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VoterParticipationwithRankedChoiceVotingintheUnitedStates
DavidC.KimballJosephAnthony
DepartmentofPoliticalScienceUniversityofMissouri‐St.Louis
St.Louis,[email protected]
October2016
Abstract
AsmorejurisdictionsintheUnitedStatesconsideradoptingrankedchoicevoting(RCV)itisimportanttoevaluateRCValongsidethepluralityvotingsystemsittypicallyreplaces.Thisstudyexaminesthedegreetowhichvotersturnoutandproperlycasttheirvotes,comparingrankedchoicevoting(RCV)topluralityvotingintheUnitedStates.Weuseadifference‐in‐differencesdesign,matchingcitiesusingRCVwithdemographicallysimilarcitiesusingpluralityvotingonthesamedate.WefindthatRCVhelpsreducethesubstantialdropinvoterparticipationthatcommonlyoccursbetweenprimaryandrunoffelections.OtherwiseRCVdoesnotappeartohaveastrongimpactonvoterturnoutandballotcompletion.InacasestudyofMinneapoliswefindsimilarlevelsofsocioeconomicandracialdisparitiesinvoterparticipationinpluralityandRCVelections.
TheresearchreportedhereissupportedbytheDemocracyFund.Theauthorsaresolelyresponsiblefortheanalysisandinterpretationinthisstudy.
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Thisstudyexaminesthedegreetowhichvotersturnoutandparticipateinlocal
elections,comparingrankedchoicevoting(RCV)topluralityvotingintheUnitedStates.An
increasingnumberofAmericanlocaljurisdictionsareadoptingpreferentialvotingsystems,
andRCVisthemostcommonofthesubstitutesforsingleseatelectionsintheUnitedStates.
RCVhasnowbeenadoptedbyatleasttencitiesintheUnitedStates,primarilyformayoral
orcitycouncilelections.Byallowingvoterstorankcandidatesforthesameoffice,RCV
contrastswiththedominantpluralityvotingmethodusedtoelectgovernmentofficialsin
theUnitedStates.
AsmoreAmericanjurisdictionsconsideradoptingRCVtherearemanyclaimsabout
themeritsanddemeritsofRCV.Todate,mostofthepublishedworksonRCVarecase
studiesthatexamineitsperformanceinasmallnumberoflocations.Indecidingwhether
RCVshouldreplacepluralityvotingitisimportanttoevaluateRCValongsidetheplurality
systemittypicallyreplacesintheUnitedStates.Ourstudydoesthatbycomparingvoter
participationinRCVandpluralityelectionsinAmericancities.Usingadifference‐in‐
differencesdesignwecompareamatchedsampleofcitiesusingRCVandpluralityvoting
rulesbeforeandaftertheadoptionofRCV.WefindthatRCVreducesthesubstantialdrop
invoterparticipationinlocalprimaryandrunoffelections.Beyondthat,however,RCV
doesnotappeartohaveastrongimpactonvoterturnoutandballotcompletionin
municipalelections.InacasestudyofMinneapoliselectionsbeforeandaftertheadoption
ofRCVwefindsimilarlevelsofsocioeconomicandracialdisparitiesinvoterparticipation
inpluralityandRCVelections.
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VoterParticipationwithRankedChoiceVoting
ThevastmajorityofAmericanelectionsareconductedundersomeversionof
plurality,orwinner‐take‐all,rules.Inelectionsforasingleoffice,likemayororacity
councilseat,voterscanexpressapreferenceforjustasinglecandidate,andthatvoteisnot
transferabletoothercandidates.However,overthepasttenyearsseveralAmericancities
haveadoptedrankedchoicevotingforsingleofficeelections.Incontrasttopluralityrules,
RCVasksvoterstorankcandidatesinorderofpreference,enablingvoterstoexpress
preferencesformultiplecandidatesinthesamecontest.UnderRCV,votescanbe
transferredtoothercandidates,forexample,ifavoter’sfirstchoiceiseliminatedfrom
contention.1
TherearecompetingargumentsabouthowRCVmightinfluencevoterparticipation.
Underthetraditionalcalculusofvoting,thedecisiontovoteisinfluencedbythecostsand
benefitsassociatedwithvoting,aswellastheprobabilitythatone’svotewilldeterminethe
outcome(Downs1957:chapter14).Thebenefitsrefertothepolicyorrepresentational
benefitsassociatedwithapreferredcandidatewinningtheelection.Thecostsofvoting
includetheeffortneededtobecomeinformedaboutthevotingrulesandthecontestson
theballot,aswellastheeffortneededtoovercomeadministrativeandotherbarriersto
registeringandcastingaballot.
1InmostAmericancitieswithRCVrulesvotersindicateapreferenceforuptothreecandidates.Asmallnumberofcitiesallowvoterstorankalargernumberofcandidates.Withoneexception,AmericancitiesusingRCVtransfervotesusingthealternativevotemethod.Thatis,whenavoter’smostpreferredcandidateiseliminatedthenthevoter’ssecondchoicevoteisreallocatedtooneoftheremainingcandidates.TheexceptionisCambridge,Massachusetts,whichusesasingletransferrablevotesystem.
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Ontheonehand,somearguethatRVCwillreinvigoratelocalelectionsbyfostering
moredeliberativecampaigns.RCVistheorizedtoalterthedynamicsofcampaignsand
electionsby:(1)encouragingcollaborationandcivilityamongcompetingcandidates;(2)
allowingvoterstoprovideamorecompletereportoftheircandidatepreferencesonthe
ballot;(3)reducingvoterconcernsabout“wastedvotes”forweakercandidates;and(4)by
providingincentivesformorecandidatestorunforoffice(Horowitz1985;Reilly2001;
Donovan,Tolbert,andGracey2016).Reducingoreliminatingwastedvoteconcernsmay
reducesomeoftheperceivedcostsassociatedwithvoting.IfRCVindeedattractsmore
candidatesthentheadditionalcampaignsmaymobilizemorevoterstoovercomethe
typicalcostsassociatedwithvoting.SomearguethatRCVencouragesmorecooperation
andbargainingamongrivalpoliticalelitesthanthezero‐sumcontextofpluralityelections
(Horowitz1985,1991;Reilly1997;2001).Thus,forexample,RCVmayhelpbridgeracial
andethnicdivisions(Guinier1994;Reilly1997,2002).Ifsomevotershavebeen
discouragedfromparticipatinginthenegativecampaignscommontopluralityelections,
thenRCVmayincreasevoterparticipation.
