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EPISCOPAL CHURCHPEOPLE . for a FREE SOUTHERN AFRICA

Phone: (212) 477-0066 339 Lafayette Street New York, N.Y. 10012

#21 29 SEPTEMBER 1985 WAR IN ANGOLA

THE WINDHOEK

ADVERTISER THURSDAY, SEPTEMBER 19, 1985 'Oft: 2 H. WIIIDHOI.K, MOO. ¥ JMIA

... launotl, AOWIImUMINT. :-=: 1&. WNGIIOeK, IIOC, '!;" u.t1

Unita by 111assive SA airlift?

BY JIM FREEMAN I \.N EXTENSIVE aid air-bridge seems j o have been established between 1 1orthern Namibia and beleaguered · Jnita rebels fighting to withstand a

1

nassive Angolan Government assault, :enior United States officials in Nashington maintain. ~From the latest repons On Monday. the South

·oming ·from Angola. it African Defence Force an­lacs seem as if there is an nounced the death in a 1ssistance relationship conta~t with the Angolan oetween Unita and the Armed Forces of a 22-iouth Africans.- one well- year old medical orderly. nformed official in the Lance Corporal Bruce ~merican capital told The Andrews Fidler. who was ~dvertiser. treating Unita wounded on

The official ref used to the battlefield. onfirm that the US The SADF admitted :iovernment had been that it gave 'humanitarian· eceiving reports from, aid to the pro-Western ~ngola on the extent of the/ rebel movement. but said ,id now to Unita each call for this type of

-That is an Intelligence· help was considered on ;sue. and as such I cannot merit. omment on it.- he said. The American govern·

However. the covert in· ment opinion is that South oh·ement of particularly Africa"s aid in the face of he US Central intelligence the FAPLA onslaught 1s ~gency in Unita is well· much more extensive. tocumcntcd as being ex- LaLc vestcrdav. the ensive. despite having no Angolan Defence Ministrv •fficial sanction by the said South Africa had car-\merican Congress. ricd nut two massive air

The Advertiser ap- raids on its ~APLA forces >roached the American. about 19 kilometres from :iovernment after certain the Umta stronghold of nformation was sup- Mavmga. 1lemented by reports from ~n ola.

The Angolans claimed that the South African Air Force had used Canberra hom hers and Mirage. fighters in an au.:mpl ro

··draw the hem·· from Unita. who arc known to he under considerable pres­sure withstanding the FAPLA thrust.

The SADF have rejected the Angolan statement.

A source within the African AITairs division of the American State Department told The Advertiser that the leader of Unita. Dr Jonas

Savimbi. appeared to be extremclv nervous about the Go~ernment assault. which he said involved about 20 000 Angolan troops supported by Cuban and Soviet air and ground forces.

··unita is facing a tremendous. materiel chal­lenge in trying to repel the attack and protect its main base at Jamba.

""What the movemenf has needed urgently since the operation was launched on July 29 is anti-aircraft and anti-tank systems.

"These could only be fonhcoming from the South Africans:· he said.

,By JIM FREEMAN THE LA TEST Territory Force and South African Defence Force incursion into Angola bas all the operauon announced ;igns of being far larger than a pure follow-up yesterd~~ could_ pre-empt :lperation against insurgents, according to promi- ~e tra~111onal ramy season !

.. . al . . mfiltration. I nent po Jtic SCientists. . Responding to a ques-

This . was ~so the He questioned whether lion whether the Security ·'l!~ress10n g81Red by General Viljoen's an- • Cont on Page 3 ~d.'t_ary correspon~ents nouncement that intensive '!Siting the Operatio~al intelligence gathering and A -~rea_ last week, wher~ m- recconaissance over the ngola j1ca11ons that preparabons past months could have Jed were _underway were clear- to an ofT-the-culT hot pur- e Cont from Page 1 'Y ev1dent. . suit.

Yesterday, the Chief of Professor Fourie said the SA!=!F, Ge~eral Cons- there was the possibility tand Viljoen sa1d elements that the Security Forces of the_ two forces had eros- had been involved in a sed mto Angola on. a follow-up against in­follow-up operabon surgents, and had then pr~~~ted by _recent Swapo seen the opportunity of es­aCIIVJiles ag81Rst the people calating the operation on of Owambo _a~ well as the Swapo installations deeper rest -of Nam1~1a. in Angola. .

_As far as ts kno_wn ~t He said a large-scale in-thiS stage, the strike ts cursion by Swapo at this spearh~ded . by moment could prove very mecharused mfantry and embarrassing for South supported . by the South Africa in the light of the African A1r Force. . unrest in the country.

Professor D~on Fo~ne- ~If the security situation

Force strike had been facilitated by the deploy­ment of Angolan Govern­ment troops against Unita rebels. he said this would depend on how many F APLA soldiers were help­ing guard Swapo installa­tions.

State Department sources in Washington confirmed to The Adver­tiser recently that the leader of Unita. Dr Jonas Savimbi. was seriously worried about the scale of the FAPLA offensive and head of ~tra~g1c Studies at in Namibia was seen to

the . Umvers1ty of South deteriorate, it could have ~fnca- told The Adver- the same effect on foreign

___________ us~ ·that recent Swapo investors as the rioting in stnkes could have been South Africa.~ used _as a reason for Professor Mike Hough llu~nching a pre-emptive of the Institute of Strategic stnke. Studies said there had been

was seekmg help fron South Africa to diver some of the forces rangec against him.

General Viljoen sajd th~ Angolans had bee!\. in formed in advance cif th~ South African . operatior through established chan· nels.

Professor Hough said h< doubted whether the an· nouncement would see ~a major rush on the pan o! FAPLA •· to protec; Swapo.

The Advertiser ha· learned that high-ranke< officers are directing th1 ~follow-up- operatior from Oshakati.

. PREVENT AMERICAN ASSISTANCE TO SOUTH AFRICAN AGGRESSION

In early autumn 1975 South Africa launched a full-scale invasion of Angola from the occupied Territory of Namibia. At that time there was a three-way contesLfor: :t:oliti­cal control of the fonner Portuguese colony, and Pretoria 1 s goal was to ensure the victory of its chosen candidate, UNITA (the National Union for the Total Independence of Angola}.

