WangcThe_Diachronic_and_Synschonichuk 2015 - The Diachronic and Synschonic

WANGCHUK 2015 Dorji Wangchuk, The Diachronic and Synchronic

Relationship between Philosophical Theory and Spiritual Praxis in Buddhism: With Special Reference to the Case of the Four Applications of Mindfulness (smtyupasthna: dran pa nye bar gzhag pa) in Vajrayna. In Buddhist Meditative Praxis: Traditional Teachings and Modern Applications, edited by K.L. Dhammajoti. Hong Kong: Centre of Buddhist Studies, University of Hong Kong, 2015, pp. 177201.

dorji WAngchuK: Philosophical Theory and Spiritual Praxis in Buddhism

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The Diachronic and Synchronic Relationship between Philosophical

Theory and Spiritual Praxis in Buddhism: With Special Reference to the Case of the Four Applications of Mindfulness

(smtyupasthna: dran pa nye bar gzhag pa) in Vajrayna1

Dorji WAngchuK

0. Prologue1. Philosophical Theory and Spiritual Praxis3. The Issue of the TheoryPraxis Dichotomy in Buddhism4. The Diachronic Relationship between Philosophical Theory and Spiritual Praxis5. Four Applications of Mindfulness in Vajrayna6. The Synchronic Relationship between Philosophical Theory and Spiritual Praxis. Epilogue

0. Prologue

The general topic of the conference Buddhist Meditative Praxis: Traditional Teaching and Modern Application lends itself well to the following brief discussion of the problems posed by the theorypraxis dichotomy in Buddhism, particularly as it relates to the Four Applications of Mindfulness (smtyupasthna: dran pa nye bar gzhag pa; henceforth smtyupasthna) in Vajrayna or the Mantric form of Mahyna Buddhism that has come down through the Ancient (rNying-ma) School of Tibetan Buddhism. On the basis of a number of primary (Tibetan) and secondary sources, I venture to discuss two related issues in Buddhist Studies, namely, (a) the diachronic (or historical) relationship between philosophical theory and spiritual praxis, and (b) the synchronic (or doctrinal) relationship between the two. My motivation for addressing these issues stems from the conviction that any steps by way of innovation that Buddhist theoreticians and practitioners might like to take ideally presuppose a nuanced understanding of Buddhist intellectual history, or at least a heightened awareness of how Buddhist

Buddhist Meditative Praxis: Traditional Teachings & Modern Applications

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theories and practices have evolved diachronically and synchronically. In other words, innovational reinterpretation and explication of traditional Buddhist teachingswhenever deemed suitable for and relevant to modern explication and applicationpresupposes a cognition and recognition of their historical developmentthat is, expertise gained through an investigation of Buddhist sources with the aid of historical-philological tools and techniques. I believe that in this way any potential contradiction or confrontation between tradition and modernity can be precluded or resolved.

1. Philosophical Theory and Spiritual Praxis

Let me begin by briefly explaining what I mean by the terms philosophical theory and spiritual praxis.2 By philosophical theory I mean any supposedly rational proposition or postulation regarding the true existential mode (gnas tshul) of phenomena, the mode, that is, that lies beyond their apparitional mode (snang tshul) and which, therefore, one is normally not aware of; or regarding their operational mode (i.e. modus operandi), namely, the fundamental principles or mechanisms according to which phenomena are said to originate or play out. The closest Sanskrit word for philosophical theory that I can think of is di (lta ba) as used, for example, in correct view (samyagdi: yang dag pai lta ba). Of the three kinds of training (ik: bslab pa), philosophical theory can be said to be associated with the higher insight or cognitive discernment (adhipraj: lhag pai shes rab). Some examples of philosophical theories in Buddhism would be those of dependent origination (prattyasamutpda: rten cing brel bar byung ba) and emptiness (nyat: stong pa nyid). The term spiritual praxis is employed here in the sense of the observation of higher moral and ethical discipline (adhila: lhag pai tshul khrims), and practices of higher contemplation and deep meditation (adhicitta: lhag pai sems = samdhi: ting nge dzin). Spiritual praxis according to any given Buddhist system is thus the actual implementation or application of a philosophical theory that is either tacitly presupposed or explicitly proposed by that particular system, and as a rule having or anticipating a desirable this-worldly and other-worldly, mundane and super-mundane, destiny as its goal. It can be said to include either pre-/post-meditative practices (cra/cary: spyod pa) or contemplative (or meditative) practices (bhvan: sgom pa) or both. What is known as


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the four infinitudes or unlimited ones (aprama: tshad med pa), the contemplation of the impure (aubhabhvan: mi sdug pa sgom pa), and the four applications of mindfulness (smtyupasthna: dran pa nye bar gzhag pa) may be mentioned here as examples of spiritual praxis.

In the context of discussing philosophical theory and spiritual praxis and their diachronic and synchronic relationships, it is worth bearing in mind that we are dealing with various types of Buddhist theories and practices, and naturally the kinds of relationship we try to trace depend on the kinds of underlying theory or praxis. With regard to a typology of philosophical theories, we may recognize, as has been done,3 two types of philosophical theory in Buddhism.

The first type represents those theories that have been inherited from pre-/non-Buddhist Indian religious traditions, such as the doctrine of transmigrational rebirth (sasra: khor ba), which is to be found as early as the Brhmaas. The doctrine that the earthly life and its constituents are essentially characterized by suffering (dukha: sdug bsngal) is said to be already found in the older Upaniads. Likewise the doctrine that craving or thirst (t: sred pa) is the cause of rebirth, which implies suffering, is foreshadowed by the Upaniadic doctrine according to which desire decides ones destiny after death. The second type of philosophical theory represents those that are exclusively Buddhist and which have been freshly developed by Buddhism. Of the two types, the former can thus be said to be common (i.e. shared) and traditional; the latter, uncommon (i.e. unshared) and innovational.

Furthermore, it may be proposed that Buddhist philosophical theories, particularly those related to ontology, can be classified into two types as well, namely, those that are somehow connected with Buddhist soteriology and which would be hence soteriologically indispensable for any given Buddhist system, and those that are not, at least not directly, connected with Buddhist soteriology and hence soteriologically dispensable. It appears that such a classification has indeed already been recognized,4 insofar as two kinds of Buddhist philosophical theories can be pointed out, namely, (a) those that are rooted in spiritual praxis and (b) those that have not stemmed directly from spiritual


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praxis and hence are only loosely (or remotely) connected, or not at all connected, with spiritual praxis.5 The former can be considered primary Buddhist philosophical theories and the latter secondary. The various versions of what I call Mtravda (Onlyism or Mereism) Buddhist philosophythat is, the Buddhist philosophical theory that asserts that our world of manifold appearances constitutes nothing but x (whose dimmed existence is accepted), whereas the existence of y, which stands for a metaphysical cause or substrate (be it theistic or otherwise), is rejectedmay be considered an example of the first kind. As examples of the second type, one may mention the theory of the ledger of debtsor promissory note(apattra: bu lon gyi dpang rgya) said to have been proposed by some Vaibhika schools)6 and Tsong-kha-pas theory of disintegration qua entity (zhig pa dngos po).7

Also, with regard to a spiritual praxis prescribed or described by Buddhist sources, there may be several ways of proposing a typology of it on the basis of various criteria. As indicated above, spiritual praxis can be (a) mundane (laukika: jig rten pa) or supramundane (lokottara: jig rten las das pa) depending on the goal or objective, (b) meditative or post-meditative, (c) directly relevant to Buddhist soteriology or only distantly or not at all related to it, (d) spiritual praxis that is considered to be epistemically veridical, or to which is attributed an epistemic value (e.g. meditation on nyat) and one that is not considered to be epistemically veridical, or one to which is attributed only an instrumental value (e.g. aubhabhvan), or, (e) three types of spiritual praxis that deal with the corresponding three types of training (ik: bslab pa), namely, with adhila, adhicitta (i.e. samdhi), and adhipraj.