SomepreviousresearchoffersreasonstobeoptimisticabouttheimpactofRCVon
voterparticipation.Across‐nationalstudyfindsthatvotersincountrieswithahigher
degreeofpreferentialvotingreportmoresatisfactionwiththefairnessofelection
outcomes(FarrellandMcAlister2006).ArecentstudyofRCVintheUnitedStatesfinds
thatvotersincitiesusingRCVreportlessnegativecampaigningandmoresatisfactionwith
thelocalelectionthanvotersincitiesusingpluralityvoting(Donovan,Tolbert,andGracey
2016).CandidatesalsonoteamorepositivecampaignexperienceinRCVcities(Donovan
2014).Whilethereisnoclearevidencethatnegativecampaigningdepressesturnout(Lau,
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Sigelman,andRovner207),votersmaybemorewillingtoparticipateinelectionswhen
theyaremoresatisfiedwiththeelectoralsystem.
Furthermore,inastudyoflocaljurisdictionsintheUnitedStates,Bowlerand
colleagues(2003)findthatcumulativevotinggeneratesmorevigorousvoteroutreach
efforts,andthusboostsvoterturnoutinlocalelections.Whilecumulativevotingprovides
candidatesandcampaignsadifferentmixofincentivesforvotermobilizationthanRCV,
bothsystemsarevariantsofpreferentialvotingandthusonemightexpectRCVtoproduce
similarvoterturnoutimprovements.Finally,exitpollsinAmericancommunitiesusingRCV
tendtorevealhighlevelsofunderstandingandsatisfactionwiththevotingsystem(e.g.,
Neelyetal.2005;2006;Mauter2014).
Ontheotherhand,somearguethatthetaskofrankingcandidatesinRCVelections
maybeconfusingforvoters,particularlyforAmericanvoterswhohavebeensocializedin
pluralityvoting.Newvotingruleswillimposecostsonvoterstounderstandandproperly
followthenewrules.Downs(1957)theorizesthatvotingcostsdisproportionately
disenfranchiselow‐incomevotersandotherslackinginresources.Thereisevidencein
Americanelectionsthatconfusingvotingequipmentorballotdesignsproducemorevoting
errors,andtheimpactofpoordesignfallsdisproportionatelyonlowincomeandminority
voters(Herrnsonetal.2008;KropfandKimball2012).Otherrecentelectionreformsinthe
UnitedStates,suchasexpandedearlyvoting,mayhaveworsenedsocioeconomicbiasesin
turnout(Berinsky2005).Somecriticssimilarlyarguethatthenovelandcomplexnatureof
RCV,includingthewayballotsarecounted,mayexacerbatesocioeconomicdisparitiesin
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voterparticipation(JacobsandMiller2013,2014).Ifvotershavedifficultyunderstanding
howRCVworks,theymaybediscouragedfromparticipatinginRCVelections.
ThereissomeevidencethatvoterparticipationinRCVelectionsmaynotbeashigh
asexpected.Onestudyfindsafairamountof“ballotexhaustion”inCaliforniaelections
usingRCV(BurnettandKogan2015).Thatis,ifsomevotersdonotmarkthefullarrayof
rankedpreferencesaffordedbytheballotoriftheyonlypreferrelativelyweakcandidates,
thentheirvotesmaynotfactorintothefinaldeterminationofthewinner.Intheelections
theyanalyze,thewinningcandidatetypicallydidnotreceiveamajorityofallballotscastin
theelection.McDaniel(2016)estimatesthatturnoutamongsomeracialgroupsinSan
FranciscodeclinedaftertheadoptionofRCV.Inaddition,ageandeducation‐related
turnoutdisparitiesaremorepronouncedinSanFranciscoaftertheadoptionofRCV
(McDaniel2016).Similarly,overvotesaremorecommoninminorityprecinctsinRCV
electionsinSanFrancisco(NeelyandMcDaniel2015).
Againstthesecompetinghypotheses,therearereasonstoexpectminimaleffectsof
RCVonvotingparticipation.Turnoutinlocalelectionstendstobeinfluencedbyfeatures
thatbearheavilyonthecost/benefitcalculusofvoting,suchastheelectionschedule,the
levelofcompetitioninlocalcampaigns,mobilizationefforts,andothercharacteristicsof
thelocalpoliticalcontext(Anzia2013;Oliver2012;Hajnal2010;GreenandGerber2015).
Incontrast,manyelectionreformsdonotfundamentallyalterthecostsandbenefitsof
voting.Priorreformstoutedasturnoutboosters,suchasthemotorvoterlaw(Hanmer
2012),theHelpAmericaVoteAct(KropfandKimball2012),votingbymail(Kousserand
Mullin2007),earlyvoting(Burdenetal.2014),andtermlimits(BowlerandDonovan
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2012)havehaddonelittletoincreasevoterparticipationintheUnitedStates(alsosee
Cain,Donovan,andTolbert2008).Berinsky(2005)classifieselectionreformsintotwo
groups:(1)thosethatstimulatenewvoters,and(2)thosethatretainexistingvoters.By
merelyallowingvoterstoindicateapreferenceformorethanonecandidateRCVmaynot
alterthebasiccalculusofvotingandthusmaynotstimulatemanynewvoters.
Ultimately,theimpactofRCVonvoterparticipationisaresearchablequestion.
However,muchoftheexistingresearchexaminesRCVelectionsinisolatedcasestudies.To
assesstherelativeadvantagesanddisadvantagesofnewvotingrules,itisimportantto
comparetheperformanceofthenewsystemtotheoldsystemitisreplacing.Thenext
sectiondescribesthedataandresearchdesignweusetoexaminetheparticipation
questionforRCVintheUnitedStates.
