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Was Zheng He a Colonialist? Tan Ta Sen

In recent years, some historians began to re-examine the nature and impact of

the Admiral Zheng He’s expeditions. Lectures, books and articles have been

published by scholars in China and outside China including Dr. Geoff Wade. These

publications have enriched our understanding of the subject under study. While most

writers argue the positive aspects of the Zheng He voyages, Dr. Wade chose to be

highly critical and is of the opinion that voyages were aggressive and colonialist in

nature – in fact, they constituted acts of aggression and invasion.

This essay examines some of the arguments presented by Dr. Wade in his

article published in the journal entitled “The Zheng He Voyages: A Reassessment” 1

and he reiterated his similar accusations in many seminars held at the Institute of

Southeast Asian Studies in Singapore and elsewhere in Malaysia. Wade accused

Zheng He and Emperor Yongle of systematically pursuing a so-called southern

expansion programme in a three-pronged strategy:

1. Zheng He’s voyages and Ming maritime proto-colonialism,

2. Ming invasion of Dai Viet (Annam),

3. Ming’s invasion and occupation of Yunnan. 2

1 Geoff Wade, “The Zheng He Voyages: A Reassessment” in JMBRAS, Vol. LXXV!!! Pt. 1, 2005, 37-58 2 Ibid., 55.

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I. Were Zheng He and Emperor Yongle proto-colonialists?

The following section examines the records of Ming’s intentions and actions taken in

connection with the diplomatic relations between the Ming Court and surrounding

small states.

Ming Foreign Relations and Tributary Exhanges

Wade began his first argument that Zheng He’s missions were

“intended to create legitimacy for the usurping emperor, display the might of

Ming, bring the known polities to demonstrate submission to the Ming, and

thereby achieve a pax Ming throughout the known world and collect treasures

for the Court”.3

Emperor Yongle (Zhu Di) was indeed an usurper and he made great efforts to

legitimize his throne, but he was by no means an expansionist and colonialist. He

ascended to the throne by a revolt against his nephew, Emperor Jianwen, who was the

second Emporer of the Ming Dynasty. He was very conscious of the fact that he had

usurped the throne and was concerned with how history would view him and judge

his position in history. He would not want to be remembered as a usurper in history.

His throne’s legitimacy was of the utmost importance to him. When he captured

Nanjing in 1402, he promptly issued an imperial decree to declare himself as

3 Ibid., 45.

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Emperor Hongwu’s oldest son of the legal wife. He proceeded to make himself a

great Ming emperor so that he would leave a good legacy behind him. He chose

foreign lands as the stage to achieve his goal. Zheng He’s historic voyages were

aimed at expanding Ming China’s sphere of political influence as wide as possible in

the western ocean and into new frontiers from Southeast Asia to Africa. Ming China

under his reign had become the sole superpower in the world and the guardian of

world peace. Emperor Yongle through Zheng He had achieved his goal and he was

remembered favourably in history for being the only Chinese emperor who had made

China a global maritime super power in history. His towering historical image had

overshadowed his usurpation of the throne. He had created another Golden Age in the

history of China. However, his overseas glory was not achieved by invasion and

territorial conquest as claimed by Wade.

Right from the outset, Yongle had no ambition to colonize native states.

“Colonialism” is defined by Heywood as a “theory or practice of establishing control

over a foreign territory and turning into a ‘colony’. Colonialism is thus a particular

form of imperialism. Colonialism is usually distinguished by settlement and by

economic domination. As typically practiced in Africa and Southeast Asia, colonial

government was exercised by a settlement community from a ‘mother country’ who

were ethnically distinct from the ‘native population”.4 Foreign relations of the Ming

court, especially during the Zheng He period, cannot be fitted into such a concept.

4 Heywood, Andrew, Politics. London: McMillan, 1997. 116.

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Imperial China since the Qin dynasty had developed a Sino-centric world

view and world order. China was perceived as the centre of the universe, the Middle

Kingdom, and the emperor the Son of Heaven who presided over all-under-Heaven

(tianxia 天下) (Fairbank 1968b: 2). Under such a framework, China’s foreign

relations were hierarchical. The graded and concentric hierarchy of China’s foreign

relations with peoples and states were grouped by Fairbank under the following three

zones 5:

A. Sinic zone consisting of the most nearby states and culturally similar

tributaries such as Korea and Annam parts of which had anciently been ruled

within the Chinese empire in the past, and Ryukyu (now Okinawa).

B. Inner Asia zone consisting of tributary tribes and states of non-Chinese

nomadic or semi-nomadic peoples of Central Asia.

C. The outer zone consisting of the ‘outer barbarians’ (waiyi 外夷) further away

including states of Southeast Asia, South Asia, Japan and Europe that were

supposed to send tribute when trading. 6

According to Fairbank, China pursued a proactive interventionist approach in dealing

with states in zones A and B, respectively, by using military or administrative

control, and cultural or religious influence. However, towards the states in zone C,

5 Fairbank, John King 1968, “A Preliminary Framework,” in John King Fairbank, eds., The Chinese World Order – Traditional China’s Foreign Relations. Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press. 2.

