Case Comment: (Former) Yukos v. Russian Federation before ...
Wall Street Journal and Financial Times on serious allegations of PwC wrongdoing in auditor’s...
Click here to load reader
-
Upload
mikhailkhodorkovsky -
Category
Documents
-
view
172 -
download
1
Transcript of Wall Street Journal and Financial Times on serious allegations of PwC wrongdoing in auditor’s...
1 / 2
Wall Street Journal and Financial Times on serious allegations of PwC wrongdoing in auditor’s reversal on Yukos
Q & A
On September 7, 2010, the Wall Street Journal and Financial Times both published major reports on PwC’s decision in June 2007 to withdraw a decade of Yukos audits. Why did these stories appear now? With new charges having been brought against Khodorkovsky and Lebedev in 2007 to prevent their scheduled release from prison in 2011, it was clear to prosecutors that PwC’s stamp of approval on the Yukos audits was raising serious questions worldwide about the credibility of the case. Since June 2007, when PwC withdrew its Yukos audit opinions for the 10 years from 1995 to 2004, the Khodorkovsky‐Lebedev defense team has been asserting that this unusual and unconventional reversal was made in response to coercion and threats from Russian authorities. In the three years since then, the defense team has documented its assertions and initiated legal actions in order to prove that PwC legally should have stood by its audits, and that the excuses PwC gave for its decision are factually incorrect and meant to cover up the truth. Neither the Wall Street Journal nor the Financial Times would have run their major features on September 7, 2010 had they not recently obtained proof of the truth and credibility of the assertions being made against PwC. The reports are also timely because the trial against Khodorkovsky and Lebedev is now coming to a close, and the defendants continue to be blocked from submitting evidence to the court that would help to prove their innocence. This establishes an unbroken pattern of prosecutorial coercion brought to bear on the case from the introduction of charges in February 2007 through to the conclusion of the trial. The Wall Street Journal and Financial Times stories also raise troubling questions about the reputation and reliability of PwC in Russia, given the firm’s national predominance. In today’s challenging financial environment, the value of PwC audits that can be pulled essentially on orders from corrupt officials alters the calculus of risk in the Russian economy. What kind of coercion and threats led PwC to withdraw its Yukos audits? Until June 2007, PwC publicly stood by its decade of Yukos audits. When the Russian authorities attacked PwC over the audits in court in December 2006, PwC stated: “We will vigorously defend our position and reputation both in court and in dialogue with government authorities which are empowered to regulate [the] auditing profession.” In January 2007, PwC insisted that its Yukos reports were “properly prepared to present, in all material respects, the company’s financial position and financial results in accordance with the relevant Russian accounting standards” and that PwC “concluded these audits according to the highest professional and ethical standards strictly in compliance with Russian [law] and best [auditing] practices.” PwC’s audits were considered by many foreign observers to be the linchpin of the defense case proving Khodorkovsky’s and Lebedev’s innocence on new charges being prepared by prosecutors. Those same prosecutors then subjected PwC to police raids, threatened partners with imprisonment for their work on Yukos, and brought legal proceedings unrelated to Yukos against the firm. When PwC suddenly reversed itself and withdrew a whole ten years of audits in June 2007, the firm’s aforementioned problems evaporated—even those problems ostensibly unrelated to Yukos. A broadly‐cited threat hanging over PwC as it adamantly defended its Yukos reporting—that the firm’s Russian license could be revoked—has not been raised again by officials since PwC backed down, and Yukos‐related investigations into the firm appear to have ceased. PwC says that Yukos lied to them—doesn’t that justify their decision to pull their audits? PwC asserts that the audits were pulled due to “new” information on Yukos that they received from prosecutors. However, documents and witness statements prove that the information provided by prosecutors was not new to PwC, and that in any case the issues raised did not affect the overall validity of the audits. The Wall Street Journal and Financial Times both obtained documents disproving PwC’s assertion about “new” information justifying the withdrawal of the audits, and the evidence is so strong that both newspapers had the confidence to publish their September 7, 2010 reports. As PwC is confronted with this evidence, their position on this matter will become so patently untenable that it will be impossible for them to maintain it with any credibility.
