration and change control processes that invoke the USQ process for a physical|change to the panel closure or substantial and isolation barriers installed in the entries to filled panels.|

|4.5 Specific Administrative Controls

SACs are those controls that provide a preventive and/or mitigative function comparable to a SC or SSSSC. The SACs are specified in Chapter 3 as a preventive control in either the accident analysis or forworker protection as identified in Tables A-13 and A-14. The SACs are summarized in Table 4.5-1,including the safety functions, accident events from Chapter 3 upon which the SAC is based, functionalrequirements, and performance criteria judged to require TSR coverage.

4.5.1 Criticality Safety Program


Through control of fissile mass and moderator/reflector mass by waste container type and the wastehandling configurations at WIPP, criticality is incredible at WIPP.

4.5.1.2 SAC Description

The WIPP criticality safety program requires that any controls required by WIPP nuclear criticality safetyevaluations are imposed in the WIPP TSRs. The WIPP TSRs identify those controls that must betranslated into the WAC15 and those controls that are done through WIPP procedures that implement theTSRs at the WIPP. Adherence to the fissile mass and moderator/reflector limits and CH waste containersapproved for disposal at WIPP, specified in the CH WAC15 and CH TSRs, is the primary method forensuring criticality safety at WIPP.

The WIPP WAC15 is a DOE requirements document, used by generator sites, that specifies the containertypes, waste restrictions, and fissile and special moderator/reflector mass limits by waste container typethat generator sites must adhere to for waste proposed for disposal at WIPP to be acceptable. The WIPPWAC ensures that waste transported to and disposed of at WIPP meets the transportation requirementsapplicable to the shipping casks, the requirements imposed on waste by the WIPP Hazardous WasteFacility Permit (HWFP)10, and any restrictions imposed on the waste contents that result from the wastehandling and disposal process at WIPP that are identified in the WIPP TSRs.

Each generator site has a DOE certified program for characterization and certification of the CH wasteproposed for disposal at WIPP and demonstrates compliance with the CH WAC through the PerformanceDemonstration Program described in DOE/CBFO-01-3107, Performance Demonstration ProgramManagement Plan.13 WIPP does not accept any CH waste container shipments for disposal if the CHwaste container information has not been submitted into the WWIS and approved by the WWIS dataadministrator. The process for submitting waste information into the WWIS is described inDOE/CBFO 97-2273, WIPP Waste Information System User's Manual.14 The WWIS is programmed toinclude the limits for each container type from the CH WAC15 such that the requirements for eachcontainer type are verified prior to shipment to WIPP.


4-21 November 2006

Once waste arrives at WIPP, the containers are checked to verify that they match those approved forshipment in the WWIS. WIPP does not perform any additional verifications of fissile content and has noequipment on site to do so. Storage and disposal configurations for CH waste containers that have beenremoved from the shipping package are described in the CH waste handling procedure, and specify thatCH waste containers are stacked the equivalent of two drums high in the WHB and no greater than theequivalent of three drums high in the underground disposal rooms. These configurations are passivelycontrolled by the facility pallet used to support waste for storage in the WHB and transport to theunderground on the waste shaft conveyance and the disposal room height in the underground.

The facility pallet and the waste shaft conveyance are identified as SS design features in this chapter.


A waste characterization/certification program at each generator site ensures that only CH waste thatmeets the WIPP CH WAC15 is disposed of at WIPP, and that any exceptions are evaluated against allapplicable baseline documents prior to their authorization for shipment. The following criticalitysafety requirements shall be met before waste is approved for disposal at WIPP (including WIPP site-derived waste):

• Fissile loading shall not exceed 200 FGE (fissile gram equivalent), including two times themeasurement error, per 55-, 85-, or l00-gallon drum containing up to 5 kg beryllium.16, 17, 18 Ifdrums are used to overpack waste that has been compacted, the waste must conform to one ofthe following conditions:

• - The packing fraction of the waste contents shall not exceed 70 percent, or- The fissile loading for the overpacking drum shall not exceed 170 FGE, or - The internal and external height dimensions of the overpacking drum shall ensure aminimum ½ in. separation between the contents of the drums containing compacted waste andother waste containers when stacked. For example, drums that meet the internal and externalheight dimensions of BNFL drawing 53-9840, Revision 8,19 ensure that the vertical separationbetween the centers of drums containing compacted waste and other waste containers, whenstacked, is at least ½ in. The use of steel spacers in the top and bottom of the overpackingdrum is also an acceptable method of achieving design separation.

• Fissile loading shall not exceed 100 FGE, including two times the measurement error, per 55-,85-, or 100-gallon drum containing beryllium at greater than 5kg and up to a maximum of 100kg of beryllium. The density for polyethylene shall not exceed 20 percent (0.184 g/cm3) of itstheoretical full density.16

• Fissile loading shall not exceed 325 FGE, including two times the measurement error, perdirect loaded SWB or TDOP with CH waste, beryllium shall not exceed 18.14 kg, andberyllium must be fines or shavings, and the density of polyethylene distributed in the SWBshall not exceed 20 percent (0.184g/cm3) of its theoretical full density.17, 18

• For compacted CH waste direct loaded into a SWB or TDOP in which the density ofpolyethylene exceeds 20 percent of its full theoretical density up to full density, fissile loadingshall not exceed 185 FGE, including two times the measurement error, beryllium shall notexceed 18.14 kg, and beryllium must be fines or shavings.17, 18

• Pipe overpacks (a 55-gallon drum containing a standard 6- or 12-inch pipe component, or aS100, S200, or S300 pipe component) are limited to no greater than 200 FGE, including twotimes the measurement error, and 5 kg beryllium.


4-22 November 2006

• A drum overpacked in TDOP or SWB requires that the FGE and beryllium mass be restrictedto the limits of the direct loaded SWB or TDOP. A SWB overpacked in a TDOP requires thatthe TDOP FGE and beryllium mass be restricted to the direct loaded TDOP limit.16, 17, 18

The waste handling, storage, and disposal configuration at WIPP is as follows:

• Drum arrays shall not exceed three drums high in the underground disposal area and twodrums high in the WHB storage areas.16, 17, 18

• SWB arrays shall not exceed three SWBs high in the underground disposal area and twoSWBs high in the WHB storage areas.16, 17, 18

• Combinations of drums, TDOPs, and SWBs shall be stacked in the underground such that thestack height is limited to the equivalent of three drums high.16, 17,18 TDOPs are positioned onehigh in either the WHB or underground disposal area.16, 17, 18

• Waste drums shall be stacked only in the vertical position (longest dimension vertical).16, 17, 18

• SWBs shall be stacked only in the normal horizontal position (longest dimensionhorizontal).16, 17, 18

• TDOPs shall be positioned with the longest dimension vertical.16, 17, 18

The functional requirements are necessary to prevent radiological consequences to workers or the publicfor events identified in Section 3.4 , Tables A-13 and A-14, in Chapter 3 and in Table 4.5-1 of this DSA.

4.5.1.4 SAC Evaluation

The criticality safety requirements for the waste container type and waste parameters are met throughgenerator site adherence to the WIPP CH WAC15. Generator sites also have criticality safety programsfor waste being processed for disposal at WIPP. The waste container fissile and specialmoderator/reflector limits are specified for transportation in the TRUPACT-II and HalfPACT regardlessof whether waste transported in those shipping casks comes to WIPP. The WIPP site NCSEs utilize thefissile and special moderator/reflector mass limits as a starting point for determining the site limits. Thesite limits differ slightly from those for transportation because of the disposal configuration in the WIPPunderground where the waste is surrounded by salt and MgO such that there is little leakage of neutronsfrom the disposal array.

The waste handling and disposal configurations for CH waste containers are specified in the CH wastehandling procedures. Waste containers that arrive at WIPP are verified against the WWIS listing ofwaste containers approved for disposal. Any discrepant container can be segregated from other wastecontainers. Segregated containers are kept in the shielded storage room in the southeast corner of the CHbay. The CH waste handling and disposal operations at WIPP is a manual operation that involvesminimal automation. The CH drums and TDOPs are easiest to handle when stacked with the long axisoriented vertically. SWBs are easiest to handle with the long axis oriented horizontally.

The waste handling equipment is designed to transport waste containers in that configuration, secured tofacility pallets, and to place drum assemblies, SWBs, or TDOPs in that configuration into tightly packedhexagonal disposal array the equivalent of three drums high in the disposal rooms. The stackingconfiguration of two drums high on the pallets ensures that the pallets of waste can easily be transferredfrom the CH bay to the waste shaft conveyance and from the conveyance to the waste transporter in theunderground. The stacking configuration of three drums high in the underground ensures that the


4-23 November 2006

columns of waste are in a more stable configuration than if they were stacked such that the curvedsurfaces of lower containers supported the weight of upper containers. There are no time constraintsimposed on the waste handling process. The stacking configuration is a criticality control as it protectsthe assumptions in the NCSE based on the actual waste handling and disposal configurations.

The WIPP waste handling and disposal process is not performed in a stressful environment. There areadequate personnel to perform the required tasks. The waste handling equipment is not noisy and there isadequate ventilation and lighting. Waste handling restrictions ensure that activities that could adverselyaffect the waste handling process or disposal configuration do not occur during actual waste handling.


The TSR for the criticality safety program will be a specific directive action in the administrativecontrols section of the CH TSRs. The limits will be as specified in Section 4.5.1.3 and in Table 4.5-1.

4.5.2 Waste Characteristics Control


The waste characteristics control ensures that waste approved for disposal at WIPP does not catch fire orexplode. The waste container types also protect basic inventory assumptions including PE-Ci bycontainer type. The requirement for metal waste containers that meet DOT Type A requirements orequivalent ensures that the containers are resistant to fires and that containers dropped for a height lessthan 4 ft. do not breach. The requirement for the waste containers to have an installed vent preventspressure buildup inside the container.


The WIPP CH WAC15 is a DOE requirements document, used by generator sites, that specifies thecontainer types, waste restrictions, and fissile and special moderator/reflector mass limits by wastecontainer type that generator sites must adhere to for waste proposed for disposal at WIPP to beacceptable. The WIPP CH WAC15 ensures that waste transported to and disposed of at WIPP meets notonly the transportation requirements applicable to the shipping casks, the requirements imposed on wasteby the WIPP Hazardous Waste Facility Permit (HWFP)10, and any restrictions imposed on the wastecontents that result from the waste handling and disposal process at WIPP that are identified in the WIPPTSRs.

The waste characteristics that prevent accidents evaluated in Chapter 3 of this DSA restrict waste to contain no residual liquids in excess of 1 percent by volume of waste; contain no pyrophoric radioactivematerials in excess of 1percent by weight of waste; contain no pyrophoric non-radioactive materials;contain no explosives; contain no compressed gases (pressurized containers); and no wastes exhibitingthe characteristic of ignitability, corrosivity, or reactivity. The control on residual liquids is anassumption of the WIPP NCSEs for some calculations and also ensures that flammable liquids are notincluded in the waste. The remaining controls ensure that waste disposed of at WIPP do not explode,cause waste containers to pressurize, or spontaneously catch fire. The requirement for metal wastecontainers protects assumptions in the criticality and fire analysis. Once waste arrives at WIPP, thecontainers are checked to verify that they match those approved for shipment in the WWIS.


4-24 November 2006


Waste characteristics are ensured by a waste characterization/certification program at each generator sitethat ensures that only CH waste that meets the CH WAC15 is disposed of at WIPP, and that anyexceptions are evaluated against all applicable baseline documents prior to their authorization forshipment. The following hazardous materials are prohibited from being in waste disposed at WIPP:residual liquids in excess of 1 percent by volume of waste; pyrophoric radioactive materials in excess of1% by weight of waste; all pyrophoric nonradioactive materials; explosives; compressed gases(pressurized containers); wastes exhibiting the characteristic of ignitability, corrosivity, or reactivity(Environmental Protection Agency hazardous waste numbers of D001, D002, or D003); no hazardouswastes unless they exist as co-contaminants with transuranics.

The PE-Ci content for waste disposed of at WIPP is as follows:

# 80 PE-Ci/55-, 85-, or 100-gallon direct loaded drum

# 560 PE-Ci/direct loaded SWB

# 560 PE-Ci/direct loaded TDOP

# 1200 PE-Ci/overpacked assembly of undamaged containers (55- gallon drum overpacked in a SWB,100-gallon drum, 85-gallon drum, or TDOP; 85-gallon or 100-gallon or SWB overpacked in a TDOP). If greater than 1200 PE-Ci, a USQ safety evaluation shall be performed and, if required, obtain DOEconcurrence for the safe processing of the waste.

# 1800 PE-Ci/waste container of solidified/vitrified waste

# 1100 PE-Ci/ undamaged 55- gallon drum overpacked in a SWB, 100-gallon drum, 85-gallon drum,or TDOP; 85-gallon or 100-gallon or SWB overpacked in TDOP

# 1800 PE-Ci/Pipe Overpack Containers including either 6-in. or 12-in. pipe components, or S100,S200, or S300 pipe components

Waste containers acceptable for disposal at WIPP include metal 55-gallon drums, 85-gallon drums,100-gallon drums, TDOPs, SWBs, and pipe overpack containers (a pipe overpack refers to a 55-gallondrum containing either a standard 6" or 12" pipe component, or S100, S200, or S300 pipe component)that meet DOT Type 7A or equivalent. All waste containers are vented. Surface dose rate on wastecontainers shall not exceed 200 mrem/hr.

The functional requirements are necessary to prevent radiological consequences to workers or the publicfor events identified in Section 3.4 , Tables A-13 and A-14, in Chapter 3 and in Table 4.5-1 of this DSA. There are no SSCs at WIPP that can be used to verify that the generator sites have met the requirementsof the CH WAC15.


Each generator site has a program for characterization and certification of the CH waste proposed fordisposal at WIPP and demonstrates compliance with the radiological characterization requirements of theCH WAC15 through the Performance Demonstration Program described in DOE/CBFO-01-3107.13 WIPPdoes not accept any CH waste container shipments for disposal if the CH waste container information hasnot been submitted into the WWIS and approved by the WWIS data administrator. The process forsubmitting waste information into the WWIS is described in DOE/CBFO 97-2273.14 The WWIS isprogrammed to include the limits/restrictions for each container type from the CH WAC15 such that therequirements for each container type are verified prior to shipment to WIPP.


4-25 November 2006

Once waste arrives at WIPP, the containers are checked to verify that they match those approved forshipment in the WWIS.


TSR for waste characteristics control will be a specific directive action in the administrative controlssection of the CH TSRs. The limits will be as specified in Section 4.5.2.3 and in Table 4.5-1.

4.5.3 Combustible Loading Control Program - Waste Handling Building


The combustible loading control program performs the following safety functions: controls combustibleloading in the WHB and TMF to minimize the potential for and size of fires; prevents small fires frombecoming larger fires with the potential to impact waste containers; prevents fires associated with theoperation of diesel powered equipment in the TMF or RH bay from propagating the CH bay andimpacting stored waste; prevents continuity of combustible material and prevents a pool fire largeenough to damage waste in the CH bay; prevents explosions due to release of flammable gas in the WHBwhile waste containers are not protected by transportation containers; prevents flammable gas explosionoutside the WHB from penetrating the WHB; and prevents fires/explosions in the waste hoist tower withthe potential to impact waste during transport on the waste shaft conveyance.


The combustible loading control program for the WHB and TMF limits the amount of combustiblematerials to prevent continuity of combustibles such that fires will self extinguish rather than propagateand become large fires with the potential to breach waste containers. There are no SSCs that canautomatically prevent the introduction of transient combustibles into areas with the potential to affectwaste should a fire occur; hence, combustible loading control for the WHB and TMF is selected as aSAC. Combustible loading is procedurally controlled with restrictions and prohibitions specified thatincorporate the preventive and mitigative controls identified in the hazard and accident analysis for fireand explosion initiators. The controls are summarized below in the functional requirements.


When waste is outside of closed TRUPACT-IIs or HalfPACTs, only electric powered equipment shall beallowed in the CH portion of the WHB. Flammable compressed gas cylinders are prohibited in the CHbay unless all waste containers are inside closed TRUPACT-IIs or HalfPACTs. The limitation does notapply to packages covered by DOT Exemption DOT-E-7607. No flammable gas/liquid or flammablecompressed gas cylinders shall be stored along the external walls of the WHB, or TMF, or in the areabetween the WHB and Support Building, except at the TRUDOCKs as stated below. No more than threepallets of fiberboard slip sheets and one pallet of polyethylene slip sheets shall be stored in the CH bay. Pallets of slip sheets must not be stacked and a 10 ft separation distance shall be maintained betweeneach slip sheet pallet and between slip sheet pallets and stored waste. Transient combustibles shall notbe stored closer than 10 ft. from waste or pallets of slip sheets. No more than one gallon oflubricants/denatured alcohol may be at each TRUDOCK location. No more than 1 gallon of solventsshall be stored in the waste hoist tower for maintenance on hoist. Used oil/hydraulic fluid shall beremoved from the waste hoist tower after hoist maintenance prior to handling waste on the waste shaftconveyance. When waste is stored in the southwest corner of the CH bay, diesel powered equipmentused in the TMF shall maintain a 15 ft standoff distance from the common wall between the CH bay andTMF or a fire watch is posted with the diesel equipment being operated. When waste is stored in the


4-26 November 2006

northeast corner of the CH bay, diesel powered equipment used in the RH bay shall maintain a 15 ftstandoff distance from the common wall between the RH bay and CH bay or a fire watch is posted withthe diesel equipment being operated.

The functional requirements are necessary to prevent radiological consequences to workers or the publicfor events identified in Section 3.4 , Tables A-13 and A-14, in Chapter 3 and in Table 4.5-1 of this DSA. The functional requirements are procedurally implemented and are visually verified each day byoperations personnel. The SAC for combustible loading control in the WHB and TMF does not requireany support SSCs to accomplish.


The adequacy of the specific administrative control for a combustible loading control program for theWHB is ensured through procedural requirements and periodic inspections performed by trainedoperations personnel. Adherence to the combustible loading control program is required continuouslywhen waste is in the WHB with specific requirements applicable based on the location of stored waste.

The specific directive action was chosen rather than an LCO approach as any period of time thatcombustibles are not controlled increases the risk of fire propagation. Since no waste handling activityor maintenance activity requires introducing a significant amount of combustible material into the WHB,the rigorous control of combustible materials was chosen to prevent fires from starting and propagating,and minimize risk.

The environment inside the WHB is climate controlled with adequate lighting, and is not noisy such thatoperations personnel can easily verify the presence of transient combustibles. Personnel staffing isadequate to perform inspections to verify the absence of specified combustible material. There areadequate access routes into the CH bay such that personnel performing activities in the TMF or RH baycan easily verify where CH waste is being stored. There are no specific time constraints on the start ofwaste handling operations each day such that excessive combustible loading, should it exist, can bequickly corrected prior to removing waste containers from shipping casks. The WHB is specificallydesigned and used for preparing waste containers for disposal. The path between the TRUDOCKs andthe conveyance car loading room has finite space available such that it accommodates the waste handlingequipment and waste being moved, but does not have extra space for storage of combustible materials. Further, other than the work stations associated with logging waste container information in the wastetracking system, there are no offices within the WHB. There are no SSCs required to support the SACfor combustible loading control.


TSR for combustible loading control for the WHB will be a specific directive action in the administrativecontrols section of the CH TSRs. The requirements will be as specified in Section 4.5.3.3 and in Table4.5-1.


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4.5.4 Waste Handling Restrictions


The waste handling restrictions in the WHB and in the underground protect basic inventory assumptionsused in the hazard and accident analysis. Waste handling restrictions also prevent waste containerbreaches from collisions between the waste handling equipment and non-waste handling equipment or acollision between vehicles and the disposal array in the underground. By restricting personnel access inE-300 during waste handling activities, the potential consequences to workers, should a waste containerbreach in the underground occur, is reduced. The addition of barricades along the south wall of theWHB between airlock 100 and the TMF prevents vehicles from breaching the WHB wall and impactingwaste stored in the SW corner of the CH bay.


Waste handling restrictions are designated as a SAC at WIPP to ensure that the hazard and accidentanalysis in Chapter 3 of this DSA remains valid. The waste handling restrictions are procedurallyspecified in the waste handling procedures and underground access control procedures. The CH wastehandling process at WIPP is a manual one with no automatic actions. Waste handling restrictionsprescribe the configuration for waste being stored and waste being moved. Waste handling restrictionsalso prevent non-waste handling vehicle movement near waste, regardless of whether the waste isstationary or being moved. Some controls are supplemented by passive design features that prevent thecontrol from being exceeded, such as only one facility pallet on the waste hoist at a time and onlytransporting the waste to the underground on the waste hoist. Facility pallets do not fit on the salt shaftconveyance or the air intake shaft conveyance. The use of spotters when moving waste with forklifts orthe waste transporters is consistent with WIPP safety practices for movement of any large non-wasteload. The waste transport path from the base of the waste shaft to the active disposal room is wideenough for two vehicles to pass each other, but restricting other vehicles from the transport path duringwaste movement prevents collisions and limits the amount of fuel that could result in a fire.


The waste handling restrictions for CH waste handling operations at WIPP include the following:

• TRUPACT-IIs and HalfPACTs are not opened in the parking area, but are brought into the CHbay inside the WHB before opening. In the WHB, the inventory is limited to 18 facility palletsin the CH bay and four TRUPACT-IIs or HalfPACTs at the TRUDOCKs, with no more thanseven pallets of waste stored in the northeast corner of the CH bay, no more than seven stored inthe southwest corner of the CH bay, no more than five pallets of waste stored near airlock 107,and one facility pallet in the shielded storage room. A facility pallet holds four drumassemblies, 4 SWBs, or two TDOPs or a combination of containers. .

• Once out of the TRUPACT-IIs or HalfPACTs, the waste containers are stored on facility palletsand are transported on facility pallets to and in the underground until disposed of in the wastearray.

• Waste is stored only in designated areas within the WHB which includes the northeast andsouthwest portion of the CH Bay, near airlock 107, the shielded storage room, and at theTRUDOCKs.

• No waste containers are opened at WIPP.

• Only one facility pallet is transported on the waste hoist at any one time.


4-28 November 2006

• A spotter is required when moving waste.

• Waste is transported to the underground storage area by way of the waste shaft only. No othershaft to the underground is used for transportation of waste.

• In the underground, no waste will be moved to a location outside the designated disposal path.

• No non-waste handling vehicles are allowed in active disposal room during waste handling.

• A spotter is required when vehicles are operating within 75 ft of the waste face.

• Personnel access in E-300 from the exit of the active disposal panel to the undergroundventilation exhaust shaft during waste transit and emplacement is restricted until these activitiesare complete.

• Barricades shall be installed along the southwest wall of the WHB between airlock 100 and theTMF such that they are nominally 15 ft. from the external wall of the WHB.

The functional requirements are necessary to prevent radiological consequences to workers or the publicfor events identified in Section 3.4 , Tables A-13 and A-14, in Chapter 3 and in Table 4.5-1 of this DSA. The functional requirements are procedurally implemented and are visually verified each day byoperations personnel. Other than the waste handling equipment, waste hoist, and placing the waste onfacility pallets to interface with the waste handling equipment, the SAC for waste handling restrictionsdoes not require any SSCs to accomplish.


The CH waste handling and disposal operations at WIPP are manual operations that involve noautomation. The CH waste arrives in TRUPACT or HalfPACTs as drum assemblies of seven packs of55-gallon drums, four packs of 85-gallon drums or three packs of 100-gallon drums, or SWBs or TDOPs. The waste handling equipment is designed to transport waste containers secured to facility palletsconfigured as 4 drum assemblies, four SWBs or two TDOPs, and to place drum assemblies, SWBs, orTDOPs into tightly packed hexagonal disposal array the equivalent of three drums high in the disposalrooms.

The stacking configuration of two drums high on the pallets ensures that the pallets of waste can easilybe transferred from the CH bay to the waste shaft conveyance and from the conveyance to the wastetransporter in the underground. The stacking configuration of three drums high in the undergroundensures that the columns of waste are in a more stable configuration than if they were stacked such thatthe curved surfaces of lower containers supported the weight of upper containers. WIPP is designed suchthat waste handling is most easily and efficiently accomplished by use of the specifically designed wastehandling equipment and the design features associated with the WHB and waste hoist such that there islittle chance that waste would be handled in any manner other than that described in Chapter 2 of thisDSA, thus ensuring the reliability of this SAC.

The CH waste handling process and storage/disposal configurations are procedurally controlled. Thewaste handling and disposal process is not performed in a stressful environment. There are adequatepersonnel to perform the required tasks, the waste handling equipment is not noisy, there is adequateventilation and lighting, and other waste handling restrictions ensure that other activities that couldadversely affect the waste handling process or disposal configuration do not occur during actual wastehandling.


4-29 November 2006


TSR for waste characteristics control will be a specific directive action in the administrative controlssection of the CH TSRs. The limits will be as specified in Section 4.5.4.3 and in Table 4.5-1.

4.5.5 Combustible Loading Control Program - Disposal Path


The combustible loading control program for the disposal path in the underground prevents continuity ofcombustible material in the disposal path such that small fires do not become large fires, prevents firesthat may result from collisions between vehicles. Prevents construction activities from impacting wastein transit from the waste shaft station to the active disposal room. Prevents collisions between wastehandling and non-waste handling equipment during waste handling operation. Prevents fires/explosionsfrom impacting waste.


The combustible loading control program for the disposal path in the underground is procedurallydefined such that the preventive controls identified in the hazard and accident analysis in Chapter 3 ofthis DSA remain valid. The functional requirements in Section 4.5.5.3 are procedurally required and aresupplemented by periodic inspections and training. Since virtually all activities performed in theunderground require human action, there are no SSCs that can automatically preclude introduction ofcombustible materials into the underground. Only diesel and electric powered vehicles are used in theWIPP underground. The configuration of the WIPP underground does not meet the MSHA requirementsfor use of gasoline powered vehicles.

Since neither the combustible loading controls or the waste handling process need to be performed in anyspecified amount of time, there is adequate time to ensure that any combustible material transported tothe underground can be done at a time other than during waste handling operations in the underground. There is adequate time prior to the start of waste handling in the underground to ensure that the transportpath is free of transient combustibles and that any significant amount combustible material, if present,can be immediately removed prior to the start of waste handling operations. The underground hasspecified storage areas for flammable gas/liquid or flammable compressed gas cylinders. Thecombustible loading control requirements are easily implemented and maintained by trained personnel. There are no SSC failures that would result in personnel being unable to ensure that combustiblematerials in the disposal path are limited.


The functional requirements for the combustible loading control program for the disposal path includethe following:

Only diesel or electric powered vehicles are allowed in the underground.

When the waste is in transit, non-waste handling equipment shall be moved to a cross cut and be secureduntil the waste transporter has passed and is greater than 75 ft away. Vehicles that may have becomedisabled (excluding the lube truck) may be in the disposal path but must be secured along the wall of thedisposal path.


4-30 November 2006

Combustibles and flammable compressed gas cylinders shall not be stored in the waste transport routefrom the waste shaft station to the active disposal room. Note that a parked vehicle is not considered tobe storage.

Flammable compressed gas cylinders shall not be used in the disposal path during waste handling. Nostorage of flammable gas/liquid or flammable compressed gas cylinders near the panel supply ventilationovercast and no construction work involving flammable gas/liquid or flammable compressed gascylinders between the disposal panel supply overcast and the construction bulkhead to the south in East300 during waste handling operations. When panel 4 is added to the disposal path no construction workinvolving flammable gas/liquid or flammable compressed gas cylinders is allowed between the overcastat E-140/S-3310 and the construction bulkhead to the west of this overcast in S-3310 during CH wastehandling operations. No storage of flammable gas/liquid or flammable compressed gas cylindersbetween the AIS and South 1000 in West 30 or within 100 ft of bulkhead 303 on the North ventilationside, and no use in these locations during CH waste handling operations

Transporters loaded with waste in the underground shall maintain greater than 75 ft separation betweenthem. This separation distance does not apply if a transporter becomes disabled while loaded with wasteand it is necessary to either move another loaded transporter past or move waste from a disabledtransporter to another transporter. If this situation occurs, a fire watch is required.

The lube truck is not allowed in the disposal path during waste handling.

The functional requirements are necessary to prevent radiological consequences to workers or the publicfor events identified in Section 3.4 , Tables A-13 and A-14, in Chapter 3 and in Table 4.5-1 of this DSA. The functional requirements are procedurally implemented and are visually verified each day byoperations personnel. The SAC for combustible loading control in the disposal path does not require anysupport SSCs to accomplish.


There are no special responses or capabilities required of underground personnel to ensure thatcombustible loading controls are maintained as specified in the functional requirements other thanadherence to the combustible loading control procedure. Since neither the combustible loading controlsor the waste handling process need to be performed in any specified amount of time, there is adequatetime to ensure that any combustible material transported to the underground can be done at a time otherthan when waste is being moved or is in transit from the base of the waste shaft to the disposal room. The underground has specified storage areas for flammable gas/liquid or flammable compressed gascylinders. The transport of waste from the base of the waste shaft to the active disposal room does notintroduce combustible materials into the waste handling process. There is adequate time prior to the startof waste handling in the underground to ensure that the transport path is free of transient combustiblesand that any combustible material, if present, can be immediately removed prior to the start of wastehandling operations.

The adequacy of the specific administrative control for a combustible loading control program for theWHB is ensured through procedural requirements and periodic inspections performed by trainedoperations personnel. Adherence to the combustible loading control program is required continuouslywhen waste is in the WHB with specific requirements applicable based on the location of stored waste.

The specific directive action was chosen rather than an LCO approach as any period of time thatcombustibles are not controlled increases the risk of fire propagation. Since no waste handling activityor maintenance activity requires introducing a significant amount of combustible material into the WHB,


4-31 November 2006

the rigorous control of combustible materials was chosen to prevent fires from starting and propagating,and minimize risk.

There are no SSCs required to support the SAC for combustible loading control.


TSR for combustible loading control in the disposal path will be a specific directive action in theadministrative controls section of the CH TSRs. The limits will be as specified in Section 4.5.5.3 and inTable 4.5-1.

4.5.6 Combustible Loading Control Program - Active Disposal Room


The combustible loading control program for the active disposal room in the underground prevents firesthat may result from collisions between vehicles, prevents continuity of combustible material in theactive disposal room such that small fires do not become large fires, and prevents fires in the activedisposal room resulting from non-waste handling activities. Prevents fires/explosions in the disposalpath.


The combustible loading control program for the disposal room in the underground is procedurallydefined such that the preventive controls identified in the hazard and accident analysis in Chapter 3 ofthis DSA remain valid. The functional requirements in Section 4.5.6.3 are procedurally required and aresupplemented by periodic inspections and training. Since virtually all activities performed in theunderground require human action, there are no SSCs that can automatically preclude introduction ofcombustible materials into the underground. Because the configuration of the WIPP underground doesnot meet the MSHA requirements for use of gasoline powered vehicles, only diesel and electric poweredvehicles are used in the underground. The combustible loading control requirements are easilyimplemented and maintained by trained personnel. There are no SSC failures that would result inpersonnel being unable to ensure that combustible materials in the disposal path are controlled.


The functional requirements for the combustible loading control program in the active disposal roomrequires that there be no use of flammable gas/liquid or flammable compressed gas cylinders in the activedisposal room without a fire watch; no storage of flammable gas/liquid or flammable compressed gascylinders in the active disposal room; no hot work or use of flammable gas/liquid or flammablecompressed gas cylinders within 75 ft of waste without a fire watch; no lube truck in active disposalroom; no non-waste handling equipment within 75 ft of waste face without a fire watch; and no non-waste handling vehicles allowed in active disposal room during waste handling.

The functional requirements are necessary to prevent radiological consequences to workers or the publicfor events identified in Section 3.4 , Tables A-13 and A-14, in Chapter 3 and in Table 4.5-1 of this DSA. The functional requirements are procedurally implemented and are visually verified each day byoperations personnel. The SAC for combustible loading control in the active disposal room does notrequire any support SSCs to accomplish.


4-32 November 2006


There are no special responses or capabilities required of underground personnel to ensure thatcombustible loading controls are maintained as specified in the functional requirements other thanadherence to the combustible loading control procedure. The combustible loading control procedure issupplemented by the underground access control procedure with some of the vehicle restrictionsrepeated. Since combustible loading controls or the waste handling process do not need to be performedin any specified amount of time, there is adequate time to ensure that any combustible materialtransported to the underground can be done at a time other than when waste is being moved or is intransit from the base of the waste shaft to the disposal room. The underground has specified storageareas for flammable gas/liquid or flammable compressed gas cylinders.

There is little need for the use of flammable gas/liquid or flammable compressed gas cylinders in theactive disposal room. Even if a piece of equipment were to require welding as part of a repair, thedisabled equipment can be moved away from the waste face for repair. The active waste disposal roomhas no excess space for materials other than that needed for the final disposal configuration. The MgOsupersacks and the support stands for multiple super sacks are staged to make stacking of the waste andthe supersacks an efficient process. This leaves little room for any material not associated with thedisposal configuration. Further, should ground control activities such as leveling the floor or removal ofa failed rock bolt near the waste face need to occur, the floor is cleared of all excess MgO and supportracks to allow adequate room for the appropriate mining equipment to operate.


TSR for combustible loading control in the active disposal room will be a specific directive action in theadministrative controls section of the CH TSRs. The limits will be as specified in Section 4.5.6.3 and inTable 4.5-1.

4.5.7 Ground Control Program


The ground control program is to minimize the likelihood of rock falling from the ceiling and preventroof fall in the underground waste handling areas to prevent a breach of waste containers.


The ground control program at the WIPP ensures underground safety from any potential unplanned rockfall from the ceiling or walls of openings. From the time an opening is mined and throughout the life ofthe opening, action is taken to identify and remove or restrain any loose or potentially unsafe ground. Regular ground control maintenance is required in the WIPP underground and ground controlmaintenance efforts increase with the age of the openings.

The WIPP ground control program uses observational experience and analysis of salt behavior toanticipate future ground support requirements. The WIPP ground control methods and mechanisms mustaccommodate the continuous creep of salt and retain broken fractured rock in the roof or walls. TheWIPP ground control includes continuous visual inspections of openings, geotechnical monitoring,installation of ground support components, and analysis of ground support component failures.

Geotechnical monitoring include data collection from geotechnical instrumentation, fracture surveys, andobservations. Geotechnical analyses are performed to ensure that rock mass behavior is understood and


4-33 November 2006

proper ground control measures are instituted. Ground support is designed, specified, and installed tomeet the requirements of 30 CFR Part 57.27 Maintenance activities ensure that ground conditionspresenting a potential hazard are rectified.

DOE/WIPP 02-3212, Ground Control Annual Plan for the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant28 addressestechnical aspects of the underground facility subsurface structures and support systems. Each year theground control annual plan is updated to reflect developments in the WIPP ground support practices,materials, and any changes in operational requirements.

Prior to disposing of waste in a panel, the panel has been mined to meet dimensional requirements suchthat CH waste is stacked the equivalent of three 55-gallon drums high. Ground control measures in anactive panel may include removal of rock, bolting, and floor milling. Pattern bolting minimizes the needto remove rock from the ceilings of disposal rooms, however, milling the floor is expected to ensure theproper room dimensions and to ensure a smoother surface over which to transport waste. In the eventthat ground control measures are not sufficient to ensure safety, rooms may be closed.

The installation of ground control measures is a manual one. The decision to install ground controlsupport systems is based on the observed behavior of the salt including the observed behavior of existingground control measures. Ground control support systems may vary as different conditions areencountered. Support system may be subjected to longitudinal and lateral loading due to the rockdeformation. The anchorage components may undergo lateral deformation due to offsetting along clayseams or fractures and increasing tensile loading. There are no support systems that automatically ensureno additional ground control measures will need to be taken. While pattern bolting in newly mined areasis the current preferred method for ceiling support, observation of rock behavior may result in additionalsupports being added.

Visual examinations are performed by underground operations personnel. To perform the requiredground control inspections, it is necessary for personnel to access the underground using on of the threeconveyances. Mining practices require preoperational checks on any hoisting system used for access tothe underground prior to transporting equipment or personnel. Following the required hoist checks, ateam of underground operations personnel performs the initial ground inspections each day prior toallowing the remaining underground workers into the underground. No instrumentation is required toperform the daily ground inspections.


There shall be weekly ground control inspections shall be performed in the underground waste handlingareas. The completion of inspections shall be documented.


The weekly ground control inspections required by this SAC documents that the disposal path and activedisposal room are inspected at a frequency that allows corrective action to be taken prior to commencingwaste transport or emplacing new waste. Ground inspections are performed daily by the undergroundoperating staff. Underground inspections are performed each shift and whenever an underground re-entry is required following periods of time when the underground is unoccupied either from plannedevents such as holidays and weekends/backshift or following loss of ventilation that resulting inevacuating the underground. All personnel who perform the inspections receive the 40-hour MSHArequired training for unescorted underground access and annual refresher. Procedure WP 04-AU100729

specifies inspections to be performed at the beginning of each shift, weekly, monthly, and annually. Thisensures that the functional requirements of Section 4.5.7.3 of this DSA are met. The ground inspections


4-34 November 2006

are done visually and do not rely on any instrumentation, as any ground of concern will be visuallyobvious. Underground operations personnel occasionally use a scaling pole to test for loose rock or tosafely dislodge a suspected loose rock. There are no time constraints on ground control inspections, onlythat they must be complete prior to allowing additional personnel into the underground. Theunderground environment is not stressful, noisy, or otherwise environmentally unpleasant forperformance of the inspections.


TSR for ground control inspections will be a specific directive action in the administrative controlssection of the CH TSRs. The limits will be as specified in Section 4.5.7.3 and in Table 4.5-1.

4.5.8 Waste Hoist Brake Performance


The waste hoist brake performance prevents the uncontrolled movement of the waste shaft conveyanceupon loss of power or loss of hydraulic pressure to the waste hoist.


The proper operation of the waste hoist includes not only verification of the waste hoist brakeperformance, but also emergency stop tripping logic, limit switches, overtravel, deadman control, andposition indicator are tested at the start of each operating shift. Additionally at the beginning of eachoperating day, inspections are made on the waste shaft conveyance, cable attachments, conveyance cagedoors, and shaft collar doors. The hoist operator visually inspects the hoist drum assembly, pedestal,bearing housings, brakes and brake operations, and all hydraulic pipes for general condition and possibleleaks. Also at the start of each operating day, the various methods of communication between the hoistoperator, toplander, bottom lander, and the shaft conveyance are checked and verified to be operatingcorrectly. The conveyance is operated empty through one round trip at the start of each operating shift. While the SAC focuses on the performance test of the waste hoist brakes, the additional inspections andtests prevent any unplanned movement of the conveyance and any other issue with the waste shaft orhoist that could adversely impact successful transport of waste or personnel.

In addition to the daily checks associated with the waste shaft, hoist, and associated controls, the wasteshaft is inspected weekly to detect cracking, corrosion, deterioration, and water intrusion. Ropeinspections are also performed weekly and the entire active length is visually examined for structuraldamage, corrosion, and proper lubrication.

The performance of the preoperational checks of the waste hoist brake system could not be performed ifthe waste hoist structure and structural support failed. The waste hoist structure and structural support,and the waste shaft conveyance are designated SC in Section 4.3 of this DSA. The waste hoist brakes aredesignated SS in Section 4.4 of this DSA. The waste hoist control console has the necessary indicators todemonstrate proper operation of the waste hoist brakes, although actual brake performance can beverified without the control console indication.


Procedures shall be established, implemented, and maintained to ensure that the preoperational checks ofthe waste hoist brake system shall be performed on each shift prior to transporting waste.


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The design of the waste hoist and brakes are discussed in Chapter 2 and Sections 4.3 of this DSA. Thewaste hoist brakes are normally engaged and require human action in addition to electric power andhydraulic pressure to disengage the brakes such that the hoist and conveyance may move. Miningregulations require that mining hoists be tested as discussed in Chapter 2 of this DSA and as required bythe functional requirements. Testing and inspections are procedurally controlled.

Access to the waste hoist tower and control room is rigidly controlled with only authorized personnelhaving unrestricted access. The waste hoist control room is climate controlled and is not noisy. Personnel who operate the waste hoist are specifically trained to do so. The waste hoist operator uses thehoist control console and associated indications including conveyance position and brake position forverification of hoist parameters. Any malfunction of the waste hoist including loss of indication must beresolved prior to placing it in service for transport of either material or personnel. Testing andinspections of the waste hoist and shaft are performed in a controlled environment by authorized trainedpersonnel with no schedule restraints.


TSR for waste hoist brake performance will be a specific directive action in the administrative controlssection of the CH TSRs. The required performance will be as specified in Section 4.5.8.3 and in Table4.5-1.

4.5.9 Nonflammable Compressed Gas Cylinder Control


The control for nonflammable compressed gas cylinder minimizes the potential for improper handling orstorage of compressed gas cylinders which could result in damage to waste containers and a subsequentrelease.


The SAC for nonflammable compressed gas cylinder control results from the hazard and accidentanalysis in Chapter 3 of this DSA to minimize the likelihood of compressed gas cylinders becomingmissiles and impacting waste containers. The management of energy hazards is a fundamental part ofintegrated safety management for personnel injury prevention, by ensuring that compressed gas cylindersare handled using carts to support the cylinders during transport and stored with a mechanical restraint toprevent them from being tipped over if stored upright. Proper transport, use, and storage of compressedgas cylinders is procedurally controlled. Compressed gas is necessary for counting radiological swipestaken to verify waste containers have no loose surface contamination as part of preparing the containersfor transport to the underground. By limiting the number of cylinders in the CH bay, the risk to waste isminimized. There are two stations in the CH bay for the nonflammable compressed gas bottles used tosupport the radiological counting activities. Each station supports two bottles and includes brackets tosecure the bottles to a structural member of the WHB such that the bottles are properly supported duringboth normal operations and during a seismic event such that the bottles do not become missiles.

WIPP CH DSA DOE/WIPP-95-2065, REV. 10 - Page Chg. 2007-002 CHAPTER 4|

4-36 August 2007|


No more than four compressed gas cylinders (no larger than DOT Type 3AA, style K) shall be in the CHbay when waste is outside of a closed TRUPACT-II or HalfPACT. This limit does not apply to handheld fire extinguishers. No other compressed gas cylinders (excluding hand-held fire extinguishers, self-|contained self-rescuers [SCSRs], and trauma kit O2 bottles) shall be stored in the CH bay, at the bottom|of the waste shaft, in the disposal path or disposal room.


Verification that the number of compressed gas cylinders in the CH bay is limited to that described inSection 4.5.9.3 is visual and does not require any instrumentation to verify. Personnel who use, handle,or transport compressed gases at WIPP complete hazard communication and compressed gas cylindertraining, as well as job-specific hazard communication training, prior to performing job duties involvingcompressed gases. Job-specific training may take the form of pre-job briefings, on-the-job training, orother effective training methods. The CH bay and the waste shaft station have adequate lighting to|visually verify the requirements of this SAC. The waste handling process in the CH bay has no timeconstraints that would make it difficult to perform the verification on the number of compressed gascylinders in the bay. The bay and the area at the waste shaft station have no obstructions that would|make it difficult to verify this SAC. The benefits provided by safety devices such as fire extinguishers, |SCSRs, and trauma kits override the low risk to workers from these items becoming missiles resulting in|a breach of a waste container. Fire extinguishers are mounted on each underground vehicle and at|selected locations throughout the plant. SCSRs are housed in enclosures on specifically designed racks|to protect the bottles. Similiarly, trauma kits are contained in a metal box that protects the contents|including the O2 bottles.|


The TSR for nonflammable compressed gas cylinder control will be a specific directive action in theadministrative controls section of the CH TSRs. The required performance will be as specified inSection 4.5.9.3 and in Table 4.5-1.

4.5.10 Qualified Operators


The SAC for qualified operators ensures operators are qualified to properly operate the waste handlingequipment during normal operations and to properly respond to off-normal operations. This requirementalso ensures that the CMR operator(s) and operations personnel in the underground performing wastehandling operations communicate and take the appropriate actions in the event of a fire in theunderground such that the CMR operator(s) blocks the automatic shift to filtration of undergroundventilation until personnel are out of danger. This requirement also ensures that operations personnel inthe underground take the necessary immediate actions to notify the CMR and proceed to a safe location.


The CH waste handling process at WIPP is a manual operation that includes no automation. Wastehandling operators use a forklift to remove the shipping casks from the transport trailer and move theTRUPACTs and HalfPACTs into the WHB from the parking area. The TRUDOCK cranes are used toremove the lids from the shipping casks and remove the waste containers from the shipping casks. Forklifts are used to stage facility pallets for receipt of waste containers and are used to move the loaded


4-37 November 2006

pallets to either the storage locations in the WHB or to the waste shaft conveyance. In the underground,the loaded facility pallets are transported to the active disposal room using the waste transporters. In theactive disposal room, waste is removed from the pallets and placed in the disposal array using a forklift.

The use of forklifts, the transporter, cranes and waste shaft conveyance requires waste handling personnel to be trained not only in the waste handling process, but also to be trained to use the specificequipment necessary for waste movement. Other than the waste hoist, there is sufficient redundancy inavailable equipment to support waste handling such that if one piece of equipment malfunctions orbecomes unavailable, an alternate piece of waste handling equipment can be utilized.

The operation of the waste hoist is a specialized skill and is operated by personnel who are trained andhave demonstrated proficiency in its operation.

Facility operations personnel are responsible for the overall WIPP facility and serve as a focal point forwork control, valve and electrical line ups and operation of all surface equipment except that specific tohoisting, mining and waste handling. Facility operations personnel staff the central monitoring roomduring both normal and off-normal events. The CMR operator has necessary equipment interfaces in theCMR to initiate and block the shift to filtration function of the underground ventilation system, start andstop selected pieces of equipment, open and close selected electrical breakers.

While all WIPP personnel receive training such that they can respond properly during an emergency, theinterface between the CMR personnel and those in the underground is of particular importance during afire event in the underground. Depending on the location of the fire and recommended actions by underground operations and waste handling personnel, the facility shift manager is responsible fordetermining whether to shift to filtration or block the shift to filtration. The most important considerationduring fires, even those that may involve radioactive waste is to provide maximum airflow to theunderground for evacuation of personnel.

The underground ventilation system is designated safety significant in Section 4.4 of this chapter basedon its importance to provide airflow in the event of fires and to provide the necessary airflow to operatethe diesel powered waste handling equipment to perform the waste handling process. The firesuppression system and fire water supply and distribution system are designated safety significant toensure that small fires do not become larger fires with the potential to damage waste containers. Theautomatic/manual fire suppression system on underground waste handling equipment is designated safetyclass to ensure that fires associated with the waste handling equipment are extinguished before the firebecomes severe enough to affect waste. Additionally, there is a SAC to perform preoperational checkson the waste hoist brakes each shift to ensure that the brakes set properly prior to placing it intooperations to transport waste. 4.5.10.3 Functional Requirements

Only operators who are trained in the operational evolutions and qualified on the applicable equipmentare authorized to operate plant equipment for waste handling operations. Additionally, only operatorswho are trained in the appropriate response to fires in the underground shall be authorized to man theCMR or to operate plant equipment for CH waste handling operations.


The requirement for qualified operators is supplemented by procedures that define the steps necessary tosafely operate WIPP facility equipment and training specific to the operating evolutions and equipmentused to perform those evolutions. There are adequate personnel to perform the required tasks. The CMR


4-38 November 2006

is in a controlled area such that access to the are is limited to only those authorized to be there with onlythe trained facility operations personnel authorized to operate equipment. The CMR is adequatelyequipped with redundant means of communication with all surface and underground personnel to ensurethat emergency situations receive the highest priority and the most appropriate response to the situation.

Areas where waste is being stored or handled are controlled to limit access to only necessary personnel. Waste and personnel are not transported to the underground at the same time. The waste hoist controlroom is also controlled to limit access such that the hoist operator is not distracted from the task of hoistoperation. The hoist operator, top and bottom lander have redundant forms of communication to ensurethat loads are secured before the waste shaft conveyance is moved.

The waste handling equipment is not noisy, there is adequate ventilation and lighting, and other wastehandling restrictions ensure that other activities that could adversely affect the waste handling process ordisposal configuration do not occur during actual waste handling. WIPP is designed such that wastehandling is most easily and efficiently accomplished by use of the specifically designed waste handlingequipment and the design features associated with the WHB and waste hoist such that there is littlechance that waste would be handled in any manner other than that described in Chapter 2 of this DSA.

The CH waste handling process and storage/disposal configurations are procedurally controlled. Thewaste handling and disposal process is not performed in a stressful environment.

Both the CMR and the waste hoist control panel are equipped with alarms and indication to alert theoperator of equipment conditions. Fire alarm pull stations and mine page phones are located throughoutthe underground in addition to telephones to ensure effective communication with the CMR in the eventof a fire or other off-normal event. Waste handling equipment has sufficient indications to ensure thatthe onboard automatic/manual fire suppression system for the selected equipment is operable.

The WHB and support building are climate controlled to provide a comfortable working environment. Inthe underground, lighting is provided at the base of the waste shaft and in selected areas of the disposalpath and active disposal room. The underground waste transporter and waste handling forklifts areequipped with lights. All personnel in the underground are required to wear hard hats and cap lights.

The waste handling process is not time sensitive such that if anything unusual happens, waste can beplaced in a safe condition and the process stopped. All personnel who work in the underground aretrained to respond properly to off normal events. In the event of a loss of ventilation in the underground,operations personnel are trained to immediately secure all operating diesel equipment. In the event of abreached waste container, personnel are trained to evacuate to a specified location. In the event of a firein the underground, all personnel are required to evacuate. All operations personnel receive training andare required to complete periodic refresher training including re-qualification, thereby providingassurance that the functional requirements of this SAC are met at all times.


The TSR for qualified operators will be a specific directive action in the administrative controls sectionof the CH TSRs. The required performance will be as specified in Section 4.5.10.3 and in Table 4.5-1.


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4.5.11 Toplander Control


The toplander control of the gate at the waste shaft collar prevents a load from inadvertently enteringwaste shaft with the waste shaft out of position. This control also prevents any load from being droppeddown the waste shaft.


The waste shaft conveyance at WIPP is used not only to transport waste from the WHB to theunderground but is also used for both transport of personnel and other materials and equipment. It hasthe largest payload capability and is the preferred method for underground evacuation of personnel. Useof a toplander is the most reliable way to ensure efficient use and safe operation of the of the waste hoistand to ensure that only one material load is in the collar area at a time. Access to the area at the top ofthe waste shaft can be made either from the conveyance car loading room, the north side of the wastehoist tower, or from the facility cask loading room on the RH side of the WHB. The north access istypically used for downloading maintenance materials such as ground support equipment, ventilationductwork, vehicles and large equipment, and fuel and other support equipment. The various doors thataccess the top of the waste shaft are interlocked such that access is through only one set of doors at atime. This is primarily for ventilation control, but also allows the toplander sufficient time tocommunicate with other personnel needing access to the conveyance to either allow access or delayaccess until an earlier evolution is completed.

