War On Drugs: Root of Immigration Crisis

8/12/2019 War On Drugs: Root of Immigration Crisis

http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/war-on-drugs-root-of-immigration-crisis 1/9

Radar Foco Politico

La guerra contra feLas drogas i .cumptio mediadecada sin exito

FOTQ IN6MA6E

Cocafna medio sigLo e guerraromantica violenta y falsaLa cocaina que consume el 1,6 de los estadouiiidertses afecta la seguridad

estabi l idady p rosperidad d el 100 de Centroamerica.

TEXTO JAVIER ARGUELLO

Corredoresde lamuerte

Oh vosotr os os que entrdis aban-

donad oda esperanza

- La ivi na Comedia

El concepto de una guerra es ro-

mantico porque apela a la moralidad

colectiva ciudadana ya que nadie quisiera fomentar la

adiccion de sus seres queridos e interpretamos esta

consecuencia como mas probable si las drogas fueran

mas accesibles. Es una falacia porque con decadas

de experiencia podemos evidenciar que la guerra no

fomenta la disminucion en el consumo y desistir de

una guerra no implica fomentar o facilitar el uso de las

drogas. La guerra cuesta US 100,000 millones cada

ano combatiendo la disponibilidad de drogas ilicitas

que consumen 3 millones en un mercado valorado

en US 330,000 millones a escala mundial segun da-

tos de Counting The Costs en The Alternati ve Drug

Repor t (2012) .

Es violenta porque donde pasa la droga deja cada-

36 E N edicion Mayo unio 2013



Radar Foco Politico

de justicia en Centroamerica (excepto Costa Rica).

Del 20% de los casos criminales que tienen proceso

legal, solo el 2% recibe una conviction en El Salvador,

corroboran datos de Naciones Unidas. Quiere decir

que la probabihdad de que un acto criminal tenga con-

secuencia legal es, en El Salvador, del 0,4%.

De acuerdo con un estudio del Programa de Na

ciones Unidas para el Desarrollo (PNUD), el presu-

puesto contra el delito sumaba, en el 2010, menos de

US 2,100 millones para el Triangulo Norte. La falta

de capacidad procesal y la corrupcion judicial se han

traducido en tasas de condenas extremadamente ba-

jas, que garantizan de hecho la impunidad. A este im-

porte simbolico habria que restarle la ineficiencia y

corrupcion para vcr cuantos ccntavos y soldados quc-

dan para cxponcr sus vidas pclcando la guerra dc EE.

UU. (que ni el mismo pais quicrc ganar).

Entonccs, scria altamcntc iluso asumir que los pai -

scs ccntroamcricanos son una amenaza real al trafico

dc drogas sofisticado, armado y con mas podcr ccono-

mico que cualquicr caudillo -cconomico o p o l i t i c o -

dc la region ccntroamcricana.

Lo mas probable es asumir que cl liderazgo p olit i

co regional, junto con su ejercito y policia, prefiercn

pcrmancccr vivos y rcmuncrados que martircs para

una guerra falsa dc otro pais. La decision es racional y

dificilmente podriamos esperar otra.

etos ante

lo ilogico

NO H BR F E L E P C I F IC

El reto es que ignorar (ser com

plice) o lucrarse del problema del

vecino norteamericano fortalece

economicamente a los narcotrafi-

cantes que terminan secuestrando

la debil infraestructura institucional que existe. En

esencia, transfiere poder a manos menos responsa-

bles que las corruptas que actualmente lo sostienen.

Si el pais intenta luchar contra el trafico de las dro

gas o si choques externos distorsionan las rutas de la

cocaina o disminuyen las cantidades distribuidas por

los traficantes, entra en un circulo vicioso muy pe-

ligroso. No hay pelea pacifica contra el narcotrafico,entonces cualquier amenaza percibida por el crimen

organizado incremen ta la violencia. A l incremen tarse

la violencia se erosiona el sistema judicial, mientras

encarece el costo de la seguridad para las personas y

empresas. Esto aisla la inversion necesaria para el de

sarrollo economico, lo cual ahorca las oportunidades

para la juventud, indirectamente fomentando la acti-

vidad ilicita... Circulo vicioso.

La juventud centroamericana, que de hecho ya ca-

UNA ENCUES

TA A EMPRE-

SAS ULTI

NACIONALES

REVELAQUE

UN20

CONSIDERA

LA VIOLEN-

CIA COMO LA

PRINCIPAL

BARRERA

PARA NVER

TIRENLA

REGION.

rece de formation academica y es poco competitiva,

termina siendo amenazada o seducida por las pandi-

llas o el narcotrafico.

