W5- Hilary Putnam

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Meaning and ReferenceAuthor(s): Hilary PutnamSource: The Journal of Philosophy, Vol. 70, No. 19, Seventieth Annual Meeting of theAmerican Philosophical Association Eastern Division (Nov. 8, 1973), pp. 699-711Published by: Journal of Philosophy, Inc.Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/2025079 .

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REFERENCE 699

He wants to saythat t's not a thing.As a matter ffact, t'smaltScotch, one of the things particularly islike.And it's the only

thing got forChris-tmasnot thebottle,the Scotch: it came in adifferentottle). t is not a matter fwielding heOED or theDailyNews here to establishanythingmomentous; 'm onlyaskingwhyChappell wantsus to talkhisway. He thinks hat f we ask,What isthe Scotch n thatbottle denticalwith?wewon'tbe able to answerourselves, nd so will give up thinkingt's a thing.But theScotchin thatbottle s (thesameas) thewhiskeyn thatbottle, heliquidin thatbottle,thestuff'm about to giveyou because I can't standit. (I don't see thatthequestion,What is

this copy of theJOURNAL

OF PHILOSOPHY identical with? gets answers that are any betterthanthose.)

And he wantsto say that it constitutes thing, ven whenyoumix it with soda. He is not contentwith the idea that the thingof which it is a part is Scotchand soda, or a glass of Scotchandsoda; I don't knowwhy.He wants to say that the Scotchin thatScotchand soda constitutesr composes omething ll its own, andso he adopts the device of prefixing heap of' or 'aggregate of'

to words forstuffs, o guaranteethatwe'll alwayshave (a count-noun phrasefor?) thing nystuffomposes.And I don't see that:if we are so sure thatthere lways will be a thingcomposedof anystuff e encounter,we might s well just prefixthingcomposedof'and be done with t.And, anyway,why hould we be so sure?

RUSSELL M. DANCY

CornellUniversity

MEANING AND REFERENCE *

U NCLEAR as it is, thetraditionaloctrinehat henotion"meaning" possesses the extension/intensionmbiguityhas certaintypicalconsequences.The doctrine that the

meaning of a term s a conceptcarriedthe implicationthatmean-ingsare mentalentities.Frege,however, ebelledagainstthis"psy-chologism."Feeling that meaningsare public property-thatthesame meaning can be

"grasped" by more than one person and* To be presented in an APA symposiumon Reference,December 28, 1973.

Commentatorswill be Charles Chastain and Keith S. Donnellan; forDonnellan'spaper, see this JOURNAL, this issue, 711-712; ProfessorChastain's commentsarenot available at thistime.

A verymuch expanded version of this paper will appear in volume 7 or 8of Minnesota Studies in the Philosophyof Science (edited by Keith Gunderson),under the title"The Meaning of Meaning'."



700 THE JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY

by personsat different imes-he identified oncepts (and hence"intensions" r meanings)with abstract ntities ather hanmental

entities.However, "grasping"these abstractentitieswas still anindividual psychological ct. None of thesephilosophersdoubtedthatunderstanding word knowing ts ntension)was just a matterof being in a certainpsychological tate (somewhat n the way inwhichknowinghow to factornumbers n one's head is just a mat-ter of being in a certainverycomplexpsychological tate).

Secondly, he timeworn xample of the two terms creaturewitha kidney' nd 'creaturewitha heart'does show thattwoterms anl

have the same extension and yet differ n intension.But it wastaken to be obvious that thereverse s impossible:two terms an-not differn extension nd have the same intension. nterestingly,no argumentfor this impossibilitywas ever offered. robably itreflectshetradition ftheancient and medievalphilosophers,whoassumedthatthe conceptcorrespondingo a termwas just a con-junction ofpredicates,nd hence thattheconceptcorrespondingoa termmustalwaysprovidea necessary nd sufficientonditionforfalling nto theextension ftheterm. or philosophersikeCarnap,

who accepted theverifiabilityheory fmeaning, the conceptcor-responding to a term provided (in the ideal case, where theterm had "completemeaning") a criterionfor belonging to theextension not just in the senseof "necessary nd sufficientondi-tion," but in the strongsense of way of recognizingwhetheragiven thingfallsinto the extensionor not). So theory fmeaningcametorest n twounchallenged ssumptions:

(1) That knowing hemeaningofa term s just a matter fbeing

in a certain psychologicalstate (in the sense of "psychologicalstate," in which statesof memory nd belief are "psychologicalstates";no one thought hatknowingthemeaningof a wordwasa continuous tateofconsciousness,fcourse).

(2) That themeaningof a termdetermines ts extension in thesense that samenessof intensionentails samenessof extension).

I shallarguethatthese woassumptionsrenot ointly atisfiedyanynotion, et alone anynotionofmeaning.The traditional on-ceptofmeaning s a conceptwhichrests n a falsetheory.

ARE MEANINGS IN THE HEAD?

For thepurposeof the following cience-fictionxamples,we shallsupposethatsomewhere here s a planetwe shall call Twin Earth.Twin Earth s verymuch ikeEarth: in fact, eople on Twin Eartheven speak English. In fact,apart fromthe differences e shallspecify n our science-fictionxamples, the reader may suppose



REFERENCE 70I

thatTwin Earth is exactly ike Earth. He mayeven suppose thathe has a Doppelganger-an identical copy-on Twin Earth, if

he wishes, lthoughmystorieswill not depend on this.Although some of the people on Twin Earth (say, thosewhocall themselvesAmericans" nd thosewhocall themselvesCanadi-ans" and those who call themselves"Englishmen,"etc.) speakEnglish,thereare,not surprisingly, fewtiny differences etweenthe dialects of English spoken on Twin Earth and standardEnglish.

One of thepeculiaritiesof Twin Earth is that the liquid called"water" s not H20 but a differentiquid whosechemicalformulais very long and complicated. I shall abbreviate this chemicalformula imply s XYZ. I shall suppose thatXYZ is indistinguish-able fromwater at normaltemperaturesnd pressures. lso,I shallsuppose that the oceans and lakes and seas ofTwin EarthcontainXYZ and not water,that it rains XYZ on Twin Earth and notwater, tc.

If a space ship fromEarth ever visits Twin Earth, then thesupposition at firstwill be that water'has the same meaningon

Earth and on Twin Earth.This suppositionwill be correctedwhenit is discovered hat"water" on Twin Earth is XYZ, and theEarth-ian space ship will report omewhat s follows.

"On Twin Earth the word water'meansXYZ."Symmetrically,f a space ship fromTwin Earth ever visits

Earth,thenthesupposition t firstwillbe that theword water'hasthe same meaningon Twin Earth and on Earth.This suppositionwill be correctedwhen it is discovered that "water" on Earth isH20, and the Twin Earthian space ship will report:

"On Earth theword water'meansH20."Note thatthere s no problem about the extensionof the term

'water': thewordsimplyhas twodifferent eanings as we say); inthe sensein whichit is used on Twin Earth,the senseofwaterTE,what we call "water"simply sn'twater,while in thesense n whichit is used on Earth,the senseofwaterE,what theTwin Earthianscall "water" simple isn't water. The extensionof 'water' in thesense of waterE s the set of all wholes consisting f 1120 mole-

cules,or somethingike that;theextension fwater n thesenseofwaterTE s the set of all wholes consisting f XYZ molecules, orsomethingikethat.

