Wake-up call for Europe!library.fes.de/pdf-files/bueros/wien/15176-20190412.pdf · 2019-04-12 · 6...

Wake-up callfor Europe!

2019

Security Radar 2019

Authors

Reinhard Krumm Head of FES Regional Office for Cooperation and Peace in Europe (FES ROCPE)

Alexandra Dienes Research Associate at FES ROCPE

Simon WeißResearch Associate at FES ROCPE

Sebastian StarystachResearch Associate at the Max Weber Institute for Sociology, Heidelberg University

Hans-Henning Schröder Professor emeritus at the Freie Universität Berlin

Stefan BärResearch Associate at the Max Weber Institute for Sociology, Heidelberg University

Many colleagues and institutions were involved in the exciting process of preparing and execut-ing this study. We would like to thank our imple-menting partner Ipsos Public Affairs, in particular Alexandra Gloger, Armgard Zindler and Robert Grimm, who conducted the public opinion poll on our behalf and consulted on many related mat-ters. Our FES colleagues in the seven country of-fices took great care of us during the field trips and helped organise the focus group discussions. We owe a debt of gratitude to all participating experts, who generously shared with us their in-sights and opinions on European security in the group discussions, conducted under Chatham House Rules. A special thanks to Daniela N. Barth, who consulted during the entire process. Our project also profited from inspiring conversations with the staff of the Munich Security Conference. This publication would not have been possible without our meticulous editor Sheelagh Barron and the tireless work of our student interns Aidyn Kaiyrbekova, who helped to design the question-naire, and Sophie Haas, who contributed to the fi-nal editing. Last but not least, many thanks to our colleague Julia Zöllner, who helped to facilitate a smooth process.

Security Radar 2019

Table of Contents

Forewords ................................................................................................................................................................................. 2

Executive Summary ............................................................................................................................................................... 4

1. Introduction ......................................................................................................................................................................... 5

Overview ......................................................................................................................................................................... 6

Research Design ............................................................................................................................................................ 7

2. Descriptive Analysis ........................................................................................................................................................... 9

Diagnosis ...................................................................................................................................................................... 10

Challenges .................................................................................................................................................................... 21

Approaches .................................................................................................................................................................. 28

3. Country Profiles ................................................................................................................................................................ 37

Germany ....................................................................................................................................................................... 38

France ........................................................................................................................................................................... 41

Latvia ............................................................................................................................................................................. 44

Poland ........................................................................................................................................................................... 47

Russia ............................................................................................................................................................................ 50

Serbia ............................................................................................................................................................................ 53

Ukraine ......................................................................................................................................................................... 56

4. Steps Towards a European Security Process .............................................................................................................. 59

Imprint .................................................................................................................................................................................... 68

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Security Radar 2019

European security now finds itself in choppy waters. The commitment of the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) to ‘a new Europe’ in 1990, which was once so optimistic and oriented towards the future, has slipped farther out of reach. Instead of a truly united Eu-rope, we see deep divisions emerging that were unimaginable a quarter of a century ago.

The victims are all of Europe’s citizens, especially those who suffer from armed conflicts. For Germany in particular, the primary foreign policy goal was and still is working to achieve long-term and sustainable peace in Europe.

Consequently, it is all the more important that we understand the needs and fears present in Europe. We need new analyses to meet the foreign policy challenges of the 21st century. There is no blueprint we can follow. German Federal Chancellor Willy Brandt once said that new challenges require answers that are in keeping with the times. This is precisely the urgent situation we are facing today, which requires us to undertake ex-traordinary efforts to find solutions.

The Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung, Germany’s oldest policy foundation, estab-lished in 1925, has already had to overcome difficult periods. But it has always been guided by its goal of shouldering responsibility for working towards peace and social progress in Europe and the world.

I therefore welcome the fact that the Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung has taken the initiative in creating the Security Radar, a mechanism for carrying out public opinion surveys and one which channels the findings into the political debate.

These surveys are being conducted not only in Germany, but also in six other selected European countries, including both members of the Euro-pean Union and non-EU countries. Despite the high level of harmonisa-tion in Europe, national sensitivities remain diverse, and understanding this is precisely what must form the basis of a responsible foreign and security policy.

The European Security Radar Project undertaken by the Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung can offer a pan-European overview of threat perceptions, which is fully in the interest of our Social-Democratic foundation.

I sincerely hope that the Security Radar receives the necessary attention it deserves to be truly heard by both political leaders and society.

ForewordsBy Kurt Beck

Chairman of the Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung Former Minister President of Rhineland-Palatinate

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Security Radar 2019

Europe has entered a phase where it is being put to the test and must once again navigate the way ahead. Values such as community and solidarity are increasingly being challenged in domestic politics. Many are seeking a European identity in times of seemingly overwhelming globalisation, yet personal feelings of security remain paramount.

Threats are on the rise – either in actuality or are increasingly being perceived as such – and include climate change, terrorism and waves of refugees. Europeans‘ perception of security is changing; what was con-sidered secure and stable yesterday is now seen as a threat.

That is why it is long overdue for us to ask the citizens of European coun-tries how they view the issue of security. This applies not only to the countries individually, but also to the countries of Europe collectively.

It is only when a representative survey such as the Security Radar pro-vides specific insights as to where fears are rooted, that political leaders in Europe can tailor their security measures accordingly. The objective is to perceive, limit and, in the best-case scenario, eliminate these threats.

The goal of European governments must be to take Europeans and their needs adequately into account in their assessment and decision-making processes. The Security Radar survey is an essential tool, an evaluation instrument, for obtaining unfiltered and objective insights into Europe-an security perceptions.

The Security Radar published by the Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung (FES) Re-gional Office for Cooperation and Peace in Europe will help provide a clear view of Europeans’ perceptions and attitudes. It can lay the foun-dations for European governments to draw constructive conclusions and help the media glean a realistic assessment of European stances in order to counter speculation and even counter propaganda.

I am very pleased that the FES Regional Office in Vienna, established at the beginning of 2017, and an initiative I very much welcomed, has assumed responsibility for carrying out this unique survey in Europe and is implementing the project for the benefit of all of the countries in Europe.

We eagerly look forward to the results. Moreover, we must take them seriously as a basis for reaching political solutions and decisions, there-by enabling Europeans to continue to live in peace and security in their own countries and in the European Union.

By Dr. Heinz Fischer

Federal President of the Republic of Austria

2004–2016

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Security Radar 2019

Executive SummaryIn the context of dramatic challenges to the European security architecture, emerging conflicts, both hot and cold, an annexation and more and more frequent cyber-attacks, the analysis presented in ‘Security Radar 2019 – Wake-up call for Europe’ is intended to shed light on two major factors of crucial importance for political decision-makers: general public opinion and particular expert perspectives on the security and foreign pol-icy situation in Europe.

The aim of the analysis is to provide detailed insights into a topic that is relevant to both politicians and society as a whole. In the 30 years since the fall of the Berlin Wall and the seemingly solid and peaceful road towards unity that Europe seemed to have set out on, new gaps have opened up, even within the EU.

Responses to the survey varied across all dimensions, with only a few predictable constants, such as the annexation issue or attitudes towards NATO in Serbia and Russia.

In the expert group discussions one could clearly discern the transformative character of the current security situation in Europe. All seven states surveyed (Germany, France, Lat-via, Poland, Serbia, Ukraine and Russia) are in the midst of this transformation, although we do not yet know where it is going and when it will end. The main reason for this is the reorientation of important players in European security (the EU, the People’s Republic of China, Russia and the United States): international relations have become much more volatile, while old alliances and ‘special relationships’ are being redefined by domestic developments. Nevertheless, this study has also uncovered positive factors that offer at least some hope that people‘s fears right across Europe and the demands arising from them could influence the political agenda.

Radar’s main advantage is its early warning capability. Our analysis in this report has a sound empirical basis and indicates that the security situation is fragile in both the West and the East. A mixture of people’s diminishing trust in central state institutions and dis-comfort with their government’s positions on the broadest level have created the widely discussed sense of insecurity in Europe. The consequences of this include a turn towards militaristic politics, the simplistic political sloganeering of populist parties and a general turn towards nationalism. The prevailing ‘state of mind’ in the seven countries analysed, which represent different regions of a larger Europe and generally give us a broader per-spective than the situation within their borders, is thus characterised by worry and criti-cism of the political status quo. This report is tasked with transforming this early warning into timely political awareness by instigating appropriate political steps. It does indeed offer policy makers a wake-up call.

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Security Radar 2019

Introduction

> Overview> Research Design

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Security Radar 2019

In the context of dramatic challenges for the European Security Architecture, new emerging cold and hot conflicts, an annexation, and intensifying cyber-attacks, the Security Radar 2019 – Wake-up-call for Europe analysis aims to shed light on two main factors which have a substantial impact on political de-cision-makers: public opinion in general, and expert perspectives in particular, regarding the security and foreign policy situation in Europe.

The aim of the analysis is to provide in-depth in-formation on a topic that is relevant for both poli-ticians and society as a whole. In the 30 years since the fall of the Berlin Wall and the seemingly solid and peaceful road towards European unity, new divisions have opened up within Europe, and even within the European Union.

According to some experts, even though there are far fewer conventional and nuclear weapons on its territory, Europe appears to be in a worse situation today than it was during the Cold War. The experts suggest that the rules and common understanding that once guided the world through dangerous mo-ments are becoming more and more irrelevant. A military conflict cannot be excluded with the same certainty that we had a quarter of a century ago.

The representative public opinion poll, held in seven European countries, was developed by the FES Re-gional Office for Cooperation and Peace in Europe and conducted by Ipsos Berlin. It systematically analyses and investigates the attitudes and values related to the current security and foreign policy sit-uation in Europe, five years after the eruption of the crisis in Ukraine and the annexation of Crimea by Russia.

Seven countries were chosen to participate in this public opinion poll. They are France and Germany, two founding members of the organisation now known as the European Union; Latvia and Poland, who joined the EU in 2004; Serbia, which has had candidate status for EU membership since 2013; Ukraine, which signed an Association Agreement with the EU in 2014 and a Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Agreement (DCFTA) with the EU in 2016; and lastly, Russia.

The choice of the seven countries detailed above for participation in the poll was based on their impor-tance for European security: France and Germany are, for the moment, the two remaining major coun-tries of the EU, whose support is necessary for any possible initiatives; Poland is the most powerful Cen-tral Eastern European EU member state; Latvia is a member of the historically volatile Baltic region and a former Soviet republic; Serbia is a very important

Overview

country in Southeast Europe, with ties to the EU but with cultural affinity to Russia; Ukraine is the largest country of the Eastern Partnership programme and is currently trying to defend itself against separatists backed by Russia in Donbass. Last but not least, the poll includes Russia, because without Russia any talk of security in Europe is pointless.

In addition to the poll, active political consulting ex-perts from the above-mentioned countries were in-volved in group discussions, intended to determine the typical mind-set of the local expert community: to reveal how experts evaluated the current situation and what actions they recommended accordingly. In each country a small group of approximately five ex-perts participated in an active and open discussion. The criteria for including the experts were (a) proven expertise and knowledge, as acknowledged within the country-specific expert discourse and (b) estab-lished influence on the political discourse within the country.

Each data set was analysed separately. Subse-quently the results were triangulated. The guiding research aim of this analytical step was to identify how the expert mind-set and public opinion differ and to examine what conclusions can be drawn from this. This information can be found in the chapter on country reports. This final report consists of four chapters. The first chapter includes introductory remarks by Heinz Fischer, former President of the Republic of Aus-tria, and Kurt Beck, former Governor of Rhine-land-Palatinate and now Head of Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung in Germany, as well as an introduction to the main findings of the public opinion poll. The second chapter presents the main findings, divid-ed into the status quo, challenges and approaches. The third chapter is devoted to the differences and similarities found between the seven countries. The last chapter seeks to analyse the findings of the survey in light of the focus group discussions and current trends. The chapter concludes with three recommendations.

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Security Radar 2019

A representative public opinion poll was con-ducted in seven European countries: Germany, France, Latvia, Poland, Serbia, Ukraine and Rus-sia. The aim was to systematically investigate the attitudes to the current security and foreign pol-icy situation in Europe. The pollster Ipsos Public Affairs in Berlin was assigned to carry out the nec-essary fieldwork.

Expert group discussions in each of the seven countries provided access to (a) expert knowl-edge and (2) the typical mind-set of the regional consulting expert community. This step aimed to replicate how regional expert communities define and evaluate the current security and foreign pol-icy situation and investigated what useful lessons could be derived from their perspective.

Survey

A representative opinion survey was conducted with the help of a fully standardised instrument (CATI-Dual-Frame). The target population sur-veyed consisted of citizens of the seven countries detailed above, aged 18 or over, with access to at least one landline telephone or at least one mo-bile phone.

The survey explores public opinion concerning the current security and foreign policy situation in five dimensions:

Perception of the current threat situation

Trust and attitudes towards institutions

Attitudes towards foreign and security policy

Attitudes towards national identity

Prospects for the development of security policy in Europe.