Es difi cil creer que la adiccion o diversion del 1,6%

de la poblacion estadounidense (unos 5 millones de

personas, de entre 15 y 64 anos) amenaza el futuro

para el 100% de los ciudadanos de Centroamerica

(unos 40 millones), por una falsa y cinica guerra con

tr a las drogas. Ante esta realidad es preferible velar

por la seguridad ybienestar de Centroamerica entera

que fingir un esfuerzo de prevenirle al adicto estado

unidense que encuentre su droga por provocar una

escasez en el mercado; algo que nunca va a suceder.

V I O L E N C I E N C E N T R O M E R I C

En el 2000, el 85% de la droga iba directamente a

Mexico. Dada la guerra declarada por el presidente

Felipe Calderon, el punto de entrada principal se tras-

lado a Cen troamerica, por donde hoy en dia entra casi

el 100% de la droga procedente a EE. UU. Entre Hon

duras y Costa Rica se reportaron 42 extradiciones de

cocaina en el 2000y490 en el 2011. La cantidad de to-

neladas captadas por las autoridades en Centroame

rica es evidencia del cambio en el flujo del trafico de

la cocaina.

La elevada tasa dehomicidios dificilmente merme

UN GRAN NEGOCIO

Estados Unidos lid era consumo y benefidos por cocaina.

US 330000Millones muevan at afio todas las drogas iifcitas.

Podio del valor de translto de coca en CA.

EE. UU. consume casi la De estadounidenses lamitaddelacocamundial. consumen habitualmente

88.000 teumo

Genera anualmente el consumo de cocafna en el

mundo, casi la mitad son en los Estados Unidos.

mUorwsmueveenNicaragua.

US 1949mllones mueveenHonduras.

SSUS 4046mllones mueveenGuatemala,

14

PorcentajesobreelPIB de Nicaragua.

13

PorcentajesobreelPIS de Honduras.

S60 millonesen El Salvador, me Porcentajesobreelnosdell%delPia PIB de Guatemala.

38 E N edici6n ayo - Junio 2013



Radar Foco Politico

en paises centroamericanos, donde elpoder economi-

co de los traficantes es un m u l t i p l o del presupuesto delos gobiernos locales. Mientras, la region se convirtio

en la mas violenta del mundo, con tasas de homicidio

que superan 60 por cada 100.000 habitantes en el

Triangulo Norte (91 en Honduras, que casi triplica la

cifra del 2 0 0 4 ) , en EE. UU. se mantuvo estable en 4,2.

Lamentablemente, la cocaina no es culpable de

toda la violencia en la region, en parte porque la v i o

lencia tiene otras raices sociales Oas maras en El Sal

vad or . En Honduras, el numero de pandilleros es seis

veces mayor que el numero de policias.

Una realidad singular (y preocupante) es el virtual

pacifismo que se vive en Nicaragua - un oasis de paz

comparado al Triangulo Norte-. iPor que es preocu

pante? Lo que se puede aprender de las rutas de tra

fico de drogas es que no son violentas hasta que perci-

ben una amenaza. Entonces, el hecho de que haya paz

relativa (en este caso en Nicaragua) no quiere decir

que el trafico esta bajo c o n t r o l , puede estar comple-

tamente fuera de c o n t r o l , o en sociedad con el sector

publico. Los salarios no ayudan. Los policias ganan

US 4 al dia en Nicaragua y US 8 en Honduras (datos

dc la Policia National dc Nicaragua). Un kilo dc cocai

na cucsta US 170,000 cn EE.UU. Ahora, ircalmcntc

pcnsamos que un policia va a poncr su vida cn pcligro

para cxtraditar miles dc kilos (millones dc dolarcs)

para cscasamcntc alimcntarsc, si ticne la dicha dc so-

brcvivir?

Economi a

de la cocaina

El narcotrafico no esta cn el nc-

gocio de la violencia, esta cn el nc-

gocio dc producir y transportar su

mcrcancia al consumidor final que

mayor prccio paga, L o que causa la

violencia es cualquier intcnto dc

i n t c r r u m p i r el flujo dc la droga o cl balance dc podcr

entre los traficantes, como succdio cn Mexico, donde,

al declararse la guerra a la droga, se disparo la v i o l e n

cia, con mas de 6 0 . 0 0 0 muertos acumulados en pocos

afios; algunos estiman que la cifra real es de mas de

2 0 0 . 0 0 0 . La violencia en Mexico se da porque los car-

teles que recibian la cocaina directamente, ahora lle-

gan a Centroamerica, entonces estos carteles estan en

una recesion, peleandose por un mercado reducido.

