THE FOOL AND THE ONTOLOGICAL STATUS OF ST ANSELM’S ARGUMENT

ALBERT W. WALD

Washington State University, Pullman, Washington

I : INTRODUCTION

There are at least two conditions that any argument must meet if it is to be ontological.’ First, an ontological argument must not actually use any empirical claim as a working premise. Second, an ontological argument must not for its validity require the use of any empirical claim as a working premise.2 These conditions are, of course, only two among many neces- sary conditions which together would capture the nature of ontological arguments.

By ‘an empirical claim’ I mean any claim (proposition) whose truth value can be established only by some particular set or sets of observations, but not by any observation whatsoever. By ‘a working premise’ I mean any premise which is actually used to arrive at a conclusion, i.e. a premise that is not superfluous. Given these meanings, the two conditions have the following consequences for what kinds of premises an ontological argu- ment may have. First, an empirical claim such as God is conceived to exist could occur as a premise in an ontological argument, but it could not be used to establish the conclusion of the argument. Only the a priori claim which it (allegedly) entails, viz. God can exist, could actually be used in this way. Second, one could have as a premise in an ontological argument the claim something or other exists. This existential claim is not an

I am especially grateful to Harry Silverstein for his acute comments on earlier versions of this paper.

* This second condition is useful in dealing with the ontological status of an argu- ment which is an incomplete attempt to state a valid argument. One wishes to judge the ontological status of the complete, valid argument that was intended rather than the incomplete and invalid account of it. To do this one invokes condition two and requires that no empirical premise need be added to the short, invalid argument to capture the full, valid argument that was intended. This second condition could, however, be avoided. One might merely apply condition one-no empirical claims may actually occur as working premises-to the fully expressed argument that was intended though not stated. This procedure has the general advantage of not assuming that invalid arguments are incomplete attempts at valid ones, but it is not as useful for dealing with Anselm’s argument where this assumption is usually warranted. By asking what addi- tional premises are needed to make Anselm’s reasoning valid, one comes to fully under- stand the content of his argument.

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THE FOOL A N D ST A N S E L M ’ S A R G U M E N T 407

empirical claim since its truth value can be established by any set of observations whatsoever; so it could be allowed as a premise. This second consequence is objectionable, however; for ontological arguments ought never to have existential claims as premises. The major philosophical interest of ontological arguments for the existence of anything is in their promise to establish existence without using the existence of anything other than concepts (or possible worlds or possibilia) as evidence for the existential conclusion. This objectionable consequence shows that the two conditions for ontological argument are too liberal.

These remarks on the nature of ontological arguments suggest a variety of interesting issues that I shall not pursue. I shall only ask whether even these too liberal conditions for being an ontological argument are satisfied by the theistic proof St Anselni presents in Proslogiort 11. 1 shall ask: ‘Is Anselm’s argument ontological ?’ In answering this question I hope to expose just what is involved in Anselm’s argument.

It would be startling and paradoxical if Anselm’s argument were not ontological, since it is considered a paradigm of an ontological argument. And not only do we consider it to be ontological if anything is, but there is even evidence that Anselm intended it to be what we would today call an ontological argument. Although Anselm neither uses the label ‘onto- logical’ nor reflects explicitly upon the logical status of his argument, he does indicate that his intention is to argue ontologically. He offers his theistic proof as a way to establish a negative answer to the question about the Greatest Conceivable Being (God): ‘Can it be that a thing of such a nature does not exist?’l This indicates that he intends to establish the existence of something whose nature is to be that-than-which-nothing- greater-can-be-conceived from the fact that this is its nature. Any such argument from the nature of something to its existence would surely be ontological.

One wishes to avoid such a paradoxical result. But to do so one must explain away a prima facie strong case for saying that Anselm’s argument does not even satisfy the liberal restrictions that I described. It appears that Anselm’s argument actually uses or for validity would have to use as a working premise at least one of two empirical-looking claims which I shall henceforth designate claim c and claim m. They are:

(c) The Greatest Conceivable Being (GCB) can be conceived [even by the Fool] to exist in reality (The Conceivability Principle-claim c).

(m) The Greatest Conceivable Being (GCB) exists in the mind [of even the Fool]. (This concerns existence in the mind, hence is claim m).

l Charlesworth, M. 1. (trans.), St Anselm’s Proslogion (Oxford, 1965). p. 117.

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The evidence that Anselm’s argument is not ontological may be pre- sented in the following format (where Anselm’s argument is called argument a) :

(1) the truth values of claims c and m can only be established empiri- cally. Claims c and m are empirical.