The research is designed to shed light on two main factors that have substantial impact on political decision-makers when faced with security or foreign affairs issues: public opinion and the perspective of political consulting experts. Accordingly, the design of the study consists of two main steps of data collection and analysis: a representative public opinion poll and expert group discussions.

Research Design

Furthermore, descriptors consisting of sociode-mographics, political views and information behaviour were collected.

The survey uses Likert-scaled, binary and open-end-ed questions. The objective of Likert-scaling is to measure the extent of agreement or disagreement with a question or statement. In most cases, the ex-tent is measured on a four-point scale ranging from ‘strongly agree’, ‘somewhat agree’, ‘somewhat disa-gree’ to ‘strongly disagree’. Some five-point and ten-point scales were also used. The respondents could also decline to agree or disagree with the question or statement. In this case, the answer was coded as ‘I don‘t know’.

For statistical analysis, each point scale is convert-ed into a number from one to four (and in a few cases one to five or ten). Statistical analysis was performed using Microsoft® Excel® and IBM® SPSS® Statistics Version 25.

Before the main fieldwork began, a pre-test was conducted in Germany (n = 52) and Serbia (n = 54) to test the clarity of the questions, answer op-tions, the questionnaire’s length, as well as the willingness to participate. The pre-test took place between May 29th and 30th 2018. Contacts were recruited under realistic fieldwork conditions. The results of the pre-test were used to inform the final design of the questionnaire.

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Security Radar 2019

Country n

Germany 1,000

France 1,017

Russia 1,000

Poland 1,002

Ukraine 1,002

Latvia 1,000

Serbia 1,001

Total 7,022

For each country surveyed a national representa-tive sample of n = 1,000 net cases was sought. The following sample was retrieved from the target population:

The sampling method consisted of a multi-lev-el, layered random selection process based on a sample, together with a random sample of the interviewees (Random Last Two Digits Approach). By applying the Dual-frame method, two separate samples were formed in each of the survey coun-tries.

The data was weighted in a multi-stage process. First, the landline telephone household-sample was transformed into a person-sample. Second, the landline telephone household-sample and the cell-phone individual-sample were transformed into a person-sample. Finally, the unweighted sample-structure was adjusted to the official sta-tistics. For the last step of the weighting process the sex, age and region variables were used to calculate the weighting factors. The iterative ‘Rim weight’ procedure supplied by Quantum Soft-ware® was used.

Expert Group Discussion

With the help of a semi-structured interview in-strument, expert group discussions were con-ducted in each of the above-mentioned countries. Trained moderators carried out the data collec-tion. Target groups were active political consult-ing experts and analysts. All expert group discus-sions took place in October and November 2018.

The central theme of the discussion was the cur-rent foreign and security situation in Europe. The participants were instructed that the notion of ‘Europe’ should go beyond the European Union and should be understood as ‘Greater Europe’.

The semi-structured interview instrument consisted of three phases:

1. An open discussion about the current secu-rity and foreign policy situation in Europe. Guiding questions were:

What concrete challenges have shaped the landscape of foreign policies of European countries as well the security situation in Europe in recent years?

Can you broadly describe the current security situation in Europe?

How did the current situation emerge?

2. A summary of the discussion and identifi-cation of key corresponding categories was compiled together with the participants, as well as a focused reflection on how every category was understood. The content was limited to the aspects introduced by the par-ticipants. The moderators provided no addi-tional external information or content.

The main goal of the first two phases was to gain access to country specific expert knowledge.

3. A subsequent guided discussion focused on nec-essary political steps to improve the status quo. In this phase, the experts were put in the virtual role of policy advisors. To provide comparabili-ty, the dimensions of the guided focus were the same as in the survey.

The main goal of this phase was to gain access to the shared underlying perspective, with which the experts participate in the current political discourse.

The criteria for including the experts in the sample were that they had (a) proven expert knowledge, which is acknowledged within the country specific expert discourse and (b) influence on the political discourse within the country. Expert group discus-sions were realised in each country with between five and seven experts involved in each discussion. The duration of the discussion varied between 120 and 140 minutes. ‘Chatham House Rules’ were ap-plied to protect the participants from possible re-percussions.

After each discussion, the moderators compiled a verbatim protocol from memory. Furthermore, the discussion was recorded and transcribed for content and mind-set analyses. Finally, after con-tent and mind-set analyses for each country were completed, the results were triangulated with the results of the public opinion poll.

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Security Radar 2019

Descriptive Analysis

> Diagnosis> Challenges> Approaches

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Security Radar 2019

Diagnosis

Europe has its own culture area and should grow closer together as a community on this basis.

UA76%

PL83%

RU78%

LV84%

DE81%

FR66% RS

84%

79%

My country is part of the European cultural sphere.

87% UA

79%

PL93%

RU74%

LV93%

DE92%

FR88% RS

91%

= Total DE = Germany FR = France LV = Latvia PL = Poland RU = Russia RS = Serbia UA = Ukraine

First, the good news. The respondents consistently perceive their own country as part of the European cultural sphere (87%) and therefore state that Europe should grow together more closely (79%).

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Security Radar 2019

Now to the challenges. 80% of respondents think that their respective country has a unique culture, which should be increasingly protected. Initially surprising, this finding is explained by differences between Russia, Ukraine and Serbia on the one

UA90%

PL79%

RU89%

LV88%

DE59%

FR63% RS

94%

This reveals something systematic witnessed through out our results. The threat perception in Europe – and in Eastern Europe especially – is very high and at the same time, the perceived legitimacy of institutions is alarmingly low. In a climate of fear, old mind-sets about ‘friend and foe’ stemming from the Cold War era are resurrected.

But there is a silver lining: the European popula-tion surveyed is, in general, in favour of diplomatic solutions and rejects military intervention. Fur-thermore, we believe that the French and Germans can act as an engine towards developing a foreign policy. This may solve current conflicts such as in Ukraine and overcome the nationalisation of secu-rity issues.

side where 89%, 90% and 94% respectively agree or totally agree with these statements, compared with Germany and France, where the proportion of agreement, although still held by the majority, clearly is smaller at 59% and 63% respectively.

80%

I think that my country has a unique culture, which should be protected more than ever before.

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Security Radar 2019

To what extent are you personally concerned about the following current events that arefrequently discussed at the moment? For each event, please state on a four-level scale how worried or not worried you are.

The people of all polled European states are great-ly concerned about current events and develop-ments in world affairs. Only the growing world population is perceived as not so threatening – this was especially notable in respondents from

Not worried at all Somewhat less worried Somewhat worried Very worried


Wars and conflicts

21%78%

Economic crises 31%68%

Growing world population56%41%

Uncontrolled immigration

38%60%

Disagreement and conflict withinthe European Union

43%54%

Eastern Europe. Surprisingly, disagreement and conflict within the European Union is not the number one concern – even among respondents of its member states.

Climate change

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Security Radar 2019

Germany and France showed similar responses overall. Against the background of a strong econ-omy, the German and Polish respondents are least worried about a possible economic crisis.

However, in France, disagreement and conflict within the European Union is of least concern. The most threatening events perceived in all countries are war and conflict, and this response is especial-ly high in conflict-ridden Ukraine.

Fear of war and other conflicts is not merely an abstract threat. The surveyed populations in East-ern Europe in particular fear that war and other conflicts will also affect their country in the future. Not surprisingly this view is especially high in Ukraine. However, this fear is also widespread in Poland.

*Deviations to 100% result from ‘will remain unchanged’, ‘do not know’ and ‘no answer’.

International terrorism 24%75%

I fear that wars and other conflicts will also affect my country.

69%29%

In view of increasing tensions between Russia and the West, I think new wars in Europe are likely.

47%49%

In France and especially Germany, the surveyed population is less concerned. The conceptualis-ation of the tensions between Russia and the West as a threat to the security situation in Europe is more prevalent in Eastern European countries. In Russia and Ukraine 59% of the respective popu-lation agrees or fully agrees with this statement. Meanwhile, the surveyed populations of Germany and France reject this proposition with 75% and 60% of disapproval ratings respectively.

Strongly agree Somewhat agree Somewhat disagree Strongly disagree

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Security Radar 2019

What is currently influencing relations between Russia and many European states? The relations are influenced by:


Strongly agree Somewhat agree

Relations between Russia and many European states are described as being influenced by the fol-lowing factors: sanctions as a result of the Ukrain-ian conflict (72%); lacking will to cooperate (69%); the USA (68%). A majority of respondents also mentioned other factors, including the eastern expansion of the EU and NATO (60%); incompat-ible values and mind-sets (58%); internal political

developments in Russia (66%); interferences of Eu-ropean states in the internal affairs of Russia (57%) as well as interferences of Russia in the internal affairs of European states (50%) all represented major influences on relations. Even repercussions of the Cold War were perceived by 52% of respond-ents as a relevant factor influencing relations be-tween Russia and many European states.

The Ukraine conflict and the resulting sanctions for Russia

72%75%

60%80%

80%

77%

61%73%

The Eastern expansion of the EU and NATO

60%60%

50%

63%

57%65%

68%52%

The interference of Russia in the internal affairs of European states

55% 52%

50%64%

74%29%

42%72%

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Security Radar 2019

The interference of European states in the internal affairs of Russia

50%42%

37%49%

47%

74%

65%38%

Internal political developments in Russia

57%59%

54%68%

57%52%

50%56%

USA 68%68%

57%71%

67%82%

79%54%

Incompatible values and mind-sets between Russia and many European states

58%50%

48%69%

70%55%

56%61%


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Security Radar 2019

Responsibility for the escalation of the Ukrainian conflict is attributed to Russia (60%) and the sepa-ratists (57%), followed by Ukraine itself (50%), the USA (44%) and finally the EU (33%). The surveyed populations of Germany, Ukraine, France and Ser-bia see the separatists as being mainly respon-sible for the conflict. Respondents in Ukraine,

We are now interested in your opinion on current security policy challenges. In your opinion, who is responsible for the escalation of the Ukrainian conflict? You can name several.

Yes No


Separatists 26%20%

19%26%

30%

24%21%

57%62%

48%

57%

51%

55%

59%

66%

41%

Germany, France, Poland and Latvia see Russia as being mainly responsible for the escalation in the conflict; by contrast, respondents in Russia per-ceive Ukraine as being mainly responsible. More-over, respondents in Russia and Serbia perceive the USA and the EU as being mainly responsible for the escalation of the Ukrainian conflict.

The repercussions of the Cold War

52%39%

40%58%

55%57%

60%55%

A lack of cooperation 69%68%

49%84%

77%70%

75%65%


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Security Radar 2019

Ukraine 36%38%

36%32%

67%10%

31%34%

50%47%

33%

56%

24%

84%

53%

54%

Russia 27%12%

13%23%

9%72%

52%11%

60%77%

63%

67%

82%

20%

35%

78%

EU 52%65%

51%64%

77%27%

28%50%

33%23%

20%

25%

14%

57%

57%

33%

USA 40%47%

37%44%

78%11%

14%51%

44%36%

30%42%

14%

82%

73%

33%


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Security Radar 2019

Recognition and perception of the role of interna-tional organisations entrusted with security differs widely. NATO is perceived as the most influential or-ganisation in Europe and is known by over 99% of all respondents. In contrast, the Collective Security Trea-ty Organisation (CSTO) is perceived as least influen-tial and is largely unknown, even in Eastern Europe.

Asked whether Crimea was illegally annexed or le-gally incorporated into the Russian Federation, a majority among all respondents think that it was an illegal act (56% versus 34%). This statement

I will read out two statements about Crimea. To what extent do you agree with them?


Other 46%49%

48%54%

87%23%

25%39%

6%6%

4%5%

4%

8%

8%

6%

Crimea was illegally annexed by Russia.

56%62%

59%56%

76%9%

26%87%

34%24%

11%

33%

17%

88%

54%

9%

Crimea was legally incorporated by Russia.

33%18%

12%34%

18%90%

54%5%

54%68%

58%

57%

76%

7%

26%

88%

is rejected by most of the respondents in Russia (88%). An overwhelming majority in Russia (90%) and a majority in Serbia (54%) think that Crimea was legally incorporated by Russia.

Around 30% of the Russian and Ukrainian respond-ents and around 50% of the German, Polish, Latvian and French respondents were not familiar with the CSTO. Meanwhile, the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) is not known to 17% of all respondents and takes a mid-position concerning its perceived impact on the world stage.




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Security Radar 2019

To what extent do you think these organisations influence international political events?