'Ihe US Congress did not know then that Pretoria had been encouraged and aided in this venture by then Secretary of State Henry Kissinger (cf, John Stockwell, IN SEARCH OF END1IES). But, fresh from its Vietnam experience, it wanted no more adventurism. The Congress therefore enacted the 1 Clark amendment 1

, which prohibited any US intervention in that new 'sinkhole' , Angola.

Pretoria, stunned by the 1 defection' of its US goverrnnent collaborator and in deep trou­ble ~[lilitarily, was forced to withdraw from Angola by the spring of 1976. But it left behH1d a UNITA oovement,led by Jonas Savimbi- and completely dependent on Pretoria. UNITA 1 s assigned function was to prevent the new MPIA govetrunent pf Angola from consoli­dating its governance throughout the country ·and from creating a prosperous and indepen­dent Angola.

Savimbi eStablished a 'capital' at Jarnba · :i::n ·the sparsely populated southeastern corner of Angola close to the border with South"African-occupied Namibia. Pretoria trained and equipped UNITA soldiers in Namibia 1 s Caprivi Strip. South African I:efence Force troops were sent in to assist, fight with and (sometimes) lead UNITA forces .. Pretoria gave UNITA air transport and air cover for raids into populous areas. A South African. officer - captured during the aborted raid on the US-run Cabinda oil fields in May 1985 revealed (fBIS Daily Report 29 May 19.85) that specially trained South African commandos destroyed major :O:ddges and that his enterprise against Cabinda Gulf Oil was one of the operations planned in Pretoria and executed under the SADF 1 s coiiiriEild. The commando units would leave behind 'evidence' to give the impression that UNITA had committed the sabot­age and that. Sav:imbi' s outfit had wide support throughout Angola.

Before this information was fully known and assimilated, Congress was persuaded this. past summer to repeal the 'Clark amendment' Although the ostensilile reason was to re­store control. over foreign policy to the PiBsident, the repeal was greeted by UNITA and its lsupporters as opening the door to support for their activities.

~ . :;~ .- ~··

At the. same time Congress was preparing to enact anti-apartheid legislation. I

Events of the past two- weeks have shown that Pretoria construed the repeal of the 'Clark amendment' as implicitly authorizing it to continue 'lts policy of regional destabiliza­tion, directly or through proxies; despite the mild censure of limited sanctions. South Africa has ·again invaded Angola to prevent the Angolan a.rrrw from attacking UNITA and taking its Jarnba base •.

Pretoria now bas for the first time publicly admitted its ongoing support for UNITA. It has not apologized for the new invasion, nor has it intimated that it will change its policy in the future.

It is thus clear that if Congress wishes to persuade Pretoria to end its policy of re­peated aggression-against neighboring states, it must reverse the message sent by the repeal of the 'Clark amendment'. It should take positive action to ensure that there is no American support for South Africa's armed forces or for their surrogates : UNITA, Renam::> in fuzarnbique, or for any successor to those groups-.-

Congress should either reinstate the 'Clark amendment' or in other legislation specifi­cally prohilii t any assistance to or intervention on behalf of groups or armed forces , in southern Africa that further Pretoria's policies of apartheid or regional destabi­lization andaggression.

easa 29 Sep 85

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Apgola Gai~ng in Figh,t Agai~st Ul\fiTA Rebels . .· . . . . . '·' · ...

,;

~-,..._ -------'--.,-- ~ording to:diplomats and Angolan South African · goven)ment sent installations in wid~pread parts of . ! By Karen DeYoung officials.. . . . troops acrosslhe. Angolan border the.country.

\V;1~gton Post Foreign Scni.:c . .Their efforts include an ongoi.ng on Monday ~ut announced· Thurs- UNIT A's tactics were designed

LUANDA, Angola-With the .offensive against rebel strongholds, .. day that they·Yiou!d be withdrn'WJk: _not only to expand its operational help}ofPortuguese commimdos-and 'in the:southl!a~tern_ part of: the :thisweekend.Details,.PageA32.) ·.areas and bring the country to an a re~rganized and rnorE! efficient Air · countrr, and major mr and ground · _. The· government advance comes. . economic standstill but also to dis­Force, the Angolan . armed. forces· opeT?t10ns- in. the eastern pa~ts ·of· ·'.after_ indications late last year that. rupt increasingly 'substantive re­appear . over the past several · Moxtco and Lul)da South proymces, _· the. rebel (urces·>of · the National gional peace talks orchestrated by months to have turned the tide a( ne~r the. liord~rs of Zambta and Umon for the Total Independence. the Reagan administration between battle against South African-backed ·Zatre; · . :-- . of Angola --~~ITA) were on. the. ~~gala and South Africa. The po.: rebel forces seeking to overthrow [In an-apparent efforUo reheve .. ver?e of a maJor br~kthrough fol-' hhcal goal of UNlTA's efforts ap-

1 the Marxist government here;· ac· pressure. on the rebel forces, tl\e :: . lowmg · attacks- agamst economic, See ANGOLA, -\34, Coll ·

gdvernment forces:ls b~sed'~~;ri!- . ·iii the.· extreml!·wtithWest; :e~eli;~~-:&;a;n highway:~~;~r,'ft;- ' Observers point to operations i~·-,\NGOLA. From Al' cent· conversations : With·;' Afigoian. ·.,when accompanied bymilitary con• _'the easf, ·is .largely closed·to civilian· t~e fa(· east;of the· country as an

pears to ·have· been achieved.!a'st political and military officials;: dip• ·. voy• ·' · .. ;,_,- ,:·.:·, . :; ·: · · ;·. .. .. ,. traffic, as .is.-the-southern;'- coastal ·example. It is there, ill the right-art-. July when the government here ,lomats:and other for~i~:oliSer.Vers : :'.There iirenumerous'el!amples:oC•: higliway:_:wheridecer.tfighting has. gle border region stretching from broke off talks following the repeal . ·in Luanda: and; dllnng,:·a:. govern~. ·. 'the· effects of: the. sabotage.· Oper-' ,·, lieen reported north .of Loliito; Re• · 'Luau in LUnda South to Cazombo in of the Clark Amendment barring : ment-sp<insoreifVisit tc{ the· soutt.;: C ·'aticins· at British diamond mines iri ·: ')eated·sabotage· attacks ciccutaloiig .· · Moidco: .. Provirice,' where. UNIT A. U.S. aid to the rebels. central.and soutlrWeste'rii';t!ortiotis' '·•'the northeast ·,have: been' severely-.'. th~ Benguela raili:oadi thii main·ar- I reportedly' controlled large areas.;