(2) Claim c or claim m is either actually used as a working premise in a or must be used as a working premise if a is to be valid.

(3) But any argument that uses or for validity must use any empirical claim as a premise is not ontological.

(4) Therefore Anselm’s argument, a, is not ontological. This format suggests four distinct ways to show that Anselm’s argument

(1) claim c is empirical and is actually used in a (Ec & Ac; where Ex=x is an empirical claim and A x = x is actually used in a); or

(2) claim c is empirical and must be used if a is to be valid (Ec & Mc; where M x = x must be used if a is to be valid); or

(3) claim m is empirical and is actually used in a (Em & Am); or (4) claim m is empirical and must be used if a is to be valid (Em & Mm). Later I shall consider in turn each of these four possible proofs that

Anselm’s argument is not ontological. But first I shall describe the argu- ment in question, paying special attention to the occurrences in it of claims c and m and the attendant psychological terminology.

is not ontological. One may show that either:

1 1 : A N S E L M ’ S A R G U M E N T

The passage in Proslogion I1 that allegedly contains the entire onto- logical argument is preceeded by some preliminaries. They refer to the Fool of the Psalms and his psychological talents and they also focus on claims c and m. They are important for understanding Anselm’s argument whether or not they are an integral part of (are working premises in) the argument itself. These remarks occur where Anselm says :

Now we believe that You are something than which nothing greater can be conceived. Or can i t be that a thing of such a nature does not exist, since ‘the Fool has said in his heart, there is no God’? But when this same Fool hears what I say: ‘something than which nothing greater can be conceived’, he understands what he hears, and what he understands is in his mind even if he does not understand that it [actually] exists.’

1 Ibid. Here and throughout the paper I have used ‘conceived’ and its cognates in place of Charlesworth’s ‘thought’ and its cognates. For example, Charlesworth trans- lates Anselm’s key phrase as ‘something than which nothing greater can be thought’. In this passage Charlesworth unhappily translates ‘Sed certe ipse idem insipiens, cum

THE FOOL A N D ST ANSELM’S A R G U M E N T 409

Here Anselm offers his famous Augustinian account of the nature of God as the Greatest Conceivable Being. He then asks whether a thing of such a nature even could be non-existent since the Fool has thought that there is no such thing. Here begins Anselni’s interest in the Fool and especially in what the Fool conceives, understands and believes. He wonders about the existence of God, but also he wonders whether the Fool believes or even could believe that there is no God. Still discussing the Fool, Anselm notes that the Fool understands what God is when God is conceived as the GCB, and he indicates that this amounts to or at least implies that the GCB exists in the mind of the Fool-claim m.

A few lines later Anselm justifies this view that the GCB exists in the mind of the Fool, and he adds that the Fool himself must admit that this is the case. He says:

Even the Fool, then, is forced to agree that something-than-which-nothing- greater-can-be-conceived exists in the mind, since he understands this when he hears it, and whatever is understood is in the mind (ibid., my italics).

Here the argument is: (I) the Fool hears (the words) ‘GCB’ and the Fool understands the

meaning of the words (the concept). (2) Whatever is understood is in the mind (of him who understands it). (3) Therefore, the Fool should agree that the GCB is in the (his)

mind; and, of course, the GCB is in the (some) mind (Claim m). At this point explicit mention of the Fool ceases, but the use of psycho- logical terminology and perhaps psychological claims continues.

Anselm next sets forth a passage which, all will agree, contains at least part of his theistic proof. Most readers have supposed that it contains the entire proof.

And surely that-than-which-a-greater-cannot-be-conceived cannot exist in the mind alone. For if it exists solely in the mind even, it can be conceived to exist in reality also, which is greater. If then that-than-which-a-greater- cannot-be-conceived exists in the mind alone, this same that-than-which- a-greater-cannot-be-conceived is that than which a greater can be con- ceived. But obviously this is impossible. Therefore there is absolutely no doubt that something-than-which-a-greater-cannot-be-conceived exists both in the mind and in reality (ibid.).

audit hoe ipsum quod dico: “afiquid quo maius nihil cogitari potest” ’ as ‘But surely when this same Fool hears what I am speaking about, namely something than . . -’ instead of ‘But surely when this same Fool hears whot I say, namely “something than . . .‘I ’.

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Let us examine this passage one sentence at a time in order to set out the structure of the argumentation.

The first sentence states the conclusion to be arrived at: the GCB cannot exist in the mind alone but must exist in reality us wefl. Note that part of the conclusion is claim m, viz. that the GCB exists in the mind.