No influence at all, Low influence Very strong influence, Strong influence Medium influence

I don‘t know this organisation No answer


NATO (North Atlantic Treaty Organisation)

16% 13% 64%

13% 14% 71%

20% 15% 55%

11% 10% 74%

11% 16% 67%

21% 14% 53%

20% 7% 67%

14% 60%14%

EU (European Union)

UN (United Nations)

21% 17% 54%

15% 19% 64%

20% 18% 55%

16% 14% 63%

25% 19% 52%

26% 18% 47%

30% 15% 51%

21% 51%19%

3%

1%

3%

2%

2%

5%

1%

5%

18% 16% 61%

13% 18% 69%

22% 17% 57%

12% 13% 72%

15% 16% 67%

23% 20% 46%

22% 13% 62%

16% 58%17%

2%

0%

2%

0%

0%

4%

1%

2%

2%

1%

2%

3%

1%

3%

1%

2%


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Security Radar 2019

War and conflict are manifest fears in Europe. In Eastern Europe in particular the threat perception is high. Against the background of the Ukrainian conflict, this perception is not based on abstract fear. Worryingly, according to the perspective of their respective surveyed populations, Russia and

CSTO (Collective Security Treaty Organisation)

16% 12% 17%

11% 9% 10%

10% 9% 8%

12% 10% 19%

17% 11% 17%

19% 17% 24%

20% 13% 21%

25% 19%14%

43%

52%

54%

48%

49%

30%

37%

27%

EAEU (Eurasian Economic Union)

20% 14% 27%

17% 11% 21%

15% 9% 20%

15% 12% 30%

19% 15% 25%

20% 20% 34%

21% 17% 34%

28% 25%15%

28%

37%

41%

32%

33%

15%

21%

18%

OSCE (Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe)

21% 18% 37%

20% 19% 50%

17% 16% 24%

10% 17% 48%

21% 17% 30%

28% 18% 32%

25% 18% 48%

28% 35%19%

17%

10%

29%

24%

27%

12%

5%

11%

Europe seem to be perceived as being in opposition to each other. On the upside, the respondents of France and Germany appear to feel less affected by the current developments. It seems that this fragile situation is leading to a reactivation of old conflict lines of the Cold War, especially in Eastern Europe.


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Security Radar 2019

ChallengesThe main challenge to a European security strategy manifests itself in the dissatisfaction with the status of countries in the world, especially in Eastern Europe. In Russia this concept polarises: Here 32% of re-spondents totally agree that the country does not have the status in the world that it deserves and 26% totally disagree. Furthermore, in Russia, Ukraine and Serbia, the respondents consider other countries responsible for preventing their country from achieving true greatness. In Germany and France how-ever, the respondents reject both conceptualisations. On a positive note, all European respondents see the fate of their country‘s prosperity as being connected with the well-being and positive development of others.

If you think about both your country and other countries, to what extent do you agree with the following statements?



In my opinion my country does not have the status in the world it deserves in comparison with other countries.

In my opinion other countries are actively preventing my country from achieving its true greatness.

The prosperity of my country is in many respects linked to the well-being and positive development of other countries.

57%39%

49%46%

75%21%

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Security Radar 2019

In addition, especially in Eastern Europe, the con-ceptions of potential enemies are still constructed along the conflict lines of the Cold War. The two most feared countries are the Russian Federa- tion and the United States of America. In parti-cular 51% of the Polish respondents and 60% of Ukrainians perceive the Russian Federation as a great security threat. On the other hand – consis-tent with its overall responses – the Serbian res-pondents are not concerned about Russia. Mean-

In your opinion, is there a country or are there several countries that constitute a threat to your country? If yes, please name this country or these countries.

Germany France

LatviaPoland

while, the surveyed populations of Germany and France are more concerned about the USA and have less concrete enemy images overall – more than 60% of these respondents did not name any country as being perceived as threatening. Re-markably, at 11%, Turkey seems almost to be as much of a threat in the view of the German res-pondents as the Russian Federation. For the Rus-sian respondents, however, the USA is seen by far as the number one threat (46%).

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Security Radar 2019

Echoing familiar Cold-War categories, overall 43% of respondents ascribe Russia to be a threat to se-curity in Europe, whereas 50% assign this role to the USA. The surveyed population of Poland (77%) and Ukraine (67%), mainly perceive Russia to be a threat,

Thinking of security in Europe, what is your opinion on the following statements?

however the USA is perceived as the main threat by respondents from Russia and Serbia (78% and 71% respectively). In Germany and France almost half of the respondents consider the USA rather than Rus-sia to be a threat to Europe’s security.

Russia

Ukraine Serbia

The movement of NATO towards the Russian border poses a threat to security in Europe.

52%50%

35%53%

43%76%

71%37%

37%42%

38%

42%

51%

18%

23%

46%



RUSSIAUSA

Hungary

PolandChinaRomania

USAALBANIA

Croatia

Great-BritanMacedonia

BosniaFrance

TurkeyKosovo

Montenegro

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Security Radar 2019

To what extent do you trust the following institutions:

Trust completely Rather trust Rather do not trust Do not trust at all

Almost 52% of all respondents think that the movement of NATO towards the Russian bor-der represents a threat to security in Europe. This statement receives the highest approval in Russia (76%) and Serbia (71%). In Germany and Latvia around 50% agree or totally agree with these statements, whereas in France, Poland and Ukraine it is less than half.

Media 34%40%

29%43%

34%26%

32%35%

63%59%

69%

55%

62%

70%

67%

60%

The USA is a threat to security in Europe.

50%44%

Russia is a threat to security in Europe.

52% 43%

To make things even worse, the trust in political institutions and the rule of law within Europe is alarmingly low. Only the military and the police have high values of approval, which can be put into perspective when taking the widespread fears concerning war and conflict into account. Political parties, governments and the media are especially mistrusted - this poses significant chal-lenges for the acceptance and legitimacy of for-eign affairs and security policies.



25

Security Radar 2019

Courts 48%72%

65%52%

48%37%

40%18%

49%26%

32%

41%

48%

57%

57%

79%

Police 65%81%

82%75%

62%47%

66%40%

34%19%17%

23%

38%

51%

33%

57%

Military 72%58%

84%71%

67%79%

78%68%

24%38%

12%

23%

31%

18%

19%

27%

Intelligence services 45%34%

55%44%

38%53%

51%44%

38%56%

21%

29%

52%

28%

34%

48%


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Security Radar 2019

The view that foreign policy is an instrument that primarily serves the interests of the respective country is a widely held view in all European states. Furthermore, with the exception of Russia and Serbia, the European states are in favour of the enforcement of values via foreign policy, even if it poses disadvantages. On the surface this seems contradictory, but it seems that for the German,

French, Polish, Ukrainian and Latvian respondents little difference is perceived between enforcing val-ues and serving the interests of their country. On the other hand, the Russian and Serbian surveyed population seem to favour a purely interest driven foreign policy. Therefore, the main challenge for a European security strategy is to reconcile these two different concepts of a legitimate foreign policy.

Government 38%49%

36%33%

32%43%

56%17%

60%50%

62%

64%

67%

53%

42%

81%

Head of state 46%58%

40%38%

36%66%

64%20%

49%41%

57%

52%

60%

30%

34%

74%

Parties 18%25%

12%16%

21%22%

26%8%

78%72%

86%

81%

76%

70%

72%

89%


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Security Radar 2019

To what extent do you agree with the following statements about security and foreign policy?



The foreign policy in my country should represent its own interests without restriction.

Foreign policy should enforce values, even if this poses disadvantages.

My country should take more international responsibility and help other states, even if there are no direct benefits for my country.

While the acceptance of the premise of political and economic interconnectedness due to globali-sation is central to introducing a peaceful and integrated security policy strategy in Europe, the main challenge lies in status dissatisfaction, as found especially in Eastern Europe. In this con-text, even values should be instrumentalised to

serve the respective nations’ interests. In addition to this explosive mix, core democratic institutions have little legitimacy, and old conflict lines are revived in the context of the current situation of perceived insecurity. Only France and Germany seem to be stable enough to work as an engine to unite Europe in matters of security.

77%19%

60%32%

57%40%


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Security Radar 2019

ApproachesWhat approaches are perceived appropriate in this fragile security situation? It is very instructive to examine how the polled European populations evaluate possible solutions to a real, current and dominant security issue: the Ukrainian conflict.

When asked about possible solutions to the Ukrainian conflict, all respondents – excluding those from Ukraine – strongly agree with a dip-lomatic solution and generally agree that their country should stay neutral in the conflict. Cor-respondingly, all countries (strongly) reject the proposition of their country intervening militarily.

In France and Germany respondents reacted very similarly: almost all offered solutions were reject-ed, or the respondents were divided on the re-spective proposal, generally leaning to its rejec-tion. However, in Germany respondents rejected the widening of sanctions and the possible NATO membership of Ukraine more strongly than re-spondents in France. Both strongly rejected mil-itary intervention.

Eastern European countries on the other hand tend to agree with the statement that the crisis is a domestic matter and should be left to Ukraine to solve. Surprisingly this opinion included respond-ents from Russia and Ukraine. In Ukraine 47% of respondents strongly agree, compared with 41% of Russians, meanwhile 16% of Ukrainian respondents and 23% of Russian respondents somewhat agree with this statement.

Furthermore, and against the background of be-ing directly affected by the crisis, the surveyed Ukrainian population (unlike most of the other countries) did not show a clear rejection of most suggested solutions. The preferred solutions were the widening of sanctions against Russia and EU membership, but Ukrainian respondents share an endorsement of a diplomatic solution with other

European countries. The Ukrainian respondents disagreed with the statement that western part-ner states should be neutral in the conflict in east-ern Ukraine, but at the same time they also disa-greed with the suggestion that western partners should intervene militarily in the conflict.

On the other side of the conflict, the surveyed Russian population rejects the proposition that the solution of the conflict should be left to Rus-sia. However, the Russian population is divided concerning neutrality, but is still leaning slightly towards its affirmation. The underlying distribu-tion shows that this solution polarises opinion: 32% strongly agree with this statement, while 26% strongly disagree. Furthermore, the Russian respondents strongly reject the widening of sanc-tions against their country as well as NATO mem-bership of Ukraine and show a stronger rejection of the proposed solutions in general. Lastly, it has to be highlighted that the surveyed Russian pop-ulation – as in other European countries – tend-ed to reject the statement that no third country should intervene in the conflict. But a closer look at the underlying distribution shows that the pop-ulation is also divided concerning this question: 29% strongly agree with this statement, while 39% strongly disagree.

To summarise, for the Ukrainian respondents the solution to the crisis lies in Western integration. On the other hand, the Russian population is ex-plicitly against this model, but is not inclined to intervene militarily. Meanwhile, the other Europe-an countries can only agree to staying neutral and seeking out a diplomatic solution.

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Security Radar 2019


Thinking of the Ukrainian conflict, to what extent do you agree with the following statements?

The crisis is a domestic matter and should be left to Ukraine.

55%40%

35%55%

54%64%

74%63%

38%54%

46%

39%

41%

30%

21%

31%

It should be left to Russia to solve the conflict.

36%19%

26%22%

44%43%

62%35%

57%76%

58%

74%

51%

48%

33%

55%

Sanctions against Russia should be widened.

32%17%

33%36%

62%6%

6%66%

59%75%

43%

59%

32%

90%

24%

91%

The crisis should be solved with the aid of a UN mission, the so called ‘Blue Helmets’.

48%48%

49%53%

63%34%

37%53%

38%43%

32%

29%

23%

50%

55%

32%


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Security Radar 2019

90%93%

85%94%

91%88%

92%86%

5%3%

5%

3%

6%

7%

6%

9%

The Ukraine crisis is a conflict between Ukraine and Russia in which no third country should intervene.

45%40%

35%41%

39%42%

81%40%

47%53%

48%

52%

57%

51%

16%51%

An attempt should be made to find a diplomatic solution involving all conflicting parties.

My country should be neutral regarding the conflict in eastern Ukraine.

59%67%

50%68%

60%51%

85%34%

35%29%

35%

30%

38%

42%

12%

58%

My country should intervene militarily in the conflict in eastern Ukraine.

14%3%

6%5%

21%21%

7%35%

80%94%

81%

92%

74%

72%

90%

56%


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Security Radar 2019

Ukraine should become a member of the EU.

45%26%

28%53%

68%20%

46%73%

40%60%

43%

38%

25%

55%

38%

18%

My country should collaborate more with Russia than before.

Against this background, at least, a majority of respondents (56%) considers more collaboration with Russia appropriate. This meets with highest approval in Serbia (80%) whereas – not surprising-

Ukraine should become a member of NATO.

35%23%

27%47%

67%7%

16%56%

48%61%

37%

42%

23%

75%

66%

30%

UA27%

PL52%

LV61%

DE58%

FR58% RS

80%

56%

ly – Ukraine’s respondents clearly reject this state-ment (64%). However, a sizeable minority of 27% of Ukrainian respondents want to cooperate.


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Security Radar 2019

Military interventions, even if they seem neces-sary, are not perceived as a suitable solution to conflicts by any of the polled European states. Even though the Polish and the Russian respons-es are ambiguous, there is no clear legitimacy for military intervention to solve security issues in Eu-



In contrast to the highly perceived influence of NATO, only 52% of all respondents are in favour of a bigger role for this organisation in interna-tional political affairs. Moreover, 42% of all re-spondents explicitly reject this idea. However, a stronger influence of NATO is seen positively in Poland, Ukraine and Latvia and negatively in Ser-

rope. Correspondingly, there is a clear mandate for relieving tensions in international politics and the peaceful mitigation of conflicts in all Europe-an countries. Furthermore, European populations expressed support for having a clear position on conflicts abroad. Foreign and security policy strat-egies must be clear but non-violent.

bia. On the other hand, the EU and UN, which stand for peaceful forms of cooperation between nations, have very high approval ratings without exception. These organisations seem to have the most legitimacy to improve the current security situation in Europe. So does the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe.