On a military. level, however; 'of the country;•_:; <'' :;::·':',; J•:J .''. ·.·curtailed:' following· four· separate:. ::tei'y' to, the ·sea•'from -~entral and , r th.at the·, nevr military· efficiency, I' NITA's tactics appear indirectly . · Non-Angolan 'oooerver's···caiifioi!r. ''attacks/th~· irlost:recent last May.· ,::eastern Angola;- and' in the. proviil•. • ~th hea\>y'emphasis on coordinated t .• have aided government forces.. howeveri that in somebHhe' mo5t · Because ofthe. inability to carry the ... · dahiapital'of Huambo, · ' .. · : · · . 'j atr attacks_. and counterinsurgency· C;ver the past several months, rebel . · painfully' Visible waJfS;: tHe<: military ' product to Atlantic ports; the north· : ·: · .' · Government ·forces: :are·: faced . operations on- the ground, has units holve been spread thin and · problems {)NITA po5es- foiJhe goY.: . ··,'ern ·c_offee:crop has re~ained large• -~ With· the seemingly endle5s taslt · ol I brought significant results. made vulnerable.. Their supply and emment are worse ·now,.tliiiri·Jhey ·: Jyunharvested, .,, :''. .. . · '···. . ·mopping up these small units: Dip• ! .·, Throughout August and Septem-i communications lines-. stretching .'ever Have lie en:· Wliile' the:.eiiiian• ,,. ·:A division. head'-' in the· :state-·:: :: lomaW here estimate, that; even if !i ber, government communiques have from bases in the far southeast; · sion strategy has: left·· UNITA~ ini a: · o'Wned • bakery·· company' --that ·sup~ · . South ·African· aid • were·· ended; ' teported hundreds of casualties and holve been interrupted, at : times. vulnerable• long-ternl .. pesitiori•' and -.. 'plies: bread for Luanda. to!~ of• its· · .UNIT A' could' survive• ~s. a· force ]· ~aptures:· of" UNIT A, ·including the· with the assistance of the Portu-· allowed governinenHorces.t!YsC:ote · : inabilit9' to :obtain s3lt from rnines. ~-inside tlie· country· for· at least--an·· :y killing of Cot_Tembi-Temba; the top guese commandos, who are non-ac· · · some• significant victories.~iti;•aJso:•. :,'·outside the• capitaL since:· the··last /.:othec·two years ... • ' , '.:: •: · ~ UNlTA- · commander ·.'in eastern: live duty officers and soldiers work-. '· has placed inriitmerable small gtier"· · :three trucks. belonging to his su~ •. \,::.But· these same ob5ervers ·note ; MOxico; ACcording to. numerous ac-: inC without the official permission. rilla units tlirou'ghout•att~tim_ated .· ;:ptier ·were blown ·up on- the· ·road. • ·:that,. through its· offensives against ~-·counts· here;· the government gains oc aclmowledgement of Lisbon.. . 90 percent of the nationat:territory •. -. ·-Following the destruction last Oc- : larger::: r.ebel concentrations; . the l, have been aided by extensive use of·

The Portuguese apparently fill a. Small UNITA tearns-eoittinile·to.: tober·ofpowerstationsnear Dando,. government is succeeding in pre- theAngolanAirForce,.whosearsenal. ~ency and training attack industrbl plants iri prmijSiorl•· · about 100 miles southeast of Luan- · · venting·' UNIT A . from developing reportedly includes new shipments of need felt by the AngQian armed al·capitals and ·'supply· convoys of,. da,.bi'iefly·leaving the capital with· . '.the· forWard bas~snecessary to sup- , Soviet MiG23s in addition to dozens-~ despite the presence of an: ·food and raw materialS; Road.travel ,: out electricity, UNIT A units struck port:-.its· 10-to-12-man sabotage of previously, acquired MiG17s and esbmated 25,000 Cuban troops sta- --·is cimsidered unsafe·iri·VirttiaiiY;the:. ·in· smalle~ towns less than 50 miles units. "The Angolan military,:• said MiG21s. . ., · booed here. · · · · ; · ·' . entire, country· outside:; of; a; few· · away from here: on: the two main- one diplomat; ~.'has gotten· a lot more It .is also in this region that the•

The assessment of gains for the milest radius around. the capital-and- :roads leading inland •.. · · efficientiately.'~ · 'Angolans rejiortedly have· made Ulle:

~ Movement for the Liber• 1tioa of Angola <MPLA) since An­robn indq!endence in 1975. While tile . two countries maintain diplo­m.JIIC •nd trade relationships, Por­tu!r.!l ~larly is denounced a3 tbe~ former colonial master whose· 'in.'· telli~ service was largely re--

'· S90ilSible for establishing UNIT A in ~ho is credited with Angola's new the 1960s as a preindependence, a1r prowess under a streamlined counterweight to the MPLA; .. . i command and training structure.