The second sentence says two things. First it states that if the GCB exists merely in the mind, but not in reality, then it can be conceived to exist in reality. This conditional says:

(4) if the GCB is even in the mind (claim m), then the GCB can be conceived (by the Fool) to exist in reality (claim c).

This does not assert that the GCB can be conceived to exist in reality; but one may link it with the conclusion of the argument Anselm gave earlier (viz. the GCB exists in the mind of the Fool) and conclude by modiis ponens: (4.1) the GCB can be conceived (by the Fool) to exist in reality (Con-

ceivability Principle, claim c).' Up to here one has an argument from claim m for claim c.

greatness (the Greatness Principle) : The second sentence also provides the false but crucial premise about

(5) it is greater for the GCB to exist in reality and in the mind than to exist in the mind but not in reality.

The third sentence validly arrives at the absurdity that the GCB is that than which something greater can be conceived (if it exists in the mind alone). This is declared to be impossible in the fourth sentence. Finally, in the fifth and last sentence it is concluded that the GCB exists both in reality as well as in the mind, because Anselm has reduced to absurdity the supposition that the GCB exists only in the mind (but not in reality).

Anselm does not indicate how he arrives at the absurdity that the GCB is something such that a greater thing can be conceived. 1 suggest and shall later make plausible the view that it may be represented thus:

(6) suppose that the GCB exists in the mind alone (supposition to be reduced to absurdity).

(6.1) Then the GCE which exists in reality as well as in the mind is greater than the GCB (from 5-Greatness Principle-and 6) .

(6.2) Therefore, something can be conceived (a GCB which exists in

1 I use decimalized numerals to signify claims which were not explicitly made by Anselm in the context under discussion but which it is reasonable to believe that he would or should interpolate there.

THE FOOL A N D ST ANSELM’S A R G U M E N T 41 1

reality) which is greater than the GCB (supposed not to exist in reality) (from 4.2-Conceivability Principle, c-and 6.1).

(7) Therefore, that than which nothing greater can be conceived (the GCB) is that than which a greater can be conceived (from 6.2).

The rest of the argument is straightforward: (8) this, (7), is impossible (premise).

(8.1) Therefore, the GCB cannot exist in the mind alone (from 6, 7, 8, reductio ad absurdurn).

(9) Therefore, the GCB exists both in the mind and in reality (from 3, 8.1).

This argument is valid. That is, if all its premises were true, then its conclusion would have to be true. But the premise at step (5)-the Greatness Principle-is not true, (and perhaps the same holds for the Conceivability Principle); so the argument is not sound. But my task in this paper is not to evaluate the argument’s worth. It is only to ask: ‘Is this argument ontological?’ In order to answer this question I shall now examine the four challenges to the ontological status of Anselm’s argu- ment that were presented at the close of Part 1.

111: THE O N T O L O G I C A L S T A T U S O F T H E A R G U M E N T

A . Challenges From Claim c. The first two challenges to the ontological status of Anselm’s argument, argument a, stem from the claim that the GCB can be conceived to exist in reality. This is the Conceivability Principle, claim c. It appears that both:

(2) c is an empirical claim and is actually used in a (Ec & Ac). (2) c is an empirical claim and must be used in a if a is to be valid

First, let us consider whether c is or must be used in a. Remarkably, Anselm never explicitly asserted claim c in his argument or anywhere in Proslogion. Nevertheless, there is indirect evidence that Anselm both accepted the principle and used it in a. The argument in steps (1) to (4) is clear evidence that he accepted it; for those four steps are pointless unless used to arrive at it. The evidence that he used the principle in the argument is that its presence alongside the Greatness Principle (viz. that it is greater for a GCB to exist in the mind and reality than in the mind only) is both sufficient and necessary for the validity of the argument. That is, if c is included in a with the Greatness Principle, then a is valid, and if c is not included, then a is invalid.

To show that the Conceivability Principle is sufficient and necessary for

(Ec & Mc).

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the validity of a, let us examine the reductio argument. Anselm argues to the absurdity that a non-existent GCB ‘is that than which a greater can be conceived’ by showing that something can be conceived which is greater than the GCB. The Greatness Principle is not alone sufficient to show this. I t only says that an existent GCB would be greater than the non-existent GCB. But the Conceivability Principle says that such an existent GCB can be conceived. If this claim about conceivability is added to the Greatness Principle, then the desired conclusion will follow; since the existent GCB that can be conceived would be greater than the non-existent GCB. The Conceivability Principle, claim c, is in this sense sufficient to make the argument valid.