2. The Issue of the TheoryPraxis Dichotomy in Buddhism

As mentioned earlier, the two issues pertinent to the theorypraxis dichotomy in Buddhism are (a) the diachronic (or historical) relationship between philosophical theory and spiritual praxis, and (b) the synchronic (or doctrinal) relationship between the two. (a) The first issue, the diachronic relationship, concerns the question of how philosophical theories and spiritual practices have developed historically, that is, essentially the question whether Buddhist philosophical theories developed out of certain spiritual practices or whether spiritual practices evolved out of philosophical theories. This


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seems to be an issue that has been raised only by modern historians of Buddhist ideas.8

(b) The second issue of the synchronic relationship between philosophical theory and spiritual praxis concerns the question as to how they relate to each other doctrinally at any given point in time, or rather, how the two are ideally said to synchronize and harmonize. This issue seems to be have been a constant concern within the Buddhist traditions. Judging from Indo-Tibetan Buddhist sources, one gets an impression that the synchronic relationship between philosophical theory and spiritual praxis has been by no means an easy one to agree on. Buddhist scholars and saints in India and Tibet recognized an inherent tension between the two, for all the considerable and diverse efforts made to synchronize or harmonize them, or at least to emphasize the need to do so. This is the second point that I wish to briefly touch upon in this article.

3. The Diachronic Relationship between Philosophical Theory and Spiritual Praxis

Let us now return to the issue of the diachronic relationship between philosophical theory and spiritual praxis. In this context, two points seem worth making. First, we shall have to concede that spiritual practice seems hardly possible without any theoretical presupposition,9 and that even the spiritual practices of the historical Buddha himself would have had some philosophical theories or doctrinal presuppositions underlying them. As has already pointed out, however, it would be rather difficult to reconstruct the intellectual or spiritual processes which induced the Buddha to establish those philosophical theories that can be traced back to the Buddha himself. Second, it is highly important to bear in mind that Buddhism is a discipline of salvation, a definition obviously approved by a host of prominent Buddhologists,10 and that the Buddha is said to have categorically and consistently rejected pure speculative and theoretical deliberations as being either irrelevant or even detrimental to ones aspiration to release from sasric bondage, as is illustrated by the famous analogy of a man who has been shot with a poisoned arrow.11 From such a position, which may very well go back to the Buddha himself, one might deduce that the Buddha already presupposed two kinds of philosophical propositions, namely, ones that


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are salvifically irrelevant (heilsirrelevant) and others that are relevant (heilsrelevant), and that, accordingly, one is supposed to concentrate on the aspects of the spiritual praxis of the Buddhas teachings and to limit ones philosophical or theoretical speculations to the absolutely indispensable philosophical presuppositions.

One important question that poses itself is how we are to explain the existence of several philosophical theories and spiritual practices that cannot, as such, be accounted for in what are believed to be the earliest Buddhist sources. Explanations or attempts to answer this question can be found in two articles of Lambert Schmithausen that seek to elucidate the historical relationship between philosophical theory and spiritual praxis. On the basis of the history of Yogcra idealism, he has attempted to demonstrate that particularly central philosophical theories that are exclusively Buddhist and others that were freshly developed by Buddhism have their origin in certain forms of spiritual praxis.12 That is, new philosophical theories in Buddhism have been the result of subsequent reflection on certain spiritual experiences undergone during certain meditative practicesin what could be called theoretical consolidation and generalization. A Buddhist philosophical theory developed in this way is historically related to spiritual praxis but may also be considered to be of soteriological relevance. In this regard, Schmithausen13 believes that Buddhist philosophy not only differs from European philosophy, particularly from Greek and modern forms, but also from Brahmanical Indian philosophy, in which influences of spiritual practices on the philosophical theory are, to be sure, in evidence, but in general only to a lesser degree. The reason for this difference, he suggests, lies in the person of the Buddha himself, who, with unique consistency and radicalism, rejected all theoretical speculations that are of no soteriological relevance.

How about those Buddhist philosophical theories that seem soteriologically dispensable or irrelevant? How do we explain their development and existence? In this case, too, Schmithausen convincingly offers an explanation:14 such secondary Buddhist philosophical theories came into existence particularly when difficulties arose in systematizing, such as when primary philosophical theories were found incompatible with other existing doctrines. As examples, Schmithausen points to theories that attempt to explain the karmic


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mechanism (Wirkmechanismus) governing good and bad actions, which became a problem on account of the dogmatization of antisubstantialism and the negative evaluation (or rejection) of a substantial Self (tman: bdag). As an example of soteriologically irrelevant and secondary philosophical theories, one may perhaps mention the theory of the ledger of debtsor promissory note (apattra: bu lon gyi dpang rgya) said to be proposed by some Vaibhika schools, the bja theory of the Sautrntika school, the layavijna theory of Yogcra, the positivistic Buddha Nature theory of the Tathgatagarbha school, or Tsong-kha-pas theory of disintegration qua entity (zhig pa dngos po), all of which seem to be a result of different attempts made by different schools of thought to solve some crucial doctrinal problems faced by Buddhists, who rejected any theistic or non-theistic metaphysical substrate of phenomena. For the Madhyamaka school and particularly its branch known as Sarvadharmpratihnavda, this problem is not at all present inasmuch as, for its adherents, the principle of this mere state of conditioning (idapratyyatmtra: rkyen nyid di pa tsam) is supposed to explain the karmic mechanism and thus not only is there no need for a metaphysical substrate, there is no excuse for one. Similarly, several doctrinal developments in the Mahyna, such as ones within various sub-schools of the Yogcra and Madhyamaka systems with their theories of epistemology and Buddhology, may have been triggered by attempts to explain the mechanism (i.e. Wirkmechanismus at a different level) of how the Buddha or a buddhawithout a metaphysical substratumacts for the benefit of sentient beings.