DataandMethods
InassessingtheimpactofRCVonvoterparticipationthisstudyusesaresearch
designsimilartothatemployedbyBowler,Donovan,andBrockington(2003)intheirstudy
ofcumulativevoting.Thebasicapproachistocomparea“treatment”groupofcitiesthat
haveadoptedRCVtoa“control”groupofcitiesusingpluralityvoting.Thecomparison
citiesinthecontrolgrouparesimilartotheRCVcitiesintermsofpopulation,region,
income,poverty,anddemographicdiversity.WecompareasimilarsetofRCVandmatched
pluralitycitiesasDonovanetal.(2016,Table1)andKropf(2015,Table1).
Inaddition,weusea“difference‐in‐differences”(DID)designtocomparetheRCV
andpluralitycities.Thisinvolvesgatheringdataonvoterparticipationinbothsetsofcities
fromelectionsheldbeforeandafterRCVwasadopted.Thereasonforthisapproachisthat
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thecitiesthathaveadoptedRCVtendtohaveastrongreputationforprogressivepolitics.
Assuch,theRCVcitiesmayhavecivicculturesandpriorpoliciesthatreducebarriersto
votingandpromotewidespreadvoterparticipation.Thus,itispossiblethatdifferentrates
ofparticipationexistedinthematchedRCVandpluralitycitiesevenbeforeadoptionof
RCV.TheDIDdesignassessestheimpactofRCVbymeasuringhowmuchthedifferencein
participationratesbetweenthetwogroupsofcitieschangesaftertheadoptionofRCV.In
ordinaryleastsquaresregressionanalysis,thetreatmenteffectisestimatedbyan
interactionbetweenatreatmentvariable(indicatingwhetheracityisinthetreatmentor
controlgroup)andatimevariable(indicatingwhetherthetimeperiodisbeforeorafter
adoptionofRCV).ForasummaryofthestatisticaltreatmentofDIDmethods,see
Wooldridge(2013,chapter13)orBailey(2016,chapter8).
Forbothsetsofcities,weexaminetherecentelectionsthroughthe2015cycleas
wellasthelastelectionortwopriortotheadoptionofRCV.Weleaveoutthecitiesthat
heldRCVelectionsin2012andotheryearsthatcoincidewithapresidentialcontest.Voter
participationinpresidentialyearsisstronglyshapedbythepresidentialcampaignandis
muchhigherthanturnoutinlocalelectionsinotheryears.Thus,wedonotexpectRCVto
haveasmuchofanimpactonturnoutinthoseelections.Furthermore,sinceCambridge,
MassachusettsadoptedRCVinthe1940s,wehavenotincludedvoterparticipationdatafor
CambridgeanditsmatchingpluralitycitiesbeforetheadoptionofRCV.Westillexamine
bothsetsofcitiesforthe2009,2013,and2015elections.Similarly,Portland,Maine
adoptedRCVin2011atthesametimethatitresumedelectingamayor.Priorto2011,
Portlandhadnotelectedamayorsincethe1920s.Therefore,wedonotincludedatafor
Portlandanditsmatchingcitiespriorto2011.Westillexaminebothsetsofcitiesforthe
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2011and2015elections.Table1liststhecitiesandelectionsthatarepartofthisstudy.
Oursampleincludesatotalof96elections,including19electionsusingRCV.
[Table1abouthere]
WegathereddatafromeachcityandelectionlistedinTable1tocreateseveral
measuresofvoterparticipation.Voterturnoutisacommoncommunity‐widemeasureof
participation.Wemeasurevoterturnoutasthepercentageofeligiblevoterswhocasta
ballotintheelection.Wecollectdataonthenumberofballotscastfromcityandcounty
electionoffices.Wemeasurethenumberofeligiblevotersineachcitybasedonestimates
ofthecitizenvotingagepopulation(CVAP)reportedintheCensusBureau’sAmerican
CommunitySurvey(ACS).TheACSreleasesfive‐yearaveragepopulationestimatesfor
Americanmunicipalities.Weusethemostrecentlyreleasedestimateforthecitizenvoting
agepopulationin2013,2014and2015.Forearlieryearsweusethefive‐yearaverage
centeredontheyeartheelectionwasheld.
Weexamineturnoutinlocalprimary,general,andrunoffelections.Incitieswitha
pluralitysystemtherearetypicallytwoelectionsheldtochooselocalofficials:(1)a
primaryelectionanda(2)runoffelection.Thetopcandidateswhoreceivethemostvotes
intheprimaryelection(usuallythetoptwo)advancetotherunoffelection.Thewinnerof
therunoffelectionthenwinstheoffice.Insomecases,ifacandidatewinsatleast50
percentofthevoteintheprimary,thenshewinstheseatwithouttheneedforarunoff
election.Also,insomecitiestheprimaryoccursinthespringorsummerandtherunoff
takesplaceonthegeneralelectiondateinearlyNovember.Inothercitiestheprimary
occursinNovemberandtherunoffelectiontakesplaceamonthorsolater.Turnouttends
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tobehigherintheNovembergeneralelectionthaninsummerprimariesorwinterrunoff
electionsbecausetheNovemberelectionoftensharestheballotwithotherstatewideor
federalconteststhattendtoattractmorevoters.
InRCVsystems,wherevotersrankcandidatesinorderofpreference,justone
electionisheldtoselectgovernmentofficials.RCVisthusdesignedtocombinetheprimary
(firstchoiceselections)andrunoff(re‐allocationofvotesforlosingcandidatestothe
voter’ssecondorthirdchoice)inoneelection,whichiswhyRCVissometimescalled
“instantrunoffvoting.”TheRCVelectionsinoursamplealltakeplaceinNovember.Asa
result,wemakeseparatecomparisonsofturnoutinRCVelectionstoturnoutingeneral
electionsaswellasinprimaryorrunoffelectionsinpluralitycities.Similarly,wecompare
thedropinvoterparticipationfromthefirstroundtothelastroundofvotetabulationin
RCVcitiestothedropinvotesbetweenthefirstround(primaryelection)andthelast
round(runoffelection)inpluralitycities.2Inoursample,45ofthe77cityelectionswith
pluralityrulesheldaseparateprimaryorrunoffinadditiontotheNovembergeneral
election.