Claim c is also necessary for the validity of the argument in the sense that the argument is valid only if the Greatness Principle is supplemented by a claim that at least entails claim c. Claim c itself need not’actually be asserted, but it is the minimal additional claim that will allow a valid proof. One will be able to show that something greater than the non- existent GCB can be conceived only if one adds to the claim that a greater thing would be an existent GCB the claim that an existent GCB can be conceived. This is exactly what claim c asserts; so something at least as strong as it is needed if the proof is to be valid.

Given that claim c is required for the validity of Anselm’s argument and that it is actually a working premise of that argument, let us turn to the question of the empirical status of that claim-the truth value of Ec. If c is empirical, both Ac & Ec and Mc & Ec will have been established, and Anselm’s argument will have been shown not to be ontological.

At this point it will perhaps be objected that it is quite natural and even rather traditional to suppose that by ‘the GCB can be conceived to exist (in reality)’ Anselm only means that the concept of the GCB is consistent and that the GCB can exist. The objector will urge that since these are a priori rather than empirical propositions, the Conceivability Principle is not an empirical proposition, and so the ontological status of Anselm’s argument is preserved. One ought surely to grant to the objector that the Conceivability Principle as Anselm used it does at least entail these apriori propositions. But one need not yet grant more than this. If there is anything more involved in the Conceivability Principle than these entailed propositions, the Conceivability Principle will not simply mean that the GCB can exist, and it will be an empirical proposition. If the full content (not just the a priori implication) of the principle were used in Anselm’s argument, then that argument would not be ontological. The question, then, is whether the principle, claim c, has an empirical component.

T H E FOOL A N D ST ANSELM’S A R G U M E N T 413

There are two major reasons for saying that claim c has an empirical component. One is that it is formulated in terms that mention persons (e.g. the Fool) and their psychological talents (e.g. conceiving). Surely it is an empirical matter what someone’s psychological talents are. More- over, one ought to take the references to people and to psychological talents at face value unless there is some special reason to believe that they are intended differently (e.g. intended as a priori remarks about what is logically possible).

The second bit of evidence that the Conceivability Principle has an empirical component is the way Anselm used empirical claims in his argument for it. Recall that this argument was:

(I) whatever is understood is in the mind. ( 2 ) Even the Fool understands the GCB. (3) Therefore the GCB exists even in the mind of the Fool. (4) If the GCB is in the mind even of the Fool, then even he can con-

ceive of it as existing in reality. (4.1) Therefore the GCB can be conceived to exist in reality (even by

the Fool) (Claim c). Clearly, empirical claims are used to establish c. Claim (2)-the Fool

understands the GCB-is surely empirical, and so is claim (3)-the GCB exists in the mind of the Fool. When a proposition is established by empirical premises, it is reasonable to suppose that it is empirical unless there is good reason to think otherwise.

In the present case there do not seem to be any good reasons to think that c is not empirical. Indeed, quite the contrary is the case, The allusions to persons and their psychological talents give c a distinctively empirical air. But in addition to this, it would be unnecessary, perhaps unnatural, to have used empirical claims to support a non-empirical claim (e.g. a claim equivalent to the proposition that the GCB can exist). Thus, barring contrary evidence, one ought to presume that claim c has an empirical component.

The conclusion that c has an empirical component provides rather persuasive grounds for saying that Anselm’s argument is not ontological if and only if one also assumes that the full content (including the empirical component) of claim c is used in Anselm’s argument. This further assumption seems unobjectionable; for why would Anselm have troubled to establish an empirical claim about people’s psychological talents if he had intended to use only its a priori component equivalent to the claim that God can exist? In this light, one has the following grounds for saying that Anselm’s argument is not ontological:

414 ALBERT W . W A L D

(1) the references to the Fool in the support for (4.1) and the refer- ences to conceivability both in (4.1) and in the argument for it are some evidence that (4.1) has an empirical component.

(2) The use of empirical premises to support (4.1) is some evidence that (4.1) has an empirical component.

(3) The full content of (4.1) is involved in the Conceivability Principle that is or must be used as a working premise of Anselm’s reductio argument.

(4 ) Therefore Anselm’s reductio argument does and must involve an empirical claim as a working premise.

(5) Therefore Anselm’s argument is not an ontological argument. This argument certainly does give some grounds, indeed some good

grounds, for saying that Anselm’s argument is not ontological. But each of the three claims used to support this conclusion is objectionable or inconclusive; so there are still better reasons for saying that Anselm’s argument is ontological. To show this, let us examine each of the three supporting claims.