Besides retracing the history of the idea of the four applications of mindfulness (smtyupasthna: dran pa nye bar gzhag pa), Schmithausen has also attemptedin two further articles15to illustrate that the reverse case is possible as well, namely, that spiritual praxis can undergo decisive change under the influence of (new) philosophical theories. He makes his case by considering the teaching of smtyupasthna as found in canonical non-Mahyna sources and (non-Mantric) Mahyna sources. He also remarks that the object lesson (das Lehrstck) offered by smtyupasthna contains a hefty portion (ein gutes Stck) of the Buddhist history of ideas, in which almost all dominant theories of the various strands of Buddhism come together. He has not, however, pursued the issue in a Vajrayna (or Buddhist Mantric) context. What I modestly attempt to do in this paper is to take up where


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Schmithausen has left off and suggest that in the Vajrayna, too, the praxis of smtyupasthna has undergone change under the influence of its philosophical view.

4. The Four Applications of Mindfulness in Vajrayna

The four applications of mindfulness in the Vajrayna (or Mantric Mahyna) system as elucidated in some sources of the rNying-ma School of Tibetan Buddhism may first be briefly discussed with the aid of the writings of Rong-zom-pa Chos-kyi-bzang-po (eleventh century), Klong-chen-pa Dri-med-od-zer (13081364), and Mi-pham rNam-rgyal-rgya-mtsho (18461912). By way of an introduction, let me make a few general points. First, although smtyupasthna as known in the non-Mahyna and non-Mantric systems and sources are not my primary concern in this context, it may be stated in general that Tibetan authors such as Mi-pham presuppose for each Buddhist soteriological vehicle or path its own thirty-seven factors that favour awakening (bodhipkik dharm: byang chub kyi phyogs kyi chos; bodhipak dharm: byang chub kyi phyogs dang mthun pai chos)which invariably include the four smtyupasthnasdistributed among the four paths of training (aikamrga: slob pai lam), namely, the path of accumulation (sabhramrga: tshogs kyi lam), path of preparation (prayogamrga: sbyor bai lam), path of seeing (daranamrga: mthong bai lam), and path of practice or meditation (bhvanmrga: sgom pai lam).16 This is true in particular of the Niruttarayogic system of Vajrayna, and Mi-pham, in his general commentary on the *Guhyagarbhatantra, does speak of the five paths of the highest Mantric system (sngags bla med kyi lam lnga) and associates the four Mantric smtyupasthnas with the minor Mantric path of accumulation (sngags kyi tshogs lam chung ngu).17 In other words, the five-mrga scheme of the non-Mantric Mahyna soteriology (which seems to have been retrospectively extended to the non-Mahynic systems) was extended also to Mantric soteriology, and thus it is that one encounters descriptions of the four smtyupasthnas according to the Mantric form of Mahyna Buddhism.Second, although the four smtyupasthnas have been often considered the Buddhist soteriological practices of those at the level of the minor path of accumulation (tshogs lam chung ngu)the first of the three levels of the sabhramrgaaccording to Mi-pham,18 aspects or


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elements of the practice (nyams len gyi cha) of what in its totality is known as the eighty inexhaustibles (mi zad pa brgyad bcu),19 which include the four smtyupasthnas, are said to be present at all levels of the path.

Third, it is worth bearing in mind that Mantric sources and systems are highly heterogeneous, and one is likely to find all sorts of interpretations of them and their components, including the smtyupasthnas. Particularly relevant here is the fact that Mantric sources, depending on the grade of doctrinal conservatism, may or may not go beyond prescribing the smtyupasthna praxis known in the non-Mantric forms of Mahyna Buddhism. But in the sources I have considered, it is very clear that the framework of the praxis of the smtyupasthnas has been refilled with a new doctrinal content that is in tune with the Mantric philosophy.

Fourth, although again the four smtyupasthnas according to non-Mantric forms of Buddhism are not our primary concern here, it seems important to consider the four Vajraynic smtyupasthnas not in isolation from but rather in relation to their earlier (non-Mantric) forms. This is precisely what Mi-pham often seems to do, namely, to compare the concept of the four smtyupasthnas found in the rvakayna (i.e. non-Mahyna) with those found in Bodhisattvayna/Pramityna (i.e. non-Mantric Mahyna) and Vajrayna/Mantrayna. That is, according to the rvakayna, bodies (kya: lus), feelings/sensations (vedan: tshor ba), minds (citta: sems), and phenomena (dharma: chos) are viewed as modalities of the four aspects/facets of the truth of suffering (sdug bden gyi rnam pa bzhii tshul), namely, transiency, (unreliability/deficiency and hence a cause of) discontentment, nullity, and non-essentiality, whereas according to the Bodhisattvayna they are viewed and meditated upon as being illusion-like on the conventional level (tha snyad du sgyu ma lta bu) and as being free from all extremes of manifoldness on the absolute level (dam par mtha kun dang bral bai sprod bral).20 Just as, according to the Madhyntavibhga, the Bodhisattvaynic smtyupasthna practice is said to excel its rvakaynic counterpart so is the Vajraynic smtyupasthna practice said to excel its non-Mantric counterpart.21


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Let me now turn specifically to how the four Mantric smtyupasthnas have been presented by Mi-pham, Klong-chen-pa, and Rong-zom-pa. First, to summarize, the four Mantric smtyupasthnas, according to Mi-pham, are as follows:22 (1) Contemplating (blo bzhag pa) the physical bodies of oneself and others as being characterized by primordial or intrinsic purity (dag pa), on the one hand, and by emptiness (stong pa nyid), freedom from manifoldness (spros bral), great homogeneity (mnyam pa chen po), and integrality (zung du jug pa), on the other, is called kyasmtyupasthna. (2) Transforming conceptual constructions whose occurrence one feels/senses (or is aware of) (byung tshor gyi rtog pa)23 into gnosis characterized by great bliss (bde ba chen poi ye shes) is called vedansmtyupasthna. (3) Channelling or containing/constraining (sdom pa) all kinds of manifoldness associated with mind and mental factors into/in/to the innate sphere of the luminous nature of the mind is called cittasmtyupasthna. (4) Conducting oneself in a way (or with an attitude) that all sasric and nirvic, universal and particular phenomena are pure and equal and hence beyond adoption or rejection, is dharmasmtyupasthna. In this context, Mi-pham maintains that the praxis of the four (Mantric) smtyupasthnas described is in accordance with a certain rGyud sgyu phrul dam pa. He, however, seems not to have drawn directly from this Tantric scripture, even if he did obviously rely on Klong-chen-pa.