My country should, if necessary, also pursue military intervention in conflicts.

39%57%

My country should take a clear stand in favour of one side or the other in the case of political conflicts abroad.

34% 60%

My country should be committed to relieving tensions in international politics and the peaceful mitigation of conflicts.

88%9%

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Security Radar 2019

In your opinion, which of the organisations mentioned should play a bigger role in the future?

Strongly agree, Somewhat agree Strongly disagree, Somewhat disagree

UN (United Nations)

76%81%

68%79%

81%79%

70%76%

19%17%

26%

18%

13%

15%

28%

18%

NATO (North Atlantic Treaty Organisation)

52%54%

45%67%

78%40%

16%67%

42%43%44%

30%

16%

50%

82%

27%

OSCE(Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe)

67%70%

45%77%

74%75%

63%61%

26%24%

44%

18%

16%

17%

34%

28%

EU (European Union)

70%79%

64%77%

59%68%

59%71%

26%19%

27%

21%

27%

23%

38%

23%

* Question answered by those respondents who knew the organisation.


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Security Radar 2019

EAEU(Eurasian Economic Union)

50%35%

33%52%

38%76%

62%40%

41%54%53%

43%

50%

17%

35%

48%

CSTO(Collective Security Treaty Organisation)

62%44%

35%62%

66%78%

70%57%

30%46%

55%

31%

23%

15%

27%

31%


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Security Radar 2019

Therefore, for a European security strategy, a non-military intervention is preferable and the shared tendency of staying neutral has to be tak-en into account. If we take the identified challeng-es seriously, we need strong international players

UA26%

PL42%

LV27%

DE30%

FR36% RS

26%

RU35%

32%

Ethnic groups and parts of countries should in principle have the right to break ties with a state.

To what extent do you agree with the following statements about security and foreign policy?


Finally, in none of the polled European countries is the separation of ethnic groups or secessions of regions perceived as a possible solution to na-tional or international security issues in Europe.

The territorial integrity of the state remains the foundation of national and international security and foreign politics.

like Germany and France to combat the national-isation of foreign and security policy and to posi-tively drive a multilateral approach to foreign and security policy.

36

Security Radar 2019

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Security Radar 2019

Country Profiles

> Germany> France> Latvia> Poland> Russia> Serbia> Ukraine

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Security Radar 2019

Public opinion in Germany is strongly swayed by history. Between 1933 and 1945, nationalist leaders led the ‘German Reich’ into a moral, political and military catastrophe. After the war, the country was divided. In West Germany, society was mainly concerned with coming to terms with and overcoming this experience. For decades, the debate was dominated by the traumatic experience resulting from the military catastrophe and by attempts to grapple with German crimes committed under the Nazi regime. While the reunification of East and West Germany has changed the underlying conditions, a ‘post-heroic’ attitude continues to prevail in the minds of the people.

Self-perception

Germany stands out among all other polled coun-tries as the most content with its status in the world. The vast majority of German respondents (over 70%) said that they were satisfied with their country’s international standing and did not see anyone threatening it. At the same time, cooper-ation with other countries is viewed as a prereq-uisite for maintaining Germany’s position. Ger-mans consider themselves part of the European culture. Some 60% of respondents would also like to see closer cooperation with Russia. It would ap-pear that German society has no desire to adopt an aggressive posture towards the outside world.

Economically, Germans currently feel well-situat-ed, but they are more concerned about climate change than people are elsewhere. Germans are much less concerned about their personal future and economic prospects than other citizens. They do not expect war to break out in Europe and also do not believe that Germany itself could be af-fected by war. Despite the existence of a general fear of war and terrorism, a deep-seated sense of security prevails, distinguishing German society from those in the other countries surveyed. At the same time, and in stark contrast to this image of

a confident anchor of stability, Germany surpris-ingly displays the most pessimistic assessment of the future developments in international politics (62% say the situation will worsen) and the global economy (52% fear deterioration).

Perception of European Security

Threat perceptions are rather underdeveloped in Germany. Only a minority sees the United States (19%) or Russia (15%) as a threat. The picture changes though when respondents rank poten-tial ‘enemies’. Paradoxically, top of the list at 39% is the USA – a NATO partner that has guaranteed

Germany[Hesitant and capable]

75%

60%

49%49%

48%40%

35%33%

In view of increasing tensions between Russia and the West, I think new wars in Europe are likely.

= Total DE = Germany FR = France LV = Latvia

PL = Poland RU = Russia RS = Serbia UA = Ukraine

Strongly disagree, Somewhat disagree

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Security Radar 2019

Germany’s military security for decades. This is indicative of latent anti-Americanism in society; however, in view of actions taken by the Trump administration, experts also share the view that the USA cannot currently be deemed a reliable

More than others, German respondents indicated that they felt threatened by growing nationalism (74%) and disinformation campaigns (77%, second only to Poland). Notably, the fear of uncontrolled immigration is less pronounced in Germany than elsewhere. However, developments within the EU are being observed with great concern. Experts also see the EU as the most important field of ac-tion for Germany‘s foreign policy. In other words Germany can only act globally to help shape inter-national policy if it does so within the framework of the EU.

More than 60% of respondents in Germany consid-er the annexation of Crimea illegal, and over 70% see Russia as the main culprit for the escalation of the Russia-Ukraine crisis (62% cite the separatists, but 47% blame Ukraine). The overwhelming ma-jority of respondents are in favour of a diplomatic resolution to the Russia-Ukraine crisis. However,

20% Turkey

15% Russia

39% USA

there do not appear to be any ideas as to how this should be achieved: while the solutions currently on the table have garnered little support, experts consistently reject the idea of military interven-tion. They also expressed concern that Chancellor Merkel’s foreseeable departure could jeopardise the existing conflict resolution formats. Neither Russia nor Ukraine were deemed keen on chang-ing the status quo.

The Way Forward

In terms of foreign policy, two-thirds of the re-spondents are in favour of pursuing primarily national interests, while two-thirds also want for-eign policy to assert values. It appears that the majority of Germans see no conflict between val-ues and interests. Experts also take the view that upholding values is part of the national interest.

In your opinion, which of these countries constitutesthe greatest threat for Germany?

partner. The fact that Turkey ranks second (20%) among the countries perceived as ‘enemies’ – even ahead of Russia (15%) – can probably be more ad-equately explained by domestic politics.

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Security Radar 2019

In Germany, as in France, the organisation of secu-rity is primarily focused on the UN and the EU. The OSCE is also accorded a greater role, with NATO tak-ing more of a backseat. Notably, experts discussed the OSCE only in Germany and Russia – others did not mention it in focus groups. The majority of Ger-

However, a majority wants Germany to play its part in shaping international politics: 69% of respond-ents call for Germany to take more international responsibility and help other states; and 70% want Germany to pursue an active foreign policy and play a relevant role in resolving international con-flicts. Experts however noted that the status quo is sticky: there is a certain lack of motivation and political will to leave the comfort zone and proac-tively tackle the challenges. The pacifist mind-set of the Germans is a contributing factor. Domestic populism further limits room for manoeuver.

Related to that, German experts had difficulty put-ting forward proposals for overcoming the chal-lenging international situation. However, they see the need to develop a ‘strategic autonomy’ now that the USA has proven to be an unstable partner. Strengthening the EU in tandem with their most

68%63%

62%58%

57%55%

55%39%

important ally, France, is seen as one solution. A European Security Council is another idea. Experts believed that smaller partners like the Visegrad countries should also be involved. However, many also perceive that domestic political developments in partner countries make this more difficult. Generally, alliances are seen as less stable than before. Despite problems, Russia is viewed as an indispensable partner for solving crises (including the Ukraine conflict). Overall, a certain amount of puzzlement prevails. Although no escalation is ex-pected in Ukraine, there are few ideas as to how the Russian and Ukrainian sides can be persuaded to behave constructively at the negotiating table. It is significant that the experts addressed the issue of societal insecurity, and globalisation leading to the dissolution of certainties. Among other things, in Germany there was a lack of clarity on what ac-tually constitutes the ‘West’.


To ward off dangers for my country it is permitted to carry out military actions in other countries.

55% France

34% Germany

37%


man respondents advocated diplomatic solutions in international conflicts, much like people in other countries. But a clear two-thirds majority of Ger-mans rejects military action, reflecting an attitude that differs significantly from that in other larger countries.

= Total

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Security Radar 2019

France

Self-perception

France is one of the crucial countries in the Europe-an Union. Accordingly, the EU also occupies an im-portant position in its foreign policy thinking. Nev-ertheless, experts insist that France must retain its own intelligence and military capabilities. They are also concerned about the future of the EU.

France has no prevailing territorial claims vis-à-vis its neighbours (64% negate this statement); in any case, borders play only a limited role in the EU. French history, however, teaches that borders can be changed and that ethnic groups are to a cer-tain extent entitled to secede from a state (36% support this). At the same time, France, similar to Germany, is fairly satisfied with its status in inter-national relations (only 33% say France does not have the status it deserves in comparison with other countries).

The French population is equally worried about the international economic and international po-litical situation: 47% expect both to deteriorate within the next five years. Regarding their person-

al future, only 44% fear that their situation will de-cline. This is much less than in the other countries surveyed (63% on average). However, the French are concerned about their economic future – 54% (twice the German rating) fear that their situation will deteriorate.


Fears of war (77%) and international terrorism (78%) are as high in France as in other countries. However, only a minority of 32% anticipates wars breaking out in Europe. Nevertheless, about 60% assume that wars elsewhere will also affect France.

Only a small group of respondents believe that other countries are a threat to France. A minority regards the United States (13%) or Russia (12%) as a threat. When asked to rank France’s ‘enemies’, 12% of respondents named Russia and 8% China, but as many as 24% cited the United States as the greatest threat to France. Neither the French pub-lic nor the country’s experts view the crisis-prone situation in the post-Soviet region as of primary importance.

Disinformation campaigns are perceived as a threat, as is nationalism. In France, a higher than average majority sees a rising global population as a threat (58%). Concern regarding uncontrolled immigration (58%) is higher than in Germany, but slightly below average among the countries we investigated. The fear of conflicts within the EU (56%) also ranked lower than in Germany or Po-land.

[Confident and active]

France has played a special role in security policy for many years. It emerged from the Second World War as one of the victorious powers and, as a result, claimed an independent international role. It sees itself as part of the ‘West’ but has kept its distance from the United States; for a long time, France was not integrated into NATO’s military structures. At the same time, it has built up its own nuclear capacity.

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Security Radar 2019

The conflict in and around Ukraine is seen as im-portant, but not as French foreign policy’s central problem. The annexation of Crimea is considered illegal by a majority of respondents (59%). As for the escalation of the Ukraine conflict, 63% assign responsibility to the Russians and 48% to separa-tists. The overwhelming majority of respondents also favour a diplomatic resolution to the crisis. The expert discussion in Paris also showed that although France is part of the Normandy format, Ukraine and the conflict there do not represent a high foreign policy priority for France.

In your opinion, which of these countries constitutes the greatest threat to France?

8% China

12% Russia

24% USA

The Way Forward

A majority of respondents are satisfied with France‘s international role and do not consider their country constrained by other powers. In terms of foreign policy, a majority in society fa-vour both pursuing national interests (59%) and asserting national values (69%). It is possible that these respondents see no contradiction be-tween these two objectives, even if this may be the case in practice. The French know that they are dependent on international cooperation, see themselves as part of Europe and rely on coop-eration within the EU. A majority want a stronger

population does not think much of increasing the influence of international organisations and ranks last in this respect among the four EU member states surveyed.

70% 59%Foreign policy

should enforce values, even if

this poses disadvantages.

Foreign policy should represent own interests without restriction

international role for their country and generally advocate a leadership role for influential states – it can be assumed that they include France in this group. In any case, 69% would like France to pur-sue an active foreign policy and play an important role in resolving conflicts. On the whole, the French

43

Security Radar 2019

Afghanistan, however, are generally accepted also by French society. Compared with the other coun-tries surveyed, the French expressed willingness to use military force (55% favour military action abroad).



Nevertheless, intervention in conflicts is viewed rather sceptically. This shows that although the idea of using the military is well accepted in French society, the government must always justify its use of the military politically. This is also reflect-ed in the fact that the public rejects increases in

defence spending (49%) and wants to bind French foreign policy to the assertion of values (69%). Also remarkable is the 10% lower trust in institu-tions in comparison with Germany, although with some exceptions, such as the national intelligence service, the police and the military.

To what extent do you trust the following institutions?

Military Police IntelligenceServices

Military Police IntelligenceServices

58%

81%

34%

84% 81%

55%

Germany France

French society has a fundamentally positive at-titude towards its military. After 1945, France waged colonial wars in Indochina and Algeria, which are still controversial today. The military operations in the former Yugoslavia, Africa and

68%63%

55%

62%

58%

55%

57%

39%

For their part, the experts stress the importance of internal stability in their own country and the EU. In terms of security policy, French society re-lies primarily on the UN and the EU, while NATO and the OSCE are accorded less importance. This

is a plausible approach for a state that relies on its own nuclear force and military capabilities in vital zones of interest and its permanent seat in the UN Security Council.