Now letus roll thetimeback to about 1750.The typicalEarthianspeaker of Englishdid not know thatwaterconsisted f hydrogenand oxygen, nd the typicalTwin-Earthian peakerof Englishdid




not know that "water" consisted of XYZ. Let Oscar1be such atypicalEarthianEnglishspeaker, nd let Oscar2be his counterparton Twin Earth. You maysupposethat there s no beliefthatOscar,had about water that Oscar2did not have about "water." If youlike,youmay evensupposethat Oscar1 nd Oscar2were exactdupli-cates in appearance, feelings,thoughts, nteriormonologue, etc.Yet the extension of the term water'was just as much H20 onEarthin 1750 as in 1950; and theextensionof theterm water' wasjust as muchXYZ on Twin Earth in 1750 as in 1950. Oscar1 andOscar2understood hetermwater'differentlyn 1750althoughthey

were n the amepsychologicaltate, nd although, iventhe stateofscienceat the time, twouldhave taken their cientific ommunitiesabout fifty earsto discoverthattheyunderstoodthe term water'differently.hus theextensionof the term water' and, in fact, ts"meaning" n the intuitivepreanalytical sage of thatterm) s nota function f thepsychological tate of thespeakerbyitself.'

But, it mightbe objected,why should we accept it that thetermwater'had the same extension n 1750 and in 1950 (on bothEarths)?Suppose I point to a glass ofwaterand

say"this

liquid iscalled water."My "ostensivedefinition" f waterhas thefollowingempiricalpresupposition: hatthebodyof liquid I am pointingtobears a certainsamenessrelation (say,x is the same liquid as y,or x is thesameLas y) to most of the stuff and otherspeakers nmy linguisticcommunityhave on otheroccasions called "water."If thispresuppositions falsebecause,say, am-unknown to me-pointing to a glassofgin and not a glassofwater, hen do notintendmyostensivedefinition o be accepted. Thus the ostensive

definition onveyswhat might be called a "defeasible"necessaryand sufficientondition: the necessary nd sufficientonditionforbeingwater s bearingthe relationsameLto the stuffn theglass;but this is the necessary nd sufficientonditiononly if the em-piricalpresupposition s satisfied.f it is not satisfied,hen one of aseriesof, o to speak,"fallback"conditions ecomesactivated.

The key pointis thattherelation ameL s a theoretical elation:whether omethings or is not thesame liquid as thismaytake an

indeterminate amount of scientific nvestigation to determine.Thus, the factthat an English speaker n 1750 mighthave calledXYZ "water,"whereas he or his successorswould not have calledXYZ water n 1800 or 1850 does not mean that the "meaning"of'water' changed for the average speaker in the interval. n 1750

1 See fn2, p. 710 below, and the corresponding ext.



REFERENCE 703

or in 1850or in 1950one mighthave pointedto,say,theliquid inLake Michigan as an example of "water."What changedwas that

in 1750 we would have mistakenlyhought hat XYZ bore therela-tion sameL to the liquid in Lake Michigan,whereasin 1800 or1850wewouldhaveknownthat t didnot.

Let us now modify ur science-fictiontory. shall suppose thatmolybdenum ots and pans can't be distinguished rom luminumpots and pans save byan expert. This could be trueforall I know,and, a fortiori,t could be truefor ll I knowbyvirtueof"knowingthemeaning"of thewordsaluminum and molybdenum.)We willnow suppose that molybdenum s as common on Twin Earth asaluminum is on Earth, and that aluminum is as rare on TwinEarth as molybdenum s on Earth. In particular,we shall assumethat "aluminum" pots and pans are made of molybdenumonTwin Earth. Finally,we shall assume that the words aluminum'and 'molybdenum' re switched n Twin Earth: 'aluminum' s thenameofmolybdenum,nd 'molybdenum's thenameof aluminum.If a space ship fromEarth visitedTwin Earth, the visitorsfromEarth probably would not suspectthat the "aluminum" pots and

pans on Twin Earthwerenotmade of aluminum,especiallywhentheTwin Earthians aid theywere.But there s one important if-ference between the two cases. An Earthian metallurgist ouldtell veryeasily that "aluminum" was molybdenum, nd a TwinEarthian metallurgistcould tell equally easily that aluminumwas "molybdenum." The shudder quotes in the precedingsen-tence indicate Twin Earthian usages.) Whereas in 1750 no oneon eitherEarth orTwin Earthcould havedistinguishedwaterfrom

"water," the confusion of aluminum with "aluminum" involvesonlya part of the linguistic ommunitiesnvolved.This example makes the same point as the precedingexample.