Second, Klong-chen-pas presentation of the four smtyupasthnas from a Vajraynic perspective, which is essentially not much different from what has just been summarized, can be found in the twenty-second chapter of his Yid bzhin mdzod24 and in the corresponding auto-commentary, the Padma dkar po.25 The rGyud sgyu phrul dam pa and the passage cited by Klong-chen-pa are yet to be identified and located. There is another aspect of the Mantric smtyupasthnas which, while having not been explicitly touched on by Mi-pham in his Od gsal snying po, is mentioned by Klong-chen-pa in his Yid bzhin mdzod and the Padma dkar po, namely, a Mantric version of the smtyupasthnas of sorts that seems to be associated with the Vajrayna soteriology that is based on the skillful manipulation and exploitation of mainly physical/physiological resources, such as the channels (n: rtsa), vital winds (vyu: rlung), and seminal drops (bindu: thig le), as opposed to the Vajrayna soteriology that is based on the skillful manipulation and exploitation of psychical/psychological resources. In


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my view, recognition of these two kinds of Vajrayna soteriology, that is, so to speak, a primarily physiology-based Vajrayna soteriology and a primarily psychology-based Vajrayna soteriology,26 would facilitate the sorting out and explaining of several Mantric concepts found in Buddhism. At any rate, two related ideas connected with the physiology-based Vajrayna soteriology are mentioned by Klong-chen-pa,27 namely, (a) the thirty-seven factors that favour awakening, which include the four smtyupasthnas, are described as being the qualities of purity, purities, or pure quality (viuddhi: rnam dag = rnam dag chos) of Mantric maalas (dkyil khor), including the maala consisting of physical bodies (lus kyi dkyil khor), and (b) all the ensuing qualities (or good outcome) of the practice of the four paths (lam bzhii yon tan; i.e. of sabhramrga, prayogamrga, daranamrga, and bhvanmrga), including the outcome of the practice of the four smtyupasthnas, would come about through the disentanglement of the twenty-two knots of the channels (n: rtsa) of ones body and once the vital and psychic energies (rlung sems) running through the cakras (khor lo) of the body become functional. Klong-chen-pa clearly intends to draw a parallel between Stric Mahyna soteriology and the physiology-based Mantric Mahyna soteriology, and he also maintains that the latter soteriology occurs both in the Ancient and the New Mantric schools of Tibetan Buddhism and that it has been endorsed by figures such as cryas Vimalamitra and Padmasambhava.28

Klong-chen-pas claim that the psychology-based Vajrayna soteriology (involving the Mantric concept of the four smtyupasthnas) found its way into the New Mantric schools of Tibetan Buddhism is supported by sources such as Kcryas Vasantatilak and Vanaratnas Rahasyadpik, both of which are extant in the original Sanskrit and in Tibetan translation.29 In both these works, the four smtyupasthnas are identified with four female Tantric deities, namely, the kyasmtyupasthna with kin (mKha-gro-ma), vedansmtyupasthna with Lm (left untranslated in Tibetan), the cittasmtyupasthna with Rpi (gZugs-can-ma), and the dharmasmtyupasthna with Khaaroh (Dum-skyes-ma). Most importantly, these deities are said to be characterized by their nature of self-cognizance (svasavidrpa: rang rig pai rang bzhin) and by their manifesting (the nature/form) of true reality (dharmatrpa: chos nyid


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kyi gzugs). In other words, the praxis of the four smtyupasthnas has now assumed a form of praxis in which the highest cognitive subject, namely, gnosis, and the highest cognitive object, namely, true reality (or dharmadhtu), are to be fused, thereby dissolving any subjectobject dichotomy. Such a spiritual praxis is very much in conformity with the fundamental Mantric philosophical theory that Vajrayna is a Resultant Vehicle (bras bui theg pa), that is, a soteriological path or vehicle according to which one views the world, and conducts oneself in it, from the perspective of an awakened being who has already reached its soteriological goal. There seems to be hardly any doubt that Mantric praxes of the four smtyupasthnas are different from their Stric or non-Mantric counterparts. The main point that I thus wish to make is that the special praxes of the four smtyupasthnas found in Vajrayna may be best explained as outcomes of the decisive modifications/transformations that these praxes underwent under the influence of its (new) Mantric philosophical theories.

Third, Rong-zom-pas discussion of the four smtyupasthnas in his commentary on the Man ngag lta bai phreng ba (abbreviated here as lTa phreng) ascribed to Padmasambhava, may be presented here briefly.30 As in many other cases, Rong-zom-pas position on this issue is quite intricate, mainly because the pertinent points for him include not only the theorypraxis relationship but also questions relating to ontology (i.e. the ontic status of the objects of various kinds of meditation) and epistemology (i.e. the epistemic veridicality of perceptions of various kinds). An attempt will be made here to summarize his position. The point of departure for Rong-zom-pas discussion is that Padmasambhava in the Vajrayna section of his lTa phreng merely teaches that the philosophical view that phenomena on the absolute level are without origination and dissipation, and that he offers instruction on how to meditate upon (them) as divine (i.e. utterly pure), but it neither teaches the philosophical view regarding phenomena on the conventional level nor the special soteriological results (of Vajrayna). The discussion of the four smtyupasthnasfrom a traditional rvakayna perspectiveoccurs specifically in the context of explaining why Padmasambhava does not talk here about the philosophical view (lta ba) of divinity or purity of phenomena on the conventional level but only about the meditational praxis (sgom pa). To drastically simplify and summarize the key points, Rong-zom-pa explains that there is no need


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to talk about the philosophical theory (separately) because meditational praxis presupposes (or implies) it, and that philosophical theory and meditational praxis will not, in any case, (mutually) contradict (each other), inasmuch as the vision-like theory always accompanies the actual walking-like praxis. In sum, Rong-zom-pa seems to suggest that various kinds of meditation/contemplation (e.g. dhynas and samdhis related to aubhabhvan, smtyupasthna, ktsnyatana, and devatyoga) have some common features. First, any given (Buddhist) philosophical view and meditational praxis will necessarily always be consistent or congruent with each other. This applies, in particular, to the theory and praxis of the four smtyupasthnas in their traditional (or conservative) sense. Second, all the various kinds of meditation familiar to Buddhism have their instrumental value (i.e. serve as antidotes of some kind). The praxis of the four smtyupasthnas has been taught as offering antidotes to four kinds of false views (phyin ci log gi lta ba bzhi), such as seizing upon impure (mi gtsang ba) bodies (lus) as being pure (gtsang ba). In general, I have the feeling that for Rong-zom-pa, all spiritual means and pathsnay, all phenomenahave only an instrumental value!

Third, ontologically, if analyzed on the basis of logical reasoning and scriptural authorities, it turns out that none of the objects of meditation contradicts its defining characteristics (dngos poi mtshan nyid dang gal ba med). Such a result is in line with the assumption that just as there are various layers, levels, or dimensions of ontological reality, so too are the corresponding epistemic perceptions/conceptions of varying degrees of veridicality.31 For Rong-zom-pa, any given meditational praxis (e.g. aubhabhvan) necessarily finds itself confronted with a certain level of ontological reality and a related perception/conception that is correspondingly veridical. Thus, epistemologically, all cognitive subjects of meditation/contemplation agree with the cognitive object or domain of meditation/contemplation. Fourth, the current state of all cognitive subjects (i.e. perceptions/conceptions) of meditation/contemplation and all their current cognitive objects/domains of meditation/contemplation (i.e. appearances) are caused by karmic propensities (las kyi bag chags), and thus, though not specified here, it will be true to state that for Rong-zom-pa all perceptions/conceptions are ultimately delusions (like the perception of water in a mirage) and all (perceptible) appearances are illusions (like a mirage), and that


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ultimately there is no cognitive subject or object that is absolutely veridical or hypostatic.