Toassesspotentialconfusionamongvoterswemeasuretheresidualvoterate
(AnsolabehereandStewart2005)inthetoplocalcontestontheballot(usuallyamayoral
race).Theresidualvoterateisthedifferencebetweenthetotalballotscastandthenumber
ofvalidvotesrecordedforthecontestinquestion(asapercentageoftotalballotscast).
Residualvotescanoccurbytwomechanisms:(1)overvotes(whenavoterselectstoomany
candidatesinacolumn),or(2)undervotes(whenavotermakesnoselectioninacolumn).
2ThankstoRobertMontjoyforaconversationaboutthiscomparison.
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Overvotesarealmostalwaysanindicationofvotererror,whileundervotesmaybedue
votererrorortheymaybeintendedbyavoterwhowantstoskipaparticularconteston
theballot.Theresidualvoteratemeasureisnotperfectsinceitcombinesboth
mechanisms.Unfortunately,mostjurisdictions,includingmostcitiesinthisstudy,donot
reportovervotesandundervotesseparately.Nevertheless,previousstudiesindicatethat
theresidualvoterateisavalidmeasureofpoorlydesignedballotsandvotingequipment
(AnsolabehereandStewart2005;seeKropfandKimball2012forareview).Inpresidential
elections,aresidualvoteratesubstantiallyabove1%isusuallyasignofsometypeof
problemwiththeballotorvotingmachinery(KnackandKropf2003).
ThereisanadditionaldecisioninhowtoapplytheresidualvotemeasuretoRCV
elections.Inpluralityelections,wherethevoterhasjustonevote,theresidualvote
calculationisstraightforward.InRCVelections,wherethevoterhasmultiplechoices(and
hencemultiplevotes),thereareseveralpossiblewaystocomputethemeasure.Shouldit
bebasedonallofthevotesavailabletothevoter?Itappearsthatthevastmajorityof
votersinRCVsystemsrecordafirstorsecondchoice,butmanymaypurposefullyabstain
fromathirdorfourthchoice.Itmaynotmakesensetointerpretthoseabstentionsasasign
ofvoterconfusion.Toallowforascloseacomparisonaspossibletopluralityelections,we
computetheresidualvoterateinRCVelectionsjustbasedonthefirstchoicevotes.Ina
casestudyofvotinginMinneapolis,weusesomeadditionalmeasuresofvoterconfusion
andballotcompletionthatwedescribebelow.
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TurnoutResults
Asimpleversionofthedifference‐in‐differencemethodcanbeillustratedwitha
graph.Startingwiththebroadermeasureofparticipation,Figure1plotsthemeanturnout
rateforNovemberelectionsinRCVandpluralitycitiesbeforeandaftertheadoptionof
RCV.IntheelectionspriortoRCVadoption,turnoutintheRCVcities(40.1%)isalmost
elevenpointshigherthanmeanturnoutinthepluralitycities(29.3%).Thissupportsour
suspicionthatthecitiesadoptingRCValreadyhadhigherturnoutratesbeforeadoption.In
electionsaftertheadoptionofRCV,thedifferenceinmeanvoterturnoutinRCVcities
(34.1%)andpluralitycities(28.4%)isroughly6points.Asthegraphindicates,the
differenceinturnoutbetweenthetwogroupsissmalleraftertheadoptionofRCV,
suggestingthatRCVreducesgeneralelectionturnout.
[Figure1abouthere]
AmorerigorousimplementationoftheDIDmethodusesregressionanalysisto
controlforotherfactorsthatinfluencevoterturnout.Weincludecontrolsforthetimingof
theelection,thenumberofcontestsontheballot,andthelevelofcompetitioninthe
mayoralcampaign.Thebasichypothesisisthatturnoutishigherwhentherearemore
contestsontheballotandwhenthecampaignsaremorecompetitive.Electionsineven‐
numberedyearsareexpectedtoproducehigherturnoutbecauseotherstateandfederal
contestsareontheballotineven‐numberedyears.Thecompetitivenatureofthecontest
formayorismeasuredwithadummyvariableindicatingwhetherthemayoralelectionis
anopenseatcontestortheoutcomeiscloserthana60‐40marginofvictoryforthewinner.
[Table2abouthere]
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Themodelresultsforturnoutingeneral(November)electionsarereportedinTable
2.Theestimatesindicatethataveragevoterturnoutwasroughly9percentagepoints
higherinRCVcitiesthanincontrolcitiesbeforetheadoptionofRCV.Thetestoftheimpact
ofRCVisthecoefficientfortheinteractionterm(RCVCity*AfterAdoption).Inthiscase,
thecoefficientisnegativebutbarelylargerinmagnitudethanitsstandarderror,suggesting
thatRCVisnotassociatedwithastatisticallysignificantchangeinvoterturnoutin
Novemberelections.Theothermodelestimatesindicatethatturnoutis,onaverage,almost
9pointshigherwhentherearemorethanthreecontestsontheballot.Inthissample,the
additionalcontestsareoftenstatewideracesorballotmeasureswhichareboundto
includemoreintensivevotermobilizationcampaigns.Furthermore,turnoutisalmost10
pointshigherineven‐numberedyears,andacompetitivemayoralcontestbooststurnout
byroughly5points,onaverage.
ForthesecondparticipationanalysiswecompareRCVturnouttoprimaryorrunoff
electionturnoutinpluralitycities.Weexclude22pluralityelectionswhereaprimaryor
runoffelectionwasnotheld,leavingasampleof64elections.Figure2plotsthemean
turnoutrateforprimaryorrunoffelectionsinRCVandpluralitycitiesbeforeandafterthe
adoptionofRCV.ThefigureagainshowsthatprimaryorrunoffturnoutwashigherinRCV
citiesthaninpluralitycities.IntheelectionspriortoRCVadoption,turnoutintheRCV
cities(22.3%)isapproximately7pointshigherthanmeanturnoutinthepluralitycities
(14.8%).InelectionsaftertheadoptionofRCV,thedifferenceinmeanvoterturnoutinRCV
cities(31.7%)andpluralitycities(16.9%)is14.6points.Thedifferenceinturnoutbetween
twosetsofcitiesislargeraftertheadoptionofRCV,suggestingthatRCVincreasesturnout
whencomparedtopluralityrunofforprimaryelections.