6 Ibid.

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China used a non-interventionist approach through material interest such as trade and

imperial gifts, and diplomacy.

The early Ming emperors Hongwu and Yongle adopted this traditional

Chinese world order and China’s foreign relations framework especially in dealing

with Southeast Asian states. After ascending to the throne, Emperor Hongwu

implemented a diplomacy of peace and fraternity with all foreign states. This policy

was against the deployment of force when dealing with foreign states. He issued

decrees to his ministers prohibiting them from launching military action against

foreign native states.

The Veritable Records of the reign of Emperor Hongwu records, “The

Emperor held an audience at Feng-tian Gate (Nanjing Palace) and instructed the

Secretariat, Military Commission and Censorate officials saying: "Of the man and the

yi countries abroad, there are some which are dangerous to China. They must be

subject to suppression. However, we should not quickly raise troops against those

which are not dangerous to China. The ancients had a saying: `Expanding territory is

not the way to lasting peace. Troubling the people is the road to disorder.' For

example, Emperor Yang of the Sui dynasty raised troops and subjugated Ryukyu,

killing the yi people, burning their palaces and houses and taking several thousand

persons prisoner. He obtained the territory, but it could not provide even its own

needs. He obtained the people, but they could not be employed. He merely longed for

a name. Thereby, he brought disorder to China and was derided in the various

subsequent history books. I feel that as the various small man and yi countries are

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obstructed by mountains, are across the seas or are secluded in some corner, they do

not pose a danger to China. I will certainly not attack them. It is only the hu and the

rong of the Northwest who have for generations posed danger to China.We must

carefully guard against them. Ministers, you must bear my words in mind, so that you

will know my will.” 7

He further ordered his descendants not to invade neighbouring states in an

imperial ancestral edict which states,

“Foreign states are sited in remote corners. To acquire their lands is

unable to meet our needs. To acquire their peoples is unable to achieve

our mission. If they are not aware of their limitations and attack our

borders, they will be courting disaster. If they are harmless to China and

we mount military action against them, it will also be inauspicious. I am

afraid that my descendants might take advantage of China’s might to

invade others and harm peoples without cause and reason. So always

remember [this ancestral edict].” 8

In his imperial ancestral edict, Zhu Yuanzhang [Emporer Hung Wu, the

first Ming Emperor], warned his descendants that there would be no tangible

benefits from acquiring those remote undeveloped states. Wars that did break

out were caused either by ignorant states attacking China’s borders or by

Chinese invasion without any cause and would inevitably lead to great

7 Ming Taizu shilu: ch. 68. Geoff Wade tran.

8 Huangming Zuxun: Ming Huidian, opening chapter.

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damage. He wanted his descendants not to launch military campaigns against

neigbouring states. He went one step further to list 15 native states including

Japan, Korea, Ryukyu, Annam, Champa, Zhenla, Siam, Srivijaya, Java,

Pahang, Samudra and Brunei as countries not to be invaded.” 9 (Melaka was

not in existence then).

Emperor Yongle continued to implement the diplomacy of peace after

ascending to the throne. He dispatched Zheng He on voyages to the Western Ocean

on a mission of peace and good will. In 1409, he issued a decree to Zheng He which

clearly spelt out his good neighbourliness foreign policy. He stated in the decree,

“I now send Zheng He on a mission with this imperial decree. You all

should follow the heavenly path, obey the imperial order, restrain

yourselves and well-disciplined; you should neither break rules nor bully

the minority and the weak. Let everyone enjoy the happiness of peace. If

they come to the court to make tribute sincerely, reward them with gifts. It

is hereby proclaimed for everyone to note.” 10

From 1405 to 1433, Zheng He was conducting his mission according to the

Emperor’s directive on fostering good relationships with foreign states. As a supreme

maritime power, Ming China sent out powerful fleets but it harboured no ambition to

occupy native states visited by the fleet. In addition, under the tributary system, Ming

China and vassal states would exchange visits by envoys. Vassal states regularly paid

9 Huangming Zuxun: opening chapter; Ming Huidian, Chapter 105.

10 Family geneological record of Zheng He.

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tribute with foreign envoys commissioned by their kings or the kings themselves

making trips to China bringing with them gifts such as local produce, precious

products and exotic animals as a symbol of submission in return for China’s

recognition of sovereignty and protection. In return, the Ming court granted the

tribute missions rich imperial gifts. Zheng He’s missions brought along the imperial

decrees with valuable gifts such as mandarin hats, robes, gold and silver, porcelain

and silk for the native rulers. Whenever Zheng He visited a native state, he would call

on the ruler first and present him with valuable gifts and perhaps a Mandarin royal

hat, seal and robe to acknowledge and respect his high position. Ming China’s foreign

relations with Afro-Asian states were based on non-intervention and aimed to

establish a harmonious world.