For Rong-zom-pa, then, a distinction can be made between the various kinds of meditation/contemplation. First, all Buddhist teachings (including those on meditation/contemplation) are diverse in view of the difference in their intended purpose (dgongs pai dbang tha dad pa). Second, sentient beings are diverse, but all of them can be subsumed under either (a) those who have an impure cognitive/interactive domain (yongs su ma dag pai spyod yul) or (b) those who have a pure cognitive/interactive domain (yongs su dag pai spyod yul), and both of them under the influence of either wholesome (dkar po) or unwholesome (nag po) karmic propensities (las kyi bag chags). Third, although all perceptions/conceptions and appearances are similar inasmuch as they are all caused by karmic propensities, a differentiation of true (bden) and untrue (mi bden) can nonetheless be made on the conventional level (kun rdzob tu) insofar as the various perceptions/conceptions and appearances differ with regard to fallibility and infallibility (slu mi slu) and stability and instability (brtan mi brtan). A fuller assessment of Rong-zom-pas unique position on the meditational praxis such as of the four smtyupasthnas and his position on the synchronic relationship between philosophical theory and meditational praxis seems possible only against the backdrop of his positions on various aspects of Buddhist philosophy, particularly on what he calls special Mahyna.

5. The Synchronic Relationship between Philosophical Theory and Spiritual Praxis

Let us now turn to the second concern of my article, namely, the synchronic relationship between philosophical theory and spiritual praxis. The history of the synchronic relationship between the two seems to be a history of the tension and resolution of the tension between any two given poles that are somehow related to or associated with theory or praxis. Such a tension, whether real or perceived, may be primarily between (a) two types of doctrines, one associated with (or representing) philosophical theory and the other with spiritual praxis, and secondarily between (b) two types of persons, positions, or traditions, one of which is predominantly inclined towards


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intellectualism (or rationalism) and hence more towards philosophical theory, and the other towards mysticism (or spiritualism) and hence more towards spiritual praxis. One is bound to encounter sources, scholars, and schools that make efforts to reconcile or harmonize the two poles and so to resolve the tension. Such attempts may account for the development of some Buddhist ideas.

With regard to the synchronic relationship between two types of doctrines associated with (or representing) philosophical theory and spiritual praxis, I would like to point out one issue that seems to particularly deserve our attention, namely, the issue of what one might call the epistemic-ontic correspondence between any given Buddhist theory and praxis. The question here is whether the object/content of meditational praxis represents the true reality established by the philosophical view and thus whether there is an epistemic-ontic correspondence between the philosophical theory and spiritual praxis, or whether there is no (and no need for) epistemic-ontic correspondence between the two inasmuch as the two are different by nature and in function. In this connection, there seems to be at least two distinct positions. First, presumably most Tibetan Buddhist scholars in general would recognize two types of meditational praxis, namely, one that is epistemically veridical (e.g. meditation on nyat) and the other that is not epistemically veridical (e.g. aubhabhvan). Such a distinction presupposes that nyat is the true reality of all phenomena and hence the perception/conception of it is correct, whereas the impurity (of the world full of skeletons) is not its true reality and hence the perception/conception of the impure is incorrect. Rong-zom-pa would have designated these two kinds of meditational praxis as one that has been taught as [mere] antidotes [against intellectual-emotional defilements] (gnyen poi don du gsungs pa) and thus one that is not in conformity with the corresponding reality and the view of reality; and one that has been taught straightforwardly (gzugs por gsungs pa) and that thus does correspond with reality and the view of reality. A careful study of the positions of gSar-ma scholars such as Sa-skya-paita Kun-dga-rgyal-mtshan (11821251) and Tsong-kha-pa Blo-bzang-grags-pa (13571419), particularly their positions on whether special kinds of Vajrayna meditational praxis have special corresponding philosophical theories, is bound to shed more light on this particular issue, but such an endeavor is beyond the scope of this paper. Second, rNying-ma scholars such as


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Rong-zong-pa and Mi-pham, however, seem to suggest or presuppose, as a rule, an epistemic-ontic correspondence between the philosophical view (lta ba) and meditational praxis of any given Buddhist system inasmuch as for them one meditates upon what has been established by the philosophical theory, it being virtually impossible that the theory and praxis are mutually contradictory. In other words, any given type of Buddhist meditational praxis is such that the feet-like praxis and vision-like theory always conform.32 Particularly for Rong-zom-pa, all types of Buddhist meditational praxis prescribed by various Buddhist vehicles are similar inasmuch as theyincluding practices such as the aubhabhvanare all characterized by epistemic-ontic correspondence. This position of his seems to be most conspicuous in his lTa grel.33 A fuller and clearer picture of this standpoint would emerge only against the backdrop of his positions on the entire range of Buddhist vehicles known to him and the graded ontology, epistemology, and soteriology that he ascribes to each vehicle. In short, what Rong-zom-pa is actually asserting is not only that any given type of Buddhist meditational praxis, even aubhabhvan, is instrumentally valuable but also that the corresponding theory is epistemically correct, although, needless to say, for him ultimately all cognitive objects of appearance are illusionary and untrue and all perceptions/conceptions are delusional and false.

A careful study of the pertinent Tibetan positions on the question of whether each Buddhist vehicle has a unique philosophical view (lta ba) of its own with a corresponding meditational praxis (sgom pa) or whether several Buddhist vehicles may have the same or similar philosophical view despite having different spiritual praxes is bound to reveal these two distinct ways of seeing the synchronic relationship between philosophical theory and spiritual praxis in Tibetan Buddhism.

. Epilogue

In sum, what I have attempted in this paper is to discuss some difficulties posed by the theorypraxis dichotomy in Buddhism, which are of two kinds, namely, (a) difficulties associated with the historical or diachronic relationship between philosophical theory and spiritual praxis, and (b) difficulties pertaining to the doctrinal or synchronic relationship between the two. In the context of the former, I have ventured to


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discuss for the first time the four applications of mindfulness from the perspective of the Mantric form of Mahyna Buddhism.


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khang, (ed.) Kun mkhyen klong chen rab byams kyi gsung bum, 26 vols. Mes-poi-shul-bzhag Series 106131. Beijing: Krung-goi-bod-rig-pa-dpe-skrun-khang, 2009.

lTa grel Rong-zom Chos-kyi-bzang-po, Man ngag lta phreng gi grel pa rong zom pai ta chen po chos kyi bzang pos mdzad pa. In Rong zom chos bzang gi gsung bum. 2 vols. Chengdu: Si-khron-mi-rigs-dpe-skrun-khang, 1999, vol. 1, pp. 301351.