The top of the shaft is surrounded by a fence with two gates that provide access to the conveyance fromeither the east or west side. There is no excess space at the top of the shaft between the fence and gatesaround the top of the shaft and the access doors into the shaft area. The door interlocks and the lack ofspace prevent loads from being simultaneously introduced into the area at the top of the shaft at the sametime. Loading either personnel or equipment onto the conveyance is a manual operation with noautomation. The gates are manually operated and only the toplander is authorized to operate the gates.

Most equipment including waste is loaded onto the conveyance using a rail-mounted car. The area at thetop of the shaft near the rails is equipped with pivot rails that are in the raised position when theconveyance is not present and are lowered to allow the rail car to be moved onto or off the conveyance.The toplander controls access to either the man deck or material deck of the conveyance by operation ofthe gates. Conveyance movement is initiated by the toplander or by the toplander communicating withthe hoist operator using a bell system to alert the hoist operator that the conveyance is ready to be moved. There is no SSC failure that would prevent the toplander from continuing to control access to the shaft,although total failure of the fence and gates would make the toplander’s job more difficult. Failure ofcommunication does not prevent the toplander from controlling access to the shaft. Withoutcommunication from the top or bottom lander to the hoist operator, the conveyance is not moved.


The toplander shall approve entry of loads onto the waste shaft conveyance through control of the gate atthe waste shaft collar.


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The toplander function to control access to the waste shaft collar is specific and uncomplicated toperform. The only other task required of the toplander in addition to opening and closing the gates at thecollar and access to the conveyance is to alert the hoist operator that the conveyance is ready to move.

The environment in which the toplander performs his assigned duties is not noisy, dusty, or excessivelyhot or cold as the waste hoist tower surrounds the shaft opening and is climate controlled. The gates areeasy to operate. The toplander is equipped with various forms of communication to the hoist operatorand bottom lander and personnel in areas outside the shaft collar area including a mine page phone, atelephone, the bell system. Loading the conveyance is not a time sensitive activity. Proper operation ofthe gates and pivot rails is performed at the beginning of each shift in conjunction with as part of thewaste hoist preoperational checks.

It is unlikely that the toplander will fail in the performance of this SAC as all personnel who transportequipment to the underground or work in the underground are trained to only move equipment into theconveyance if and when the toplander approves entry.


The TSR for toplander control of access to the waste shaft will be a specific directive action in theadministrative controls section of the CH TSRs. The required performance will be as specified inSection 4.5.11.3 and in Table 4.5-1.


4-41 April 2007 |


1. 10 CFR Part 830, Subpart B, "Safety Basis Requirements," 2001.

2. DOE-STD-3009-94, Change 3, Preparation Guide for U.S. Department of Energy NonreactorNuclear Facility Documented Safety Analysis, 2006.

3. DOE G 421.1-2, Implementation Guide for Use in Developing Documented Safety Analyses ToMeet Subpart B of 10 CFR 830, 2001.

4. DOE-STD-1186-2004, Specific Administrative Controls

5. SDD UH00, Underground Hoisting.

6. SDD CF00-GC00, Plant Buildings, Facilities, and Miscellaneous Equipment.

7. NFPA 220, Standard on Types of Building Construction.

8. NFPA 17, Standard for Dry Chemical Extinguishing Systems, National Fire ProtectionAssociation.

9. DOE G 420.1-1, Nonreactor Nuclear Safety Design Criteria and Explosives Safety CriteriaGuide for use with DOE O 420.1, Facility Safety, 2000

10. Hazardous Waste Facility Permit No. NM4890139088-TSDF, issued by the New MexicoEnvironment Department, October 27, 1999.

11. PLG-1167, Analysis of Roof Falls and Methane Gas Explosions in Closed Rooms and Panels, |1997. |

12. ECO 11676, 13-Ton Forklift Fire Evaluation, October 2006.

13. DOE/CBFO-01-3107, Performance Demonstration Program Management Plan

14. DOE/CBFO 97-2273, WIPP Waste Information System User's Manual

15. DOE/WIPP-02-3122, Contact-Handled Transuranic Waste Acceptance Criteria for the WasteIsolation Pilot Plant, Rev. 4.0, December 2005.

16. CS-2003-001, Revision 1, Waste Isolation Pilot Plant Nuclear Criticality Safety Evaluation forContact Handled Transuranic Waste Storage, August 2003.

17. SAIC 1171-001, Revision 1, Nuclear Criticality Safety Evaluation for Storage of MachineCompacted Transuranic Waste at the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant, February 2005, andAddendum 1, June 2005.

18. SAIC 1171-002, Revision 1, Two Container Model Calculation for Non-Compacted WasteContaining <1wt% Beryllium, February 2005.

19. BNFL 53-9840, General Arrangement and Details 100-Gallon Puck Drum, Revision 8, fromUSQ Safety Evaluation 04-034.


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20. NFPA 20, Standard for the Installation of Centrifugal Fire Pumps, National Fire ProtectionAssociation.

21. NFPA 24, Standard for the Installation of Private Fire Service Mains and TheirAppurtenances, National Fire Protection Association.

22. NFPA 25, Standard for the Inspection, Testing, and Maintenance of Water-Based FireProtection Systems, National Fire Protection Association.

23. NFPA 13, Standard for the Installation of Sprinkler Systems, National Fire ProtectionAssociation.

24. SDD FP00, WIPP Fire Protection System.

25. 41-D-011-W1, Rev. J, Waste Handling Facilities Facility Pallet Assembly

26. 31-U-002-014, Rev. D, Waste Shaft 312 Conveyance 31-H-003 General Arrangement

27. 30 CFR 56, 57, 58, and 62, Federal Mine Safety and Health Regulations for Metal andNonmetal Mines

28. DOE/WIPP 02-3212, Ground Control Annual Plan for the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant.

29. WP 04-AU1007, Underground Openings Inspections.


4-43 November 2006

Table 4.3-1 Safety Class SSCs

Chapter 4Section

Safety Class SSCChapter 3 Accident/

RationaleSafety Function Functional Requirements

PerformanceCriteria thatrequires TSR

coverage

4.3.1 Waste Hoist Structure andStructural Support

HA Event UG3-9 Prevent uncontrolled drop ofloaded waste conveyance downthe waste shaft.

The waste hoist load bearing components aredesigned with sufficient safety factor to ensurethat the hoist load bearing components will notfail under maximum loading conditionscoincident with design basis natural events. The structural support to the waste hoist loadbearing components is also designed withsufficient safety factor to support the wastehoist load bearing components undermaximum loading condition.

Programmaticcontrols includingmaintenance, changecontrol process, andUSQ process fordesign changes, andthe waste hoiststructure andstructural supportintegrity program

4.3.2 Waste Handling Building HA Events WHB6-2,WHB7-1, WHB7-2, WHB7-6,WHB7-7, UG7-3, BG7-1

The WHB must withstand theDBE loading to prevent damageto the waste containers within it. The Support Building and theTMF are designed to preventdamage to the WHB from theDBE The WHB shall protectwaste inside it from design basissnow and ice loading. The WHBnoncombustible constructionprevents external and wildlandfires from propagating to theWHB and reduces the likelihoodthat fires will propagate from onepart of the WHB to another

The WHB is designed to withstand a seismicevent that generates a free-field horizontal andvertical ground acceleration of 0.1g, based ona 1,000-year recurrence period, withoutstructurally collapsing.

The main lateral force resisting members of theSupport Building and the TMF are designed towithstand the DBE to protect the WHB fromstructural failure.

The WHB is designed to withstand a roofloading of 27 lb/sq ft. The WHB meets TypeII noncombustible construction.

Programmaticcontrols includingmaintenance, changecontrol process, andUSQ process fordesign changes


Table 4.3-1 Safety Class SSCs

Chapter 4Section

Safety Class SSCChapter 3 Accident/



coverage

4-44 November 2006

4.3.3 Waste Shaft Conveyance HA Events UG1-6, UG2-6,UG3-9, UG6-2.

Prevent loading more than onefacility pallet containing wasteonto the waste hoist conveyanceand waste is protected fromfalling objects and tornadomissiles as the material deck islocated below the mandeck.

The waste shaft conveyance is designed suchthat the height, width, and length of thematerial deck can hold only one facility palletcontaining waste. The chairs on the materialdeck of the waste shaft conveyance hold onlyone loaded facility pallet. The material deck islocated below the mandeck. The waste shaftconveyance is designed such that a facilitypallet can only be loaded using the conveyanceloading car.

Programmaticcontrols includingmaintenance, changecontrol process, andUSQ process fordesign changes

4.3.4 Underground CH WasteHandling EquipmentAutomatic/Manual FireSuppression System

HA Events UG1-1, UG1-2,UG1-3, UG1-4, UG1-5

Prevent fires associated with fuelline leaks and the engine fromdeveloping into a large fire.

The automatic/manual fire suppression systemon diesel powered CH waste handlingequipment selected for use shall be operablefor CH waste handling in the underground. Anoperable automatic fire suppression systemconsists of verifying that the system statuslights on the control module are functioningproperly and no trouble lights are illuminatedand that the system is charged. An operablemanual fire suppression system consists ofverifying that the system is charged.

Programmaticcontrols includingmaintenance, changecontrol process, andUSQ process fordesign changes andan LCO withrequired surveillanceto ensure the systemis operable for theequipment selectedfor use prior tohandling waste

4.3.5 CH Waste Handling 13-TonElectric Forklifts

HA Events WHB1-2, 1-3, 1-5 Forklift design and robustconstruction prevents a forkliftfire from becoming large enoughto damage CH waste containersin the WHB.

The CH waste handling 13-ton electricforklifts shall be designed and constructedsuch that the hydraulic fluid is segregated frompotential ignition sources. The batteries,motor, and motor contactors are separatedfrom each other and from the hydraulicreservoir by thick metal partitions. The body ofthe forklift has thick metal walls that protectthe electrical and hydraulic components fromdamage due to collisions.

Programmaticcontrols includingmaintenance, changecontrol process andUSQ process for anyphysical change tothe electric wastehandling forklifts.


4-45 November 2006

Table 4.4-1 Safety Significant SSCs

Chapter 4Section

Safety Significant SSCChapter 3 Accident/



coverage

4.4.1 Water Distribution, FireWater Supply andDistribution, and FireSuppression Systems

HA Events WHB1-1,WHB1-2, WHB1-3,WHB1-5, WHB6-2,WHB7-1, UG1-6

The safety function is to preventsmall fires from becoming largefires and to reduce the likelihoodthat a fire in the Support Buildingor TMF will propagate to theWHB.

The fire water supply and distribution systemand fire suppression system within the TMF,WHB, and Support Building mustautomatically actuate and provide firesuppression sufficient to keep any fire fromdeveloping into a large fire. To accomplishthis the fire water supply and distributionsystem includes:- a water capacity of $135,000 gallons- two operable fire pumps

An operable fire suppression system includesthe following:- The static pressure as measured at each

riser to the WHB and Support Buildingshall be greater than or equal 125 poundsper square inch gauge (psig).

- The main isolation valve at riser shall belocked in the open position

- All other system isolation valves shall belocked in the open position

- The post indicator valve shall be locked inthe open position

- Main drain test results are less than orequal to 20 percent pressure change

- Water flow indication when the inspector'stest valve is opened

LCO coverage in theTSRs to meet thefunctionalrequirementsincludingsurveillance andmaintenance inaccordance withNFPA 25.



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4-46 November 2006

4.4.2 Waste Handling BuildingLightning Dissipation Systemand design for highwinds/DBT

HA Events WHB7-3,UG7-4, WHB7-4, WHB7-5

Prevent damage to wastecontainers that could impactworkers due to lightning strikes,high winds and DBT

The WHB is designed to withstand a tornadowith a 183 mph wind speed with a1,000,000-year return frequency, and towithstand straight winds with a wind speed of110 mph with a 1,000-year return frequency. The WHB is not designed to withstandpenetration by wind driven missiles. Ensureby passive design that the LightningDissipation System dissipates the lightning toground and WHB withstands high winds andDBT.

Programmaticcontrols includingmaintenance, changecontrol process, andUSQ process fordesign changes.

4.4.3 Waste Hoist Brakes HA Events UG3-8, UG6-1

The waste hoist brakes preventthe uncontrolled movement of thewaste shaft conveyance upon lossof power or loss of hydraulicpressure.

The waste hoist brakes are required to stopmovement of the waste shaft conveyance uponloss of power or loss of hydraulic pressureunder all modes of operation includingmaximum speed and maximum load at anylocation along the shaft. The waste hoistbrakes can stop the fully loaded waste shaftconveyance under all emergency stopconditions. The redundant brakes aredesigned so that either set is capable ofstopping the waste shaft conveyance when theconveyance carries the maximum payload atthe maximum hoisting depth.

The TSRs willrequire an AC toperformpreoperationalchecks on the wastehoist brakes at thebeginning of eachshift, prior to placingthe waste hoist inservice.

4.4.4 Property Protection Area HA Events WHB6-2,WHB7-1

Maintain a physical separationbetween the WHB and theindigenous low profile vegetationsurrounding site.

Provide a separation (firebreak) between thevegetation outside the PPA and the WHBinside the PPA.

Change controlprocess and USQprocess for designchanges.

4.4.5 Bulkheads, Overcasts, andAirlocks

HA Events UG1-1,UG1-4, and UG1-5

Provide separation betweenconstruction ventilation circuitand disposal circuit and wasteshaft station in the underground.

Bulkheads, overcasts, and airlocks shall beconstructed of noncombustible material.




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4-47 November 2006

4.4.6 6-Ton TRUDOCK Cranes HA Events BG7-1,WHB6-4, WHB7-2

Prevents dropping wastecontainers or dropping items onwaste containers that could resultin a breach and release ofradiological material.

The cranes shall be designed to hold their loadduring the DBE or loss of power.

To ensure the 6-tonTRUDOCK craneswill continue toperform their safetyfunction, periodicmaintenance,inspections, andbrake tests shall beperformed. Changecontrol process andUSQ process fordesign changes.

4.4.7 Fence around the waste shaftcollar

HA Event UG6-2 Defines restricted area around thewaste shaft and preventsuncontrolled access to the shaft.

A barrier to prevent inadvertent access to thewaste shaft .

Visually inspect forproper operation. and ensure thechange controlprocess and USQprocess for designchanges.

4.4.8 Conveyance Loading Car HA Event UG6-2 Prevent pallet of waste frominadvertently entering wasteshaft.

Design features of the Conveyance LoadingCar shall ensure that even if the car is movedtoward an empty waste hoist shaft that a palletcontaining waste mounted on it will not fallinto the shaft.

Change controlprocess and USQprocess for designchanges. Programmaticcontrol to requirepreoperationalchecks prior to use.



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4-48 November 2006

4.4.9 Facility Pallet HA Event UG6-2 Interfaces with the conveyanceloading car to prevent the palletfrom sliding off the car, mateswith the waste shaft conveyancechairs to support the pallet duringtransport of waste to theunderground, and extendsbeyond the waste containerstransported on the pallet toprotect the waste from bulkheaddoor impact.

Ensure by passive design characteristics thatwhen bulkhead doors accidentally shut whilethe waste on a facility pallet on theunderground transporter is moving throughthem the waste containers will not beimpacted by the doors. Ensure by passivedesign feature that the pallet is sized to fit onthe conveyance loading car and rest on thechairs on the waste shaft conveyance. Thefacility pallet is designed to mate with pintleson the conveyance loading car to prevent thepallet from sliding off the conveyance loadingcar.


4.4.10 Waste Hoist Head Frame HA Event UG6-2 Prevent loading a facility palletinto the waste shaft from aforklift

Ensure by passive design characteristics that afacility pallet will not fit into the waste shaftwhen an attempt is made to place it thereusing a forklift.


4.4.11 Underground Ventilation HA Events UG1-1,UG1-2, UG1-3, UG2-1,UG2-3, UG3-6, UG3-7

Ensures airflow is directed awayfrom workers and towards thedisposal array, and that there issufficient airflow to facilitateevacuation of the undergroundworkers in the event of a fire.

Ensure sufficient airflow is provided to theunderground for waste handling operationsand worker evacuation in the event of a fire.

LCO coverage in theTSRs to requireverification ofminimum airflow inactive disposal roomand in the wasteshaft ventilationcircuit.

4.4.12 Lift Fixtures and SpaceFrame Pallet Assemblies

HA Events WHB3-1,WHB3-2

ACGLFs, four-drum pallet liftingdevice, SWB lift fixture adapter,the TDOP lift fixture adapter, andspace frame pallet assemblies andlift pins are designed to holddesign basis load.

Prevents dropping waste during removal fromthe shipping cask

Change controlprocess and USQprocess for designchanges. Preoperationalchecks prior to use


4-50 November 2006

Table 4.5-1 Specific Administrative Controls

Chapter 4Section

SpecificAdministrative

Control

Chapter 3Accident/Rationale

Safety Function Functional Requirements


coverage

4.5.1 Criticality SafetyProgram

HA EventsOA5-1,WHB5-1, UG5-1

Through control of fissile mass andmoderator/reflector mass by wastecontainer type and the waste handlingconfigurations at WIPP, criticality isincredible at WIPP.

A waste characterization/certification program at each generator siteensures that only CH waste that meets the WIPP CH WAC15 is disposedof at WIPP, and that any exceptions are evaluated against all applicablebaseline documents prior to their authorization for shipment. Thecriticality safety requirements shall be met before waste is approved fordisposal at WIPP

Fissile loading shall not exceed 200 FGE (fissile gram equivalent),including two times the measurement error, per 55-, 85-, or l00-gallondrum containing up to 5 kg beryllium.16, 17, 18 If drums are used to overpackwaste that has been compacted, the waste must conform to one of thefollowing conditions:

- The packing fraction of the waste contents shall not exceed 70 percent,or

- The fissile loading for the overpacking drum shall not exceed 170FGE, or

- The internal and external height dimensions of the overpacking drumshall ensure a minimum ½ in. separation between the contents of thedrums containing compacted waste and other waste containers whenstacked. For example, drums that meet the internal and external heightdimensions of BNFL drawing 53-9840, Revision 8,19 ensure that thevertical separation between the centers of drums containing compactedwaste and other waste containers, when stacked, is at least ½ in. Theuse of steel spacers in the top and bottom of the overpacking drum isalso an acceptable method of achieving design separation.

Fissile loading shall not exceed 100 FGE, including two times themeasurement error, per 55-, 85-, or 100-gallon drum containing berylliumat greater than 5kg and up to a maximum of 100 kg of beryllium. Thedensity for polyethylene shall not exceed 20 percent (0.184 g/cm3) of itstheoretical full density.16

SAC for thefunctionalrequirements



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4-51 November 2006

Criticality SafetyProgramcontinued

Fissile loading shall not exceed 325 FGE, including two times themeasurement error, per direct loaded SWB or TDOP with CH waste,beryllium shall not exceed 18.14 kg, and beryllium must be fines orshavings, and the density of polyethylene distributed in the SWB shall notexceed 20 percent (0.184g/cm3) of its theoretical full density.17, 18

For compacted CH waste direct loaded into a SWB or TDOP in which thedensity of polyethylene exceeds 20 percent of its full theoretical densityup to full density, fissile loading shall not exceed 185 FGE, including twotimes the measurement error, beryllium shall not exceed 18.14 kg, andberyllium must be fines or shavings.17, 18

Pipe overpacks (a 55-gallon drum containing a standard 6- or 12-inch pipecomponent, or a S100, S200, or S300 pipe component) are limited to nogreater than 200 FGE, including two times the measurement error, and 5kg beryllium.

A drum overpacked in TDOP or SWB requires that the FGE andberyllium mass be restricted to the limits of the direct loaded SWB orTDOP. A SWB overpacked in a TDOP requires that the TDOP FGE andberyllium mass be restricted to the direct loaded TDOP limit.16, 17, 18

The waste handling, storage, and disposal configuration at WIPP is asfollows:

Drum arrays shall not exceed three drums high in the undergrounddisposal area and two drums high in the WHB storage areas.16, 17, 18



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4-52 November 2006

4.5.2 WasteCharacteristicsControl

HA EventsWHB1-4,WHB2-4, andUG2-5.Basis HA andChapter 3assumption.

Basis HA andChapter 3assumption

Prevent fires and explosions in wastecontainers by eliminating ignitionsources in waste containers.

Protect basic inventory assumptions

The following hazardous materials are prohibited from being in wastedisposed at WIPP: S Residual liquids in excess of 1 percent by volume of waste - Pyrophoric radioactive materials in excess of 1% by weight of waste - All pyrophoric nonradioactive materials - Explosives - Compressed gases (pressurized containers) - Wastes exhibiting the characteristic of ignitability, corrosivity, or

reactivity (Environmental Protection Agency hazardous wastenumbers of D001, D002, or D003)

- No hazardous wastes unless they exist as co-contaminants withtransuranics.

# 80 PE-Ci/55-, 85-, or 100-gallon direct loaded drum# 560 PE-Ci/direct loaded SWB # 560 PE-Ci/direct loaded TDOP# 1200 PE-Ci/overpacked assembly of undamaged containers (55-

gallon drum overpacked in a SWB, 100-gallon drum, 85-gallon drum,or TDOP; 85-gallon or 100-gallon or SWB overpacked in TDOP). Ifgreater than 1200 PE-Ci, a USQ safety evaluation shall be performedand, if required, obtain DOE concurrence for the safe processing ofthe waste.

# 1800 PE-Ci/waste container of solidified/vitrified waste# 1100 PE-Ci/ undamaged 55- gallon drum overpacked in a SWB,

100-gallon drum, 85-gallon drum, or TDOP; 85-gallon or 100-gallonor SWB overpacked in TDOP

# 1800 PE-Ci/Pipe Overpack Containers including either 6-in. or 12-in.pipe components, or S100, S200, or S300 pipe components




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4-53 November 2006

4.5.2 WasteCharacteristicsControlcontinued

HA/AA initialconditions

HA EventsWHB1-4, 2-4,UG2-5

Basis HA andChapter 3assumption




Limit acceptable containers to metal 55-gallon drums, 85-gallon drums,100-gallon drums, TDOPs, SWBs, and pipe overpack containers (a pipeoverpack refers to a 55-gallon drum containing either a standard 6" or 12"pipe component, or S100, S200, or S300 pipe component) that meet DOTType 7A or equivalent. All waste containers are vented

Surface dose rate on waste containers shall not exceed 200 mrem/hrsurface reading.



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4-54 November 2006

4.5.3 CombustibleLoading ControlProgram - WHB

HA initialcondition

HA Events WHB1-1,WHB1-2,WHB1-3,WHB2-3

HA EventWHB2-3

HA EventWHB6-2

HA EventsWHB1-1, WHB1-2, WHB1-3

Minimize potential and size of fires bycontrolling the amount of combustiblematerial in the WHB and TMF, controlcombustible loading in the WHB towithin the assumptions of the firehazards analysis

Prevents fires/explosions due to releaseof flammable gas in the WHB whilewaste containers are not protected by transportation containers.

Prevents flammable gas explosionsoutside the WHB from penetrating theWHB

Prevents fires in the TMF frompropagating to the CH bay andimpacting waste.

Prevents fires in the RH bay frompropagating to the CH bay andimpacting waste.

Prevents continuity of combustiblematerial and prevents a pool fire largeenough to damage CH waste in theWHB.

When waste is outside of closed TRUPACT-IIs or HalfPACTs, onlyelectric powered equipment shall be allowed in the CH bay.

Flammable compressed gas cylinders are prohibited in the CH bay unlessall waste containers are inside closed TRUPACT-IIs or HalfPACTs. Thelimitation does not apply to packages covered by DOT Exemption DOT-E-7607.

No compressed flammable gas/liquid or flammable compressed gascylinders shall be stored along the external walls of the WHB, or TMF, orin the area between the WHB and Support Building

When waste is stored in the southwest corner of the CH bay, dieselpowered equipment used in the TMF shall maintain a 15 ft standoffdistance from the common wall between the CH bay and TMF or a firewatch is posted with the diesel equipment being operated.

When waste is stored in the northeast corner of the CH bay, dieselpowered equipment used in the in the RH bay shall maintain a 15 ftstandoff distance from the common wall between the CH bay and RH bayor a fire watch is posted with the diesel equipment being operated.

Transient combustibles shall not be stored closer than 10 ft. from waste orpallets of slip sheets. No more than three pallets of fiberboard slip sheetsand one pallet of polyethylene slip sheets shall be stored in the CH bay. Pallets of slip sheets must not be stacked and a 10 ft separation distanceshall be maintained between each slip sheet pallet and between slip sheetpallets and stored waste. No more than one gallon of lubricants/denaturedalcohol may be at each TRUDOCK location.




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4-55 November 2006

4.5.3 cont. CombustibleLoading ControlProgram - WHBcont.

WHB1-6,WHB2-6

Prevent fires/explosions in the wastehoist tower with the potential to impactwaste during transport on the wasteshaft conveyance.

No more than 1 gallon of solvents shall be stored in the waste hoist towerfor maintenance on hoist. Used oil/hydraulic fluid shall be removed fromthe waste hoist tower after hoist maintenance prior to handling waste onthe waste shaft conveyance.

SAC for thefunctionalrequirements.

4.5.4 Waste HandlingRestrictions

HA and Chapter3 assumption

HA eventsUG1-2, UG1-3

Prevents collisions in the wastetransport from the waste shaft to theactive disposal room, prevents firesresulting from collisions, and protectbasic inventory assumptions

- Once out of the TRUPACT-IIs or HalfPACTs the WASTE containersare stored on facility pallets and are transported on facility pallets toand in the underground until disposed of in the waste array.

- No waste containers are opened at the WIPP- Only one facility pallet is transported on the waste hoist at any one

time.- A spotter is required when moving waste.- Waste is transported to the underground storage area by way of the

waste shaft only. No other shaft to the underground is used fortransportation of waste.

- In the underground, no waste will be moved to a location outside thedesignated disposal path.

- No non-waste handling vehicles allowed in active disposal room duringwaste handling.

- A spotter is required when vehicles are operating within 75 ft of thewaste face.




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4-56 November 2006

4.5.4 Waste HandlingRestrictions

HA andChapter 3assumption



All undergroundHA events thatresult in releaseof radioactivematerial.

HA EventWHB6-1

Protects HA assumptions

Protect basic inventory assumptions.

Protects HA assumptions

Reduce the potential consequences tounderground workers in the event arelease of material occurs.

Prevents vehicles from breaching theWHB wall and impacting waste storedin the SW corner of the CH bay.

TRUPACT-IIs and HalfPACTs are not opened in the parking area, but arebrought into the CH bay inside the WHB before opening.

In the WHB, the inventory is limited to 18 facility pallets in the CH bayand four TRUPACT-IIs or HalfPACTs at the TRUDOCKs, with no morethan seven stored in the northeast corner of the CH bay, no more thanseven stored in the southwest corner of the CH bay, no more than fivestored near airlock 107, and one facility pallet in the shielded storageroom. A facility pallet holds four drum assemblies, 4 SWBs, or twoTDOPs or a combination of containers.

Waste is stored only in designated areas within the WHB which includesthe northeast and southwest portion of the CH Bay, near airlock 107, theshielded storage room, and at the TRUDOCKs.

Restrict personnel access in E-300 from the exit of the active disposalpanel to the underground ventilation exhaust shaft during waste transitand emplacement until these activities are complete.

Barricades shall be installed along the southwest wall of the WHBbetween airlock 100 and the TMF such that they are nominally 10 ft. fromthe external wall of the WHB.




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4-57 November 2006

4.5.5 CombustibleLoading ControlProgram -Disposal Path

HA EventsUG1-1, UG1-4,UG1-5, UG2-1,UG3-4, UG3-5

AA CH-5

Prevents fires that may result fromcollisions between vehicles. Preventsconstruction activities from impactingwaste in transit from the waste shaftstation to the active disposal room. Prevents collisions between wastehandling and non-waste handlingequipment during waste handlingoperation. Prevents fires/explosionsfrom impacting waste.


When the waste is in transit, non-waste handling equipment shall bemoved to a cross cut and be secured until the waste transporter has passedand is greater than 75 ft away. Vehicles that may have become disabled(excluding the lube truck) may be in the disposal path but must be securedalong the wall of the disposal path.

No storage of combustibles or flammable compressed gas cylinders in thewaste transport route from the waste shaft station to the active disposalroom. Note that parked vehicle is not storage. No use of flammablegas/liquid or flammable compressed gas cylinders in the disposal pathduring waste handling. No storage of flammable gas/liquid or flammablecompressed gas cylinders near the panel supply ventilation overcast andno construction work involving flammable gas/liquid or flammablecompressed gas cylinders between the disposal panel supply overcast andthe construction bulkhead to the south in East 300 during waste handlingoperations. When panel 4 is added to the disposal path no constructionwork involving flammable gas/liquid or flammable compressed gascylinders is allowed between the overcast at E-140/S-3310 and theconstruction bulkhead to the west of this overcast in S-3310 during CHwaste handling operations. No storage of flammable gas/liquid orflammable compressed gas cylinders between the AIS and South 1000 inWest 30 or within 100 ft of bulkhead 303 on the North ventilation side,and no use in these locations during CH waste handling operations

Transporters loaded with waste in the underground shall maintain greaterthan 75 ft separation between them. This separation distance does notapply if a transporter becomes disabled while loaded with waste and it isnecessary to either move another loaded transporter past or move wastefrom a disabled transporter to another transporter. If this situation occurs,a fire watch is required.

The lube truck is not allowed in the disposal circuit during wastehandling.




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4-58 August 2007|

4.5.6 CombustibleLoading ControlProgram - ActiveDisposal Room

HA EventsUG1-2, UG1-3,and UG3-6.

AA CH-2

Prevents fires/explosions resulting fromnon-waste handling activities.

No use of flammable gas/liquid or flammable compressed gas cylinders inthe active disposal room without a fire watch.

No storage of flammable gas/liquid or flammable compressed gascylinders in the active disposal room.

No hot work or use of flammable gas/liquid or flammable compressed gascylinders within 75 ft of waste without a fire watch.

No lube truck in active disposal room.

No non-waste handling equipment within 75 ft of waste face without a firewatch.

No non-waste handling vehicles allowed in active disposal room duringwaste handling.


4.5.7 Ground ControlProgram

HA EventsUG3-1, 3-3AA CH-8

Prevents roof fall event in activedisposal room

Weekly ground control inspections shall be performed in the undergroundwaste handling areas.


4.5.8 Waste HoistBrakePerformance

HA EventsUG3-8

Prevent the uncontrolled movement ofthe waste shaft conveyance upon lossof power or loss of hydraulic pressure.

Procedures shall be established, implemented, and maintained to ensurethat the preoperational checks of the waste hoist brake system shall beperformed on each shift prior to transporting waste.


4.5.9 NonflammableCompressed GasCylinder Control

HA EventsWHB3-5 andUG3-10

Minimize the potential for improperhandling or storage of compressed gascylinders which could result in damageto waste containers and a subsequentrelease.

No more than four compressed gas cylinders (no larger than DOT Type3AA, style K) shall be in the CH bay when WASTE is outside of a closedTRUPACT-II or HalfPACT. This limit does not apply to hand held fireextinguishers. No compressed gas cylinders (excluding hand held fire|extinguishers, SCSRs, and O2 bottles in trauma kits) shall be stored at the|bottom of the waste shaft, in the disposal path or disposal room.




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4-59 November 2006

4.5.10 QualifiedOperators

HA EventsWHB3-1,WHB3-2,WHB3-3,WHB3-6,UG1-1, UG1-2,UG1-3, UG3-6,and UG3-7.

Ensures operators are qualified toproperly operate the waste handlingequipment during normal operationsand to properly respond to off-normaloperations. This requirement alsoensures that the CMR operator(s) andoperations personnel in theunderground performing wastehandling operations communicate andtake the appropriate actions in the eventof a fire in the underground such thatthe CMR operator(s) blocks theautomatic shift to filtration ofunderground ventilation until personnelare out of danger. This requirementalso ensures that operations personnelin the underground take the necessaryimmediate actions to notify the CMRand proceed to a safe location.

Only operators who are trained in the operational evolutions and qualifiedon the applicable equipment are authorized to operate plant equipment forwaste handling operations. Additionally, only operators who are trainedin the appropriate response to fires in the underground shall be authorizedto man the CMR or to operate plant equipment for CH waste handlingoperations.


4.5.11 ToplanderControl

HA EventsUG6-2AA CH-7

Prevents a load from inadvertentlyentering the waste shaft with the wasteshaft conveyance out of position. Alsoprevents any load from being droppeddown the waste shaft or a load frominadvertently entering the waste shaft.

The toplander shall approve entry of loads onto the waste shaftconveyance through control of the gate at the waste shaft collar.



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5-i November 2006

DERIVATION OF THE TECHNICAL SAFETY REQUIREMENTS

TABLE OF CONTENTS

SECTION PAGE NO.

5.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5-1

5.2 Requirements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5-1

5.3 TSR Coverage . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5-2

5.4 Derivation of Facility Modes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5-2

5.5 TSR Derivation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5-35.5.1 Fire Water Supply and Fire Suppression System . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5-3

5.5.1.1 Safety Limits, Limiting Control Settings, and Limiting Conditions for Operation. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5-3

5.5.1.2 Surveillance Requirements for Fire Water Supply and Fire Suppression . . . . . 5-45.5.2 Underground CH Waste Handling Equipment Automatic/Manual Fire Suppression

System . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5-55.5.2.1 Safety Limits, Limiting Control Settings, and Limiting Conditions for Operation

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5-55.5.2.2 Surveillance Requirements for Underground CH Waste Handling Equipment

Automatic/Manual Fire Suppression System . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5-65.5.3 Underground Ventilation System . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5-6

5.5.3.1 Safety Limits, Limiting Control Settings, and Limiting Conditions for Operation. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5-7

5.5.3.2 Surveillance Requirements for Underground Ventilation System . . . . . . . . . . . 5-75.5.4 Administrative Controls . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5-7

5.6 Design Features . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5-12

5.7 Interface with TSRs from Other Facilities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5-14



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DERIVATION OF THE TECHNICAL SAFETY REQUIREMENTS

LIST OF TABLES

TABLE PAGE NO.

Table 5-1 Summary of TSR Controls and Design Features . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5-16


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5.1 Introduction

The purpose of this chapter is to derive the technical safety requirements based upon the control functionsdetermined to be essential in Chapter 3, Hazard and Accident Analysis; and Chapter 4, Safety Structures,Systems, and Components. This chapter consists of summaries and references to pertinent sections of thisCH DSA in which design features (DFs) and administrative controls (ACs) are needed to prevent and/ormitigate the consequences of a postulated event. The limiting conditions for operation (LCOs),surveillance requirements (SRs), and necessary ACs determined in this chapter form the basis for thefacility technical safety requirements (TSRs) and provide the logical link between the TSRs and thedocumented safety analysis (DSA).

Expected products of this chapter, as applicable and based on the graded approach, include the followinginformation with a sufficient basis to derive, as appropriate, any of the following TSR parameters forindividual TSR controls:

• Safety limits (SLs)

• Limiting control settings (LCSs)

• LCOs

• SRs

• Information with a sufficient basis to derive TSR ACs and specific administrative controls(SACs) for specific control features or to specify programs necessary to perform institutionalsafety functions

• Identification of TSR controls for all passive design features addressed in the DSA

• Identification of TSR controls from other facilities that affect the WIPP safety basis

• Derivation of facility modes

5.2 Requirements

The content, format, and graded-approach guidelines for identifying TSRs in this chapter have beenspecifically developed in accordance with requirements of the following codes, standards, and regulatorydocuments:

• Title 10 CFR 830.205, "Technical Safety Requirements"1

• DOE-STD-3009-94, Preparation Guide for U.S. Department of Energy Nonreactor NuclearFacility Documented Safety Analyses2

• DOE-STD 1186-2004, Specific Administrative Controls.3

• DOE Guide 423.1-1, Implementation Guide for Use in Developing Technical SafetyRequirements4


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5.3 TSR Coverage

This section provides assurance that TSR coverage for the WIPP is complete. The TSR controls ensurethat the safety functions outlined in Chapters 3 and 4 of the DSA are operational when required, andpreserve the Initial Conditions. Chapter 3 identifies the controls necessary to prevent and/or mitigatepotential hazardous events evaluated in this DSA. Chapter 4 identifies which SSCs are safety class (SC)and safety significant (SS) and systematically evaluates the credited SSCs identified in Chapter 3. TheSSCs and ACs identified in Chapter 3 are required to prevent and/or mitigate postulated events within theWIPP and, therefore, they are evaluated for TSR coverage.

Table 5-1 provides a listing of controls (SSCs and ACs) along with the type of operating limit required,the safety function performed, and the related HA events. The selected passive design features that wouldhave a significant effect on the safe operation of the WIPP, if altered or modified, are described in Section5.6.

All SSCs and ACs credited with prevention and/or mitigation in the AA and those required for workerprotection have been incorporated into the TSRs. In this context, preventive controls are not viewed toreduce the probability of the event to zero, but rather to significantly reduce frequency.

5.4 Derivation of Facility Modes

To aid in compliance with the WIPP LCOs, operational modes are established to provide a safe,structured approach to facility operation. Modes reflect the relative hazards associated with differentfacility or process configurations; categorize the requirements placed on the facility as a convenience foroperator control; and aid the Operations staff in determining when the LCO is applicable. Also, modesprovide a convenient way to ensure availability of all pertinent safety functions during the current processarea/system configuration because not all safety functions are required in each mode. If equipmentperforms a safety function, but the safety function is not required in certain modes, it would be inefficientto require the equipment to be operable when it is not needed.

The three MODES defined in the TSRs for the WIPP are CH Waste Handling, CH Waste Storage, andCH Standby. The hierarchy of modes from the highest to the lowest in relation to hazards is CH WasteHandling, CH Waste Storage, and CH Standby. Mode designations and changes are an administrativedeclaration made by the WIPP Facility Shift Manager or designee. There are certain requirements andcharacteristics that will be present during each mode. The mode definition addresses the actualperformance or the capability of the WIPP facility to conduct its intended function(s).

CH Waste Handling Mode

CH waste handling mode is used for the CH bay of the WHB when moving waste outside of theTRUPACT-II or HalfPACT, and underground during waste transport using the waste hoist, or movingwaste in the disposal path, or emplacing waste in the active disposal room. While in this mode, CH wasteis being unloaded from transportation containers, transported on facility pallets to the WHB storage area,loaded on the conveyance loading car and onto the waste shaft conveyance, transported to theunderground, off loaded from the waste shaft conveyance, transported to the active disposal room, andemplaced. While in this mode all LCOs for operation(s) have been met and the facility is performing or iscapable of performing its intended function(s). Other actives that are allowed in this mode aremaintenance, repair, and inspections as long as these activities are not in conflict with the requirementsset forth in this document.


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CH Waste Storage Mode

CH waste storage mode is a mode that is used for the CH bay. While in this mode, CH waste can not bephysically handled, but will be temporarily stored. Other activities, such as maintenance, repair, andinspections are allowed as long as these activities do not conflict with the requirements set forth in thisdocument.

CH Standby Mode

CH standby mode is a mode used for the CH bay. While in this mode, no CH waste outside of a closedTRUPACT-II or HalfPACT can be present in the CH bay or on the waste hoist.

The CH standby mode is the safest mode for the CH bay due to the fact that while in this mode no wastewill be present outside of a closed TRUPACT-II or HalfPACT in the CH bay, therefore, the postulatedevents involving waste can not occur. The underground portion of the facility can never be in the standbymode.

5.5 TSR Derivation

The derivation of the TSRs is organized by specific design or administrative feature identified inSection 5.3. Each subsection includes the specific feature, relevant modes of operation, LCO, SRs, andACs. The WIPP facility has no SLs or LCSs derived for TSRs.

5.5.1 Fire Water Supply and Fire Suppression System

The safety function of an operable fire suppression system is to reduce the frequency of a small-scale fire growing into a large-scale fire by spreading to the WHB from various parts of the surface structuresresulting in an off-site release. The suppression system is required to be functional only while the facilityis in CH Waste Handling or CH Waste Storage mode. Chapter 4 provides (1) system description andsystem functionality, (2) system evaluation, and (3) justification for the TSR.

5.5.1.1 Safety Limits, Limiting Control Settings, and Limiting Conditions for Operation

SLs are limits on process variables associated with those physical barriers that, if exceeded, could directlycause the failure of one or more barriers that prevent the uncontrolled release of radioactive or otherhazardous materials, with the potential of consequences to the public above specified guidelines. Inoperability of the Fire Suppression System would not result in a release of material. Therefore no SLs are required.

LCSs are settings on safety systems that control process variables to prevent exceeding SLs. Because noSLs are identified for the WIPP, no LCSs are required.

LCOs are selected to detail the operability requirements for the given equipment and to ensure that thepractical definitive parameter limits are included in the LCO statement. As identified in Chapter 4, thetwo LCOs with their accompanying definitive parameters are presented below.

Fire Suppression System for the WHB and Support Building

A LCO shall be required, along with the appropriate conditions for an operable fire suppression system,for the WHB and the fire suppression system for the Support Building:


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• The static pressure as measured at each riser to the WHB and Support Building shall be greaterthan or equal 125 pounds per square inch gauge (psig).

• The main isolation valve at riser shall be locked in the open position

• All other system isolation valves shall be locked in the open position

• The post indicator valve shall be locked in the open position

• Main drain test results are less than or equal to 20 percent pressure change

• Water flow indication when the inspector's test valve is opened

Fire Water Supply System

A LCO shall be required along with the appropriate conditions for an operable Fire Water Supply System:

• The system shall maintain a water capacity of $135,000 gallons

• The system shall have two operable fire pumps

5.5.1.2 Surveillance Requirements for Fire Water Supply and Fire Suppression

Fire Suppression System

Water Supply Pressure

In order for the fire suppression system to operate properly, the water supply pressure at the CH bay risermust be greater than or equal to 125 psig. This SR verifies on a monthly basis that the water supplypressure is adequate.

Main Isolation Valve

The main isolation valve for each riser is required to be locked open. This SR verifies that these valvesare locked open on a monthly basis.

Other Isolation Valves

The other isolation valves in the system are required to be locked open. This SR verifies that these valveare locked open on a monthly basis.

Post Indicator Valves

The post indicator valve associated with each system is required to be locked open. This SR verifies thatthis valve is locked open on a monthly basis.

Inspector's Test Valve Flow

The fire suppression system requires indication of water flow when the ITV is opened. This SR opens theITV and verifies water flow through the associated system on a quarterly basis.

Main Drain Test

In order for the fire suppression system to be operable, the main drain test results must be less than orequal to 20 percent pressure change. This SR performs this test annually and verifies that the results arewithin the required parameters.


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Fire Water System

Fire Water Capacity

The fire water supply system is required to have more than 135,000 gallons of water available for fireprotection. This SR verifies that the required amount of water is present prior to each shift.

Isolation Valve

In order for the Fire water supply system to provide water to individual sprinkler systems, the isolationvalve is required to be locked open. This SR verifies that the valve is open prior to each shift. Diesel Fuel

To maintain the diesel pump operable, there is required to be greater than 125 gallons of diesel fuel in thediesel fire pump fuel tank. This SR verifies that the required amount of fuel is present prior to each shift.

Automatic Start Test

An automatic start test is required to be performed on the fire pumps weekly. This SR ensures that eachpump can automatically start at the proper pressure parameters.

Pump Output

To provide the necessary amount of water to the sprinkler systems, each fire pump must be capable ofpumping at least 1500 gpm at 105 psi net discharge. This SR verifies annually that the pumps canperform this function.

5.5.2 Underground CH Waste Handling Equipment Automatic/Manual Fire Suppression System

The safety function of the automatic/manual fire suppression system on diesel powered CH wastehandling equipment is to prevent a small fire associated with fuel line leaks or the engine from developinginto a large fire. The automatic/manual fire suppression system is required to be operable while handlingwaste in the underground. Chapter 4 provides (1) system description and system functionality, (2) systemevaluation, and (3) justification for the TSR.


Safety Limits ( SLs) are limits on process variables associated with those physical barriers that, ifexceeded, could directly cause the failure of one or more barriers that prevent the uncontrolled release ofradioactive or other hazardous materials, with the potential of consequences to the public above specifiedguidelines. Inoperability of diesel powered waste handling equipment fire suppression system would notresult in a release of material. Therefore no SLs are required.

Limiting Control Settings (LCSs) are settings on safety systems that control process variables to preventexceeding SLs. Because no SLs are identified for the WIPP, no LCSs are required.

Limiting Conditions for Operation (LCOs) are selected to detail the operability requirements for the givenequipment and to ensure that the practical definitive parameter limits are included in the LCO statement.As identified in Chapter 4, the LCO with the accompanying definitive parameters is presented below.


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Underground CH Waste Handling Equipment Automatic/Manual Fire Suppression System

A LCO shall be required, along with the appropriate conditions for an operable automatic/manual firesuppression system on diesel powered CH waste handling equipment selected for use. An operableautomatic fire suppression system consists of the following:

• System status lights are functioning properly and no trouble lights are illuminated on theautomatic fire suppression system control module.

• A charged fire suppressant system on the waste handling equipment selected for use.

An operable manual fire suppression system consists of the following element:

• A charged fire suppressant system on the waste handling equipment selected for use.

5.5.2.2 Surveillance Requirements for Underground CH Waste Handling EquipmentAutomatic/Manual Fire Suppression System

Control Module

The automatic fire suppression system control module system status lights shall be verified as functioningproperly and that no trouble lights are illuminated for the selected waste handling equipment. This SR isperformed every 48 hours.

Visual Verification

A visual verification is made that the fire suppression system has not discharged. This SR is performedevery 12 hours.

Fire Suppression System Charge

The automatic/manual fire suppression system cartridge shall be verified as charged. This SR verifies thesystem is charged on a semi-annual basis.

System Controls

The automatic/manual fire suppression system control shall be verified as functioning. This SR verifiesthe system controls operate properly on a semi-annual basis.

5.5.3 Underground Ventilation System

The safety function of underground ventilation system is to ensure that there is sufficient airflow forwaste handling activities and to direct airflow away from workers in the event of a waste containerbreach. The system also provides fresh air for worker evacuation in the event of a fire. In accordancewith operating procedures, the automatic shift to filtration of the underground ventilation exhaust isblocked, based on fire conditions, by the CMR operator until personnel are out of danger. The ventilation system is required to be operable for waste handling operations. Chapter 4 provides (1) systemdescription and system functionality, (2) system evaluation, and (3) justification for the TSR.


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Safety Limits (SLs) are limits on process variables associated with those physical barriers that, ifexceeded, could directly cause the failure of one or more barriers that prevent the uncontrolled release ofradioactive or other hazardous materials, with the potential of consequences to the public above specifiedguidelines. Inoperability of the underground ventilation system would not result in a release of material. Therefore no SLs are required.

Limiting Control Settings (LCSs) are settings on safety systems that control process variables to preventexceeding SLs. Because no SLs are identified for the WIPP, no LCSs are required.

Limiting Conditions for Operation (LCOs) are selected to detail the operability requirements for the givenequipment and to ensure that the practical definitive parameter limits are included in the LCO statement.As identified in Chapter 4, the LCO with accompanying definitive parameters is presented below.

Underground Ventilation System

A LCO shall be required, along with the appropriate conditions for an operable underground ventilationsystem:

• The underground ventilation system shall be verified to provide a minimum of 42,000 actual cubicper minute (acfm) airflow in the active disposal room

• The underground ventilation system shall be verified to provide a minimum of 12,000 acfm airflowin the waste shaft ventilation circuit as measured on the waste shaft side of regulator 74-B-308.

5.5.3.2 Surveillance Requirements for Underground Ventilation System

Airflow

The underground ventilation system shall be verified as providing the required airflow through the activewaste disposal room and in the waste shaft ventilation circuit as measured on the waste shaft side ofregulator 74 B-308. This SR verifies the required airflow on a daily basis and after ventilationconfiguration changes.

5.5.4 Administrative Controls

The facility TSR contains an administrative control selection that imposes administrative requirementsnecessary to control the operation of the WIPP. There are two types of administrative controls found inthe TSRs:

• Programmatic administrative controls (PACs) are designed to provide broad programmaticsupport for safety management programs supporting defense-in-depth or worker safety.

• SACs provide specific preventive or mitigative functions for accident scenarios identified inChapter 3 where the safety function has importance similar to, or the same as, the safety functionof a safety SSC.

Both the PACs and the SACs are delineated in Table 5-1.


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Programmatic Administrative Controls

Initial Testing, In-Service Inspection and Test, Configuration Management, and Maintenance Program

The PAC for initial testing, in-service inspection and test, configuration management, and maintenanceprogram ensures SSCs supporting safe operation fo the WIPP and DFs subject to degradation performtheir intended functions.

Document Control

The PAC for document control establishes minimum review and approval requirements, change control,and minimum record retention requirements for the WIPP facility.

Quality Assurance Program

The PAC for quality assurance includes required elements including work planning; training andpersonnel development; preparing, reviewing, approving, and verifying designs; qualifying suppliers;preparing, reviewing, approving, and issuing instructions, procedures, schedules, and procurementdocuments; purchasing; verifying supplier work; identifying and controlling hardware and software;manufacturing; managing and operating facilities; calibrating and controlling measuring and testequipment; conducting investigations and acquiring data; performing maintenance, repair, andimprovements; performing assessments; tracking non-conformances and corrective actions; andcontrolling records.

Training

The PAC for training ensures operators are trained to properly operate the waste handling equipmentduring normal CH waste handling operations and to properly respond to off-normal operations. TheCMR operator(s) and waste handling personnel are trained in the proper response to a fire in theunderground during CH waste handling operations.

Conduct of Operations

The PAC for conduct of operations contains elements of organization and administration of facilityoperations to ensure that operations activities are controlled to be consistent with assumptions in theCH DSA. The basic elements of the conduct of operations includes: operations organization andadministration; shift routines and operating practices; control area activities; communications; control ofon-shift training; control of equipment and system status; lockouts and tagouts; independent verification;log keeping; operations turnover; timely orders to operators; operations procedures; operator aid postings;and component and piping labeling. Preoperational checks shall be performed to ensure that equipmentperforming CH waste handling operates as required prior to CH waste handling.

Emergency Response Program

The PAC for Emergency Response provides preparedness, training, and operational response capabilities(including notification, evacuation, and direct responses to events) to minimize consequences to workersand the public from accidents involving WIPP operations.