The Portuguese a!e publicly. ac•lj He and other young Angolan of: ~ ~Y ~he government' of co~.! 1 ficers· close to President Jose tmumg i?dtrect sup~rt _for UNIT A lj-E!!!!_~rdo dos Santos reportedly feel by _•!lowing Jt to mamtam a base of i! uncomfortable with Soviet military political operations in Lisbon .. The •! advisers and are eager to put their M~ long has charged that "thou-. ;; new levels of training and organi­und5 o_f Portugu_ese mercenaries >· .. ~a_tiorl to political as well as military ~~~tmg alongs1de UNIT A .. _ . . us~as this desire that report-two he S?me t1me. however, \he e?ly led the.military quietly to in-

coan~nes share a common Jan· vtte the first contigent of several gu:age_ a cul1ure and, _perhaps dozen Portuguese commandos here = rmportant ~· a ~ong h~story. of in the early 1980s under the spon-1 ry ~tJon ln~ludmg, Por- sorship of Adm. Rosa Coutinho t~andmlltlta~ rule! 10 the coun- 'Known as the "Red Admiral" for hi~ ''""""' rammg o some oftbeir II' 'th d' . . momterparts i th · · . a lance WI ra Jcal JUmor officers

otf>ettcorps. n e current Angolan who launch~d the 1974 coup in Par-

One of the highest-rankin. ·Por· tugal:. Coutmho served briefly as !uguee.trained Angolans !: Ai; colo~Jal governor here shortly be-fon:e axnmander lk ea· . '- fore Independence.

o · rrerra. See AHCOf.A A'tl< l'ol t ..

That original group now is be' lieved to have grown to a contin­gent of 150 to 200 Portuguese, who helped train the Angolan equivalent

· of Green Beret special forces units. Both the special forces and the Por• tuguese are reliably said. to be par­ticipating in the Moxico operations. . ·Meanwhile, the P<irtuguese gov· ernment. is moving toward a much-· desired politiCal rapprochment with the MPLA, marked most tecently by the first-ever meeting between the Portuguese foreign· minister and Angolan · Presi<lent dos Santos early this month, As the unofficial military cooperation continues, Lis-· bon is torn between its desire to be accommodating and a fear that some of its citizens will be captured or otherwise identified, putting both g~IVernments into' an embarrassing­ly compromised position,

· of a number of Portuguese counter­insurgency. commandos. ·

Portugal-jtas had a curious rela­tionship with , the ruling- Marxist

The Marxist government here still relies on the Cuban forces orig­inally brought in to help the MPLA defeat two other liberation groups, including UNIT A, and secure inter­national r~cognition as the !egiti- . mate government in 1975. Today, their official function is to provide a static defense line to deter South Africa from launching an all-out in· vasion deep into Angola;

They reportedly are lotated in · large concentrations in all but the. far south. Outside their gimisons, they are most visible as advisers­and reportedly pilots-at major air installations like the military bases at airports in Luanda and Lubango, iri the southwest.

Lubango itself is defended · against ·anticipated South African air raids (UNIT A has no air force) by batteries of surface-to-air mis­siles on the hills around the city. The fields around the airstrip are dotted with earth-covered, camou; flaged hangars housjng the Soviet­supplied jets, which fly daily sorties to undisclosed destinations.

According to recent reports from foreign travelers to other areas of Cuban concentratiop away· from the

· capital, such as the garrison in Sau­rimo in northern Lunda South Prov­ince, Cuban units rarely have en­gaged UNITA forces ex~ept when directly attacked. One exception. according to a reliable source here, was when "the Cubans had to re­take~ one of the. UNITA-captured British diamond mines.

The Angolan government sharply denies, and informed diplomatic observers ·give little credence to,

. UNIT A charges that SoViet officers and combat troops have been in· valved in recent fighting.

Tlie final contingent of South Af-. rican troops occupying southern · Angola withdrew last April under a U.S.-brokered agreement signed by Luanda and Pretoria nearl}' a year

· earlier. Since then, Angola has charged South Africa with l'eJlt'ated air reconmiissance incursions from its bases in Namibia .. •

The Angolan govern-ment main· tains that South Africa's current

.. high level of interest in southern Angola is based less on concern· about Namibian rebels it charges are· based there than on a desire to

·support crumbling UNIT A-forceS.·

S. Afriea sho#s ~-itStill ainis to desblb~ l-egion • ; .•. ·• ' ·;.,.. ; ; • • • ' ~~ . . . •. . .. ;, ·••. :r-.... ·~ :'" •' .

By Patrick laurence . Special to Th<l CMsflan Science Monitor

. Johonneoburg There is mounting evidence that South Af-

~ca has not abandoned its policy of destabiliz­. mg neighboring coimtries, despite signs last . Yll9! that ~toria was pursuing a more benign · reg10nal policy. ..

Diplomats in Pretoria suspect that South Af­rica's invasion of Angola Monday was aimed at preventing the fall of the main base of rebels fighting to topple the Angolan government. . Their suspicions were sharpened when Gen . . Constand Viljoen, chief of the South African military, announced that a South African Il)edi-cal orderly was with the rebels when killed last . ·. ! · weekend during a clash with Angolan soldiers. · Pretoria says its invasion was a preemptive strike against a different group of. rebels, the South-West Africa ·People's Organization. SWAPO is fighting to end South African rule in Namibia (South-West Africa}. Pretoria said yesterday it will withdraw this weekend.

Trouble was also looming for South Africa on the opposite flank in Mozambique. Fbreign Minister Roelof Botha admitted yesterday that

' ~.-BOTHA.h<rit~·,

BO'TIIA fmni 1ron1 page

South Africa has "technically" violated a nonaggression pact it signed with Mozam­bique last year. The so-ealled Nkomati ac­cord forbids each counf2T from support-ing the other's rebels. . .

Pretoria's continuing support of the Mozambican rebels, the Mozamqique Na­tional Resistance movement (MNR), was revealed in documentS ca11tured with the fall of the group's headquarters last month. The captured document was a diary of an MNR lead~ that.listed visits to the group's headquarters by South Af­rican Deputy Fbreign Minister Louis Nel.

Evidence that South Africa was in­volved in the support of MNR forces in Mozambique, was presented to Mr. Botha

. by Mozambique President Samora ' Machel in Maputo, the Mozambican cap-

ital, on Monday. · Early yesterday, after an investigation

into the evidence by a two-man South Af­rican team, Botha conceded that South Africa had violated the Nkomati aceord.