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[Figure2abouthere]
TheregressionestimatescomparingturnoutinRCVcitiestoprimaryorrunoff
turnoutinpluralityelectionsarereportedinTable3.AsinFigure2,theestimatesindicate
thataveragevoterturnoutwasroughly5percentagepointshigherinRCVcitiesthanin
controlcitiesbeforetheadoptionofRCV.Inthiscasethecoefficientfortheinteraction
termispositiveandstatisticallysignificant.ThissuggeststhattheadoptionofRCVis
associatedwithan8percentagepointincreaseinturnoutoverwhatwasobservedin
primaryorrunoffpluralityelections.Theothermodelestimatesindicatethatturnoutis
alsohigherineven‐numberedyears,whentherearemorethanthreecontestsontheballot,
andwhenthereisacompetitivemayoralcontest.
Theseresultsareconsistentwithotherstudieswhichconcludethatthescheduling
oflocalelectionshasamajorimpactonvoterturnoutandpoliticalrepresentation(Hajnal
2010;Anzia2013).LocalelectionsheldinNovember(particularlyineven‐numberedyears
tocoincidewithstatewideandfederalcontests)generatehighervoterturnoutthanlocal
electionsscheduledduringoff‐cycleperiods(e.g.,outsideofNovember).Thus,theturnout
effectofRCVreportedinFigure2andTable3maybeduetotheelectionschedulerather
thantheRCVvotingrules,perse.
[Table3abouthere]
ResidualVoteResults
Turningtoameasureofvoterconfusion,Figure3plotsthemeanresidualvoterate
inRCVandpluralitycitiesforthetoplocalcontestontheballotbeforeandafterthe
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adoptionofRCV.3InelectionspriortoRCVadoption,theresidualvoterateintheRCVcities
(7.5%)isslightlylowerthanthemeanresidualvoterateinthepluralitycities(8.0%).In
electionsaftertheadoptionofRCV,thedifferenceinthemeanresidualvoterateinRCV
cities(4.8%)andpluralitycities(6.9%)isabout2points.Thus,itappearsthatresidual
votesdeclinedaftertheadoptionofRCV.
[Figure3abouthere]
TheregressionresultsinTable4indicatethatthechangeinthedifferencebetween
groupmeansisnotstatisticallysignificant.Thus,theadoptionofRCVdoesnotappeartobe
associatedwithanoticeablechangeintheresidualvoterateforthetopcontestonthe
ballotintheselocalelections.Meanwhile,acompetitivemayoralcontestdoesappearto
reducetheresidualvoteratebyroughly3.7percentagepoints,onaverage.Residualvote
ratesalsotendtobehigherinlocalelectionsheldineven‐numberedyears,whenstateand
federalcontestslikelydrawattentionawayfromthelocalelection.
[Table4abouthere]
VoteDrop‐off
Ourfinalcomparisonexaminesthedrop‐offinvotesbetweenthefirstandlast
roundsofvotesineachsystem.Inelectionswithmultipleroundsofvotingortabulatinga
fundamentalquestioninvolveshowmanyvotesstillcountwhencandidatesareeliminated
ateachstage.Somehavehighlightedhighratesof“ballotexhaustion”asashortcomingof 3Therearethreeelectionsinoursampleexcludedfromthisanalysis.TwoelectionsfromLowell,Massachusettsaredroppedbecausetherewerenomayoralcontestsineitherelection,andthecityusesanat‐largesystemforelectingthecitycouncil.At‐largeelectionsdonotproduceacomparableresidualvotemeasure.WealsoexcludetheTulsaelectionof2005becausetherewasnomayoralraceinthatelection.
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RCVvotingrules.Thus,thevotesforthewinningcandidateinthefinalroundoftabulation
foranRCVelectionmaynotcompriseamajorityofallballotscastintheelection(Burnett
andKogan2015).However,asimilarcritiqueappliestothemorefamiliarprimaryelection
withpluralityrulesandlaterrunoffelectionforthetopprimaryfinishers.Intheelections
usingthefamiliarpluralityrulesthenumberofvotescastintheprimaryorrunoffelections
tendtobesubstantiallysmallerthanthevotescastinthegeneralelection.Acommonclaim
ofRCVproponentsisthatreplacingtwoelections(primaryandrunoff)withoneRCV
electionyieldsgreatercontinuityinvoterparticipationbetweenthefirstandlastroundsof
voting.DoesballotexhaustioninRCVelectionsunderminethisclaim?
ForRCVelections,wecomputevoterdrop‐offasthedifferencebetweenthetotal
ballotscastintheelectionandthenumberofvalidvotescountedinthefinalroundofRCV
tabulation(aspercentageoftotalballotscast).Thus,thevotesthatdropoffinRCV
electionsincludeblankballots,overvotes,andexhaustedballots.Forpluralityelections,we
computevoterdrop‐offasthedifferencebetweenthetotalballotscastinthegeneral
electionandthevalidvotesforthetoplocalcontestintheprimaryorrunoff(againasa
percentageoftotalballotscast).Thus,thedrop‐offincludespeoplewhovoteinthegeneral
electionbutnotintheprimaryorrunoffelection.Weexclude22pluralityelectionswherea
primaryorrunoffelectionwasnotheld.Weexcludetwoadditionalpluralityelections
whereaprimaryorrunoffwasonlyheldforonecouncildistrict,ratherthanfortheentire
city.4Thisleavesasampleof62elections.Figure4plotsthemeanvotedrop‐offinRCVand
pluralitycitiesbeforeandaftertheadoptionofRCV.Asthefigureshows,thedropinvoting
participationbetweenprimaryandrunoffelectionsisverysubstantialincitiesusing
4TheseelectionsoccurredinDesMoines(2013)andWorcester(2013).
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pluralityrules.Onaverage,thedrop‐offisequivalenttoroughlyhalfofthevotersinthe
generalelection.IntheelectionspriortoRCVadoption,drop‐offintheRCVcities(50.3%)
isonly3pointslowerthanmeandrop‐offinthepluralitycities(56.8%).Inelectionsheld
aftertheadoptionofRCV,thedifferenceinmeanvoterdrop‐offinRCVcities(13.1%)and
pluralitycities(45.8%)is32.7points.Thedifferenceinvotedrop‐offbetweenthetwosets
ofcitiesismuchlargeraftertheadoptionofRCV,suggestingthatRCVsubstantiallyreduces
thedropinvotesbetweenthefirstandlastrounds.