In foreign t rade, Yongle forbade private foreign trade but he enforced a

state foreign trade policy. He reinstated the offices of the Commissioners for Foreign

Trade at Quanzhou, Guangzhou and Mingzhou (Ningpo) soon after his coronation in

1403. He also allowed foreign tribute missions to bring in private goods for tax-free

trading to be conducted within the official guest house, Hui Tong Guan, for three

days. In business t ransact ions, Zheng He appl ied Confucian ethics

such as t rust , integr i ty, amiabi l i ty and co-operat ion. His business

deals were based on a win-win formula which ref lected bestowing

valuable gifts worth more than what is received and valuing righteousness above

material gain. In carrying out diplomatic activities and foreign trade within the

tributary system, the Ming court was altruistic. It was obligatory on vassal states to

make regular tribute of local produce to the Ming court. Likewise, Ming emperors

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would return them with valuable gifts. When Ming envoys on mission abroad, they

would bring with them imperial decree and mandarin robes as well as valuable

presents such as silver, gold, porcelain and silk for the native rulers. Foreign envoys

or rulers making their tributary trips to the Ming court with such local produce and

rare and exotic animals like peacock and crane from Brunei, elephant and ivory from

Champa, elephant, coral and pepper from Siam, and giraffe, lion and pearls from

Hormuz. In return, the Ming court granted them gifts including tens of bales of silk,

thousands of porcelain pieces, and silver and gold. Hence, the foreign trade was not

in favour of the Ming court as Wade asserted but much in favour of the native states.

Noted historians shared the above observations on tributary relations and

tributary trade. Wang Gungwu observed,

“Obviously, from the emperor’s point of view, tributary relations were not to

be conducted for profits. What does need to be emphazised is the emperor’s

explicit policy of refraining from aggression against overseas countries. This

striking new feature of an entire defensive policy towards countries to the

south and east cannot be overemphasized. It not only confirmed the past

practices of the Han, Tang and Song empires and rejected those of the

Mongolian emperor Khubilai, but also established an important doctrine of

Ming foreign policy.11

11 Wang Gungwu, China and the Chinese Overseas. Singapore:: Eastern Universities Press,

1991, p. 56.

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Martin Stuart-Fox observed Southeast Asian states viewed “tribute”

differently from the official and orthodox Chinese concept of “tribute”. For the

Chinese tribute denoted not the transfer of economic resources, but symbolic

submission. However, for Southeast Asian rulers, tribute “paid” to China did not

carry the same connotation as tribute demanded from their own vassals, just because

more valuable gifts were given in exchange. What was tribute for the Chinese was for

Southeast Asian rulers the polite exchange of gifts as a formality that went with

mutually beneficial trade. The accompanying ceremonial established status of

hierarchy, but not vassalage in the Southeast Asian sense. It was acceptable for

envoys to show proper respect to the Chinese emperor, just as Chinese envoys, for

example, Zheng He, paid proper respect to Southeast Asian kings. 12

II. Guanchang – Supply and Trading Bases not Colonies

Wade also argued that guanchang (government depots) set up by Zheng He’s fleet

in strategic port cities such as Melaka were military bases or colonies. He wrote, “To

enable these great fleets to maintain the pax Ming in the immediate region and sail

through the Indian Ocean to Africa, it was necessary to create staging posts in what is

today Southeast Asia.”13

Along this wide and long maritime trade routes spreading from the Malay

Archipelago to East Africa, Zheng He’s fleets and sub-fleets called at major ports to

12 Martin, Stuart-Fox, A Short History of China and Southeast Asia: Tribute, Trade and Influence. NSW: Allen & Unwin, 2003. 53-54.

13 Wade, op. cit., 47.

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trade Chinese silk, tea and porcelain for local produce such as spices, medicinal

herbs, etc. with traders from all over the world. As each overseas operation was a

major one involving more than 200 ships and over 25,000 men and with large stocks

of provisions, water, imperial gifts, tributes, arms and weapons, gold and silver, silk,

tea and porcelain for trade, Zheng He had to set up strategic bases along the long

journey ranging from months and even years to serve as mid-way houses while

awaiting fair monsoon winds for home-bound voyages. Apparently, he divided his

overseas operation into four zones: Malay Peninsula, Indonesia Archipelago, South

Asia, and Arabia. He also identified four key ports of call within each zone as his

administrative centres: Melaka, Samudra, Calicut (also known as Guli in Chinese

sources) and Hormuz. These administrative centres were selected for their being

regional commercial hubs which could facilitate carrying out his two vital

diplomatic and foreign trade missions. Melaka being situated at the southern

entrance of the Strait of Melaka, Zheng He had long realized that Melaka would

become an important regional sea power in Southeast Asia. Samudra, also situated at

the northern entrance of the Strait of Melaka, was a busy port in the Indonesia

Archipelago in the Zheng He era. Ma Huan wrote, “At this place, there are foreign

ships going and coming in large numbers, hence all kinds of foreign goods are sold

in great quantities in the country.”14 Arab and Indian Muslim and Chinese traders

assembled here to conduct trade. Being close to the Strait of Melaka, Java and Spice

Islands, it was made the headquarter of Zheng He’s operation in the spice trade in

14 Ma Huan, Ying-Yai Sheng-Lan –The Overall Survey of the Ocean’s Shores. J.V.G. Mills tr. Bangkok:

White Lotus Press. 120.