Botha admitted that radio communica­tions had been established between the South African military and MNR, that· South Africa had helped build a rebel air­strip in Mozambique, that supplies -mainly "humanitarian" but including some small arms - had been dropped to the rebels and 'that South Africa had

South Africa was requested by both· parties to help ensure implementation of the declaration. Nel attempted to bring the two parties together after negotiations broke down.

Nel's ·visits to the MNR.- bush· cainp were undertaken to try to get them started again, Botha said. Nel's last two visits were undertaken with his approval, Botha added.

Both Botha and General Malan con-,. · tended that these "technical" contraven­

tions did not amount to violation of the Nkomati accord per se, as contact with the MNR rebels had been made with the objective of "softening" ~eir attitude and bringing them to the negotiating table.

Later yesterday Botha flew to Komatipoort on the South African·

transported rebel leaders to "and froin Mo- · ha~e let him go," Botha ~ommen1<ed~ Mozambican border for talks . with two zambique, ·once by submarine. He said . The South African minister of defense, Mozambique cabinet ministers. At this the arms drop was to help the builders of - Gen. Magnus Malan, who was present at writing no details were available. · the airstrip defend themselves: the press briefing, contended that Mozam- As international pressure against

· _ ·But he insisted South Africa's bique's government Was aware of the con- South Africa's invasion of Angola bresches of the accord were in the inter- tact betweerr·t.he South African military inounted, the Angolan government has est8 of trying to end the civil war between and MNR: "But the response from them declared that the primary purpose of Mozambique's government and rebels of was, 'Don't bother ils with South Africa's military incursion is to the MNR. · · techi:ricalities ... , Just get them to come help anti-goverDJjlentrebels.

The first of Mr. Nel's three visits to the to us for peace-tiilks.' " . It charged that South African military MNR base· was undertaken without his· Last OctOber South Africa succeeded aircraft had bo1Jlbed an Angolan column knowledge, Botha said . .Nel had not in- ' in bringing senior officials of Mozam- advancing on rebel headquarters, killing formed him because he; · Nel, thought bique and MNR representatives to talks six soldiers and wounding 25: · Botha would veto the visit because the in Pretoria, persuading them to sign a dec- South Africa gave the strength· of its risk to. Nel's personPl safety was too laration agreeing to "work out n basis for force as 500 men, divided intoJ2 teams of great. "He was right. I ?robably wouldn't peace.", _ .. , . , . . about 40 men. ./

Attack designed;t9 Financial Tlm••:'Th~~:.~~fi~~\·~; • ·· . , , J · • ,. • · . It said that the operation fol·:: Africli. a~reed" tQ;- w_itbaril.w,;,its

aid Angola. 'reb.els~\;;i. ~~~:?f:5Vair nflJ!~~~: ~ir~!1~::~;~:\?~.~~~:~~:-~~ \ ... '· . ..,, .. ,. , of them .. siDCe the wi~d~walo~ "It .rapidly. bec.atn~.-op~Joils

BY ANTHONY ROBINSON IN JOHANNESBURd . .. Soltth,, ,African forces,, fro~ thnt; the.; Angolan::. forces.·_,npt .. In re<:eiii! weeks ·unit~ forces· southern :Angola .on..Ma,y.. ·• 18 •.• ,~only ;· prqvideq·:.;Swapol· with are believed to h:tve coine under ~e statement add~ .t,hat t~, logistic help but also i~tormed. strong pressure around the maJoritY•:: of1·' .the 2uu>_swa~ them of security force actions.·~­Benguela railway and . other.· forces i~1(<i-lved hi· the first· the statement said.·, ·:; · ·.• t··iC are.as of central A.ngo•a from." . operation be!ween January 10"· Securl~ arlalysts •her~- no~ed · FPLA forces strengthened by : 15 had been destroyed. and that that: .the~latest:, rald,·Js• partlY, recent shipments of soviet built 72 had been.killed in tlie latest aim~ at.J)re-emptlnir the:tradi"· MiG 23 ~hter bombers and. ope;at~ons~·.. . . . ..... ': tlona.t..r!iiny .season Inflltr~tion• heUcGpter gunships. . . , SJgnlfl.can\}y the latest state-. effoJi1: by .. Swapo and of break". . Defence headquarters in Pre-,. ment fro~ , defen<:e headquar-~ ing. up t~elr s~pplyjin.es -~();;·~~-

SOUTH AFRICAN defence headquarters yesterday revealed further details of its latest cross­border ra:id into Angola as in­ternational criticism mounted and diplomats voiced a growing iJelief that the operation is at least partly designed to ease the pressure on Unita forces further north.

South African defen<:e offi­cials have in the past saiid that!: at least 60 per cent of the 8,000 South-West Africa People's Organisation (Swapo) guernillas have been deployed In support of the Angolan FPLA army In operations against Unta forces led by Dr1 Jonas Snvimbi.

toria said yesterday that nearr . ters, c~ti<:ts~d the FPLA. , . it··. south •... ,·.; ··• ,.·~':;?,:' ., ....... . ; . ., ·500. South African and.Nami.: noted greater ~o:-operatlon be-. _It.. afso:>t&kes•.place· a~;··.fu.e bian . troops split · into , 12 · .. tween the FPLA and Swapo and;· recentliY formed coalitio~ , ~:~-'1• "reaction teams" of abOut, 40 , accu~e~ the. Angola~ force~· of emment of national umty. ~~·fb.;, -...._ __ men. each, backed ,Up. by air-. providmg Swapo Wlth· lOgiSti~ _Windhoek· is flbOUt to embar~. craft, ,were conducting· what it help and also informing them,. o~ ~'.political o~ration de

. called, . the "follow-up opera-· of security force movements. signed:· • _to .. boost tts• standing: trion" against the Swaj:IO ~th. Defence . headquarte~ .. also.. amdngtt11e_1_pvambo· ~ti~I•_Wh~cH, Battallan consisting of between accused .. Swapo of violati!lg the ma~e~1\1P.'nearly so._per .. cent-.of 4oo and 8oo men. . .. . FebruaJ,'Y. 19~4 L!lSaka. a~~- the to:tal· Namibian popuJ.atlo.n