Madhyntavibhga Maitreya (ascribed), Madhyntavibhga. In bsTan gyur (dpe bsdur ma). Beijing: Krung-goi-bod-rig-pa-dpe-skrun-khang, 19942005, vol. 70.

Mi pham gsung bum Mi-pham rNam-rgyal-rgya-mtsho, gSung bum: Mi pham rgya mtsho. 32 vols. Chengdu: [Gangs-can-rig-gzhung-dpe-rnying-myur-skyobs-lhan-tshogs], 2007.

mKhas jug Id., mKhas pai tshul la jug pai sgo zhes bya bai bstan bcos. In Mi pham gsung bum, vol. 17, pp. 1317.

Od gsal snying po Id., gSang grel phyogs bcu mun sel gyi spyi don od gsal snying po. In Mi pham gsung bum, vol. 19, pp. 1271.

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sDom byang Mi-pham rNam-rgyal-rgya-mtsho, mKhas jug gi sdom byang. In Mi pham gsung bum, vol. 17, pp. 359405.

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Shing rta chen po Klong-chen-pa Dri-med-od-zer, rDzogs pa chen po sems nyid ngal gsoi grel pa shing rta chen po (smad cha). In Klong chen gsung bum, vol. 21, pp. 1480.

Vasantatilak Samdhong Rinpoche & Vrajvallabh Dwivedi, (ed.), Vasantatilak of Caryvratrkcrya with Commentary: Rahasyadpik by Vanaratna. Rare Buddhist Texts Series 7. Sarnath: Central Institute of Higher Tibetan Studies, 1990.

Yid bzhin mdzod Klong-chen-pa Dri-med-od-zer, Theg pa chen poi man ngag gi bstan bcos yid bzhin rin po chei mdzod. In Klong chen gsung bum, vol. 13, pp. 167.

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Immanence of Gnosis in Some rNying-ma Tantric Sources. In Yogic Perception, Meditation and Altered States of Consciousness, ed. by Eli Franco & Dagmar Eigner. Vienna: Verlag der sterreichischen Akademie der Wissenschaften, pp. 241262.

Horner 1957 I. B. Horner, The Collection of The Middle Length Sayings (Majjhima-Nikya), vol. 2. Delhi: Motilal Banasidass, 2004 [first published: London: Luzac and Co., 1957].

de lA vAlle Poissin 1917 Louis de La Valle Poussin, The Way to Nirva: Six Lectures on Ancient Buddhism as a Discipline of Salvation. Hibbert Lectures, Manchester College, Oxford, FebruaryApril 1916. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1917.


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schmithAusen 1973 Lambert Schmithausen, Spirituelle Praxis und philosophische Theorie im Buddhismus. Zeitschrift fr Missionswissenschaft und Religionswissenschaft 3, 1973, pp. 161186.

schmithAusen 1976a Id., On the Problem of the Relation of Spiritual Practice and Philosophical Theory in Buddhism. In German Scholars on India: Contribution to Indian Studies, edited by the Cultural Department, Embassy of the Federal Republic of Germany. Bombay: The Cultural Department, Embassy of the Federal Republic of Germany, 1976, vol. 2, pp. 235250.

schmithAusen 1976b Id., Die vier Konzentrationen der Aufmerksamkeit: Zur geschichtlichen Entwicklungen einer spirituellen Praxis des Buddhismus. Zeitschrift fr Missionswissenschaft und Religionswissenschaft 4, 1976, pp. 241265.

schmithAusen 1986 Id., Critical Response. In Karma and Rebirth: Post Classical Developments, ed. by Ronald W. Neufeldt. Albany: State University of New York Press, 1986, pp. 203230.

schmithAusen 2014 Id., The Genesis of Yogcra-Vijnavda: Responses and Reflections. Kasuga Lectures Series 1. Tokyo: The International Institute for Buddhist Studies, 2014.

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WAngchuK 2007 Dorji Wangchuk, The Resolve to Become a Buddha: A Study of the Bodhicitta Concept in Indo-Tibetan Buddhism. Studia Philologica Buddhica Monograph Series 23. Tokyo: The International Institute for Buddhist Studies, 2007.

WAngchuK 2009 Id., A Relativity Theory of the Purity and Validity of Perception in Indo-Tibetan Buddhism. In Yogic Perception, Meditation, and Altered States of Consciousness, ed. by Eli Franco & Dagmar Eigner. Vienna: Austrian Academy of Sciences, 2009, pp. 215237.


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Notes

1. The present article is a slightly modified version of a paper (Apropos the Problems of the TheoryPraxis Dichotomy in Buddhism with Particular Reference to the Case of the Four Applications of Mindfulness (smtyupasthna: dran pa nye bar gzhag pa) in Vajrayna) that I presented (on August 24, 2013) during the international conference on Buddhist Meditative Praxis: Traditional Teaching and Modern Application held at the University of Hong Kong marking the tenth anniversary of the establishment of the Centre of Buddhist Studies at the University of Hong Kong. I had initially hoped that I would be able to enhance the present contribution for publication considerably by augmenting it with additional primary and secondary sources but have come to realize that that was too optimistic, and have thus decided to submit it as it stands and with minimal modifications. I would like to take this opportunity to thank once again the Conference Organizing Committee and Venerable Prof. K. L. Dhammajoti (Glorious Sun Professor of Buddhist Studies and Chairman of the Master of Buddhist Studies Program, University of Hong Kong). My sincere thanks also go to Philip Pierce for his careful proofreading of this article.

2. For my understanding of the terms philosophical theory and spiritual praxis, I largely rely on the following statements in schmithAusen 1976b: 235 The term philosophical theory should be understood here in a general sense comprising any attempt to make rational statements about the true nature or the fundamental principles of the totality or some part of the existent, or about those aspects of it of which everyday experience is not aware. In this sense, philosophical theories in Buddhism are, e.g., the doctrine that there is no substantial Self, no tman; or the doctrine that the whole universe consists of momentary factors, of factors each of which lasts only for the time of an extremely short moment. Spiritual practice, in the case of Buddhism, consists essentially of moral or ethical exercises, and of practices of meditation, deep concentration, or trance. As an example, we may adduce the so-called four infinitudes, or unlimited ones (aprama), i.e. the meditative practice of the attitudes of friendliness, compassion, sympathetic joy, and impartiality or equanimity with regard to all living beings. Another example is the contemplation of the impure (aubhabhvan). See also schmithAusen 1973: 161163.

3. schmithAusen 1976b: 236; cf. schmithAusen 1973: 163: Es soll dabei weniger um die angeborenen, z. T. ererbten und unspezifischen theoretischen Voraussetzungen des Buddhismus wie etwa die Lehre von der Seelenwanderung (sasra) gehen als vielmehr um die fr den Buddhismus typischen philosophischen Theorien, die er erst im Laufe seiner Entwicklung neu hervorgebracht hat. Although the two kinds of Buddhist theories addressed in these two articles have not been proposed as a typology of Buddhist philosophical theories, such a distinction seems to nonetheless prove beneficial to those of us interested in the history of Buddhist philosophical ideas.