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the Indonesia Archipelago zone covering Java, Spice Islands, Sumatra and Borneo.

Calicut in the western coast of India was Zheng He’s third trading base in South

Asia. Ma Huan wrote, “foreign ships from every place come here; and the king of

the country also sends a chief and a writer and others to watch the sales; thereupon

they collect the duty and pay it in to the authorities” 15 Ma Huan also told us that the

chief, the traders and the Eunach would engage in the negotiation of transactions in

the selling and buying of silk and local products16 . Arab Muslim traders

monopolized the trade between India and Europe. They provided the crucial links

between high-valued Asian products such as silk, porcelain and spices, and

European markets in the East-West international trade. Hormuz at the mouth of the

Persian Gulf was a flourishing commercial hub in Arabia. Zheng He set up his

fourth base there. Ma Huan witnessed in Hormuz “foreign ships from every place

and foreign merchants traveling by land all come to this country to attend the market

and trade; hence the people of the country are all rich.” 17 So Zheng He broke the

monopoly of the Arab and Indian Muslim traders by forming a regional trading base

in Hormuz to oversee the trade in Arabia and East Africa. 18 Meanwhile, his staff

also collected in these market places useful political and economic information like

trade methods, local products, local currency, political systems and market demand

for Chinese goods and the like.

15 Ibid., 143. 16 Ibid., 141. 17 Ibid. 165. 18 陈信雄,章乐绮，“忽鲁模斯－郑和远航的最远的基地”《郑和研究与活动简讯.期17

(03.2004),27-31.

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Zheng He set up these official warehouses (guanchang) in these trading bases

for the storage of goods and provisions. Ma Huan described the guanchang in Melaka

as follows :

“Whenever the treasure-ships of the Middle Kingdom arrived there, they at

once erected a line of stockading, like a city-wall, and set up towers for the

bell and drums at four gates. At night they had patrols of police carrying

bells. Inside they erected a second stockade, like a small city-wall, [within

which] they constructed warehouses and granaries [and] all the money and

provisions were stored in them. The ships which had gone to various

countries returned to this place, and loaded foreign goods and loaded them

in the ships, [then] waited till the south wind was perfectly favorable. In the

middle of the fifth moon they put to sea and returned home.”19

According to the description by Gong Zhen and Ma Huan, the guanchang was

obviously a warehouse. It has been a normal practice to guard warehouses with some

security measures, for example, deploying security guards.

III. Grand Fleet

Generally, each time when he set sail, his fleet consisted of more than two

hundred ships of which more than 60 were large and medium treasure ships, and

more than 28,000 crew members. The first expedition in 1405 was the grandest.

Zheng He mobilized more than 200 ships and 28,700 crew members. Wade is of the

19 Ma Huan, Mills tr., Ying-Yai Sheng-Lan –The Overall Survey of the Ocean’s Shores. J.V.G.

Bangkok: White Lotus Press, 1997: 113-114.

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opinion that, the majority of the ships were warships, and, the majority of the crew

were military men. He believed “it is likely that all of the missions carried something

in excess of 20,000 military men20. He added, “…with perhaps 26,000 out of 28,000

members of some missions being military men”.21 He has not disclosed his source of

information about the so-called “majority” claims. However, many historical sources

show that Zheng He’s fleets consisted of a variety of ships, for example, treasure

ships, supply ships, horse ships, water ships, troops ships and battleships but Wade

has suggested that the “majority” were warships and military men. In fact, there was

no strong maritime power within the trading zones of East Asia and Southeast Asia in

the 15th century that warranted Zheng He’ s bringing along a great number of

warships. At that time, the formerly great empires such as Majapahit of Java and

Srivijaya of Sumatra had already declined and even disintegrated into small states.

Meanwhile, in the vast ocean, piracy was rampant. If not supported by some troops,

Zheng He during his first voyage would have been defeated by the pirate chief Chen

Zuyi of Palembang. So, those military forces were meant for self-defence and to

protect the valuable gifts and commodities on board and not for invasion. They were

there simply to safeguard the safe journey of the fleet and safe passage of the trade

routes as well as to ensure efficiency in performing duties of the mission.

Wade strongly felt that Zheng He made effective use of such a large fleet to

carry out his missions through coercion in several ways. Wade singles out three key

coercion scenarios. Firstly, they were engaged to control ports and shipping lanes and

20 Wade, op.cit., 45.

21 Ibid., 51.

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hence controlled trade, an essential element for the missions’ treasure-collecting

tasks. The colonial armies manning these ships were the tool necessary to ensure that

the control was maintained. Thus, Wade claims “the Ming, through these maritime

missions, was engaged in what might be called maritime proto-colonialism”.22

Secondly, “such a force would have played a major threatening role” in coercing

foreign rulers to come to the Ming court.23 Thirdly, the armies were used to attack

native states.24 Unfortunately, these allegations were not substantiated by historical

facts.