DISTRIBUCION DE LAS UTILIDADES

El que mas cerca esta del consumidor final ma

y o r u t i l i d a d percibe. E l 85% de la u t i l idad queda en

EE.UU., con el mayorista siendo el m i n o r i t a r io (15 )

y el operador ret il devenga un 7 0 del total. Entre el

Cambiosentaproduccionyeorredordetrafico

Caidadelaproduction de cocaen Colombia

Reduction en diez anas

195vs7toneladas. Oiferencialenunadecada.

400 |

Subid coca extraditada en CA en 10 afios

BOvstoneldas. Diferencialentre 2011 y 2001

de la coca extraditadafueenCA

InterceptabaCAen1985

17

de la coca interceptadacae en Mexico

48Era la cifra que Mexicodetenfaenel2001

p r o d u c t o r agricola y el transportista en los Andes ge-

neran un 2% de la u t i l idad, mientras que el trafican-te regional (hasta EE.UU.) devenga un 13 . No son

centavos, ya que Centroamerica trafica US 39,000

millones, de esto le deberian quedar mas de US 5,000

millones de u t i l idad para distribuirse entre todos los

traficantes internacionales. Dificilmente compite con

los salarios locales.

Los beneficiarios menos obvios son los que pro-

rnueven la guerra. Estos son los contratistas de annas

detras del complejo indu s t rial mil it ar de EE.UU. Los

grupos economicos que venden equipo mil it ar y ope-

ra n carceles tienen intereses economicos y son aliados

en la guerra. La infraestructura mil it ar detras de este

esfuerzo es masiva y, de culminar esta guerra falsa, se

desplomaria el negocio detras de la mil it arizat ion.

Uno de los principales productos de exportation

de EE.UU. son las armas. En el 2011, los acuerdos de

venta de armas ascendieron a US 71,500 millones.

EE.UU. logro acaparar cl mercado global, particular-

mcntc cn los paises pobrcs. L a abundancia dc armas

cn Centroamerica es alarmantc. En la region hay mas

dc cinco millones dc armas, dc las cualcs menos del

2 0 ( 8 7 0 . 0 0 0 ) cstan rcgistradas por cl gobicrno. In -

discutiblcmcntc, la abundancia dc armas combinada

con pobrcza, justicia incxistcntc y cl lucro cconomico

que prcscnta la cocaina son una c o m b i n a t i o n pcrfecta

para fomentar la violencia o una patifica transition a

u n narcocstado, donde los traficantes tendran sccucs-trad o al Estado -si cs que no son ya los mismos- .

En ajedrez, un jaquc mate ocurrc cuando cl rey

esta atrapado y ve su muerte. Pareciera que Centro

america no tiene salida, pero en realidad la tiene, por

que este problema es altamente exportable via el libre

comercio sincronizado y estrategico.

El Istmo no tiene como pelear o ganar esta lucha

contra el narcotrafico: es mas fuerte que su iristerna

fragil y corrupto. Ignorar el problema destruye el capi

ta l humano y deja el poder en manos muy peligrosas.

Una fusion del poder entre las manos de los politicos

actuales con el crimen organizado -algo que proba-

blemente ya sucedio-, magnifica las debilidades de

ambos, mientras que pelear la guerra de EE. UU. solo

pvovocaria mas violenciay menos inversion.

Centroamerica y Mexico deberian unirse y exigirle

a EE.UU. que asuma responsabilidad por su problema

de consumo. La amenaza de dejar que el libre comer

cio regule la oferta y demanda es una amenaza real

contra EE. UU., que seguramente provocaria una ac

tion favorable de su parte *

javier ar guello@acelapart ners com

40 E&N edicibn Mayo - Junio 2013



COCAINE half a century of a war that is romantic, violent and based ona false premise. The Cocaine consumed by 1.6% of N orth Americans

15-64 years olds) affects the security, stability and prosperity of 100%of Central Americans.

Abandon all hope,you who enter here- Dante Alighieri The Divine omedy

The concept of w ar is romantic because it appeals to citizens' collective morality

since nobody would encourage addiction, and we interpret this result as more likelyif drugs were more accessible. However, this logic is faulty, because decades ofexperience reveal that war does not promote decreased consumption, and abortingthe war does not involve promoting or fac ilitating the use of drugs. The war, whichcosts 100,000 million a year, tries to decrease the av ailability of drugs consumedby 300 million people, in a global market worth 330 billion.