Radiation Protection Program

The PAC for radiation protection ensures personnel radiation protection for any WIPP operationsinvolving personnel radiation exposure. The radiation protection program, as specified in WP 12-5,


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WIPP Radiation Safety Manual,5 includes considerations and general facility DFs employed to maintainradiation exposures as low as reasonable achievable; radiological control zoning and access control;radiation shielding; ventilation systems; differential pressure; radiation monitoring equipment, andeffluent monitoring and sampling systems.

Unreviewed Safety Questions

The PAC to maintain an Unreviewed Safety Question program ensures that the WIPP remains consistentwith this DSA and credited DFs as proposed modifications to the facility or activities that affect wastehandling are considered prior to making the change.

Fire Protection Program

The PAC for the WIPP fire protection program is established to prevent fires from occurring and tomitigate them if they occur. The program includes, at a minimum, periodic inspection and testing of firesuppression, detection and alarm equipment to meet the requirements of NFPA. The program includescombustible loading control for structures or areas of the facility with the potential to impact CH waste atthe WIPP and ensures that combustible loading is maintained such that small fires will not propagate intolarger fires with sufficient heat to cause a significant release from waste containers in close proximity tothe fire. The fire protection program also includes periodic updates to the site fire hazards analysis.

Ground Control and Geotechnical Monitoring Program

A ground control and geotechnical monitoring program shall be established, implemented and maintainedto initiate remedial action for unstable salt and to characterize, monitor, and trend salt behavior tominimize the likelihood of falling objects from the overhead and prevent a roof fall event in theunderground. The program shall include periodic ground control inspections as a specific control inaddition to the PAC.

Waste Hoist Structure and Structural Support Integrity Program

The PAC for the structural integrity of load bearing components of the waste hoist and structural supportincludes periodic inspections, tests and maintenance activities. These activities include cable lubrication,cable and cable attachment inspections and/or nondestructive testing, verification of proper load sharingof all the ropes, and inspections of the headframe, conveyance and counterweight and the structuralsupport provided by the waste hoist tower.

Specific Administrative Controls

Criticality Safety Program

The SAC to ensure waste meets the fissile mass and reflector/moderator mass limits as specified bycontainer type prior to being approved for disposal at the WIPP ensures that criticality remains incredibleat WIPP. Limits are determined through nuclear criticality safety evaluations and are imposed in the CHTSRs and in DOE/WIPP-02-3122, Contact-Handled Waste Acceptance Criteria for the Waste IsolationPilot Plant.6 A waste characterization/certification program at each generator site ensures that only CHwaste that meets the requirements in the CH WAC6 is disposed of at the WIPP, and that any exceptionsare evaluated against all applicable baseline documents prior to their authorization for shipment.


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Waste Characteristics Control

This SAC ensures that only waste that meets the specified curie content by waste container type, surfacedose rate and hazardous constituent restrictions is approved for disposal at the WIPP. The wastecharacteristics are imposed in the CH TSRs and in the CH WAC.6 The specific requirements imposedupon generator sites are delineated in Table 4.5-1 and Table 5-1. A waste characterization/certificationprogram at each generator site ensures that only CH waste that meets the requirements in the CH WAC6 isdisposed of at the WIPP, and that any exceptions are evaluated against all applicable baseline documentsprior to their authorization for shipment.

Combustible Loading Control Program - Waste Handling Building

The SAC for a combustible loading control program, as it applies to the WHB, controls the amount ofcombustible materials and transient combustibles in the WHB such that fires in the WHB will not producesufficient heat to cause a significant release from waste containers in close proximity to the fire. Thesecontrols include the number of slip sheet pallets and associated standoff distances of combustibles fromwaste. Combustible loading controls also protect initial conditions and assumptions in the hazardevaluation and analysis in Chapter 3 of this DSA. The combustible loading control program imposesrestrictions on the use and storage of flammable gas/liquid or flammable compressed gas cylinders withinthe WHB to prevent breach of waste containers from fires or explosions. Controls are also specified toprevent damage to CH waste from the operation of diesel powered equipment in the RH portion of theWHB or the TMF. The specific requirements imposed upon generator sites are delineated in Table 4.5-1and Table 5-1.

Combustible Loading Control Program - Disposal Path

The SAC for a combustible loading control program, as it applies to the disposal path, prohibits thestorage of transient combustibles including flammable gas/liquid and flammable compressed gascylinders in the and prohibits the use of flammable gas/liquid and flammable compressed gas duringwaste handling operations. This also includes prohibitions on the storage or use flammable gas/liquid orflammable compressed gas cylinders in construction areas that are close to the waste transport path. Combustible loading controls also protect initial conditions and assumptions in the hazard evaluation andanalysis in Chapter 3 of this DSA. The specific controls are delineated in Table 4.5-1 and Table 5-1. This program is supplemented by waste handling restrictions that imposing standoff distances and othercontrols to prevents collisions between waste handling equipment and non-waste handling equipmentduring waste handling operations. A LCO applies to the automatic/manual fire suppression system onCH waste handling equipment.

Combustible Loading Control Program - Disposal Room

The SAC for a combustible loading control program, as it applies to the disposal room, prohibits storageof flammable gas/liquid and flammable compressed gas cylinders in the active RH disposal room andprohibits their use during waste handling in the active disposal room and prohibits the lube truck from theactive CH disposal room. Combustible loading controls also protect initial conditions and assumptions inthe hazard evaluation and analysis in Chapter 3 of this DSA. This program is supplemented by wastehandling restrictions that impose standoff distances and use of a spotter to prevent collisions with the CHdisposal array that could result in fire with the potential to breach CH waste. The specific controls aredelineated in Table 4.5-1 and Table 5-1.


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Waste Handling Restrictions

The SAC for waste handling restrictions limit the amount of CH waste stored within the CH portion ofthe WHB, and place restrictions on non-waste handling activities when CH waste handling is beingconducted. The control also protects initial conditions and assumptions in the hazard evaluation andanalysis in Chapter 3 of this DSA. The specific controls are delineated in Table 4.5-1 and Table 5-1.

Ground Control Program

The SAC for weekly ground control inspections in the underground waste handling is to detect conditionsthat indicate instability and initiate corrective action. The specific controls are delineated in Table 4.5-1and Table 5-1.

Waste Hoist Brake Performance

The SAC for pre-operational tests of the waste hoist brake system are performed on each shift prior totransporting waste to ensure that the hoist is working properly. The specific controls are delineated inTable 4.5-1 and Table 5-1.

Nonflammable Compressed Gas Cylinder Control

The SAC for nonflammable compressed gas cylinder control limits the number of compressed gascylinders in the WHB and prohibits storage of compressed gas cylinders in the WHB, at the base of thewaste shaft, in the disposal path, or in the active disposal room to minimize the potential for improperhandling or storage of compressed gas cylinders which could result in damage to waste containers and asubsequent release. The specific controls are delineated in Table 4.5-1 and Table 5-1.

Qualified Operators

The SAC for qualified operators ensures that only operators who are trained in the operational evolutionsand qualified on the applicable equipment are authorized to operate plant equipment for waste handlingoperations. This ensures operators are qualified to properly operate the waste handling equipment duringnormal operations and to properly respond to off-normal operations. Additionally, only operators whoare trained in the appropriate response to fires in the underground are authorized to man the CMR or tooperate plant equipment for RH waste handling operations. This ensures that the central monitoringroom (CMR) operator(s) and operations personnel in the underground performing RH waste handlingoperations communicate and take the appropriate actions in the event of a fire in the underground that theCMR operators(s) block the automatic shift to filtration of underground ventilation until personnel are outof danger. This requirement also ensures that operations personnel in the underground take the necessaryimmediate actions to notify the CMR and proceed to a safe location. The specific controls are delineatedin Table 4.5-1 and Table 5-1.

Toplander Control

The SAC for the toplander control at the waste shaft collar ensures that loads are supervised duringloading of the waste shaft conveyance. No items may enter the waste shaft collar area without theapproval of the toplander. The purpose of this requirement is to prevent a load from inadvertentlyentering the waste shaft or being dropped down the shaft. The specific control is delineated in Table 4.5-1 and Table 5-1.


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5.6 Design Features

Design features (DFs) are normally passive characteristics of the facility not subject to change byoperations personnel (e.g., shielding, structural walls, relative locations of major structures andcomponents, or physical dimensions and interfaces). Any change to a DF could affect the safe handlingof CH waste and will be analyzed for safety implications and approved at the appropriate level prior tomaking the modification.

The DFs credited in the safety analysis are passive components, configuration and/or physicalarrangement as part of the facility design. DFs are controlled to the engineering drawings andspecifications. DFs are controlled to ensure that if the SSC is modified or replaced, the modification ornew SSC has essentially the same feature, form, fit and function as the original SSC. Typically, thematerial, construction or the actual physical dimensions of the item are controlled as a DF. As such, theACs of the configuration management, quality assurance, initial testing, in-service surveillance andmaintenance, and USQ programs apply to these DFs. DFs are listed in Table 5-1.

The following DFs are credited as performing a safety function:

CH Waste Handling 13-Ton Electric Forklifts

The CH waste handling 13-ton electric forklifts shall be designed and constructed such that the hydraulicfluid is segregated from potential ignition sources. The batteries, motor, and motor contactors areseparated from each other and from the hydraulic reservoir by thick metal partitions. The body of theforklift has thick metal walls that protect the electrical and hydraulic components from damage due tocollisions. This prevents a CH waste handling electric forklift fire from becoming large enough todamage CH waste containers in the WHB.

Property Protection Area Is Paved or Graveled and Surrounded by a Gravel Road

The gravel and pavement surfaces maintain a physical separation of greater than 200 feet between theWHB and the indigenous low profile vegetation surrounding the site, which minimizes the likelihood of awildfire spreading to the WHB.

Underground Bulkheads, Overcasts, and Airlocks

The bulkheads, overcasts, and airlocks are of non-combustible construction and provide segregationbetween the construction ventilation circuit and the disposal ventilation circuit and waste shaft station andprevents fires outside the waste disposal path from propagating into the disposal path or disposal area orthe underground.

Six Ton TRUDOCK Cranes and Waste Hoist

The six ton TRUDOCK cranes and the waste hoist are designed to hold their load during the DBE or lossof power.

Lift Fixtures and Space Frame Pallet Assemblies

ACGLFs, four-drum pallet lifting device, SWB lift fixture adapter, the TDOP lift fixture adapter, andspace frame pallet assemblies and lift pins are designed to hold design basis load.


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Waste Handling Building

The WHB is designed to withstand a roof loading of 27 lb/sq ft. to prevent the roof from collapsing andimpacting CH WASTE in the WHB.

The WHB is grounded, and has a lightning protection system to prevent direct lightning strikes fromimpacting CH WASTE in the WHB.

The WHB, including the waste hoist tower, is designed to withstand the design basis earthquake (DBE)postulated for the WIPP of 0.1 g peak acceleration with a 1,000-year return interval to prevent the WHBfrom structurally collapsing and breaching CH WASTE containers.

The WHB is required to meet NFPA 220, Standard on Types of Building Construction,? Type IIconstruction. The WHB is constructed primarily of steel and concrete..

The WHB, including the waste hoist tower, is designed to withstand (1) a design basis tornado (DBT)with a 183-mile-per-hour (mph) wind speed at a 1,000,000-year return frequency, (2) straight winds witha wind speed of 110 mph with a 1,000-year return frequency. The WHB, including the waste hoist tower,is designed to withstand a translational velocity of 41 miles per hour, a maximum rotational velocityradius of 325 ft, a pressure drop of 0.5 pounds per square inch (lb/in.2) and a pressure drop rate of0.09 lb/in.2/s. The WHB is not designed to withstand wind or tornado driven missiles.

The main lateral force resisting members of the Support Building and the TRUPACT MaintenanceFacility are designed to withstand the DBT and DBE to protect the WHB from structural failure andimpacting CH WASTE.

Waste Shaft Conveyance

The waste shaft conveyance is designed such that the height, width, and length of the material deck canhold only one facility pallet containing waste. The chairs on the material deck of the waste shaftconveyance hold only one facility pallet. The material deck is below the man deck. The waste shaftconveyance is designed such that a facility pallet can only be loaded using the conveyance loading car.

Conveyance Loading Car

The conveyance loading car platform is equipped with two pintles spaced to match correspondingopenings in the bottom of the facility pallet, to prevent the pallet from sliding off the conveyance loadingcar. The conveyance loading car has a platform that raises and lowers to set a loaded facility pallet on thewaste shaft conveyance material deck chairs. The conveyance loading car has a low center of gravityand low horsepower drive motors. The front wheels are not powered. The car will "high center" if thefront wheels are driven into the waste shaft without the conveyance present. Once the front wheels dropinto the shaft there is no more motive force to propel the car further. This design will prevent WASTE ona facility pallet from inadvertently falling down the waste shaft.

Waste Hoist Brakes

The waste hoist brake system prevents the uncontrolled movement of the waste shaft conveyance uponloss of power or loss of hydraulic pressure. The brake system must be energized to release bothindependent sets of brakes. During loss of power, the brakes fail safe to the engaged position.


5-14 April 2007|

Waste Hoist Structure and Structural Support

The waste hoist load bearing components are designed with sufficient safety factor to ensure that the hoistload bearing components will not fail under maximum loading conditions coincident with design basisnatural events. The structural support to the waste hoist load bearing components is also designed withsufficient safety factor to support the waste hoist load bearing components under maximum loadingcondition.

Fence Around Waste Shaft Collar

The fence around the waste shaft collar defines the restricted area surrounding the waste shaft andprevents uncontrolled access to the shaft.

Waste Hoist Head Frame

The waste hoist head frame is sized such that a facility pallet can only be loaded onto the waste shaftconveyance in one direction and can only be loaded using the conveyance loading car. A facility palleton a forklift will not fit past the waste hoist head frame.

Facility Pallet Design

The facility pallet is wider than the waste containers to prevent bulkhead doors from impacting wastecontainers. The facility pallet is designed to hold no more than four drum assemblies, four SWBs, or twoTDOPs. The facility pallet is designed to mate with pintles on the conveyance loading car to prevent thepallet from sliding off the conveyance loading car.

Panel Closure or, Substantial and Isolation Barrier||

Panel closure or, a substantial and isolation barrier shall be installed in the entries of filled panels. Panel|closures prevent radioactive and hazardous material releases from a filled panel. Substantial and isolation|barriers minimize radioactive and hazardous material releases from a filled panel. Panel closure or the|substantial and isolation barrier protect the waste face from operational events such as fires, explosions,|collisions and impact. |

5.7 Interface with TSRs from Other Facilities

The CH WAC6 specifies the waste fissile and special moderator/reflector content mass limits, the wastecharacteristics including content restrictions, the acceptable container types and that the waste containersmust be vented. The CH WAC6 requires the generator sites to prepare a waste certification program thatlists the methods and techniques for determining compliance with the CH WAC6 and associated qualitycriteria. The generator site program must meet the requirements found in the HWFP Waste AnalysisPlan. The CH WAC6 imposes the limits, controls, and restrictions from the HWFP and the CHTRAMPAC for the TRUPACT-II and HalfPACT and is the implementing requirements document atgenerator sites for CH TSRs. Generator sites are responsible for meeting the requirements imposed bythe CH WAC6 prior to shipment of waste to the WIPP. Violation of the stated limits is a violation of theTSRs by the WIPP only if the generator site certification documentation included characterization datathat was not in compliance with the stated limits, but the waste was accepted by the WIPP.


5-15 November 2006


1. 10 CFR §830.205, Subpart B, "Technical Safety Requirements."

2. DOE-STD-3009-94, Preparation Guide for U.S. Department of Energy Nonreactor NuclearFacility Documented Safety Analyses, Change 3, March 2006.

3. DOE-STD 1186-2004, Specific Administrative Controls, 2004.

4. DOE Guide 423.1-1, Implementation Guide for Use in Developing Technical SafetyRequirements, dated October 24, 2001.

5. WP 12-5, WIPP Radiation Safety Manual.



8. SAIC 1171-001, Revision 1, Nuclear Criticality Safety Evaluation for Storage of MachineCompacted Transuranic Waste at the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant, February 2005, and Addendum1, June 2005.




5-16 November 2006

Table 5-1 Summary of TSR Controls and Design Features

Control OperatingLimits

Required

Safety Function Selection Basis

Fire Water Supply and Fire Suppression SystemsLCO Minimizes the release by reducing WHB temperature

during large fire such that minimal damage to wastecontainers occurs and/or prevents spread of fire fromadjacent areas.

HA Events WHB1-1,WHB1-2, WHB1-3,WHB1-5, WHB6-2,UG1-6, WHB7-1

Underground CH Waste Handling Equipment Automatic/Manual FireSuppression System

LCO Prevent fires associated with fuel line leaks and theengine from developing into a large fire.

HA Events UG1-1,UG1-2, UG1-3

Underground Ventilation System LCO The underground ventilation system ensures that thereis sufficient airflow for waste handling activities anddirects airflow away from workers in the event of awaste container breach. The system also providesfresh air for worker evacuation in the event of a fire.

UG1-1, UG1-2, UG1-3,UG2-1, UG2-3, UG3-6,UG3-7

Initial Testing, In-Service Inspection and Test, Configuration Management andMaintenance Program

An initial testing, in-service inspection and test, configuration management, andmaintenance program shall be established, implemented, and maintained to ensureSSCs supporting safe operation of the WIPP and DFs subject to degradationperform their intended functions. This shall ensure the DFs of equipment remainconsistent with those assumed in the CH DSA.

PAC Minimizes the likelihood of an accident resulting inthe release of radioactive material or worker injurycaused by equipment failure, through programsrequiring maintenance, testing, and inspection ofequipment to confirm proper configuration, operationand continued reliability

Applicable to all HAevents except thefollowing: OA4-1, OA6-1, OA6-3, OA6-4, OA6-6, OA7-1, OA7-2,OA7-3, OA7-5, OA7-6,WHB1-4, WHB2-3,WHB3-4, WHB3-5,WHB4-1, WHB5-1, WHB6-3, WHB6-4,WHB7-1, WHB7-2,WHB7-4, WHB7-5,WHB7-6, WHB7-7,UG2-1, UG2-4, UG2-5,UG3-10, UG4-1, UG5-1




Required


5-17 November 2006

Document Control

A document control program and associated procedures shall be established,implemented, and maintained to control WIPP documents. The program shallestablish minimum review and approval requirements, change control, and minimumrecord retention requirements for the WIPP.

PAC Ensures the facility is operated and maintained in anapproved, prescribed manner consistent with theassumptions of the facility safety basis

Applicable to all HAevents.

Quality Assurance Program

A quality assurance program and associated procedures shall be established,implemented, and maintained. The basic elements of the quality assurance programinclude work planning; training and personnel development; preparing, reviewing,approving, and verifying designs; qualifying suppliers; preparing, reviewing,approving, and issuing instructions, procedures, schedules, and procurementdocuments; purchasing; verifying supplier work; identifying and controllinghardware and software; manufacturing; managing and operating facilities;calibrating and controlling measuring and test equipment; conducting investigationsand acquiring data; performing maintenance, repair, and improvements; performingassessments; tracking non-conformances and corrective actions; and controllingrecords.

PAC Minimizes the likelihood and consequences of eventsthrough a program that ensures commitments made inthe safety analysis are properly implemented.


TrainingA training program for the WIPP facility operation staff and technical supportpersonnel shall be established and maintained to ensure that operators are trained toproperly operate the waste handling equipment during normal operations and toproperly respond to off-normal operations. The CMR operator(s) and wastehandling personnel are trained in the proper response to a fire in the undergroundduring waste handling operations.

PAC Minimizes likelihood of an accident by ensuring thatworkers can successfully and safely execute actionsdefined by programs and supporting procedures. Training reduces the frequency of human error byimproving awareness of hazards that could lead toworker injury or release of radioactive waste.





Required


5-18 November 2006

Conduct of Operations

The Conduct of Operations program shall contain elements of organization andadministration of facility operations to ensure that operations activities arecontrolled to be consistent with assumptions in the CH DSA.1 Effectiveimplementation and control of operating activities are primarily achieved throughestablished written standards for operations, periodic monitoring and performanceassessment, and holding personnel accountable for their performance.

The basic elements of the Conduct of Operations program include, as applicable,guidance for: operations organization and administration; shift routines andoperating practices; control area activities; communications; control of on-shifttraining; control of equipment and system status; lockouts and tagouts; independentverification; log keeping; operations turnover; timely orders to operators; operationsprocedures; operator aid postings; and equipment and piping labeling. This programincludes performance of preoperational checks to ensure that equipment performingwaste handling operations operates as required for waste handling operations.

PAC Ensure operation of the facility is in accordance withthe assumptions of the facility safety basis.


Emergency Response Program

An emergency response program and associated procedures shall be established,implemented, and maintained that provides preparedness, training, and operationalresponse capabilities (including notification, evacuation, and direct responses toevents) to minimize consequences to workers from accidents involving WIPPoperations. It will provide emergency response actions for events such as fires orflammable gas explosions in the WHB and underground and other events resultingin a breach of waste containers at the WIPP.

PAC Provide protection for workers providingpreparedness, training, and operational responsecapabilities for abnormal events to ensure workers areremoved from the area of hazardous material releaseand initiate mitigating actions as appropriate.

Applicable to HA eventsexcept the following:OA4-1, OA4-2, WHB4-1, UG4-1




Required


5-19 November 2006

Radiation Protection Program

A radiation protection program and associated procedures shall be established,implemented, and maintained to ensure personnel radiation protection for alloperations involving personnel radiation exposure.

The Radiation protection program, as specified in the WIPP Radiation SafetyManual 5 includes considerations and general facility DFs employed to maintainradiation exposures as low as reasonably achievable (ALARA); radiological controlzoning and access control; radiation shielding; ventilation systems; differentialpressure; radiation monitoring equipment, and effluent monitoring and samplingsystems. The Radiation Protection Program shall ensure consistency with theassumptions in Chapter 5 of the CH DSA.

PAC Reduce the likelihood and minimizes exposure ofworkers and the public to radiation and radioactivematerial.

All HA events that resultin direct radiationexposure or release ofradioactive materials.

Unreviewed Safety Question

A USQ program and associated procedures shall be established, implemented, andmaintained that ensures the WIPP remains consistent with the CH DSA1 andcredited DFs.

PAC Ensures all proposed facility changes or new activitiesare reviewed for impact on the facility safety basis.


Fire Protection Program

The WIPP fire protection program shall be established to, at a minimum, provide forperiodic inspection and testing of fire suppression, detection and alarm equipment tomeet the requirements of NFPA. The program includes combustible loading controlfor structures or areas of the facility with the potential to impact CH waste at theWIPP and ensures that combustible loading is maintained such that small fires willnot propagate into larger fires with sufficient heat to cause a significant release fromWASTE containers in close proximity to the fire.

PAC Minimizes the likelihood of fire by controlling thesources of ignition and reduces the spread andconsequences of fires by limiting the quantities ofcombustibles and maintaining the operability of firesuppression systems.

HA events OA6-1,OA7-6, WHB1-1,WHB1-2, WHB1-3,WHB1-5, WHB1-8,WHB2-3, WHB6-2,WHB6-3, WHB7-1,WHB7-2, UG1-1, UG1-2, UG1-3, UG1-4,UG1-5, UG1-6, UG2-1,UG2-4, UG6-2, UG7-2,UG7-3




Required


5-20 November 2006

Ground Control and Geotechnical Monitoring Program

A ground control and geotechnical monitoring program shall be established,implemented and maintained to initiate remedial action for unstable salt and tocharacterize, monitor, and trend salt behavior to minimize the likelihood of fallingobjects from the overhead and prevent a roof fall event in the underground. Theprogram shall include periodic ground control inspections as a specific control inaddition to the PAC.

PAC Minimizes likelihood of falling objects from theoverhead and prevents roof fall event in activedisposal room

HA Events UG3-1 andUG3-3.

Waste Hoist Structure and Structural Support Integrity Program

The PAC for the structural integrity of load bearing components of the waste hoistand structural support includes periodic inspections, tests and maintenance activities. These activities include cable lubrication, cable and cable attachment inspectionsand/or nondestructive testing, verification of proper load sharing of all the ropes, andinspections of the headframe, conveyance and counterweight and the structuralsupport provided by the waste hoist tower.

PAC Maintains the integrity of the waste hoist whichprevents uncontrolled drop of loaded wasteconveyance down the waste shaft.

HA Event UG3-9.




Required


5-21 November 2006

Criticality Safety Program - A waste characterization/certification program at eachgenerator site ensures that only CH waste that meets the WIPP CH WAC6 isdisposed of at the WIPP, and that any exceptions are evaluated against all applicablebaseline documents prior to their authorization for shipment. The followingcriticality safety requirements shall be met before waste is approved for disposal atthe WIPP (including WIPP site-derived waste):

Fissile loading shall not exceed 200 FGE (fissile gram equivalent), including twotimes the measurement error, per 55-, 85-, or l00-gallon drum containing up to 5 kgberyllium.7, 8, 9 If drums are used to overpack waste that has been compacted, thewaste must conform to one of the following conditions:

- The packing fraction of the waste contents shall not exceed 70 percent, or- The fissile loading for the overpacking drum shall not exceed 170 FGE, or - The internal and external height dimensions of the overpacking drum shall ensure

a minimum ½ in. separation between the contents of the drums containingcompacted waste and other waste containers when stacked. For example, drumsthat meet the internal and external height dimensions of BNFL drawing 53-9840,Revision 8,10 ensure that the vertical separation between the centers of drumscontaining compacted waste and other waste containers, when stacked, is at least½ in. The use of steel spacers in the top and bottom of the overpacking drum isalso an acceptable method of achieving design separation.

Fissile loading shall not exceed 100 FGE, including two times the measurementerror, per 55-, 85-, or 100-gallon drum containing beryllium at greater than 5kg andup to a maximum of 100 kg of beryllium. The density for polyethylene shall notexceed 20 percent (0.184 g/cm3) of its theoretical full density.7

Fissile loading shall not exceed 325 FGE, including two times the measurementerror, per direct loaded SWB or TDOP with CH waste, beryllium shall not exceed18.14 kg, and beryllium must be fines or shavings, and the density of polyethylenedistributed in the SWB shall not exceed 20 percent (0.184g/cm3) of its theoreticalfull density.8, 9

SAC Through control of fissile mass andmoderator/reflector mass by waste container type atthe generator sites and the waste handlingconfigurations at the WIPP, criticality is incredible atthe WIPP.

OA5-1, WHB5-1,UG5-1




Required


5-22 November 2006

Criticality Safety Program (continued)

For compacted CH waste direct loaded into a SWB or TDOP in which the density ofpolyethylene exceeds 20 percent of its full theoretical density up to full density,fissile loading shall not exceed 185 FGE, including two times the measurementerror, beryllium shall not exceed 18.14 kg, and beryllium must be fines or shavings.8,

9

Pipe overpacks (a 55-gallon drum containing a standard 6- or 12-inch pipecomponent, or a S100, S200, or S300 pipe component) are limited to no greater than200 FGE, including two times the measurement error, and 5 kg beryllium.

A drum overpacked in TDOP or SWB requires that the FGE and beryllium mass berestricted to the limits of the direct loaded SWB or TDOP. A SWB overpacked in aTDOP requires that the TDOP FGE and beryllium mass be restricted to the directloaded TDOP limit.7, 8, 9

The waste handling, storage, and disposal configuration at the WIPP is as follows:

Drum arrays shall not exceed three drums high in the underground disposal area andtwo drums high in the WHB storage areas.7, 8, 9


OA5-1, WHB5-1,UG5-1




Required


5-23 November 2006

Criticality Safety Program (continued)

SWB arrays shall not exceed three SWBs high in the underground disposal area andtwo SWBs high in the WHB storage areas.7, 8, 9

Combinations of drums, TDOPs, and SWBs shall be stacked in the undergroundsuch that the stack height is limited to the equivalent of three drums high.7, 8,9 TDOPs are positioned one high in either the WHB or underground disposal area.7, 8, 9

Waste drums shall be stacked only in the vertical position (longest dimensionvertical).7, 8, 9

SWBs shall be stacked only in the normal horizontal position (longest dimensionhorizontal).7, 8, 9

TDOPs shall be positioned with the longest dimension vertical.7, 8, 9


OA5-1, WHB5-1,UG5-1

Waste Characteristics Control Program*

The following hazardous materials are prohibited from being in waste disposed atthe WIPP:

- Residual liquids in excess of 1 percent by volume of waste - Pyrophoric radioactive materials in excess of 1% by weight of waste - All pyrophoric nonradioactive materials - Explosives - Compressed gases (pressurized containers) - Wastes exhibiting the characteristic of ignitability, corrosivity, or reactivity

(Environmental Protection Agency hazardous waste numbers of D001, D002, orD003)

- No hazardous wastes unless they exist as co-contaminants with transuranics.

SAC Prevent fires and explosions in waste containers by eliminating ignition sources in waste containers.

HA Events WHB1-4,WHB2-4, and UG2-5.Basis HA and Chapter 3assumption.




Required


5-24 November 2006

Waste Characteristics Control Program*- continued

# 80 PE-Ci/55-, 85-, or 100-gallon direct loaded drum

# 560 PE-Ci/direct loaded SWB

# 560 PE-Ci/direct loaded TDOP

# 1200 PE-Ci/overpacked assembly of undamaged containers (55- gallon drumoverpacked in a SWB, 100-gallon drum, 85-gallon drum, or TDOP; 85-gallon or100-gallon or SWB overpacked in TDOP). If greater than 1200 PE-Ci, a USQsafety evaluation shall be performed and, if required, obtain DOE concurrence forthe safe processing of the waste.

# 1800 PE-Ci/waste container of solidified/vitrified waste

# 1100 PE-Ci/ undamaged 55- gallon drum overpacked in a SWB, 100-gallon drum,85-gallon drum, or TDOP; 85-gallon or 100-gallon or SWB overpacked in TDOP

# 1800 PE-Ci/Pipe Overpack Containers including either 6-in. or 12-in. pipecomponents, or S100, S200, or S300 pipe components

* Waste characteristics are ensured by a waste characterization/certification programat each generator site that ensures that only CH waste that meets the CH WAC6 isdisposed of at the WIPP, and that any exceptions are evaluated against all applicablebaseline documents prior to their authorization for shipment.

SAC Protect basic inventory assumptions. Basis HA and Chapter 3assumption




Required


5-25 November 2006

Waste Characteristics Control Program*

Limit acceptable containers to metal 55-gallon drums, 85-gallon drums, 100-gallondrums, TDOPs, SWBs, and pipe overpack containers (a pipe overpack refers to a55-gallon drum containing either a standard 6" or 12" pipe component, or S100,S200, or S300 pipe component) that meet DOT Type 7A or equivalent.

All waste containers are vented

Surface dose rate on waste containers shall not exceed 200 mrem/hr surface reading.

SAC

SAC

SAC

Robust waste containers minimize the release ofradioactive material.

Prevent pressure buildup in container


Containers assumed inHA/AA

HA Events WHB1-4,2-4, 5-1, UG2-5

HA and Chapter 3assumption


- Once out of the TRUPACT-IIs or HalfPACTs the WASTE containers are stored on facility pallets and are transported on facility pallets to and in the undergrounduntil disposed of in the waste array.- No waste containers are opened at the WIPP- Only one facility pallet is transported on the waste hoist at any one time.- A spotter is required when moving waste.- Waste is transported to the underground storage area by way of the waste shaft only. No other shaft to the underground is used for transportation of waste.- In the underground, no waste will be moved to a location outside the designateddisposal path.- No non-waste handling vehicles allowed in active disposal room during wastehandling.- A spotter is required when vehicles are operating within 75 ft of the waste face.

SAC Prevents collisions in the waste transport from thewaste shaft to the active disposal room, prevents firesresulting from collisions, and protect basic inventoryassumptions.





Required


5-26 November 2006


TRUPACT-IIs and HalfPACTs are not opened in the parking area, but are broughtinto the CH bay inside the WHB before opening. In the WHB, the inventory islimited to 18 facility pallets in the CH bay and four TRUPACT-IIs or HalfPACTs atthe TRUDOCKs, with no more than seven pallets of waste stored in the northeastcorner of the CH bay, no more than seven pallets of waste stored in the southwestcorner of the CH bay, no more than five pallets of waste stored near airlock 107, andone facility pallet in the shielded storage room. A facility pallet holds four drumassemblies, 4 SWBs, or two TDOPs or a combination of containers.

Waste is stored only in designated areas within the WHB which includes thenortheast and southwest portion of the CH Bay, near airlock 107, the shieldedstorage room, and at the TRUDOCKs.

Restrict personnel access in E-300 from the exit of the active disposal panel to theunderground ventilation exhaust shaft during waste transit and emplacement untilthese activities are complete.

Barricades shall be installed along the southwest wall of the WHB between airlock100 and the TMF such that they are nominally 10 ft. from the external wall of theWHB.

SAC Protect basic inventory assumptions.


Reduce the potential consequences to undergroundworkers in the event a release of material occurs.

Prevents vehicles from breaching the WHB wall andimpacting waste stored in the SW corner of the CHbay.



All underground HAevents that result inrelease of radioactivematerial.

WHB 6-1




Required


5-27 November 2006

Combustible Loading Control Program - WHB

When waste is outside of closed TRUPACT-IIs or HalfPACTs, only electricpowered equipment shall be allowed in the CH bay.

Flammable compressed gas cylinders are prohibited in the CH bay unless all wastecontainers are inside closed TRUPACT-IIs or HalfPACTs. The limitation does notapply to packages covered by DOT Exemption DOT-E-7607.

No flammable gas/liquid or flammable compressed gas cylinders shall be storedalong the external walls of the WHB, or TMF, or in the area between the WHB andSupport Building (except as allowed at the TRUDOCKs and waste hoist tower asstated below)

When waste is stored in the southwest corner of the CH bay, diesel poweredequipment used in the TMF shall maintain a 15 ft standoff distance from thecommon wall between the CH bay and TMF or a fire watch is posted with the dieselequipment being operated.

When waste is stored in the northeast corner of the CH bay, diesel poweredequipment used in the in the RH bay shall maintain a 15 ft standoff distance fromthe common wall between the CH bay and RH bay or a fire watch is posted with thediesel equipment being operated.

Transient combustibles shall not be stored closer than 10 ft. from waste or pallets ofslip sheets. No more than three pallets of fiberboard slip sheets and one pallet ofpolyethylene slip sheets shall be stored in the CH bay. Pallets of slip sheets must notbe stacked and a 10 ft separation distance shall be maintained between each slipsheet pallet and between slip sheet pallets and stored waste. No more than onegallon of lubricants/denatured alcohol may be at each TRUDOCK location.

No more than 1 gallon of solvents shall be stored in the waste hoist tower for hoistmaintenance. Used oil/hydraulic fluid shall be removed from the waste hoist towerafter hoist maintenance prior to handling waste on the waste shaft conveyance.

SAC

Minimize potential and size of fires by controlling theamount of combustible material in the WHB andTMF, control combustible loading in the WHB towithin the assumptions of the fire analysis

Prevents explosions due to release of flammable gasin the WHB while waste containers are not protectedby transportation containers.

Prevents flammable gas explosions with the potentialto impact waste containers.

Prevents fires in the TMF from propagating to the CHbay and impacting waste.

Prevents fires in the RH bay from propagating to theCH bay and impacting waste.

Prevents continuity of combustible material and prevents a pool fire large enough to damage waste inthe CH bay.

Prevent fires/explosions in the waste hoist tower withthe potential to impact waste during transport on thewaste shaft conveyance.

HA Events WHB1-1,WHB1-2, WHB1-3,WHB1-5, WHB2-3,WHB6-2 and WHB7-1.AA CH-1

WHB2-3, WHB6-2

WHB6-2, AA CH-1

WHB6-2, AA CH-1

WHB1-1, 1-2, 1-3

WHB1-6, WHB2-6




Required


5-28 November 2006

Combustible Loading Control Program - Disposal Path


When the waste is in transit, non-waste handling equipment shall be moved to across cut and be secured until the waste transporter has passed and is greater than75 ft away. Vehicles that may have become disabled (excluding the lube truck) maybe in the disposal path but must be secured along the wall of the disposal path.

No storage of combustibles or flammable compressed gas cylinders in the wastetransport route from the waste shaft station to the active disposal room. Note thatparked vehicle is not storage. No use of flammable gas/liquid or flammablecompressed gas cylinders in the disposal path during waste handling. No storage offlammable gas/liquid or flammable compressed gas cylinders near the panel supplyventilation overcast and no construction work involving flammable gas/liquid orflammable compressed gas cylinders between the disposal panel supply overcast andthe construction bulkhead to the south in East 300 during waste handling operations. When panel 4 is added to the disposal path no construction work involvingflammable gas/liquid or flammable compressed gas cylinders is allowed between theovercast at E-140/S-3310 and the construction bulkhead to the west of this overcastin S-3310 during CH waste handling operations. No storage of flammable gas/liquidor flammable compressed gas cylinders between the AIS and South 1000 in West 30or within 100 ft of bulkhead 303 on the North ventilation side, and no use in theselocations during CH waste handling operations

Transporters loaded with waste in the underground shall maintain greater than 75 ftseparation between them. This separation distance does not apply if a transporterbecomes disabled while loaded with waste and it is necessary to either move anotherloaded transporter past or move waste from a disabled transporter to anothertransporter. If this situation occurs, a fire watch is required.

The lube truck is not allowed in the disposal circuit during waste handling.

SAC Prevents fires that may result from collisions betweenvehicles. Prevents construction activities fromimpacting waste in transit from the waste shaft stationto the active disposal room. Prevents collisionsbetween waste handling and non-waste handlingequipment during waste handling operation. Preventsfires/explosions from impacting waste.

HA Events UG1-1,UG1-4, UG1-5, UG1-6,UG1-7, UG2-1, UG3-4,and UG3-5

AA CH-5




Required


5-29 November 2006

Combustible Loading Control Program - Disposal Room

No use of flammable gas/liquid or flammable compressed gas cylinders in the activedisposal room without a fire watch.

No storage of flammable gas/liquid or flammable compressed gas cylinders in theactive disposal room.

No hot work or use of flammable gas/liquid or flammable compressed gas cylinderswithin 75 ft of waste without a fire watch.

No lube truck in active disposal room.

No non-waste handling equipment within 75 ft of waste face without a fire watch.

No non-waste handling vehicles allowed in active disposal room during wastehandling.

SAC Prevents fires resulting from non-waste handlingactivities. Also prevents explosions.

HA Events UG1-1,UG1-2, UG1-3, andUG3-6.

AA CH-2

Ground Control Program

Weekly ground control inspections shall be performed in the underground wastehandling areas.

SAC Minimizes the likelihood of falling objects from theoverhead and prevent a roof fall event in theunderground CH waste handling areas. The programis designed to detect conditions that indicateinstability and initiate corrective action.

HA Events UG3-1, 3-3AA CH-8

Waste Hoist Brake Performance

Procedures shall be established, implemented, and maintained to ensure that thepreoperational checks of the waste hoist brake system shall be performed on eachshift prior to transporting waste.

SAC Prevent the uncontrolled movement of the waste shaftconveyance upon loss of power or loss of hydraulicpressure.

HA Events UG3-8




Required


5-30 August 2007|

Nonflammable Compressed Gas Cylinder Control

No more than four compressed gas cylinders (no larger than DOT Type 3AA, styleK) shall be in the CH bay when WASTE is outside of a closed TRUPACT-II orHalfPACT. This limit does not apply to hand held fire extinguishers. Nocompressed gas cylinders (excluding hand held fire extinguishers, SCSRs, and O2|bottles in trauma kits) shall be stored at the bottom of the waste shaft, in the disposal|path or disposal room.

SAC Minimize the potential for improper handling orstorage of compressed gas cylinders which couldresult in damage to waste containers and a subsequentrelease.

HA Events WHB3-5,UG3-10

Qualified Operators

Only operators who are trained in the operational evolutions and qualified on theapplicable equipment are authorized to operate plant equipment for waste handlingoperations. Additionally, only operators who are trained in the appropriate responseto fires in the underground shall be authorized to man the CMR or to operate plantequipment for CH waste handling operations.

SAC Ensures operators are qualified to properly operate thewaste handling equipment during normal operationsand to properly respond to off-normal operations. This requirement also ensures that the CMRoperator(s) and operations personnel in theunderground performing waste handling operationscommunicate and take the appropriate actions in theevent of a fire in the underground such that the CMRoperator(s) blocks the automatic shift to filtration ofunderground ventilation until personnel are out ofdanger. This requirement also ensures that operationspersonnel in the underground take the necessaryimmediate actions to notify the CMR and proceed to asafe location.

All movement of wasterequires trainedoperators. Thefollowing are the higherconsequence events thatexplicitly take credit forthe training: HA EventsWHB3-1, WHB3-2,WHB3-3, WHB3-6,UG1-1, UG1-2, UG1-3, UG3-4, UG3-5, UG3-6and UG3-7.




Required


5-31 November 2006

Toplander Control

The toplander shall approve entry of loads onto the waste shaft conveyance throughcontrol of the gate at the waste shaft collar.

SAC Prevents a load from inadvertently entering the wasteshaft with the waste shaft conveyance out of position. Also prevents any load from being dropped down thewaste shaft or a load from inadvertently entering thewaste shaft.

HA Events UG6-2AA CH-7

CH Waste Handling 13-Ton Electric Forklifts

The CH waste handling 13-ton electric forklifts shall be designed and constructedsuch that the hydraulic fluid is segregated from potential ignition sources. Thebatteries, motor, and motor contactors are separated from each other and from thehydraulic reservoir by thick metal partitions. The body of the forklift has thick metalwalls that protect the electrical and hydraulic components from damage due tocollisions.

DF Prevents a CH waste handling forklift fire frombecoming large enough to damage CH waste in theWHB.

HA Events WHB 1-2,WHB1-3, and WHB1-5

Conveyance Loading Car

The conveyance loading car platform is equipped with two pintles spaced to matchcorresponding openings in the bottom of the facility pallet, to prevent the pallet fromsliding off the conveyance loading car. The conveyance loading car has a platformthat raises and lowers to set a loaded facility pallet on the waste shaft conveyancematerial deck chairs. The conveyance loading car has a low center of gravity andlow horsepower drive motors. The rear wheels are not powered. The car will "highcenter" if the front wheels are driven into the waste shaft without the conveyancepresent. Once the front wheels drop into the shaft, there is no more motive force topropel the car further.

DF Prevent pallet of waste from inadvertently fallingdown the waste shaft.

HA Events UG6-2Basis HA and Chapter 3assumption

Fence Around Waste Shaft Collar DF Defines restricted area surrounding the waste shaftand prevents uncontrolled access to the shaft.

HA Events UG3-8 andUG6-2.




Required


5-32 November 2006

Facility Pallet Design

The Facility Pallet is wider than the waste containers to prevent bulkhead doors fromimpacting waste containers. The facility pallet is designed to hold no more than fourdrum assemblies, four SWBs, or two TDOPs. The facility pallet is designed to reston chairs on the waste shaft conveyance material deck. The facility pallet isdesigned to mate with pintles on the conveyance loading car to prevent the palletfrom sliding off the conveyance loading car.

DF Interfaces with the conveyance loading car to preventthe pallet from sliding off the car, mates with thewaste shaft conveyance chairs to support the palletduring transport of waste to the underground, andextends beyond the waste containers transported onthe pallet to protect the waste from bulkhead doorimpact.

Basis HA and Chapter 3assumption

PPA is paved or graveled and surrounded by a gravel road. DF Maintain a physical separation greater than 200 ftbetween the WHB and the indigenous low profilevegetation surrounding site.

HA Events WHB7-1 andWHB6-2.

TRUDOCK cranes and waste hoist DF Designed to hold their load during the DBE or loss ofpower

HA EventsWHB6-4, WHB7-2, UG7-3, andBG7-1.

Lift Fixtures and Space Frame Pallet Assemblies

ACGLFs, four-drum pallet lifting device, SWB lift fixture adapter, the TDOP liftfixture adapter, and space frame pallet assemblies and lift pins are designed to holddesign basis load.

DF Prevents dropping waste during removal from theshipping cask

WHB3-1, WHB3-2




Required


5-33 November 2006

Waste Handling Building

The WHB is designed to withstand a snow/ice roof loading of 27 lb/sq ft.

The WHB is grounded and has a lightning protection system.

The WHB meets Type II noncombustible construction

The WHB, including the waste hoist tower, is designed to withstand (1) a tornadowith a 183-mile-per-hour (mph) wind speed at a 1,000,000-year return frequency,(2) straight winds with a wind speed of 110 mph with a 1,000-year return frequency. The WHB, including the waste hoist tower, is designed to withstand a translationalvelocity of 41 miles per hour, a maximum rotational velocity radius of 325 ft, apressure drop of 0.5 pounds.

The WHB is designed to withstand a seismic event that generates a free-fieldhorizontal and vertical ground acceleration of 0.1g, based on a 1,000-year recurrenceperiod, without structurally collapsing. The main lateral force resisting members ofthe Support Building and the TMF are designed to withstand the DBT and DBE toprotect the WHB from structural failure.

DF

DF

DF

DF

DF

Prevents the WHB from collapsing and breachingwaste containers within the building.

Reduce the potential for direct lightning strikes towaste containers in the WHB.

Prevents external and wildland fires from propagatingto the WHB and prevents fires from propagating fromone part of the WHB to another

Prevents the WHB from structural failure that resultsin a breach of waste containers within the building.

Prevents the WHB, the Support Building and the TMFfrom structural failure that results in a breach of wastecontainers within the WHB.

HA Events WHB7-6,and WHB7-7

HA Event WHB7-3 andUG7-4.

HA Events WHB6-2,WHB7-1, WHB7-2

HA Events BG7-1,WHB7-4, WHB7-5, andUG7-3.

HA Events WHB7-2,BG7-1

Underground bulkheads, overcasts, and airlocks are of non-flammableconstruction.

DF Provide separation between construction ventilationcircuit and disposal circuit and waste shaft station.

HA Events UG1-4, UG1-5, UG1-6, andUG1-7.




Required


5-34 November 2006

Waste Shaft Conveyance

The waste shaft conveyance is designed such that the height, width, and length ofthe material deck can hold only one facility pallet containing waste. The chairs onthe material deck of the waste shaft conveyance hold only one loaded facility pallet. The material deck is located below the mandeck. The waste shaft conveyance isdesigned such that a facility pallet can only be loaded using the conveyance loadingcar.

DF Prevent loading more than one facility palletcontaining waste onto the waste hoist conveyance andwaste is protected from falling objects and tornadomissiles as the material deck is located below themandeck.

HA Events UG1-8,UG3-8, UG3-9 andUG6-2.

Waste Hoist Structure and Structural Support

The waste hoist load bearing components are designed with sufficient safety factorto ensure that the hoist load bearing components will not fail under maximumloading conditions coincident with design basis natural events. The structuralsupport to the waste hoist load bearing components is also designed with sufficientsafety factor to support the waste hoist load bearing components under maximumloading condition.

DF Prevent uncontrolled drop of the conveyance loadedwith waste down the waste shaft.

HA Event UG3-9

Waste Hoist Brakes

The waste hoist brake system must be energized to released both independent sets ofbrakes. During loss of power, the brakes fail safe to the engaged position.

DF Prevent the uncontrolled movement of the waste shaftconveyance upon loss of power or loss of hydraulicpressure.

HA Event UG3-8

Waste Hoist Head Frame

Facility pallet on a forklift will not fit past the waste hoist head frame or into thewaste shaft conveyance.

DF Prevent loading a pallet into the waste shaft from aforklift.

HA Event UG6-2




Required


5-35 April 2007 |

Panel Closure or, substantial and isolation barrier ||

Panel closure or, a substantial and isolation barrier shall be installed in the entries of |filled panels |

DF |Panel closures prevent radioactive and hazardous |material releases from a filled panel. Substantial and |isolation barriers minimize radioactive and hazardous |material releases from a filled panel. Panel closure or |the substantial and isolation barrier protect the waste |face from operational events such as fires, explosions, |collisions and impact. |

|

HA Events UG1-3B&C, |UG2-5B&C, |UG3-1B&C, |UG3-3B&C, |


5-36



6-i November 2006

PREVENTION OF INADVERTENT CRITICALITY

TABLE OF CONTENTS

SECTION PAGE NO.

6.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-1

6.2 Requirements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-1

6.3 Criticality Concerns . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-1

6.4 Criticality Controls . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-26.4.1 Engineering Controls . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-26.4.2 Administrative Controls . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-36.4.3 Application of Double Contingency Principle . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-4

6.5 Criticality Safety Program . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-56.5.1 Criticality Safety Organization . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-56.5.2 Criticality Safety Plans and Procedures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-66.5.3 Criticality Safety Training . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-76.5.4 Determination of Operational Nuclear Criticality Limits . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-76.5.5 Criticality Safety Inspections/Assessments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-86.5.6 Criticality Infraction Reporting and Follow-Up . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-8

6.6 Criticality Instrumentation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-8



6-ii November 2006



6-1 November 2006

PREVENTION OF INADVERTENT CRITICALITY

6.1 Introduction

The objective of this chapter is to describe essential elements of the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP)nuclear criticality safety program for contact handled (CH) waste. The WIPP nuclear criticality safetyprogram, documented in WP 12-NS.04, WIPP Nuclear Criticality Safety Program,1 requires that NuclearCriticality Safety Evaluations (NCSEs) be developed to analyze the activities involved in the handlingand disposal of CH transuranic waste. The waste accepted for disposal at the WIPP is required to becharacterized/certified to meet the requirements of DOE/WIPP-02-3122, Contact-Handled TransuranicWaste Acceptance Criteria for the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (CH WAC)2 and DOE/WIPP 95-2125,Waste Isolation Pilot Plant Contact Handled (CH) Technical Safety Requirements [TSRs]3 prior to beingapproved for shipment to the WIPP. The CH WAC2 applies to all generator sites that ship CH waste tothe WIPP for disposal.

The CH WAC2 and CH TSRs3 specify fissile mass limits, special reflector/moderator mass limits, CHwaste container types, and waste characteristics that have been approved for disposal at the WIPP. Thelimits are derived from NCSEs specific to the WIPP CH waste handling, storage, and disposalconfigurations. The fissile mass and moderator/reflector limits for each container type, and the CH wastehandling storage and disposal configuration at the WIPP ensures that the probability of an inadvertantcriticality is less than 10-6 per year for all normal and credible abnormal conditions.

6.2 Requirements

The WIPP nuclear criticality safety program is based on the requirements of Title 10 CFR Part 830,Subpart B, Safety Basis Requirements;4 DOE-STD-3009-94, Preparation Guide for U.S. DOENonreactor Nuclear Facility Safety Analysis Reports;5 DOE STD-3007-93, Guidelines for PreparingCriticality Safety Evaluations at Department of Energy Non-Reactor Nuclear Facilities,6 DOE O 420.1B,Facility Safety;7 and the American National Standards Institute (ANSI)/American Nuclear Society (ANS)standards.