44

Security Radar 2019

Latvia

Latvians consider themselves European (92% say they are part of the European cultural sphere, 82% support more collaboration with the EU). At the same time, 88% think that Latvia’s unique cul-ture needs to be better protected.

According to experts, the threat of war is a higher concern than social and economic issues. How-ever, internal challenges are manifold, such as lit-tle trust in institutions, lack of social cohesion and a government-society gap.


Latvians are fairly relaxed about international economic and political prospects (36% and 28% respectively think they will improve), in contrast to the much more pessimistic response of the Poles, Germans and French. At the same time, 70% of Latvian respondents are worried that war and conflicts may potentially affect their country.

[Ambiguous and pragmatic]

Latvia looks back on a difficult history. In the 18th century it came under the control of Tsarist Russia. The country gained its independence in 1918, but after the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact in 1940 Latvia was occupied first by the Red Army and then by the German Wehrmacht. After the Second World War, Latvia was made part of the Soviet Union. Only shortly before the collapse of the Soviet Union in late 1991 Latvia regained its independence. In 2004 Latvia joined NATO and the EU. The ethnic Russians constitute almost a quarter of the population. The Russian speaking population is represented in parliament by the party Harmony. It has enjoyed considerable voters’ support and is currently governing the capital city of Riga.



86%83%

83%78%

75%75%

62%61%

Self-perception

More than half of Latvians are unhappy with the status of their country in the world – however, among the ‘Eastern Europeans’ they are the most relaxed. 64% of respondents do not think that

other countries prevent Latvia from achieving its true greatness. More than any other country, Lat-via recognises that its prosperity is linked to the well-being of other countries.

45

Security Radar 2019

Thereby Russia is considered a threat, both for security in Europe (50% of respondents think so) and Latvia proper (36%). Asked to rank potential enemies, 57% consider Russia the greatest threat (only in Ukraine and Poland is the share higher). The expert group noted that Russia is the ‘con-stituting other’ for Latvia: historical experience of Russian oppression and occupation was very

Experts named the EU and NATO as important allies. Since the USA plays a mental stabilising role in Latvia, the current ‘unlike-mindedness’ of the transatlantic community poses a challenge. Within the EU, Poland is considered crucial in terms of military supplies, being the outer de-fence line for Latvia even in the doomsday sce-nario of a NATO collapse. Germany is considered Latvia’s top partner in Western Europe. In this context the current rift within the EU might pose a difficult choice for Latvia if it had to choose be-tween Germany or Poland. The survey buttresses this assessment: disagreement within the EU wor-ries 43% of Latvians, which is 10% more than in neighbouring Poland or Germany.

The Way Forward

Like respondents in other countries, Latvians sup-port peaceful mitigation of conflicts. 65% of Lat-vians reject military interventions abroad (only

Relations between Russia and many European states are influenced by a lack of cooperation.

France, Russia and Poland are pro intervention). The same pattern holds when asked about gener-al military intervention in conflicts – 64% of Latvi-ans are against it. Interestingly, among all coun-tries polled Latvia’s population demonstrates the highest support for taking sides in conflicts (76%).

Within the ‘Eastern’ camp Latvia stands out in re-jecting increased military spending (52%). Here Latvians share the attitudes of the German and French public, who are sceptical of re-militarisa-tion. On the question of assuming more respon-sibility and pursuing an active foreign policy, Lat-via is positioned in the middle between ‘East’ and ‘West’: 70% of respondents want Latvia to play a significant role in solving international problems and crises.

The expert group discussion revealed a high aware-ness of one’s own responsibility: many of Latvia’s security problems were recognised as self-inflict-ed. The slogan ‘The Russians are coming!’ is often

84%

77%

76%70%

70%67%

65%49%


formative, so that insecurity can be considered part of the Latvian DNA.

At the same time, stronger cooperation with Rus-sia has strong support in society (61%). With a rating of 84%, Latvia leads the poll in citing lack of cooperation as influencing relations of many of the European states with Russia.

46

Security Radar 2019

used as an excuse to avoid dealing with important domestic issues such as health and education. Therefore, tackling domestic problems was con-

Latvia should take a clear stand in favour of one side or the other in case of political conflicts abroad.

Interests are important in foreign policy (85% think interests should be represented without re-striction), just as in other ‘Eastern’ countries. At

On the Ukrainian crisis, Latvians strongly support staying neutral (69%) and reject military inter-vention (92%). A thin majority of 47% supports NATO membership of Ukraine, but 42% oppose it. Experts perceive the Ukrainian conflict as a two-country conflict (41% of the population agree), which is hard to solve from the outside. The view is that there are few face-saving options for Ukraine and Russia, so ‘muddling through’ may be the most likely strategy for the near future. In the meantime, drawing on its transformation experience, Latvia could help Ukraine improve issues of governance.

For the future of European security, experts saw deterrence and dialogue as important comple-mentary components. The limited presence of NATO troops in Latvia is viewed as an important symbolic sign of like-mindedness and re-assur-ance. At the same time, dialogue was described not as a signal of weakness or concession, but rather as an important sign of self-confidence showing that it is possible to engage with an op-ponent.

76%67%

66%62%

60%51%

50%45%

Foreign policy should enforce values, even if this poses disadvantages.

82%73%

70%66%

66%60%

35%32%



sidered to be helpful for dealing with external threats, even though it might be politically unpop-ular.

the same time, more than in any other country polled, the Latvian population has a stake in a val-ue-based foreign policy (82%).

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Security Radar 2019

Poland[Concerned and aspiring]

Poland looks back on a difficult history. There had been no Polish state since the Polish divisions in the 18th century. It was not until 1918 that Poland regained its sovereignty, which was again dismantled in 1939 by the ‘German Reich’ and the Soviet Union. In 1945 a new state emerged, but it was firmly integrated into the ‘socialist camp’. It was not until 1989 that Polish society forced a political change. Poland gained foreign pol-icy capacity, renounced its ties to the Soviet Union and joined NATO in 1999. The long history of its struggle for sovereignty to a certain degree shapes the attitudes of Polish society today.

Self-perception

Polish society is not satisfied with the country’s international position. A majority of 67% believes that Poland does not occupy its deserved place in the world and that there are powers actively limit-ing its international role (52%). At the same time, an overwhelming majority perceives that Poland

66%77%Poland should collaborate

more with the European Union than before.

The politics of the European Union is regularly in conflict with the interests of Poland.


Overall, the Polish public is concerned about the de-velopment of international politics. The dangers for the world economy and international politics are ex-pected to increase over the next five years. Fear of war and international terrorism is as strong in Poland as it is in other countries. A majority (79%) as-sumes that Poland would immediately feel the effects of war.

While only a minority of respondents indicated that the growth of the world’s population is problematic (35%), fear of uncontrolled immigration is well above average (66%). Conflicts within the EU are also viewed with concern by 64% of respondents.

is dependent on international cooperation (83%). Poles see themselves as Europeans, and closer cooperation is desired despite Poland’s conflicts with the EU. Even if there are glimmers of a revi-sionist foreign policy, the idea that Poland needs to be integrated into the ‘West’ prevails.

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Security Radar 2019

Russia is named as a threat by 51% of respond-ents, 79% name it as the main source of threat to Poland – more than in any other country polled. Experts add that Russia uses the weaknesses that derive from within the EU, such as instability on its eastern edge, lack of internal cohesion, and Brexit, from which Poland faces the prospect of large losses in economic terms. Poland’s struggle with the EU is viewed as a new dimension of Pol-ish foreign policy.

The Way Forward

In determining foreign policy goals, 76% of re-spondents are in favour of pursuing national interests, and two-thirds believe foreign policy

Sanctions against Russia should be widened.

66% Ukraine

62% Poland

32%

Which organisations should play a bigger role in the future?

81%76% 78%

52%

74%67% 68% 70% 66% 62%

38%

50%

UN NATO OSCE EU CSTO EAEU

76% of respondents considered the annexation of Crimea illegal. For the escalation of the Ukrainian conflict 82% blame Russia and 51% the separa-tists. An overwhelming majority of respondents are in favour of a diplomatic resolution to the Ukraine crisis. However, more than 60% back ex-panding the current sanctions, which makes Po-land the only country apart from Ukraine where the majority supports expanding sanctions. Over 60% of Poles believe that Ukraine should become a member of NATO and the EU. At the same time, 73% reject the idea of a military intervention in the conflict in eastern Ukraine.

Poland

should assert values. It is apparent that Polish so-ciety assumes that promulgated values dovetail with national interests.

= Total

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Security Radar 2019

For respondents in Poland security is assured above all by the UN and NATO, the latter being an exception compared to other surveyed countries. When it comes to which organisation should play a bigger role in the future, the EU is in fourth place in Poland while in the other three EU countries, the EU is always supported in second place (behind the UN). Expert assessment differed, emphasising that Polish foreign policy can be effective only through collaboration with the EU, which it considers to be the main forum for showing that Poland matters.

In Poland, as in other countries, a large majority of respondents are in favour of resolving conflicts through diplomatic channels. However, about half also consider the use of military force to be per-missible. Consequently, a majority (68%) supports increasing military spending, second only to Ser-bia. Poles lead the poll in terms of supporting the right of self-determination: 42% believe that eth-nic groups or parts of countries have the right to break ties with a state.

A majority of Poles advocate a leading role for influential states (64%) and want their country to play a stronger international role. 83% want Po-land to pursue an active foreign policy and play an important role in resolving conflicts – the highest number in the poll, and a view held in common with Russia. The expert group discussed, among other things, Poland assuming a leading role in the region (Visegrad countries and Baltics), citing the example of the Three Seas Initiative, and at the same time striving to play in the ‘bigger league’, by collaborating with France and Germany. Germany is often portrayed as an enemy in the official dis-course, but in fact only 11% of the respondents consider Germany a threat to Poland.

The experts in the focus group favour a pragmatic approach. With Russia, the view is that commu-nication channels should be kept open, including contacts between academics and younger gen-erations (52% of the population support more cooperation with Russia) without disavowing the threat from Russia. Relations with Ukraine are regarded as difficult – also for historical rea-sons – especially since many in Poland do not see much support in Ukraine for Polish initiatives. Experts also note that Poland is not part of any crisis resolution format, but nevertheless felt that a solution would require a different Russia. EU cohesion is important; in this context Poland seeks to play a relevant role. Otherwise adopting a ‘wait and see’ approach is seen as the most re-alistic option for Poland.

42%36%

35%32%

30%27%

26%26%

Ethnic groups and parts of countries should in principle have the right to break ties with a state.


50

Security Radar 2019

Russia

Self-perception

As a consequence, the majority of respondents in the survey perceive that Russia does not occupy its rightful place in the world (56%) and that there are powers actively striving to limit Russia’s inter-national role (69%).

However, there is also a perception that Russia is dependent on the positive development and well-being of other countries (62%), even though this figure is the lowest among all countries polled. Moreover, three-quarters of respondents see themselves as part of Europe, while at the same time an even larger share asserts that Rus-sia has its own separate culture. A significant minority (44%) in Russian society be-lieves it has territorial claims against neighbours. On the other hand, more people than in any other country polled – 54% – believe that borders are inviolable.

A narrow majority (52%) thinks that ethnic minor-ities have no right to secede from a state. This stance contradicts the attitude of the Russian government with regard to Ukraine and Georgia, but is in line with the principles of Soviet foreign policy as enshrined in the Helsinki Accords.

[Assertive and challenging]

For society in Russia today, the collapse of the Soviet Union remains a traumatic experience. The elites and the majority of the population remember well that the Soviet Union was ‘the other superpower’ along with the USA and the leading power in the ‘socialist camp’. The loss of this position and the ex-perience of economic and social decline in the 1990s have shaped the attitudes of Russian society to this day. The attitude of the ‘West’ is perceived as hostile, and the enlargement of the EU and NATO is seen as an aggressive policy aimed at Russia.

33%

33%

21%20%

18%16%

16%12%


Borders have always been changed by wars and this will continue to be the case in the future.

54%

47%

45%40%

37%36%

35%27%

= Total DE = Germany FR = France LV = Latvia

PL = Poland RU = Russia RS = Serbia UA = Ukraine

Strongly disagree, Somewhat disagree

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Security Radar 2019

All in all, Russians look to the future with opti-mism, expecting positive developments over the next five years in both the political and economic spheres (with ratings of 38%). Remarkably, citi-


A majority of Russian respondents expects wars to have an impact on their own country (70%) or on Europe (59%). The experts interviewed ex-pressed their concern at the crisis in the arms control system (including the threats to termi-nate the INF Treaty), however noting that the risk of incidents is more probable than the danger of a large-scale war.

Against the backdrop of the current situation, al-most 80% of Russian respondents cite the threat posed by the USA and NATO as their top concern. More than half of them also view the enlargement of the EU negatively. Almost 90% of respondents support the annexation of Crimea. Improved co-operation with the EU is currently hampered by

the Ukraine crisis and sanctions (77%), as well as by the USA (82%) and EU interference in Russia‘s internal affairs (74%). Just like respondents in oth-er countries, Russians also perceive disinforma-tion campaigns as a threat (73%).