On the so-called Ming’s maritime proto-colonialism, Wade said it “had its

equivalent in the later maritime colonialism of the fifteenth and seventeenth-century

Portuguese voyages” .25 This is a serious fallacy. The nature of Ming’s state foreign

trade and Portuguese (and also Spanish) Crown or royal trade were entirely different.

We have discussed earlier the need for Zheng He to set up strategic bases

along the long journey to serve as mid-way houses for storage of cargo and

provisions supply while awaiting fair monsoon winds for home-bound voyages. This

was an essential logistical move. More importantly, Zheng He did not monopolize

these markets but applied the Art of Collaboration to partner respective native rulers

and international traders on mutual-beneficial win-win formula to develop the

markets. Under his open and free market strategy, the key ports along the East-West

22 Ibid., 51.

23 Ibid., 47.

24 Ibid.

25 Ibid., 51.

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maritime highway like Melaka, Samudra, Calicut and Hormuz had become regional

and international commercial hubs. The rise of Melaka as a regional commercial hub

is a good example. Under Ming’s patronage, Melaka managed to free itself from

constant threat of invasions by Majapahit and Siam. Zheng He made Melaka his

regional headquarter to conduct regional diplomatic and entrepot trade activities in

Southeast Asia. It greatly enhanced Melaka’s position as the most important regional

entrepot trading centre in Southeast Asia. It attracted traders of all nationalities to

trade in Melaka. The Southeast Asian traders brought their spices and other local

produce to Melaka for re-export to other parts of the world. Indian and Arab traders

brought in European, Persian and Indian goods and commodities, and Zheng He’s

fleets came with Chinese tea, silks and porcelain. From 1434 to 1511, Melaka had

become the largest international collection and distribution hub of commodities and

entrepot trade centre in Southeast Asia.

In contrast, the Portuguese Crown also realized the importance to capture key

ports and shipping lines along the main East-West maritime highway in the 16th

century. However, it adopted a high-handed approach by showing its hard power to

force open the markets and eventually colonized Goa, Melaka and Macau by superior

warships and colonial armies. The Crown of Portugal claimed a tight monopoly on

the provision of ships for the Carreira, or passage to India, and on the trade in

precious metals from Portugal and imports of pepper and spices.26 M.N. Pearson

26 M.N. Pearson, “Merchants and States”, The Political Economy of Merchant Empires:

StatePower and World Trade, 1350-1750 edited by James D. Tracey. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991. 77.

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elaborated how the Portuguese Crown enforced its trade monopoly policy. No trade

in any product was to take place except in ships that had taken a pass from the

Portuguese, which in turn obliged these ships to call at Portuguese ports and pay

customs duties. This policy in Asia was backed up by extensive naval patrolling and a

string of ports around the littoral of the Indian Ocean, among them several of the

great port cities which included Melaka, Diu and Hormuz. 27 Pearson labelled this as

a protection racket. He described, “Basically a tribute was demanded from Asian

trade; the Portuguese created de novo a threat of violence to Asian shipping, and then

sold protection from this threat, as seen in the requirement to take passes and pay

custom duties. No service was provided in return, in modern terms this was precisely

a protection racket.”28 Under this monopoly policy, Melaka under the Portuguese

declined rapidly. Portuguese monopolistic economic policies chased away foreign

traders to trade in other rising commercial centres in Java and Sumatra. Zhang Xie

(1574-1640) had witnessed Melaka’s economic crisis and reluctance of Chinese junks

calling at Melaka in the late 16th century and early 17th century. He wrote that

Melaka’s commercial activity under Portuguese occupation was declining and

Chinese junks seldom called at Melaka because Chinese traders were always cheated

by the Portuguese. Hence, the Portuguese resorted to robbing Chinese junks by

intercepting them in the Strait of Melaka29. To sum up, Zheng He had not used

coercion as accused by Wade in opening up the key port cities. Instead, it was the

27 Ibid., 78.

28 Ibid., 79.

29 Zhang Xie (张燮), Dongxiyang Kao (东西洋考). 北京: 中华书局, 1981. 66-70.

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Portuguese who used coercion that led to the decline of these port cities. In 1511 the

population in Melaka was about 15,000 of them and after the war, 10,000 of them

were killed by the Portugese. However, in 1407 Zheng He fleet arrived with 28,700

people but none of the 3,000 population in Melaka were killed.

As regards Wade’s second allegation that foreign rulers were coerced to pay

tribute to the Ming court, it is equally unfounded. In fact, foreign rulers were attracted

by the favourable tributary trade to send tribute missions to the Ming court. Under

this imperial system, China and vassal states would exchange visits by missions. The

vassal states would pay tributes to China with their local produces regularly and in

return the Ming court would bestow handsome imperial gifts to vassal states. The

Ming missions would bring along the imperial decrees with valuable gifts such as

hats, robes, gold and silver, porcelains and silks. When the rulers of the vassal states

or their tribute missions came to the court, they would bring along local produces,

animals and rare curios, treasures or luxury goods to present to the Ming emperors.