The ANSI/ANS standards applicable to the WIPP include ANSI/ANS-8.1, Nuclear Criticality Safety inOperations with Fissionable Materials Outside Reactors,8 ANSI/ANS-8.7, Guide for Nuclear CriticalitySafety in the Storage of Fissile Materials,9 ANSI/ANS-8.15, Nuclear Criticality Control of SpecialActinide Elements,10 and ANSI/ANS-8.19, Administrative Practices for Nuclear Criticality Safety.11

6.3 Criticality Concerns

The WIPP is a waste repository for the disposal of transuranic and mixed defense related waste.Consequently, the surface WHB and underground disposal rooms contain fissile material. The primaryfissile material of concern is plutonium ( 239Pu). While other transuranic isotopes may be in the CHwaste, they are identified in terms of fissile gram equivalent (FGE) of 239Pu. The underground disposalarray is configured as a tightly packed hexagonal lattice, three tiers high, such that the CH waste issurrounded by salt on all sides. Also, a super sack of magnesium oxide (MgO) is placed on top of CHwaste stacks. The salt and MgO are reflective and result in the reactivity of the disposal array beinghigher than if the waste had more open space surrounding the containers. To ensure that the probabilityof an inadvertent criticality remains less than 10-6 per year for the WIPP, fissile mass andreflector/moderator mass limits, determined through analysis, are specified for each container typeacceptable for disposal at the WIPP. These limits are imposed as administrative controls in the WIPP CHTSRs.3 The CH TSRs3 are implemented at the waste generator sites through adherence to the CH WAC.2


6-2 November 2006

6.4 Criticality Controls

The primary criticality safety control for the WIPP is that CH waste approved for disposal meet limitsspecified in the CH TSRs3 and CH WAC.2 In compliance with DOE O 420.1B,7 NCSEs were performedto ensure that no credible criticality accident can occur at the WIPP. The analyses consider 239Pu fissilemass and geometry, moderation and reflection, CH waste container types, storage and disposalconfigurations, and density of materials. Controls include fissile and reflector/moderator mass limits,container types, and storage disposal configurations. Both engineering and administrative controls resultfrom the analyses.

6.4.1 Engineering Controls

metal CH waste containers, the arrangement ofcontainers into drum assemblies, and the surface storage and disposal array stacking configurationprovide both active and passive engineered controls to ensure that the probability of an inadvertentcriticality at the WIPP remains less than 10-6 per year. Human intervention is not required with passiveengineered controls. CH waste disposed of at the WIPP is packaged in 55-, 85-, or 100-gallon drums,SWBs, TDOPs, or pipe overpacks. The pipe overpack refers to a 6- or 12-inch pipe componentoverpacked in a 55-gallon drum surrounded by packing material to keep the pipe component centrallylocated within the drum.

Once CH waste containers are removed from the shipping container they are stored in the WHB andtransferred to the underground on a facility pallet. The facility pallet holds four seven packs of 55-gallondrums, four four-packs of 85-gallon drums, four three packs of 100-gallon drums, four SWBs or twoTDOPs or combinations of CH waste containers such that the containers are stacked no higher that twodrum assemblies or two SWBs high on the facility pallet. In the disposal rooms the CH waste containersare stacked the equivalent of three drums or SWBs high in a closely-packed hexagonal lattice. Wastecontainers occupy the footprint defined by a seven pack of 55-gallon drums. The TDOP is as tall as twoseven packs of 55-gallon drums.

Only one facility pallet at a time is transferred from the surface to the underground on the waste hoist. The CH waste disposal array is limited to columns of CH waste containers no greater than the equivalentof three drums high. The underground disposal area room height is sized to include large sacks of MgOon the top of each column in the disposal array and allow adequate space for the airflow needed tosupport the diesel equipment used to transport and emplace the waste. The disposal area dimensions area passive design feature that limits the number of CH waste containers that can be stacked. The nominaldisposal area dimensions are specified in the Hazardous Waste Facility Permit15 and are controlled byWP 09-CN3007, Engineering and Design Document Preparation and Change Control.16 The stackingconfiguration of CH waste at the WIPP is specified in WP 05-WH1011, CH Waste Handling.14 Procedures, designs or changes in the designs of the facility pallet, the waste disposal room dimensions,container types, and backfill configurations are required by WP 09-CN300716 to be evaluated forunreviewed safety question (USQ) determination through procedure WP 02-AR3001, Unreviewed SafetyQuestion Determination.13


6-3 November 2006

6.4.2 Administrative Controls

A Waste Characterization/Certification Program at each generator site ensures that only CH waste thatmeets the CH WAC is disposed of at the WIPP, and that any exceptions are evaluated against allapplicable baseline documents prior to their authorization for shipment. The following criticality safetyrequirements are met before CH waste is approved for disposal at the WIPP:

• Fissile loading shall not exceed 200 FGE, including two times the measurement error, per 55-,85-, or 100-gallon drum containing up to 5 kg beryllium.17, 19, 21 If drums are used to overpackwaste that has been compacted, the waste must conform to one of the following conditions:19, 20

- The packing fraction of the waste contents shall not exceed 70 percent, or

- The fissile loading for the overpacking drum shall not exceed 170 FGE, or

- The internal and external height dimension of the overpacking drum shall ensure a minimum1/2 inch separation between the contents of the drums containing compacted waste and otherwaste containers when stacked. For example, drums that meet the internal and externalheight dimension of BNFL drawing 53-9840, Revision 8,18 ensure that the vertical separationbetween the contents of drums containing compacted waste and other waste containers, whenstacked, is at least 1/2 inch. The use of steel spacers in the top and bottom of theoverpacking drum is also an acceptable method of achieving design separation.19, 20

• Fissile loading shall not exceed 100 FGE, including two times the measurement error, per 55-,

85-, or 100-gallon drum containing beryllium at greater than 5kg and up to a maximum of 100 kgof beryllium.17, 21 The density for polyethylene shall not exceed 20 percent (0.184 g/cm3) of itstheoretical full density.17

• Fissile loading shall not exceed 325 FGE, including two times the measurement error, per direct

loaded SWB or TDOP with CH waste, beryllium shall not exceed 18.41 kg, and beryllium mustbe fines or shavings, and the density of polyethylene distributed in the SWB or TDOP shall notexceed 20 percent (0.184g/cm3) of its theoretical full density.17, 20

For compacted CH waste direct loaded into a SWB or TDOP in which the density ofpolyethylene exceeds 20 percent of its full theoretical density up to full density, fissile loadingshall not exceed 185 FGE, including two times the measurement error, beryllium shall notexceed 18.41 kg, and beryllium must be fines or shavings.19, 20

• Pipe overpacks (a 55-gallon drum containing a standard 6 or 12 inch pipe component, or a S100,S200, or S300 pipe component) are limited to no greater than 200 FGE, including two times themeasurement error, and 5 kg of beryllium.17, 22

• A drum overpacked in a larger drum requires that the overpacking drum be restricted to thesingle drum FGE and beryllium limit. A damaged or open drum overpacked in TDOP or SWBrequires that the FGE and beryllium mass be restricted to the limits of the direct loaded SWB orTDOP. A SWB overpacked in a TDOP requires that the TDOP FGE and beryllium mass berestricted to the limits of the direct loaded TDOP.17, 19, 21

• Drum arrays shall not exceed three drums high in the underground disposal area and two drumshigh in the WHB storage areas.17, 19, 21


6-4 November 2006

• SWB arrays shall not exceed three SWBs high in the underground disposal area and two SWBshigh in the WHB storage areas.17, 19, 21

• Combinations of drums, TDOPs, and SWBs shall be stacked in the underground such that thestack height is limited to the equivalent of three drums high.17, 19, 21

• TDOPs are positioned one high in either the WHB or underground disposal area.17, 19, 21

• Waste drums shall be stacked only in the vertical position (longest dimension vertical).17, 19, 21

• SWBs, if not overpacked, shall be stacked only in the normal horizontal position (longestdimension horizontal).17, 19, 21

• TDOPs shall be positioned with the longest dimension vertical.17, 19, 21

Changes to CH waste containers, CH waste characteristics, fissile content, moderator or reflector contentin the waste container or external to the containers that would alter assumptions in the criticality safetyevaluations are evaluated through NCSEs and WP 02-AR3001, Unreviewed Safety QuestionDetermination,13 with new or updated limits or controls specified in a change to the CH TSRs3 and theCH WAC.2

6.4.3 Application of Double Contingency Principle

The NCSEs contain evaluations to ensure that there are sufficient factors of safety to require at least twounlikely, independent, and concurrent changes in process conditions before a criticality accident ispossible. No single credible event or failure results in the potential for a criticality accident. CH wasteand waste containers proposed for disposal at the WIPP must meet the CH WAC prior to being approvedfor shipment to the WIPP. Further, the TRUPACT-II and HalfPACT have mass limits that apply to theentire shipment. Unless waste containers are contaminated such that overpacking is necessary, drumassemblies are not altered and are emplaced as they are received. Contingencies include exceeding thecontainer stacking limits, exceeding the fissile mass or beryllium limits in CH waste containers, or loss ofgeometry due to failure of the waste hoist brakes and subsequent breach of waste containers orbreach/compaction of waste containers due to roof fall in the underground. In all cases analysis showedthat results to be safely subcritical such that additional controls are not required.

6.5 Criticality Safety Program

The criticality safety program at the WIPP, described in WP 12-NS.04,1 is structured to meet therequirements of DOE O 420.1B7 and complies with the mandatory ANSI/ANS nuclear criticality safetystandards applicable to WIPP.

6.5.1 Criticality Safety Organization

ANSI/ANS 8.78 and ANSI/ANS 8.1911 require management to clearly establish responsibility for nuclearcriticality safety. The following defines the WIPP management and organizational responsibilities withrespect to criticality safety:

The WTS General Manager (GM) ensures that personnel who identify the necessary criticality safetyrequirements are, to the extent practicable, administratively independent of process supervisors. TheWTS GM ensures that the Nuclear Safety group is staffed with personnel skilled in the interpretation ofdata pertinent to criticality safety and familiar with facility operation.


6-5 November 2006

The WIPP Waste Handling Operations ensures that the CH waste handling procedures reflect theapplicable criticality safety controls identified in the most current NCSE and approved CH TSRs, ensuresthat personnel access to areas where fissile material is handled, processed, stored or disposed of iscontrolled, and ensures that the waste containers received for disposal at the WIPP match the wasteapproved for receipt as identified in the WIPP Waste Information System (WWIS). Waste HandlingOperations also ensures that waste handling personnel and their supervision receive criticality safetytraining.

The Nuclear Safety group performs annual assessments to verify that controls that ensure criticalitysafety at the WIPP are being implemented, ensures that criticality safety-related deficiencies andcorrective actions are addressed, and maintains the WIPP Nuclear Criticality Safety Program. The groupalso ensures that personnel who prepare and independently review NCSEs for the WIPP have theappropriate education/experience and are trained in accordance with a documented training programconsistent with DOE-STD-1135-99, Guidance for Nuclear Criticality Engineer Training andQualification.28 .The Nuclear Safety organization also reviews changes to the WIPP safety analysis reports for packaging,CH WAC,2 WWIS, procedures for CH or RH waste handling at the WIPP, and facility design changes forimpact to criticality safety limits. The Nuclear Safety organization will also assist industrial safety,operations, and engineering personnel in developing specific recovery plans in the event a criticalitysafety noncompliance has occurred. The Nuclear Safety organization assists Training in the developmentof criticality training for the WIPP personnel. Any necessary limits of controls identified in NCSEs areincluded in the CH TSRs.3

The NCSEs implemented at the WIPP are prepared and independently reviewed by personnelknowledgeable in nuclear criticality safety as evidenced by documented experience and training. NCSEsare performed by individuals with the training and qualification consistent with DOE-STD-1135-99,Guidance for Nuclear Criticality Safety Engineer Training and Qualification,28 which includes formaleducation requirements, classroom training, site specific knowledge, and demonstrated expertise in theuse of the computer codes used. The WIPP personnel who prepare and independently review NCSEs aretrained in accordance with NCS-01, WIPP Safety Analysis Nuclear Criticality Safety SpecialistAuthorization Card29 and NCS-02, WIPP Safety Analysis Senior Nuclear Criticality Safety SpecialistAuthorization Card.30 Subcontractors who prepare NCSEs for the WIPP are required to supply evidenceof training and qualification consistent with DOE-STD-1135-99.28

The Design/Engineering organizations ensure that engineered items important to criticality safety asidentified in the CH TSRs3 are under configuration management and ensure that design for ormodification to the surface CH waste storage locations, disposal area configuration, backfill material andCH waste handling equipment are reviewed through the USQ process prior to implementing the change.

The WIPP Quality Assurance assesses organizations at the WIPP to ensure that nuclear criticality safetyprogram requirements are being implemented.

Transportation and Packaging ensures that changes to CH waste forms, changes in container fissile masslimits, and new or modified CH waste containers receive a review to ensure compliance with the WIPPsite criticality safety program prior to implementing the changes in the CH WAC.2 The Transportationand Packaging and Nuclear Safety organizations interface frequently with the CBFO to address anyconcerns or additional controls for new CH waste forms.

Technical Training maintains a criticality safety training program for the WIPP personnel who review orimplement criticality controls.


6-6 November 2006

There are no institutionalized committees at the WIPP that address criticality safety issues.

6.5.2 Criticality Safety Plans and Procedures

Adherence to the fissile mass and moderator/reflector limits and CH waste containers approved fordisposal at the WIPP, specified in the CH WAC2 and CH TSRs,3 is the primary plan for ensuringcriticality safety at the WIPP. Each generator site has a program for characterization and certification ofthe CH waste proposed for disposal at the WIPP and demonstrates compliance with the CH WAC2

through the Performance Demonstration Program described in DOE/CBFO-01-3107, PerformanceDemonstration Program Management Plan.24 WIPP does not accept any CH waste container shipmentsfor disposal if the CH waste container information has not been submitted into the WWIS and approvedby the WWIS data administrator. The process for submitting waste information into the WWIS isdescribed in DOE/CBFO 97-2273, WIPP Waste Information System User's Manual.25 The WWIS isprogrammed to include the limits for each container type from the CH WAC2 such that the requirementsfor each container type are verified prior to shipment to the WIPP.

Once waste arrives at the WIPP, the containers are checked to verify that the containers that shippedmatch those approved for shipment in the WWIS. The WIPP does not perform any additionalverifications of fissile content and has no equipment on site to do so. Storage and disposal configurationsfor CH waste containers that have been removed from the shipping package are described in the CHwaste handling procedure,14 and specify that CH waste containers are stacked the equivalent of twodrums high in the WHB and no greater than the equivalent of three drums high in the undergrounddisposal rooms. These configurations are passively controlled by the facility pallet in the WHB and thedisposal room height in the underground. Because NCSEs have shown that the probability of a criticalityis less than 10-6 per year, no criticality accident alarm systems are necessary at the WIPP. All controlsand limits are incorporated and embedded in the operational procedures. No criticality safety postingsare used or are necessary. There are no evacuation plans specific to an inadvertent criticality. In theevent that an unusual event happens during waste handling, personnel are trained to stop and evacuate thearea.

There are no restrictions on fire fighting associated with CH waste handling and disposal activities. There is a wet pipe sprinkler system in the WHB and waste hoist tower. There are no fire suppressionsystems in the disposal path and disposal rooms in the underground other than the installed chemical firesuppression system and hand held fire extinguishers on the underground waste handling equipment. Thelikelihood of fires is minimized through a combustible loading control program for both the WHB andunderground disposal transport path and active disposal rooms. The combustible loading controlprogram is implemented through WP 12-FP3003, Combustible Loading Controls for the Waste HandlingBuilding and Underground,26 and is further discussed in Chapter 11 of this DSA.

Changes to the WIPP facility procedures, designs and equipment that impact nuclear safety or changefacility processes described in this DSA are required by WP 09-CN300716 to be evaluated forunreviewed safety question (USQ) determination through procedure WP 02-AR3001, Unreviewed SafetyQuestion Determination.13

6.5.3 Criticality Safety Training

The WIPP has established procedures that reflect the training requirements for personnel who performand independently review nuclear criticality safety evaluations.

Qualification and training of criticality safety engineering personnel is addressed in Section 6.5.1 of thisChapter.


6-7 November 2006

Technical Training maintains a criticality safety training program for the WIPP personnel who review orimplement criticality controls.

The WIPP has a criticality safety training module available for all WIPP personnel. Waste handlingpersonnel are required to take the training module which explains both criticality safety fundamentalsand the administrative criticality safety limits contained in the CH WAC2 and CH TSRs.3 This trainingincludes the criticality safety relevance of the storage and disposal configuration, and the effects of fissilemass, geometry, reflection and moderation.

6.5.4 Determination of Operational Nuclear Criticality Limits

The NCSEs for the WIPP are developed in accordance with the requirements of DOE-STD-3007-93.6 Calculations performed in the current NCSEs?,? for the WIPP have been prepared using both MonteCarlo N-Particle (MCNP) and Standardized Computer Analyses for Licensing Evaluation (SCALE)computer codes. The software used for criticality safety evaluation or calculations is controlled andincludes bias validation as required by DOE O 420.1B.7 The analytical process includes establishing theupper subcritical limit for the proposed operation and demonstrating that the operation remainssubcritical for all normal and credible abnormal operations. The NCSEs consider fissile mass andgeometry, moderation and reflection, CH waste container types, storage and disposal configurations, andmaterial properties.

The NCSEs evaluate normal and credible abnormal operations including exceeding fissile ormoderator/reflector mass limits in a CH waste container, exceeding stacking configurations, loss offissile material confinement, compaction of the CH waste due to roof fall in the disposal array or saltcreep, and inadvertent initiation of the WHB fire suppression system. The NCSEs for the WIPP identifythe minimum subcritical margin for the CH waste storage and disposal operations. To ensure that aninadvertant criticality remains incredible for the WIPP, the fissile and reflector/moderator limits for eachcontainer type and the WIPP handling, storage, and disposal configurations described in Section 6.4.2above are imposed as administrative controls in the CH TSRs3 and incorporated into the CH WAC.2

The WIPP procedure WP 12-NS.05, Preparation, Review, and Approval of Nuclear Criticality SafetyEvaluations,12 is based on DOE-STD-3007-936 and describes the necessary NCSE content for analyses. NCSE documentation also includes bias development and validation for the computer code and hardwareused in the preparation of the analysis.

6.5.5 Criticality Safety Inspections/Assessments

CH waste is certified to meet the CH WAC2 prior to being approved for shipment to and disposal at theWIPP. The approval for waste to be disposed of at the WIPP is documented in the WWIS as discussed inSection 6.5.2. Programs are in place to verify adherence to the CH WAC,2 which includes datavalidation and reviews of characterization documentation. At the WIPP, QA and departmentalassessments are performed to verify adherence to the CH waste handling, the design change control, andthe USQ procedures, and adherence to the CH TSRs.3 Waste handling operations are reviewedperiodically to verify that stacking configurations for the surface and underground are being adhered toand that process conditions have not been altered such that assumptions in the NCSE have beencompromised. There are no specific criticality safety inspections identified for the WIPP as theassessments are sufficient to ensure implementation of the necessary criticality safety requirements.

Characterization records are retained by the WIPP organizations that characterize CH waste and areultimately transferred to the WIPP records center for long term retention. Waste profiles, containertypes, fissile mass, disposal location, and other parameters are documented in the WWIS database, which


6-8 November 2006

is a living document that changes as new CH waste is approved for disposal and disposed at the WIPP. Audit and assessment records are retained as specified on each implementing group’s recordsidentification document.

6.5.6 Criticality Infraction Reporting and Follow-Up

While the probability of an inadvertent criticality at the WIPP is less than 10-6 per year, items that wouldconstitute a criticality infraction include receipt, handling and disposal of waste that exceeded the fissileand special reflector/moderator limits as specified in the CH TSRs3 and associated CH WAC2 limits orexceeding the CH waste container stacking restrictions for storage in the WHB or in the disposal roomsin the WIPP underground.

Infractions, should they occur, are reported in accordance with WP 12-ES3918, Reporting Occurrencesin Accordance with DOE Order 231.1A.31 Event recoveries at WIPP are controlled by procedure WP 12-ER3903, Event Recovery.32 Recovery from a criticality infraction may include performing ananalysis based on the actual CH waste content, container type, and disposal location to determinewhether the non-compliant container is bounded by the criticality safety analysis. Recovery could alsoinclude returning the container to the generator site for remediation or correcting the stackingarrangement.

Corrective action following recovery from a criticality limit violation may include, but are not limited tochanges to the WWIS, changes in criticality safety training , or changes to oversight of generator sites. The WIPP utilizes occurrence reports generated under WP 12-ES391831 to incorporate lessons learnedinto training and future safety analyses. The lessons learned program is controlled by WP 15-MD3100,Lessons Learned Program.33 Additional information concerning corrective action is contained inChapter 11 of this DSA.

6.6 Criticality Instrumentation

The WIPP NCSEs conclude that no credible criticality hazard exists at the WIPP for CH waste handlingand disposal. The analyses further conclude that because no credible criticality scenarios exist for theWIPP, there is no need for a criticality accident alarm system or criticality detection system.17 There isno criticality related instrumentation required at the WIPP.


6-9 November 2006


1. WP 12-NS.04, WIPP Nuclear Criticality Safety Program

2. DOE/WIPP-02-3122, Contact-Handled Transuranic Waste Acceptance Criteria for the WasteIsolation Pilot Plant, August Rev. 4.0, December 2005.

3. DOE/WIPP 95-2125, Waste Isolation Pilot Plant Contact Handled (CH) Technical SafetyRequirements

4. Title 10 CFR Part 830, Subpart B, Safety Basis Requirements

5. DOE-STD-3009-94, Preparation Guide for U.S. Department of Energy Nonreactor NuclearFacility Documented Safety Analysis, Change 3, March 2006

6. DOE-STD-3007-93, Change 1, Guidelines for Preparing Criticality safety Evaluations atDepartment of Energy Non-Reactor Nuclear Facilities, 1998

7. DOE O 420.1 B, Facility Safety

8. ANSI/ANS-8.1, Nuclear Criticality Safety in Operations with Fissionable Materials OutsideReactors

9. ANSI/ANS-8.7, Guide for Nuclear Criticality Safety in the Storage of Fissile Materials

10. ANSI/ANS-8.15, Nuclear Criticality Control of Special Actinide Elements

11. ANSI/ANS-8.19, Administrative Practices for Nuclear Criticality Safety

12. WP 12-NS.05, Preparation, Review, and Approval of Nuclear Criticality Safety Evaluations

13. WP 02-AR3001, Unreviewed Safety Question Determination

14. WP 05-WH1011, CH Waste Processing

15. Hazardous Waste Facility Permit No. NM4890139088-TSDF

16. WP 09-CN3007, Engineering and Design Document Preparation and Change Control



19. SAIC 1171-001, Revision 1, Nuclear Criticality Safety Evaluation for Storage of MachineCompacted Transuranic Waste at the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant, February 2005, and Addendum1, June 2005.



6-10 November 2006

21. SAIC-4287-002, Revision 1, Science Applications International Corporation, Nuclear CriticalitySafety Evaluation for Disposal of Beryllium-Bearing Contact-Handled Transuranic WasteDrums at the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant, May 2003.

22. USQ Safety Evaluation 04-013, Addition of S300 Pipe Overpack to Waste Forms to be Disposedof at WIPP

23. Contact Handled Transuranic Waste Authorized Methods for Payload Control (CH-TRAMPAC),Revision 1, 2004.

24. DOE/CBFO-01-3107, Performance Demonstration Program Management Plan

25. DOE/CBFO 97-2273, WIPP Waste Information System User's Manual

26. WP 12-FP3003, Combustible Loading Controls for the Waste Handling Building andUnderground

27. DOE G 421.1-1, Criticality Safety Good Practices Program Guide for DOE Nonreactor NuclearFacilities, 1999.

28. DOE-STD-1135-99, Guidance for Nuclear Criticality Safety Engineer Training andQualification, September 1999.

29. NCS-01, WIPP Safety Analysis Nuclear Criticality Safety Specialist Authorization Card

30. NCS-02, WIPP Safety Analysis Senior Nuclear Criticality Safety Specialist Authorization Card

31. WP 12-ES3918, Reporting Occurrences in Accordance with DOE Order 231.1A

32. WP 12-ER3903, Event Recovery

33. WP 15-MD3100, Lessons Learned Program

WIPP CH DSA DOE/WIPP-95-2065 , REV. 10 CHAPTER 7

7-i November 2006

RADIATION PROTECTION

TABLE OF CONTENTS

SECTION PAGE NO.

7.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7-1

7.2 Requirements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7-1

7.3 Radiation Protection Program and Organization . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7-17.3.1 Radiation Protection Program . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7-17.3.2 Radiation Protection Organization . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7-2

7.4 ALARA Policy and Program . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7-3

7.5 Radiological Protection Training . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7-5

7.6 Radiation Exposure Control . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7-67.6.1 Administrative Limits . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7-67.6.2 Radiological Practices . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7-77.6.3 Dosimetry . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7-97.6.4 Respiratory Protection . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7-10

7.7 Radiological Monitoring . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7-11

7.8 Radiological Protection Instrumentation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7-12

7.9 Radiological Protection Record Keeping . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7-14

7.10 Occupational Radiation Exposures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7-15



7-ii November 2006

RADIOLOGICAL AND HAZARDOUS MATERIAL PROTECTION

LIST OF TABLES

TABLE PAGE NO.

Table 7.5-1, Radiological Worker Entry Training Requirements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7-6

Table 7.6-1, WIPP Occupational Dose Limits, DOE, and WIPP Administrative Control Levels . . . . . 7-7


7-1 November 2006

RADIATION PROTECTION

7.1 Introduction

This section discusses (1) the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP) radiological protection program andorganization, (2) the radiological hazards to the worker and off-site public as a result of contact-handled(CH) waste handling and disposal at the WIPP, (3) the WIPP ALARA (as low as reasonably achievable)policy and program, (4) radiological protection instrumentation, and (5) radiological protection recordkeeping. The scope of this chapter includes a description of the overall radiological protection programand organization, the practices and design features for keeping exposures ALARA, the administrativelimits, dosimetry and respiratory protection, radiological monitoring and the program for maintainingradiation records.

7.2 Requirements

The radiological protection program was established to ensure the exposure of employees and the generalpublic to radiation and radioactive materials is within the requirements of Title 10 CFR Part 835,Occupational Radiation Protection1; U.S. DOE Standard (STD) DOE-STD-1098-99, RadiologicalControl2; DOE G-441.1-2, DOE Occupational ALARA Program Guide3; 40 CFR Part 191, Subpart A,Environmental Standards for Management and Storage;4 40 CFR Part 61, Subpart H, "National EmissionStandard for Radionuclide Emissions from Department of Energy (DOE) Facilities";5 and DOE Order5400.5, Radiation Protection of the Public and the Environment.6 The radiological protection programfor WIPP is described in WP 12-5, WIPP Radiation Safety Manual.7

7.3 Radiation Protection Program and Organization

7.3.1 Radiation Protection Program

WP 12-57 describes the radiological protection program for WIPP. The objectives of the program aremet by ensuring that:

• ALARA design reviews are conducted to ensure facility changes comply with 10 CFR Part 835,Subpart K, Design and Control.8

• Shipments of radioactive materials to WIPP meet the requirements of the WIPP CH wasteacceptance criteria, as set forth in DOE/WIPP-02-3122, Transuranic Waste Acceptance Criteriafor the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant.9

• Access control and posting are used to reduce direct radiation exposure to WIPP employees.

• Containment and ventilation design and controls minimize the potential for internal exposuresduring normal operations.

• Areas where waste containers are unloaded from the transportation shipping container aremonitored with alarm capabilities for airborne radioactivity.

• Personnel receive radiation protection training appropriate to their assignments.

• Access/egress control and radiological surveys of personnel and equipment are used to preventthe spread of external contamination when waste handling operations are in progress.


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• A source control program is in place to minimize the potential for the spread of contamination,unnecessary exposure to personnel, loss, theft, sabotage, or improper disposal of radioactivesources.

• A respiratory protection program is in place, and respiratory protection equipment will be usedduring abnormal activities where personnel could be exposed to high surface contaminationand/or airborne radioactivity.

• Instruments and equipment used to detect radiation or radioactive materials are calibrated so thataccurate radiation, contamination, and airborne radioactivity surveys can be performed.

• Radiological work procedures and instructions provide for an ALARA review prior tocommencement of work, for jobs in which radiation and/or radioactive contamination areexpected to exceed site limits established by the WP 12-5.7

• Personnel dosimetry devices are supplied and are appropriate to the work being performed. Aradiation exposure record system is maintained.

• An internal dose-assessment program that includes whole-body counting and bioassay is in place.

• Management responsible for radiological protection is notified of any unusual or unexpectedradiological conditions.

• Every radiological worker at WIPP has the authority to stop radiological work if there isevidence that radiological controls are being compromised.

• An effluent and environmental monitoring and/or sampling program is in place to detect releasesto the environment, and to verify that facility releases are maintained at a minimum.

• The radiological control program is conducted in accordance with written and approvedprocedures.

7.3.2 Radiation Protection Organization

The radiation protection program at WIPP includes the following organizational responsibilities:

The Safety & Health department is responsible for developing and maintaining the WIPP programs forindustrial safety and radiation protection of employees and the general public. The Safety & HealthManager is responsible for development, maintenance and oversight of the radiation protection program,the training of radiation workers and radiological control technicians (RCTs), emergency planning, andthe ALARA program. This programmatic responsibility is delegated to the Radiation Safety andEmergency Management (RS&EM) Manager, who reports to the Safety & Health Manager and has adirect line of communication to the General Manager in matters of radiation safety.

The RS&EM Manager establishes training programs for qualification and requalification of RCTs. TheRS&EM Manager is responsible for establishing and implementing the Radiological Safety TrainingProgram, and reviewing and approving all radiological safety training. The RS&EM Manager reviewsand approves radiological procedures. The ALARA coordinator and radiological engineering activitiesare also directed by the RS&EM Manager.


7-3 November 2006

The RS&EM Manager is responsible for operating and maintaining a dosimetry program to determineexternal radiation exposure to employees and visitors. In addition, the RS&EM Manager is responsiblefor implementing and operating the internal dosimetry program. The RS&EM Manager has the authorityto remove from further exposure, employees who have either reached or exceeded the establishedadministrative radiation exposure limits or have not demonstrated their continuing understanding of, orcompliance with, the WIPP radiological control program.

Operational radiation safety associated with all waste handling activities at the WIPP is the responsibilityof the manager of Integrated Waste Operations and is delegated to the Radiological Control Manager,who reports to the Integrated Waste Operations Manager. The Radiological Control Manager maintainsthe radiological safety of the facility by regularly evaluating and assessing surface contamination,radiation levels, and airborne radioactivity levels in the radiological work areas with respect to approvedlimits. The Radiological Control Manager directs operational health physics activities, ensures theperformance monitoring of routine and special WIPP operations, and is responsible for approval ofRadiation Work Permits (RWPs). The Radiological Control Manager ensures appropriate training for theWIPP RCTs is maintained effective and current. All waste handling and disposal activities areperformed in accordance with procedures that ensures worker exposures are maintained ALARA.

The Technical Training Manager is responsible for ensuring that all radiological safety traininginstructors are qualified and have the technical knowledge, experience, and instructional skills to conductradiological training. The Technical Training Manager is also responsible for maintaining, preparing,and grading written examinations, and maintaining question banks and radiological safety trainingrecords for all WIPP personnel. Technical Training is responsible for coordinating the radiologicalsafety training programs including RCT training and qualification, Radiological Worker I training,Radiological Worker II training, General Employee Training (GET), visitor orientation, and ALARAtraining for supervisory, job planning personnel, and radiological workers.

Line managers are responsible for ensuring that their personnel attend GET within one month of theirinitial assignment to the WIPP and that they maintain the retraining and refresher requirementsassociated with GET. Line managers ensure that workers whose job assignments require access toradiological areas have completed Radiological Worker I and/or II training, as appropriate to their jobassignments. Line managers responsible for waste handling personnel, engineers, schedulers, dosimetrytechnicians, medical personnel, radiochemistry personnel, and procedure writers whose job assignmentssupport actual or potential radiological activities and radiological systems ensure that their personnel aretrained appropriate to the tasks they perform at the WIPP and in the principles of ALARA.

Radiological ALARA Committee members are responsible for obtaining and maintaining a minimum ofRadiological Worker I training as required by WP 12-2, WIPP ALARA Program Manual,10 being trainedin the principles of ALARA, basic ALARA techniques, and dose-reduction techniques, and participatingin selected portions of job-specific and specialized training, particularly in situations using mock-ups,before performing their work functions.

7.4 ALARA Policy and Program

The WIPP ALARA program is defined in WP 12-2.10 The ALARA program interfaces with the overallWIPP radiological protection program described in WP 12-5.7 The WIPP ALARA Committee isestablished by management charter MC 9.4, Radiological ALARA Committee.11 The WIPP ALARAprogram minimizes the radiation exposure to workers, the public, and the environment. The programrequires pre- and post-job reviews of work that exceeds preset triggers as well as reviews of designs,programs, and procedures that involve control activities where there is a potential for radiationexposures. ALARA issues are reviewed by the WIPP ALARA Committee.


7-4 November 2006

WP 12-210 requires radiation safety training for personnel who routinely work in the controlled areas ofthe facility, radiological control procedures, and continued review of operations for enhancements andimproved efficiency. RCTs participate in CH waste handling and provide up-to-date information towaste handling operators as to radiation levels and locations where exposures can be minimized. Performance is monitored through audits and periodic review of exposures, procedures, and incidentreports, and recommending corrective action when required.

The ALARA principles applied to the WIPP design were based on DOE/EV/1830-T5, A Guide toReducing Radiation Exposure to as Low as Reasonably Achievable,12 and DOE O 6430, General DesignCriteria Manual for Department of Energy Facilities,13 which was the original design basis. Currentdesign modifications are made in accordance with 10 CFR Part 8351; DOE O 420.1B, Facility Safety14;DOE O 430.1A, Life-Cycle Asset Management15; DOE G-441.1-23; and other codes, standards, andorders applicable at the time of modification. Changes to the WIPP structures, systems, and componentsare made in accordance with the engineering change order process described in WP 09-CN3007,Engineering and Design Document Preparation and Change Control,16 which includes ALARA reviews.

ALARA practices include the use of RWPs, radiological postings, use of shielding, monitoring andpostings. Design features that keep exposures ALARA are discussed below:

Facility Arrangement - WIPP area to which access is managed to protect individuals from exposure toradiation and/or radioactive materials are identified as Controlled Areas, and are administrated inaccordance with the WP 12-5.7 The Controlled Areas are normally segregated from other operating areasby physical barriers (e.g., tape, rope, fences, walls, bulkheads) and signs that are conspicuously postedwith at least one sign visible at each accessible point on the posted area boundary. The surfaceControlled Areas include the parking area on the south side of the waste handling building (WHB) andthe WHB itself as shown in Figure 2.4-1.

WHB Arrangement - A Controlled Area is established in the WHB to support waste handling operations. All entrances to Controlled Areas are posted and personnel must either have current training or be escorted by an individual who has current GET.

Airlocks are located between areas with different levels of contamination potential. The ventilationsystem and airlocks act to prevent and mitigate the spread of contamination by maintaining pressuredifferentials between radiological areas. Ventilation is directed from areas with low potential forcontamination to areas with higher potential for contamination.

CH Waste Handling Area Arrangement - The CH waste handling area of the WHB is arranged so thatwaste handling flow patterns are as direct as possible from shipping package unloading to hoist loadingand that adequate space is provided for waste transfer activities.

Underground Disposal Area Arrangement - The underground disposal area is segregated from other areasof the WIPP underground by bulkheads to separate ventilation flow paths. Access control and personneltraffic patterns are considered in the plant layout to minimize the potential for spreading contamination,and to minimize personnel radiation exposure.

Waste Handling Equipment - Forklifts, cranes, lifting fixtures, etc. used to move waste containers aredesigned to minimize the potential for drops or punctures that could result in a radiological release.Waste handling equipment has smooth cleanable surfaces, and crevices and corners are minimized oreliminated, where practical. Mechanical handling equipment is designed for easy replacement fordecontamination and/or repair.


7-5 November 2006

Instruments - Radiation monitoring equipment or other equipment that is located near areas withpotentially higher radiation levels are designed for easy removal such that the item can be moved to anarea with a lower radiation background for calibration or repair. Other than radiation monitoringequipment, instrumentation and control devices for other WIPP systems and components are located inareas away from potential radiological materials.

Lighting - Multiple electric lights are provided in the WHB and the underground such that the immediatereplacement of a defective light does not require immediate replacement.

Heating, Ventilation, and Air Conditioning Equipment - HEPA filter housings are located in rooms thatare smooth coated. Filter housings are located such that access and filter changes can be accomplishedwith minimal potential for contamination.

Shielding - Although the CH waste contains alpha and beta emitting radionuclides, the primary radiationthat requires shielding is gamma. Alpha and beta particles are shielded by the waste containers. The CHwaste handling area includes a shielded storage room for temporarily storing CH waste containers withdiscrepant identification or suspect integrity.

7.5 Radiological Protection Training

WP 12-57 outlines the radiological protection training required for personnel working at or visiting theWIPP. Radiation safety training is conducted at the WIPP to ensure that each worker understands: (1) the general and specific radiological aspects of their assignment, (2) their responsibility to theirco-workers and the public for safe handling of radioactive materials, and (3) their responsibility forminimizing their own radiation exposure. The level of training is commensurate with the requirements ofan individual’s job. Training includes GET and may include Radiological Worker I and II training.RCTs receive training consistent with the guidance provided in DOE Handbook 1122-99, RadiologicalControl Technician Training.17 GET and Radiological Worker refresher training is required annually. RCT continuing training is performed annually, and requalification is done every two years. Site-specifictraining and refresher training includes changes in requirements and updates of lessons learned fromoperations and maintenance experience and occurrence reporting, for the site and across the DOEcomplex.

GET is required for all the WIPP employees and is required for entry into the Controlled Area. Visitorswho enter Controlled Areas receive a radiological safety orientation that includes basic radiationprotection concepts, risk of low-level occupational radiation exposure, radiological protection policiesand procedures, visitor and management responsibilities for radiation safety, adherence to radiologicalposting and labeling, applicable emergency procedures, and training for issuance of dosimeters, whereapplicable. Radiological Worker I and II training is required for unescorted entry into areas as stated inthe Table 7.5-1. WP 12-9, WIPP Emergency Management Program,18 establishes the emergencypreparedness program for the protection of personnel and property for which the WIPP is responsible.


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Table 7.5-1, Radiological Worker Entry Training Requirements

AreasGET or

Visitor OrientationRadiological

Worker IRadiologicalWorker II

Allows entry into Controlled Areas YES YES YES

Allows entry into Radioactive Material Areas orRadiological Buffer Areas

NO YES YES

Allows entry into Radiation Areas NO YES YES

Allows entry into High- or Very-High-Radiation Areas NO NO YES

Allows entry into Contamination Areas and High-Contamination Areas

NO NO YES

Allows entry into Airborne Radioactivity Areas NO NO YES

7.6 Radiation Exposure Control

Radiation exposure control is addressed in the WP-12 series programs and implementing procedures. External radiation exposure control is accomplished at WIPP by establishing administrative dose controllevels well below DOE regulatory dose limits and by institutionalizing processes such as access controland postings into areas with the potential for radiological exposure, radiological surveys, contaminationcontrol, radiation work permits, work planning and control, personnel protective equipment, dosimetry, radiological monitoring and sampling, source control, and emergency radiological event response, andtraining of the WIPP personnel and visitors.

Because waste containers are not opened at the WIPP and they must meet 10 CFR Part 835 externalcontamination limits prior to shipment, significant contamination is not expected at WIPP. ALARApractices, use of RWPs, and ventilation design are the main methods for controlling contamination,should it occur. Inhalation and ingestion of radiological materials is prevented through postings andprohibiting eating and drinking in posted area.

7.6.1 Administrative Limits

This section provides a summary of the occupational dose limits for the WIPP workers. Wastecontainers accepted for disposal at the WIPP are expected to meet the 10 CFR Part 835 externalcontamination limits. WIPP normal operations do not involve any expected releases of airborneradioactive materials. As such, the projected occupational worker dose from normal operations isexpected to result from direct radiation from waste containers only, with no contribution from internaldose (committed effective dose equivalent [CEDE]) due to airborne radiological materials.

The dose to personnel from CH waste handling varies with the number of shipments and the radiationdose rates of the waste in those shipments. Each year the ALARA committee estimates the doses topersonnel based on the expected numbers and dose rates of the shipments. The actual doses received byworkers are then reviewed by the committee to determine if work was performed to limit personnelexposures to radiation and radioactive materials to ALARA levels.

Occupational dose limits from 10 CFR Part 8351 are provided in Table 7.6-1. The occupational doselimits provided in Table 7.6-1 apply to all general employees and is expressed as roentgen equivalentman (rem). A site-specific administrative control has been established at 1 rem per year, per person, inaccordance with WP 12-5,7 Other administrative control levels are defined in Table 7.6-1. Generalemployees who have not completed at least Radiological Worker I training are not permitted unescortedaccess to any radiological area, Radioactive Material Area (RMA), or Radiological Buffer Area (RBA).


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No individual is allowed to exceed the WIPP administrative control levels without prior written approvalof the RS&EM Manager and the WTS General Manager.

Efforts are made to control each individual's lifetime occupational dose below a lifetime control level ofN rem where N is the age of the individual in years. In rare cases, emergency exposure to radiation maybe necessary to rescue personnel or to protect major property. Emergency exposures are authorized inaccordance with the provisions contained in 10 CFR Part 835. These doses are in addition to, andaccounted for separately from, the doses received under the limits in Table 7.6-1.

Table 7.6-1, WIPP Occupational Dose Limits, DOE, and WIPP Administrative Control Levels

Type of ExposureOccupational Dose

LimitDOE Admin

ControlLevel

WIPP AdminControl Level

General Employee: Whole Body (internal +external) (TEDE) Whole body dose total effectivedose equivalent (TEDE) = effective dose equivalentfrom external exposures + CEDE from internalexposures

5 rem/year 2 rem/year 1 rem/year

General Employee: Lens of the Eye (external) 15 rem/year N/A 3 rem/year

General Employee: Skin and extremities(external shallow dose)

50 rem/year N/A 10 rem/year

General Employee: Any organ or tissue (otherthan lens of eye) (internal + external)

50 rem/year N/A 10 rem/year

Declared Pregnant Worker: Embryo/Fetus(internal + external)

0.5 rem/gestationperiod

N/A 0.5 rem/gestationperiod

Minors: Whole body (internal + external) (TEDE) 0.1 rem/year N/A 0.1 rem/year

Minors: Lens of the eye, skin, and extremities 10% of GeneralEmployee limits

N/A 10% of GeneralEmployee limits

7.6.2 Radiological Practices

Radiological practices at the WIPP includes proceduralizing those processes with the potential to resultin a radiological exposure and preplanning work such that the radiological hazards are evaluated at theearliest stage in a job. Preplanning work is directed to controlling contamination at the source,eliminating airborne radioactivity, maintaining personnel exposure below regulatory limits andperforming work that assures ALARA exposures. The RWP specifies the controls necessary for entryinto an area with the potential for a radiological exposure. The RWP may require additional dosimetryand monitoring devices, protective clothing, and respiratory equipment. The necessity for these items isbased on radiation level, a combination of surface contamination and radiation level, the presence ofairborne radioactivity, or the potential for occurrence of any of these conditions. When required, theseadditional control items are prescribed on a RWP that personnel must follow.

Waste containers are not opened at the WIPP and are also not removed from the shipping container untilit is moved into the WHB, where access is controlled and equipment is available to direct airflow whenopening a shipping container through HEPA filtration and a sample filter. General radiological controlpractices include:


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Access Control - Access to radiological areas of the facility is controlled in accordance with 10 CFR Part 835.1 Only personnel who have successfully completed the requirements specified inWP 12-57 are allowed unescorted entry to the radiological areas of the site. All other personnel willrequire an escort. Personnel performing radiological work in a radiological area are required to sign inon a RWP.

Personnel Access Control Points - Access to the areas at the WIPP where radioactive materials arehandled is controlled and limited to personnel who have successfully completed the appropriate level ofradiological training. Personnel leaving Contamination, High Contamination, and Airborne RadioactivityAreas are required to perform a personnel survey prior to exit.

Radiological Monitoring - Personnel monitoring is performed in accordance with WP 12-3, DosimetryProgram,19 and WP12-5,7 discussed in Section 7.7.

Radiological Posting - Areas within the WIPP including the underground disposal area are posted inaccordance with 10 CFR Part 8351 and WP 12-57 to specify the actual or potential radiological hazard. Posting provides necessary information and access control for minimizing personnel radiation exposuresand the potential spread of contamination Exposure control is accomplished by identifying areascontaining sources of radiation and/or contamination, and controlling personnel access into these areas. Radiological areas are designated and defined in 10 CFR Part 8351 and in the WP 12-57 as follows:

• Radiological Area - Any area within a controlled area defined as a Radiation Area, HighRadiation Area, Very High Radiation Area, Contamination Area, High Contamination Area, orAirborne Radioactivity Area.

• Controlled Area (CA) - Any area to which access is controlled in order to protect individualsfrom exposure to radiation and radioactive materials.

• Radiological Buffer Area (RBA) - An intermediate area established to prevent the spread ofpotential radioactive contamination. The area may surround Contamination Areas, RadiationAreas, High Contamination Areas, and Airborne Radioactivity Areas.

• Radioactive Material Area (RMA) - Any area within a controlled area, accessible to individuals,in which items or containers of radioactive material exist and the total activity of radioactivematerial exceeds the applicable values in Appendix E of 10 CFR Part 835.1

• Radiation Area - An area accessible to individuals in which radiation levels could result in anindividual receiving a deep dose equivalent in excess of 0.005 rem (0.05 millisievert) in one hourat 30 centimeters from the source, or from any surface that the radiation penetrates.

• High Radiation Area - An area accessible to individuals in which radiation levels could result inan individual receiving a deep dose equivalent in excess of 0.1 rem (1 sievert) in one hour at30 centimeters from the radiation source or from any surface that the radiation penetrates.

• Very High Radiation Area - An area accessible to individuals in which radiation levels couldresult in an individual receiving an absorbed dose in excess of 500 rads (5 Grays) in one hour atone meter from a radiation source or from any surface that the radiation penetrates.


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• Contamination Area - Any area, accessible to individuals, where removable surfacecontamination levels exceed or are likely to exceed the removable surface contamination valuesspecified in Appendix D of 10 CFR Part 835,1 but do not exceed 100 times those values.

• High Contamination Area - Any area, accessible to individuals, where removable surfacecontamination levels exceed or are likely to exceed 100 times the removable surfacecontamination values specified in Appendix D of 10 CFR Part 835.1

• Airborne Radioactivity Area - Any area, accessible to individuals, where: (1) the airborneradioactivity, above natural background, exceeds or is likely to exceed the Derived AirConcentration (DAC) values listed in Appendix A or Appendix C of 10 CFR Part 835,1 or (2) anindividual present in the area without respiratory protection could receive an intake exceeding 12DAC-hours in a week.

Radiation Shielding - Although CH waste handling activities will not normally require the use ofshielding, there is a shielded storage area in the southeast corner of the CH bay of the WHB. This area isused for segregating waste containers that may have discrepant documentation or may exceed expectedradiation levels.

Radiation and Contamination Surveys - RCTs perform routine radiation and contamination surveys of thefacility and surveys of the waste packages upon receipt of waste shipments, during removal from theshipping container, and during processing of waste containers. Survey areas and frequencies areestablished in accordance with health physics procedures and are based upon the likelihood ofcontamination and changes in radiation level, and upon personnel occupancy. Surveys consist ofmeasurements for dose rate and contamination, as appropriate, for the specific area. RCTs performsurveys on normally inaccessible areas when they are opened for maintenance and/or inspections. Theseareas include ventilation duct work, filter housings, piping, drains, and overhead structural surfaces in thewaste handling areas.

Radioactive Material Control - This includes control of radioactive sources and control of radioactivematerial produced through work processes performed on-site. Use of sources on-site is controlled inaccordance with WP 12-HP3200, Radioactive Material Control,20 to ensure proper control, leak testing,inventory, transfer, and disposal of sources are maintained at all times to prevent loss/theft, spread ofcontamination, and other abnormal occurrences involving radioactive sources. Any item used in aprocess that involves known or suspected presence of radioactive contamination or radioactive materialsis surveyed prior to release from a radiological area. Items which could contain internal or masked(e.g., painted) contamination are evaluated prior to release. If the survey indicates the presence ofradioactive material on the item, the item is either decontaminated or disposed of as radioactive waste.

Airborne Radioactivity Monitoring Program - The airborne radioactivity monitoring program complieswith 10 CFR Part 835,1 and verifies that the survey program described above is detecting contaminationcontrol problem areas, and those problem areas are corrected before loose surface contaminationbecomes airborne. The equipment used for air sampling and monitoring is described in Section 7.8. Theairborne monitoring program is described in WP 12-5.7

7.6.3 Dosimetry

The basis of the WIPP dosimetry program, contained in WP 12-3,19 is to measure and report occupationalradiation exposures to individuals at the WIPP site in compliance with 10 CFR Part 835. WIPPpersonnel are classified as radiation workers or non-radiation workers. Non-radiation workers are


7-10 November 2006

typically not monitored for occupational exposure. For radiation workers, the external occupationalradiation exposures of concern are of ionizing radiation (x-ray, gamma, beta, and neutron).

The external radiation dosimetry program uses thermoluminescent dosimeters (TLDs) to measureoccupational radiation exposures to external radiation exposure for radiation workers. Radiation workersare assigned a TLD and are instructed in its use by dosimetry personnel. TLDs remain at the site whenworkers leave for the day. Workers pick up their assigned TLD when returning to the site. Electronicpersonnel dosimeters are also issued to personnel when required by the RWP and are read and recordedupon leaving the area. TLDs are exchanged quarterly for most individuals and monthly for individualswith projected exposures approaching 1 rem annually.

The internal dosimetry program at the WIPP to determine internal exposure measurement may includein-vitro bioassay examination (e.g., urinalysis, and/or fecal analysis) and in-vivo bioassay examination(whole-body counting and chest counting). There are no planned or expected releases of airborneradioactive materials that may present an internal occupation radiological hazard. To verify the absenceof airborne radioactivity, workplace monitoring is performed using portable air samplers, fixed airsamplers (FASs) and continuous air monitors (CAMs). WIPP waste handling operations do not involveopening waste containers. Routine bioassay is not required at the WIPP. Bioassay is performedperiodically for workers who handle radioactive materials as a normal function of their job, to confirmthat there is no internal exposure. Confirmatory bioassay is performed annually. Any waste handlingevent resulting in loss of radioactive material confinement at the WIPP triggers an internal doseassessment to limit further occupational exposures and to facilitate any decision for medical therapy toremove internal contamination. This could be triggered by high airborne activity in work areas and/orunexpected contamination incidents.