If Oscar, and Oscar2are standard peakers fEarthianEnglishandTwin Earthian English,respectively,nd neither s chemicallyormetallurgicallyophisticated, hen there may be no difference tall in theirpsychologicaltateswhenthey se the word aluminum';nevertheless,we have to say that 'aluminum' has the extensionaluminum n theidiolect of Oscar, and theextensionmolybdenumin the diolectofOscar2. Alsowehave to saythatOscar1 nd Oscar2mean differenthingsby 'aluminum'; that 'aluminum' has a dif-ferentmeaningon Earth than it does on Twin Earth,etc.)Againwe see that the psychological tate of the speakerdoes not deter-mine the extension(or the "meaning,"speakingpreanalytically)oftheword.




Beforediscussing hisexample further,et me introducea non-science-fictionxample. Suppose you are like me and cannot

tell an elm from beechtree.We stillsaythattheextension f elm'in my diolect s thesame as theextension f elm' in anyoneelse's,viz., the set of all elm trees, nd that the set of all beech trees sthe extensionof 'beech' in both of our idiolects.Thus 'elm' in myidiolecthas a differentxtensionfrombeech' in your diolect as itshould). Is it really credible that this differencen extensionisbroughtabout by some differencen our concepts?My conceptof an elm treeis exactly the same as myconcept of a beech tree(I blushtoconfess). f someoneheroically ttempts omaintainthatthe differenceetweenthe extensionof 'elm' and the extensionof'beech' in myidiolect is explained by a differencen my psycho-logical state, then we can always refutehim by constructing"Twin Earth" example-just let the words elm' and 'beech' beswitchedon Twin Earth (the way 'aluminum' and "molybdenum'were in the previous example). Moreover, suppose I have aDoppelgangeron Twin Earthwho is molecule formolecule "iden-tical" with me. If you are a dualist,then also supposemyDoppel-

gangerthinks he sameverbalizedthoughts do, has the same sensedata, the same dispositions, tc. It is absurd to thinkhis psycho-logical state s one bit differentrommine: yethe "means" beechwhen he says"elm," and I "mean" elm when I say "elm." Cut thepie anywayyoulike,"meanings" ust ain't in thehead!

A SOCIOLINGUISTIC HYPOTHESIS

The last two examples depend upon a fact about language thatseems, urprisingly, everto have been pointed out: that there sdivisionoflinguisticabor.We could hardlyuse suchwords s 'elm'and 'aluminum'if no one possessed wayofrecognizing lm treesand aluminummetal; but not everyone o whom the distinctionis important as to be able tomake thedistinction. et us shift heexample; considergold. Gold is important ormanyreasons: t is apreciousmetal; it is a monetarymetal; it has symbolicvalue (itis important omostpeople thatthe"gold" weddingringtheywearreallyconsistof gold and not just look gold); etc. Consider ourcommunity s a "factory": n this"factory" ome people have the

"job" of wearing gold wedding rings; other people have the"job" of selling gold weddingrings; still other people have thejob of tellingwhether r not something s really gold. It is not atall necessary r efficienthatevery ne whowearsa gold ring or agold cufflink,tc.), or discusses the "gold standard,"etc., engagein buying nd sellinggold.Nor is it necessaryr efficienthatevery



REFERENCE 705

one who buys and sells gold be able to tell whether r not some-thing s really gold in a societywhere this form of dishonesty s

uncommon sellingfake gold) and in which one can easilyconsultan expert n case of doubt. And it is certainly ot necessary r effi-cientthatevery ne whohas occasiontobuyor weargold be able totell with any reliabilitywhetheror not something s really gold.

