Washington Consensus

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WASHINGTON CONSENSUS International Political Economy POSC 128 3:00-4:30 MW Daniel Alantraca Renee Dominique Rodelas Justin Leon Villarante

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A brief powerpoint presentation on the Washington Consensus

Transcript of Washington Consensus

  • WASHINGTON

    CONSENSUS

    International Political Economy

    POSC 128 3:00-4:30 MW Daniel Alantraca

    Renee Dominique Rodelas

    Justin Leon Villarante

  • LATIN AMERICAN DEVELOPMENT

    1930s 1970s

    - Latin America (esp. Brazil and Mexico)

    - Short term success

    - Long term failure

    Country 1960 1975 1975 - 1989

    Brazil 4.57% 1.27%

    Mexico 3.37% 0.76%

    per capita GDP growth rates

  • LATIN AMERICAN DEVELOPMENT

    Import Substitution Industrialization (ISI)

    Replace imports with local production:

    State direction of investment and production

    Tariffs, quotas and trade barriers

    Infant industries

    Logic: Disengagement Juan Peron President of Argentina (1946-1955)

    Early adopter of ISI

  • LATIN AMERICAN DEVELOPMENT

    Problems with ISI

    Regulation

    Efficiency of infant industries

    High cost of imported goods

    Oil Crisis

    Debt Crisis Celso Furtado and Brazil President Luiz Inacio Lula da Silva (2004)

    Furtado is widely credited as one of the founders of ISI

  • THE WASHINGTON CONSENSUS

    Term coined by John Williamson in 1980

    Basic reforms envisioned by the World Bank, IMF

    and US Treasury

    Department

    Rejection of ISI

    Initial focus on Latin America, but expands.

    When I first formulated the

    Washington Consensus, it

    really wasnt as a prescription of

    development. It was a list of

    policies that I

    claimed were widely held in Washington to

    be widely desirable in

    Latin America.

  • THE WASHINGTON CONSENSUS

    Emphasis on a macroeconomic (particularly fiscal) discipline, a market economy and openness to the world economy (at least with

    respect to trade and foreign direct investments).

    Privatize state

    enterprise

    Reduce govt

    regulation

    Control inflation

    Keep money supply tight

    Set prices free

    Foreign investment will

    flow in and produce

    prosperity, creating

    development.

  • THE TEN ELEMENTS OF THE WASHINGTON CONSENSUS

    Fiscal discipline Public

    expenditure priorities

    Tax reform Interest rate liberalization

    Competitive exchange rate

    Trade liberalization

    Liberalization of inflows of

    foreign direct investment (FDI)

    Privatization

    Deregulation Secure property

    rights

  • THE WASHINGTON CONSENSUS

    1. FISCAL DISCIPLINE

    Economic stability as foundation for economic growth.

    Price stability essential for economic stability.

    Price stability undermined by large budget deficits (through inflation).

    Therefore, establishing fiscal discipline is essential.

    Inflation is the general decline in the purchasing value of money;

    a general increase in the price of goods.

  • THE WASHINGTON CONSENSUS

    2. REDIRECTION OF PUBLIC EXPENDITURE PRIORITIES toward fields

    offering both high economic returns and the potential to improve

    income distribution such as primary health care, primary

    education and infrastructure

    Original formulation: Cut public spending across the board

    Reformulation: Redirect public spending in a pro-poor, pro-

    growth way.

    Non-merit subsidies: cannot be rationalized either in terms of

    offsetting externalities or improving income distribution.

  • THE WASHINGTON CONSENSUS

    3. TAX REFORM

    Broaden tax base

    Cut marginal tax rates

  • THE WASHINGTON CONSENSUS

  • THE WASHINGTON CONSENSUS

    Liberalization of

    4. INTEREST RATES: should ideally be market-determined

    6. TRADE RULES

    7. FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT: by reducing barriers

    9. DEREGULATION: abolition of regulations that impede the entry of

    new firms or restrict competition (except in the areas of safety,

    environment and finance)

    Economic Liberalization: A general reduction in the role of the

    government in the economy, generally encompassing reducing

    barriers to trade, foreign direct investment and broader state

    regulation.

  • 5. COMPETITIVE EXCHANGE RATES

    THE WASHINGTON CONSENSUS

    8. PRIVATIZATION 10. PROTECTION OF PROPERTY RIGHTS

    export growth as key to economic growth cheaper exports; more expensive imports

  • CRITIQUES OF THE CONSENSUS

    Former Chief Economist (WB) Joseph Stiglitz

    When the IMF decides to assist a country, it dispatches a "mission" of economists. These economists frequently lack extensive experience in the country; they are more likely to have firsthand knowledge of its five-star hotels than of

    the villages that dot its countryside. They work hard, poring over numbers deep into the night. But their task is impossible. In a period of days or, at most, weeks, they

    are charged with developing a coherent program sensitive to the needs of the country. Needless to say, a

    little number-crunching rarely provides adequate insights into the development strategy for an entire nation.

  • CRITIQUES OF THE CONSENSUS

    Former Chief Economist (WB) Joseph Stiglitz

    Even worse, the number-crunching isn't always that good. The mathematical models the IMF uses are

    frequently flawed or out-of-date. Critics accuse the institution of taking a cookie-cutter approach to

    economics, and they're right. Country teams have been known to compose draft reports before visiting. I heard stories of one unfortunate incident when team members

    copied large parts of the text for one country's report and transferred them wholesale to another. They might have

    gotten away with it, except the "search and replace" function on the word processor didn't work properly, leaving the original country's name in a few places.

    Oops

  • CRITIQUES OF THE CONSENSUS

    Former Chief Economist (WB) Joseph Stiglitz

    It's not fair to say that IMF economists don't care about the citizens of developing nations. But the older men who staff the fund--and they are overwhelmingly older men--

    act as if they are shouldering Rudyard Kipling's white man's burden. IMF experts believe they are brighter, more

    educated, and less politically motivated than the economists in the countries they visit. In fact, the

    economic leaders from those countries are pretty good--in many cases brighter or better-educated than the IMF staff, which frequently consists of third-rank students from

    first-rate universities. (Trust me: I've taught at Oxford University, MIT, Stanford University,

    Yale University, and Princeton University, and the IMF almost never

    succeeded in recruiting any of the best students.)

  • CRITIQUES OF THE CONSENSUS