Radiation exposure data for monitored individuals is reported in compliance with 10 CFR Part 8351 andDOE O 231.1A, Environment, Safety and Health Reporting.21 Radiation exposure data is confidentialand controlled. An annual radiation dose report is provided to each individual monitored at the WIPPsite during the year, and is provided upon request for individuals terminating employment, or fromindividuals requesting more detailed information.

Personnel dosimetry records are maintained at the WIPP site by dosimetry personnel. Occupationalexposure records are maintained in a readily retrievable database, to permit ready accounting ofemployees' accumulated radiation exposure. The WIPP dosimetry program and implementing proceduresare included in the WIPP WP-12 series procedures.

7.6.4 Respiratory Protection

Respiratory protection is addressed in Chapter 5 of WP 12-5,7 and WP 12-IH.02, WIPP IndustrialHygiene Program.22 The respiratory protection program meets the requirements of ANSI Z88.2-1992.23 Only respiratory protection equipment approved for use by the National Institute of Occupational Safetyand Health is used at the WIPP. Workers who may be required to wear respiratory protection equipmentmust attend a training program on the equipment use during normal, abnormal and emergency conditions. They are fitted for the devices they are required to wear, and are given a special medical examination toensure that there is compatibility with wearing the devices.

Respiratory protection is required when specified on the RWP and when levels exceed the removable andtotal contamination levels specified in WP 12-5. Respiratory protection equipment available at the WIPPincludes self-contained breathing apparatus, airline supplied-air suits and hoods, and respirators withparticulate or gas-filtering cartridges. Only self-contained breathing apparatus may be used in toxic oroxygen-deficient atmospheres.


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Use and maintenance of respiratory protection equipment is proceduralized in the WIPP WP-12 seriesprocedures.

7.7 Radiological Monitoring

Radiological monitoring is performed in accordance with WP 12-319 and WP12-5,7 and includes thefollowing activities:

Radiation and Contamination Surveys - RCTs perform routine radiation and contamination surveys of thefacility and surveys of the waste packages upon receipt. In addition, RCTs will perform surveys onnormally inaccessible areas when they are opened for maintenance and/or inspections. These areasinclude ventilation duct work and filter housing, piping, drains, and overhead structural surfaces in thewaste handling areas. Routine survey areas and frequencies are established in accordance with10CFR835 and implemented in health physics procedures and manuals, and are based upon theprobability of contamination, changes in radiation level, and upon personnel occupancy. These surveysconsist of measurements for dose rate and contamination, as appropriate, for the specific area.

Radioactive Material Control - There are two facets to the control of radioactive material. The first isradioactive source control. Radioactive sources, including Plutonium, Strontium/Yttrium, and Cesium, are used to test, calibrate, and check the operation of radiation detection instrumentation. Use ofradioactive sources, brought on-site by external organizations for testing, radiography, and soil densityoperations, is controlled in accordance with WP 12-HP3200.20 The Radiological Control Managerensures the external organization meets training and source documentation requirements prior toauthorizing the source on-site. The radioactive source control program ensures that proper control, leaktesting, inventory, transfer, and disposal of these sources are maintained at all times to prevent loss/theft,spread of contamination, and other abnormal occurrences involving radioactive sources.

The second facet of the radioactive material control program is the control of radioactive materialproduced from radiological work processes performed on-site. Any item used in a process that involvesknown or suspected presence of radioactive contamination or radioactive materials is surveyed prior torelease from a radiological area. Items which could contain internal or masked (e.g., painted)contamination will be evaluated prior to release. If the survey indicates the presence of radioactivematerial on the item, then the item is either decontaminated or disposed of as radioactive waste.

Various types of protective clothing and equipment protect personnel from contamination. Personalprotective equipment (PPE) including clothing and head, hand, and foot protection is provided.

Contamination control equipment is used to prevent or limit the spread of radioactive contamination andto assist in its removal. The equipment is stored and routinely inventoried in cabinets in or near areaswhere it is normally used.

Workplace radiation monitoring is performed in waste handling areas, in the exhaust of the activedisposal room, and at the effluent of the WHB and underground ventilation exhaust with instrumentationas discussed in Section 7.8.

Environmental monitoring is also performed and requires monitoring of air, groundwater, surface water,soils, sediments, and biota to characterize the radiological environment around the WIPP facility. Environmental monitoring is performed in accordance with DOE/WIPP 99-2194, Waste Isolation PilotPlant Environmental Monitoring Plan.24 The purpose of radiological environmental monitoring is tomeasure the radionuclides in the ambient environment media. This allow for a comparison of sampledata to results from previous years and to baseline data to determining the impact of the WIPP operations


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on the surrounding environment. For each sample a chain of custody form is initiated to track andmaintain an accurate written record of sample handling and treatment from the time of sample collectionthrough delivery to the laboratory. The results from environmental monitoring are compiled periodicallyin a site environmental report, the most recent being DOE/WIPP 05-2225, Waste Isolation Pilot Plant2004 Site Environmental Report.25 Meteorology data from the WIPP meteorological station is alsosummarized in the site environmental report. The data is used for atmospheric dispersion modeling andused as necessary in the review of environmental radiological data.

7.8 Radiological Protection Instrumentation

The radiological protection instrumentation used by the health physics personnel include:

• Fixed radiation counting instruments (laboratory type)

• Portable radiation/contamination survey instruments

• Airborne radioactivity sampling and monitoring instruments

• Personnel monitoring instruments

Instruments are repaired and calibrated on-site or at off-site calibration facilities. In some cases,specialized instruments may be returned to the manufacturers for repair and calibration. If theinstruments have been used in areas where they have the potential to be contaminated, radioactivecontamination surveys will be conducted before any maintenance/calibration can start. The use,maintenance, and calibration of radiological protection instrumentation is procedurally controlled.

The radiation instrumentation used at WIPP is further discussed as follows:

Fixed Radiation Counting Instruments - Fixed radiation counting instruments are located in the countinglaboratories and at specific task monitoring stations. These monitoring locations include TMF and theCH bay. The instruments in the counting laboratories include gross radioactivity counters andspectrographic systems. These instruments are used to verify radiological conditions are within limitsduring job coverage and receipt surveys. The instruments possess the sensitivities required formonitoring airborne contamination. Instruments are periodically calibrated using approved proceduresand with standard sources, traceable to the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST). Instrument response and operation is verified each operating day to verify that the instrument backgroundand calibration have not changed.

When required, samples are prepared for counting in the sample preparation facility. Sample preparationfor counting may include evaporation, ashing, partitioning, grinding, chemical separation, or placingsamples in containers that conform the sample to a defined geometry.

Portable Radiation Survey Instruments - The portable radiation detection instruments are used to performradiation and contamination surveys in the field. Portable instruments include alpha contaminationdetectors, beta contamination detectors, gamma survey meters, and neutron survey meters. Portablegamma dose rate instruments are calibrated in the calibration room using a shielded calibrator andapproved procedures. Portable neutron dose rate instruments are sent to a qualified vendor forcalibration. Portable contamination instruments are calibrated in the area of the instrument calibrationroom with NIST traceable sources and approved procedures. Prior to use, these instruments are checkedfor response with a check source containing a nominal amount of radioactivity. Those instruments that


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cannot be calibrated at the WIPP are sent to a calibration facility that has been approved by QualityAssurance.

Personnel Monitoring Instruments and Service - The WIPP has a personnel dosimetry program thatconforms to the requirements of 10 CFR Part 835.1 The program is certified by the DOE LaboratoryAccreditation Program for Personnel Dosimetry, and is conducted in accordance with WP 12-3.19 Directreading dosimeters are used when required by a RWP. These dosimeters are used to keep track ofexposure in between TLD readouts. The TLD reading is the record of exposure. Employees who handlewaste perform contamination surveys on their clothing and body. In addition, when special operationsare conducted, contamination surveys of personnel are performed by or under the direction of a qualifiedRCT. Portal monitors are placed at the WIPP site security gate to monitor personnel for radiationsources. Bioassay programs are conducted in accordance with WP 12-3.19

Calibration of Radiation Survey Instruments - All calibrations of radiological instruments are traceable toNIST or other equivalent recognized standards. The portable dose rate instruments are calibrated with ashielded calibrator that minimizes radiation exposure to the calibration technician. Portable sources areused to calibrate fixed instruments such as CAMs. Accountable sources are checked out and under thedirect control of RCTs or qualified individuals during calibration activities in accordance withWP 12-HP3200.20 Instruments receive periodic electronic calibration using NIST traceable, calibratedelectronic sources. Radiation survey instrument calibration records are maintained for the life of thefacility.

Airborne Radioactivity Monitoring - For CH waste handling operations, alpha CAMs are installed ateach operating station on the TRUDOCKS in the WHB. The CAMs are in operation at the TRUDOCKswhen waste handling activities are being conducted. Two alpha CAMs and a beta CAM are installed inthe underground disposal area at the exit of the active waste emplacement room. The CAMs are typicallyin operation in the underground except when removed from service for maintenance or outage activities. The CAMs continually collect and measure airborne particulates by pulling air through a filter inproximity to an integral beta-gamma and/or alpha spectrometer. The TRUDOCK and undergroundCAMs provide a local and remote readout and alarm in the Central Monitoring Room. Each CAM is setto alarm within the limits in 10 CFR Part 835.1 Alpha CAMs are sensitive to an energy range of 1 MeVto 10 MeV. The Beta CAM has an energy range rom 80 KeV to 2.5 Mev. The CAMs located in theexhaust of the active disposal room will divert the underground ventilation exhaust through HEPA filtersupon detection of airborne release.

FASs are located in the WHB, the Exhaust Filter Building, the Support Building and the TMF andprovide and indication of activities that could be causing releases of airborne radioactivity. Some FASsare connected to the plant vacuum system and those that are not connected to plant vacuum have theirown pumps.

Radiological effluent monitoring systems (REMS) are installed on the WHB ventilation exhaustdownstream of the HEPA filters (Station C), and on the underground ventilation system exhaust bothupstream (Station A) and downstream (Station B) of the HEPA filters. Effluent sampler Station D islocated in the underground in E-300 before the disposal exhaust joins the exhaust from other areas of theunderground. The REMS consist of sampling equipment including a pump, flow controller, sampleholder, and delivery piping. Station C is located on the second floor of the WHB. Station C samples theWHB exhaust downstream of the HEPA filters associated with both the RH and CH portions of thebuilding. The underground exhaust effluent monitoring system is composed of Station A and Station B. Station A is located over the underground ventilation system exhaust elbow at the surface and samplesusing probes that extend 21 ft below the elbow in the exhaust shaft. Station B samples from a pointdownstream from the underground ventilation system main fans and HEPA filters. Figure 2.4-12 shows


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the location of both Station A and Station B. Station A contains three sampling skids each splitting thesample and directing the air into three air samplers per skid. Station B contains two sampling skids eachsplitting the sample and directing the air into three air samplers per skid. The effluent samplers collectperiodic confirmatory particulate samples from the total volume of air being discharged. The samplersconsist of tubing/piping to deliver the sample, a filter holder, and a vacuum supply. Sample locationsmay have multiple filters to allow parallel sampling for outside agencies. The analysis data from effluentsamplers is used for quantifying total airborne particulate radioactivity discharged. This is done todemonstrate compliance with the mandated regulatory requirements contained in 40 CFR Part 191,Subpart A;4 and 40 CFR Part 61, Subpart H.5 The counting equipment used to analyze FAS filtersprovide indication of releases at much lower levels than general area samples or CAMs.

The underground room exit CAMs and effluent samplers are supplied with an uninterruptible powersupply in the event of a power outage.

In addition to the permanently installed equipment, portable CAMs and portable air samplers areprovided. The portable air samplers and portable CAMs are similar to those installed in waste handlingareas. Portable samplers normally are used for sampling routine/nonroutine operations, for emergencyair sampling, or to temporarily replace inoperable equipment. The CAMs are calibrated periodically andafter repairs, using standards that are traceable to the NIST. The source and detector geometry duringcalibration are the same as the sample and detector geometry in actual use.

Area Radiation Monitoring Instruments - There are no area radiation monitoring instruments used for CHwaste handling.

Radiological analysis and sample preparation facilities are located at the Carlsbad EnvironmentalMonitoring and Research Center and in the safety and emergency services building, and in the supportbuilding. The dose rate instrument calibration facility is located in the analytical laboratory in thesupport building. Contamination survey instruments are calibrated in the analytical lab in the supportbuilding. The dosimetry laboratory is located in the safety and emergency services building. No otherradioactive materials, other than those used for calibration purposes, are permitted in the dosimetrylaboratory.

7.9 Radiological Protection Record Keeping

Management of radiological records are maintained in accordance of WP 12-57 and WP 15-PR, WIPPRecords Management Program.26 Dosimetry records are maintained as described in WP 12-3.19

Individual monitoring records are maintained to demonstrate compliance with the regulatory limits. Radiation dose records contain information sufficient to identify each person. Procedures, data, andsupporting information needed to reconfirm a person's dose at a later date are maintained. External doserecords includes applicable extremity, skin, lens of the eye, and whole body dose monitoring results. These doses are usually measured with personnel dosimeters, but records may include evaluationsresulting from anomalous dose results such as unexpected high or low doses, dose reconstructions fromlost or damaged dosimeters, or for unbadged workers, evaluations of nonuniform radiation doses. Internal dose records include CEDE, committed doses to the affected organs and tissues, and identity ofradionuclides. The supporting information typically includes applicable whole body and lung countingresults (including chest wall thickness measurements where applicable), applicable urine, fecal, andspecimen analysis results, including estimated intake. Emergency doses and planned special exposuresare accounted for separately, but are maintained with the individual's occupational exposure records.


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Records of doses, including zero dose, received by all visitors for whom monitoring was performed ismaintained.

Records of the formal written declaration of pregnancy, including the estimated conception date,pregnancy conclusion date, and revocations of declarations of pregnancy are maintained. The doseequivalent to the embryo/fetus of a declared pregnant radiological worker is maintained with theoccupational dose records for that worker.

Records include results of monitoring and surveys for radiation and radioactive materials, results ofmonitoring and calculations used to determine individual occupational doses, results of surveys forrelease of materials from radiological areas, results of sealed radioactive source leak tests andinventories, results of surveys of radioactive material packages received from transportation.

Personnel records that name an individual are private information and are available only to the employeeand to personnel needing them for the performance of their duties. The release of this information toother persons is permitted only upon specific, written approval of the individual or when required by law.

The complete records of radiological incidents and occurrences involving personnel dose is retained in orcross-referenced to the individual's dose records. Records related to doses exceeding the Table 2-1 limitsincluding authorized emergency doses and planned special exposures is maintained. Records ofauthorization to exceed administrative control levels shall be retained.

Medical records are maintained in accordance with Industrial Safety records requirements. Theseinclude the preemployment examinations, physical examinations, fit test results and medical evaluationsand treatment performed in support of the radiological control program.

Formal records or summary reports of training and qualification shall be readily available to first-linesupervision and management of involved personnel to aid in making work assignments.

The personnel training records are maintained by Technical Training. Retained records include GET,Radiological Worker training and refresher or retraining, radiological safety training including instructortraining, training of radiological control personnel, respiratory protection training, and training ofemergency response personnel. Documentation of completion of radiological orientation is maintainedfor visitors entering an area where radiation monitoring is required.

Records of the Radiological Control Program, policy statements, procedures, work authorizations, andsupporting data are maintained in such a way as to allow correlation with the corresponding supportinformation. Completed RWPs are maintained. Records generated by radiological control proceduresare maintained so that the resulting document can be tied back to the governing procedure.

ALARA records are maintained in accordance with WP 12-2.17

7.10 Occupational Radiation Exposures

Occupational radiation doses at the WIPP are expected to average about 1.5 person-rem per year. This isbased on site radiation exposures for the years 2001 through 2004 which ranged from 1.103 to2.298 person-rem. Actual collective doses for waste handling operations will vary based on shipmentsreceived and dose rates on the waste containers.

Collective occupational doses from waste handling activities at the WIPP are estimated at the beginningof each year. These estimates are based on the expected shipping rates from each waste generator, the


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average container dose rates from those waste generators from the previous years and a collective doseconversion factor. The collective dose conversion factor is based on the previous years' ratio of workercollective dose divided by the sum of waste container dose rates. Management then reviews theprojected doses and determines if any intervention is necessary to reduce doses.


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1. 10 CFR Part 835, Occupational Radiation Protection, January, 1993.

2. DOE-STD-1098-99, DOE Radiological Control Standard, July, 1999.

3. DOE G-441.1-2, DOE Occupational ALARA Program Guide.

4. 40 CFR Part 191, "Environmental Standards for the Management and Disposal of Spent NuclearFuel, High-Level and Transuranic Wastes"; Subpart A, "Environmental Standards forManagement and Storage."

5. 40 CFR Part 61, "Environmental Protection Agency Regulations on National Emission Standardsfor Hazardous Air Pollutants"; Subpart H, "National Emission Standard for RadionuclideEmissions from Department of Energy (DOE) Facilities."

6. DOE Order 5400.5, Radiation Protection of the Public and the Environment, June, 1990.

7. WP 12-5, WIPP Radiation Safety Manual.

8. 10 CFR Part 835, Subpart K, Design and Control.

9. DOE/WIPP-02-3122, Transuranic Waste Acceptance Criteria for the Waste Isolation PilotPlant, March 2006, effective TBD.

10. WP 12-2, WIPP ALARA Program Manual.

11. MC 9.4, Radiological ALARA Committee.

12. DOE publication DOE/EV/1830-T5, A Guide to Reducing Radiation Exposure to as Low asReasonably Achievable.

13. DOE Order 6430, General Design Criteria Manual for Department of Energy Facilities,June 1981.

14. DOE Order O 420.1 B, Facility Safety, December 2005.

15. DOE Order O 430.1B, Life-Cycle Real Property Asset Management, September 2003.

16. WP 09-CN3007, Engineering and Design Document Preparation and Change Control.

17. DOE Handbook 1122-99, Radiological Control Technician Training.

18. WP 12-9, WIPP Emergency Management Program

19. WP 12-3, Dosimetry Program.

20. WP 12-HP3200, Radioactive Material Control.

21. DOE O 231.1A, Environment, Safety and Health Reporting


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22. WP 12-IH.02, WIPP Industrial Hygiene Program.

23. ANSI Z88.2-1992, American National Standard for Respiratory Protection.

24. DOE/WIPP 99-2194, Waste Isolation Pilot Plant Environmental Monitoring Plan, 2004.

25. DOE/WIPP 05-2225, Waste Isolation Pilot Plant 2004 Site Environmental Report.

26. WP 15-PR, WIPP Records Management Program


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HAZARDOUS MATERIAL PROTECTION

TABLE OF CONTENTS

SECTION PAGE NO.

8.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8-1

8.2 Requirements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8-1

8.3 Hazardous Material Protection and Organization . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8-1

8.4 ALARA Policy and Program . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8-2

8.5 Hazardous Material Training . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8-2

8.6 Hazardous Material Exposure Control . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8-38.6.1 Hazardous Material Identification Program . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8-38.6.2 Administrative Limits . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8-48.6.3 Occupational Medical Programs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8-48.6.4 Respiratory Protection . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8-4

8.7 Hazardous Material Monitoring . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8-58.7.1 Volatile Organic Compound Monitoring . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8-68.7.2 Meteorological Monitoring . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8-78.7.3 Nonradioactive Air Contaminants Monitoring . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8-78.7.4 Diesel Emissions Monitoring . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8-78.7.5 Workplace Monitoring . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8-7

8.8 Hazardous Material Protection Instrumentation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8-8

8.9 Hazardous Material Protection Record Keeping . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8-8

8.10 Hazard Communication Program . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8-8

8.11 Occupational Chemical Exposures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8-9



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LIST OF TABLES


Table 8-1, Maximum Occupational and Public Exposure From Underground Waste VOC Emissions. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8-12


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8.1 Introduction

The purpose of this chapter is to describe the key elements of the WIPP hazardous material protectionprogram most important to the safety basis. It summarizes provisions for hazardous material protectionother than radiological hazards and summarizes the hazardous materials concerns. The elements of thischapter include:

• An overall description of the hazardous material protection policy and program

• A summary of the hazardous material exposure control program

• Information on the hazardous material communication program 8.2 Requirements

The standards, regulations, and DOE Orders required for establishing the safety basis of the facility,specific to the hazardous materials program include the following:

• 29 CFR Parts 1900-1999, Occupational Safety and Health Act1

• 29 CFR Parts 1926.1, Safety and Health Regulations for Construction2

• 10 CFR Part 850, Chronic Beryllium Disease Prevention Program3

• DOE Order 440.1A, Worker Protection Management for DOE Federal and ContractorEmployees4

• DOE Order 450.1A, Environmental Protection Program5

• DOE Order 5480.4, Environmental Protection, Safety, and Health Protection Standards6

8.3 Hazardous Material Protection and Organization

Hazardous material protection is an integral part of the WIPP industrial safety program and documentedin WP 12-IS.01-1, Industrial Safety Program - Structure and Management,7 and WP 12-IH.02, WIPPIndustrial Hygiene Program Manual - Overview.8 The organization responsible for implementation isthe WIPP Industrial Safety and Hygiene (IS&H) section. Implementation of the defined programelements controls occupational health hazards originating from chemical, biological, and physical(excluding ionizing radiation) agents. WP 12-IH.02-4, Hazard Communication and Hazardous MaterialManagement Plan,10 is used to control the acquisition (requisition and procurement), use, handling, andstorage of non-radiological waste hazardous materials and chemicals. Protection of personnel fromradiological material is addressed in the radiation protection program discussed in Chapter 7 of thisdocumented safety analysis (DSA).

The hazardous material program is established to protect human health and the environment bycontrolling chemical hazards. This program defines the scope of chemical covered and providesdirection and references to analyze the hazards that are inherent in their storage and use. It describes theprocesses and systems used for self-performed work and by subcontractors for their activities to controlchemical hazards to protect personnel, the public, and the environment.


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The organizational structure and responsibilities delegated by the Washington TRU Solutions (WTS) General Manager for IS&H is discussed in Chapter 17 of this DSA. In addition, the following functionsare assigned to IS&H:

• Chemical safety

• Industrial hygiene

• Fire prevention, protection, and control

• Medical examinations, diagnosis, treatment, and preventive medicine

• Safety training

WP 12-IH.028 identifies the qualifications and positions of authority and responsibilities of the IS&Horganization. IS&H liaisons with other safety organizations, and facility operations is discussed inWP 12-IH.02.8

8.4 ALARA Policy and Program

The hazardous materials exposure control program at the WIPP seeks to ensure that employee exposuresto hazardous materials are minimized and maintained beneath levels of regulatory toxicological concern. WP 12-2, WIPP ALARA Program Manual,11 ensures that employee exposure to radioactive material is aslow as reasonably achievable (ALARA). The programs evaluate potential hazards for radioactive,chemical, physical, and biological agents and ergonomic stressors using DOE requirements, andOccupational Safety and Health Act (OSHA),1 National Institute for Safety and Health (NIOSH), andU.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) exposure assessment methodologies. The followingcontrols are used to keep the hazardous materials exposures ALARA:

• Using approved and controlled procedures that provide administrative or engineering controlsthat minimize or eliminate exposure to hazardous materials

• Furnishing employees the necessary personal protective equipment (PPE) and training on theproper use of PPE

• Training employees to recognize potential hazards, take safety precautions, understandconsequences of an accident, and know the actions to take in case of an accident

• Monitoring the work environment to obtain personnel and area exposure data

• Reviewing and approving all chemical use and storage at the WIPP

• Maintaining Material Safety Data Sheets (MSDSs)

8.5 Hazardous Material Training

WP 12-IH.02-410 requires hazards communication training be provided to the WIPP personnel through general employee training (GET) and GET refresher. This training covers the topics required by 29 CFR§1910.1200, Hazard Communication,12 as well as site-specific policies and procedures, including accessto on-line MSDS databases. Information about new site hazards and changes in applicable policies orprocedures is provided to employees in the annual GET refresher training.


8-3 November 2006

Personnel who sample for hazardous constituents or who are responsible for management of hazardouswaste receive training as a hazardous waste worker. Sampling personnel also must complete aqualification card.

Job-specific hazard communication training for chemical hazards is provided through pre-job briefingsand on-the-job instruction involving management and employees.

8.6 Hazardous Material Exposure Control

WP 12-IH.028 encompasses the comprehensive aspects of industrial hygiene defined by DOEOrder 440.1A,4 excluding ionizing radiation, physical safety, fire prevention, medical examinations, andformal training, which are addressed by other industrial hygiene programs. Hazardous materials andchemicals are controlled through a combination of engineered controls, administrative controls, and PPE.

WP 12-IH.028 protects the WIPP workers by anticipating, recognizing, evaluating, and controllingchemical, physical, biological, and ergonomic factors and/or stressors in the workplace. The permissibleexposure limits used in hazard evaluation and hazard communication shall not exceed those in themandatory standards of DOE Order 440.1A.4

IS&H personnel conduct surveys to ensure the adequacy of controls to ensure adequacy of controls. Procedures provide guidance for on-site handling and disposal of waste materials, including chemicallycontaminated waste, personnel monitoring when necessary or requested, establish PPE requirements, andjob site sampling and monitoring when required.

WP 12-IH.02-9, WIPP Industrial Hygiene Program - Beryllium Exposure Prevention Program,9 has beendeveloped as some of the TRU waste forms being disposed of at the WIPP include beryllium. Noactivities at WIPP involve direct handling of beryllium as part of normal operations. The programidentifies the controls necessary for worker protection from beryllium in the event that a waste containeris breached. In general, since beryllium may be in the waste, the controls that provide radiologicalprotection also provide protection from beryllium.

8.6.1 Hazardous Material Identification Program

WP 12-IH.02,8 and implementing procedures, ensure the proper management of material hazards byestablishing procedural and programmatic controls for hazardous materials procurement. Restrictedmaterials are identified that require written IS&H/Site Environmental Compliance management approvalprior to purchase. Receipt inspection is conducted as appropriate to ensure control of hazardousmaterials throughout the site. Chemicals purchased for use are reviewed for their associated hazards. Where feasible, less hazardous materials are selected. Once received, hazardous materials areinventoried and traced until they are used or disposed. A Hazardous Materials Area Representative(HMAR) maintains inventory lists of the hazardous materials used in areas of their responsibility. AnMSDS is maintained for each chemical. The MSD provides chemical-specific information includingchemical name, manufacturer, physical properties, chemical properties, reactivity, and fire suppressioninformation.

Workers are trained annually through GET in the ways to obtain MSDS information, including paper orelectronic copies, and how to interpret them. Employees receive annual hazardous waste worker trainingif handling hazardous chemicals is specific to their work assignment. Workers also receive informationspecific to the hazards and conditions of their specific work area.


8-4 November 2006

When work is to be performed by a subcontractor, the subcontractor's safety and health program isrequired by WP 12-IH.02-410 to address hazardous and toxic materials brought on-site by the contractor. The subcontractor must provide MSDSs for these chemicals, and the chemicals are entered into acentralized list.

8.6.2 Administrative Limits

The industrial hygiene monitoring program for evaluating employee exposures to potential chemical,physical, biological, and ergonomic health hazards ensures that the personnel exposure to hazardousmaterial does not exceed those in the mandatory standards in DOE Order 440.1A.4

8.6.3 Occupational Medical Programs

The occupational medical site personnel, as defined in WP 15-HS.02, Occupational Health ProgramPlan,13 work in cooperation with other WIPP site organizations to optimize the maintenance of ahealthful work environment. Pre-employment, periodic, return-to-work, and termination healthexaminations are coordinated through the WTS Human Resources Department. Diagnosis and treatmentof occupational injuries and illnesses are coordinated with WIPP organizations where these incidentsmay occur. Health maintenance and preventive medical activities are coordinated with IS&H.

As part of the program, the WIPP employs a part time occupational medical physician. The physician isassisted by an on-site occupational health nurse and emergency service technicians (ESTs). The ESTsprovide 24-hour emergency medical coverage on the site.

The occupational medical program is designed to accomplish the following:

• Ensure the health and safety of employees in their work environments, through the application ofoccupational health principles

• Determine the physical fitness of employees to perform job assignments without undue hazard tothemselves, fellow employees, or the public at large

• Ensure the early detection and treatment of employee occupational illness, or injuries, by meansof scheduled periodic health evaluations and a wellness awareness program

• Provide employees, as appropriate, with medical evaluations, guidance, counseling, and referralsto specialists in support of physical and mental health. This includes assisting the OccupationalMedical Director as defined in WP 15-HS.0213 with the planning, implementation, andadministration of the Employee Assistance Program and the Alcohol/Substance AbuseRehabilitation Program

• Maintain confidentiality of employee medical records

• Maintain employee exposure and medical records in accordance with 29 CFR §1910.1020,Access to Employee Exposure Medical Records,14 and document exposures to hazardouschemicals

8.6.4 Respiratory Protection

WP 12-IH.028 defines the WIPP respiratory protection program as part of the WIPP's management policyMP 1.28, Integrated Safety Management.15 WP-IH.02-6, Respiratory Protection,16 specifies the program


8-5 November 2006

responsibilities, training and qualification requirements for respirator wearers and managers, and therequirements for selection and issuance of respirators. The program provides compliance with OSHAand MSHA respiratory protection regulations. Training is provided before initial use and everysubsequent year for general respiratory use. Elements of the respiratory protection program required forradiological protection include the following:

• Explanation of why respiratory protection is required

• Nature, extent, and effects of respiratory hazards in the workplace

• Explanation of available engineering and administrative controls

• Explanation of why a particular type of respirator has been selected for a specific respiratoryhazard

• Description of hazards typically encountered and the respiratory equipment provided for theindividual's job category

• Explanation of the operations, capabilities, and limitations of the respirator selected

• Instruction and individual participation in inspecting, donning, performing a user seal check,wearing, and doffing a respirator

• Instruction in proper issuance of respirators

• Maintenance and storage of respirators

• Instruction for verifying that the labeling and color-coding of filtering media are correct

• Instruction in proper disposal of the face piece and cartridges

• Instruction in how to recognize and cope with emergencies

• As applicable, instruction for special respirator use (e.g., in emergency procedures, and the use ofemergency escape devices, special respirators and air suits)

• Regulations concerning respirator use

• Importance of respirator wearers informing supervisors of any problems experienced by them ortheir coworkers while wearing respirators

• The need for a successful completion of a fit-test

8.7 Hazardous Material Monitoring

DOE Order 450.15 requires each DOE site to conduct environmental sampling and monitoring to preventthe spread of hazardous materials both internal and external to the facility. DOE/WIPP 99-2194, WasteIsolation Pilot Plant Environmental Monitoring Plan,17 implements this Order at the WIPP site. Theinternal monitoring program, includes controls for hazardous chemicals/materials. Hazardous materialsand chemicals are controlled through procedures addressing inventory control, material screening,material accountability, and labeling. Environmental monitoring is conducted throughout the year and


8-6 November 2006

the analytical data is reported in the annual site environmental reports (current report isDOE/WIPP 05-2225, Waste Isolation Pilot Plant 2004 Annual Site Environmental Report).18

8.7.1 Volatile Organic Compound Monitoring

The airborne emission of VOCs is the only credible release pathway from the WIPP during disposaloperations, and the final closure design basis requires this pathway to be eliminated upon final closure.

A baseline VOC monitoring program was conducted at the WIPP and the results of the baseline programwere used, in part, to define the confirmatory monitoring program for the disposal phase. VOCmonitoring will be conducted throughout the disposal phase of operations to determine VOCconcentrations attributed to open and closed panels. WP 12–VC. 02, Quality Assurance Project Plan forConfirmatory Volatile Organic Compound Monitoring,19 describes a sampling and analysis program toconfirm the theoretical calculations. The VOC monitoring program quantifies VOC concentrations in theambient mine air at the WIPP and addresses the following elements:

1. Rationale for the design of the monitoring program, based on:

• Possible pathways from the WIPP during the active life of the facility

• VOC sampling operations at the WIPP

• Optimum location of the ambient mine air monitoring stations to confirm theoreticalcalculations

2. Descriptions of the specific elements of the monitoring program including:

• The type of monitoring conducted

• The location of the monitoring stations

• The monitoring frequency

• The specific hazardous constituents monitored

• The implementation schedule for the monitoring program

• The equipment used at the monitoring stations

• The sampling and analytical techniques used

• Data recording and reporting procedures

Sampling in the underground for target VOC compounds, as listed in Table 8.1, takes place at twolocations designated as air monitoring stations VOC-A and VOC-B. VOC-B samples for VOCs in theupstream sources (inlet ventilation air to TRU waste disposal panels) and VOC-A samples theunderground exhaust air which is the total of VOCs from upstream sources plus any VOC releases fromemplaced TRU waste. Confirmatory VOC sampling began with initial CH waste emplacement inPanel 1. Some sampling, however, was conducted prior to waste disposal to evaluate the monitoringsystem. For each quantified target VOC, the concentrations measured at Station VOC-B are subtractedfrom the concentrations measured at Station VOC-A to assess the magnitude of VOC releases, if any,from the emplaced waste.

Table 8-1 lists the maximum public exposure concentration at the site boundary from VOC air emissionsfrom both the WHB and the underground. The total risk from contributions from all nine VOC emissionsis considerably less than the acceptable risk level.


8-7 November 2006

Monitoring is performed using pressurized sample collection in stainless steel canisters described in theEPA Compendium Method TO-14A, Determination of Volatile Organic Compounds (VOCs) in AmbientAir Using Specially Prepared Canisters with Subsequent Analysis by Gas.20 The TO-14A20 samplingconcept uses six-liter passivated stainless-steel canisters to collect integrated air samples at each samplelocation. This conceptual method is used as a reference for collecting the samples at the WIPP.

The VOC monitoring program is run under WP 12-VC. 02,19 that has been prepared in accordance withEPA Requirements for Quality Assurance Project Plans for Environmental Data Operations,EPA QA/R-5.21 Quality criteria for the target analytes are presented in Attachment N of HazardousWaste Facility Permit.22 Definitions of the criteria are given in Attachment N, along with a discussion ofother aspects of the quality assurance program, including sample handling, calibration, analyticalprocedures, data reduction, validation and reporting, performance and system audits, preventivemaintenance, and corrective actions.

8.7.2 Meteorological Monitoring

The meteorological monitoring program at the WIPP is performed in accordance with WP 02-EM.01,WIPP Meteorological Quality Assurance Plan,23 which was written using guidance contained inEPA-454/R-99-005, Meteorological Monitoring Guidance for Regulatory Modeling Applications.24 Meteorological data is monitored and recorded to supplement characterization of the local environmentand facilitate the interpretation of data from other environmental monitoring activities at the WIPP.

8.7.3 Nonradioactive Air Contaminants Monitoring

WP 12-IH.02-1, WIPP IH Program - Hazard Assessment,25 implements the WIPP air quality monitoringprogram. To ensure compliance with American Conference of Governmental Industrial Hygienists(ACGIH) threshold limit values (TLV), administrative or engineering controls are determined andimplemented whenever possible. When such conditions are not feasible to achieve full compliance,protective equipment and/or protective measures are used to keep employee exposures to aircontaminants within prescribed limits. Any equipment and/or technical measures used must be approvedby IS&H personnel.

8.7.4 Diesel Emissions Monitoring

Vehicle emissions of underground equipment are periodically monitored in accordance with WP 12-IH.028 to ensure the health and safety of personnel. Incomplete combustion of diesel fuels causescontaminants of carbon monoxide, carbon dioxide, and nitrogen dioxide. The air in the underground isperiodically monitored for these contaminants, to ensure compliance within TLV limits. Vehicles arechecked for carbon monoxide and nitrogen dioxide emissions after preventive maintenance checks andduring scheduled overview inspections.

8.7.5 Workplace Monitoring

Periodic and unscheduled surveys and inspections are performed by IS&H in accordance with WP 12-IH.028 to identify any actual or potential hazards, problems, or undesirable conditions that couldadversely impact facility workers in the workplace. Examples of items surveyed are drinking waterpotability; local exhaust ventilation systems; and chemical, physical, and biological hazards. Samplingof the environment involves calibration of equipment, actual sampling, and recording the results in termsof the actual impact to the worker.


8-8 November 2006

8.8 Hazardous Material Protection Instrumentation

WP 12-IH1006, Airborne Contaminant Sampling,26 details methods used for collection of airbornecontaminant samples to determine employee exposure. Industrial Hygiene has the responsibility tosample airborne contaminants. When necessary, IS&H monitors or tests the air in areas where hazardouschemicals are stored, and in areas where workers may be exposed to concentrations of airborne fumes,mists, or vapors. Surveys are recorded; records contain the location, time, job description, or occurrencesthat may be associated with the contaminants and instruments used. Chemical inventories, reports andmonitoring data are available to Health Services personnel for use in the medical monitoring program.

In the underground, airborne concentrations of mists, fumes, or vapors are monitored and sampled asneeded, or upon request, by suitable devices such as Draeger pumps or other portable direct readinginstruments. If relevant air concentrations are found in excess of the TLVs, immediate corrective actionswill be taken as determined by IS&H, and the air will be periodically tested until in compliance.

Air quality monitoring equipment is calibrated in accordance with manufacturers' recommendations, withan accurate record kept of pre-calibration conditions of the instrument. Functional tests are performeddaily. Competency of individuals required to use air monitoring equipment is verified. Functionaltesting competency requires a formal training program. The selection and placement criteria fortechnical equipment, types of detectors, and monitors are determined by Industrial Hygiene as defined in WP 12-IH1006.26 Chapter 10 of this DSA discusses the procedure for the control and calibration of testequipment, the functional testing programs and the maintenance programs for technical equipment.

8.9 Hazardous Material Protection Record Keeping

WP 13-1, Washington TRU Solutions, LLC Quality Assurance Program Description (QAPD),27 definesrecord keeping requirements at the WIPP. Records are specified, prepared, reviewed, approved,controlled, and maintained to accurately reflect completed work and facility conditions and to complywith statutory or contractual requirements. WP 15-PR3002, Records, Filing, Inventorying, Scheduling,and Dispositioning,28 and associated procedures ensure that records are reviewed for adequacy, approvedfor release by authorized personnel, and distributed to and used at the locations where required.

Hazardous materials inventories will be initiated by IS&H and conducted by the HMAR designated bythe responsible manager for the area in which the hazardous materials are to be stored and used. Aquarterly inventory report will be prepared by IS&H based on input from HMARs from each affectedarea. The information is then used by Site Environmental Compliance to develop an annual inventoryreport to satisfy federal environmental reporting requirements.

8.10 Hazard Communication Program

The requirements for hazard communication are set forth in 29 CFR §1910.1200.12 The WIPP hazardcommunication program is defined in detail in WP 12-IH.02.8 Section 8.6.1 of this chapter and discusses hazard communication training for all employees and subcontractors.

The OSHA Hazard Communication Standard applies to hazardous chemicals procured and generated inthe workplace and/or laboratories; consumer products used in janitorial activities; and pure chemicalsassociated with the treatment, storage, and disposal at Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA)facilities.


8-9 November 2006

Training on the OSHA Hazard Communication Standard is a requirement of all personnel who work withor enter areas where hazardous materials are used. Training of employees is discussed further inChapter 10 of this DSA.

8.11 Occupational Chemical Exposures

The primary occupational, nonradiological hazard to both the worker and the public during normaloperations is from the airborne release of diesel fuel exhaust. Occupational exposures to VOCs and otherhazardous materials at the WIPP site do not constitute a concern. Monitoring results for VOCs arediscussed in Section 8.7.1 of this chapter.


8-10 November 2006


1. 29 CFR Parts 1900-1999, Occupational Safety and Health Act, July 2004

2. 29 CFR §1926.1, Safety and Health Regulations for Construction, July 2004

3. 10 CFR Part 850, Chronic Beryllium Disease Prevention Program

4. DOE Order 440.1A, Worker Protection Management for DOE Federal and ContractorEmployees, March 1998

5. DOE Order 450.1, Environmental Protection Program, Change 1, January 2005

6. DOE Order 5480.4, Environmental Protection, Safety, and Health Protection Standards, Change4, January 1993

7. WP 12-IS.01-1, Industrial Safety Program - Structure and Management

8. WP 12-IH.02, WIPP Industrial Hygiene Program Manual - Overview

9. WP 12-IH.02-9, WIPP Industrial Hygiene Program - Beryllium Exposure Prevention Program

10. WP 12-IH.02-4, Hazard Communication & Hazardous Material Management Plan

11. WP 12-2, WIPP ALARA Program Manual

12. 29 CFR §1910.1200, Hazard Communications, July 2004

13. WP 15-HS.02, Occupational Health Program Plan

14. 29 CFR §1910.1020, Access to Employee Exposure Medical Records, July 2004

15. MP 1.28, Integrated Safety Management

16. WP 12-IH.02-6, Respiratory Protection

17. DOE/WIPP 99-2194, Waste Isolation Pilot Plant Environmental Monitoring Plan

18. DOE/WIPP 05-2225, Waste Isolation Pilot Plant 2004 Annual Site Environmental Report

19. WP 12-VC.02, Quality Assurance Project Plan for Confirmatory Volatile Organic CompoundMonitoring

20. TO-14A, Determination of Volatile Organic Compounds (VOCs) in Ambient Air Using SpeciallyPrepared Canisters with Subsequent Analysis by Gas

21. EPA QA/R-5, EPA Requirements for Quality Assurance Project Plans, Washington, DC, 1994

22. Hazardous Waste Facility Permit No. NM4890139088-TSDF, issued by the New MexicoEnvironment Department


8-11 November 2006

23. WP 02-EM.01, WIPP Meteorological Quality Assurance Plan

24. EPA-454/R-99-005, Meteorological Monitoring Guidance for Regulatory ModelingApplications, U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, Washington, DC, 2000

25. WP 12-IH.02-1, WIPP IH Program - Hazard Assessment

26. WP 12-IH1006, Airborne Contaminant Sampling


28. WP 15-PR3002, Records, Filing, Inventorying, Scheduling, and Dispositioning

WIPP CH DSA DOE/WIPP-95-2065, REV. 10 DRAFT CHAPTER 8

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Table 8-1, Maximum Occupational and Public Exposure From Underground Waste VOC Emissions

Indicator Volatile OrganicCompounds

Worker Receptor Concentration(ppmv)

ApplicableExposure

Standard ACGIHTLVc

(ppmv)

Estimated Risk forCarcinogens and Hazard

Quotients forNon-Carcinogens forPublic Exposure toWaste Emissions

Acceptable Level of Risk e

Surface Underground

Carbon Tetrachloride 3.0E-04 1.2E-02 10 3E-08 1E-06

Chlorobenezene a 6.9E-04 2.9E-02 75 4E-06d 1

Chloroform 2.7E-04 1.0E-02 50b 2E-09 1E-06

1,1-Dichloroethylene 1.2E-03 4.7E-02 5 2E-09 1E-05

1,2-Dichloroethane 3.8E-04 1.5E-01 50 8E-10 1E-06

Methylene Chloride 4.5E-03 1.6E-02 25 6E-10 1E-06

1,1,2,2-Tetrachloroethane 3.2E-04 1.3E-02 5 3E-09 1E-05

Toluene a 1.6E-03 6.7E-02 200 3E-07d 1

1,1,1-Trichloroethane 4.0E-03 1.6E-01 350 2E-08 1E-05a. Non-carcinogen (all others are class B2 or C carcinogens)b. Ceiling value limit not to be exceededc. Equivalent to or less than applicable OSHA PELd. Non-carcinogen hazard quotiente. Acceptable level of risk for carcinogens is the probability of developing cancer, and for non-carcinogens is a hazard quotient less than or equal to 1


9-i November 2006

RADIOACTIVE AND HAZARDOUSWASTE MANAGEMENT

TABLE OF CONTENTS

SECTION PAGE NO.

9.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9-1

9.2 Requirements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9-1

9.3 Radioactive and Hazardous Waste Management Program and Organization . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9-1

9.4 Radioactive and Hazardous Waste Streams and Sources . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9-29.4.1 Waste Management Process . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9-29.4.2 Waste Sources and Characteristics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9-39.4.3 Waste Handling or Treatment Systems . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9-3

References for Chapter 9 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9-4


9-ii November 2006



9-1 November 2006

RADIOACTIVE AND HAZARDOUSWASTE MANAGEMENT

9.1 Introduction

This chapter provides information on the site-derived radioactive waste and site-generated nonradioactivehazardous waste. Included is information on (1) identification and sources of the site waste streams,(2) waste management process, and (3) waste sources and characteristics.

The Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP) was designed and built to dispose of transuranic (TRU) wastegenerated by the defense-related activities of the U.S. Government. Maintenance and operations of thefacilities and equipment used in the waste handling processes generate waste. Chapter 2 provides the CHwaste handling facility and process description, while Chapter 3 provides the hazard identification of theCH waste shipped to the WIPP.

9.2 Requirements

The following regulations form the basis of the WIPP site-derived radioactive waste and site-generated hazardous waste management program:

• WIPP Hazardous Waste Facility Permit (HWFP) No. NM4890139088-TSDF1

• 10 CFR Part 835, Occupational Radiation Protection2

• 29 CFR §1910.120, Hazardous Materials Operations and Emergency Response, Subpart H,Hazardous Materials3

• 40 CFR Parts 260-268 and 273, U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) regulationsimplementing the RCRA4

• 40 CFR Part 273, Universal Waste5

• 20.4.1 NMAC (New Mexico Administrative Codes), Hazardous Waste Management6

• DOE Order 435.1, Radioactive Waste Management7


• DOE Order 450.1, Environmental Protection Program9

• DOE Order 5400.5, Radiation Protection of the Public and the Environment10

9.3 Radioactive and Hazardous Waste Management Program and Organization

The Waste Handling Operations organization is responsible for the management and disposal of CHwaste derived from the waste handling process; maintenance/operations of the CH waste handlingfacilities, as described in Chapter 2; and from decontamination performed in the CH waste handlingfacilities or equipment. Any waste derived from the described activities is managed using WP 05-WH1036, Site-Derived Mixed Waste Handling,11 which implements the waste management and disposalrequirements of the HWFP.1


9-2 November 2006

The WIPP hazardous waste management program (HWMP) is used for site-generated hazardous waste. The HWMP is delineated in WP 02-RC.01, Hazardous and Universal Waste Management Plan.12 SiteEnvironmental Compliance (SEC) administers the HWMP at the WIPP. The managers of thedepartments generating the hazardous waste are responsible for controlling and managing the hazardouswaste generated by their organization. Quality Assurance is responsible for the evaluation of disposalfacilities for inclusion into the Quality Supplier's List and oversight of site waste management activities. Operations is responsible for transferring hazardous waste to designated storage or disposal areas,marking the waste containers as directed by HWMP, and assisting in the packaging of waste fortransport. Industrial Safety is responsible for providing employees involved in the management ofhazardous waste with information on hazardous properties, safe handling of the waste, and identifyingthe appropriate personal protective equipment for handling hazardous waste. Shipping Coordination isresponsible for providing appropriate waste containers, packaging waste in preparation for shipment to apermitted Treatment Storage Disposal Facility (TSDF), and coordinating hazardous waste shipments to aTSDF as specified in 40 CFR Part 262.4

9.4 Radioactive and Hazardous Waste Streams and Sources

The primary waste streams at the WIPP site are:

• TRU waste shipped to the WIPP for disposal

• Site-derived radioactive waste generated from radiological activities (swiping anddecontaminating) involving the waste containers and waste handling equipment and facilities

• Site-generated nonradioactive hazardous waste

The principal operations at the WIPP site involve the receipt of waste from generator sites, and disposalof that waste. The CH waste received for disposal at WIPP must meet the requirements of the CH WasteAcceptance Criteria (WAC)13 before shipment. The CH WAC13 identifies the waste acceptance criteriaapplicable to the transportation, storage, and disposal of CH waste at the WIPP site. Chapter 2 of thisDSA provides the description of the CH waste handling facility and equipment, and Chapter 3 identifiesthe hazards of CH waste.

Site-generated nonradioactive hazardous waste typically includes absorbed liquids from spills, and wastegenerated from the maintenance and operations of the non-waste handling WIPP facilities, whichtypically includes oils, coolants, solvents, batteries, and other solid wastes. There are no gaseous wastestreams at the WIPP.

9.4.1 Waste Management Process

The NMED issued the HWFP1 in October 1999 to WIPP, which authorized the receipt, management,storage, and disposal of CH waste at the WIPP. Any waste derived from the maintenance and operationof the CH waste handling facilities, equipment, and/or decontamination activities is managed anddisposed of using procedure WP 05-WH1036,11 which implements the requirements of the HWFP1 andthe PCB disposal requirements of the EPA (63 Federal Register 35384, Disposal of PolychlorinatedBiphenyls [PCBs]: Final Rule).14

The Waste Isolation Pilot Plant Pollution Prevention Program Plan (WP 02-EC.11)15 implements therequirements of DOE Order 450.1.9 The plan allows some of the site-generated hazardous waste such asbatteries, and used oils and solvents to be recycled, which removes those items from the waste stream. The site-generated hazardous waste not recycled is accumulated in a satellite accumulation area where it


9-3 November 2006

is managed in accordance with WP 02-RC3109, Satellite Accumulation Area, Hazardous Waste StorageArea, and Universal Waste Storage Area Inspections,16 which implements requirements of 40 CFR Part273,5 20.4.1 NMAC,6 and 40 CFR §262.34, Accumulation Time.17 The waste disposal process is initiatedby using WP 02-RC3108, Request for Disposal,18 to start the disposal process for all waste except thosemanaged by WP 02-EC.11.15 Completion of the disposal process is accomplished by the SEC usingWP 08-NT3103, Shipment of Waste.19

9.4.2 Waste Sources and Characteristics

The WIPP is a permitted1 hazardous waste disposal facility of CH waste generated by the defense relatedactivities of the U.S. Government. CH waste handling is accomplished in the CH bay of the WHB. AnyCH waste derived from handling the CH waste is managed and disposed of in accordance with WP 05-WH1036.11 CH waste disposed of at WIPP contains solids and very little liquids in compliance with theCH WAC.13 Gaseous wastes are not allowed in the CH waste shipped to WIPP.