• ' · · ·· ment · between . South · ·. Afnca· and :whaM; hitberto..has ·Ql!l\Qu~d. and Ang!)la 145 ..times~· _ :;:, its. ·~~~!~P,~: :!~PP~rt; .. ~~; ;, ·/\£i2:~S:

-"¥·'' ......... _, ___ ~

DAI L '/ Y. 29 May 85

REPORT C+ra.nse""~~ SOUTHERN AFRICA

u 1

I tl rorm:t..,.l 0)1 Sev- VIce ( F Bl s:J Pore1;n "Broa.dus:f

ANGOLA e Captured RSA Commando Reveals Mission, Tactics MB282042 Luanda Domestic Service in Portuguese 1928 GMT 28 May 85

[Text] In a press conference held in Luanda this afternoon attended by members of diplomatic corps accredited in ou; country_ and by national and foreign journalists, Wynand Petrus, an offictal of the South African Special Forces, was presented to those present. He was captured by the F APLA forces when he was preparing_ with so~e other elements of the racist army to sabo~age the mstallat10n of Cabinda Gulf in Malanga. The meetmg was opened by Comrade Pinto Joao, dirctor of the MPLA Department of Information and Propaganda.

"* ~ ~ Gentlemen of the national and international press, distinguished representatives of the diplomatic corps accredited to the People's Republic of Angola, as part of this press conference, it is our wish to present to you the prisoner captured by our glorious F APLA. We are certain that he himself will be able to describe to you the action which was intended to be carried out by the special commando unit. The prisoner captured by our Defense and Security Forces belongs to the commando group of the South African Special Forces and has the rank of captain.

[Petrus- in English] I am Captain Wynand Petrus Johannes du Toit of the SADF. My force number is 74770553-PF. l am a member of the SADF with the rank of captain, belonging to the Special Forces unit that is situated at Longebaan in the Cape.

My base is situated - if you look at this map here - you can see Langebaan in the Saldanha Bay area. It is in the Cape province of South Africa.

My military background is as follows: I have 8 years of military experience, of which a great deal of time was spent doing my training as an officer at the military academy at Saldanha Bay.

I started my- military career in 1977 with my junior leader training and during 1978 I started my officers' training, and in 1979 I s~arted with my military degree at the military academy at Saldanha Bay, and in 1981 I finished after obtaining my military degree.

After finishing my studies at Saldanha Bay in 1981, I went to special courses training in 1982. The special courses training inClude- mosfof inaf year~- and after the training phase of more or less 32 weeks, I started to participate in several Special Forces operations.

The lirst operation I took part in was the des.!.!:oying of the Qiraul Br~e !11 Mocamedes during 1982, the end of 1982. The main aim of this act, this operation, was tc cut off S'N A PO's logistical lines which was the railway line that w~• ~ning across the Giraul Bridge.

The secend military or second special force operation in which I participated was the Maputo raid.

. The third operation in which I participated "'as carried out between end of 1983 and January 1984 near Cahama.

The only success we had during this operation was that we found an evacuated base ofSWAPO.

The next operation and the last one, to which we came, is the operation for which l am here.

This last operation was launched with the aim of dClltroying the oil storage tanks in Cabinda Gulf.

[Joao] Gentlemen of the international press, dear comrades, you have just heard the statement made by the prisoner captured by our glorious FAPLA. If there are journalists who would like to pose to us or to the prisoner some questions, we would be ready to answer them.

[Unidentified reporter] The question comes ~rom the USSR television. The first question is first as a professtonal offic~r, you should be aware of the damage that the mines you took ~tth you were capable of cau.c;ing. How many deaths do you thmk o?e explosion of the mine could cause and what would be_ the_ matenal damage cause by such a mine? And the second suestton ts: Yo.ll said nothing about the UNIT A .grogaganda which you brought with you. ··-

(Petrus- in English] The South African Special Forces cons~t of several units, as I showed out to you earlier. It is ,a fa~t..that different commando grou arc not told of each others mtssto_l)~. There ore, 1t 1s not to my knowledge, I do ~ot know that there are any other spectallorces commandos at thts stage active mstde

~ tfie southern part of AnKola and also I do not know what the other commando groups are do.!!!J.

6'ix·r~~~n~cr•r') - - -

j .-.

'·.,...._.·.: .,

Western gOveQUllen~ to,] hold talks on S. Africa · :

.. \

. FinanC1al Times Friclay June 21 19~ .. ·

20 tHE NAMIBIAN FRIDAY ~gust 30 1985

NO ALTERNATIVE TO MPC SAYSNEWAG

NATIONAL ELECTIONS In Namibia are a long way off, If likely at all, and the present •transitional govern­ment' had to establish Itself as a viable alternative to SWAPO. ThiswasthemessageglvenbytheneV# Ad­ministrator General, Mr LOUIS PIENAAR, In an in­depth interview with SUE CULLINAN last week. Mr Pienaar said the aim of the •transitional government' was to broaden Its basis of support until there was an Infrastructure which 'had to be recognised', and which would challenge the notion of SWAPO as the 'sole and authentic representative of the Namibian people'. One could not even consider that this ven­ture might fall, he said, as the alternative was •too ghastly to contemplate'.

Mr Plenaar said his role In the present dispensa­tion was quite different from that of his predecessor, In that while he was technically still head of state, •real power' had been transferred to the new Administra­tion. He Aid that while the South African State Presi­dent could, on paper, repeal legislation drawn up by the •transitional government', this was put Into the Proclamation to •aasure the outside world' that UDI was not taking place.

0: We've been told that the aim of the MW Interim gowmment Is to become • 'government of nation­al unity'. How do you see thla coming about?