The foregoing actsare just examples of mundane division oflabor (in a wide sense). But theyengendera division of linguisticlabor: everyone to whomgold is important orany reason has toacquire theword gold'; buthe doesnot have to acquire themethod

ofrecognizingwhether omething s or is notgold. He can relyon aspecial subclassofspeakers.The features hat are generally houghtto be present n connectionwith a general name-necessary andsufficientonditions for membership n the extension, ways ofrecognizingwhethersomething s in the extension, etc.-are allpresent n the inguistic ommunityonsidered s a collectivebody;but that collectivebody divides the "labor" of knowingand em-ployingthesevarious parts of the "meaning" of 'gold'.

This divisionof linguistic abor restsupon and presupposes hedivisionof nonlinguistic abor, of course. If only the people whoknow how to tell whether ome metal is reallygold or not haveany reason to have the word 'gold' in theirvocabulary, hen theword 'gold' will be as the word 'water'was in 1750 withrespectto that subclass of speakers, and the other speakers ust won'tacquire it at all. And some words do not exhibit any division oflinguistic labor: 'chair', for example. But with the increase ofdivisionof labor in the society nd the rise of science, more and

more words begin to exhibit this kind of division of labor.'Water', for example, did not exhibit it at all beforethe rise ofchemistry. oday it is obviouslynecessary orevery peaker to beable to recognizewater (reliably under normal conditions), andprobablymost adult speakerseven know the necessary nd suffi-cientcondition"water s H20," but only a fewadult speakers oulddistinguishwater from iquids that superficiallyesembledwater.In case of doubt, otherspeakerswould relyon the judgmentofthese

"expert"speakers.Thus theway of recognizing ossessedbythese "expert" speakersis also, throughthem,possessedby thecollective inguisticbody,even though t is not possessedby eachindividualmember f thebody, nd in thiswaythe mostrecherchdfact boutwatermay becomepart ofthesocialmeaningof thewordalthoughunknownto almost all speakerswho acquire the word.

It seems to me that this phenomenon of divisionof linguistic



7o6 THE JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY

labor is one that it will be very mportantforsociolingu-isticsoinvestigate. n connection with it, I should like to propose the

followinghypothesis:HYPOTHESIS OF THE UNIVERSALITY OF THE DIVISION OF LINGUISTIC LABOR:

Every inguistic ommunityxemplifieshe sortof division f lin-guisticabor ustdescribed;hat s, it possessest least sometermswhose ssociatedcriteria"reknown nly oa subset fthe peakerswhoacquire heterms,ndwhose sebytheother peakersependsupona structuredooperationetween hem nd the speakersn therelevantubsets.

It is easy to see how thisphenomenonaccounts for some of theexamplesgiven above of the failureof the assumptions 1 and 2).When a term s subjectto the divisionof inguistic abor, the"aver-age" speakerwho acquires it does not acquire anything hat fixesits extension. n particular,his individual psychological tate cer-tainlydoes not fix ts extension; t is only the sociolinguistic tateof the collective inguisticbody to which thespeakerbelongsthatfixes heextension.

We maysummarize hisdiscussionby pointingout that there retwo sortsof tools in theworld: thereare toolslike a hammeror ascrewdriver hich can be used by one person; and thereare toolslike a steamshipwhichrequirethecooperative ctivity f a numberof personsto use. Words have been thoughtof too much on themodel of thefirstort of tool.

INDEXICALITY AND RIGIDITY

The first f our science-fictionxamples-'water' on Earth and onTwin Earth in 1750-does not involvedivision of linguistic abor,

or at least does not involve it in the same way the examples of'aluminum' and 'elm' do. There were not (in our story, nyway)any "experts" on water on Earth in 1750, nor any experts on"water" on Twin Earth. The example does involve thingswhichare of fundamentalmportance o the theory freferencend alsoto the theory f necessary ruth,which we shall now discuss.