I t is a violent war

because wherever there is drug trafficking there are fatal victims,not such much because of consumption, but because the activity is criminalized.

Finally, the concept of a war against drugs is based on a false premise (mislabeled asa war) because it has no beginning or successful end. The most troubling part of this

war however is that the country that sponsors it does not change its strategy despitedecades of failure.

The war on drugs is also strategically incoherent because it only attacks the supply-side of the equation w hile the demand-side prevention and treatment) is almostignored. For every dollar the U.S. spends on preventing and treating addiction(demand reduction), 30 is invested in the military part of decreasing supply.

The fact that the country that preaches globally on the benefits of a free marketignores the concept of supply and demand appears somewhat ironic and cynical.Without reducing demand drug use) a war only increases violence in countrieswhere it is produced and transported. This causes serious problems for countrieshaving the geographical misfortune of residing between production centers and themecca of consumption -along the distribution path. If the country that declares thewar doesn't change its consumption habits, and it doesn't suffer the consequences ofa unilateral and perpetual war, it leaves the problem for the corridors of Latin

America that traffic the drugs. Today, that corridor is Central America.

Supply hain

Historically, cocaine was primarily produced and/or exported out of Colombia andtrafficked to N orth America through the Caribbean. Production centers anddistribution channels were disrupted and weakened by the Plan Colombia,providing aid by the State Department for Colombia to fight its war on drugs. Thesupport intensified with President Alvaro Uribe in Colombia. With this distortion,

cocaine production emerged in neighboring countries: Peru and Bolivia. While



Translation Cocaine and War on Drugs by Javier Arguello

Venezuela replaced Colombia as the main exporter for cocaine and Mexico became

the main bridge to enter the U.S.

The US accelerated its m ilitary aid program, Plan Colombia, when i t began losing

political influence in Latin America during the last decade (given the rise of the leftw i t h antagonism and resentment towards the US). Plan Colombia finally managed to

reduce cocaine production in the country by almost 50%. The problem is that it didno t address or affect demand and production simply shifted to neighboring

countries. Plan Colombia provoked a mere relocation of the Cartels and a reroutingof the drugs w i th some changes in the balance of power. The historic route of

cocaine i n the 80's and 90's was directly between Colombia and South Florida by

sea, using the Caribbean islands as stopover points.

The distortion in the flow of maritime traffic via the Caribbean, combined with

Mexico's declaration of its ow n war on drugs, prompted Central America to emerge

as the main bridge to traffic cocaine seeking to enter the U.S. This change was swift,and in half a decade the region emerged as violence capital of the world.

The increase in violence is concentrated in the Northern Triangle of Central

America, consisting of Guatemala, Honduras, El Salvador and Belize, where

homicide rates are up to 20 times higher than in the United States. Today between

300 and 350 tons of cocaine pass by Guatemala on their way to the US, where

approximately $38 billion are consumed in cocaine, according to UN data.

David v s Goliath

A drug trafficking operation of this scale requires logistical sophistication and

creates an economic and military power that can't compare to the fragile

infrastructure of the local police forces or corrupt or inexistent justice system. In

fact, it is estimated that five out of six m urderers aren't even reviewed by the

judicial system in Central America (except in Costa Rica). Out of 16% of criminalcases that do follow due process, only 2% receive a conviction in El Salvador,

according to UN data. This means that the probability of a criminal act having a legal

consequence is about 0.4% in El Salvador.

According to a study by the United Nations Program for Development, in 2010, the

budget against crime amounted to less than $2.1 billion for the northern triangle.The fact that the judicial system can't handle the volume of cases coupled withcorruption in the system result in extremely lo w conviction rates, almost

guaranteeing impunity. The rem aining budget, after accounting for the judicials y s t m leaves pennies to compensate the soldiers and cops that are expected tofight America's war on drugs, w hile knowing that it is a disingenuous war.

I t w ould therefore be highly naive to assume that Central American courts and cops

are a real threat to such a sophisticated, armed and powerful drug-traffickingnetwork The most logical assumption is that political leadership in the region along

w i t h the police forces, prefer to stay alive and w ell compensated than become

2



ranslationCocaine and War on Drugs by Javier Arguello

martyrs in a disingenuous war for another country. The decision to aid or benefitfrom the drug trafficking is rational and often one of survival.