Well I want to say at the outset that I have a problem with the way the press is reporting events in the National Assembly- that they con­'\:entrate on differences between the parties Instead of matters of comr1,1on Interest, such as the

question of alleviating unemploy­ment or upgrading education ... My Impression is that the Cabinet has given considerable attention to these matters but no-one reports this. Everyvrte i!Halklng about AG 8-what it does or doesn't mean-but there are also other matters of equal or greater importance. There Is a lot of work being done behind · closed doors in the common in­terest of the country; I don't know

The interview with the Administrator-Gen,tral is the first in a two-part series. Part II will be carried in next week's edition.

what they're doing because I don't sit in, one just hears it ... but there are other matters that could be reported other than just the ques­tion of catching flies in the Nation-al Assembly. · a: I think the concern Is whether this new Administration, the In­terim government, Is going to work, or whether thel'f! are al­ready cracks which show wide differences of opinion?

Do we ever tell ourselves what would be the alternative if it doesn't last? Do we emphasise that enough, or only the differences? Why emphasise the differences that could lead to rupture, if the al­ternative to not finding common ground is 'too ghastly to contemplate'? 0: So do you think there Ia no al­ternative to the present set-up?

I have no alternative. It's going to be a very bad alternative if it's go­ing to be an alternative at all. But people are in too much of a hurry; conciliation and reconciliation is not a thing that is achieved by the flick of a finger. lt'a a process of growing together, understanding

and having good faith in· one another. I'm speaking from a cer­tain measure of experience: I was a memberofthe President'sCoun­cil and It took us one solid year to find common ground or to establish our good faith vis-a-vis one another,

and then afterwards we began producing our reports, which even­tually gave rise to the new Consti­tution in South Africa. Of course then we had,the advantage that we weren't in the public eye because

-we were debating behind closed doors and we could find common grounds without being pressed and hunted down ...

Unitydoesn'tfallfrom heaven, it is a thing that is achieved by negoti-

NAMIBIA's new Administrator General, MR LOUIS PIENAAR.

--7'

ation ... and I think the public should have an enormous interest in the success of this venture, which is by and large one of the most interest­ing that has ever happened in Afri­ca; it may even be a precursor of what should happen in the Repub­lic of South Africa in the near future.

Personally I have great confi­dence that there is a large measure of understanding among members oft he Cabinet, and iflhat sort of co­hesion which I seem to observe ex­isting could now be expanded in a debate behind closed doors within the new Constitutional Council, to

·for example, the other sixty mem­bers of the National Assembly, I think that would be an exercise worth doing. And we shouldn't press them, we the public, we sh9uld ask them to go behind closed doors and start talking about these things, because the alterna­tive, as I say again, is not one that we should contemplate. Q: But Is there not an alternative that would Include elections?

Well ... if you are prepared to hold elections, then you would have to contemplate the participation of those members of the electorate that support SWAPO. Then you are right back on the International po­litical scene, which makes it very difficult at this stage to even think about the possibility of general elections; you are right back with the question of the implementation of 435 and the United Nations Monitoring Force, and United Na­tions partiality towards SWAPO in the whole situation • there is no question of that in my mind. And all that makes it awfully difficult to think of an alternative based on a gener­al election at this particular point in time. I am not excluding it for the fu­ture; I sincerely hope that we might achieve a certain situation in terms of which it would be possible to hold impartial elections without the in­tervention of any force or threat of violence or menace of any sort.

Bu\ one must also realise that it is a question of a choice between

basically two systems: one is the socialist-inspired and based sys­tem which would be imposed by a SWAPO-dominated government, which would make it well-nigh im­possible for people now living in this country, or a large percentage of the people, to continue living in this country. Its a question of that system, and it you look at what SWAPO has from lime to lime said in this regard· in 1978 and again in 1980,1aying down its principles for thegovernmentofthiscountry-one can only fear really, that it will be a totally revolutionary new econom­ic social and political system, in­compatible with the attitudes of a very large percentage of the peo­ple, I could even say I he majority of people in this country.

So that's your one choice. The other one is finding a compromise between the contending parties, but on the basis of individual free­dom, the capitalistic system of pri­vate enterprise and what goes with that, and at least within a situation in terms of which you could express yourself politically in opposition to the government, it you so wish.

So there you have the two alter­natives. And the alternative of maintaining a status quo, I'm not pleading for that at all, because there has- got tQ be an immense amount of adaptation,! can see that in the future. But at least a system growing out of the known, a system which could use the infrastructure which is already here • and here I am not only speaking of the physi­cal infrastructuw. but of the eco­nomic infrastructure and the infras­tructure of human resources that exist in this country • and could build on this infrastructure and ex­pand and adapt to the benefit of all, Instead of the revolutionary process which would be the alter­native of SWAPO: to break down, mould and start rebuilding from a new basis and on a new political concept. And that to my mind is go­ing to put this country back for many years.

Q: To my knowledge, SWAPO In negotiation• with the Contact Group, agreed to certain propoaala which Included minority right guarantee• and the right to property and private ownerahlp •••

But how would you do that if you have a system of one-man one­\'Ote, with the majority simply decid­ing by majority vote to change everything that you could change? I've no idea that SWAPO would be prepared to guarantee minority rights,just judging by their state­ments of '76, their statement of prin­ciples In reaction to the then Turn­halleAIIiance Interim Government, and also their statements in 1980. Judging by those statements -claiming themselves to be the only and sole representatives of the Namibian people, and the only party that should govern -I have no confidence, really no confidence, that there will be any guarantees for minority groups or minority cultures.

Q:So would you uy thlals ac­tually one of the moet fundamen­tal problema ... the question of aole and authentic repreaen­tatlon?

Yes, and one must look at it also in the African context: Africa has become prone to a series of coup d'etats, military governments ... although I'm not completely against the principle of a one party government; I think there is some validity in the claim that in a one party state you could still exercise democratic rights, but In a typical­ly Alrican context ... But by and large welll8a Thlrd\Nortdcountrybut na nece88afily and totli.lly an African country, and by and large there Ia a large percentage ot the locaJ population reasonably well Im­bibed with Western democratic concepts- and I'm apeaking espe­cially of the White, Coloured, Rehe­both and Namapopulationgroupt -andtosubjectthemtotheAtrican prlooipleofaoM~IWltewou!d be ~!'1\COO~fl.M)IJ~, 1Jllr\111CC~~/Q!P.J,

and soonewoold have to find some sort of compromise.