4. schmithAusen 1973: 185 Natrlich gibt es im Buddhismus auch philosophische Theorien, die nicht unmittelbar aus spirituellen Quellen stammen. Solche


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Theorien entwickelten sich vor allem dann, wenn sich Schwierigkeiten bei der Systematisierung jener theoretischen Grundlagen, die unmittelbar aus der spirituellen Praxis erwachsen waren, einstellten, etwa dadurch, da diese Lehren mit anderen Lehren nicht ohne weiteres vereinbar waren. Ein Beispiel hierfr waren etwa die verschiedenen Theorien zur Erklrung des Wirkmechanismus der guten und bsen Werke, der vor allem durch die Dogmatisierung des Antisubstantialismus und der negativen Einstellung zum Selbst problematisch wurde. Solche Theorien sind oft nur noch lose oder gar nicht mehr in der spirituellen Praxis verwurzelt. Aber es handelt sich bei ihnen doch meist um Lsungen spezieller und sekundrer Fragen. Fr die zentralen, das Ganze bestimmenden philosophischen Theorien gilt, da sie, zum mindesten zum grten Teil, unmittelbar aus der spirituellen Praxis hervorgewachsen sein drften.

5. schmithAusen 1973: 185.6. On the concept of apattra, see seyfort ruegg 2002: 159, n. 7.7. For the controversial dGe-lugs theory of cessation/decay as an entity (zhig

pa dngos po), see seyfort ruegg 2002: 159169. See also schmithAusen 1986: 217220 (VII), which provides several insights that help us understand and explain issues pertaining (and related) to the theory.

8. Lambert Schmithausen addressed the following issues (schmithAusen 1976a: 235): Did Buddhism usually start from philosophical theories and afterwards develop corresponding spiritual practices? Or is it more typical for Buddhism that first there are spiritual practices and that philosophical theories are only the result of a subsequent reflection that leads to a theoretical consolidation and generalization of those spiritual practices? Cf. schmithAusen 1973: 163.

9. schmithAusen 1976a: 236.10. WAngchuK 2007: 3031.11. The Buddhist parable of a man shot with a poisoned arrow is found in the

Camlukyasutta of the Majjhimanikya. For an English translation of the story, see horner 1957: 97101. The story is said to have come down in the Chinese tradition, but it is not clear to me if it has also been transmitted in the Tibetan tradition. It is discussed, among other places, in de lA vAlle Poussin 1917: 128129.

12. schmithAusen 1973; schmithAusen 1976a. Although the author has responded (schmithAusen 2014: 597641) to the criticisms raised by several scholars (Robert Sharf, Johannes Bronkhorst, and Eli Franco) against the content of these two articles, I have not been able to carefully consider his most recent (refined) positions in this new book.

13. schmithAusen 1973: 185186 Ich glaube, da sich der Buddhismus dadurch nicht nur von der europischen Philosophie unterscheidet vor allem von der griechischen und der neuzeitlichen , sondern auch von der brahmanischen indischen Philosophie, in der Einflsse der spirituellen Praxis auf die philosophische Theorie zwar durchaus nachweisbar, aber doch im ganzen zweifellos geringer sind. Der Grund fr diesen Unterschied liegt gewi letztlich in der Person des Buddha selbst, der mit einer wohl einmaligen Konsequenz


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und Radikalitt alle fr das Heil irrelevanten theoretischen Spekulationen abgewiesen hatte.

14. schmithAusen 1973: 185.15. schmithAusen 1973 & schmithAusen 1976b.16. Mi-pham, mKhas jug (p. 149.56): mdor na lam lngar rang lam gyi byang

phyogs so bdun bsgom pas gnas skabs su rgyun bzhugs sogs gsum gyi bras bu dang | mthar bras dgra bcom pai go phang mngon du byed pao ||.

17. Mi-pham, Od gsal snying po (p. 137.5): sngags bla med kyi lam lnga; ibid. (p. 139.2): de ltar dran pa nyer bzhag [= gzhag] bzhii rang bzhin can gyi sngags kyi tshogs lam chung ngu skye la |.

18. Mi-pham, mKhas jug (p. 183.34): di dag gtso che bai dbang du byas kyi lam thams cad na yang kun gyi nyams len gyi cha yod par shes par byao ||. I understand that by these (di dag) Mi-pham means all eighty inexhaustibles and that although for him certain sets of practices are assigned to a certain level on the bodhisattva path, all aspects of the practices can be found at all levels.

19. See, for example, Mi-pham, mKhas jug (pp. 154.5183.3); sDom byang (p. 384.45). The concept of the eighty inexhaustibles must have been inspired by the Akayamatinirdeastra.

20. For a rundown of the four smtyupasthnas as treated in the rvakayna and Bodhisattvayna, see Mi-pham, mKhas jug (p. 163.5165.1).

21. Mi-pham, Od gsal snying po (p. 138.56): de yang theg dman las theg chen gyi dran nye phags tshul dbus mtha las | byang chub sems dpa rnams kyi ni || dmigs dang yid la byed pa dang || thob pas de nyid khyad par phags || zhes gsungs pa bzhin du | mdo las sngags phags tshul kyang de dang dra ste |. Cf. Maitreya (ascribed), Madhyntavibhga (B, vol. 70, p. 909.1718): byang chub sems dpa rnams kyi ni || dmigs dang yid la byed pa dang || thob [DC, thob PN] pas de ni khyad par phags ||. See also Kong-sprul, Shes bya mdzod, where a distinction between Stric and Mantric Mahyna practices of the four smtyupasthna is made (p. 924.2428): de rnams kyi grub don go bde bar brjod na lus sogs bzhi po kun rdzob tu mi gtsang ba sogs bzhir snang zhing | don dam du ciang ma grub bo zhes bsgom pa ni mdo lugs kyi dran pa nyer gzhag bzhi ste | ngo bo bdag med gnyis bsgom par dus so || lus lha skur bsgom pa la bde stong gi rgyas debs pa dang | tshor ba dang rnam shes dang sems byung yul snang thams cad la yang bde stong gi rgyas debs pa ste gsang sngags bla med kyi lam gyi dran pa nyer gzhag bzhio ||.

22. Mi-pham, Od gsal snying po (p. 138.25): de yang dang por rang gzhan gyi lus la sogs pa dkyil khor gyi khor lor ye nas dag pa bzhin sgom zhing | de yang stong nyid spros bral mnyam pa chen po dang zung du jug pai tshul la blo bzhag pa ni lus dran pa nye bar bzhag pa | byung tshor gyi rtog pa bde ba chen poi ye shes su bsgyur ba tshor ba dran pa nye bar bzhag pa | sems sems byung gi spros pa ma lus pa sems nyid od gsal gnyug mai dbyings su sdom pa sems dran pa nye bar bzhag pa | khor das snang btags kyi chos thams cad dag mnyam blang dor dang bral ba spyod pa chos dran pa nye bar bzhag pa ste rgyud sgyu phrul dam pa nas ji skad bstan ba lta buo ||.