[Figure4abouthere]
Theregressionestimatescomparingvotedrop‐offinRCVcitiestopluralitycitiesare
reportedinTable5.AsinFigure4,theestimatesindicatethataveragevotedrop‐offwas
roughlythesameinRCVandpluralitycitiesbeforetheadoptionofRCV.Inthiscasethe
coefficientfortheinteractiontermisnegativeandstatisticallysignificant.Thissuggests
thattheadoptionofRCVisassociatedwitharoughly24percentagepointreductionin
voterdrop‐offcomparedtowhatisobservedinpluralityelections.Theothermodel
estimatesindicatethatacompetitivemayoralcontestalsoreducesvotedrop‐off,by
roughly11points.Thus,theevidenceonvotedrop‐offsupportsaparticularclaimmadeby
RCVproponentsaboutcontinuityinvoterparticipation.Again,thisseemstobean
advantageofholdingoneNovemberelectioninplaceoftwoelectionsheldonseparate
dates.Overall,withtheexceptionofimprovedturnoutcomparedtopluralityprimaryand
runoffelections,voterparticipationseemstobeinfluencedmorebythestimulusofa
competitivelocalorstatewidecampaignratherthanbytheadoptionofRCVrules.
[Table5abouthere]
17
ResultsfromMinneapolis:SocioeconomicBiasinVoterParticipation
Whiletheevidencethusfarindicatesanimprovementinoverallratesofvoter
participationduetotheadoptionofRCV,somehaveexpressedconcernsthatRCVfailsto
amelioratesocioeconomicbiasesinparticipation(JacobsandMiller2013,2014;Neelyand
McDaniel2015;McDaniel2016).ForAmericanvoterswhohavegrownaccustomedto
pluralityvoting,properlycastinganRCVballotmaytakesomelearningandskill,which
mayconferaparticipatoryadvantageonvoterswithmoreresources(i.e.,wealth,
education,andcivicskills).Inarecentpaper,JacobsandMiller(2014)reportonthe2013
Minneapoliselection,notinghigherratesofvoterparticipationinwhiteandhigh‐income
wardsthaninwardswithhighconcentrationsofracialandethnicminoritiesandlow‐
incomevoters.However,JacobsandMillerdonotprovideevidencetoindicatehowthe
disparitiesinvoterparticipationobservedin2013comparetopatternsinprevious
elections.IstheevidencefromMinneapolisin2013worsethanusual?Socioeconomic
biasesinvoterparticipationarehardyperennialsinAmericanelections(Leighleyand
Nagler2013;Schlozman,Brady,andVerba2012),particularlyinlocalelections(Hajnaland
Lewis2003;Oliver2012;Anzia2013).Thus,RCVelectionsneedtobecomparedto
similarlysituatedpluralityelections.Wetrytoprovideonesuchcomparisonbelowforthe
caseofMinneapolis.
[Figure5abouthere]
JacobsandMillerpresentevidenceshowingthatinthe2013Minneapoliselection
turnoutwasconsiderablyhigherinthethreewealthiestwards(11,12,and13)thaninthe
threeleastaffluentwards(2,3,and5).Theymeasureturnoutasapercentageofregistered
18
votersineachward.WeusethesamedatafromMinneapoliselectionstoreplicatethis
findingandgeneratethesameturnoutmeasuresfromthesamewardsinthe2005election
(thelastlocalelectioninMinneapolisusingpluralityvoting).Bothelectionsincluded
contestsformayorandcitycouncil.5Ouranalysisincludestherestofthecity’s13wards,
labeled“Middleincomewards.”Voterturnoutwasslightlyhigherin2013(29%)thanin
2005(26%).AsFigure5indicates,thesame14percentagepointgapinturnoutbetween
lowandhighincomewardsinthe2013RCVelectionwaspresentinthe2005plurality
election.6TheincomedisparityinvoterturnoutisnotuniquetoRCVelectionsin
Minneapolis,butasJacobsandMillernote,thatdisparitydidnotgetsmallerinthe2013
RCVelection.
JacobsandMilleralsoexaminemeasuresofvoterconfusion.Onesuchmeasureis
thefrequencyofspoiledballots(asapercentageoftotalballotscast).Thespoiledballot
rateisnotspecifictoaparticularcontestontheballotbutreflectstheoverallvoting
experience.Thegoodnewsaboutspoiledballotsisthattheypreservetherighttovote.Ifa
mistakeisrecognizedbyavoterorthevotingequipment,thevotercanreturntheballotin
exchangeforanewone.Theballotwiththemistakeis“spoiled”andisnotcounted.The
votercompletesanewballot,whichiscounted.Nevertheless,spoiledballotscandiagnose
voterdifficultyincompletingtheballot.Inthe2013election,JacobsandMillerobservea
higherrateofspoiledballotsinlowincomewardsthaninhighincomewards.Figure6
comparesthespoiledballotrateinhighandlowincomewardsinthe2005and2013
5ThisisnotanidenticalgeographiccomparisonsinceMinneapoliswardboundarieschangedsomewhatbetween2005and2013.Smallergeographicunits,suchasprecincts,arepreferableforinferencesabouttherelationshipbetweenincome,race,andvoterparticipation,butprecinctboundariesalsotendtochangewhenwardsareredrawn.6Thesamepattern,notshownhere,holdswhencomparingthewardswiththehighestshareofwhitevoterstowardswiththesmallestshareofwhitevoters.
19
Minneapoliselections.Thecitywidespoiledballotrateincreasedfrom1%in2005to4%in
2013,andtherateincreasedinbothlowincomeandhighincomewards.Moreover,as
Figure6shows,thegapinthespoiledballotratebetweenhighandlowincomewards
increasedonlyslightlyinthe2013RCVelection.