These tributes included peacocks from Brunei, elephants, ivory and pepper from

Siam, and lions, pearls and Zebras from Hormuz. To show off China’s wealth and

greatness, the Ming emperors would return them with tens of silks and thousands of

porcelains. In terms of value, the exchange of gifts was absolutely unbalanced and

lopsided, very much in favour of the vassal states.

Besides tributes, foreign missions also benefitted tremendously from the

ensuing private trade following ceremonial diplomatic functions. After having made

tribute to the emperor, the Ming court allowed the tribute missions and its individual

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members to engage in trading activities within the compound of the official guest

house, Hui Tong Guan, for three days under the supervision of the Ming officials.

According to the tributary regulations as laid down by Emperor Hongwu, tribute

missions could bring in private goods for trading. The Ming government would

acquire 60 per cent of these goods at a price much higher than the market price. The

balance would then be traded in the market place, tax free.

Over the years, in order to increase foreign trade with the Ming Empire so as

to satisfy their demand for Chinese products, a few vassal states were found to have

abused their tributary privileges by sending tribute missions more frequently and with

larger entourages. The goods they purchased also exceeded their specified quota.

Consequently, the Emperor had to impose regulatory measures to curb such abuse by

regulating the frequency and duration of the tribute mission each vassal state could

send. Some would make tributes every three years and some every five years. It was

also stipulated that the tribute missions would proceed to the capital Nanjing via

Guangdong, Fujian and Zhejiang provinces and they could only stay at three cities,

Guangzhou, Quanzhou and Mingzhou. The number of ships, number of entourages

and the type of tributary items were also specified. To prevent fake or illegitimate

tribute missions from entering China for trading, all tribute missions were issued with

official identity documents. If foreign states had to be coerced as Wade claimed to

send tributary missions to the Ming court, it is extremely illogical for the Ming court

to impose regulatory measures on frequency, duration and size of tributary mission to

curb abuse. It is clear that it was the pull factor (substantial material gains made from

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the tributary trade) that was responsible for native states sending tributary missions to

the Ming court.

The third charge against Zheng He’s military actions taken in Java,

Palembang, Samudra and Sri Lanka was not justifiable. A Ming source, Shuyu

Zhoushilu by Yan Congjian, gives an account on Zheng He’s military action in Java

as follows:

“In the 4th year (1406) for the reign of Emperor Yongle, the Ruler of the

West sent tributes like pearls and coral while the East Ruler sent horses.

However, the two were at war, and the Ruler of the East was killed. At

that moment, our mission was passing through the city of the East Ruler,

the West Ruler killed 170 of our men. The West Ruler sent a messenger

to say that the East Ruler should not have been installed and had

therefore been killed. The West Ruler was severely reprimanded with a

decree. In the 5th year (1407) , the West Ruler Dumaban asked for

forgiveness and was prepared to compensate 60 thousand taels of gold.

He also consented to accession of the son of the East Ruler. It was

consented. In the 6th year (1408), the West Ruler Dumaban paid tribute of

10 thousand taels of gold as a token of apology for his wrongdoing. The

Minister of Rituals said that he had owed us 50 thousand taels of gold

and asked an official to deal with him in accordance with the law. The

Emperor noted, “it was sufficient if people in far lands feared punishment

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for their crimes. We were not interested in his gold! As long as he was

remorse for his crime, paying gold as compensation was not required.”30

The narration above reveals that Zheng He’s men were not willfully killed

and Zheng He had not sent troops to take revenge. He had just submitted the case to

seek the emperor’s decision. There was no military action, and certainly no

invasion.

On Zheng He’s capture of the notorious pirate, Chen Zuyi, in Palembang,

Ma Huan who accompanied him on the trip wrote,

“During the 5th year of the reign of Emperor Yongle (1407), the emperor sent

Eunuch Zheng He to lead a fleet of treasure ships and arrived at this place. A

certain Shi Jinqin, originally from Guangdong, reported the atrocities

committed by Chen Zuyi. He was arrested by Eunuch Zheng He and together

with others was brought back to imperial court for execution.”31

Similarly, the Ming Shi (The Official History the Ming Dynasty) records,

“During the 5th year (1407), Zheng He returned drom the West Ocean. The

emperor sent for him…Zuyi plotted to rob Zheng He by pretending to surrender. A

30 Yan Congjian (严从简)，Suyu Zhouzilu (殊域周咨录)..北京：中华书局, 2000. 294-5.

Ming Shih has similar narration.

31 Ma Huan (马欢), Yingya Shenglan (瀛涯胜览). 北京：中华书局,1955. 17.

22

certain Shi Jinqin informed Zheng He of the conspiracy. Zuyi was captured when

he mounted an attack. He was presented to the emperor, and was executed.”32

At that point in time, Palembang was in name a vassal state of Majapahit

but, in fact, the port of Palembang was governed by several Chinese. Chen

Daoming and Chen Zuyi were the pirate chief and kangzu (port master)

respectively. After Zuyi was defeated, Emperor Yongle established a separate

mission in Palembang and appointed Shi Jinqin to be the commissioner there.