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23. The expression byung tshor gyi rtog pa is not clear to me, and hence the interpretation and translation of it as conceptual constructions whose occurrence one feels/senses (or is aware of) is merely tentative.

24. Klong-chen-pa, Yid bzhin mdzod (p. 63.913): tshogs lam chung ngur dran pa nyer gzhag ste || lus lhar bskyed pa lus dran nye bar bzhag || byung tshor rnam rtog ye shes bsgyur ba ni || tshor ba dran pa nye bar gzhag pa ste || sems dang sems byung spros pa nyer zhii sgom || sems dran nyer gzhag rdzogs pai rim pa ste || snang btags chos kun sgyu mar shes pa ni || chos dran nyer gzhag lags par rgyud las gsungs ||. The presentation of the four smtyupasthnas in his Shing rta chen po (p. 368.4369.10) is very general and is without any Mantric elements.

25. Klong-chen-pa, Padma dkar po (pp. 283.15284.6). After citing the pertinent mla text of the Yid bzhin mdzod, the Padma dkar po goes on to cite the rGyud sgyu phrul dam pa (pp. 283.20284.6): ji skad du | sgyu phrul dam pa las | sngags pa gang zhig rnal byor la brtson pas | bdag byin gyis brlab pa ni | lus dran pa nye bar gzhag pa ste | lhai ngo bo nyid du snang ba gzungs brnyan lta buo || kun tu rtog pa ye shes chen poi gnas skabs ni | tshor bai ngo bo nyid de bde ba chen poo || spros pai phyogs las rnam par rgyal ba ni | dir sems mi dmigs pa nyid do || gzugs brnyan gyi ngo bo nyid du sgyur mar sbyong ba ni chos kyi rang bzhin no zhes so ||.

26. The two types of Vajrayna soteriology are put forward in WAngchuK 2007: 223225 in the context of discussing Psycho-Physiological Bodhicitta in Yogic Practices. See also Almogi 2009: 247248.

27. Klong-chen-pa, Yid bzhin mdzod (p. 63.19); Padma dkar po (pp. 281.18283.14). 28. Klong-chen-pa must be thinking of the physiology-based Vajrayna soteriology

involving cakras; this is discussed in Almogi 2009. 29. Kcrya, Vasantatilak (Skt. p. 51; Tib. pp. 8889); Vanaratna, Rahasyadpik

(Skt. pp. 5153; Tib. pp. 8892).30. Rong-zom-pa, lTa grel (pp. 330.11332.14).31. Rong-zom-pas position on the various levels of ontological reality and the

varying degrees of epistemic (i.e. perceptual/conceptual) veridicality may become clearer if we consider what I call his relativity theory of the purity and validity of perception, discussed in WAngchuK 2009.

32. Rong-zom-pa, lTa grel (p. 330.1518): lta bas ji ltar bcad pa bzhin du ting nge dzin gyis goms par byed pa yin te | gang gi phyir lta ba dang sgom pa ni gal du mi rung ste | rig pa dang rkang par ldan dgos pai phyir dang |; Mi-pham, Od gsal snying po (pp. 129.2130.2). Note particularly his statement: lta sgom ni rig pa dang rkang par dang ldan dgos pai phyir.

33. Rong-zom-pa, lTa grel (pp. 330.11332.16). The question about the ontological status of the objects of meditation that appear in the form of visible entities (rpa: gzugs) raised at the beginning of his Rang byung ye shes (pp. 111.22112.11) and his answer thereto ought to help us to understand his position on the epistemic-ontic correspondence between philosophical theory and meditational praxis.

New Publication from the Centre of Buddhist Studies, The University of Hong Kong:

Buddhist Meditative Praxis: traditional teachings & modern applications Edited by K.L. Dhammajoti

The Centre of Buddhist Studies was inaugurated at The University of Hong Kong in 2002. In August 2013, on the occasion of celebrating its tenth anniversary, the Centre held a two-day international conference on Buddhist meditative praxis as part of the celebration, resulting in the publication of this volume of essays. This volume is divided into two parts. The first part consists of papers on issues related to the historical, doctrinal and philosophical aspects on the theme of Buddhist meditative praxis. As the contents of this part show, the scope of meditative praxis has been viewed from a very broad perspective. The presentations also included discussion on the modern applications and interdisciplinary studies related to Buddhist teachings, particularly those connected with meditative praxis. These are collected in the second part of this volume.

Part I - Buddhist Meditative Praxis: History, Doctrines and Philosophical Implications 1. The Sutta On Mindfulness with In and Out Breathing -- L.S. Cousins (Oxford University) 2. Praj-vimukta, ubhayatobhga-vimukta and vimokvaraa The Sarvstivda perspective --

KL Dhammajoti (The University of Hong Kong) 3. The Sevenfold Purification (sattavisuddhi) as the Structural Framework of the Visuddhimagga:

Some Observations -- Toshiichi Endo (The University of Hong Kong) 4. Jitri on Backward Causation (bhvikraavda) -- Eli Franco (Leipzig University) 5. The Role of Meditation in the Threefold Scheme of Buddhist Mental Culture Y. Karunadasa

(University of Kelaniya) 6. Samdhi Names: The Nature of Meditative Experience In Mahyna -- Lewis Lancaster (The

University of Hong Kong) 7. A Reexamination of on Being Mindless: Possible Meditative Implications of the Eightfold Proof

of layavijna -- Nobuyoshi Yamabe (Waseda University) 8. The Diachronic and Synchronic Relationship between Philosophical Theory and Spiritual Praxis

in Buddhism: With Special Reference to the Case of the Four Applications of Mindfulness (smtyupasthna: dran pa nye bar gzhag pa) in Vajrayna -- Dorji Wangchuk (Universitat Hamburg)

9. Central Asian Meditation Manuals -- Charles Willemen (International Buddhist College) 10. Do Meditative Objects Exist? -- Zhihua Yao (The Chinese University of Hong Kong) Part II - Buddhist Meditative Praxis: Modern Applications and Interdisciplinary Studies 1. A Chinese Chan-Based Intervention: A Way to Improve the Mind and Body - Agnes, Sui Yin

Chan (The Chinese University of Hong Kong) 2. Neurodharma: Practicing with the Brain in Mind -- Rick Hanson (University of California) 3. Can Meditation Change our Brain? -- Tatia M.C. Lee, Natalie T.Y. Leung (The University of

Hong Kong) 4. The Importance of the Buddhist Teaching on Three Kinds of Knowing: In a School-based

Contemplative Education Program -- Hin Hung Sik, Bonnie Wai Yan Wu (The University of Hong Kong)

5. Mindfulness-based Cognitive Therapy for Depression -- Mark Williams (The University of Oxford)

Ven. Professor K.L. Dhammajoti - Glorious Sun Professor of Buddhist Studies, Centre of Buddhist Studies, The University of Hong

Kong

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