The first claim (step (1) in the argument just presented) is that the refer- ences to persons and their psychological abilities in claim c and in the sup- port for c are some evidence that c has an empirical component. In res- ponse, one may (and ought to) admit that ‘the Fool can conceive of the existence in reality of the GCB’ does not appear to be merely an a priori claim. Indeed, the most natural reading of this sentence in light of the overtly empirical claims used to support it would be:

It is psychologically possible that the Fool conceives of the existence in reality of the GCB,

It is psychologically possible that someone conceives of the existence in reality of the GCB.

But because of the ambiguity of ‘can be conceived’, it can just as plausibly be taken to express the a priori claim:

It is logically possible that the Fool conceives of the existence in reality of the GCB.

Moreover, despite the reference to the Fool and to conceiving, it turns out that claim c is logically equivalent to the claim that it is logically possible that the GCB exists in reality (since Anselm takes conceivability and logical possibility to be equivalent in many contexts). It is, then, possible to eliminate all reference to the Fool and to conceivability; but in the context of a discussion of the psychology of the Fool it was not natural to do SO.

or at least:

THE FOOL A N D ST ANSELM’S ARGUMENT 415

Claim c is equivalent to an a priori claim : either the claim that the GCB can exist or the claim that it is logically possible that the Fool conceives of the existence in reality of the GCB. Since one can save the ontological status of Anselm’s argument by treating claim c as an a priori claim, it is more reasonable to treat it in this way than as an empirical claim.

The second claim (step (2)) used against the ontological status of Anselm’s argument is that the use of empirical premises about the talents of people in support of claim c is some evidence that c has an empirical component. In reply, one may (and ought to) admit that the use of em- pirical claims in support of c is some evidence that c is empirical. But empirical support need not be given only to empirical claims. One may use empirical claims to support a priori claims. Indeed, Descartes and (if I am correct) Anselm argued to the a priori claim that God can exist from the empirical claims that someone has a clear and distinct idea of God and that someone can (and does) conceive of God as existing in reality. To argue from empirical claims to a priori claims may even be a natural pro- cedure, although it is certainly very different from the a priori argumenta- tion insisted upon by Leibniz and Duns Scotus. Since it is not impossible or unnatural to move from empirical claims to a priori claims, and since one will be able to preserve the ontological status of Anselm’s argument by supposing that this was Anselm’s intention, I conclude that one should not take the empirical support for claim c as grounds that are sufficient to show that c is empirical.

The third claim (step (3)) invoked against the ontological status of Anselm’s argument is that the full content of claim c is used in Anselm’s argument. One may grant this claim and yet still preserve the ontological status of the argument if one insists, as 1 have done, that the full content of c involves no empirical component. This is my position. But even if c has an empirical component, one could still preserve the ontological status of Anselm’s argument if this third claim were false and the empiri- cal component were not used in that argument.

lt is far from obvious, however, that the (alleged) empirical component was not used in the argument; so it is not easy to defend the ontological status of the argument in this way. After all, why would Anselm have included an unused (and unnecessary) component in c in the first place? If and only if this could be explained would one be justified in saying that the full content of c was not used in the argument. Happily, this matter can be explained by saying that the (alleged) empirical component was included in c because c was established in the course of the discussion of the Fool’s psychological talents.

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This explanation of the presence of the unused and unneeded com- ponent of c still leaves open a more ultimate puzzle of why Anselm intro- duced this discussion of the Fool’s psyche prior to or as the initial segment of his theistic argument. I shall deal with this question in Part IV, and thereby further clarify and extend the defense I have here given of the ontological status of Anselm’s argument. Nevertheless, without facing this more ultimate question, it should now be sufficiently clear why Anselm would have given an empirical proof of (4.1), (i.e. claim c), and why he would have stated it in the psychological terminology of con- ceivability. Both are possible courses of action and both are natural courses of action in the still unexplained context of a discussion of the psychological talents of the Fool. These explanations relieve some of the pressure to take the Conceivability Principle as used in the theistic proof, claim c, as an empirical claim. It is at least as reasonable to think that it is an a priori claim.

I conclude that Ec is false and so are Ac & Ec and M c & Ec. The onto- logical status of Anselm’s argument is not destroyed by its use of claim c.