Responsibility for the Ukrainian crisis is attributed to Ukraine (83%) and the USA (82%), followed by the separatists (55%) and the EU (57%). The over-whelming majority of Russian respondents are in favour of a diplomatic resolution to the Rus-sia-Ukraine crisis. Apparently there is no special preference for more concrete approaches: two-thirds of the Russian survey participants would like to leave the solution to Ukraine, and 70% reject a military intervention. This indicates that society is not necessarily the locus for pushing ag-gressive Russian action in the region.

When I think of the various developments in my country and in the world, I am concerned about my personal future.

zens of other countries polled expressed less op-timism. However, Russians’ expectations for their personal futures stand in stark contrast, as a ma-jority of respondents expressed marked concern.

63%

81% Russia

83% Ukraine

= Total

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Security Radar 2019

The Way Forward

In contrast to all other countries polled, more than half of the Russians surveyed rejected the notion of a stronger international responsibility for their country (58%). However, the overwhelm-ing majority advocates a leadership role for influ-

The majority of those surveyed would like to see Russian foreign policy pursue national interests (84%) and reject using it to enforce values (56%). This was echoed in the expert discussion, with opin-ion often revolving around pursuing deals based on interests (dogovoritsa), which illustrates a transac-tional approach to foreign policy. Two-thirds want Russia to take a clear position in conflicts, indicating that this attitude dovetails with the superpower pol-icies pursued by the Russian leadership.

The majority of respondents in Russia rely primari-ly on the UN, the OSCE and the post-Soviet organi-sations of the Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU) and the Collective Security Treaty Organisation (CSTO) to assure security. It is not surprising that only a mi-nority (but 40% nevertheless) wants NATO to play an important role. There is obviously considerable po-tential for conflict with the EU, but two-thirds of re-spondents would still like to see closer cooperation.

An overwhelming majority of respondents are in fa-vour of conflict resolution through diplomatic chan-nels, while about half of respondents also consider the use of military force permissible. Consequently, a majority also supports increasing military spending (53%). Experts maintained that the resolution of the Ukraine crisis is a prerequisite for an improvement in Russia-West relations.

Influential states should take a leadership role in international politics.

81%

66%

66%64%

64%60%

57%55%

In light of this difficult situation, the proposed solutions discussed in the focus groups were cen-tred on taking realistic steps. In particular, experts were insistent on the importance of maintaining dialogue despite the crisis in relations, both within the NATO-Russia Council and in other formats. The NATO-Russia Founding Act was considered a last re-sort preventing the slide into a new Cold War.

A recommitment to the Helsinki principles and arms control was viewed as sensible. A restoration of ‘bi-polarity,’ i.e. a return to an international model as formulated in Yalta in 1945 was also discussed, nota-bly as a source of cooperation rather than confronta-tion. However, room for cooperation was considered limited as Russia is not prepared to admit mistakes, including its military presence in the Donbass.

Compromise is generally considered a sign of weak-ness. Making a comparison with the EU’s pragmat-ic relations with China, Russian experts suggested removing the ‘stumbling block of democracy’ from EU’s relations with Russia, by simply acknowledg-ing different types of governance and taking it from there. In any case – and this is also expressed in the surveys – experts expect relations to be carried out ‘on an equal footing’, including the acceptance of Russia as a great power with consideration given to its interests.


ential states. It can be assumed that they see Rus-sia as an influential state. In any case, 83% would like Russia to pursue an active foreign policy and assume an important role in resolving conflicts.

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Security Radar 2019

Serbia

Self-perception

The Serbian population is the least content with the status of the country. An overwhelming major-ity of 85% think that Serbia does not have the sta-tus in the world that it deserves and 75% believe that other countries prevent it from achieving true

policy represents a balancing act between four pil-lars: the USA and the EU on the one side and China and Russia on the other. Among the main foreign policy goals stated are: joining the EU; not joining NATO; and working against the recognition of Koso-vo. The Serbian ruling elite is described as a ‘sta-bilotocracy’: in order to maintain legitimacy, policy makers engage in warmongering and then solve al-leged crises. The Kosovo issue seems central to Ser-bia’s self-perception. On the one hand it is viewed as a burden, limiting Serbia’s foreign policy options, whilst on the other hand, it provides an element of balancing and maintenance of the status quo.

Second only to Russia, and in contrast to other polled states, Serbia sees the EU in conflict with its interests (70% compared to 55% on average). More than other countries Serbia is highly aware of its cultural uniqueness (94% compared to 80% on av-erage).

[Dissatisfied and balancing]

The most decisive landmark in recent Serbian history was the Kosovo war (1998-1999), in which NATO intervened. After Kosovo became independent in 2008, Serbia pursued the policy of non-recognition. Serbia formally adheres to the policy of military neutrality and has been a candidate country for EU membership since 2014.

In my opinion, my country does not have the status in the world it deserves in comparison with other countries.


greatness. At the same time, similar to Latvia and Poland, Serbia strongly connects its prosperity to the well-being of other countries (83%).According to expert assessment, Serbia’s foreign

85%

74%

67%57%

56%55%

33%26%

54

Security Radar 2019


Most Serbian respondents are worried that war can affect their country (69%). However, only 49% think that wars in Europe are likely in view of increasing Russia-West tensions. The majori-ty (74%) are concerned about their personal fu-tures.

From the Serbian perspective, the largest threats to European security are posed by the USA (71%), NATO enlargement (71%) and EU ex-pansion towards the East (47%). Only the Rus-sian population evaluates these threats more gravely. Among the threats mentioned by ex-perts were the current unpredictability of the international system, the breakdown of multi-lateralism and the rise of populism.

The movement of NATO is a threat to security in Europe.


More than three quarters of the population does not perceive Russia as a threat. Russian actions in Crimea are approved by 54% (26% think it was an annexation). Although the expert discussion revealed Russia as a threat, it concluded that Rus-sia was not a root cause of conflicts in Europe but rather a contributor to their emergence. In the experts’ opinion, the situation in Ukraine echoed the situation in Serbia, with some people taking the view that ‘we can take back Kosovo just as the Russians took Crimea.’

The Way Forward

The way forward for Serbia seems to strongly de-pend on the resolution of the Kosovo issue. Experts named two options: a territorial option, leading to partition or territory swap, or a ‘German model’, al-luding to the division of Germany during the Cold War and amounting to normalisation without recog-nition. An option of ‘trading’ recognition of Kosovo for a promise of EU membership was deemed unac-ceptable. In any case, resolution of the Kosovo issue would end Serbia’s dependence on Russia and China

as the most prominent ‘non-recognisers’ in the inter-national community.

In line with the policy of balancing, the Serbian pop-ulation desires more collaboration with both the EU (71%) and with Russia (80%). Only a small fraction (6%) believes that sanctions against Russia should be widened. The favourable attitude towards the Rus-sians is linked to its vehement non-recognition of Kosovo and goes back to the times of the Cold War. This echoes the focus group assessment, according to which Serbia calls anyone who rejects Kosovo an ally.

Nonetheless the EU member states (which, with the exception of Spain, recognise Kosovo) are viewed as im-portant partners. More than most other polled countries Serbia would like to see the EU grow closer together as one cultural community (83%). This corresponds with the assessment in the focus group: the EU can guaran-tee stability in Europe only if it is unified, strengthened as player in international relations, and addresses the concerns that gave rise to populism. A change in Rus-sia-West relations is expected to occur only when other rulers come to power in crucial capitals.

76%

71%53%

52%50%

43%

37%

35%

55

Security Radar 2019

My country should collaborate more with...

In strong contrast to other countries and felt even more keenly than in Russia, Serbian respondents fa-vour interests rather than values in foreign policy. A clear majority of 61% – twice the average rating – rejects the proposition that foreign policy should enforce values even if it poses disadvantages. Fol-lowing its own interests without restriction is ap-proved by 84% of Serbs, a rating that is very similar to other ‘Eastern’ countries (83% on average) and in contrast to the ‘Western’ camp (Germany 66% and France 59%). Expert assessment corroborates this result: Serbian foreign policy bypasses liberal values such as human rights or the fight against climate change, and is based on the hard concept of security.

Neutral Serbia has a somewhat peculiar attitude to the military. On the one hand, the country stands out through its strong endorsement of neutrality (83%), also regarding its stance in the Ukraine con-flict (85%, compared to 59% on average). Reactions towards military intervention were much stronger by Serbs than by respondents of other countries. Serbs reject the idea of having a Responsibility to Protect (military interventions abroad to ward off dangers) and clearly oppose their own military in-tervention in conflicts (72% and 71% respectively).

On the other hand, Serbia also leads the poll in endorsing increased military spending (77%) and believing that borders can and will be changed by wars (71%). However, as regards taking sides in conflicts, Serbia is similarly divided as Germa-ny and France, with a slight majority opposing it (50%). This stands in strong contrast to other ‘Eastern’ countries polled, where clear majorities support taking sides. Perhaps connected to that, the Serbian population least of all expects influ-ential states to take a leadership role in interna-tional politics (42%).

The Ukrainian conflict is viewed controversially: 74% of respondents – the highest number of all countries polled – view it as a domestic matter and believe that the solution should be left to Ukraine. At the same time, a staggering 81% think it is a conflict between Russia and Ukraine.

The expert group believes that the solution to the Ukraine crisis is linked to an agreement between major powers because they take more responsi-bility. Experts underline a lack of sense of urgency in tackling the crisis, noting that the Ukrainian rul-ing class seems comfortable with the status quo and uses the unfavourable situation as a rally cry.

My country should increase its military spending.


77%68%

61%56%

53%45%

44%43%

72%

73%

80%

56%

EU

Russia

Serbia

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Security Radar 2019

Ukraine

Self-perception

After five turbulent years one can observe an adap-tation to the new economic and political conditions. Ukrainians are quite relaxed about their future eco-nomic prospects even in the face of rising prices and an economic situation that has been deteriorating

2019 is ‘super election’ year in Ukraine. The out-come of the upcoming presidential election is perceived as crucial for the country’s develop-ment trajectory. Ukrainians are dissatisfied with their country’s global status. According to the poll, 74% believe that Ukraine does not have the status in the world that it deserves. Another very worrisome issue is the fragile state of trust in the main domestic institutions, which is described in Chapter 2. The only trusted institution is the army, which is also a cornerstone of the election campaign of current president Petro Poroshenko.

[Struggling and transformative]

The conflict in and around Ukraine is not the only cause of the current disarray of security in Eu-rope; many more issues underlie it, some of which go back considerably more than five years. Nev-ertheless, the past five years have been dominated by conflict management in Ukraine. At the same time, Ukrainian society has been undergoing a deep transformation after the establishment of a new government in the aftermath of the Euromaidan protests. This situation however is not unique – one might look back to 1991 and 2004 in this regard. With this change of government came a new push for nation-building. The Russian annexation of Crimea and the hostilities in the Donbass have functioned as catalysts of a more antagonistic and radicalised approach to national identity, reflected in a num-ber of key dimensions, including language, religion, education and history.

59%

57%49%49%

47%32%

24%

59%In view of increasing tensions between Russia and the West, I think new wars in Europe are likely.


since 2014. Only 44% think that their economic sit-uation or that of their family will deteriorate in the future, but the vast majority – 83% – are concerned about their personal future, given the developments in Ukraine and the world more generally.

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Security Radar 2019

The survey shows that Ukrainians are among the strongest proponents of further European integration (76%), based on a keen sense of a shared European culture (79%). In Ukraine, this manifests itself in the clearest commit-ment among all the countries surveyed to greater cooperation with the EU (79%). Having said that, 27% favour more cooperation with Russia, which once again highlights Ukraine’s very special situation and its relations with East and West.


According to Ukrainian experts, ambiguity and uncertainty loom large in the security landscape of the Euro-Atlantic zone. One major problem is disagreement about clear threat perceptions in the Western (EU/NATO) camp. According to ex-perts in Kyiv the Ukrainian government should improve its relations with all regional partners,

because in the current circumstances no part-ner is unimportant. This applies in particular to positive developments in relations with Hunga-ry. Overall, however, the experts emphasise the importance of ‘heavyweight’ partners, such as the United States, Canada, Poland and Germany, which implies, conversely, a lower agency for their own country. Russia was not mentioned as a part-ner in any sense, although there is still economic cooperation, which currently is even growing. The ambivalent attitude within Ukraine towards Russia, potential accession to Western organisa-tions and the separatist conflict in the country are illustrated by the following data.

For respondents in Ukraine the main enemy is, by a large margin over other named states, Russia (73%), followed at a considerable distance by the United States (11%).

The central foreign policy issue in Ukraine in re-cent years has been its aspiration to membership of various international institutions, which for the Ukrainian elite symbolises affiliation to the West and, at the same time, fundamental differentia-tion from Russia. Among organisations mentioned by name, Ukrainians distinguish quite clearly be-tween the EU, accession to which is favoured by 73%, and NATO, favoured by only 56%.