The challenge is that ignoring (complicity) or profiting from this American problemgives drug traffickers more economic strength, so they end up abducting the already

weak institutional infrastructure. In essence it transfers power to less responsiblehands than the corrupt ones who currently support it , which is where the real

problem lies for the region.

If the country tries to fight drug trafficking, or if external shocks distort cocaine

routes, things can enter into a very dangerous cycle. Any perceived threat by

organized crime may lead to increased violence. As violence increases the judicialsystem erodes, while simultaneously increasing the cost of security for individuals

and businesses. This isolates the investment needed for economic development,

which in turn jeopardizes opportunities for youth and indirectly fosters illicit

activity.

Central American youth, already belonging to an uncompetitive labor force lackingacademic formation and professional training, end up being threatened or seducedby gangs and / or drug trafficking.

It is hard to believe that the addiction or leisure of 1.6 of the U.S. population

(about 5 million people) threaten the future of 100 of Central Americans (40

million people) due to a cynical war against drugs. Given these facts, it is preferable

to ensure the safety and welfare of all of Central America, than to fake an effort to

prevent users from obtaining drugs.

entr l merican Violence

In 2000, about 85 of the drug flowing into the United States was flowing directly

through Mexico. Given the war on drug trafficking declared by President Felipe

Calderon, Central America became the main point of entry, where almost 100 ofthe drug going to the U.S. pass by. Between Honduras and Costa Rica 42 extraditions

of cocaine were reported in 2000, a figure that rose twelve-fold to 490 in 2011. Theamount of cocaine caught by the authorities in Central America is evidence of the

change in traffic flow of cocaine.

In Central America drug traffickers are far more powerful than any local

government. They don't stand a chance if they were to try to fight America's war

against drugs. As the region became the most violent in the world, with homicide

rates that exceeding 60 per 100,000 (in the northern triangle of Central America),the homicide rate in the U.S. has remained stable at 4.2. In Honduras the ratereached 9 1 per 100,000, which is almost three times its 2004 figure.

Unfortunately, cocaine is not guilty of all the violence in the region in part becauseviolence has other roots. In Honduras, the number of gang members is six times

greater than the number of police officers. But, perhaps more worrisome is the

relative peace in Nicaragua - an oasis of peace compared to its neighboring

3



ranslationCocaine and War on Drugs by Javier Arguello

countries. Drug trafficking is in the business of logistics, not in the business ofviolence, unless they perceive a threat. So the fact that there is relative peace inNicaragua does not mean that traffic is contained. In fact, it is probably in a peacefulpartnership with public servants.

Local wages do not help in fighting a war on drugs. Police officers make 4/day in

Nicaragua and 8/day in Honduras (data from the National Police of Nicaragua). Yet,a kilo of cocaine costs 170,000 in the US. Would a cop who tries to feed a family on

100- 200 per month, put his life in danger to extradite thousand kilos (millions ofdollars)?

Drug trafficking is in the business of producing and transporting the goods to theend consumer paying top dollar. What causes violence is any attempt to disrupt theflow of drugs and the balance of power between traffickers, as has happened inMexico. Declaring a war on drug violence prompted over 60,000 deaths in a coupleof years, some estimate that the real figure is more than 200,000. The violence inMexico is due to the fact that the cartels that used to receive cocaine were squeezed

out of the distribution chain as they now go directly to Central America. As a result,cartels are in an e onomi recession fighting over a shrinking market

The consequence of this traffic poses to the security and prosperity of the region isunquestionable. Only 4% o f the populations in El Salvador and Guatemala feel safein their country. In Nicaragua, the poorest and most armed country in the region,22 % o f the population feels safe which is significantly better but far from a Utopia.

Economics of ocaine

Cocaine like other agricultural commodities, produces the highest profit margins atthe end of the supply chain: at retail level. The lowest profits are perceived at thebeginning of the supply chain: producers. Not surprisingly, 85% of drug trafficking

profit is realized in the US with the wholesaler earning 15% (absolute terms) andthe operator or retailer earning the remaining 70% of the total. The agriculturalproducer and the carriers in the Andes earn 2% of revenue, while the regionaldealer (to the U.S.) earns the remaining 13%. These are not pennies, particularly ascompared to the size of the economies the drug flows through. Central Americatraffics 39 billion, of w hich over 5 billion is profit for traffickers. Local wages orfederal budgets are laughable to the industry, which is consolidated in the hands offew pow erful traffickers.

The less obvious beneficiaries are those who promote the war on drugs. These are

the weapons contractors behind the military industrial complex in North America.Economic groups that sell military equipment and operate prisons have economicinterests, which make them allies in a perpetual war. The military infrastructure

behind this effort is massive. If this war w ould end, revenue would collapse forthese actors.