[Figure6abouthere]
Asomewhatsimilarpatternemergeswhenexaminingthemayoralcontests.The
residualvoterateishigherinlowincomewardsinbothyears,andthegapbetweenthe
twosetsofwardsincreasesslightlyfrom0.8percentagepointsinthepluralityelectionof
2005to1.7pointsintheRCVelectionof2013,astatisticallyinsignificantincrease.A
similarstudyofSanFranciscofoundthatresidualvotesdidnotincreaseaftertheadoption
ofRCV(NeelyandCook).In2013,theMinneapoliselectionsdepartmentbeganreporting
overvotesandundervotesforlocalelections.Theovervoterateinthemayoralcontestwas
low(0.2%ofballotscast),andtheratewasthesameatallincomelevels.Therefore,thegap
infirstchoiceresidualvotesbetweenlowandhighincomewardsin2013isduetoa
slightlyhigherundervoterateinlowincomewards.Voterscanrankuptothreecandidates
inRCVelectionsinMinneapolis.AsJacobsandMillernote,abitmorethan20%ofvoters
didnotrecordthreecandidatechoicesformayor.Whentabulatingundervotesacrossall
threechoicesformayorin2013theundervoterateissomewhathigherinlowincome
wards(24%)thanhighincomewards(21%).However,theundervoterateisevenhigher
20
(26%)inmiddleincomewards.7Overall,theundervoteandovervotedatadonotreveal
substantialincomedisparitiesinthe2013Minneapolismayoralelection.
Finally,itisworthexaminingcitycouncilelectionsinMinneapolis,whichalsoused
RCVinthe2013election.Councilseatsforall13citywardswereupforelectionin2005
and2013.Therefore,wecanmakeasimilarcomparisonbetweenapluralityelection
(2005)andanRCVelection(2013).RCVseemstohaveencouragedmorecandidatestorun
forcitycouncilinMinneapolis.Thenumberofcitycouncilcandidatesalmostdoubled,
increasingfrom25candidatesin2005to47in2013.In2005,nowardfeaturedacampaign
withmorethantwocitycouncilcandidates.In2013,tenofthethirteenwardsproduced
morethantwocandidatesrunningforacitycouncilseat.8
JacobsandMilleralsopresentevidenceshowingthatinthe2013Minneapolis
electionvoterparticipationinthemayoralcontestwashigherinthewardswiththehighest
shareofwhitevoters(10,11,12,and13)thaninwardswherethenon‐whiteshareofthe
populationisatleast50percent(4,5,6and9).Weusethesamedatatocomparethe
residualvoterateinthecitycouncilracesforthe2013RCVelectionandthe2005plurality
election.Weincludetherestofthecity’s13wards,labeled“Mixedwards.”Figure7
comparestheresidualvoterateinthe2005and2013Minneapoliscitycouncilelectionsby
racialcompositionofthewards.Thecitywideresidualvoterateforfirstchoicecitycouncil
votingincreasedfrom4%in2005to5.9%in2013,buttheincreasedisconfinedtoracially
mixedwards.Asthefigureshows,the2005pluralityelectionproducesthefamiliarpattern
7TheMinneapolisratesforovervotes,undervotes,andfailuretorankthreecandidatesaresubstantiallylowerthanthosereportedforRCVelectionsinSanFrancisco(NeelyandCook2008;NeelyandMcDaniel2015).8The2009election(thefirstinMinneapolisusingRCV)alsoproducedahighernumberofcitycouncilcandidates.
21
ofhigherresidualvoteratesinminoritywardsandlowerratesinwhitewards.However,
asFigure7shows,theresidualvoterateactuallydeclinedintheminoritywardsinthe
2013RCVelection.Thisisbecausetheminoritywardsfeaturedseveralcandidatesrunning
forcitycouncilseatsin2013.Theresidualvoterateincitycouncilcontestsissubstantially
lowerinwardswithmorecandidatesrunningforaseat.Furthermore,in2013overvote
andundervoteratesforcitycouncilcontestsappeartobeunrelatedtotheincomeorracial
compositionofMinneapoliswards.Overall,theMinneapolisevidenceindicatesthat
socioeconomicdisparitiesinvoterparticipationaresimilarinpluralityandRCVelections.
[Figure7abouthere]
Conclusion
SeveralAmericancitieshaveadoptedRCVrulesforlocalelections,andother
jurisdictionsmaybeconsideringRCVinthefuture.InassessingtheimpactofRCVvoting
rulesitisimportanttoevaluateRCValongsidethepluralitysystemsthatRCVreplaces.For
themostpart,wefindthatRCVelectionshaveminimaleffectsonratesofvoter
participation.Themainexceptioninvolvesthecomparisonwithprimaryandrunoff
electionsusingpluralityrules.Bycompressingthevotingandwinnowingofcandidates
intooneelectionscheduledinNovember,RCVelectionsincreasevoterparticipationwhen
comparedtopluralityprimaryandrunoffelectionsheldbeforeoraftertheNovember
generalelectiondate.Whencomparinggeneralelectionstogeneralelections,pluralityand
RCVelectionsgeneratesimilarturnoutrates.Wealsofindsimilarratesofresidualvotes,a
measureofvoterconfusion,inpluralityandRCVelections.
22
OurcasestudyofMinneapolisalsorevealscomparableratesofparticipationand
voterconfusioninpluralityandRCVelections.Themainexceptionisthatweobserve
higherratesofspoiledballotsintheRCVelectionthaninthepluralityelection.Wealso
observethatthesocioeconomicandracialdisparitiesinvoterparticipationaresimilarin
pluralityandRCVelectionsinMinneapolis.
Thesefindingsarebasedonarathersmallbutgrowingsampleofevidence.Some
cautionisrecommendedindrawingconclusionsfromthisevidenceabouttheimpactof
RCVonvoterparticipation.Nevertheless,theresearchdesigncanbeusedtocontinue
examiningtheeffectofRCVadoptiononvoters.AsmoreresultsfrompastelectionsinRCV
andcomparisoncitiesareincludedinthedata,andasmorecitiescontinuetoholdRCV
electionsinthefuture,theevidencewillgrowandsupportmoreconfidentconclusions
abouttheresponseofvoterstoRCVrulesintheUnitedStates.Itwillbeimportantto
continuetomonitormeasuresofvoterparticipationinRCVandpluralityelectionsinthe
UnitedStates.