Thinking of the Ukrainian conflict, in my opinion sanctions against Russia should be widened.


66%61%

35%34%

32%17%

6%6%

73% 56%

Ukraine should become a member of the EU.

Ukraine should become a member of NATO.

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Security Radar 2019

At the same time, 52% of respondents believe that eastern enlargement of both the EU and NATO are responsible for the current tension between the West and Russia, and that NATO‘s ‘encroachment’ on the Russian border poses a threat to European security (37%). This response is surprising only at first glance; the relatively low – 56% – approval of NATO accession among the general public is strik-ingly different from the high level of approval in the expert community in Kyiv, which sees joining both the EU and NATO as a foreign policy priority.

The Way Forward

Finding a way out of this tense security situation in Europe depends on finding a viable solution to the conflict in and around Ukraine.

This conflict has a prominent place in this study, so it is especially interesting to look at Ukraini-an society. After all, 54% of Ukrainians say that Ukraine is responsible for the outbreak of con-flict within its borders. From the point of view of Ukrainian focus group participants, the key to the resolution of and responsibility for the conflict in the east of the country lies in Moscow. Scep-ticism was also expressed concerning a possible blue-helmet mission in the Donbass, because of the hostility of the Kremlin. Looking at the state-ments in the population about the conflict in their own country, the picture looks different.

Remarkably, 63% favour domestic conflict resolution (‘it should be left to Ukraine’) which could mean both a ‘de-occupation’ of the uncontrolled territories or negotiations with representatives of the so-called Peoples Republics to achieve reintegration of the breakaway region. By contrast, only 52% support a UN mission.

Neither the experts nor the general public consider a military solution to the conflict as a way out, howev-er, 63% say that regionalisation is preferable to inter-nationalising the conflict (‘The conflict is a domestic matter and should be left to Ukraine’). In this context, it was also important to the Ukrainian experts that a ‘Transnistrian scenario’ – whereby unilateral conces-sions would be made to the separatist side – should be prevented by all means. It would only cement Russia’s influence over the country. Given that Kyiv

Russia Separatists Ukraine EU USA Other

78%66%

54%

33% 33%

6%

In your opinion, who is responsible for the escalation of the Ukrainian conflict?

wants to reintegrate the separatist regions, initiating political dialogue with actors in the breakaway re-gions will be crucial, as will be its scope.

As regards the future of European security, experts saw initiation of a broader dialogue on threat per-ceptions – in all possible areas, including migration and the influence of Russia and China – as a promis-ing measure to boost mutual understanding among European actors.

Ukrainians are strongly in favour of an active foreign policy (78%) oriented to national interests (88%). This at least represents a solid basis in the search for complementary interests in security policy, both re-gionally and internationally.

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Security Radar 2019

Steps Towards a European Security Process“I hope the dark clouds in the political heavens will soon disperse.

Our modern wars make many unhappy while they last, and no one happy when they are over.”

Johann Wolfgang Goethe, Italian Journey Rome, 6th of September 1787

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Security Radar 2019

Steps Towards a European Security ProcessI. Status Quo: Unstable

We need to be concerned about Europe. This, in short, can be concluded from the Security Radar 2019 opinion survey. This applies not only within the European Union, which is usually assumed to be the entire continent, but also within greater Eu-rope, which includes countries like Russia, Serbia and Ukraine. The volatility of international affairs frightens people. But despite the tensions, the Se-curity Radar survey does not detect a belligerent mood among the people. Respondents would like to see their governments cooperate more with oth-er states and solve challenges by peaceful means. In this brief final analysis, the most interesting findings of the survey, together with the results of the focus groups, will be put into perspective in the current European security environment. With this aim, the status quo of European securi-ty according to public and expert opinion will be briefly summarised with an eye towards answering the following question: How can we achieve a sta-ble future cooperative European security architec-ture in light of the diverse perspectives and opin-ions of the three different groups of countries that comprise Europe today? Three recommendations will conclude the analysis.

To evaluate the potential for future cooperative European security architecture against the back-ground of these findings, one needs first to exam-ine the current status quo of security in Europe. While there is no major war on the horizon, the se-curity situation is very complicated and dangerous. The conflict in and around Ukraine, with Russia’s involvement, can be considered as a war within Eu-rope. Nor should one forget the frozen conflicts in Abkhazia and South Ossetia, in Transnistria and in Nagorno-Karabakh, as well as the Russian annexa-tion of Crimea. Moreover, the status of Kosovo has not been completely resolved.

There is more reason for concern. Steps that seemed possible in Europe after the Cold War – conventional arms control and confidence- and security-building measures in Europe – are under heavy stress. The Conventional Armed Forces in Europe Treaty (CFE), introduced in 1992 mainly to create a secure and stable balance of conventional armed forces and to

reduce military capabilities to prevent surprise at-tacks or massive offensives in Europe, has not been renewed. The Open Skies Treaty (OST) of 2002, es-tablished to regulate observation flights by states over the territories of other states, is currently not working very well. And the Vienna Document on Confidence- and Security-Building Measures from 2011, which was originally designed in 1990, is con-stantly being violated.

In general, the Charter of Paris in 1990, ‘For a New Europe’, which was a guideline for Europe entering the 21st century, has proved to be over-optimistic. Europe is far from being united. It is true that the military potential on the part of both NATO and es-pecially Russia is much smaller than in 1991. But Russia is still capable and has shown that it can militarily escalate a conflict in Europe and harm its neighbours. As if this were not enough, the Intermediate Nucle-ar Forces Treaty (INF) on the elimination of inter-mediate-range and shorter-range missiles between Russia and the USA is under threat. Washington will most probably walk out soon. This could lead to the stationing of new cruise missiles in Europe, a re-minder of the situation in the 1980s during the Cold War. New threats to crucial infrastructure from cy-ber-attacks, combined with increased propagan-da activities, to the development of new weapons systems have taken place without any clear under-standing of how to curb this development.

To sum up, the status quo of European security is unstable and the populations of the seven partici-pating countries – France, Germany, Latvia, Poland, Russia, Serbia and Ukraine – for good reason sense that they are living in an unsafe environment. The chance of warfare in Europe is seen as a clear pos-sibility. This worrying observation implies that it is time to act.

II. Ideas to Start a Political ProcessThe seven countries whose populations were sur-veyed have been sorted into three groups, each with a different perspective on foreign and secu-rity policy according to our analysis of the results

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of the poll. France and Germany are two of the largest EU countries with high political and eco-nomic capabilities. They are not seen as a threat by their neighbours, have the potential to bridge differences with Russia and could be therefore seen as responsible and capable of pushing for cooperative security architecture in Europe. Lat-via, Poland, Serbia and Ukraine are four countries that are either members of, or at least associated with the EU but are having difficulties finding their role in a larger Europe. Russia, which is still the only European major power from a military per-spective and is involved militarily in a neighbour-ing country, is clearly also struggling to establish its desired role as an important foreign policy ac-tor in Europe and the world. The countries were assigned to the three groups on the basis of similar responses to the survey questions by the countries’ respondents. Although it should be noted that in some dimensions of the survey there were national peculiarities and var-ying similarities with other states which were de-scribed in chapter 3.

(1) The Central Eastern Europeans – Latvians, Poles and Ukrainians, together with Serbs – despite having substantially different views on Russia, share a sense of dissatisfaction with the status quo: they feel undervalued, and in general they support increased mili-tary spending. A majority of their popula-tions, especially Poles, also believe also that their countries should take more responsibil-ity in foreign policy.

(2) The same is true for Russians. The popu-lation of the major military power in Europe also feels underappreciated and thinks that other countries are hindering their country’s development. The Russians also very strong-ly believe that their country should pursue an active foreign policy and that influential states should assume responsibility in inter-national relations. Nevertheless, Russia de-serves a separate grouping because a consid-erable share of the Central Eastern European public sees it as a threat to their security.

(3) The French and Germans are quite content with the current role of their state in interna-tional affairs: they are not threatening other countries, nor do they feel particularly threat-ened. Still, the majority of both populations are of the opinion that their countries should be more active in security policy matters, with the difference that the French would be more willing to use military force than the Germans.

Nevertheless, one should not look at these three groups and their respective perspectives on foreign and security policy as cast in stone. Some of the opin-ions of the Poles and Latvians float between Germa-ny and France on the one side and Russia on the other side. The same goes for almost all the other countries too. They seem to want to reorient them-selves. Trajectories of the EU, transatlantic bonds, as well as alliances are being questioned. No path is predetermined. Convictions can change. But still, the patterns are solid enough to offer these three group-ings of countries as a reasonable starting point for discussion.

What are the challenges for the future security ar-chitecture, given these three different conceptions of European security, which are based on different historical developments and different experiences following the end of the Cold War? What are the en-try points if one of these groups were to start a pro-cess of rebuilding a European consensus or at least a compromise? What could be their main impetus for the future of a secure Europe? And finally: What are the common takeaways of the three perspectives that could be used to start an urgently needed polit-ical process?

Latvia, Poland, Serbia, Ukraine: The Worried

All four of these countries are either member states of the EU or closely associated with it. They have expe-rienced differing levels of economic prosperity since 1991. Latvia and Poland are success stories; Serbia and Ukraine are still struggling. What they have in common is their uneasiness about the status quo in European security affairs. The population of these countries, except for Latvia, feel that they do not have the status they deserve, and even worse, they perceive that other countries are undermining their efforts.

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This statistical analysis validates our main finding that reveals the dire status quo of European security. We combined items to build two sum scores: one measures the general threat perception, and the other the legitimacy of central in-stitutions in society.

The ‘General Threat Perception Score’ consists of seven items of the question ‘To what extent are you personally concerned about the following current events that are frequently being discussed at the moment? Wars and conflicts; international terrorism; climate change; economic crises; uncontrolled immigration; disagreement/conflict within the EU; growing world population.‘ The sum-score has a sufficient internal consistency (α = 0.734). A value of 1 corresponds with the perception of no threat at all, and a value of 4 implies a very high threat perception.

The ‘Legitimacy of Institutions Score’ consists of eight items of the question ‘To what extent do you trust the following institutions of your country? Head of state; government; parties; media; courts; intelligence services; police; military.‘ The sum-score has a good internal consistency (α = 0.817). A value of 1 represents a very low overall legitimacy of institutions, and a value of 4 a very high legitimacy of institutions.

The sum scores do not correlate with each other (r = 0.065**). Thus, they represent two different dimensions. In the sys-tem of coordinates, the points are defined as the combination of the respective arithmetic means of the two sum-scores for each country.

The general legitimacy of societal institutions is alarmingly low in all countries polled. In Poland and Ukraine in particular, institutions suffer a severe lack of legitimacy. Only in Germany are institutions perceived as relatively legitimate, but even so, not in a convincing manner. All countries exhibit a high level of general threat perception.

The combination of the two sum-scores paints a grim picture. People‘s sense of security depends on their perception of threats and their belief in the legitimacy of institutions. The data show a highly unstable situation, in which society is afraid and does not believe that the authorities responsible for dealing with the challenges are in a legitimate position to do so. This creates an environment in which hasty measures and extreme forms of foreign and security policies easily find popular support.

1,5

2

2,5

3

3,5

1,5 2 2,5 3 3,5

low

Legi

timac

yof

Inst

itutio

nshi

gh

low Threat Perception high

Threat Perception vs. Legitimacy of Institutions

StrugglingResilient

High RiskVulnerable

3,5

3

2,5

2

1,5

1,5 2 2,5 3 3,5

Germany

FranceRussia Latvia

Poland

Ukraine

Serbia

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Poles, Serbs and Ukrainians particularly, accord-ing to the survey and focus groups, perceive their past in a more positive light than the uncertain future. According to experts consulted in the study, this has to do with the fact that political de-cision-makers look more towards traditions and the past rather than towards the unknown future. History is back in geopolitics. Maybe it never left. The populations of the Central Eastern Europe-an states remain influenced by the still-painful wounds inflicted during the last hundred years, or even before (Polish partitions), mainly by Russia, but also by Germany.

Whereas Latvia and Poland have strong reassur-ances for their security through NATO member-ship, Serbia and Ukraine lack this. It is interesting that despite the different membership status of these four states, there is very little difference in the populations’ threat perceptions and the dis-satisfaction with their current standing in interna-tional affairs, and only some differences in their support for increasing their countries’ military spending.

However, one major challenge for European se-curity architecture is the different understanding of the threat. For Latvians, Poles and Ukrainians it is Russia; for Serbia it is the USA. There is also a common understanding that the USA is a major factor influencing security in Europe. The expert focus group in Poland pointed out that the policy of looking towards the USA for shortcuts in secu-rity matters, rather than finding common ground within the EU, could alienate other EU member states. Another challenge for a united approach in the current European security environment is the strong support of Latvia and Poland for Ukraine’s NATO membership, while the French and the Germans show far less support, not to mention Russia, which is of course opposed. Indeed, the support in Ukraine itself (56%) is remarkably low compared with its Western partners.

All four countries are still shaken by the past and the injustices that were done to them. More than half of the population in Latvia, Poland, Serbia and Ukraine (and in Russia as well), believes that parts of the territory of neighbouring countries should be part of their own country. In addition to that, there is an overall perception that borders have always been changed by wars and that this will continue to be the case in the future.