B. Challenges from Claim m. The two other challenges to the onto- logical status of argument n stem from claim m: the GCB exists in the mind of (even) the Fool. Anselm treats existence in the mind as equivalent to at least partially understanding what a GCB is. Thus the GCB exists in the mind of someone if and only if he at least partially understands what ‘GCB means. Since m is obviously an empirical claim, one needs only to determine whether it is used or for validity must be used in Anselm’s argument. If it is so used, it destroys the allegedly ontological status of that argument.

One threatening occurrence of claim m is in the proof that the GCB can be conceived to exist:

(3) the GCB exists in the mind of even the Fool (Claim m). (4) Whatever exists in the mind can be conceived to exist in reality.

(4.1) Therefore the GCB can be conceived to exist in reality even by the Fool (Claim c).

Since claim m is used as a premise in arriving at (4.1) and since (4.1) or its apriori implication is vital to Anselm’s argument, it would appear that claim m is a working premise in a sub-argument within Anselm’s total argument.

The only way to save the ontological status of Anselm’s argument is to decree that steps (3) and (4) of my suggested version of Anselm’s argument are not part of the ontological argument he intended. In that case, step (2)-that even the Fool understands the GCB-also will have to be elimin-

THE FOOL A N D ST ANSELM’S A R G U M E N T 41 7

ated. This, in turn, makes step (1) otiose too. In brief, the entire argument for (4.1) must be deleted from any interpretation of Anselm’s argument that is to yield an ontological argument. The only portion of this sub- argument that can remain in Anselm’s theistic proof is an a priori reading or entailment of (4.1) (e.g. that it is logically possible that someone conceives of the existence in reality of the GCB). That claim will be entered as a basic datum of the argument rather than as the conclusion of a sub-argument which is integral to Anselm’s theistic proof.

This position does no violence to the text. Surely arguments that support the premises of proofs need not be included as parts of those proofs. Descartes argued for God’s possibility from the empirical, psychological claim that he had a clear and distinct idea of God, yet nobody thinks that there is any necessity for including this argument for God’s possibility as an integral stage of his ontological argument. The cases of Anselm and Descartes are quite parallel and should be so treated. The suggested read- ing of Anselm’s argument is close to the text in further ways. There is no substitution of modern logicians’ terminology of possibility, possible exist- ence and existence for Anselm’s medieval, psychological language of conceivability, existence in the mind and existence in reality. Nor is there any need to do this since the a priori version of (4. I) can be expressed by use of ‘the GCB can be conceived (even by the Fool) to exist in reality’.

A further threat to the ontological status of Anselm’s argument from claim m can be discovered by examining the conclusion of that argument: ‘something-than-which-a-greater-cannot-be-conceived exists both in the mind and in reality’. This conclusion is a conjunction of two claims: (I) the GCB exists in the mind; (2) the GCB exists in reality. The first of these is claim m. The occurrence of claim m in the conclusion of Anselm’s argument is by itself no threat to the ontological status of the argument. But if its occurrence in the conclusion should require it to be a working premise ofthe argument for that conclusion, then claim m would be a threat.

Tt would appear that claim m does threaten in this way. If one conjunct of the conclusion is the assertion that the GCB exists in the mind (of at least the Fool), then that claim (or some claims entailing it) would have to occur as a working premise in order for that conclusion to be established with any plausibility. Thus, something at least entailing claim m must be a working premise of the argument, and the argument will not be onto- logical.

One may reply to this challenge in two ways. First, one may deny the objector’s assumption that claim m is asserted as one of the conjuncts of Anselm’s conclusion. One may interpret the conclusion to say that a GCB

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which we suppose to exist in the mind must exist in reality. Here the con- clusion is read as a conditional asserting that ifthe GCB exists in the mind (as we suppose to be the case in order to identify the GCB), then the GCB exists in reality. On this interpretation claim m is not asserted in the conclusion, so it need not occur as a working premise used to support that conclusion.

The second reply grants the objector’s assumption that claim m is asserted as a conjunct of the conclusion, yet still denies that it or some- thing as strong as it must be a working premise (a premise used to establish the conclusion). The grounds for this are that claim m as it occurs in the conclusion is not argued for, but is simply asserted. The only conclusion for which anything need be (or even could be) a working premise is that the GCB (which is simply asserted to exist in the mind) exists in reality; consequently there is no reason why claim m would have to be a premise, much less a working premise, of Anselm’s argument.

I believe that this second reply is closer to the truth. Anselm did assert claim m as a conjunct of his conclusion, but he made no attempt to prove this assertion. Whether or not this is a correct interpretation will not, however, affect the success of my argument that claim m neither is nor need be a working premise of the argument and that its occurrence does not jeopardize the ontological status of Anselm’s argument.