The site-generated hazardous waste does not come from a particular process, it is generated during theperformance of maintenance and operations of non-CH waste handling facilities and equipment. Safestorage of site-generated hazardous waste and associated hazards are administered by the performance ofWP 02-RC.01,12 WP 02-RC3109,16 and WP 12-IH.02-4, WIPP Industrial Hygiene Program - HazardCommunication & Hazardous Materials Management Plan.20

9.4.3 Waste Handling or Treatment Systems

The WIPP is not a permitted treatment facility and does not treat site-generated hazardous waste. Site-derived TRU waste is characterized, treated if necessary and disposed of in accordance with therequirements of the CH WAC13 and the HWFP.1


9-4 November 2006


1 Hazardous Waste Facility Permit No. NM4890139088-TSDF, as amended, issued by theNew Mexico Environment Department, October 27, 1999

2 10 CFR Part 835, Occupational Radiation Protection, February 2002

3 29 CFR §1910.120, Hazardous Materials Operations and Emergency Response, Subpart H,Hazardous Materials, March 2005

4 40 CFR Part 260-268 and 273, U.S. Environmental Protection Agency regulations implementingthe Resource Conservation and Recovery Act

5 40 CFR Part 273, Universal Waste

6 20.4.1 NMAC, Hazardous Waste Management

7 DOE Order 435.1, Radioactive Waste Management, Change 1, August 2001

8 DOE Order 440.1A, Worker Protection Management for DOE Federal and ContractorEmployees, March 1998

9 DOE Order 450.1, Environmental Protection Program, Change 2, December 2005

10 DOE Order 5400.5, Radiation Protection of the Public and the Environment, January 1993

11 WP 05-WH1036, Site-Derived Mixed Waste Handling

12 WP 02-RC.01, Hazardous and Universal Waste Management Plan

13 DOE/WIPP-02-3122, Contact-Handled Transuranic Waste Acceptance Criteria for the WasteIsolation Pilot Plant, Rev. 4.0, December 2005

14 63 Federal Register 35384, Disposal of Polychlorinated Biphenyls [PCBs]: Final Rule,U.S. Environmental Protection Agency

15 WP 02-EC.11, Waste Isolation Pilot Plant Pollution Prevention Program Plan

16 WP 02-RC3109, Satellite Accumulation Area, Hazardous Waste Storage and Universal WasteStorage Area Inspections

17 40 CFR 262.34, Standards Applicable to Generators of Hazardous Waste, Accumulation Time,July 2004

18 WP 02-RC3108, Request for Disposal

19 WP 08-NT3103, Shipment of Waste

20 WP 12-IH.02-4, WIPP Industrial Hygiene Program - Hazard Communication & HazardousMaterials Management Plan


10-i November 2006

INITIAL TESTING, IN-SERVICE SURVEILLANCE,AND MAINTENANCE

TABLE OF CONTENTS

SECTION PAGE NO.

10.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10-1

10.2 Requirements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10-1

10.3 Initial Testing Program . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10-110.3.1 Start-Up Testing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10-210.3.2 Modification Testing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10-210.3.3 Preoperational Testing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10-2

10.4 In-Service Surveillance Program . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10-310.4.1 Surveillance Test Equipment and Results Trending . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10-310.4.2 Programmatic Review . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10-310.4.3 Training of Personnel Who Perform Surveillance Testing or Maintenance . . . . . . . . 10-3

10.5 Maintenance Program . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10-410.5.1 Maintenance Organization and Administration . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10-510.5.2 Training and Qualification of Maintenance Personnel . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10-510.5.3 Post-Maintenance Testing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10-510.5.4 Control and Calibration of Measuring Equipment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10-510.5.5 Maintenance History and Trending . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10-5



10-ii November 2006



10-1 November 2006

INITIAL TESTING, IN-SERVICE SURVEILLANCE,AND MAINTENANCE

10.1 Introduction

The purpose of this chapter is to describe the key elements of the program under which initial testing,in-service surveillance and maintenance activities at the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP) facility areconducted. This chapter presents information demonstrating that testing is performed to ensure that thetested structures, systems, and components (SSCs) meet their functional and performance requirementssuch that the SSC has reasonable assurance of fulfilling its normal and safety functions described in thisdocumented safety analysis (DSA).

The key attributes of the WIPP initial testing, in-service surveillance and maintenance activities are:

• The initial testing of specified items, services and processes is controlled through procedures thataddress the implementation requirements for the initial testing program

• The in-service surveillance program assures testing, calibration, or inspection requirements areapplied to operational equipment, safety class and safety significant SSCs, and design features tomaintain operation of the facility as specified in this DSA.

• The maintenance program ensures that maintenance activities are conducted to preserve andrestore the availability, operability, and reliability of plant SSCs and design features important tooperation of the facility

10.2 Requirements

The standards, regulations, and U.S. DOE Orders required for establishing the initial testing, in-servicesurveillance and maintenance at the WIPP are provided in:

• DOE Order 433.1, Maintenance Management Program for DOE Nuclear Facilities1

• DOE Order 430.1B, Real Property Asset Management2

• DOE G 433.1-1, Nuclear Facility Maintenance Management Program Guide for Use with DOEOrder 433.13

• DOE Order 5480.19, Conduct of Operations Requirements for DOE Facilities4

• DOE Order 5480.20A, Personnel Selection, Qualification, and Training Requirements for DOENuclear Facilities5

• DOE Order 420.1B, Facility Safety6

10.3 Initial Testing Program

Testing of the WIPP SSCs is required by SDD GPDD, System Design Description General Plant DesignDescription,7 and WP 13-1, Washington TRU Solutions LLC Quality Assurance Program Description(QAPD).8 The WIPP initial testing program is a process that verifies and document the operation ofpermanent plant installed SSCs according to specifications and/or other site approved design basisdocuments. Initial testing overlaps with other areas of safety management. The procurement, receipt,and testing of equipment for a new or modified facility prior to service is controlled. Procedures addressthe requirements for the initial testing program including; identification of item functional requirementsand characteristics, item acceptance, and satisfactory performance testing. A review process ensures that


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organizational, functional, and administrative controls are in place for initial startup of systems and/oroperations.

10.3.1 Start-Up Testing

The WIPP Start-Up Test Program, WP 09-SU.01,9 establishes administrative controls to verify anddocument that SSCs required for safe operation of the WIPP facility meet established design criteria andfunctional requirements of approved test procedures. A start-up test may be a formal start-up test, anacceptance test, or a postmodification retest. Start-up tests/retests will be reviewed and approved by aqualified start-up test engineer (STE). WP 09-SU.019 specifies the qualifications and responsibilities ofSTEs.

When a formal start-up test is required, it will be written in accordance with WP 15-PS.2, TechnicalProcedure Writer’s Guide,10 and processed in accordance with WP 15-PS3002, WID ControlledDocument Processing.11

Start-up tests document SSC performance and operability as installed at the WIPP; and ensures that anydeviations from design requirements is reviewed for acceptability prior to relying on the SSC. Start-uptests may include testing documentation from the manufacturer or elsewhere, that demonstrates the SSCmeets system design requirements.

Start-up/postmodification tests/retests are specifically written to test the subject SSC to the engineeringand design specifications, which will be documented by the cognizant system engineer in the test/retestsection of the modification work order per the requirements of WP 09-SU.01,9 and WP 10-2,Maintenance Operations Instruction Manual.12 The following criteria is used to determine therequirement for start-up/postmodification testing at the WIPP:

• Functional classification of SSCs (Safety Class, Safety Significant, or Defense in Depth)• SSCs described in the CH DSA• SSCs that confine or measure the release of radioactive material• SSCs used for the handling and/or storage of transuranic waste• SSCs designed to ensure personnel or environmental safety• SSCs designed to ensure the physical security of the WIPP facility 10.3.2 Modification Testing

STEs review and approve the test/retest section of modification work orders in accordance withWP 10-WC3011, Maintenance Process.13 Test results are documented and conformance with acceptancecriteria evaluated/approved by a STE to ensure that test requirements have been satisfied. STEsdetermine whether adequate start-up testing for new or modified designs is accomplished by thetest/retest section of a modification work order. SSCs that have undergone prior start-up testing may beretested with the test/retest section of the implementing modification work order. SSC modifications aretested in the same manner as the original design. Implementation of modifications/changes, includingretesting, are accomplished by approved and current procedures.

10.3.3 Preoperational Testing

Prior to initiating waste handling activities on each shift, waste handling equipment is operationallytested. Preoperational testing determines if equipment needs maintenance or if it is operationally readyto perform its waste handling task.


10-3 November 2006

Another type of preoperational testing is that which demonstrates the waste handling process fromreceipt through final emplacement is conducted to demonstrate that operating personnel can safely handlewaste packages, demonstrate the satisfactory operation of the CH waste handling equipment, anddemonstrate that the operating procedures are sufficiently detailed to perform normal waste handlingoperations, and to recover from off-normal occurrences encountered during waste handling operations. This type of preoperational testing is typically conducted prior to and during readiness reviews.

10.4 In-Service Surveillance Program

In-service surveillance testing and calibration is performed in accordance with approved procedures andis conducted in accordance with established schedules. In-service testing and calibration is applied tooperational equipment, safety class and safety significant SSCs, and to design features as credited in thisDSA. In-service testing and calibration ensures safe and reliable operation of the equipment important tosafety.

In-service surveillance is also performed by implementation of WP 04-CO, Conduct of Operations14

which describes the development and use of Round Inspection Sheets that identify equipment to bemonitored. Operators use the round sheets to record key equipment parameters including whenequipment parameters exceed maximum/minimum values. Supervisory personnel review the round sheetdata including a review for adverse trends. Identified trends are evaluated to determine if immediatecorrective action is required and appropriate cognizant personnel are informed of the trend to identify ifother actions are required.

10.4.1 Surveillance Test Equipment and Results Trending

WIPP procedure WP 10-AD3028, Calibration and Control of Measurement and Test Equipment,15 isused for the control and calibration of measuring and test equipment (M&TE) used in performing in-service surveillance testing and calibration. Procedure WP 10-WC301113 provides instructions fortrending of historical data obtained from surveillance tests and other maintenance activities.

10.4.2 Programmatic Review

If deficiencies are identified during an in-service surveillance, inspection, or test, an Action Request form (maintenance work order) is prepared in accordance with WP 10-2.12

10.4.3 Training of Personnel Who Perform Surveillance Testing or Maintenance

The managers of personnel performing surveillance testing have the overall responsibility and authorityfor the content and effective conduct of the training and qualification program(s) within theirorganization. Managers training responsibilities are:

• Define training and qualification requirements for personnel in each functional level.

• Review and approve training program content.

• Review and update qualification and training programs biennially to reflect changes to thefacility, procedures, regulations, and applicable industry operating experience, and document thereview in writing to Technical Training.


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• Define specific job positions that have a direct impact on employee, facility, or public safety andrequire a systematic approach to training application in accordance with DOE Order 5480.20A.5

• Verify that all employees under their cognizance complete required training and qualificationrequirements.

Training and qualification programs are developed, based on input from managers, and administered bythe WIPP Technical Training Department.

10.5 Maintenance Program

The maintenance program, described in WP 10-2,12 is implemented to ensure that maintenance activitiesare conducted to preserve and restore the availability, operability, and reliability of the WIPP SSCsimportant to operation of the facility. The maintenance organization, responsibilities, work scope,management and control, and interfaces are prescribed in WP 10-212 and WP 10-WC3011.13

Maintenance work control and work activities, performed by the WIPP maintenance personnel orsubcontractors, are performed in accordance with WP 10-WC3011.13 Subcontracted maintenanceactivities are also specified in a Statement of Work. The maintenance work control program includesthe following elements:

• A configuration management process established to ensure the integrity of the SSCs

• A prioritization process used to properly emphasize safety requirements, the maintenancebacklog, system availability, and requirements for those infrastructure elements identified as partof the nuclear facility safety basis

• A process for feedback and improvement established to provide relevant information regardingoperations, maintenance, and assessment efforts

• Maintenance procedures and other work-related documents (e.g., drawings and instructions) toprovide appropriate work direction and to ensure that maintenance is performed safely andefficiently

• An interface with the cognizant system engineer to support maintenance activities associatedwith assigned systems. The system engineer's activities include providing technical support tomaintenance activities, evaluating modification impacts, coordinating and reviewing maintenanceactivities, and supporting readiness reviews

• An accurate maintenance history in a system that is retrievable by component

The maintenance program is tailored to the WIPP operation through a graded approach. A gradedapproach considers the element's relative importance to safety of workers, the public, and theenvironment, safeguards and security, fulfillment of the programmatic mission, and other site/facilityspecific requirements. A graded approach is used in determining the level of formality, detail, andresources required.


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10.5.1 Maintenance Organization and Administration

WP 10-212 identifies the groups that constitute the maintenance organization and the positions withineach group and their responsibilities. Maintenance work activities are performed in accordance with WP 10-WC3011.13 Surface maintenance facilities include a mechanical shop, and electrical shop, and anarea for instrumentation and control calibration. Measurement and test equipment and tools for specificjobs are checked out from a “tool crib”. There is also a maintenance shop in the north end of theunderground for making equipment repairs.

10.5.2 Training and Qualification of Maintenance Personnel

WP 10-212 delineates the training requirements for maintenance personnel. Training and qualification ofmaintenance personnel is discussed in Section 10.4.3.

10.5.3 Post-Maintenance Testing

Post maintenance testing is performed to verify that SSCs will fulfill their design function when returnedto service after maintenance. Post maintenance testing is performed by the department responsible forthe SSC on which maintenance was performed. WP 10-WC301113 implementing procedures identifies the post maintenance testing requirements for completed corrective maintenance. Post maintenancetesting of SSCs operated by Facility Operations is governed by the requirements of WP 04-CO14 and theoperations procedures specific to the equipment.

10.5.4 Control and Calibration of Measuring Equipment

Calibration of monitoring and data collection (measuring) equipment used at the WIPP is in accordancewith WP 10-AD.01, Metrology Program16. Control and calibration of M&TE is addressed in Section10.4.1.

10.5.5 Maintenance History and Trending

WP 10-212 provides instruction used for trending the maintenance history of plant equipment andimplements the requirements of DOE-STD-1073-2003, Configuration Management Program.17 Trending is used to identify improvements in the maintenance program, as well as needed equipmentmodifications.

The process of trending equipment and analyzing operational data satisfies the need for periodicassessment of design life, design operating conditions, and performance characteristics. It applies to theequipment important to safety as identified on the master equipment listing, which has been determinedto be those components whose failure would have a major cost, safety, or programmatic impact on wastehandling operations. The organizational interfaces for the Materials Condition and Aging Managementare defined in the instructions for the WIPP trending program.


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1. DOE Order 433.1, Maintenance Management Program for DOE Nuclear Facilities, June 2001

2. DOE Order 430.1B, Real Property Asset Management, September 2003

3. DOE G 433.1-1, Nuclear Facility Maintenance Management Program Guide for Use with DOEOrder 433.1-1, September 2001

4. DOE Order 5480.19, Conduct of Operations Requirements for DOE Facilities, Change 2,October 2001

5. DOE Order 5480.20A, Personnel Selection, Qualification, and Training Requirements for DOENuclear Facilities, Change 1, July 2001

6. DOE Order 420.1B, Facility Safety, December 2005

7. SDD GPDD, General Plant Design Description System Design Description


9. WP 09-SU.01, WIPP Start-Up Test Program

10. WP 15-PS.2, Technical Procedure Writer’s Guide

11. WP 15-PS3002, WID Controlled Document Processing

12. WP 10-2, Maintenance Operations Instruction Manual

13. WP 10-WC3011, Maintenance Process

14. WP 04-CO, Conduct of Operations

15. WP 10-AD3028, Calibration and Control of Measurement and Test Equipment

16. WP 10-WC.01, Metrology Program

17. DOE-STD-1073-2003, Configuration Management, October 2003


11-i November 2006

OPERATIONAL SAFETY

TABLE OF CONTENTS

SECTION PAGE NO.

11.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11-1

11.2 Requirements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11-1

11.3 Conduct of Operations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11-111.3.1 Shift Routines and Operating Practices . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11-211.3.2 Control Area Activities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11-211.3.3 Communications . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11-211.3.4 Control of On-Shift Training . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11-311.3.5 Control of Equipment and System Status . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11-311.3.6 Lockouts and Tagouts . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11-411.3.7 Independent Verification . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11-411.3.8 Log Keeping . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11-411.3.9 Operations Turnover . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11-511.3.10 Operations Aspects of Facility Chemistry and Unique Processes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11-511.3.11 Required Reading . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11-511.3.12 Timely Orders to Operators . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11-511.3.13 Operator Aid Postings . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11-511.3.14 Equipment and Piping Labeling . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11-6

11.4 Fire Protection . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11-611.4.1 Fire Hazards . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11-711.4.2 Fire Protection Program and Organization . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11-711.4.3 Combustible Loading Control . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11-811.4.4 Firefighting Capabilities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11-811.4.5 Fire Fighting Readiness Assurance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11-9

References for Chapter 11 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11-10


11-ii November 2006



11-1 November 2006

OPERATIONAL SAFETY

11.1 Introduction

This chapter identifies the key elements of the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP) programs that providefor operational safety, conduct of operations and the fire protection program. Conduct of operationsspecifically focuses on the bases of operations programs specified by U.S. Department of Energy (DOE)Order 5480.19, Conduct of Operations Requirements for DOE Facilities.1 DOE Order 5480.191

addresses many of the other topics covered in Title 10 Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) Part 830,Subpart B, "Safety Basis Requirements"2 (e.g., management, organization, the institutional safetyprovisions, procedures, training, and human factors) and is applicable to all facilities including industrialfacilities. Elements of conduct of operations are also covered in other chapters of this DSA.

The scope of this chapter includes:

• Identification of operation safety aspects of the conduct of operations program

• Integrated summary of the main features of the conduct of operations program

• Description of the WIPP fire protection program

Application of the graded approach for conduct of operations and the fire protection program is based onthe hazards associated with facility operations and the complexity of those operations. Use of the gradedapproach does not compromise the safety of the public, employees, or facilities; adversely impact theenvironment; or result in noncompliance with contractual requirements. Safety is given priority overother programmatic considerations.

11.2 Requirements

The standards, regulations, and DOE Orders required for establishing the safety basis for the WIPP, aHazard Category 2 nuclear facility, specific to operational safety programs include the following:

• 29 CFR Part 1910, "Occupational Safety and Health Standards"3

• 29 CFR Part 1926, "Safety and Health Regulations for Construction"4

• DOE Order 420.1B, Facility Safety, Section 4.2, Fire Protection5


• DOE Order 5480.19, Conduct of Operations Requirements for DOE Facilities1

11.3 Conduct of Operations

This section summarizes the applicability of conduct of operations to the WIPP facility and identifies the salient features of the conduct of operations program as required by DOE Order 5480.19.1 Operation ofthe WIPP is conducted in accordance with approved procedures and DOE/WIPP-95-2125, WIPPContact-Handled (CH) Technical Safety Requirements (TSRs).7 This CH DSA considers the term“operations” as those daily activities, resources, management, and communication required to supportthe WIPP in disposing of defense generated transuranic waste.


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Supervisors are responsible for reporting to the Facility Shift Manager (FSM) any conditions that mayaffect the operation or operability of the facility. The FSM approves the operation of plant equipmentand releases work as part of the work control process. All maintenance, inspection, and testing work isscheduled through the plan of the day and plan of the week meetings.

Pre-job briefings are conducted regularly by supervisors to ensure that the operational activities arecompleted safely, correctly, and efficiently.

11.3.1 Shift Routines and Operating Practices

WP 04-CO, Conduct of Operations,8 specifies the shift routines and operating practices that apply to theWIPP facility operating and support personnel. Operation of the WIPP facility is performed inaccordance with approved operating procedures by qualified personnel. WP 04-CO8 specifies theorganizational interfaces for making changes to the plant configuration. The responsibility formaintaining proper configuration of the facility and authorizing changes of general surface andunderground equipment rests with the FSM. Changes in equipment status are communicated to theCentral Monitoring Room Operator (CMRO). Changes in equipment or system status that affects thewaste handling process are required to be reported to the CMRO.

Waste handling operations incorporate the shift routines and operating practices aspect of conduct ofoperations by the following activities:

• Performing preoperation inspections and testing of waste handling equipment prior to initiationof waste handling

• Wearing the proper personal protective equipment and adhering to the safe working andoperating requirements of the facility industrial safety program

• Operating equipment on which they are qualified

• Utilizing ALARA techniques when performing work

• Observing process indicators (e.g. warning lights, equipment back up alarms, etc) andresponding to abnormal or unexpected indications

• Not having potentially distractive written material and devices at their work stations

Only facility operations personnel reset protective devices.

11.3.2 Control Area Activities

The control areas at the WIPP consists of the CMR and the hoist control room at each of the three hoists(salt handling, air intake, and waste). Portions of the CH bay and RH part of the WHB are controlledareas when waste is present. Access to and activities performed in the WIPP control areas are controlledby WP 04-CO.8

11.3.3 Communications

Communications within the WIPP are accomplished through the use of the public address (PA) system,the Site Notification System (SNS) via plectrons, radios, beepers, mine phones, and touch-tonetelephones. The CMR is the focal point for communications between surface and undergroundoperations. Communications to site personnel of an abnormal or emergency situation is performed by theCMRO as follows:


11-3 November 2006

• Use the PA system, the SNS and the mine phone when making site wide announcements

• Use the surface zone of the PA system and the SNS to make an announcement applicable to onlysurface personnel

• Use the Zone 4 of the PA system and the mine phone to make an announcement applicable toonly underground personnel

• If an emergency or response announcement is made, an introduction tone will precede theannouncement

• If the response action is ongoing, the announcement will be repeated every 15 to thirty minutes• When the emergency or response is terminated, an announcement stating such will be made

The CMRO uses the PA system and the mine phone to announce the waste handling mode. Personnelworking in areas where the PA system cannot be heard are notified by flashing lights, vibrating pagers, orby other personnel. The most reliable form of communication in the underground is the mine pagerphones. PA emergency communications are periodically tested to ensure functionally.

Facility operations and waste handling operations use portable radios and verbatim repeat backcommunications.

11.3.4 Control of On-Shift Training

Equipment/systems qualification training will occur in the form of instructed on-the-job training (OJT),following established training programs, as addressed by training documentation, to maintaininstructional uniformity. The responsibilities of the manager, instructor, and trainee are identified inWP 14-TR3308, On-the-Job Training.9

On-shift training is conducted by subject matter experts (SMEs) and OJT evaluators, who are also trainedin accordance with site training procedures. A SME or OJT evaluator observes trainee performanceskills to ensure that no adverse actions occur. Procedure steps, cautions, and notes must be discussedwith the SME before operating any equipment. Trainees are monitored until the trainee hasdemonstrated proficiency in performing a skill. Training procedures provide documentation guidance foroperator qualification and certification programs. Qualification cards are signed by the SME,documenting that the trainee has successfully and adequately demonstrated proficiency of that skill.

11.3.5 Control of Equipment and System Status

The FSM, as the senior operating person on shift, is tasked with maintaining a broad overview ofoperations. The FSM's perspective of the status of the WIPP must be the focal point for shift operations.The FSM has the responsibility for maintaining proper configuration and authorizing changes of generalsurface and underground equipment and systems. The hoisting manager has the responsibility formaintaining proper configuration and authorizing changes of hoisting equipment and systems. The wastehandling manager has the responsibility for maintaining proper configuration and authorizing changes ofwaste handling equipment and systems.

The FSM, hoisting manager, or waste handling organization, as appropriate, will be advised of the statusof equipment and systems delegated by the FSM, hoisting manager, or waste handling manager to othershift positions. The cognizant manager will ensure that equipment status changes are effectivelycommunicated to the CMR and other shift positions and operators as appropriate. Operations managersmust report status changes of plant equipment.


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The FSM, hoisting manager, or waste handling manager, as appropriate, will authorize, in writing, allshift actions (including maintenance) for equipment that is important to plant safety, affects operations,or changes control indications or alarms. For emergent work, when FSM approval through the Plan ofthe Day is not feasible, the hoisting manager or waste handling manager, as appropriate, will ensure FSMapproval is obtained before authorizing work.

Equipment and systems are checked for proper alignment before being placed into operation. Approvedoperating procedures are used to ensure that equipment is controlled, checked, and monitored. Equipment is functionally tested following maintenance to verify that the maintenance performedcorrected the original problem and that no new problems were introduced. The functional test alsodemonstrates the equipment’s capability of performing its intended function. The cognizant operationsmanager ensures that testing proves equipment operability.

The Central Monitoring System (CMS), with display in the CMR, monitors the status of plant systemsand equipment including; the WHB ventilation, continuous air monitors, plant air, and the WHB andsupport building chilled water systems. The CMRO monitors the CMS display and notifies theappropriate operations department of any alarm conditions. Response to the alarms are in accordancewith approved procedures.

The distribution and control of equipment and system engineering drawings and specifications issatisfied by the performance of procedure WP 09-CN3007, Engineering and Design Preparation andChange Control.10

11.3.6 Lockouts and Tagouts

WP 12-IS.01-2, Industrial Safety Program - Lockout/Tagout and Nonelectrical Energy Hazards 11

establishes the WIPP Lockout/Tagout program required by DOE Order 5480.191 and 29 CFR §1910.147,The Control of Hazardous Energy (Lockout/Tagout).12 WIPP procedure WP 04-AD3011, EquipmentLockout/Tagout,13 used in conjunction with procedure WP 10-AD3005, Control and Use of MaintenanceLocks,14 implements the lockout/tagout activities used for isolating, blocking, and securing facilitysystems and components; the placement and removal and transfer of the lockout/tagout devices (tags andlocks); and the testing of the systems and components to determine and verify the effectiveness oflockout/tagout.

11.3.7 Independent Verification

Procedure WP 04-AD3005, Administrative Control of System Lineups,15 provides independentverification information and instructions for the following

• Methodology for determining which systems require lineups and which systems requireindependent verification

• Instructions for developing system lineups• Requirements for performing complete or partial system lineups• Instructions for the performance and review of system lineups• Documentation requirements for system lineups

11.3.8 Log Keeping

Logbooks are kept at each of the control locations identified in Section 11.3.2 and at four waste handlingoperations locations, CH and RH areas of the WHB and underground. A logbook is also located in the


11-5 November 2006

Emergency Operations Center (EOC) and is maintained when the EOC is activated. The logbooks aremaintained by designated personnel working in that area. The CMR logbook is maintained by theCMRO; the three hoisting logbooks are maintained by the hoist man at each of the three shafts; and thewaste handling logbooks are maintained by waste handling personnel in the WHB and underground. Procedures WP 04-CO,8 and WP 04-AD3008, Shift Operating Logs16 provide guidance on the use oflogbooks and recording information in them. The FSM and the cognizant operations manager (hoistingshift manager and waste handling shift manager) are responsible for reviewing logbooks forcompleteness and for their approval.

11.3.9 Operations Turnover

The operations turnover process, as defined in WP 04-CO,8 ensures that conditions related to abnormallineups, status of major components, and planned or in-progress surveillances or activities, and otherspecial instructions are reported to the oncoming supervisor.

Oncoming personnel and supervisors conduct a review of plant status and turnover information beforeresponsibility is transferred for the shift. The off-going supervisor performs the turnover at a time whenfacility conditions are stable for the oncoming personnel.

11.3.10 Operations Aspects of Facility Chemistry and Unique Processes

The WIPP is a unique transuranic waste handling and disposal facility and has no facility chemistryprocesses as described in DOE Order 5480.19,1 Waste handling personnel are trained and qualified toperform the waste handling and disposal operations.

11.3.11 Required Reading

The WIPP required reading program is discussed in Management Policy (MP) 1.30, Required Reading.17 Required reading material includes, but is not limited to procedures, equipment changes, operatingexperience information, and other information needed to keep operating personnel aware of facilityactivities and conditions, including safety information. The required reading program ensures thatdesignated individuals read, understand, and remain informed of important information. Completion ofrequired reading is documented.

11.3.12 Timely Orders to Operators

Orders to operators are essential tools to communicated special conditions and instructions to shiftpersonnel. Operator orders are segregated into long-term orders (Standing Instructions) and daily orders(Shift Instructions) to facilitate a review by shift personnel. Standing order information intended tosupplement a procedure is incorporated into the appropriate procedure by a revision or change beinggenerated and issued. Items specific to waste handling operations that may change the waste handlingprocess as described in this DSA must be processed as a procedure change to ensure changes arereviewed for unreviewed safety question.

11.3.13 Operator Aid Postings

WIPP procedure WP 04-MD3003, Control of Operator Aids18 controls the use of operator aids andensures that only up to date information and controlled drawings are contained in the operator aids. Operator aids are copies of procedures, system drawings, information tags, and graphs that help operatorsperform their duties.


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11.3.14 Equipment and Piping Labeling

WIPP procedure WP 09-CN3021, Component Indices,19 establishes the requirements for controlling andmethod for assignment of equipment numbering and labeling, including numbering instrument loops,valves, pipes, dampers, cables, conduit runs and structures. WP 09-CN302119 also addresses the specificresponsibilities for maintaining the WIPP SSC Component Indices (CIs). Information regarding the CIsare maintained in the Computerized History and Maintenance Planning System (CHAMPS) EquipmentModule.

11.4 Fire Protection

The WIPP fire protection program is designed to ensure personnel safety, the mission, and propertyconservation. These objectives are met through design and programmatic controls. Designs includeincorporation of automatic fire suppression systems in buildings and on underground waste handlingequipment, use of fire resistant materials in building construction, installation of fire barriers and firedoors, and enclosing vertical openings in buildings, thereby preventing the spread of fires. Also, firehazards are controlled throughout the WIPP by administrative controls including combustible loadingcontrol and procedures that control hot work. The plant design meets the improved risk level ofprotection defined in DOE O 420.1B, Facility Safety, Section 4.2, "Fire Protection,"5 and satisfies theapplicable sections of the National Fire Protection Association (NFPA) codes, DOE orders, and federalcodes to the extent described in WSMS-WIPP-06-0001, Fire Hazard Analysis for Waste Isolation PilotPlant (FHA).21 The WIPP design incorporates the following features:

• Most buildings and their support structures are protected by fixed, automatic fire suppressionsystems designed to the individual hazards of each area. The WHB including the waste hoisttower, support building, and TMF have wet pipe sprinkler systems. The TMF sprinklers aresupplied by the WHB sprinkler system.

• Noncombustible construction, fireproof masonry construction, and fire resistant materials areused whenever possible. The bulkheads, airlocks, and overcasts in the underground ventilationsystem are also of non-combustible construction.

• Areas susceptible to fire are separated by fire walls and fire doors, to contain and isolatehazardous materials or operations. Fire separations are installed where required, in accordancewith the Uniform Building Code.

• In multistory buildings, vertical openings are protected by enclosing stairways, elevators,pipeways, electrical penetrations, etc., to prevent fire from spreading to upper floors. The wastehoist tower is an exception and has an open path from the hoist tower to the bottom of the wasteshaft to accommodate the hoist ropes.

• The exhaust ventilation systems, which remove gases, toxic contaminants, and smoke, areconstructed of noncombustible materials.

• The components of the electrical service and distribution systems are listed by Underwriters'Laboratory, or approved by Factory Mutual Engineering Corporation.

• A combustible loading control program is in place to minimize the accumulation ofcombustibles within the WHB, the TMF, and area between the support building and WHB.

• The area within the Property Protection Area (PPA) security fence is either paved or graveledwith minimal vegetation. A gravel road parallels the PPA perimeter security fence, which actsas a fire break in the event of a wild land fire. Several features outside the perimeter securityfence also serve as fire breaks and include the salt pile to the north, pond areas to collect rainrunoff to the north, east and south, a paved parking area and access road to the west, and bermsand the electrical switch yard to the east.


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To ensure reliability of the active fire protection systems, inspection, testing, and maintenance programsare provided. There are also administrative controls for the fire system impairments, hot work andinternal audits of the inspection, testing and maintenance, and other program elements essential to themaintenance of a fire protection program, as required by DOE orders.

11.4.1 Fire Hazards

The main fire hazards to the WIPP waste handling facilities as presented in Chapter 3 of this DSA are combustibles such as wood pallets, crates, plywood, paper associated with work activities, plastic signs,plastic containers, plastic slipsheets, shrink wrap, personal protective equipment, petroleum basedcombustibles (e.g., grease, hydraulic fluid). Other identified fire hazards include hydrogen gas generatedfrom lead-acid batteries on facility equipment and from battery charging stations; the diesel fuel used byfacility equipment; flammable compressed gases in cylinders; and the flammable material in the wastecontainers (gases, rubber, plastic, pyrophorics, etc.).

Pyrophoric materials are prohibited in CH waste contents through the DOE/WIPP-02-3122, Contact-Handled Transuranic Waste Acceptance Criteria for the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant20, referred to in thisDSA as the CH WAC20. Generator site adherence to the CH WAC20 controls the fire hazards containedthe CH waste shipped to the WIPP. Each of the CH and RH underground waste handling vehicles havean automatic/manual fire suppression system to ensure that any fire resulting from fuel or hydraulicleaks, or the engine are extinguished before they become larger fires with the potential to breach wastecontainers. Non-waste handling vehicles are prohibited in the active disposal room during wastehandling to prevent collisions that could result in fire. When non-waste handling vehicles are needed inan active disposal room, a spotter and a fire watch are required when they are operated within 75 ft. ofthe CH disposal array waste face. The lube truck is prohibited from the active disposal room. Theconcentration of any generated hydrogen gas is kept below the lower explosion limit by the air flowcaused by the ventilation systems.

The WIPP Fire Hazard Analysis (FHA)21 concluded that the WIPP has adequate fire detection, alarm andsuppression systems in place to mitigate a fire. To prevent fires from starting or propagating,combustible loading in the WHB and underground disposal area is procedurally controlled through WP12-FP3003, Combustible Loading Controls for the Waste Handling Building and Underground,22 andprotected with controls as discussed in Chapters 3 and 5 of this DSA.

11.4.2 Fire Protection Program and Organization

WP 12-FP.01, WIPP Fire Protection Program,23 establishes the requirements for a comprehensive fireand related hazards protection program for the WIPP based on DOE O 420.1A.5 The WIPP is designedwith active and passive fire protection features. To meet the program goals and objectives, fire safetypractices are required of each employee and subcontractor during their daily work and are an integral partof all activities at the WIPP. WP 12-FP.01,23 has incorporated DOE orders, NFPA requirements, andother applicable federal, state, and local fire safety requirements.

The Fire Protection Self-Survey Facility Appraisal is performed annually in accordance with DOEguidelines and addresses the following, at a minimum:

• Life safety

• Inspection, testing, and maintenance reports

• Fire suppression equipment

• Water runoff


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• Fire apparatus accessibility

• Administrative controls

• Temporary protection and compensatory measures

• Fire barrier integrity

• Fire suppression system tests and adequacy of water supplies

• Maintenance procedures for maintaining fire suppression systems

• Status of findings from previous survey

Procedure WP 12-FP300322 provides guidance and instructions for controlling the introduction, storage,and handling of ordinary combustibles, combustible/flammable liquids, and flammable gases in theWHB, the underground disposal transport path, and the active disposal panel area at the WIPP. Therequired fire control measures are for the purpose of decreasing the possibility and consequences of fireto ensure protection of workers and the public.

The Safety and Health Manager has the responsibility to provide principal overview for the WIPP FireProtection Program. The Industrial Safety and Hygiene (IS&H) Manager is responsible for theimplementation of the WIPP Fire Protection Program and for providing staffing and resources formaintaining and revising, as necessary, the fire protection program. Fire Protection Engineering isresponsible for administering the WIPP Fire Protection Program and ensuring its integration with thisDSA, the WIPP Fire Hazard Analysis (FHA) Report, and the HWFP issued by the NMED to the WIPP. WIPP Emergency Services is responsible for implementing inspection, maintenance, and testing of fireprotection systems and equipment.

11.4.3 Combustible Loading Control

Combustible loading control is the most significant part of the WIPP fire protection program. Combustible loading is procedurally controlled and is required by specific administrative controls in theCH TSRs.7 Combustible loading control includes facility inspections, assessments, and fire protectionengineering reviews. Periodic inspections are performed to identify and correct potential fire hazardsand/or conditions of noncompliance with WP 12-FP3003.22

Combustible loading controls for the WHB and underground include vehicle restrictions in the WHB,near the disposal array, and near waste in transit in the underground; use of a fire watch and spotter fornon-waste handling equipment operated near the waste face; controls on use and storage of flammablegas and flammable compressed gas in the WHB and underground, and standoff distances from wastehandling vehicles to prevent collisions that could result in fire. Periodic combustible loading inspectionsare performed and documented.

11.4.4 Firefighting Capabilities

The WIPP Emergency Management organization develops and maintains emergency response plans andprocedures that govern and facilitate all aspects of emergency response at the WIPP, including fireprotection and Mutual Aid Agreements for firefighting.

Fire protection engineers prepare and maintain the WIPP site prefire plans. The prefire plans containimportant firefighting information such as the location of fire suppression equipment, hazardous material(radiological and chemical), exits, utility disconnects, for each building at the WIPP. Upon receipt of afire alarm, the FSM determines the location and notifies the responders of the location. The respondersrefer to the prefire plan to determine any special precautions. Prefire plans are reviewed and updated as


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necessary to accommodate any changes at the site. Copies of the prefire plans are maintained in the EOCand in emergency response vehicles.

Firefighting equipment at the WIPP includes a fully-equipped pumper engine, a brush fire truck,associated firefighting equipment, and trained firefighters. The fire brigade and the Emergency ResponseTeam are the WIPP site trained firefighters. Personnel belonging to the two groups receive extensive onsite training including CPR, hazardous waste worker, radiation worker, and firefighting. They arerequired to annually attend a one week live fire fighting training that is compliant with NFPA- 600 andoffered by the State of New Mexico. One member of the fire brigade is an Emergency ServicesTechnician (EST). The ESTs, who are state-licensed as described in DOE Order 5480.19,1 emergencymedical technicians, provide 24-hour emergency medical response capability at the WIPP facility. Sitefirefighting activities are led by the FSM.

Memoranda of Understandings (MOUs) between the WIPP and several key community organizations areimportant aspects of the available protective actions governed by legal cooperation agreements. Themutual aid agreement between the DOE and the Eddy County Commission provides for the actualassistance of the parties in the furnishing of fire protection for the Eddy County Fire District and theWIPP site.

11.4.5 Fire Fighting Readiness Assurance

To ensure fire fighting readiness, the fire waste supply and fire suppression system for the SupportBuilding and WHB are required to support waste handling operations in the CH bay and in theunderground during transport of waste using the waste hoist. The fire water supply and suppressionsystem require periodic inspections and surveillance to ensure system operability. Fire protectionsystems inspection, maintenance, and testing program requires WTS organizations, with fire protectionengineering oversight, to perform inspection, maintenance, and testing of fire protection equipment andsystems at regular intervals. The inspections, maintenance, and testing are accomplished in accordancewith applicable DOE directives and implementation guidance.

ESTs conduct inspections of facility fire suppression systems and emergency equipment and are responsible for keeping the assigned emergency apparatus in good operating condition. All fire protection inspection, maintenance, and testing documentation is maintained as records. Fireprotection engineers verify accomplishment of fire protection program record keeping and may initiatecorrective action(s) required to resolve any deficiencies identified during inspections, maintenance, ortesting activities.


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2. 10 CFR Part 830, Nuclear Safety Management, Subpart B, Safety Basis Requirements

3. 29 CFR Part 1910, Occupational Safety and Health Standards

4. 29 CFR Part 1926, Safety and Health Regulations for Construction

5. DOE Order 420.1B, Facility Safety, Section 4.2; Fire Protection, December 2005

6. DOE Order 440.1A, Worker Protection Management for DOE Federal and ContractorEmployees

7. DOE/WIPP-95-2125, WIPP Contact Handled (CH) Technical Safety Requirements


9. WP 14-TR3308, On-the-Job Training

10. WP 09-CN3007, Engineering and Design Document Preparation and Change Control

11. WP 12-IS.01-2, Industrial Safety Program - Lockout/Tagout and Nonelectrical Energy Hazards

12. 29 CFR §1910.147, The Control of Hazardous Energy (Lockout/Tagout)

13. WP 04-AD3011, Equipment Lockout/Tagout

14. WP 10-AD3005, Control and Use of Maintenance Locks

15. WP 04-AD3005, Administrative Control of System Lineups

16. WP 10-AD3008, Shift Operating Logs

17. MP 1.30, Management Policy, Required Reading

18. WP 04-MD3003, Control of Operator Aids

19. WP 09-CN3021, Component Indices


21. WSMS-WIPP-06-0001, Fire Hazard Analysis for Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (FHA), Rev.0,March 2006

22. WP 12-FP3003, Combustible Loading Controls for the Waste Handling Building andUnderground

23. WP 12-FP.01, WIPP Fire Protection Program


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PROCEDURES and TRAINING

TABLE OF CONTENTS

SECTION PAGE NO.

12.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12-1

12.2 Requirements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12-1

12.3 Procedure Program . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12-212.3.1 Development of Procedures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12-212.3.2 Maintenance of Procedures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12-3

12.4 Training Program . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12-312.4.1 Development of Training . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12-4

12.4.1.1 Initial Training . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12-612.4.1.2 General Employee Training . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12-612.4.1.3 Criticality Safety Training . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12-612.4.1.4 Radiological Protection Training . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12-612.4.1.5 Radiological Control Technician Training . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12-612.4.1.6 Hazardous Material Training . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12-712.4.1.7 Surveillance Testing and Maintenance Training . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12-712.4.1.8 Fire Protection Program . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12-712.4.1.9 Quality Assurance Training . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12-712.4.1.10 Emergency Preparedness Training . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12-712.4.1.11 Engineering Training . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12-712.4.1.12 Facility Operations Shift Engineer Training . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12-812.4.1.13 Waste Handling Engineer Training . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12-812.4.1.14 Underground Operations Engineer Training . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12-812.4.1.15 Instrumentation and Control Technician Training . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12-8

12.4.2 Maintenance of Training . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12-812.4.3 Modification of Training Materials . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12-9



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12-1 November 2006

PROCEDURES and TRAINING

12.1 Introduction

The objective of this chapter is to describe the key elements of the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP)procedures and training programs.

The scope includes the processes by which the technical content of the procedures and training programsare developed, verified, and validated. The goal is to ensure that the facility is operated and maintainedby personnel who are qualified and competent to carry out their job responsibilities using procedures andtraining elements that have been developed and kept current by the use of feedback and continuousimprovement. It is important that operators are trained and qualified and have well developed, currentprocedures to perform their duties. This assures assumptions made in the safety basis regarding bothprocedural compliance and response are maintained. A programmatic commitment to ongoingprocedures and training programs is considered to be a necessary part of safety assurance. The WIPPtraining program is organized and managed to facilitate planning, directing, evaluating, and controlling asystematic training process that fulfills job-related needs and regulatory requirements. Washington TRUSolutions (WTS), the management and operating contractor for the WIPP, is responsible for establishingand administering the overall training program for the WIPP personnel. Operations procedures areprovided to ensure the facility is operated within its safety basis.

In summary, the key attributes of the WIPP procedures and training programs for procedures and trainingfor safety analysis purposes are:

• Work processes are controlled by approved procedures, and management controls appropriateto the specific tasks to be performed

• Procedures are maintained under change control

• Procedures are periodically reviewed for accuracy and applicability

• Procedure development includes validation to assure technical accuracy and properconsideration of human factors issues

• The training program ensures the work force is trained and qualified, with the knowledge,skills, and abilities to effectively perform their work while protecting themselves, coworkers,the public, and the environment

• Training includes incorporation of results from a formal lessons learned process

12.2 Requirements

Minimum requirements for the selection, qualification, and training of personnel at the WIPP arespecified in DOE Order 5480.20A, Personnel Selection, Qualification, and Training Requirements forDOE Nuclear Facilities.1 The minimum requirements for procedures are specified in DOE Order5480.19, Conduct of Operations Requirements for DOE Facilities.2 DOE Order 420.1B, Facility Safety,3

defines the procedure and training requirements for system engineers.


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12.3 Procedure Program

WP 04-CO, Conduct of Operations4 and WP 15-PS3002, WTS Controlled Document Processing,5

provide specific guidance for the development of procedures and training that ensure personnel arequalified and competent in fulfilling their job-related responsibilities. WP 13-1, WTS Quality AssuranceProgram Description,6 requires that technical documents and procedures be reviewed for adequacy,correctness, and completeness prior to approval and issuance as controlled documents. Trainingrequirements are implemented by the WIPP Training Implementation Matrix (TIM)7 and the WP14-TR.01, WIPP Training Program.8

WP 04-CO4 states that operation of the facility will be in accordance with approved operating proceduresand will be performed by qualified personnel. Formal written operating procedures are prepared formodifications that would affect the safety and/or the design of the facility as defined in this DocumentedSafety Analysis (DSA). Procedures govern configuration control, maintenance, and calibration of theWIPP structures, systems, and components (SSCs), particularly those that are functionally classified inChapter 3 of this DSA.

Management policy MP 1.28, Integrated Safety Management,9 provides guidance for the development ofsafety management functions. These activities define scope of work, identify and analyze hazards,develop and implement hazard controls, perform work within controls, and provide feedback onadequacy of controls and continuous improvement in defining and planning work. These policies andprocedures are developed and managed in accordance with WP 15-PS3002.5 Inspection andsurveillance/test requirements are delineated in WP 13-16 and Chapter 5 of this DSA and accomplishedthrough procedures or work instructions in accordance with WP 10-2, Maintenance OperationsInstruction Manual.10 Chapter 14 of this DSA further discusses quality requirements for inspection andtesting which are performed in accordance with approved implementing procedures.

12.3.1 Development of Procedures

Procedures prescribe the actions and steps that are essential to safe and consistent performance ofadministrative, operations, and maintenance activities. Instructions and guidance documents are used tosupplement procedures and ensure specific information is conveyed to the user in the best mannerpossible. Identification of the need for a new procedure is based on the following criteria:

• Failure to correctly perform an operation or activity will have a negative impact on the workprocess.

• The complexity of the operation or activity exceeds the knowledge of assigned personnel.

• Requirements need to be documented and interpreted to assure compliance and communicatemanagement direction.

• Users require the current version of a procedure to assure proper implementation.

• Upper tier policies or directives require that a procedure be written.

WP 15-PS30025 controls the process for procedure development. The cognizant organization managerassigns a technically competent person as defined in WP 13-1,6 to develop the technical content of thedocument. Procedures are required when a defined task or activity is to be performed, which meets oneof the following criteria: (1) accomplishes work or activities defined in WP 13-1,6 or creates quality


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records, (2) provides specific direction for the operating equipment and/or systems included in theconfiguration management process, (3) provides specific direction for physical activities that requirerepeatability and documented results, as described in WP 15-PS.2, Technical Procedure Writer's Guide.11 A unreviewed safety question (USQ) screening is performed on all new procedures and changes toexisting procedures by a qualified individual in accordance with WP 02-AR3001, Unreviewed SafetyQuestion Determination.12

Procedures are verified and validated for normal, abnormal, and emergency operations and forsurveillance testing and maintenance as defined in WP 13-1.6 Following completion of the technicalreview and validation process, document packages are sent to the Document Review Committee for finalreview, then the procedure is approved for use by the cognizant organization manager. The following areexamples of procedures developed and approved by this process:

• WP 02-1, Waste Isolation Pilot Plant Groundwater Monitoring Program Plan13

• WP 04-CO, Conduct of Operations4

• WP 09-CN, Engineering Conduct of Operations documents14

• WP 09-CN3007, Engineering Design Document Preparation and Change Control15

• WP 07-1, Waste Isolation Pilot Plant Geotechnical Engineering Program Plan16

• WP 05-WH1011, CH Waste Processing17

• WP 08-NT.01, Waste Isolation Pilot Plant Waste Information System Program Plan18

• WP 15-2, Management Control System Program Plan19

12.3.2 Maintenance of Procedures

WP 15-PS30025 requires a periodic review of each procedure during which a technically competentperson reviews the procedure to ensure the incorporation of any new requirements, changes in facilityconfiguration, changes in the DSA or technical safety requirements (TSRs), changes due to unreviewedsafety question determinations, or changes in training. These reviews maintain congruence between thefacility’s actual condition, the procedures, and the training for the procedures. Changes to the proceduresmandate a technical review that must be signed off by the cognizant organization manager and atechnically competent person before issuance as an approved change. USQ screening is required for allchanges to procedures.

12.4 Training Program

DOE Order 5480.20A1 provides the requirements for establishing performance-based training programsand the personnel qualification requirements for DOE nonreactor nuclear facilities. This Order isimplemented at the site level by WP 14-TR.018 and the TIM7 which address the development of a formaltraining program for personnel and site subcontractors in job-related subjects from fundamental technicalskills and specialty training to supervisory and management skills. Training program policies andprocedures define job function, responsibility, authority, and accountability of WTS personnel involvedin managing, implementing, and conducting training.

The primary objective of the WIPP training program is to prepare personnel to operate the WIPP in a safeand environmentally sound manner. To achieve this objective, the training program provides employeeswith training relevant to their positions. Full-time employees at the WIPP, regardless of employer,receive general employee training (GET) which includes an introduction to the Public Law 94-580,


12-4 November 2006

Resource Conservation and Recovery Act20 and emergency preparedness processes within thirty days ofemployment. In this way, everyone at WIPP is provided basic training of regulatory requirements andemergency procedures. Employees who operate plant equipment, work in areas involving radiologicalmaterials, or deal with hazardous or mixed waste management receive additional classroom and on-the-job training designed specifically to teach them how to perform their duties safely, and to ensure thefacility's compliance with the regulations.

12.4.1 Development of Training

Formal training programs for personnel who support nuclear facilities are listed in the WIPP TIM7 andinclude the following elements:

• Needs/job analysis and identification of tasks for training

• Development of learning objectives

• Development of lesson plans and training guides

• Evaluation of trainee mastery of learning objectives

• Evaluation of the effectiveness of training

The TIM7 describes the operating organization and the training/qualification programs for positions inthe operating organization. It lists each position that is subject to DOE Order 5480.20A,1 and includes amatrix that shows the status of programs relative to the requirements of DOE Order 5480.20A.1 Thefollowing are examples of the positions:

• Management Positions

– General Manager

– Facility Shift Manager

– Quality Assurance Manager

– Mine Operations Manger

– Radiation Safety Manager

• Technical Staff Management

– Mechanical Maintenance Manager

– CH Projects Manager

– Electrical Maintenance Manager

• Operator

– Facility Operations Shift Engineer (Operator Supervisor)

– Underground Operations Engineer (Operator Supervisor)

– CH Waste Handling Engineer (Operator Supervisor)

– Waste Hoist Operator


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• Maintenance

– Mechanical Maintenance Technician

– Instrumentation and Control Technician

• Technician

– Radiological Control Technician

– Radiochemistry Technician

• Technical Staff

– Cognizant Engineer

• Training Coordinator

– Team Leader - Technical Training

• Training Instructor

– Technical Training

WP 14-TR.0110 defines the systematic process used in the design and development of the WIPP trainingprograms. The degree of analysis (needs analysis, job analysis, and task analysis) will vary based oncomplexity and job function. Using a graded approach, several options exist for analysis:

• A table top method where a team of trainers, supervisors, and subject matter experts meet toidentify duty areas, tasks within the duty area, and the tasks to be included in the trainingprogram

• Verification and validation of task list from similar facilities and job duty areas

• Use of consensus-based content guides to determine training program content

Job analyses are conducted for qualified positions to determine tasks for training for both normal andemergency duties, establish program goals, and define the scope of training program content. A detailedtask analysis may be developed or expected based on a graded approach. The graded approach shouldtake into consideration the existing procedures controlling the activity and if the consequence ofperforming the task improperly is of low consequence. Group brainstorming or a joint review of theprocedure by trainers and subject matter experts are acceptable to determine skills and knowledge.