The people have not come to terms with their tragic history and its traumas, a fact which to some extent drives their respective international policies. No doubt Russia’s current behaviour only

exacerbates these factors, rather than alleviating them.

For the four countries in Central Eastern and Southern Europe the entry points for initiating a new security process is the overall understanding that Europe should grow together; that conflicts can be solved using peaceful means; and that co-operation with Russia could be intensified. Even 27% of Ukrainians favour more cooperation with Russia.

According to the experts surveyed, all these coun-tries recognise their limits with regard to foreign policy, and their populations are thus open to non-violent solutions to the crisis in and around Ukraine. Binding international norms and laws are essential. The Ukrainian population sees its own country as the main actor for resolving the crisis, using diplomatic solutions. This approach would be extremely useful for developing cooper-ative security architecture.

Russia: Status Seeking

Russians have gone through major upheavals and transformations since 1991. Many lost political guidance along with their jobs or savings, and even hope for a better future. Others saw a rare chance for improvement. Perceiving the end of the Cold War more as a challenge rather than an opportunity, Russians are nonetheless pragmatic. The country is more stable than one could have imagined, even though economically and politi-cally there is still no consistent path to prosper-ity and stability. But then again, what country in Europe is not in that difficult situation? One just has to look at Great Britain. However, the Rus-sian population still does not feel that its country is fairly represented in international affairs. It is no wonder that it supports an increase in military spending and military interventions abroad. Inter-national politics, according to Russians, is based primarily on interests, not on values. The Russian government is following a principle of looking for ad hoc alliances that can be changed according to its interests.

Experts of the Russian focus group emphasise that the security architecture that was estab-lished after the Cold War was not created for seri-ous rivalry but rather for a friendly environment. Moreover, they point out that it fails to reflect the current military strength of Russia, which would enable Russia to pursue an active foreign policy. Therefore, Moscow is looking for new security ar-chitecture, without officially denouncing the old one based on the Helsinki Final Act from 1975.

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The challenge is that there are very few allies Rus-sia can count on. Most Europeans see Russia as a serious threat – not only because of the Ukrainian case but also because of the values gap and Rus-sian interference in the affairs of other European states. Only Russians and Serbians in part consid-er the annexation of Crimea legal. Furthermore, Russians feel that EU policies are regularly in con-flict with their country. It seems that Russia is very much looking inwards. Its own unique culture is important, and it feels threatened by the interfer-ence of others and by the Eastern expansion of NATO in general – and especially by the possible EU and NATO membership of Ukraine.

Still, entry points for Russia’s engagement to-wards a cooperative European security remain. One is the prevailing public perception that there is a common Europe and that Russia is part of it. Thus, even though it seems almost to contradict their critical stance towards the EU, Russians are asking for more collaboration with Brussels. An-other is the strong support for a diplomatic solu-tion to the Ukrainian conflict and a stance against military intervention by other countries in the conflict in eastern Ukraine. Russia is needed but at the same time Russia is feared. This has been the case since Russian troops overpowered the French and Russia be-came part of the European concert of powers in 1815. Until now its foreign policy has been mostly seen as the result of domestic authoritarian de-velopments and therefore not driven by any ra-tional foreign policy with the interests of a ma-jor European power. But according to the survey, Russians see their country as part of Europe and would like it to stay engaged.

This stands in contrast to their feeling of not be-ing treated well in international European affairs, which they compensate for with a foreign policy that, especially because of its might, is ready to escalate and to use force. Including Russia in se-curity talks could be a first step to giving Russians the status they long for. At the same time their government has to act as a responsible power.

France and Germany: Responsibility to Lead

Both France and Germany could be envisioned as suitable initiators of an attempt to work on coop-erative European security architecture. Their peo-ple feel respected in Europe, they do not feel pres-sured by other states, and they have no desire for territories in neighbouring countries. Their policy is geared towards stability in and around the EU but because of a rapidly changing foreign policy environment they are willing to start new think-ing on European security, which is officially still based on the 2010 OSCE Astana Commemorative Declaration towards a Security Community. The essence is expressed in point 3: ‘The security of each participating State is inseparably linked to that of all others. Each participating State has an equal right to security.’ But according to the opinion poll, the French and the Germans are in-stinctively asking for more political involvement by their respective governments.

Against this background, the hot or smouldering conflicts such as Abkhazia, South Ossetia, Transn-istria, Nagorno-Karabakh and foremost the illegal annexation of Crimea and the on-going conflict in the Donbass must be resolved. Partners for a French and German initiative could be found among the countries of the Eastern Partnership and EU member states as well as Russia.

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This statistical analysis illustrates the extent to which the seven countries polled for the Security Radar 2019 survey can be drivers of an inclusive security and peace strategy in Europe. The perceived status of the respondents’ country was contrasted with the popular support for a foreign and security policy that assumes international responsibility.

The concept of ‘international status‘ was assessed through the item ‘In my opinion, my country does not have the sta-tus in the world it deserves in comparison with other countries.‘ The value of 1 corresponds with strong agreement and therefore indicates a low perceived status. Accordingly, the value of 4 corresponds with a high perceived status.

The concept of ‘international responsibility‘ was assessed through the item ‘My country should take more international responsibility and help other states, even if there are no direct benefits for my country.‘ The scale was inverted so that 1 corresponds with strong disagreement and therefore indicates a low potential to assume international responsibility; conversely, the value 4 corresponds with high potential. In the system of coordinates, the points are defined as the com-bination of the respective arithmetic means of the two items for each country.

Respondents in Germany and France perceive their countries as occupying a respectable position in the world. They also support a security and foreign policy that assumes responsibility and contributes to the international common good. Therefore, France and Germany have the public support to take a leading role in the development and enforcement of such policy.

In the ‘Eastern European’ countries of Poland, Latvia, Ukraine and Serbia, respondents also support their states’ con-tribution to a security policy that fosters an international common good, but at the same time perceive the status of their countries as low. An inclusive security strategy can therefore build on public support in these countries. However, the widespread fear of losing status or remaining unimportant on the international stage must be taken into account.

The public of Russia shares with the Eastern European states the feeling of being left behind, but does not support the idea of contributing to an international common good. This is the main obstacle for developing and enforcing a success-ful security strategy. Inclusive European security would be barely possible without Russia, but Russian political elites currently do not have popular support for joining such an undertaking.

1

1,5

2

2,5

3

3,5

4

1 1,5 2 2,5 3 3,5 4

low

Resp

onsi

bilit

y hi

gh

low Perceived Status high

Perceived Status vs. Responsibility

Responsible to leadAnxious

IsolationistFrustrated

GermanyPoland

4

3,5

3

2,5

2

1,5

11 1,5 2

Germany

FranceLatvia

Russia

Ukraine

Serbia

2,5 3 3,5 4

Poland

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But there are a couple of challenges. One is the low level of trust in domestic institutions. An as-tonishing crisis of legitimacy can be seen in France and Germany towards national institutions such as political parties, government and the media. Such distrust goes across the board. The only two trustworthy institutions, in the opinion of the re-spondents, are the military and the police. A ma-jor challenge for a Franco-German initiative is the crumbling unity in the EU. The EU’s disharmony is not helpful for a united foreign policy approach. Neither is the missing strategic discussion in Ger-many of taking on more responsibility in foreign affairs, which can be seen in the reluctance of the political elite. Whether a much-talked-about army of the EU could be a tool for European integration remains to be seen.

Another major challenge is Russia, because its leadership is not satisfied with the current securi-ty arrangements in Europe and is unwilling to give up influence in neighbouring countries or Crimea, knowing that its population supports it. Nine out of ten Russians believe that Crimea was legally incorporated by Russia. The threat Russia poses to other European countries is a major problem for cooperative security. As is the threat posed by the USA, with its threats to multilateral security, according to opinion in several countries.

Nonetheless, there are still entry points for a French and German initiative. In January 2019, France and Germany signed a new bilateral friend-ship treaty, which provided for closer cooperation, including on foreign policy. Prior to that, Presi-dent Macron repeatedly put forward proposals to strengthen European security. As our survey shows, these initiatives would have solid public backing. For example, most respondents believe that conflicts can be solved using peaceful means. This goes for the Ukrainian conflict as well – a diplomatic solution is favoured. In this respect at least, half of the people in all the countries sur-veyed think that there should be more coopera-tion between Russia and many European states. The majority of the respondents believe strongly that their respective country is part of the Europe-an cultural sphere.

France and Germany are both countries that have good enough relations with all parties to start rethinking security in Europe. For a broader ap-proach, EU member states in Central Eastern Eu-rope like Poland should be included, giving this initiative more legitimacy and responsibility and supplying the approach with more credibility for

a cooperative security architecture that is based on binding international norms and laws. Expert group discussions reveal, most notably in Poland but also in Latvia, that there is a considerable will-ingness on the side of the Central Eastern Europe-ans to join the ‘German-French engine’. The next step would be to include non-EU members from the region.

III. Three Takeaways: Essential Steps for a Political ProcessThis examination of these three different per-spectives and their potential consequences for a cooperative European security architecture leads us to three takeaways that need to be kept in mind for initiating a process towards a secure and stable Europe. They might not seem in line with the current zeitgeist, but if any progress is to be achieved, these first steps will have to be taken. We believe that the opinion survey can be seen as a wake-up call for Europe before it is too late. If the INF treaty is discontinued, a rapid nuclear re-armament could follow. The people are ready and willing to cooperate; now it is up to the politicians to follow through.

Step 1: Taking security perceptions of others seriously The fear of instability and military confrontation in the heart of Europe is tangible. Asking the ex-perts in the seven countries one gets answers that reflect the feeling of an overarching uncer-tainty about their own societies and about their governments’ foreign policy agendas.

One should avoid judging or even denying the fear of others. That means, that Russia has to take the threat perceptions of the Central Eastern Europe-an countries seriously – especially because these are grounded in a very long history, first of an expansive Russian empire and then a dominant Soviet Union. The Russian Federation has shown that using military force is still an option. It is not clear if Russia will do so again. But on the other side, Russia also deserves that its threat percep-tions should also be seen as real, even though the biggest country in the world proclaims them.

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Step 2: Looking for compromises

Cooperative European security architecture with every European state on board seems impossible in the current environment of big power rivalry. But things change. The oft-quoted ‘end of histo-ry’ lasted only a decade, if at all. If there is to be a common effort to improve the future state of affairs, compromises will be needed. It is easier to reconcile interests than perceptions: once we acknowledge and respect the differences, we can start negotiating a compromise. Since the survey shows that none of the populations of the seven states are belligerent, we argue that there is pub-lic support for dialogue and compromise. After all, according to the Astana Declaration of 2010, as previously mentioned, the security of each member state in the OSCE region is tightly connected to that of all the other member states. Further NATO expansion should not be pursued, but at the same time sufficient security guaran-tees must be provided for countries like Ukraine. Moreover, a necessary step towards a stable Eu-ropean security architecture – one supported by both the populations surveyed and the experts involved – would be a diplomatic solution to the crisis in and around Ukraine.

There are still plenty of factors, mentioned above, which could potentially threaten any compromise in the near future. But the willingness of the ma-jority to support cooperation over military conflict should be a serious stimulus for decision-makers not to delay but rather to start a political process sooner rather than later. Germany and France could jointly kick-start it.

Step 3: Respecting international norms

So far, no government of any state participating in the survey has denounced the original Helsinki Accords of 1975 confirmed 35 years later by the OSCE in Astana. In general, international organ-isations such as the UN and the OSCE poll well among the populations of the seven countries. They represent international norms and cooper-ation. All populations acknowledge and support the interdependence of their own country with the well-being and positive development of other countries. This is a substantial argument in favour of international cooperation and dialogue. To-gether with an overwhelming majority committed to the relief of tensions in international politics

and the peaceful mitigation of conflicts, one can conclude that respect for international norms, in both small and large countries, is very much pre-ferred by the population, as long as no country has special rights.

The practice of upholding international norms as well as restoring trust after breaches can be chal-lenging, but the broad public support for norms is certainly helpful. A unilateral affirmation of already agreed-upon international norms as an important symbolic gesture in support of a rules-based order should be possible. New norms can be agreed upon on the basis of new compromises.

IV. Outlook

The results of the survey are twofold: On the one hand a partial backlash towards nationalism and militarisation is evident. Populism is clearly linked with European security. It seems that the mount-ing and simultaneously occurring challenges are bigger than the instruments at hand to possibly solve them. The crisis of liberal democracy, of trust in domestic state institutions, of multilater-alism in international affairs, of transatlantic pre-dictability and a digital revolution which is moving faster than one would hope for all contribute to the uncertainty.

On the other hand, a very clear longing for coop-eration and peace in Europe is evident. This con-trasts strongly with the situation before the First World War, which usually is used for comparison, when a major war seemed possible, plausible and geopolitically a win-win situation. It is now up to Europe’s population to spread the word voiced in our opinion poll, that 2019 is not 1914.

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Imprint

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ISBN 978-3-96250-285-0

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