Weapons are one of the primary exports for the US. In 2011, arms sales agreementstotaled 71.5 billion. The US has cornered the global market, particularly in poor



ranslationCocaine and War on Drugs b y Javier Arguello

countries, where 79 of the agreements for arms impo rts are with the US

companies. Their strongest competitor is Russia, with a 5.7 market share.

The abundance of arms in Central America, the ease with which they are imported

and the continuous increase of stockpiles are alarming. The region has more than 5

million guns, of which less than 20 (870,000) are registered by the gov ernment Of

the remaining 4 .1 million, 2.8 million are not registered at all. Nicaragua s case is

the most alarming because there are 35 guns per active army officer, it continues to

increase its arms imports and is the main destination for illegal arms trafficking. In

Panama s case, you can freely import weapons from the US without tariffs, which

makes the country the illegal distributor to the rest of the region. Free trade within

the region, with lack of regulatory harmonization, only facilitates arms trafficking

between countries. In fact, Nicaragua and Panama, countries that do not produce

weapons -export guns to Colombia, illegally.

The abundance of poverty and weapons in an env ironment where justice is no n

existent and the economic incentive of trafficking cocaine and weapons is so great,

make a perfect combination to ensure a peaceful transition to a Narco-State. This

transition is probably well under way.

Strategy Checkmate

In chess, a checkmate occurs when the king is trapped and sees his death. It seems

that Central America is in such a position. However, the king has an unpopu lar exit

strategy because this problem is highly exportable via free trade.

The Central American Isthmus cannot win the fight against drug trafficking: it is

stronger than its already fragile and corrupt system. Ignoring the problem destroys

human capital, leaving power in very dangerous hands. A merger of power betweenthe region's political leaders and organized crime - something that probably already

happened, weakens both, w hile fighting America s war only provokes more violence

and less investment.

Mexican and Central American governments should unite and demand that the

United States assume responsibility for its share of the equation: demand for drugs.

The threat of letting free trade regulate supply and demand is a real threat to US,

which would surely lead to a favorable negotiation.

5



Translation: Cocaine and War onDrugs by Javier Arguello

GR PHS

Homicides Homicides Total Police Officers Average Monthly

per 100,000 per 100,000 Homicides per 100,000 Salary (US )3

(2004) (2011) 2011 1 citizens2

Honduras 32 91 7,104 188 232

El Salvador 56 69 4,308 318 370

EEUU 5.7 4.2 12,996 232 4,500 - 10,000

EEUU emulating Honduras+ 12+ 37,131+

+ Assumes that the U.S. would have the same increase as Honduras suffered as a result of the

war on drugs moved to the U.S. causing 24,127 excess deaths, representing 5 times the

number of deaths that wins U.S. in its war against terrorism in Iraq and Afghanistan since

2001 (4,977 deaths).

Cocaina Valor de la Cocaina que Cocaina como del PIB

Importancia Economica Regional Transita (en millones US f

Guatemala 4,046 10

Honduras 1,949 13Nicaragua 910 14%

Costa Rica 896 3%

Panama 200 1

Belice 74 5%

El Salvador 60 <1

Relation entre disminucion de Coca producida en

Colombia e incremento en la violencia en Centro America

2001 2011 Cambio

CENTROAMERICA: Homicidas porcada 100,000 personas

en el triangulo norte (Belize, Honduras, Guatemala, El

Salvador)

156 242 +55

CENTRO AMERICA: Toneladas de cocaina extraditada 16 80 +400

COLOMBIA: Toneladas metricas de cocaina pura

producidas

700 195 -72

Sources: U.S. government (Annual Report of National Drug Control Policy July 2012 and the United

Nations Office on Drugs and Crime ( Report on Organized Crime in Central America and the Caribbean,

September 2012

Cocaine Seized 1985 2001 2008

Mexico 24 48% 17

Caribbean 75% 28 3%

Central America 1 24 80%

1 United Nations Office of Crime & Drugs(World Report onHomicides and Violence -Honduras 2011)

2 Presentationdelivered by Minta Granera Chief of National Police of Nicaragua (data sources for

Centro America) y Eurostat (EEUU)

3 Ibid and US Government (vyww.justice.gov) for DEA salaries

4 Reporte de Naciones Unidas

6

War On Drugs: Root of Immigration Crisis

Documents

Transcript of War On Drugs: Root of Immigration Crisis