Let W1 and W2 be two possible worlds in which I exist andin which this glass existsand in which I am giving a meaning

explanationby pointingto thisglass and saying "This is water."Let us suppose that in W1 theglass is full of H20 and in W2 theglass is full of XYZ. We shall also suppose that W1 is the actualworld, and that XYZ is the stuff ypically alled "water" in theworldW2 so thattherelationbetweenEnglishspeakers n W1 andEnglishspeakers n W2is exactlythe sameas the relationbetweenEnglish speakerson Earth and English speakerson Twin Earth).



REFERENCE 707

Then thereare two theories ne mighthave concerning hemean-ing of water':

(1) One might hold that water' was world-relative ut constantin meaning (i.e., the word has a constantrelativemeaning). Onthis theory,water' means the same in W1 and W2; it's just thatwater s H20 in W1,and water s XYZ in W2.

(2) One might hold that water is H20 in all worlds (the stuffcalled "water" n W2 sn't water),but 'water'doesn'thave the samemeaning n W1andW2.

If whatwas said beforeabout the Twin Earth case was correct,then (2) is clearlythe correct heory.When I say "this (liquid) is

water," he "this" s, so to speak,a de re "this"-i.e., theforce fmyexplanation s that"water"is whatever ears a certain quivalencerelation (the relation we called "sameL" above) to the piece ofliquid referred o as "this" n theactual world.

We mightsymbolize he differenceetween the two theories sa "scope" differencen thefollowingway. On theory1), thefollow-ing s true:

(1') (For every orldW) (Forevery in W) (x is water x bears ameL

to the ntityeferredo as "this"n W)

whileon theory 2):

(2') (Forevery orldW) (Forevery in W) (x is water x bears ameL

tothe ntityeferredoas "this" n the ctualworldW1)

I call this a "scope" differenceecause in (1') 'the entity eferredto as "this"' is within the scope of 'For everyworld W'-as thequalifying hrase in W' makesexplicit-whereas in (2') 'the entityreferred o as "this"' means "the entityreferred o as 'this' inthe actual world," and has thus a reference ndependentof thebound variable W'.

Kripkecalls a designator rigid" (in a givensentence) f (in thatsentence) t refers o thesameindividual n every ossibleworld nwhich the designatordesignates. If we extend this notion ofrigidity o substancenames,then we may expressKripke's theoryand mineby saying hat the termwater' s rigid.

The rigidity f the term water'followsfrom he factthatwhenI give the "ostensivedefinition": this (liquid) is water," intend

(2') and not 1').We may also say,followingKripke,thatwhen I give the osten-

sive definition this (liquid) is water,"the demonstrativethis' isrigid.




What Kripkewas the first o observe s that this theory f themeaning (or "use," or whatever)of the word 'water' (and other

natural-kinderms s well) has startlingonsequences orthetheoryofnecessaryruth.

To explain this, et me introduce the notion of a cross-worldrelation.A two-termelationR will be called cross-world hen t isunderstoodn such a waythat tsextension s a setoforderedpairsofindividualsnotall in the samepossibleworld. For example, t iseasyto understand he relation ame height s as a cross-worldela-tion: just understand t so that, .g., f x is an individual n a world

W1who is 5 feettall (in W1)and y is an individual n W2who is 5feettall (in W2),thenthe orderedpair x,ybelongsto the extensionofsameheight s. (Since an individual mayhavedifferenteightsndifferent ossible worlds in which that same individual exists,strictlypeaking, t is not the orderedpair x,ythatconstitutes nelementof theextensionof same height s, but rather heorderedpair x-in-world-W1,-in-world-W2.)

Similarly,we can understand herelationsameL same liquid as)as a cross-worldelationby understandingt so that a liquid inworld W1 which has the same importantphysicalproperties inW1) thata liquid in W2 possesses in W2)bearssameLto thelatterliquid.

Then thetheorywe have been presentingmaybe summarized ysayingthat an entityx, in an arbitrary ossibleworld, s water fand only if it bears the relationsameL (construed s a cross-worldrelation)to thestuffwe call "water"in the actual world.