I conclude that Em is true, but that both Am & Em and M m & Em are false.

I V : THE ROLE OF THE FOOL

I have argued in Part I11 that claims c and m do not destroy the ontological status of Anselm’s argument if their meanings and their functions in that argument are correctly understood. But in order to show this, I advanced several views about the meanings and roles of c and m which were odd enough to require special justification. Regarding claim c, for example, 1 urged that in spite of appearances to the contrary, the sub- argument for c was not a part of Anselm’s theistic proof and that c was neither empirical nor essentially about people’s psychological talents. I justified the first view on the grounds that there is no special reason why the sub-arguments for the premises of a proof should be part of that proof, and I suggested that the illusion that c is an empirical claim essentially about human psychology is due to two facts. First, this sub-argument for c was made part of a discussion of the Fool’s psychological talents; and second, the language of conceiving, understanding and existence in the

THE FOOL AND ST ANSELM’S ARGUMENT 419

mind that was used in that discussion was continued in the theistic proof itself.

These justifications, although adequate in themselves, raise questions which I have promised to answer in this final part of the paper: ( I ) Why was Anselm discussing the Fool’s psyche prior to his theistic proof? (2) Why did Anselm extend the use of the misleading terminology of con- ceivability into his theistic proof (especially when he often equated con- ceivability and possibility and he could have used the overtly a priori and non-psychological claim that it is logically possible that the GCB exists) ?

The use of claim m (viz., that the GCB exists in the mind) raises similar questions. The occurrence of m in the theistic proof seems to saddle the proof with an empirical claim and it also requires that the proof use the contrast of existence in the mind and existence in reality instead of the contrast between possible existence and actual existence. Here too I explained that these oddities were the results of carrying into the proof from the preceeding discussion the psychological concepts used to char- acterize the psyche of the Fool. But, once again, this explanation raises the further questions: (1 ) Why was Anselm discussing the Fool’s psyche prior to his theistic proof? (2 ) Why did Anselm carry into the theistic proof the notion of existence in the mind and the attendant contrast between this and existence in reality (especially since he sometimes, even in Proslogion 11, used the ‘modern’, non-psychological contrast between the non-existent (but possible) and the existent) ?

The answers to these questions are closely related and can be rather briefly stated. Anselm wished to stress the consequences that his theistic proof would have for anyone who even merely understood the meaning of ‘GCB’, hence had the GCB in his mind, hence conceived of the existence in reality of the GCB. He wished to point out that if his argument was sound, then such a person-even if an alleged atheist like the Fool-would be incorrect and stupid or irrational and inconsistent if he did not believe that there is a GCB. It was to make clear these implications of his argu- ment that he prefaced the argument with a discussion of the Fool’s psyche and then set up the argument as a reply to people (exemplified by the Fool) who have God in their minds and can conceive of his existence in reality. But to assure that his proof that God exists would have conse- quences for their non-belief, mere discussion of the Fool’s psyche was insufficient. Even if the Fool had God in his mind and conceived of God’s existence in reality, it was necessary to identifv this God of the Fool with the God of the proof. To do this Anselm carried the psychological termin-

420 ALBERT W . W A L D

ology of claims c and m into the theistic proof. By doing this Anselm assured that any person who talked meaningfully about a GCB would realize that he must admit that there is a GCB if he were not to be proved stupid or irrational and inconsistent.

In order to fill out and support this brief account of the role of the Fool in Anselm’s scheme, 1 shall examine some parts of chapters 11, 111 and LV of the Proslogion. Through this examination I establish that Anselm was as much concerned to show thatpeople ought to believe that there is a GCB as he was simply to show that there is a GCB; for the stress of these chapters, respectively, is that non-believers are incorrect, stupid or irrational, and incoherently inconsistent. Having demonstrated these points, I shall show in more detail how the inclusion of claims c and in and the attendant psychological terminology in the theistic proof assures that anyone who understands the proof will have to admit that non-belief is incorrect, stupid or irrational, and incoherently inconsistent.

Recall that in Proslogion I1 Anselm introduces the theistic proof as an answer to the question ‘Can it be that a thing of such a nature does not exist, since ‘the Fool has said in his heart, there is no God”? (my italics). Here Anselm suggests that the alleged atheism of the Fool (or anyone else) provides some reason for doubting the existence of a GCB. This strongly suggests that the ontological argument’s negative answer to the question is to be applied to the Fool’s belief in order to discredit it. This is borne out by the texts of Proslogion I11 and IV, where the main topic of interest shifts from the truth of the claim that God exists to the veracity of the Fool’s belief about the existence of God. But this interest is present even in Proslogion 11; for its proof that there is a GCB is supposed to have the force of showing that the Fool’s belief to the contrary must be in- correct at the least.