Nevertheless, Palembang remained as a vassal state of Majapahit; there was no

change of suzerainty. This helped to clamp down on piracy and thus was good for

maritime trade. Zheng He did not send troops to occupy or invade Palembang.

As regards the incident in Samudra, a small native state on the island of

Sumatra, the Ming Shi states: “The ruler of Samudra was killed by a certain Batak

king in a battle. As his son was too young to revenge…a fisherman…thus led

troops to defeat the Batak king…As agreed the wife of the Samudra ruler married

the fisherman and made him the king…In the 10th year during the reign of Emperor

Yongle (1412)…the grown-up son of the former ruler conspired with troop leaders

to murder the stepfather, the fisherman, usurped the throne and ruled the native

state. The fisherman had a son called Sekander who escaped with his men and

formed a settlement on a hill. In revenge he launched attack frequently. In the 13th

year during Emperor Yongle’s reign (1415), Admiral Zheng He with his fleet of

32 Ming Shi （明史）。北京:中华书局, 1974. Vol 323-332. 408.

23

treasure ships arrived and captured Sekander…”33 At the request of the ruler, Zheng

He quelled the rebellion. Once the rebellion was over he left the native state. It

would be most unreasonable to call him an invader and a colonialist.

Wade also mentioned Zheng He’s military action in Sri Lanka. The military

action in Sri Lanka is interesting but it is far from a planned deliberate invasion. The

Ming Shi again threw light on the incident: “In the 9th month of the 6th year (1408)

when Zheng He was passing by Ceylon (Sri Lanka) again, the king Alakeswara lured

Zheng He into the country and demanded gold and silk while he sent troops to rob

Zheng He’s ships. Realizing that most of the king’s troops were out. Zheng He led

2000-odd men and took the town by surprise. The king and his family members were

captured. The ship robbers, on hearing of the attack, rushed back to town but they

were badly defeated by the imperial troops. In the 6th month of the 9th year (1411),

captives were presented to the imperial court. The emperor granted them amnesty and

spared their lives. They were released and sent back to their native state.”34 Based on

the above records, it appears that Zheng He mounted the military attacks in self-

defence. It should also be pointed out that Emperor Yongle did not execute the

captives as he had done in the case of the pirate chief, Chen Zuyi. Instead, he sent

them home and installed another individual to be the king. In addition, there was no

occupation of the native state. The episode though a military action but should

therefore not be regarded as an act of invasion.

33 Ibid. Similar story was carried by Ma Huan, 27-28, Gong Zhen (巩珍)，Xiyang Fanguozhi

(西洋番国志)。北京：中华书局,1961. 18; and Fei Xin (费信), Xingcha Shenglan

(星槎胜览)。北京：中华书局,1954. 27. 34

Ibid., vol. 304.

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In the above cases, Zheng He acted as a peace-keeper and guardian of native

states to maintain law and order of the region and safety of trade routes. Throughout

his seven voyages, Zheng He did not occupy or colonize an inch of foreign land.

Wade’s expansionist theory is not supported by valid evidence and therefore not

plausible at all.

III. Invasion and Occupation of Yunnan

Located at the southwest corner of China, Yunnan has been part of the

Chinese empire since the Han Dynasty. In 109 BC Emperor Wu ordered General

Guo Chang to go to the south to establish Yizhou province and 24 regions. The

capital should be in the Dianci region, today’s Jinning, another region was called

Yunnan. In 109 AD, the Han court established the county of Yunnan as

commandant. 35 Yunnan was called Kunzhou in the Sui Dynasty and Nanzhao in

the Tang Dynasty. Nanzhou was overthrown in 902 and in 937. Duan Siping

established the Kingdom of Dali with Dali as its capital. It was ruled by a

succession of 22 kings until the year 1253, when it was conquered by an invasion

of the Mongol Empire. The Yuan Dynasty was the first regime in China to govern

Yunnan under a strict administrative control. In 1253, Kublai Khan’s Mongol

forces advanced to Yunnan and many other native regimes, including the

controlling Dali Kingdom, who had to abdicate from their thrones. Thus, Yunnan

became a province of Kublai Khan Empire. Zheng He’s 6th generation ancestor,

35 Ming Shi, vol. 201.

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Sayid Ajall ShamsuddinYunnan was posted by him to Yunnan as its governor.

After the fall of the Yuan Dynasty, Yunnan province was thrown into chaos and

anarchy. Remnants of the Mongol forces continued to rule Yunnan. It was 13 years

later that Zhu Yuanzhang, sent his troops to crush the remnants of the Mongol

forces in Yunnan in 1381. He sent 300 thousand-strong imperial troops led by one

of his capable generals, Fu Youde to attack the last Mongol fortress in Yunnan.

Yunnan was captured and China was unified. When Yunnan fell, a good number of

young boys, including the 10-year old Ma He, were taken, castrated and brought

back to the capital. Hence, the invasion and occupation of Yunnan was more a

dynastic civil war between the Ming government armies and remnants of Mongol

forces.