As part of the development of training, a task list of duties to be included in the training program isdeveloped. Task analyses are performed and task-to-train matrices are developed that include a list oftasks, training determination, and training setting, for qualified positions. Based on the training analysisconducted, training is developed and implemented. Materials to conduct training (e.g., lesson plans,on-the-job training guides, training aids, and student materials) are then developed. During the actualtraining, trainee mastery of the learning objectives in periodically evaluated. Initial and continuingtraining programs are established to ensure personnel are qualified to perform job requirements.


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12.4.1.1 Initial Training

Initial training may include classroom training and on-the-job training (OJT) necessary to provide anunderstanding of the fundamentals, basic principles, systems, procedures, and emergency responseinvolved in an employee’s work assignments. Initial task or duty area qualification is granted by the linemanagement based on the evaluation of the employee’s mastery of the learning objectives presentedduring the training.

12.4.1.2 General Employee Training

Annual GET is required for all employees, subcontractors, and visitors who have unescorted facilityaccess. Any changes made to GET are included in continuing training programs for all facilitypersonnel. The following areas are included in GET training:

• General description of facilities

• Policies and procedures

• Radiological health and safety programs

• Hazard communication

• Industrial Safety/Hygiene Program

• Fire Protection Program

• Security Program

• Conduct of Operations

12.4.1.3 Criticality Safety Training

Personnel with responsibilities that may affect nuclear criticality safety, including waste handlingpersonnel and their supervisors or those individuals who generate and review nuclear criticality safetyevaluations, are trained appropriate to their assigned functions. Chapter 6 of this DSA discusses thecriticality program and associated training in further detail.

12.4.1.4 Radiological Protection Training

Radiological protection training is included in GET and addresses the employee’s responsibilities forkeeping exposures to radiation and radioactive materials as low as reasonably achievable (ALARA). If aperson requires unescorted access to a radiological area, additional radiological safety training isrequired. Radiation Worker Training I and II is required for personnel whose jobs require unescortedaccess to radiological posted areas. Chapter 7 of this DSA discusses the radiation protection program infurther detail.

12.4.1.5 Radiological Control Technician Training

Training program content for radiological control technicians is in accordance with the requirements of10 CFR Part 835, "Occupational Radiation Protection."21 Training program elements are in accordancewith the requirements of DOE Order 5480.20A1 and implemented in WP 14-TR.018 and the TIM.7

Training is provided for personnel who are assigned to work in waste handling areas. Training iscommensurate with the hazard level and complexity of job duties performed in a waste handling area. Chapter 7 of this DSA discusses radiological worker training in further detail.


12-7 November 2006

GET is required for all WIPP employees and is required for entry into a waste handling area. Visitorswho enter waste handling areas receive a radiological safety orientation that includes basic radiationprotection concepts, risk of low-level occupational radiation exposure, radiological protection policiesand procedures, visitor and management responsibilities for radiation safety, adherence to radiologicalposting and labeling, applicable emergency procedures, and training for issuance of dosimeters, whereapplicable. WP 12-9, WIPP Emergency Management Program,22 establishes the emergency preparednessprogram for the protection of personnel and property for which the WIPP is responsible.

12.4.1.6 Hazardous Material Training

Training is provided for workers, supervisors, and managers who are assigned to work with hazardousmaterials. Training includes the environmental, worker safety, and health subject areas, commensuratewith their job assignments as identified in work control documents. Work control documents specifyprogrammatic requirements (including training) such as Hazardous Waste Worker. Chapter 8 of thisDSA discusses the program for hazardous materials protection in further detail.

12.4.1.7 Surveillance Testing and Maintenance Training

Training is provided for operations and maintenance personnel involved in surveillance testing. TheWIPP procedures address maintenance activities such as training of maintenance personnel, maintenanceof SSCs, post maintenance testing, control and calibration of measuring equipment. Chapter 10 of thisDSA discusses surveillance testing and maintenance training program in further detail.

12.4.1.8 Fire Protection Program

Fire protection training is governed by the WIPP fire protection program and is included in initial GET. Employees who perform fire watches receive additional training. Chapter 11 of this DSA discusses thefire protection program in further detail.

12.4.1.9 Quality Assurance Training

Quality assurance training is included in initial GET. Chapter 14 of this DSA discusses the qualityassurance program in further detail.

12.4.1.10 Emergency Preparedness Training

Basic training is provided to all permanently assigned personnel, including other DOE contractors andsubcontractors, through GET and periodic refresher training with respect to the actions they should takeduring an emergency event. Chapter 15 of this DSA discusses emergency preparedness in further detail.

12.4.1.11 Engineering Training

Training for engineers follows the same systematic approach to training in job-specific duties andqualification programs as for operations personnel. Training requirements including on-the-job-training(OJT) are developed to ensure that engineers are sufficiently trained to perform the job duties. WP14-TR3307, Qualification Programs;23 and WP 14-TR3308, On-the-Job Training,24 implement associatedrequirements defined in WP 14-TR.01.8 All OJT is conducted and evaluated by designated personnelwho have been instructed in program standards and methods in accordance with site controlledprocedures.


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12.4.1.12 Facility Operations Shift Engineer Training

Training programs for facility operations shift engineers are sufficiently comprehensive to cover theareas which are fundamental to the job duties. A core of subjects such as industrial safety,instrumentation and control, basic physics, chemistry industry operating experience, and major facilitysystems as applicable to the position and the facility is established. Training programs include on-the-joband classroom training on the topics identified for the specific job duties. Continuing training programsare established for operating organization personnel who perform functions associated with engineeredsafety features as identified in this DSA. Training programs for the requirements of DOE Order5480.20A1 and are defined by the TIM7 and implemented in the WIPP procedures.

12.4.1.13 Waste Handling Engineer Training

Training for waste handling engineers is sufficiently comprehensive to cover the job duties in wastehandling areas. Training programs include on-the-job and classroom training8 on the topics identified forthe specific job duties. Continuing training programs are established for operating organizationpersonnel who perform functions associated with the safety basis as identified in this DSA and inDOE/WIPP 95-2125,Waste Isolation Pilot Plant Contact-Handled (CH) Technical Safety Requirements[TSRs].25

12.4.1.14 Underground Operations Engineer Training

Training programs for underground operations engineer follow the same systematic approach andtraining requirements as the facility operations shift engineer. Job-specific training and qualificationprograms are developed as applicable to work in the underground facility and waste handling areas. Qualification programs are reviewed by management and kept up to date to reflect changes in theunderground facility, DSA, and the CH TSRs.25 The development of qualification programs is defined inWP TR.018 and implemented in WP 14-TR3307.23

12.4.1.15 Instrumentation and Control Technician Training

Training programs for instrumentation and control technicians follow the requirements of DOEOrder 5480.20A1. Instrumentation and control technician training consists of a series of qualificationcards that are developed for the process controlled calibration and repair of onsite instrumentation usedfor plant operations. WP 10-AD3028, Calibration and Control of Measurement and Test Equipment,26

establishes the requirements and responsibilities to identify and recall equipment and obtain calibrationservices for measurement and test equipment.

12.4.2 Maintenance of Training

WP 14-TR.018 implements the requirement for the periodic review of training programs. Programreviews are a shared effort between Technical Training and the functional groups. These reviews ensurethat training programs are updated to reflect any changes to the facility, procedures, regulations,documented safety analysis and technical safety requirements, and applicable industry operatingexperience in accordance with site controlled procedures. Record maintenance follows an approvedRecords Inventory and Disposition Schedule, reviewed and updated at least annually, to comply withfederal codes, policies, or directives concerning training records administration. WP 14-TR.018 providesinstruction for maintaining training records.

Employees receive refresher training for GET and other job specific training. Employees who arequalified to qualification cards, are required to requalify at a periodicity specific to their qualification.


12-9 November 2006

This requalification focuses on continuing training in tasks that are critical to safety, or are difficult, orinfrequently performed. Refresher training ensures a proficient and safe workforce.

12.4.3 Modification of Training Materials

DOE-STD-1070-94, Guidelines For Evaluation of Nuclear Facility Training Programs,27 requires aperiodic comprehensive evaluation of individual training programs and materials by qualifiedindividuals. Using the combined efforts of the WIPP training instructors and cognizant personnel,programs and materials are evaluated, revised and updated in accordance with WP 1-TR.01.8 Anyimprovements or deficiencies are identified and tracked systematically until incorporated into the trainingprograms. Updates may be due to changes in regulations, task performance, modifications to equipmentor noted human factors deficiencies. At the completion of program modification, cognizant linemanagement and the WIPP training must approve any revision before implementation.


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1. DOE Order 5480.20A, Personnel Selection, Qualification, Training Requirements for DOENuclear Facilities, Change 1, July 2001


3. DOE Order 420.1B, Facility Safety, December 2005.


5. WP 15-PS3002, WTS Controlled Document Processing


7. Training Implementation Matrix (TIM), Rev. 6. Waste Isolation Pilot Plant, TechnicalTraining Department. Access Date: March 15, 2005

8. WP 14-TR.01, WIPP Training Program



11. WP 15-PS.2, Technical Procedure Writer’s Guide

12. WP 02-AR3001, Unreviewed Safety Question Determination

13. WP 02-1, WIPP Groundwater Monitoring Program Plan

14. WP 09-CN Engineering Conduct of Operations documents

15. WP 09-CN3007, Engineering Design Document Preparation and Change Control

16. WP 07-1, Waste Isolation Pilot Plant Geotechnical Engineering Program Plan

17. WP 05-WH1011, CH Waste Processing

18. WP 08-NT.01, Waste Isolation Pilot Plant Waste Information System Program Plan

19. WP 15-2, Management Control System Program Plan

20. Public Law 94-580, Resource Conservation and Recovery Act

21. 10 CFR Part 835, Rev. 21, Occupational Radiation Protection, January 2004

22. WP 12-9, WIPP Emergency Management Program

23. WP 14-TR3307, Qualification Programs


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24. WP 14-TR3308, On-the-Job Training

25. DOE/WIPP 95-2125, Waste Isolation Pilot Plant Contact Handled Technical SafetyRequirements

26. WP 10-AD3028, Calibration and Control of Measurement and Test Equipment

27. DOE-STD-1070-94, Guidelines For Evaluation of Nuclear Facility Training Programs, June1994


12-12 November 2006



13-i November 2006

HUMAN FACTORS

TABLE OF CONTENTS

SECTION PAGE NO.

13.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13-1

13.2 Requirements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13-1

13.3 Human Factors Process . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13-1

13.4 Identification of Human-Machine Interfaces . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13-1

13.5 Optimization of Human-Machine Interfaces . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13-3



13-ii November 2006



13-1 November 2006

HUMAN FACTORS

13.1 Introduction

This chapter describes the impact of human factors on the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP) contacthandled (CH) waste operations. WIPP CH waste handling operations consist of removing containerizedCH waste from shipping packages in the WHB, placing CH waste containers on facility pallets,transferring one facility pallet at a time to the underground on the waste shaft conveyance, removing thefacility pallet from the waste hoist conveyance and transporting to the active disposal room where the CHwaste containers are removed from the facility pallet using a forklift and placed in the disposal array. This chapter includes a description of the human factors process for systematically inquiring into theimportance of human factors in facility safety specific to the CH waste handling processes and adescription of the human machine interfaces with structures, systems, and components (SSCs) importantto safety or that provide defense in depth.

13.2 Requirements

DOE Order 420.1B, Facility Safety,1 and associated guidance documents discuss the design requirementsfor facility safety in nonreactor nuclear facilities. Human factors focuses on facility and equipmentdesign that reflects sensitivity to human capabilities and limitations, and considers human reliability andthe contribution of human error to facility risk. This chapter is written using the guidance provided byDOE G 420.1-1, Nonreactor Nuclear Safety Design Criteria and Explosives Safety Criteria Guide foruse with DOE O 420.1, Facility Safety 2 and DOE-STD-3009-94, Preparation Guide for U.S. Departmentof Energy Nonreactor Nuclear Facility Documented Safety Analysis.3

13.3 Human Factors Process

WP 12-NS.06, Human Factors Evaluation Updates,4 implements the requirement for a human factorevaluation of the CH waste handling process and human-machine interfaces at the WIPP. Humanfactors is addressed in WP 09-CN3018, Design Verification,5 as part of the overall design considerationsapplied to new or modified designs to the WIPP SSCs. WP 02-RP.03, WIPP Human Factors EvaluationReport,6 analyzed the adequacy of human factors with respect to the CH and RH waste handlingprocesses. The evaluation identified human-machine interactions, including the activities of surveillance,maintenance, and normal, abnormal, and emergency operations, to ensure safety was not comprised.

13.4 Identification of Human-Machine Interfaces

Chapter 4 of this documented safety analysis (DSA) identifies the safety class (SC) and safety significant(SS) SSCs based on accident analysis in Chapter 3. The safety function, system description, functionalrequirements, system evaluations for the safety related SSCs are discussed in Chapter 4. The SC SSCsand their human-machine interface requirements are listed below.


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SC SSC Human-Machine Interface Requirement(s)

Waste hoist components, structure and structuralsupport including1. Conveyance ropes2. Counterweight3. Head frame4. Conveyance 5. Waste hoist tower6. Waste hoist drum

Passive design does not require human-machineinterface, except for periodic inspections and tests.

Waste Handling Building structure-noncombustibleconstruction

Passive design does not require human-machineinterface except for configuration control

Waste shaft conveyance Passive design does not require human-machineinterface, except for configuration control

Automatic/manual fire suppression system on CH waste handling equipment used in the underground

Passive design that can be manually actuated byoperator. System requires surveillances as describedin Chapter 5 of this DSA and maintenance inaccordance with National Fire ProtectionAssociation (NFPA) 25, Standard for the Inspection,Testing, and Maintenance of Water-Based FireProtection Systems.7

CH Waste Handling Electric Forklifts Passive design does not require human-machineinterface, except for configuration control.

The SS SSCs and their human-machine interface requirements are listed below.

SS SSC Human-Machine Interface Requirement(s)

Fire water supply and fire suppression systems Passive design does not require human-machineinterface except for surveillances and maintenance

Waste Handling Building (designed to withstandthe DBT, 27 lb/ft2 roof load design; also the WHBhas a lightning protection system and is grounded)

Passive design does not require human-machineinterface, except for configuration control

Waste hoist brakes Passive design does not require human-machineinterface except for configuration control,surveillances, and maintenance

PPA paved or graveled and surrounded by gravelroad

Passive design does not require human-machineinterface

Underground bulkheads, overcasts, and airlocks Passive design does not require human-machineinterface except for configuration control

TRU dock cranes Active design requires human-machine interface tooperate. Holds suspended load in place upon loss ofpower. DBE designed.

Fence around waste shaft collar Passive design does not require human-machineinterface except for pre-operational checks each shiftbefore first use and configuration control

Conveyance loading car Passive design does not require human-machineinterface except for configuration control,

Facility pallet Passive design does not require human-machineinterface except for configuration control,


SS SSC Human-Machine Interface Requirement(s)

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Waste hoist head frame (sized such that a facilitypallet can only be loaded on the conveyance in oneposition and can only be loaded using a conveyanceloading car)

Passive design does not require human-machineinterface except for configuration control,

Underground ventilation Passive design does not require human-machineinterface except for configuration control,surveillances, and maintenance

Lift fixtures and space frame pallet assemblies Passive design does not require human-machineinterface except for inspections each shift before firstuse and configuration control

Maintenance and surveillances on SC and SS SSCs are performed during periods when no waste is beingactively handled. Preoperation inspections and testing is conduced by waste handling operations prior tostarting waste handling. In the event of an operational alarm or an emergency condition occurring, wastehandling operations is stopped and operators evacuate the area In accordance with WP 05-WH4401,Waste Handling Operator Event Response.8 Waste handling can be resumed when acceptable operatingcondition are reestablished.

13.5 Optimization of Human-Machine Interfaces

General considerations in optimization of human-machine interfaces include adequate space, lighting,and arrangement of controls, indications, and alarms to accommodate the operator. Emergency audibleand visual alarms are provided throughout the underground and surface structures. Doors used for egressare designed for ease of opening in the direction of emergency egress travel.

As part of the design and design verification process, WP09-CN30185 includes a checklist to be used as aguide when performing a formal design review. WP09-CN30185 addresses several human factorsparameters including, instrumentation and control requirements, equipment redundancy, normal andemergency access requirements, personnel requirements and limitations, interface requirements betweeninstalled designs and maintenance, radiation protection considerations, and incorporation into the designconsiderations important to preventing or reducing undue risk to the health and safety of site personneland the public. The facility design provides adequate space and a favorable environment in which toaccomplish maintenance activities. The layout and design of equipment controls and instrumentation,and associated labeling are considered in the design process and also during procedure verification ofoperating procedures.

WP04-CO, Conduct of Operations,9 and implementing procedures address, among other items, communication, operator aids, equipment and instrumentation control, component labeling and procedurevalidation and verification, staffing levels, training requirements, allocation of control function, andfacility status turnover between shifts. Training and procedures are discussed in Chapter 12 of this DSA.

WP 10-2, Maintenance Operations Instruction Manual,10 ensures that human-machine interfaces formaintenance are deliberate and post maintenance testing is required before an item is returned to service. Preoperational checklists are completed on waste handling equipment prior to any waste handlingactivities.

DOE Order 440.1A, Worker Protection Management for DOE Federal and Contractor Employees,11

specifies requirements for a worker protection program. MP 1.12, Worker Protection Policy,12 providesguidance for a systematic process that ensures safety is integrated into management and work practices at


13-4 November 2006

all levels of the organization so that the mission is accomplished while protecting the workers, the public,and the environment. WP 12-IS.01, Industrial Safety Program - Structure and Management,13 as well asits subdocuments and implementing procedures, addresses safe work environments, including physicalaccess, need for protective clothing or breathing apparatus, noise levels, temperature, humidity,ergonomics, and other factors bearing upon physical comfort, alertness and fitness.

Chapter 5 of this DSA derives the WIPP TSRs and addresses the required staffing levels for CH wastehandling activities, programs that ensure the facility is operated and maintained to protect the workers,public, and environment, and specific administrative actions to prevent accidents from occurring.

Chapter 3 of this DSA discusses human errors as they apply to accidental releases of radioactive orhazardous materials as an integral part of postulated accidents. The analysis of those accidents showsthat the SC and SS SSCs, adherence to the CH WAC,14 facility design, safety management programs,and operational controls provide confidence that releases can be contained without sophisticated human-machine interfaces.


13-5 November 2006


1. DOE Order 420.1B, Facility Safety, U.S. Department of Energy, December 2005

2. DOE Guide 420.1-1, Nonreactor Nuclear Safety Design Criteria and Explosives Safety CriteriaGuide for use with DOE Order 420.1, Facility Safety, U.S. Department of Energy, March 2000

3. DOE-STD-3009-94, Preparation Guide for U.S. Department of Energy Nonreactor NuclearFacility Documented Safety Analysis, Change 3, March 2006

4. WP 12-NS.06, Human Factors Evaluation Updates.

5. WP 09-CN3018, Design Verification

6. WP 02-RP.03, Rev. 1, Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP) Human Factors Evaluation Report, July 2006

7. NFPA 25, Standard for the Inspection, Testing, and Maintenance of Water-Based FireProtection Systems, National Fire Protection Association

8. WP 05-WH4401, Waste Handing Operator Event Response




12. MP 1.12, Worker Protection Policy

13. WP 12-IS.01, Industrial Safety Program - Structure and Management.

14. DOE/WIPP-02-3122, Contact-Handled Transuranic Waste Acceptance Criteria for the WasteIsolation Pilot Plant, Revision 4.0, December 2005


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14-i November 2006

QUALITY ASSURANCE

TABLE OF CONTENTS

SECTION PAGE NO.

14.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14-1

14.2 Requirements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14-2

14.3 Quality Assurance Program and Organization . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14-214.3.1 Quality Policy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14-214.3.2 Program Description . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14-214.3.3 Organization and Responsibilities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14-3

14.3.3.1 WTS Departments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14-414.3.3.2 Personnel Qualification . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14-5

14.4 Quality Improvement . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14-5

14.5 Documents and Records . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14-6

14.6 Quality Assurance Performance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14-714.6.1 Work Processes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14-714.6.2 Design . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14-814.6.3 Procurement . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14-914.6.4 Inspection and Testing for Acceptance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14-914.6.5 Independent Assessment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14-10

14.6.5.1 Assessments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14-1014.6.5.2 Surveillances . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14-11

14.6.6 Management Assessments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14-11



14-ii November 2006



14-1 November 2006

QUALITY ASSURANCE

14.1 Introduction

This chapter describes the aspects of the Washington TRU Solutions (WTS) quality assurance (QA)program which are pertinent to safety analysis at the WIPP. The following QA features are described inthis chapter:

• QA program and organization

• Personnel training and qualification

• Quality improvement processes

• Documents and records

• Work processes

• Design

• Procurement

• Inspection and acceptance testing

• Management assessments

• Independent assessments

WTS applies a graded approach, in accordance with 10 CFR Part 830 Subpart A, Quality AssuranceRequirements,1 DOE Order 414.1C, Quality Assurance,2 and DOE-CBFO-94-1012, DOE Carlsbad FieldOffice Quality Assurance Program Document (CBFO QAPD),3 for the application of QA requirements toWIPP items and activities. The graded approach process determines the level of controls appropriate foreach item or activity, commensurate with the following criteria:

• Functional Classification

• Importance of an item or activity with respect to safety, waste isolation, and regulatorycompliance

• Importance of the data to be generated

• The need to demonstrate compliance with specific regulatory, design, and QA requirements

• Impact on the results of performance assessments and engineering analyses

• Magnitude of any hazard or the consequences of failure

• Life-cycle stage of a facility or item

• Programmatic mission of a facility

• Particular characteristics of a facility, item, or activity

• Relative importance of radiological and nonradiological hazards

The WTS graded approach process is implemented in WP 09-CN3005, Graded Approach to Applicationof QA Controls.4


14-2 November 2006

14.2 Requirements

The following documents form the basis for the WTS QA program:

• 10 CFR Part 830 Subpart A1 applies to contractor work at nuclear facilities. It requirescontractors to have a written QA program based on the ten criteria in 10 §CFR 830.122,applied using a graded approach.

• DOE Order 414.1C2 applies to all DOE work that is not regulated by other agencies/programs. It applies to non-nuclear work at WIPP. It requires both the DOE and its contractors to have awritten QA program based on the ten criteria in DOE Order 414.1C,2 applied using a gradedapproach.

• 40 CFR §194.22, "Quality Assurance,"5 requires the DOE to have a QA program at WIPP thatimplements the requirements of ASME NQA-1-1989 edition,6 ASME NQA-2a-1990 addenda,part 2.7, to ASME NQA-2-1989 7 edition, and ASME NQA-3-1989 8 edition (excluding Section2.1 (b) and (c), and Section 17.1). (Incorporation by reference as specified in § 194.5).

• The CBFO QAPD3 consolidates and incorporates the requirements from 10 CFR Part 830,Subpart A1, DOE Order 414.1C2, NQA-1-19896, and other relevant requirement documents. The CBFO QAPD3 establishes QA program requirements for all quality affecting programs,projects, and activities sponsored by the CBFO.

14.3 Quality Assurance Program and Organization

14.3.1 Quality Policy

WTS is committed to developing, implementing, and maintaining a formal QA program that ensures thehighest standards of performance. Problems are identified, graded by importance, tracked, corrected andevaluated for trends so that recurrence is avoided and performance may be improved. Work processesare fundamental to worker safety with respect to work planning and control. Management assessments,defined in WP 04-IM1000, Issues Management Program Processing of WIPP Forms,12 and DOE Order231.1A, Change 1, Environment, Safety, and Health Reporting,14 are the tools for continued improvementat the WIPP facility.

14.3.2 Program Description

The WTS QA program is defined in WP 13-1, Washington TRU Solutions LLC Quality AssuranceProgram Description (WTS QAPD),9 and implemented in WTS procedures. WTS has incorporated eachrequirement in the CBFO QAPD implementation through QA Department audits, surveillances, andreviews. In addition, WTS reviews requirements documents cited in Section 14.2 and revisions, andmaintains the WTS QAPD 9 current with their requirements.

The WTS QAPD 9 requires that work is planned, documented, performed under controlled conditions,and periodically assessed to establish work item quality and process effectiveness, and promoteimprovement. Effective implementation of the WTS QA program is dependent on the efforts of all levelsof the WTS organization. Responsibilities are assigned to management and personnel of all WTSorganizations for planning and achieving quality and promoting continuous improvement.


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14.3.3 Organization and Responsibilities

The WTS General Manager (GM) has overall responsibility and authority for the development andimplementation of the QA program. The WTS QA manager reports to the WTS GM.

The QA manager has the following specific responsibilities and authorities delineated in theWTS QAPD:9

• Develop, establish, and interpret the overall WTS QA policy and ensure effectiveimplementation

• Maintain liaison with QA organizations from other WIPP participants and other affectedorganizations

• Ensure QA Department involvement in decisions or commitments which directly affect nuclearsafety or waste isolation at WIPP

• Prepare, maintain, and improve the WTS QAPD9

• Prepare and maintain QA plans and procedures that implement the QA program

• Review WTS procedures that implement the QA program

• Schedule and conduct QA independent oversight, including assessments

• Evaluate the adequacy of and approve supplier QA programs

• Track and perform trend analysis of quality problems, and report quality problem areas

• Provide for the administrative processing of documentation concerning conditions adverse toquality

• Be sufficiently independent from cost and schedule considerations

• Have the organizational freedom to effectively communicate with other senior managementpositions

• Have no assigned responsibilities unrelated to the QA program that would prevent appropriateattention to QA matters

• Assist other departments and sections with quality planning, documentation, measurement,problem identification, and the development of problem solutions

• Provide guidance to all applicable subordinate organizations concerning identification, control,and protection of QA records

• Have sufficient authority, access to work areas, and organizational freedom to:

– Identify quality problems

– Participate in development of solutions


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– Verify implementation of solutions

– Ensure that unsatisfactory conditions are controlled until proper disposition hasoccurred.

• Disseminate information pertinent to quality performance, including:

– Status of development and implementation of the QA program

– Status and resolution of significant quality problems

– Lessons learned from significant quality problems and adverse conditions

– Quality management practices and improvements

– Trend analysis results

Section managers reporting to the QA manager oversee specific QA functions, including:

• Assessments

• Inspections

• QA engineering

• QA programs

• Continuous improvement programs

The QA Department maintains sufficient staffing to support its responsibilities at WIPP. QA is the onlyfunction of QA personnel (other than miscellaneous administrative duties).

14.3.3.1 WTS Departments

Department managers representing the primary functional organizations report directly to the GeneralManager. The WTS organizational structure is described in Chapter 17.

Department managers are responsible for implementing the WTS QAPD9 and have the following specificQA responsibilities (delineated in the WTS QAPD):9

• Provide the necessary organization, direction, control, resources, and support to achieve theirdefined objectives.

• Plan, perform, and improve the work.

• Establish and implement policies and procedures that control the quality of work inaccordance with the QA program.

• Provide technical and QA training for personnel performing work.

• Ensure compliance with applicable regulations, DOE Orders, requirements, and laws.

• Ensure that personnel adhere to procedures.

• Stop unsatisfactory activities, if necessary, to ensure that cost and schedule do not overrideenvironmental, health, safety, and quality considerations.


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• Develop, implement, and maintain plans, policies, and procedures that implement applicableportions of the QA program.

• Identify, investigate, report, and correct quality problems.

• Disseminate information pertinent to quality performance.

Line managers are responsible for defining quality requirements for work. Workers are responsible forachieving and maintaining quality in their work, and for promptly reporting to management any conditionadverse to quality.

14.3.3.2 Personnel Qualification

Qualification requirements for personnel performing quality related work, including managers, designers,scientists, independent assessment personnel, operators, maintenance personnel, technicians, andinspectors, are established and documented in the WTS training program.

WP 13-QA.04, Quality Assurance Department Administrative Program,10 defines training andindoctrination requirements for all WTS QA personnel. Inspection and test, nondestructive examination,and assessment personnel are qualified in accordance with the WTS QAPD,9 WP 13-QA.04,10 and WP 14-TR.01, WIPP Training Program,11 to meet the requirements of NQA-1-19896 and supplements.

The WIPP training program is described in Chapter 12.

14.4 Quality Improvement

WTS has established processes to detect and prevent adverse quality conditions and to promote qualityimprovement. Preventive actions are taken, through design, procurement, and other process controls andassessment activities described in the WTS QAPD,9 to prevent or reduce the probability of occurrence ofquality problems. Items and processes that do not meet established requirements are identified,controlled, and corrected. Correction includes identifying the causes of adverse conditions and workingto prevent recurrence. All personnel are responsible for identifying nonconforming items, activities, andprocesses and are encouraged by management to suggest improvements. Quality improvementrequirements are delineated in the WTS QAPD.9

Control of nonconforming items (i.e., items and materials that do not conform to specified requirementsor whose conformance is indeterminate) is implemented in WP 13-QA3004, Nonconformance Report.12 Nonconforming items are documented on Nonconformance Reports; controlled to prevent inadvertentuse; identified by marking, tagging, or other appropriate means; and segregated or controlledadministratively. The nonconforming characteristics are reviewed, and recommended dispositions areproposed and approved. Implementation of the disposition is verified by the QA Department before theNonconformance Report is closed.

Control of conditions adverse to quality (i.e., programmatic and/or process failures, malfunctions,deficiencies, and nonconformances) is implemented in WP 04-IM1000.13 Conditions adverse to qualityare documented on WIPP Forms. All WTS personnel are responsible for identifying and reportingconditions adverse to quality. Responsible management investigates conditions adverse to quality,determines the extent and impact of the condition, and determines the corrective action response.

Significant conditions adverse to quality, as defined in the WTS QAPD,9 are reported to and evaluated bythe QA Department, relevant regulatory compliance functions, and the appropriate management


14-6 November 2006

responsible for the condition, to determine if a work suspension order is necessary. If necessary, work issuspended until the condition is corrected and verified by the QA Department. Any WIPP employeehaving a concern for employee safety, the safety of the environment, or the quality or regulatorycompliance of an activity has the responsibility and authority to suspend the performance of that activity. The QA Department verifies implementation of corrective actions for significant conditions adverse toquality before the WIPP Form is closed.

The WTS improvement analysis process is implemented in WP 13-QA3006, Data Analysis andTrending.15 WTS performs a periodic site evaluation and trend analysis of performance indicating data. Performance data is identified, collected, and analyzed to identify adverse quality trends andopportunities to improve items, activities, and processes. Results are reported to responsiblemanagement and organizations responsible for corrective action.

14.5 Documents and Records

Document review, approval, issuance, and control requirements are delineated in the WTS QAPD.9 Documents which prescribe processes, specify requirements, or establish design are prepared, approved,issued, and controlled in accordance with approved procedures. Documents are reviewed for adequacy,correctness, and completeness, by designated technically competent reviewers, prior to approval andissuance as controlled documents. The QA Department reviews documents that translate QArequirements into implementing documents to ensure that QA program requirements are properlyimplemented.

Document changes are indicated in the changed document and reviewed by the organizations or technicaldisciplines affected. Editorial or minor changes may be made without the same level of review andapproval as the original or otherwise changed document.

The distribution and use of documents and forms is controlled. Documents used to perform work aredistributed to affected personnel and used at the work location. Effective dates are established for andplaced on approved documents. Controls are established and maintained to identify the currentstatus/revision of documents and forms. Obsolete or superseded documents and forms are controlled toavoid their inadvertent use.

Implementation of the WTS procedure process is described in Chapter 12.

Records management requirements are delineated in the WTS QAPD.9 The WTS records managementprogram is implemented in WP 15-PR, WIPP Records Management Program.16

Records are specified, prepared, reviewed, approved, controlled, and maintained to accurately reflectcompleted work and facility conditions and to comply with statutory or contractual requirements. QArecords are completed documents (regardless of medium) that furnish evidence of the quality of itemsand/or activities. Implementing procedures identify the records they generate. Such records aredesignated as QA records when applicable in the Records Inventory and Disposition Schedule (RIDS),defined in WP 15-PR.16 QA records are classified according to their retention times in the RIDS.

QA records are provided reasonable protection from damage until completed, authenticated, andsubmitted to the records management system. Requirements and responsibilities for QA recordtransmittal, distribution, receipt, indexing, retention, maintenance, storage, disposition, and retrievabilityare established in WP 15-PR.16 Disposition requirements for individual records are documented in theRIDS. The records storage arrangements provide adequate protection of records to preclude damage


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from fire, moisture, temperature, rodent infestation, excessive light, electromagnetic fields, or stacking asdeemed appropriate for the type of record being stored.

14.6 Quality Assurance Performance

14.6.1 Work Processes

Each person who performs work at WIPP is responsible for the quality of his or her work. Work isperformed to established, approved, and documented technical standards and administrative controls, andunder controlled conditions using approved instructions, procedures, drawings, or other appropriatemeans. Items are identified and controlled to ensure their proper use, and maintained to prevent theirdamage, loss, or deterioration.

Quality requirements for performance of work are delineated in the WTS QAPD9 and implemented inWP 10-2, Maintenance Operations Instruction Manual17 and WP 04-CO, Conduct of Operations.18 Specific QA requirements which affect the performance of work by all organizations are incorporatedinto each organization's procedures.

Personnel performing work are responsible for the quality of their work. Because the individual workeris the first line in ensuring quality, personnel are required to be knowledgeable of requirements for workthey perform and the capability of the tools and processes they use. Line managers ensure that personnelworking under their supervision are qualified and are provided the necessary training, resources, andadministrative controls to accomplish assigned tasks. Criteria describing acceptable work performanceare defined for the worker. Line managers periodically review work and related information to ensurethat the desired quality is being achieved, and to identify areas needing improvement. Work is planned,authorized, and accomplished under controlled conditions using technical, quality, and implementingprocedures commensurate with the complexity and risk of the work.

Individuals performing work comply with applicable implementing procedures. When work can not beaccomplished as described in the implementing procedure or accomplishment of such work would resultin an undesirable situation, a condition adverse to quality, or an unacceptable safety risk, the work issuspended and the procedure changed in accordance with the approved procedure change process.

Quality requirements for item identification and control are delineated in the WTS QAPD.9 Items areidentified and controlled to ensure their proper use, and maintained to prevent their damage, loss, ordeterioration. Traceability requirements are specified in design documents or supporting implementationprocedures. Items are identified by physical marking or by other appropriate means. Records aremaintained to ensure that the item can be traced at all times from its source through installation or enduse. The status of inspections, tests and special controls is identified either on the item(s) or indocuments traceable to the item(s). Items with limited operating or shelf life are identified to prevent theuse of items where the shelf life or operating life has expired.

WP 09-CN3021, Component Indices,19 and WP 15-PM3517, Stores Inventory Control,20 implementrequirements for item identification and control. Suspect/counterfeit items are controlled in accordancewith WP 13-QA.05, Suspect/Counterfeit Items Program.21

Quality requirements for handling, storage, and shipping are delineated in the WTS QAPD.9 Handling,storage, cleaning, shipping, and other means of packaging, transporting, or preservation of items isconducted in accordance with established work and inspection implementing procedures, shippinginstructions, or other specified documents. Items are marked or labeled as necessary to adequatelyidentify, maintain, and preserve them. Special environments or controls are indicated as necessary.


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Handling, storage, and shipping requirements are implemented in WP 15-PM3517,20 and WIPP shippingprocedures for various organizations.

Quality requirements for control of special processes are delineated in the WTS QAPD.9 Special processparameters are controlled, and specified environmental conditions are maintained through implementingprocedures, which specify requirements for qualification of personnel, process(es), and equipment, andconditions necessary for completing the special process.

Nondestructive examination processes are controlled in accordance with WP 13-QA.06, QualityAssurance Department Qualification and Certification of Nondestructive Examination Personnel,22 andindividual nondestructive examination method procedures. Code welding is controlled through the workinstruction process in accordance with WP 10-2.17

14.6.2 Design

Quality requirements for design control are delineated in the WTS QAPD9 and implemented in WP 09, Engineering Conduct of Operations.23 Cognizant system engineers are responsible for design,design modifications, associated design documentation such as drawings and specifications,procurement, installation instructions, and testing of structures, systems, and components at WIPP.

Items and processes are designed using sound engineering/scientific principles and appropriate standards. Design work, including changes, incorporates appropriate requirements such as general design criteriaand design bases. Design interfaces are identified and controlled. The adequacy of design products isverified by individuals or groups other than those who performed the work. Verification work iscompleted before approval and implementation of the design. In establishing design controls,management is responsible to ensure that design inputs are technically correct; that design interfaces areidentified; that authorities, responsibilities, and lines of communication are clearly defined; and that thedesign processes clearly define the acceptance criteria for the product.

Applicable design inputs are controlled by those responsible for the design. The design process iscontrolled by procedure. The codes and standards applied to the design are based on the functionalclassification of the item being designed as discussed in Chapter 2 of this DSA. Computer software usedto perform design analyses is developed and qualified.

New designs or modifications to existing designs undergo design verification. Design verification isperformed using one or a combination of the following methods: design review, alternate calculations, orqualification testing. Design verification takes place prior to release for procurement or manufacture,construction, or to another organization for use in other design work, and is completed before relying onthe item to perform its function. Design verification is performed by qualified individuals other thanthose who performed the design. Formal design review processes independently verify compliance of thedesign with applicable requirements specified in design input documents. Assumptions, design method,and output are compared and considered to disclose any discrepancies. Alternative calculations are madewith alternate methods to verify correctness of the original calculations or analyses. Qualification testingdemonstrates the adequacy of performance under conditions that simulate the most adverse designconditions on all components of the system or structure. Modifications to existing designs are approvedby the same groups or organizations that reviewed and approved the original design documents.


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14.6.3 Procurement

Quality requirements for procurement are delineated in the WTS QAPD.9 Procurement planning,documentation, selection of suppliers, evaluation of supplier performance, and acceptance of purchaseditems and services are the elements of procurement control implemented at WIPP. The WTS hasestablished processes that ensure that procured items and services meet established technical and QArequirements and that they perform as specified.

Procurement planning and document requirements are implemented in WP 15-PC3609, Preparation ofPurchase Requisitions,24 and WP 13-QA3012, Supplier Evaluation/Qualification.25 Procurement ofitems and services is planned and controlled to ensure that technical and QA requirements are accurate,complete, and clearly understood by suppliers. Procurement documents define the scope of work andrequirements applicable to the item or service being procured. Procurement documents are prepared byWIPP personnel who complete training, as specified in WP 15-PC3609,24 and are reviewed prior toissuance to verify that the documents include appropriate provisions to ensure that items or services meetthe prescribed requirements. Procurement document reviews include representatives from affectedtechnical organizations, and the QA Department for items and services subject to the QA program.

The QA department is responsible for performing supplier evaluations for quality-related items andservices, in accordance with WP 13-QA3012.25 Supplier selection is based on an evaluation of thesupplier's capability to provide items or services in accordance with procurement document requirements.The evaluation is based on the supplier's history, documentation, or an onsite evaluation of the supplier'sfacilities, personnel, and quality program implementation. Suppliers are evaluated and accepted by theQA Department before starting work. Approved suppliers are evaluated periodically to verify that theycontinue to provide acceptable items and services.

Quality related items and services are accepted using specified methods such as source verification,receipt inspection, post-installation tests, certificates of conformance, or a combination of these methods. Quality-related items and services are inspected and accepted in accordance with QA procedures.

14.6.4 Inspection and Testing for Acceptance

Quality requirements for inspection and testing are delineated in the WTS QAPD.9 Inspections and testsare planned and performed in accordance with approved implementing procedures, using establishedperformance and acceptance criteria. Items and processes are inspected to verify quality at all stages,including source, receipt, in-process, final, and in-service inspections. Items and processes to beinspected or tested, parameters or characteristics to be evaluated, techniques to be used, acceptancecriteria, hold points, and the organizations responsible for performing the tests and inspections areidentified during the work planning process. Inspection and test requirements are incorporated into thework process and documented using work instructions and hold and witness points, in accordance withQA inspection procedures and WP 10-2.17 Inspection and test results are documented, and conformanceto acceptance criteria is evaluated and documented.

Inspection for acceptance of quality-related items and processes is performed by QA personnel. QApersonnel perform nondestructive examinations, receipt, source, and plant inspections, and verify tests asrequired by work instructions. Inspection and nondestructive examination requirements are implementedin QA procedures.

Test procedures include or reference test objectives and provisions for ensuring that prerequisites havebeen met, that adequate instrumentation is available and used, that necessary monitoring is performed,and that suitable environmental conditions are maintained. Test results are evaluated by a responsible


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authority to ensure that test requirements have been satisfied. Test requirements are implemented inWP 09-SU.01, WIPP Start-Up Test Program,26 and accomplished through test procedures or workinstructions in accordance with WP 10-217. The cognizant system engineers are responsible fordetermination, implementation, and verification of start-up, acceptance, and postmodification testing.

The status of inspections and tests is identified either on the items, or in documents traceable to theitems, to ensure that required inspections and tests are performed, and that items that have not passed therequired inspections and tests are not inadvertently installed, used, or operated. Nonconforming itemsand conditions adverse to quality found during inspections and tests are controlled in accordance withWTS nonconformance procedures.

Personnel who perform inspections or tests to verify conformance of items to specified acceptancecriteria are qualified in accordance with approved procedures to meet qualification requirementsestablished in the WTS QAPD.9 Qualification requirements are implemented in WP 13-QA.04,10 andWP 09-SU.01.26

WTS ensures that monitoring, measuring, testing, and data collection equipment used for quality-relatedinspections and tests is controlled, and calibrated to the specified accuracy. Equipment used forinspections and tests is verified to have a current calibration label. Damaged equipment or equipmentwhose calibration has expired or is suspect is removed from service and controlled untilrecalibrated/repaired. Calibration requirements are implemented in WP 10-AD.01, Metrology Program27

and WIPP maintenance procedures.

14.6.5 Independent Assessments

Independent assessment requirements are delineated in the WTS QAPD9 and are implemented inWP 13-QA.03, Quality Assurance Independent Assessment Program.28 Planned and periodicassessments are conducted to measure management effectiveness, item and service quality and processeffectiveness, and to promote improvement. Management assessments are performed or directed bymanagers to assess the effectiveness of their organizations' processes. Independent assessments areperformed by a group or organization having authority and freedom, sufficient to carry out itsresponsibilities, from the line organization being assessed. Persons conducting assessments aretechnically qualified and knowledgeable of the items and processes to be assessed.

14.6.5.1 Assessments

The QA Department plans and performs assessments to determine the effectiveness of the QA programand compliance with implementing procedures. The QA Department develops an annual assessmentschedule. An audit plan is developed and documented for each audit. The assessment plan includes thescope, requirements, purpose, assessment personnel, work to be assessed, organizations to be notified,and schedule. Assessment include technical evaluations of procedures, instructions, activities, and items. Past assessment results are reviewed to determine whether corrective actions were effective.

Assessment team members are selected on the basis of technical qualification and knowledge of the itemand/or process being assessed. A lead auditor is appointed to indoctrinate and supervise the team,organize and direct the assessment, and coordinate the preparation and issuance of the assessment report. Lead auditors are qualified in accordance with WP 13-QA.04,10 and WP 14-TR.01,11 to meetqualification requirements in the WTS QAPD.9

Assessment results are documented and reported to responsible management. Conditions adverse toquality are controlled in accordance with WTS assessment and nonconformance procedures.


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Responsible management investigates and corrects audit findings (conditions adverse to quality). TheQA Department evaluates and approves the adequacy of proposed corrective actions and verifies theirimplementation.

14.6.5.2 Surveillances

QA department personnel perform surveillances of activities to verify conformance with specifiedrequirements and to evaluate their adequacy and effectiveness. Surveillances are used to monitor work inprogress, review documentation, document compliance or noncompliance with established requirementsand procedures, identify actual and potential deficiencies, and provide notification to responsiblemanagers of the status and performance of work under assessment.

Surveillance results are documented and reported to responsible management. Conditions adverse toquality are controlled in accordance with WTS assessment and nonconformance procedures. Responsible management investigates and corrects surveillance findings (conditions adverse to quality). The QA department evaluates and approves the adequacy of proposed corrective actions and verifiestheir implementation.

14.6.6 Management Assessments

WTS uses the management assessment process delineated in the WTS QAPD9 and implemented inWP 15-GM1000, Management Assessments,29 to evaluate the adequacy and effectiveness of itsmanagement control systems. While retaining overall responsibility for the assessment process, seniormanagement requires managers at all levels to assess the performance of the activities assigned to theirorganization. This accomplished through a formal management assessment process.

Management assessments include walkdowns, scheduled assessments, reviews, and critiques. Suchassessments are planned and performed as an ongoing activity to verify conformance to applicablerequirements and identify opportunities to improve performance and cost-effectiveness. Results andconclusions from these assessments are documented and evaluated. Corrective actions are taken toresolve identified problems and to achieve continuous improvement. Provisions are included to track andfollow-up on planned corrective actions from the self-assessments.


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1. 10 CFR Part 830, Subpart A, Quality Assurance Requirements

2. DOE Order 414.1C, Quality Assurance, June 2005

3. DOE-CBFO-94-1012, U.S. Department of Energy Carlsbad Field Office Quality AssuranceProgram Document, Rev. 6, September 2004

4. WP 09-CN3005, Graded Approach to Application of QA Controls

5. 40 CFR §194.22, Quality Assurance

6. ASME NQA-1-1989 Edition, Quality Assurance Program Requirements for Nuclear Facilities

7. ASME NQA-2-1989, Quality Assurance Requirements for Nuclear Facility Applications.

8. ASME NQA-3-1989, Quality Assurance Program Requirements for the Collection of Scientific andTechnical Information for Site Characterization of High-Level Nuclear Waste Repositories.


10. WP 13-QA.04, Quality Assurance Department Administrative Program

11. WP 14-TR.01, WIPP Training Program

12. WP 13-QA3004, Nonconformance Report

13. WP 04-IM1000, Issues Management Program Processing of WIPP Forms

14. DOE Order 231.1A, Environment, Safety, and Health Reporting, Change 1, June 2004

15. WP 13-QA3006, Data Analysis and Trending

16. WP 15-PR, WIPP Records Management Program



19. WP 09-CN3021, Component Indices

20. WP 15-PM 3517, Stores Inventory Control

21. WP 13-QA.05, Suspect/Counterfeit Items Program

22. WP 13-QA.06, Quality Assurance Department Qualification and Certification of NondestructiveExamination Personnel

23. WP 09, Engineering Conduct of Operations


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24. WP 15-PC3609, Preparation of Purchase Requisitions

25. WP 13-QA3012, Supplier Evaluation/Qualification

26. WP 09-SU.01, WIPP Start-Up Test Program

27. WP 10-AD.01, Metrology Program

28. WP 13-QA.03, Quality Assurance Independent Assessment Program

29. WP 15-GM1000, Management Assessments


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15-i November 2006

EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS PROGRAM

TABLE OF CONTENTS

SECTION PAGE NO.

15.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15-1

15.2 Requirements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15-1

15.3 Scope of Emergency Preparedness . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15-2

15.4 Emergency Preparedness Planning . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15-215.4.1 Emergency Response Organization . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15-315.4.2 Assessment Actions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15-5

15.4.2.1 Basis for the Recognition and Declaration of Operational Emergencies . 15-515.4.2.2 Recognition and Classification of Operational Emergencies . . . . . . . . . . 15-515.4.2.3 Acquisition of Radiological and Hazardous Material Information . . . . . . 15-515.4.2.4 Acquisition of Meteorological Information . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15-615.4.2.5 Estimation of Source Terms and Release Rates . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15-615.4.2.6 Estimation of Dispersion and Dose Rates . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15-6

15.4.3 Notification . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15-615.4.4 Emergency Facilities and Equipment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15-6

15.4.4.1 Emergency Facilities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15-615.4.4.2 Emergency Equipment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15-7

15.4.5 Protective Actions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15-715.4.6 Training and Exercises . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15-815.4.7 Recovery and Reentry . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15-8



15-ii November 2006



15-1 November 2006

EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS PROGRAM

15.1 Introduction

The WIPP Emergency Management Program (EMP) is discussed in WP12-9, WIPP EmergencyManagement Program,1 and provides an organized plan of action for dealing with emergencies at theWIPP. This program identifies lines of authority, responsibilities of emergency response personnel andorganizations, and the WIPP manpower and equipment resources available to cope with emergencies.

A hazards survey conducted as required by DOE Order 151.1C, Comprehensive Emergency ManagementSystem,2 and DOE G 151.1-1, Emergency Management Guide,3 is documented in WP 12-RP.01,Emergency Planning Hazards Survey of the Department of Energy Waste Isolation Pilot Plant Report.4 The report concluded that an emergency planning hazards assessment (EPHA) was required for WIPPunder the same provision.

DOE/WIPP 02-3286, WIPP Contact-Handled Waste Handling Emergency Planning Hazards Assessment(CH EPHA),5 analyzes the accident scenarios identified in this CH DSA. In addition, malevolent actswere analyzed that reflected a moderate amount of material at risk. The spectrum of accidents analyzedin this CH DSA have been determined to be the bounding CH accidents for the WIPP; hence they areused for emergency planning purposes. The CH EPHA5 evaluates the consequences of the CH DSAaccidents and two malevolent acts. The CH EPHA5 is reviewed annually and revised as necessary.

The WIPP EMP1 is followed to minimize the impact of emergency events upon the health and safety ofplant personnel, the general public, and the environment. In events concerning hazardousmaterials/waste, the Contingency Plan, Attachment F to the WIPP Hazardous Waste Facility Permit(HWFP) (No. NM4890139088-TSDF),6 is implemented.

Emergency response at WIPP consists of WP 12-9;1 the Contingency Plan;6 and the WP 12-ERemergency response procedures.7 Emergency events involving DOE operations or property at the WIPPare reported to the DOE Carlsbad Field Office (CBFO).