23
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26
Table 1 Cities and Elections for Voter Participation Comparisons
RCV City
Matched Plurality Cities
Elections Before RCV
Elections After RCV
Minneapolis, MN Boston, MA; Cincinnati, OH; Tulsa, OK; Seattle, WA
2005 2009, 2013
St. Paul, MN Cedar Rapids, IA; Des Moines, IA; Madison, WI; Spokane, WA
2009 2013, 2015
Cambridge, MA Ann Arbor, MI; Lowell, MA; Stamford, CT; Worcester, MA
2009, 2013, 2015
Berkeley, CA Alameda, CA 2002, 2006 2010, 2014 Oakland, CA; San Leandro, CA
Anaheim, CA; Santa Ana, CA; Santa Clara, CA; Stockton, CA; Richmond, CA
2002, 2006 2010, 2014
San Francisco, CA San Jose, CA 2002 2006, 2010, 2014, 2015
Portland, ME Lewiston, ME; Dover, NH 2011, 2015
27
Table 2 Predictors of General Election Turnout in RCV and Plurality City Elections
Independent Variable
Coefficient (Std. Error)
RCV City 9.1* (3.2)
After RCV Adoption 0.9 (2.0)
RCV City * After Adoption -4.1 (3.8)
Even-Numbered Year 9.6* (2.1)
More than 3 Contests 8.9* (2.2)
Contested Mayoral Contest 5.5* (2.0)
Constant 16.7* (2.1)
N R2 Root MSE
96 .58 7.9
The dependent variable is voter turnout in city elections (ballots cast as a percentage of the citizen voting age population). Cell entries are ordinary least squares coefficients (standard errors in parentheses). *p < .1, two-tailed
28
Table 3 Predictors of Turnout in RCV Cities and Primary/Runoff Elections in Plurality Cities
Independent Variable
Coefficient (Std. Error)
RCV City 5.4 (3.4)
After RCV Adoption 1.9 (2.5)
RCV City * After Adoption 8.2* (3.8)
Even-Numbered Year 4.8* (2.4)
More than 3 Contests 8.8* (2.3)
Contested Mayoral Contest 6.4* (2.1)
Constant 6.8* (2.4)
N R2 Root MSE
64 .69 6.9
The dependent variable is voter turnout in city elections (ballots cast as a percentage of the citizen voting age population). Cell entries are ordinary least squares coefficients (standard errors in parentheses). *p < .1, two-tailed
29
Table 4 Predictors of Residual Votes in Top Contest in RCV and Plurality City Elections
Independent Variable
Coefficient (Std. Error)
RCV City -2.7 (1.8)
After RCV Adoption 0.2 (1.2)
RCV City * After Adoption -0.0 (2.2)
Even-Numbered Year 5.6* (1.2)
Contested Mayoral Contest -3.7* (1.2)
More than 3 Contests 1.1 (1.3)
Constant 5.0* (1.3)
N R2 Root MSE
93 .40 4.6
The dependent variable is the residual vote rate (as a percentage of the number of ballots cast). For RCV elections, the residual vote measure is based on the first choice votes. Cell entries are ordinary least squares coefficients (standard errors in parentheses). *p < .1, two-tailed
30
Table 5 Predictors of Voter Drop-off between First and Last Rounds in RCV Cities and
Primary/Runoff Elections in Plurality Cities
Independent Variable
Coefficient (Std. Error)
RCV City -10.6 (9.8)
After RCV Adoption -8.7 (7.4)
RCV City * After Adoption -24.4* (11.2)
Even-Numbered Year 4.5 (7.1)
More than 3 Contests -1.5 (6.8)
Contested Mayoral Contest -11.3* (6.2)
Constant 58.7* (6.9)
N R2 Root MSE
62 .48 19.9
The dependent variable is voter drop-off between the first and last round of voting in city elections (as a percentage of ballots cast). Cell entries are ordinary least squares coefficients (standard errors in parentheses). *p < .1, two-tailed
31
Figure 1 Mean Voter Turnout in RCV and Plurality City Elections:
General Elections
0
10
20
30
40
Me
an V
ote
r T
urno
ut (
Pe
rce
nt)
Before Adoption After Adoption
Plurality RCV Plurality RCV
32
Figure 2 Mean Voter Turnout in RCV and Plurality City Elections:
Primary/Runoff Elections
0
10
20
30
Me
an V
ote
r T
urno
ut (
Pe
rce
nt)
Before Adoption After Adoption
Plurality RCV Plurality RCV
33
Figure 3 Mean Residual Vote Rate in Top Contest in RCV and Plurality City Elections
0
2
4
6
8
Me
an R
esi
dual
Vot
e R
ate
(P
erce
nt)
Before Adoption After Adoption
Plurality RCV Plurality RCV
34
Figure 4 Mean Voter Drop-off Between First and Last Rounds in RCV and Plurality City Elections:
Primary/Runoff Elections
0
20
40
60
Me
an V
ote
r D
rop
-off
(P
erce
nt)
Before Adoption After Adoption
Plurality RCV Plurality RCV
35
Figure 5 Voter Turnout by Ward Income:
2005 and 2013 Minneapolis Elections
38.1
28.5
24
41.7
31.4
27.7
0
10
20
30
40
Vot
er
Tu
rnou
t (P
erc
ent
)
2005 2013
High income wards Middle income wardsLow income wards
Income Level
36
Figure 6 Ballot Spoilage by Ward Income:
2005 and 2013 Minneapolis Elections
.7
1.2
1.8
3.5
4.3
5.2
0
1
2
3
4
5
Spo
iled
Ba
llots
(P
erce
nt)
2005 2013
High income wards Middle income wardsLow income wards
Income Level
37
Figure 7 Residual Vote for City Council (1st Choice) by Ward Race:
2005 and 2013 Minneapolis Elections
3.43.9
5.5
3.9
9.4
3.8
0
2
4
6
8
10
Re
sidu
al V
ote
Ra
te (
Pe
rce
nt)
2005 2013
White wards Mixed wardsMinority wards
Racial Composition of Wards