IV. The Invasion of Annan, 1406

Annan (Vietnam today) formed part of the Chinese empire before the Tang

Dynasty as a province called Jiaozhi. The collapse of the Tang Dynasty provided

an opportunity for Annan to break free of Chinese imperial control. In 966 AD, six

years after the founding of the Song Dynasty, Dinh Bo Linh proclaimed Annan’s

independence.36 However, Annan continued to maintain vassal relations with

China. Historians give a variety of causes which led to the Ming invasion on

Annan in July 1406, ranging from Annan’s attack on Guangxi and Yunnan due to

36 Martin Stuart-Fox, 45.

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border disputes to Champa’s complaint to the Ming court about Annan’s invasion.

37 The direct cause seems to be the usurpation that took place in Annan in 1400. In

that year a powerful Vietnamese mandarin, Hu Quy Ly, took advantage of the

political turmoil in China to replace the emperor of Annan (last of the Tran

Dynasty), with his own son and proclaimed a new dynasty. When Yongle ascended

the throne, the new king sent tribute to him and was acknowledged as Annan’s new

king. However, Yongle was annoyed when he discovered a few months later the

man was a usurper. The sole remaining descendant of the Tran line was found and

returned to Annan to be installed as the new king, but he was murdered on his

arrival. Yongle gave his support to the Tran family and escalated the conflict with

Annan’s usurped throne. An imminent war with Annan was looming large. Despite

Annan’s non-invading status as laid down in his father’s Ancestral Injunctions,

Yongle “believed that there was sufficient provocation in this instance according to

the Ancestral Injunction”38 to punish the usurper in a large-scale war. Twenty main

crimes held against the usurper were listed as reasons for the military campaign.

Prof. Wang Gungwu listed and analysed these crimes as follows:

• For the murder of the Tran King who was properly recognized by China;

• For the massacre of the Tran royal family;

37

戴可来，“明明成祖证安南原因探析”，梁志明等编,《古代东南亚历史与文化研究》。

北京：昆仑出版社，2006。131－139。

38 Wang Gungwu, Chinese and the Chinese Overseas. 61.

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• For not using the Chinese calendar and for using his own reign-period;

• For ill-treating the Annamese people;

• For changing his own surname from Li to Hu;

• For deceiving the Ming emperor about his usurpation;

• For blushing the Ming emperor and resisting Ming missions;

• For murdering the legitimate Tran heir;

• For taking Chinese tribal territory at Ning-yuan Chou;

• For killing the tribal chief’s son-in-law and related crimes;

• For disturbing the peace among other border tribes;

• For taking Ssu-ming Fu territory and only returning parts of it;

• For inciting the tribes of His-ping Chou against the emperor;

• For invading Champa territory during the king’s mourning period;

• For taking four chou from Champa and sacking them;

• For taking over one hundred elephants from Champa and some territory;

• For forcing Champa, a vassal of China, to use Annan seals and ceremonial

dress instead of Chinese ones;

• For invading Champa because it acknowledged China as suzerain and not

Annan;

• For capturing Chinese and Cham envoys at one of the Cham ports; and

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• For insulting China by sending a criminal as envoy.39

Prof. Wang pointed out that one of the key words in the declaration of war

appears to be that Annan was very closely related to China and it is in this context

that the crimes can be seen as heinous. 40 He added, “ I have listed them fully to

show what vassalage to China meant at the time. The first eight may be described

as moral and idealogical issues, the next five as security matters, the five after that

as Annanese aggression against another vassal, and the final two as personal insults

to the emperor”.41 Prof. Wang very correctly and aptly concluded, “There are thus

four groups of issues which purported to have aroused Yongle to take strong

action. From his point of view, it may be argued that there was extreme

provocation. From the point of view of the country (Cham) attacked, the list

reveals the extent to which Chinese claims to suzerainty denied freedom and

independence of action to the vassal state.”42

Concluding Remarks

Dr. Wade attempted to interpret the role of the Ming Dynasty in general and

Zheng He’s expeditions in particular, based on Chinese historical records but using a

Western perspective. He was imaginative and very selective in arguing his cases but

it was not adequately or correctly supported by historical records. In addition, he

39 Ming Tai-zong Shilu: juan 60.1a-4a.

40 Wang Gungwu, “China and Southeast Asia 1402-1424” in Jerome Chen & Nicholas Tarling eds., Studies in Social History of China and Southeast Asia. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1970. 382. 41

Ibid. 42

Ibid., 382-383.

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purposely ignores the decrees issued by many Ming Emperors not to invade the

foreign countries and concluded that Yongle's seven voyages was to launch invasions

for the purpose of China southern expansion and for colonization.

Zheng He was an admiral in the Ming Dynasty. He was instructed by the

Ming emperor to project the power of Ming China (xuanyang guowei 宣扬国威), and

to implement the tributary system to States around the Western Ocean. He conducted

his diplomacy in the context of the Chinese concept of world order and tributary

system. His expeditions should be seen in that context rather than that of Western

colonialism. There is always a danger to see history from a non-historical point of

view; forcing a Western model and interpreting Chinese history pose pitfalls and will

only distort our understanding of history.

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