The CH EPHA5 identifies and describes the CH waste handling process and operations, identifies thehazardous materials inside the WIPP Property Protection Area (PPA) and describes the hazards andhazardous materials that are outside the PPA. The CH EPHA5 also provides accident consequenceanalysis and identifies the protective action guidelines (PAGs) as published by the U.S. EPA in Manualof Protective Action Guides and Protective Actions for Nuclear Incidents.8

The EMP1 applies to all personnel employed at, or assigned to the WIPP, and defines emergencyresponse roles and responsibilities. The EMP1 does not include any required DOE radiological responseto transportation accidents that occur away from the facility. Such DOE response, if requested by thestate, is directed by the cognizant DOE Operations Office. The WIPP personnel are available to supportlocal and state organizations in such cases, as directed by the DOE Albuquerque (DOE-AL) OperationsOffice.

15.2 Requirements

The EMP1 establishes the requirements and procedures in compliance with the following:

• DOE Order 151.1C, Comprehensive Emergency Management System2


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• DOE Order 232.1A, Occurrence Reporting and Processing of Operations Information9

• 40 CFR Part 264, Standards for Owners and Operators of Hazardous Waste Treatment,Storage, and Disposal Facilities10

• 40 CFR Part 265, Subpart D, Contingency Plan and Emergency Procedures11

• 40 CFR §265.37, Arrangements with Local Authorities12

• 40 CFR §265.52(c), Content of Contingency Plan13

• 29 CFR §1910.120, Paragraph (p), Certain Operations Conducted Under the ResourceConservation and Recovery Act of 1976 (RCRA)14

• WIPP Hazardous Waste Facility Permit , Attachment F6

Guidelines for radiological exposure related to public and worker health and safety implemented in siteemergency procedures are maintained consistent with current PAGs.8

Guidelines for hazardous material exposure (other than radiological) related to public and worker healthand safety implemented in site emergency procedures are maintained consistent with the EmergencyResponse Planning Guidelines (ERPGs) published by the American Industrial Hygiene Association.15

15.3 Scope of Emergency Preparedness

The EMP1 is developed from the accidents identified in this CH DSA, through the CH EPHA,5 andstandard workplace hazards. The CH EPHA5 identifies, evaluates, establishes emergency action levelsand selects the range of initiating events, based on this CH DSA, for emergencies for workers, the public,and the environment. The CH EPHA5 is revised as the CH DSA is revised.

The EMP1 applies to safety response actions relative to the following:

• Radiological emergencies

• Waste container breaches in the CH portion of the Waste Handling Building

• Underground emergencies (medical and fire)

• CH waste container breaches in the underground

• Severe weather emergencies

• Security (malevolent acts) emergencies

• Earthquakes/seismic events

• Surface emergencies (medical and fire)

15.4 Emergency Preparedness Planning

The EMP1 identifies necessary actions for dealing with sitewide and area emergencies, and defines thelines of authority. Responsibilities of emergency response personnel and organizations are detailed inthe program, including a discussion of the WIPP labor and resources required.


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Operational emergencies at WIPP are classified by EALs that provide specific predetermined criteriaallowing WIPP emergency personnel to categorize operational emergencies. The classification ofoperational emergencies is detailed in WP 12-ER3904, Categorization and Classification of OperationalEmergencies.16

15.4.1 Emergency Response Organization

The WIPP Facility Shift Manager (FSM) is the Incident Commander and RCRA Coordinator who is incharge of mitigation activities and ensuring that proper emergency response activities are conducted. The FSM is responsible for activation of the emergency response and/or support teams as needed. TheFSM activates the Emergency Operations Center (EOC) for operational emergencies. The WashingtonTRU Solutions LLC (WTS) General Manager, or designated alternate, functions as the Crisis Manager(CM). Upon activation of the EOC, the CM assists the FSM in ensuring that necessary emergencyactions take place or assists with further emergency actions. These actions may involve DOE facilities inCarlsbad. Management of an emergency depends on the time and location of the event as determined bythe FSM or CM. Upon activation of the EOC, the WIPP program provides for immediate managementresponse, and for proper notifications to be made during an emergency.

The WIPP has the ability to convene a Crisis Management Team, which is an executive decision-makinggroup tasked specifically to respond to emergencies. The Crisis Management Team consists of severalpersonnel experienced in dealing with emergencies and assembles in the EOC. The OperationalAssistance Team may be activated with the Crisis Management Team, to provide technical, logistical,and administrative support. The Operational Assistance Team assembles in the Central MonitoringRoom (CMR) area. Individuals on these teams are governed by specific directions found within theWIPP EMP.1

Depending upon the location, severity, and type of emergency, the FSM has several Memoranda ofUnderstanding (MOUs) that can be activated. The MOUs between the WIPP and several key communityorganizations are important aspects of the available protective actions governed by legal cooperationagreements. A tabular summary of these agreements including their purpose is as follows:

• JOINT POWERS AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OFENERGY AND THE CITY OF CARLSBAD AND THE COUNTY OF EDDY AND NEWMEXICO ENERGY, MINERALS AND NATURAL RESOURCES DEPARTMENT FOR AJOINT-USE ALTERNATE EMERGENCY OPERATIONS CENTER. This MOU directs thatthe parties involved shall share in establishing and maintaining an alternate EOC.

• MUTUAL AID FIREFIGHTING AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE EDDY COUNTYCOMMISSION AND THE U.S. DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY. This Agreement provides forthe actual assistance of the parties in the furnishing of fire protection for the Eddy County FireDistrict and the WIPP site.

• FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION/DEPARTMENT OF ENERGYMEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING. This MOU deals with threats and criminal actsassociated with theft, sabotage, or hostage attempts against the DOE-AL sites within the stateof New Mexico.


15-4 November 2006

• MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING BETWEEN THE DOE AND THEU.S. DEPARTMENT OF INTERIOR, ROSWELL DISTRICT. This agreement provides for afire management program that ensures a timely, well coordinated, and cost effective responseto suppress wild fire within the land withdrawal area.

• MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING BETWEEN THE UNITED STATESDEPARTMENT OF ENERGY AND THE NEW MEXICO DEPARTMENT OF PUBLICSAFETY CONCERNING MUTUAL ASSISTANCE AND EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT. The MOU applies to any actual or potential emergency or incident that: involves a significantthreat to employees, or the public; involves DOE property; involves threat to environmentreportable to an off-site organization; requires combined resources of the DOE and the state;requires DOE resources unavailable from the state or vice versa; involves any other incidentfor which a joint determination has been made by the DOE and the state that the provisions ofthis MOU apply.

• AGREEMENT BETWEEN CBFO MANAGER, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY,INTREPID MINING, LLC., and MOSAIC CORP. This agreement provides for mine operatorshaving two mine rescue teams available whenever miners are underground, and backup rescuecapability is deemed desirable.

• MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING: EMERGENCY RADIOLOGICALTREATMENT CENTER FOR THE WASTE ISOLATION PILOT PLANT PROJECTBETWEEN THE U.S. DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY AND CARLSBAD MEDICALCENTER. This MOU provides for an Emergency Radiological Treatment Center at theCarlsbad Medical Center.

• MUTUAL AID AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE CITY OF CARLSBAD AND THEU.S. DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY. This agreement authorizes assistance in times of declaredemergency where the enormity of the emergency exceeds the response capability of theresponsible jurisdiction.

• MUTUAL AID AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE CITY OF HOBBS AND THEU.S. DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY. This agreement authorizes assistance in times of declaredemergency where the magnitude of the emergency exceeds the response capability of theresponsible organization.

• INTERAGENCY AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE U.S. BUREAU OF LANDMANAGEMENT AND THE U.S. DOE, AND THE U.S. NATIONAL PARK SERVICE(NPS), AND THE U.S. FOREST SERVICE. This agreement provides for assistance in searchand rescue missions and training.

• MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING BETWEEN U.S. DOE AND LEA REGIONALHOSPITAL (L. H.). This MOU provides for an Emergency Radiological Treatment Center.

All on-site emergencies shall be reported immediately to the CMR Operator (CMRO), who gathersspecific information relating to the incident and reports that information to the FSM. Other personnelinvolved with emergency response are:

Emergency Services Technician (EST) - An EST is a WTS employee whose job is that of full-timeemergency responder. The EST responds to emergencies that threaten lives or property at WIPP(e.g., medical, fire, hazardous material). The EST reports information pertaining to emergencies to the


15-5 November 2006

FSM. ESTs are responsible for keeping the assigned emergency apparatus in good operating condition, the safe operation of the apparatus and the safety of others involved with the apparatus.

Mine Rescue Teams (MRTs) - The MRTs are responsible for underground reentry and rescue. TheMRTs are trained in accordance with 30 CFR Part 49, Mine Rescue Teams.18

15.4.2 Assessment Actions

15.4.2.1 Basis for the Recognition and Declaration of Operational Emergencies

Emergency response actions can be triggered by any of the events listed in Section 15.3. The basis forthe recognition and declaration of operational emergencies is the CH EPHA. The CH EPHA containsevent scenarios ranging from minor to severe, including malevolent acts and events identified in thisCH DSA, and the consequences for each event at various receptor locations, including 30 meters, at theProperty Protection Area, and the WIPP Site Boundary. The CH EPHA identifies the WIPP emergencyplanning zone and emergency action levels. The CH EPHA is used by personnel performingWP 12-ER390416 to determine the category of an emergency.

15.4.2.2 Recognition and Classification of Operational Emergencies

Operational emergencies are unplanned, significant events or conditions that require time urgent responsefrom outside the immediate/affected facility or area of the incident. Incidents that can be controlled byemployees in the affected facility or area are not operational emergencies. Incidents that do not pose asignificant hazard to safety, health, and/or the environment and that do not require a time urgent responseare not operational emergencies.

Initial activity associated with emergency response includes detection, recognition, categorization, andclassification of an emergency event. Events and event symptoms are recognized through directobservation and/or monitoring of indicators. WP 12-ER390416 is used by the FSM to determine if anevent is to be categorized as an operational emergency and, if required, to be classified as an Alert, SiteArea Emergency, or General Emergency. The classification is required when an event has the potentialto expose site personnel or the public to hazardous/radioactive materials outside the immediatelyinvolved facility.

15.4.2.3 Acquisition of Radiological and Hazardous Material Information

The hazards survey, WP 12-RP.01,4 determined that the radiological and hazardous material content ofthe CH transuranic waste received and disposed of at WIPP, was the source of material at risk (MAR)that could cause a CH operational event to be classified as an Alert or higher classification.

The WIPP Waste Information System (WWIS) provides an online source of data showing the wasteform, type payload, weight, and radionuclide inventory of each waste container shipped to WIPP. Documents with the WWIS data for each waste container entering the waste disposal process that day aredelivered each morning to the EOC. EOC personnel performing dose assessment have access to both theonline and printed WWIS radiological data. Additionally, WP 12-ER4916, Consequence AssessmentDose Projection,19 has an attachment that contains a list of radiological MAR for events described in thisCH DSA and the CH EPHA5 that can be used for initial dose assessment.


15-6 November 2006

15.4.2.4 Acquisition of Meteorological Information

The WIPP site meteorological monitoring tower is located approximately 1,970 feet northeast of theWaste Handling Building. Instrumentation on the tower measures and records wind speed, winddirection, and temperature at elevations of 2, 10, and 50 meters. The data is displayed in the CMR and inthe EOC. WP 12-ER491619 is performed in the EOC, and personnel performing the procedure haveaccess to the meteorological information.

15.4.2.5 Estimation of Source Terms and Release Rates

Initial estimates of source terms are determined based on the MAR as identified in the WWIS data orAttachment 4 to WP 12-ER4916.19 Initial estimates of release rates are determined from the airbornerelease fractions and respirable fractions listed in Attachment 4 of WP 12-ER4916.19

Initial consequence assessment is performed as soon as the EOC is activated and a radiological engineerhas reported to the EOC. Consequence assessment is calculated as soon as more definitive informationconcerning the MAR is received; a greater than 0.5 meter/second wind speed change occurs; or a changein the atmospheric stability class occurs; or thirty minutes elapses since the last calculation.

15.4.2.6 Estimation of Dispersion and Dose Rates

GXQ 4.0,20 a Gaussian straight line plume model based computer program, is used to calculateatmospheric dispersion and dose. Radiological release dose to the public calculations are performed inaccordance with WP 12-ER4916.19

15.4.3 Notification

WIPP procedure WP 12-ER3904,16 provides the instructions for the FSM or designee to determine if anevent at the WIPP is to be categorized as an operational emergency and, if required, classified as anAlert, Site Area Emergency (SAE), or General Emergency (GE). The classifications are required whenan event has the potential to expose site personnel or the public to hazardous/radioactive materialsoutside the immediately involved facility. If the event is classified as an Alert, SAE, or GE, procedureWP 12-ER3904,16 provides instructions for notifying the required external agencies.

If the event is a hazardous/radioactive materials operational emergency, initial consequence assessment isperformed to determine the classification of the event. The FSM may direct the EOC or JointInformation Center (JIC) to complete Table 1 of procedure WP 12-ER390416 with the most currentinformation, and provide to the EOC Crisis Manager for distribution in accordance with procedure WP12-ER3002.17 WP 12-ER3904,16 provides instructions for initial notifications, follow-up notifications,and external agencies notification for operational emergencies.

15.4.4 Emergency Facilities and Equipment

15.4.4.1 Emergency Facilities

Central Monitoring Room - The CMR, located in Building 451 (Figure 2.4-1), provides an initial focalpoint for emergency actions, including communications and response activities. The FSM is located inthe CMR where the Central Monitoring System (CMS) is located. The function of the CMS is describedin detail in Section 2.8.3.1.


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Emergency Operations Center (EOC) - The EOC is the facility used by the crisis management teamand CM to evaluate, perform consequence analysis and assist the FSM as necessary during theemergency. The EOC is located in Building 452 (Figure 2.4-1).

On-Site Alternate EOC - The On-Site Alternate EOC is in the Guard and Security Building, which is asecured area. In the event the primary EOC cannot be activated, the FSM will direct the CMRO toactivate the On-Site Alternate EOC.

Off-Site Alternate EOC - The Off-Site Alternate EOC is located in the Skeen Whitlock Building inCarlsbad, New Mexico. In addition to its primary purpose of serving the needs of WIPP, the off-siteEOC may provide assistance to the city of Carlsbad, Eddy County, and the state of New Mexico ifassistance is requested as part of the MOUs with these entities.

Joint Information Center - The JIC, located at the Skeen-Whitlock Building, provides the PublicAffairs Management Team a gathering place for generating information during emergency situations, andis activated as needed. The JIC provides a central location for the coordination and dissemination ofemergency pubic information to the media and public.

15.4.4.2 Emergency Equipment

Some of the emergency equipment at the WIPP site include a fully-equipped pumper engine, a brush firetruck, a surface ambulance, with capabilities to respond to off site emergencies and an undergroundambulance. The surface emergency equipment is stationed in the Safety building. A detailed list ofWIPP emergency equipment appears in Attachment F of the Hazardous Waste Facility Permit No.NM4890139088-TSDF.6

Emergency Management conducts regular inspections of emergency facilities using a checklist todocument the inspections. The site commitment tracking system (CTS) is used to tract the completion ofinspections of EOC equipment, alternate EOC equipment, DOE equipment provided to Carlsbad MedicalCenter and Lea Regional Medical Center according to the MOUs. In addition, periodic inspections of theemergency response radio, pager, and plectron systems are conducted.

15.4.5 Protective Actions

Protective actions are measures, such as evacuation or sheltering, taken to prevent or minimize potentialhealth and safety impacts on workers, responders, or the public.

WIPP procedure WP 12-ER3904,16 provides the instructions for the FSM or designee to determine if anevent at the WIPP is to be categorized as an operational emergency and, if required, classified as anAlert, SAE, or GE. If the event is classified as an Alert, SAE, or GE, procedure WP 12-ER3904,16 isused to identify the EALs and the protective actions required for each type of event classification.

For hazardous materials operational events, additional protective actions such as decontamination, accesscontrol, and others may be applicable. Once the level of hazard is identified and the consequences of arelease are identified, the consequences are compared to the EALs so that the actions necessary to protectthe health and safety of the workers and the public can be determined. The CH EPHA5 provides ananalysis of those hazards and consequences resulting in the development of preplanned protectiveactions. Additional protective actions are developed as needs are identified. These are then directlylinked to the categorization/classification process so that the issuance of protective actions is automaticupon declaration of an Operational Emergency. The protective actions, including sheltering in place, or


15-8 November 2006

site evacuation, are specified for each accident or malevolent act identified in the CH EPHA5 and inprocedure WP 12-ER3904.16

Once continuous consequence assessment is started and additional information is acquired about theevent, including the actual release and status of mitigation of the event, reevaluation of protective actionswill begin. The re-evaluation of protective actions/recommendations is a product of continuousconsequence assessment and is performed throughout the response. The evaluation of habitability forareas being used by responders and sheltered personnel is part of the continuing evaluation for protectiveactions.

15.4.6 Training and Exercises

Emergency management training consists of formal classroom instruction, self-paced training modules,on-the-job training, drills and exercises. Assigned individuals participating in emergency managementmust be trained before they are allowed to assist in emergencies.

The Emergency Management Section coordinates and conducts a variety of drills and exercises. Acoordinated program of drills and exercises enhances the ability of specialized teams and individualpersonnel to respond to potentially adverse situations. A full participation exercise is conducted annuallyto demonstrate an integrated emergency response capability. The integrated exercise includes federal,state, local, regulatory, and/or emergency response organizations which may include DOE/Headquarters,DOE-AL, and CBFO participants.

15.4.7 Recovery and Reentry

The recovery phase of an emergency is that portion of the response designed to restore order to theaffected area. Recovery may involve cleaning up the emergency scene, securing the scene forinvestigation purposes, or restoring the area to pre-emergency conditions.

Recovery teams must be formed at the completion of the emergency phase of an incident. The FSMappoints a recovery team leader who then identifies the recovery team members. The makeup of therecovery team will be comprised of individuals with the expertise to evaluate and investigate theemergency and to secure the area or return it to pre-emergency conditions.

Reentry is a planned activity to accomplish a specific objective that involves reentering a facility oraffected area that has been evacuated or closed to personnel access during the course of the emergency. Reentry planning includes contingency planning to ensure the safety of reentry personnel. Allindividuals involved in reentry receive a hazards/safety briefing prior to emergency reentry activities,consistent with federal, state, and local laws and regulations. The FSM must approve all reentry plans. All reentry activities must be authorized with written approval of doses/exposures that may exceedoccupational or administrative limits.

Guidance for the reentry and recovery following an emergency is based on regard for human life, andconditions existing at the time. The recovery process detailed in WP 12-ER3903, Event Recovery,21

evaluates the proposed actions by comparing the risks of the hazards to the actual or potential benefits tobe gained.


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1. WP 12-9, WIPP Emergency Management Program.

2. DOE Order 151.1C, Comprehensive Emergency Management System, November 2005

3. DOE G151.1-1, Emergency Management Guide, August 1997

4. WP 12-RP.01, Emergency Planning Hazard Survey for the Department of Energy WasteIsolation Pilot Plant Report

5. DOE/WIPP-02-3286, Waste Isolation Pilot Plant Contact-Handled Waste HandlingEmergency Planning Hazards Assessment

6. Hazardous Waste Facility Permit No. NM4890139088-TSDF Attachment F, issued by theNew Mexico Environment Department

7. WP 12-ER, Emergency Response Procedures

8. Manual of Protective Action Guides and Protective Actions for Nuclear Incidents,U.S. Environmental Protective Agency, 1992

9. DOE Order 232.1A, Occurrence Reporting and Processing of Operations Information, August2003

10. 40 CFR Part 264, Standards for Owners and Operators of Hazardous Waste Treatment,Storage, and Disposal Facilities, June 1993

11. 40 CFR Part 265, Contingency Plan and Emergency Procedures, Subpart D, May 1980

12. 40 CFR §265.37, Arrangements with Local Authorities, May 1980

13. 40 CFR §265.52 (c), Content of Contingency Plan, May 1980

14. 29 CFR §1910.120, Paragraph (p), Certain Operations Conducted Under the ResourceConservation and Recovery Act of 1976 (RCRA)

15. ERPG, Emergency Response Planning Guidelines, American Conference of GovernmentalIndustrial Hygienists, Threshold Limit Values for Chemical Substances, ACGIH

16. WP 12-ER3904, Categorization and Classification of Operational Emergencies

17. WP 12-ER3002, Emergency Operations Center Activation

18. 30 CFR Part 49, Mine Rescue Teams

19. WP 12-ER4916, Consequence Assessment Dose Projection

20. GXQ Program Users Guide, WHC-SD-SWD-3002, Rev.1A, B. E. Hey, December 1994

21. WP 12-ER3903, Event Recovery


15-10 November 2006



16-i November 2006

PROVISIONS FOR DECONTAMINATION AND DECOMMISSIONING

TABLE OF CONTENTS

SECTION PAGE NO.

16.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16-1

16.2 Requirements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16-1

16.3 Description of Conceptual Plans . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16-1



16-ii November 2006



16-1 November 2006

16.1 Introduction

The WIPP is designed and constructed in a manner that allows ease of decontamination anddecommissioning (D&D). During WIPP operations, the facility consists of surface structures, shafts, andsubsurface structures. The goal of D&D is to restore the surface area encompassing the WIPP site topreconstruction and preoperational conditions. Surface radiological levels will be returned to levelscommensurate with regulatory guidelines. Records of the WIPP will be listed in the public domain andmonuments or markers will exist at the site to inform future generations of the presence of the WIPPrepository.

16.2 Requirements

The WIPP was designed for a 35-year disposal phase, and will be decommissioned after wasteemplacement is completed (see DOE/NTP-96-1204, National TRU Waste Management Plan).1 TheHazardous Waste Facility Permit (HWFP)2 implements Resource Conservation and Recovery Act(RCRA) (42 United States Code §6901)3 regulations and assumes 25 years for disposal operations and 10years for closure. Congress and the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) have established post-operational requirements for the WIPP within the Land Withdrawal Act (Public Law 102-579)4;40 CFR Part 191, Environmental Standards for the Management and Disposal of Spent Nuclear Fuel,High-Level and Transuranic Radioactive Wastes, Subpart B, Standards for Disposal5; and40 CFR Part 194, Criteria for the Certification and Recertification of the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant'sCompliance with the 40 CFR Part 191 Disposal Regulations.6 How the DOE satisfies these requirementsfor the WIPP was described in DOE/WIPP 1996-2184, 40 CFR Part 191 Compliance CertificationApplication for the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (CCA).7 The EPA’s original approval of the CCA isdocumented in Criteria for the Certification and Recertification of the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant'sCompliance With the Disposal Regulations: Certification Decision, (63 Federal Register 27354-27406).8 The EPA recertified the WIPP facility on March 29, 2006, documented in Criteria for theCertification and Recertification of the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant's Compliance With the DisposalRegulations: Recertification Decision (71 Federal Register 18010-18021).9

Decommissioning requirements applicable to the WIPP are also included in DOE O 430.1B, RealProperty Asset Management,10 DOE O 435.1, Radioactive Waste Management,11 and DOE M 435.1-1,Radioactive Waste Management Manual.12 Additional requirements are included in the RCRA asimplemented in 40 CFR Part 264, Standards for Owners and Operators of Hazardous Waste Treatment,Storage, and Disposal Facilities,13 and 20.4.1.5 NMAC (New Mexico Administrative Code), HazardousWaste Management.14

16.3 Description of Conceptual Plans

The WIPP was designed and constructed to meet the requirements of DOE Order 6430.1, Criteria forDepartment of Energy Facilities,15 and incorporated structural and internal features that would facilitatethe safe and economical D&D of the facility. The current design features are consistent with therequirements in DOE M 435.1-1.12 The following features have been incorporated into the WIPP wastehandling surface structures:

• Coatings provide easily cleanable surfaces

• Cracks, crevices, and joints are sealed to prevent contamination spread to inaccessible areas


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• Exhaust filters at points of potential contamination minimize contamination of long sections ofduct work and downstream exhaust equipment

• Architectural or structural features allow the dismantlement and removal of equipment fromareas of contamination or potentially high radiation levels to other areas for decontamination,maintenance, or repair.

Activities associated with D&D involve three primary areas: surface structures, subsurface structures,and the shafts. The objective of the WIPP D&D is to return the surface to as close to the preconstructioncondition as reasonably possible, while protecting the health and safety of the public and theenvironment. Decontamination involves the removal or reduction of radioactive or hazardouscontamination from facilities, equipment, or soils by washing, chemical or electrochemical action,mechanical cleaning or other techniques to achieve a stated objective or end condition. Decommissioning is part of final facility closure only, and will involve the removal of equipment,buildings, closure of the shafts, and establishing active and passive institutional controls for the facility.

Detailed planning for D&D activities will begin prior to the actual initiation and will incorporatecurrently available technologies and prescribed decontamination limits consistent with 10 CFR Part 835,Occupational Radiation Protection16 or its equivalent at the time of closure. Surface structures will bedecontaminated in accordance with the requirements applicable at the time D&D activities take place andwill ensure that personnel and public exposure limits are maintained ALARA and within prescribedlimits. Dismantlement of the buildings will be consistent with the revision of the decommissioning plancurrent at the time of actual D&D activities.

D&D activities are discussed in DOE/WIPP 95-2072, Conceptual Decontamination andDecommissioning Plan for the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant,17 and in Attachment I of the HWFP.2 Activities include, but are not limited to:

• Review of operational records for historical information on releases

• Visual examination of surface structures for evidence of spills or releases

• Performance of site contamination surveys

• Decontamination, if necessary, of usable equipment, materials, and structures including surfacefacilities and areas surrounding the Waste Handling Building

• Disposal of equipment/materials that cannot be decontaminated but that meet waste acceptancecriteria in an Hazardous Waste Management Unit.

• Dismantling of surface facilities

• Dismantling of underground facilities at the time the panels are closed

• Emplacement of final panel closure system and emplacement of fill material in the underground,if required

• Emplacement of shaft seals to minimize the intrusion of fluids into the repository and anymigration of hazardous constituents from the underground


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• Regrading the surface to approximately original contours

• Initiation of active controls which includes monitoring and installation of a permanent markersystem.

Before final closure activities begin, health physics personnel will conduct a hazards survey of the unit(s)being closed. The presence of radionuclides could also indicate a presence of hazardous constituents. Ifradionuclides are not detected, sampling for hazardous constituents may still be performed if there isevidence that a spill or release has occurred. The results of the hazards survey will be used to identifyany control measures necessary to reduce worker risk from D&D activities. The survey will provide theinformation necessary to identify the worker qualifications, personal protective equipment, safetyawareness, work permits, exposure control programs, and emergency coordination for D&D activities.

A record of the WIPP Project will be listed in the public domain. Active institutional controls areprojected to continue for at least the first 100 years after the final facility closure. Postclosuresurveillance is projected to consist of periodic drive-by patrolling around the fenced perimeter, andinclude checks for fence and locked gate integrity and evidence of human activity. Postclosuresurveillance activity will be documented. A passive institutional control system consisting of monumentsor markers will be erected at the site to inform future generations of the WIPP repository location.

Detailed records will be filed with local, state, and federal government agencies to ensure that thelocation of the WIPP site is easily determined. This information together with land survey data will beon record with the United States Geological Survey and other agencies as provided by thedecommissioning plan. The DOE will maintain permanent administrative authority over those aspects ofland management assigned by law (i.e., by the permanent withdrawal legislation).

Further description of the institutional controls to be implemented after closure are found in Attachment Iof the HWFP.2

Once the permanent markers are installed, the active access control measures and surveillance will beevaluated for continued implementation. The physical surveillance requirements will be provided in thefinal decommissioning plan. Environmental surveillance after closure will include appropriate radiationmonitoring, soil, vegetation, Culebra groundwater monitoring, Delaware Basin surveillance, subsidencemonitoring, and wildlife sample analysis. Frequency and duration of the environmental surveillanceprogram will be defined in the final decommissioning plan as prescribed by standards applicable at thetime.


16-4 November 2006


1. DOE/NTP-96-1204, National TRU Waste Management Plan, Rev. 3, July 2002

2. Hazardous Waste Facility Permit No. NM4890139088-TSDF

3. 42 United States Code §6901, et seq., Resource Conservation and Recovery Act

4. Public Law 102-579, as amended Sept. 23, 1996 Public Law 104-201, Subtitle F, Waste IsolationPilot Plant Land Withdrawal Act

5. 40 CFR Part 191, Environmental Standards for the Management and Disposal of Spent NuclearFuel, High-level and Transuranic Radioactive Wastes, U.S. Environmental Protection Agency,September, 1985

6. 40 CFR Part 194, Criteria for the Certification and Re-Certification of the Waste Isolation PilotPlant's Compliance with the 40 CFR Part 191 Disposal Regulations, February, 1996.

7. DOE/WIPP 1996-2184, Title 40 CFR Part 191 Compliance Certification Application for theWaste Isolation Pilot Plant, October, 1996

8. Federal Register, May 18, 1998, Part III, Environmental Protection Agency, 40 CFR Part 194

9. Federal Register, April 10, 2006, Environmental Protection Agency, 40 CFR Part 194

10. 430.1B, Real Property Asset Management, October 2005

11. 435.1, Radioactive Waste Management

12. DOE M 435.1-1, Radioactive Waste Management Manual

13. 40 CFR Part 264, "Standards for Owners and Operators of Hazardous Waste Treatment, Storage,and Disposal Facilities," U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, May 19, 1980 and subsequentamendments

14. 20.4.1 NMAC, Hazardous Waste Management

15. 6430.1, General Design Criteria Manual for Department of Energy Facilities, December 1983

16. 10 CFR Part 835, Occupational Radiation Protection, December 14, 1993

17. DOE/WIPP 95-2072, Conceptual Decontamination and Decommissioning Plan for the WasteIsolation Pilot Plant, January 1995


17-i November 2006

MANAGEMENT, ORGANIZATION, AND INSTITUTIONALSAFETY PROVISIONS

TABLE OF CONTENTS

SECTION PAGE NO.

17.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17-1

17.2 Requirements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17-1

17.3 Organizational Structure, Responsibilities, and Interfaces . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17-117.3.1 Organizational Structure . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17-217.3.2 Organizational Responsibilities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17-217.3.3 Staffing and Qualifications . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17-5

17.4 Safety Management Policies and Programs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17-517.4.1 Safety Review and Performance Assessment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17-517.4.2 Configuration and Document Control . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17-717.4.3 Occurrence Reporting and Lesson Learned . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17-717.4.4 Safety Culture . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17-8



17-ii November 2006


LIST OF FIGURESFIGURE TITLE PAGE NO.

Figure 17.1-1, WIPP Operations Responsibility . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17-11


17-1 November 2006


17.1 Introduction

The objective of this chapter is to describe the management, organizations, and institutional safetyprovisions as they apply to the safe operation of the WIPP. This chapter also outlines the requirementsused to develop the safety management programs, includes descriptions of the responsibilities of andrelationships between the non-operations organizations having a safety function and their interfaces withthe operations organization. This chapter presents the following: (1) the overall structure of theorganizations and entities involved in safety-related functions not described earlier in this document,including key responsibilities and interfaces, and (2) the safety programs that promote safetyconsciousness and morale, including safety review and performance assessment, configuration anddocument control, occurrence reporting, and safety culture. The overall site management team isdescribed in Washington TRU Solutions LLC (WTS) Management Charter (MC) 1.6, Plant ManagementTeam.1

WIPP is managed and operated by Washington Group International Energy and Environment BusinessUnit, Washington TRU Solutions (WTS), LLC.

17.2 Requirements

The standards, regulations, and U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) Orders required for establishing thesafety basis for the WIPP specific to management, organization, and institutional safety provisionsinclude:

• 10 CFR Part 830, Nuclear Safety Management2

• 19 CFR Part 1910, Occupational Safety and Health Standards3

• 29 CFR Part 1926, Safety and Health Regulations for Construction4

• 30 CFR Part 57, Safety and Health Standards - Underground Metal and Nonmetal Mines5

• DOE Order 231.1A, Environment, Safety and Health Reporting6

• DOE Order 225.1A, Accident Investigations7

• DOE Order 420.1B, Facility Safety8

• DOE Order 425.1C, Startup and Restart of Nuclear Facilities9


• DOE Order 5480.19, Conduct of Operations Requirements for DOE Facilities, Change 211

• DOE Order 5480.20A, Personnel Selection, Qualification, and Training Requirements for DOEFacilities, Change 112

• New Mexico Mine Safety Code for All Mines, 199013

17.3 Organizational Structure, Responsibilities, and Interfaces

Westinghouse Waste Isolation Division (Westinghouse TRU Solutions in 2001) managed and operatedthe WIPP for the DOE from October 1985 to January 2003. In January 2003 the company changed itsname to WTS. WTS, as the management and operating contractor (MOC), provides the managementstaff, sets the safety culture, issues policies, and implements programs.


17-2 November 2006

WTS has access to corporate expertise in several disciplines including waste management, riskassessment, safety analysis, environmental services, technical and analytical services, regulatorycompliance, transportation, legal, quality assurance (QA), and others, as required.

Several committees have been formed to integrate information regarding environment, safety, health, andradiation protection activities at the various facilities served by Washington Group International (WGI)Energy and Environment Business Unit. The committees facilitate the sharing of solutions to commonproblems and issues. The WGI management team is supportive of WTS activities by participating incorporate reviews and audits of the WIPP activities, and by providing management attention, as needed.

17.3.1 Organizational Structure

WTS, as the MOC for The WIPP, is responsible for general management and operating services,including operational safety, engineering management, quality assurance and control, project control,construction management, and environmental services. As part of its responsibility, the MOC ensuresthat all inputs to facility operations are properly reviewed for health, safety, and environmentalimplications.

While responsible for all aspects of The WIPP, the DOE has contracted these scopes of work to variousorganizations. The MOC is responsible for managing the current and future construction contracts, andfor operating the WIPP, including day-to-day operations and waste handling operations.

The WTS executive staff defines roles and responsibilities to ensure effectiveness of communicationduring work planning and execution. The WTS General Manager (GM) is responsible for managing thecompany and guiding the management team toward the safe performance of all work. The GM isultimately responsible for safe accomplishment of work and leads in setting the company standards andexpectations for all work under this contract. Other members of the executive staff include: TheAssistant GM of Site Operations and Disposal; Assistant GM of Retrieval, Characterization andTransportation; Chief Financial Officer and Manager of Business Management, Chief Nuclear Engineerand Manager of Engineering; Quality Assurance Manager; Safety and Health Manager; StrategicPlanning; Internal Audit Manager; External Programs Manager; Manager of Environmental Permitting,Compliance and Monitoring and General Counsel. The WTS GM is responsible for chartering the WTSPlant Management Team to be responsible for implementation of the Integrated Safety ManagementSystem (ISMS). The WTS Plant Management Team members are identified in MC 1.6.1 Managementfunctions are performed according to management policies and requirements defined in the operatingcontract. Managers are directed to perform field observations and communicate directly with employeesand line managers to assess the effectiveness of WTS department managers in applying company safetyand environmental standards and requirements.

17.3.2 Organizational Responsibilities

The WTS GM has delegated specific responsibilities to executive staff members for the following TheWIPP functions:

• Safety and Health - Radiation safety, industrial safety and hygiene, facility emergencymanagement; dosimetry; and environmental protection

• Regulatory Compliance - Environmental monitoring; regulatory compliance


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• Surface Operations and Maintenance - Operation, control, and maintenance of surface structures,systems, and components (SSCs), including utilities (electrical, water, sanitary waste) and wastehandling equipment; interface with offsite suppliers of electrical and water services

• Waste Operations - Handling and storing radioactive waste on-site

• Mine Operations - Transporting salt on the surface and below ground; underground operationsincluding mining and hoisting; operation and control of underground structures, systems, andcomponents

• Hoisting Operations - Inspections, maintenance and operations of the WIPP site’s shafts andhoists

• Mine Maintenance - Maintenance of underground structures, systems, and components, including electrical services for waste handling and disposal, and mining operations

• Regulatory Compliance - Transporting hazardous material off-site

• Engineering - Design of new or modification to structures, systems, and components; review ofdesigns proposed by other project participants; resolution of technical, maintenance, andoperational problems; and configuration control

• Quality Assurance - Identification, development and definition of quality requirements;interpretation and implementation of QA program elements; performance of assessments andaudits; review Federal Register; and review DOE Orders

• Project Analysis & Control - Planning and scheduling; integrating technical programs, programdevelopment and program reporting, strategic planning and long term budget development;analyzing performance; and recommending work scope priorities

• Business Management - Financial resources, accounting, material and property control,document and procedure review, and procurement services

• Nuclear Safety - Criticality safety, development of documented safety analyses (DSAs) andtechnical safety requirements (TSRs), development and maintenance of the unreviewed safetyquestion (USQ) process

• Human Resources (Training) - Coordination of personnel-related functions supporting facilitysafety, operations, planning and implementing the general employee technical training programs,and certifying/qualifying the operating staff

• External Communications - Public information programs, governmental affairs, technicaloutreach and communications; The WIPP web page, visitor's program at The WIPP,identification and resolution of issues between the WIPP Project and outside institutions

• Transportation - External Emergency Management to prepare emergency response personnelbordering the WIPP transportation routes


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Integrated Safety Management System (ISMS)

The WIPP's mission is to dispose of transuranic waste in an environmentally sound and safe manner. While accomplishing this mission, protection of the environment, the public, and the safety and health ofemployees is the number one priority for the conduct of operations. WTS conducts nuclear, industrial,occupational health, safety, environmental protection, and emergency management activities incompliance with the requirements and intent of applicable federal, state, and local regulations andprocedures. Among the drivers are requirements of the DOE, the Occupational Safety and HealthAdministration, the Mine Safety and Health Administration, the U.S. Environmental Protection Agencyand the New Mexico Environment Department.

ISMS mechanisms are the means by which the safety management functions are implemented andperformed. Charters, policies, manuals, plans, procedures, reports, walk around inspections, planningmeetings, critiques, and feedback meetings are all mechanisms used at the WIPP for implementing theISMS. Details regarding the specific mechanisms used by the WIPP to perform work safely areidentified in DOE/CBFO 98-2276, Integrated Safety Management System Description.14

WTS management policy MP 1.28, Integrated Safety Management,15 requires WTS to systematicallyintegrate safety into program management and work practices at all levels of the organization toaccomplish the WIPP mission while protecting the workers, the public, and the environment. Employeesare accountable for identifying and reporting potential hazards and for being involved in implementingsolutions, including suspending work, if necessary to prevent serious injury to personnel or damage toequipment. Managers are accountable for preplanning and involving employees in the preplanningprocess. Managers are responsible for ensuring the safe performance of work and for conductingworkplace inspections to ensure a safe work environment. Managers ensure that hazards are identifiedand mitigated.

WTS uses the following guiding principles as the basis for MP 1.2815 and its daily operation:

1. Line Management Responsibility for Safety - Line managers (section and group managers) areresponsible for the protection of the worker, the public, and the environment. A line manageris an individual who has the responsibility and the authority for getting the job done.

2. Clear Roles and Responsibilities - Clear and unambiguous lines of authority and responsibilityfor ensuring safety are established and maintained at all organizational levels.

3. Competence Commensurate with Responsibilities - Personnel possess the experience,knowledge, skills, and abilities necessary to discharge their responsibilities in a safe,environmentally sound manner.

4. Balanced Priorities - Resources are allocated effectively to address safety, environmental,programmatic, and operational considerations. Protecting the workers, the public, and theenvironment is the number one priority and consideration for the conduct of operations.

5. Identification of Safety Standards and Requirements - Before work is performed, theassociated hazards are evaluated and an agreed-upon set of safety standards and requirementsand mitigating actions is established which, if properly implemented, provide adequateassurance that the worker, the public, and the environment are protected from adverseconsequences. Work processes are continually assessed, and assessments are used to improvework practices.


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6. Hazard Controls Tailored to Work Being Performed - Administrative and engineering controlsto prevent and mitigate hazards are tailored to the work being performed and addressassociated hazards.

7. Operations Authorization - The safety standards and requirements to be satisfied foroperations to be initiated and conducted are clearly established and agreed upon.

17.3.3 Staffing and Qualifications

The WIPP plant management program for personnel selection, qualification, and training is conducted inaccordance with DOE O 5480.20A,12 resulting in trained and qualified personnel who can conductoperations in the various plant operations in a safe and efficient manner. WTS has established requiredmanagement training for designated WTS managers. The training requirements include (1) supervisoryskills training - leadership, interpersonal communication, responsibility and authority, motivation,problem analysis and decision making, fitness for duty, and administrative policies and procedures; and(2) management training - quality assurance and quality control, facility security and emergency plans,purchasing, material storage, facility modifications, environmental issues, budgeting, andnuclear/industrial/radiation safety. The WIPP management and supervisor training qualifications aredescribed in MP 1.40, Management and Supervisor Training Qualifications.16

WP 09, Engineering Conduct of Operations,17 specifies the training requirements for the WIPP sitecognizant system engineers. The cognizant system engineer concept is defined by DOE Order 420.1B.8

The WIPP technical training department has a Training Implementation Matrix (TIM)18 as required byDOE Order 5480.20A.12 The TIM18 defines the administration of qualification and training programs,and establishes the responsibility, authority, and methods for implementing those programs. The TIM18

describes the operating organization and lists each position that is subject to DOE Order 5480.20A12 andincludes a matrix that shows the status of training and qualification programs relative to the requirementsof DOE Order 480.20A.12

17.4 Safety Management Policies and Programs

17.4.1 Safety Review and Performance Assessment

The WIPP safety elements are periodically reviewed. The WIPP MOC ensures that applicableenvironment, safety, and health requirements are met according to 10 CFR §830.204, Documented SafetyAnalysis.19 The review focuses on the functional areas within the safety program including: industrialsafety, fire protection, and hazardous material control. Feedback information on the adequacy of controlsis gathered; opportunities for improving the definition and planning of work are identified andimplemented; line and independent oversight is conducted.

Assessments

An integrated assessment process is used by WTS for conducting overall safety assessment of The WIPPactivities. Important components of the assessment program are management assessments andindependent assessments. Both types of assessments are delineated in WP 13-1, Washington TRUSolutions LLC Quality Assurance Program Description.20 Management assessments are planned andperformed as an ongoing activity where a manager assess the performance of their organization to verifyconformance to applicable requirements and to identify opportunities to improve safety and performance. Independent assessments are conducted to evaluate compliance with applicable QA requirements andimplementing procedures.


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Safety Reviews

WTS annually prepares a comprehensive ISMS report for WTS management review. It determines theeffectiveness of the ISMS and includes self-assessments and other evaluations performed by WTS. Areas of improvement are identified, reported and tracked to closure via the WTS Commitment TrackingSystem. This mechanism helps the team review not only the effectiveness of individual components butalso the effectiveness and integration of the entire ISMS.

WTS measures the effectiveness of ISMS through both leading indicators and quantitative safetyperformance. WTS regularly monitors basic leading indicators, such as management commitment tosafety, employee involvement in safety, prevention and control of hazards, work site safety analysis, andsafety training. Some additional specific leading indicators include the lessons learned program, resultsof internal and external inspections and evaluations, and closure of safety-related corrective actions.

Quantitative safety performance monitored at The WIPP include the following:

• Industrial Safety - Recordable case rates; days away, restricted, or transferred

• Radiation Protection - Worker radiation exposure, contamination events

• Conduct of Operations - Procedural violations or inadequacy

• Environmental Protection - Reportable environmental release events, annual trending reports,and environmental assessment results

• Authorization Bases - Technical safety requirement violations

• Fire Protection - Impaired or defective fire protection/detection systems

• Equipment Maintenance - Status of preventive maintenance and corrective maintenance

• Security - Security incidents, violations, and infractions

• Transportation Management - Incidents/accidents related to CH waste transportation

Nuclear Safety Reviews

WP 02-AR3001, Unreviewed Safety Question Determination (USQ),21 implements the requirements of10 CFR § 830.203, Unreviewed Safety Question Process.22 The procedure includes screening criteria todetermine if a proposed activity requires further evaluation; identification of the training requirements forscreeners, evaluators, and independent reviewers; documentation requirements; and identification of thesafety basis documents.

Temporary or permanent changes proposed for the WIPP facility as described in the DSA, changes to thewaste handling process/equipment, changes to the waste form, changes to the waste configuration,procedure changes, proposed engineering changes, and discovery issues are screened and/or evaluated byqualified personnel using WP 02-AR3001.21 Proposed changes are reviewed against the DSA and TSRs.


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A safety evaluation documents any change, as mandated by 10 CFR § 830.203.22 Positive USQdeterminations are reviewed by the Nuclear Review Board prior to submittal to DOE for approval.

17.4.2 Configuration and Document Control

WP 0917 implements configuration management requirements through the WP 09 series of procedures. WP 0917 and implementing WP 09 series procedures includes requirements for design reviewdocumentation, system design descriptions, component labeling, as builts, etc.

The WIPP procedures are written to WP 15-PS.2, Procedure Writer's Guide,23 which references steps forprocedure writing found in DOE-STD-1029-92, DOE Writer's Guide for Technical Procedures.24 Modifications to operating procedures resulting from an engineering change order are controlled andimplemented through WP 15-PS3002, WTS Controlled Document Processing.25 The process for review,approval, and cancellation of The WIPP documents is controlled. Changes to procedures identified orreferenced in the DSA are evaluated using WP 02-AR3001.21 New and cancelled procedures aresubjected to the USQ process.

17.4.3 Occurrence Reporting and Lesson Learned

The occurrence reporting process at The WIPP is directed by DOE Order 231.1A.6 The WIPPoccurrence reporting implementing procedure is WP 12-ES3918,26 Reporting Occurrences in Accordancewith DOE Order 232.1A. This occurrence reporting procedure provides for reporting events to the FSMor his designee for categorization.

An occurrence report is initiated by and applies th the activities, projects, and operations of The WIPPand/or subcontract employees. Occurrence reporting directives require that notifications be timely inaccordance with the significance of the occurrence and that written reports contain appropriateinformation describing the occurrence, significance, causal factors, and corrective actions. The DOE iskept fully informed on a timely basis of events that could adversely affect the health and safety ofworkers, the public, and environment.

Examples of events that should be reported include, but are not limited to the following: events thatcould endanger or adversely affect personnel safety or operations, or are contrary to DOE requirements. In addition, the procedure requires the event to be investigated to determine the direct cause, root causeand contributing causes, and to develop corrective actions to prevent recurrence. Trending of occurrencereport information is performed to determine if there is a common causal factor or a series of causalfactors. Identifying the causal factor(s) facilitates corrective actions.

The WIPP Lessons Learned Program was established as required by DOE Order 5480.19,11 and isimplemented by WTS Management Charter MC 9.20, Lessons Learned Working Group.27 The LessonsLearned Working Group is empowered to administer the Lessons Learned Program and promotecontinuing improvement in plant safety and reliability. Lessons learned bulletins are developed frominformation obtained from DOE Safety Notices, Nuclear Regulatory Commission Bulletins, externaloccurrence reports, internal occurrence reports, internal investigative reports, and other pertinent industrydocuments. Lessons learned bulletins are distributed to The WIPP managers for inclusion into theirrequired reading, as applicable.


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17.4.4 Safety Culture

A safe working environment is the priority at The WIPP. Individuals responsible for performing workare continually evaluating their safety, the environment, and the facility. This philosophy is directedfrom the top down within the organization.

The management approach to occupational health and safety at The WIPP emphasizes the integration ofsafety into all aspects of the WIPP. The WIPP management has communicated its expectations of sitepersonnel and subcontractors regarding safety through policies, procedures, and programs. Seniormanagement infuses the principles of safety to mid-management, mid-management to line management,and this continues until every employee incorporates safety principles into their job.

Top management is visibly involved in safety and health programs by establishing goals, approvingmanagement policies, providing accountability mechanisms, implementing site tracking systems,participating in employee communications, reviewing injury/illness trends, reviewing safety and healthsummaries, and providing resources to perform jobs safely. Management support is evidenced by theWIPP Voluntary Protection Program (VPP) Star recognition, awarded by the DOE to the WIPP becauseof the comprehensive health and safety program. "VPP Star" status was first awarded to the WIPP in1994 based on the VPP application,28 and has been retained to date. The DOE VPP encouragesrecognition of successful leading-industry injury and illness prevention programs that result in reducingworkplace hazards. The WIPP safety program elements including training, employee involvement,management commitment, and hazard prevention and controls were reviewed during the VPP applicationand recertification process.

A strong safety culture is a prerequisite and key to the effective integration of safety into all phases ofwork planning and execution. This core value of safety is fundamental to every work activity at theWIPP and is the basis for the continued growth and strength of this safety culture. WTS commitment toperform work safely is described in MP 1.28, Integrated Safety Management.15


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1. MC 1.6, Plant Management Team

2. 10 CFR Part 830, Nuclear Safety Management

3. 19 CFR Part 1910, Occupational Safety and Health Standards

4. 29 CFR Part 1926, Safety and Health Regulations for Construction

5. 30 CFR Part 57, Safety and Health Standards - Underground Metal and Nonmetal Mines

6. DOE Order 231.1A, Environment, Safety and Health Reporting. June 2005

7. DOE Order 225.1A, Accident Investigations, November 1997

8. DOE Order 420.1B, Facility Safety, December 2005

9. DOE Order 425.1C, Startup and Restart of Nuclear Facilities, March 2003



12. DOE Order 5480.20A, Personnel Selection, Qualification, and Training Requirements for DOENuclear Facilities, Change 1, July 2001

13. New Mexico Mine Safety Code for All Mines, 1990

14. DOE/CBFO 98-2276, Integrated Safety Management System Description


16. MP 1.40, Management and Supervisor Training Qualifications

17. WP 09, Engineering Conduct of Operations

18. Training Implementation Matrix (TIM), Rev. 6. Waste Isolation Pilot Plant, Technical TrainingDepartment. Access Date: March 15, 2005

19. 10 CFR Part 830.204, Documented Safety Analysis


21. WP 02-AR3001, Unreviewed Safety Questions Determination

22. 10 CFR Part 830.203, Unreviewed Safety Question Process

23. WP 15-PS.2, Procedure Writer's Guide


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24. DOE-STD-1029-92, Writer's Guide for Technical Procedures, Change 1, December 1998

25. WP 15-PS3002, WTS Controlled Document Processing

26. WP 12-ES3918, Reporting Occurrences in Accordance with DOE Order 231.1A

27. MC 9.20, Lessons Learned Working Group

28. Westinghouse Electric Corporation, Waste Isolation Division Voluntary Protection ProgramApplication, 1994


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Figure 17.1-1, WIPP Operations Responsibility


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