Anselm goes beyond this minimal claim of incorrectness when in Proslogion 111 he asks why the Fool believes that God does not exist and when in Proslogion IV he asks whether and how the Fool even could believe that God does not exist. To the question of why the Fool says that there is no God he answers: ‘Why, indeed, unless because he was stupid and a fool?’ (Cur nisi quia stultus et ins@iens?)l This implies that only a ‘stupid’ person could be an atheist, so that atheism is an unintelli- gent as well as an incorrect position. This is not as damning as it sounds, however; for the stupidity consists only in failing to believe that the ontological argument is sound. Since the argument is not in fact sound, this ‘failure’ might well indicate intelligence rather than stupidity.

Charlesworth, op. cit., pp. 118-9.

THE F O O L A N D S T ANSELM’S ARGUMENT 42 1

Tn Proslogion IV Anselm appears to explain how the Fool could deny the existence of the GCB, but his point is that really the Fool could not deny the existence of the GCB of which Anselm is speaking. If atheism involves the denial of the existence of God as conceived by Anselm, then nobody can really be an atheist; for it is contradictory to say that there is no God so conceived. On the other hand, if atheism only involves the denial of the existence of God differently conceived, then it is a denial of the existence of something mistaken for God and, therefore, is not really atheism. For Anselm, one can say in one’s heart that there is no God if one uses ‘God’ ‘without any [objective] signification or with some peculiar (extranea) signification’ (ibid., p. 121), but pretty clearly this is not really to say that God does not exist. On the other hand, if one really is thinking of God, then one cannot coherently (without contradiction) deny his existence anymore than one can coherently deny that a triangle has three sides. This, genuine atheism is impossible, while alleged (but not genuine) atheism is beside the point.

This survey of Proslogion 11,111 and 1V reveals the nature and the extent of Anselm’s desire to expose the consequences for non-believers that his argument would have if it were sound. The only task remaining is to explain why nobody who understood the argument and agreed that it was sound could avoid admitting that his own atheism was incorrect and irra- tional if not incoherent. This can be understood by imagining how an alleged atheist like the Fool might have tried to claim that his position was correct. He would have maintained that Anselm’s negative conclusions about his beliefs did not apply to him because he did not share the con- ception of God used by Anselm in the ontological argument. This, no doubt, would be a last resort to escape the clutches of Anselm’s argument; for it not only involves refusal to use what (without close inspection) appears to be a fairly plausible and widely accepted concept of God, but it means that the Fool is not even an opponent of Anselm’s kind of theism. This escape is one that Anselm wished to prevent; for he believed that the Fool did represent opponents of his views. To do this, Anselm prefaced his proof with the discussion of the Fool’s psychological abilities and then carried the psychological claims and terminology introduced in that discussion into the theistic proof itself. In this way he identified the God which the atheist (Fool) admits to exist in his mind with the God whose existence is proved in the argument. In this way the escape is blocked.

To conclude: Anselm wished to use the results attained in his onto- logical argument to show that nobody (e.g. the Fool) could be a genuine

422 A L B E R T W . WALD

atheist or any other variety of non-believer. In order to do this he first asserted that the GCB existed in the mind of the Fool (claim m) and that the GCB could be conceived by the Fool to exist in reality (claim c). Next, by importing claims m and c into the argument, Anselm identified the GCB of his argument as this GCB that is conceived of and is in the mind of the Fool. In this way he forced the Fool to admit that the GCB of Anselm’s proof was in his mind unless he wanted to admit that he was not even opposing Anselm.1 The Fool could not escape the conclusion that his belief was incoherent (or a t least incorrect and irrational) because of the way Anselm imported c and m into his theistic argument. Yet none of this apparatus of psychological language and empirical claims destroyed the ontological status of Anselm’s argument.

In the ninth chapter of his replies to Gaunilo Anselm gives grounds for saying that the Fool must understand what is meant by ‘God‘ : ‘Whoever, then, denies that there is something-than-which-a-greater-cannot-be-con~ived, at any rate understands and thinks of the denial, and this denial cannot be understood and thought apart from its elements. Now one element [of the denial] is‘ ‘that-than-which-a-greater-cannot-be- conceived”. Whoever, therefore, denies this, understands and thinks of “that-than- which-a-greater-cannot-be-conceived” ’ (Charlesworth, op. cit., p. 189).