Suppose,now,that have notyetdiscoveredwhat theimportant

physicalproperties f waterare (in the actual world)-i.e., I don'tyetknow thatwater s H20. I mayhave waysof recognizingwaterthatare successfulof course, maymake a small numberofmis-takesthat won'tbe able to detectuntil a laterstage n our scien-tificdevelopment), ut not knowthemicrostructuref water. f Iagree that a liquid withthesuperficial roperties f "water"but adifferentmicrostructuresn'treallywater,thenmyways of recog-nizingwater cannot be regardedas an analyticalspecification fwhat it is to be water.Rather,the

operationaldefinition,ike theostensive ne, is simply wayofpointingout a standard-pointingout the stuffn the actual worldsuch that,for x to be water, nanyworld, s forx to bear therelation ameLto thenormalmem-bersof the class of local entities hatsatisfy he operationaldefini-tion. "Water" on Twin Earth is not water,even if it satisfies heoperational definition, ecause it doesn't bear sameL to the local



REFERENCE 709

stuff hat satisfies he operational definition,nd local stuff hatsatisfies he operationaldefinition ut has a microstructureiffer-

ent from the rest of the local stuff hat satisfies he operationaldefinition sn't water either,because it doesn'tbear sameL to thenormal examples of the local "water."

Suppose, now, that I discover the microstructuref water-that water is H20. At this point I will be able to say that thestuff n Twin Earth that I earlier mistook for water isn't reallywater. n the same way, f you describe,not anotherplanet in theactual universe,but another possible universe n which there isstuff ith the chemical formulaXYZ which passes the "operationaltest" for water,we shall have to say that that stuff sn'twater butmerelyXYZ. You will not have described possibleworld n which"water s XYZ," but merely possibleworld n whichthere re lakesof XYZ, people drink XYZ (and not water), or whatever. n fact,once we have discovered he natureof water,nothingcountsas apossibleworld in which waterdoesn't have that nature.Once wehave discoveredthat water (in the actual world) is H20, nothingcounts as a possible worldin which water sn'tH20.

On the otherhand, we can perfectlywell imagine having ex-periences hat would convinceus (and that would make it rationalto believe that)water sn'tH20. In thatsense, t is conceivablethatwater sn't H20. It is conceivablebutit isn'tpossible! Conceivabilityisno proof f possibility.

Kripke refers o statements hat are rationally nrevisable assum-ing there are such) as epistemically ecessary. tatements hat aretrue n all possible worldshe refers o simply s necessary or some-

timesas "metaphysically ecessary").n thisterminology,hepointjust made can be restated s: a statement an be (metaphysically)necessary nd epistemically ontingent.Human intuitionhas noprivileged ccessto metaphysical ecessity.

In this paper,our interest s in theory fmeaning,however, ndnot in theoryof necessary ruth.Words like 'now', 'this', here'have long been recognized o be indexical,or token-reflexive-i.e.,to have an extensionwhich varies from context to contextortoken to token. For these words,no one has ever suggestedthe

traditionaltheory hat "intensiondetermines xtension."To takeour Twin Earthexample: if have a Doppelgangeron Twin Earth,then when I think "I have a headache,"he thinks I have a head-ache." But the extension of the particular token of 'I' in hisverbalized hought s himself or his unit class, to be precise),whilethe extensionof the token of 'I' in myverbalizedthought s me



7IO THE JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY

(or my unit class, to be precise). So the same word, I', has twodifferentxtensionsin two differentdiolects; but it does not

followthattheconcept have ofmyselfs in anywaydifferentromthe conceptmyDoppelgangerhas of himself.Now then,we have maintained that ndexicality xtendsbeyond

the obviously ndexical words and morphemes e.g., the tensesofverbs). Our theorycan be summarized s sayingthatwords like'water' have an unnoticed indexical component: "water" is stuffthat bears a certainsimilarity elation to the water around here.Water at another timeor in anotherplace or even in anotherpos-sible world has to bear the relation sameL to our "water" inorderto be water.Thus thetheory hat 1) wordshave "intensions,"which are something ike concepts associated with the words byspeakers; nd (2) intensiondeterminesxtension-cannotbe trueofnatural-kind ords ike water'for hesamereason t cannotbe trueof obviously ndexicalwords ike 'I'.