And I think what we are trying to do should fall well on the ears of BlackAfrica,and especially the Or­ganisation of African Unity which Is supposed to be just this- an organi­sation of reconciliation of contend­ing parties. And if I look at Europe in the last 40 years, that is exactly how things went: finding common ground, reconciling,not subjecting toanyonegovemment(notyet), still maintaining their Independence

within their national states, culturee protected by boundaries, by guarantAeSwhich have been deve­loped over many years, but at leaet finding common ground within the -Common Market situation ... even these days to the extent that they have evolved common foreign poli­cies( vis-a-vis South Africa as the prime example). My contention Is that the alternative, of negotiating, of finding common ground .. .it's a process of growing conciliation, and should be encouraged. _

Q: I think the concern ofthoae who Wllntpeace 11 that •tonga SWAPO Ia excluded from theao­lutlon, the war will continue up North ...

I don't think SWAPO n6ed re­main out of the picture. If SWAPO wants to come tomorrow, we've set our conditions that they should come without their arms.The mili­tary action is only there to buy time so the politicians can find a solu­tion; there will be no military sofu­tlon ,only a political solution.

As tar as the military action Is concerned,! am very satisfied with the way things are going: it would seem the South West African -South African forces are Indeed able to cope with the situation at the moment,andthatasfaraaonecan talk of military ascendancy they are certainly gaining the day. The SWA­PO incursions are becoming • It would seem on f~gures submitted to me ~~ iea:an " !es~ and less, and

they've reduced from guerilla tac­tics to terrorist tactics again.That is a step down the grade of revolution-ary warfare. ·

So I'm reasonably satisfied with the situation there. But that's not go. ing to solve the problem: SWAPO is not looking for a military victory, SWAPO's looking for a political victory.

ihe Na.~, b1~h

3D A ud. J') 15

NAMIBIA COMMUNICATIONS CENTRE Post Office Box 286, London WClX OEL, U.K. Tdephone:(44 1) 833 2905/6

Windhoek: 13 September 1985.

NAMIBIAN SHOP-OWNERS TERRORISED BY KOEVOET-.

On 25 August, off-duty constables of the South African Koevoet police brutalised Johannes Ishindinbua and Joseph Andreas, two shop-owners, and their families at Ongandjera in northern Namibia. In addition, much of their property was damaged or destroyed. Both men are members of the Evangelical Lutheran Church (ELOC). On the same evening the constables pillaged other properties, including the cafe of Mr. Phillipus Shiimbi.

"At midnight," said Mr. Ishindinbua, "my wife and I were awakened by gun shots around our house. I realized that the shooting was aimed at me." When he attempted to escape through the back door, Ishindinbua was captured. He was blindfolded and beaten on the head with the butt of a gun. After they had beaten him unconscious with clubs, the gunmen piled straw on Ishindinbua and attempted to set him on fire. "The pain made me a regain consciousness," said Ishindinbua. It was then that he heard policemen argue over whether to kill his wife or not. Mrs. Ishlndinbua was not killed.

The Koevoet members collected and burned Mr. Ishindinbua's legal papers, and tJ:!en burned his car and house.

/' The other shop-owner, Mr. Joseph Andreas, said that "at

eight p.m., on Aug-qst 25, men (whom he recognized to be members of Koevoet) came/to my house... They said that they were "from Angola" ~rid thaf they had come for him because he was a police informer. Instead, they stole R.4,500 (c. £1,415) from Andreas' house and blindfolded him. "They then started shooting on the ground around me," said Andreas.

The constables took Mr. Andreas and went to the cafe of Mr. Phillipus Shiimbi. There they met the Koevoet men who had terro­rised Ishindinbua, and broke into the cafe. Later, the police­men drove into the bush where they ate and slept,with Mr. Andreas still in their custody. He was freed the next day, on 26 August.

Military officials inspected the remains of Mr. Ishindinbua's house on 26 August. On the same day, the South African police at Oshakati a-r-r-ested the Koevoet constable in possession of Mr. Andreas' car. He---.--1.--s __ due to appear in court. No one else was arrested. c---

Sources report that military aut~ities deny that Koevoet is responsible because the constables who cummitted these acts of

, violence were not on duty at the time. '-,

+++end.

ECSA 339 Lafayette Street

New York, N.Y. 10012

London: September 13, 1985

NAMIBIAN BISHOP CALLS :?OR "QUICK STEPS" TO FREE HIS COUNTRY

The leader of Namibia's largest church, Bishop Kleopas Dumeni, has called for an increase in international pressure on South Africa so that Namibia can get its independence. "Surely quick steps must be taken. My people are dying," said the Bishop.

Speaking in Helsinki, Finland, to the press last week, Bishop Dumeni said that the martial law situation imposed by South Africa in norther~ Namibia had worsened. Many persons had been det~ined without trial by the South African authorities. According to the Bishop, two Evangelists of the Lutheran Church are among those in prison. Due to the problems of landmines and harassment., the Bishop :-eported that "even immunization programmes for children have been curtailed."

Dumeni quoted the statement of Finland's Archbishop John Vikstr&n calling for a "great increase of international pressure on the minority government" of South Africa. "This is true," said Durneni, "Quick steps should be taken."

"There are those who would like to ask me about investments," said Dumeni. "They ask that if this investment action is happening, 'who will suffer, who will lose?' The question today is not who will suffer or lose," said Dumeni. "The Namibian people are already suffering and dying, therefore we cannot deal· with that question anymore. The correct question is 'what kind of steps can we take quickly to rescue the people in our situation?'"

South Africa has illegally occupied Namibia since 1966, when its trust mandate over the territory was terminated by the United Nations because of gross violations of human rights. In the present world-wide debate about the Republic of South Africa, the plight of the.people in Namibia, South Africa's colony, has been largely forgotten.

+++end.