2 / 2
Are Khodorkovsky and Lebedev waging a vendetta against PwC? No. Khodorkovsky and Lebedev want to set the record straight. They understand that PwC was under pressure, but they cannot accept the fabricated accusations of dishonesty leveled against them by the firm. Of course, Khodorkovsky and Lebedev understand the risks of challenging corrupt officials in Russia. They have on their minds their former Yukos colleagues who have been forced to flee Russia, or who have been improperly detained, jailed and tortured while terminally ill. They also have on their minds the widely‐reported deaths of 37‐year‐old lawyer Sergei Magnitsky in November 2009 and 53‐year‐old entrepreneur Vera Trifonova in April 2010; both detainees were denied medical treatment after refusing to cooperate with corrupt officials. In 2007, prosecutors were raiding PwC’s offices and threatening to arrest and imprison PwC partners. Publicly asserting that there were parallels between Yukos and Enron, the Kremlin’s message to PwC was that it could be the next Arthur Andersen. Khodorkovsky and Lebedev are among the best‐placed people in Russia to understand what can happen to those who become targets of reckless and corrupt officials in control of law enforcement and judicial authorities. Yet PwC’s accusations of dishonesty, as a means of self‐preservation, were unnecessary, unlawful and unethical. In making known the truth about PwC, Khodorkovsky’s and Lebedev’s main goals are to prove, first, that they were in fact not dishonest in their dealings with PwC; second, that prosecutors are guilty of grave misconduct in their handling of the case; and third, that the charges against them are bogus and improperly motivated. Is this a problem just for PwC Russia, or is it a problem for PwC in the rest of the world as well? This is a problem for PwC internationally. In an attempt to contain reputational damage and legal risks, PwC has asserted that the decision to pull the Yukos audits was a matter decided by PwC Russia. But this assertion was contradicted by Douglas Miller, lead PwC partner on Yukos, who is quoted in a prosecution interrogation transcript saying: “I believe these issues are being examined not so much by the company’s Russian Office Managers, but by executives at PricewaterhouseCoopers’ global, world level.” The California Board of Accountancy is currently reviewing the conduct of PwC partner Miller, who left Russia after this debacle. Additional investigations of PwC US’s role in the withdrawal decision by the US Public Accounting Oversight Board may follow. PwC, which prides itself on its global network, is going to have a hard time containing negative publicity and responsibility for the withdrawal decision to PwC Russia. What are the implications of the PwC‐Yukos story for foreign investment and economic development in Russia? As stated by the Financial Times in its September 7, 2010 report, “what is emerging is a situation where global audit firms operating in Russia may all be vulnerable to the double jeopardy of auditing the books of notoriously opaque companies, while being regulated by a government able to launch arbitrary attacks. This lose‐lose situation could call into question the value of audits that have been hotly sought as a western seal of approval ever since Russian companies began to access international financial markets.” Khodorkovsky had understood the importance of transforming Yukos from opacity to transparency, and with PwC’s help he was on the vanguard of a corporate renewal that served as an example for the rest of Russia. PwC’s about‐face on Yukos was an affront to this example. The lesson investors learn from PwC’s reversal is that an audit in Russia does not have the same value and reliability as an audit in the US or Europe. This means higher risk, which means lower investment and stunted economic development. Don’t the Russian authorities see that their attack on PwC did not help Russia? Russian authorities may see it, including President Medvedev, but they do not appear motivated or empowered to do anything to remedy the situation. It is a small but influential group of corrupt officials that has triumphed in imposing their political and mercantile interests upon Russia’s law enforcement and judicial bodies—ordering or emboldening them to take down PwC if the firm did not relent on Yukos. In the process they set an example for others to follow, and exposed the true fragility of the rule of law and economic prospects in this country that aspires yet continually fails to modernize.