The theory that natural-kindwords like 'water' are indexicalleaves it open, however,whether o say that 'water' in the TwinEarth dialect of English has the same meaningas 'water' in the

Earth dialectand a differentxtension-whichis what we normallysay about 'I' in differentdiolects-therebygivingup the doctrinethat "meaning (intension)determines xtension,"or to say, as wehave chosen to do, thatdifferencen extension s ipso facto a dif-ference n meaningfornatural-kindwords,thereby ivingup thedoctrinethat meanings are concepts,or, indeed, mental entitiesofanykind.2

It should be clear,however, hatKripke's doctrinethatnatural-

kindwordsare rigiddesignatorsnd our doctrine hatthey re in-dexical are but twowaysofmakingthesamepoint.We have now seen thatthe extensionof a term s not fixedby

a conceptthat the individual speakerhas in his head, and thisistrue both because extension s, in general,determined ocially-there s divisionoflinguisticabor as muchas of "real" labor-and

2 Our reasons for rejectingthe first ption-to say that 'water' has the samemeaning on Earth and on Twin Earth,while givingup the doctrinethatmean-ing determinesreference-are presented n "The Meaning of 'Meaning'." They

may be illustrated thus: Suppose 'water' has the same meaning on Earth andon Twin Earth. Now, let the word 'water' become phonemically different nTwin Earth-say, it becomes 'quaxel'. Presumably, this is not a change inmeaning per se, on any view. So 'water' and 'quaxel' have the same meaning(although they refer to differentiquids). But this is highly counterintuitive.Why not say,then,that elm' in my idiolect has the same meaning as 'beech' inyour idiolect, although they referto different rees?



REFERENCE 7II

because extension s, n part,determinedndexically.The extensionofour terms epends upon the actual natureof the particular hings

that serve as paradigms, nd this actual nature is not, in general,fullyknown to the speaker.Traditional semantic heoryeaves outtwocontributions o thedetermination freference-thecontribu-tion of societyand the contribution f the real world; a bettersemantictheorymust encompass both.

HILARY PUTNAM

Harvard University

SUBSTANCES AS INDIVIDUALS *

pUTNAM'S central ontentionseem o mebothtrue nd ex-tremelymportant.My contribution o the symposiumwill,therefore, ot take the formof a criticalreply. Instead, I

want to take up a point that is, perhaps,peripheralto Putnam's

main concerns, ut one thatI have found the need to get straightabout in thinkingbout thesematters.Putnam gives us a theory bout how names of substancesand

species, water', gold', 'tiger',etc., function, theorythat is in-consistentwiththe conjunctionof twoassumptions bout meaningto be found ust about wherever ne looks in thehistory fphilo-sophicalsemantics. utnampointsout thatthistheorys very loseto one developed by Saul Kripke.And, using Kripke'snotion ofrigiddesignators, e says 707),"wemay expressKripke'stheorynd

mine by sayingthatthe term water' [forexample] is rigid."NowKripke introduced rigiddesignators"n his paper, "Naming andNecessity," firstn connectionwithsingularterms,n particular,propernames.A rigiddesignators a term hatdesignates hesameindividual n every ossibleworld.

The point I wish to discuss has to do with the relationshipsamongthreetheseswhichare to be foundin Kripke'spaper: (1) athesisabout propernames concerning he way in which they are

connectedwith what theyname; (2) a thesis bout thereferentsf*Abstract of a paper to be presented in an APA symposiumon Reference,

December 28, 1973, commentingon Hilary Putnam, "Meaning and Reference,"thisJOURNAL, this ssue, 699-711.

1 In Donald Davidson and Gilbert Harman, eds., Semantics of Natural Lan-guage (Dordrecht: Reidel; New York: Humanities, 1972), pp. 253-355.

W5- Hilary Putnam

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