Voter Participation with Ranked Choice Voting-Oct …kimballd/KimballRCV.pdfVoter Participation with...

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Voter Participation with Ranked Choice Voting in the United States David C. Kimball Joseph Anthony Department of Political Science University of Missouri‐St. Louis St. Louis, MO 63121 [email protected] October 2016 Abstract As more jurisdictions in the United States consider adopting ranked choice voting (RCV) it is important to evaluate RCV alongside the plurality voting systems it typically replaces. This study examines the degree to which voters turn out and properly cast their votes, comparing ranked choice voting (RCV) to plurality voting in the United States. We use a difference‐in‐differences design, matching cities using RCV with demographically similar cities using plurality voting on the same date. We find that RCV helps reduce the substantial drop in voter participation that commonly occurs between primary and runoff elections. Otherwise RCV does not appear to have a strong impact on voter turnout and ballot completion. In a case study of Minneapolis we find similar levels of socioeconomic and racial disparities in voter participation in plurality and RCV elections. The research reported here is supported by the Democracy Fund. The authors are solely responsible for the analysis and interpretation in this study.

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Page 1: Voter Participation with Ranked Choice Voting-Oct …kimballd/KimballRCV.pdfVoter Participation with Ranked Choice Voting in the United States David C. Kimball Joseph Anthony Department

VoterParticipationwithRankedChoiceVotingintheUnitedStates

DavidC.KimballJosephAnthony

DepartmentofPoliticalScienceUniversityofMissouri‐St.Louis

St.Louis,[email protected]

October2016

Abstract

AsmorejurisdictionsintheUnitedStatesconsideradoptingrankedchoicevoting(RCV)itisimportanttoevaluateRCValongsidethepluralityvotingsystemsittypicallyreplaces.Thisstudyexaminesthedegreetowhichvotersturnoutandproperlycasttheirvotes,comparingrankedchoicevoting(RCV)topluralityvotingintheUnitedStates.Weuseadifference‐in‐differencesdesign,matchingcitiesusingRCVwithdemographicallysimilarcitiesusingpluralityvotingonthesamedate.WefindthatRCVhelpsreducethesubstantialdropinvoterparticipationthatcommonlyoccursbetweenprimaryandrunoffelections.OtherwiseRCVdoesnotappeartohaveastrongimpactonvoterturnoutandballotcompletion.InacasestudyofMinneapoliswefindsimilarlevelsofsocioeconomicandracialdisparitiesinvoterparticipationinpluralityandRCVelections.

TheresearchreportedhereissupportedbytheDemocracyFund.Theauthorsaresolelyresponsiblefortheanalysisandinterpretationinthisstudy.

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Thisstudyexaminesthedegreetowhichvotersturnoutandparticipateinlocal

elections,comparingrankedchoicevoting(RCV)topluralityvotingintheUnitedStates.An

increasingnumberofAmericanlocaljurisdictionsareadoptingpreferentialvotingsystems,

andRCVisthemostcommonofthesubstitutesforsingleseatelectionsintheUnitedStates.

RCVhasnowbeenadoptedbyatleasttencitiesintheUnitedStates,primarilyformayoral

orcitycouncilelections.Byallowingvoterstorankcandidatesforthesameoffice,RCV

contrastswiththedominantpluralityvotingmethodusedtoelectgovernmentofficialsin

theUnitedStates.

AsmoreAmericanjurisdictionsconsideradoptingRCVtherearemanyclaimsabout

themeritsanddemeritsofRCV.Todate,mostofthepublishedworksonRCVarecase

studiesthatexamineitsperformanceinasmallnumberoflocations.Indecidingwhether

RCVshouldreplacepluralityvotingitisimportanttoevaluateRCValongsidetheplurality

systemittypicallyreplacesintheUnitedStates.Ourstudydoesthatbycomparingvoter

participationinRCVandpluralityelectionsinAmericancities.Usingadifference‐in‐

differencesdesignwecompareamatchedsampleofcitiesusingRCVandpluralityvoting

rulesbeforeandaftertheadoptionofRCV.WefindthatRCVreducesthesubstantialdrop

invoterparticipationinlocalprimaryandrunoffelections.Beyondthat,however,RCV

doesnotappeartohaveastrongimpactonvoterturnoutandballotcompletionin

municipalelections.InacasestudyofMinneapoliselectionsbeforeandaftertheadoption

ofRCVwefindsimilarlevelsofsocioeconomicandracialdisparitiesinvoterparticipation

inpluralityandRCVelections.

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VoterParticipationwithRankedChoiceVoting

ThevastmajorityofAmericanelectionsareconductedundersomeversionof

plurality,orwinner‐take‐all,rules.Inelectionsforasingleoffice,likemayororacity

councilseat,voterscanexpressapreferenceforjustasinglecandidate,andthatvoteisnot

transferabletoothercandidates.However,overthepasttenyearsseveralAmericancities

haveadoptedrankedchoicevotingforsingleofficeelections.Incontrasttopluralityrules,

RCVasksvoterstorankcandidatesinorderofpreference,enablingvoterstoexpress

preferencesformultiplecandidatesinthesamecontest.UnderRCV,votescanbe

transferredtoothercandidates,forexample,ifavoter’sfirstchoiceiseliminatedfrom

contention.1

TherearecompetingargumentsabouthowRCVmightinfluencevoterparticipation.

Underthetraditionalcalculusofvoting,thedecisiontovoteisinfluencedbythecostsand

benefitsassociatedwithvoting,aswellastheprobabilitythatone’svotewilldeterminethe

outcome(Downs1957:chapter14).Thebenefitsrefertothepolicyorrepresentational

benefitsassociatedwithapreferredcandidatewinningtheelection.Thecostsofvoting

includetheeffortneededtobecomeinformedaboutthevotingrulesandthecontestson

theballot,aswellastheeffortneededtoovercomeadministrativeandotherbarriersto

registeringandcastingaballot.

                                                            1InmostAmericancitieswithRCVrulesvotersindicateapreferenceforuptothreecandidates.Asmallnumberofcitiesallowvoterstorankalargernumberofcandidates.Withoneexception,AmericancitiesusingRCVtransfervotesusingthealternativevotemethod.Thatis,whenavoter’smostpreferredcandidateiseliminatedthenthevoter’ssecondchoicevoteisreallocatedtooneoftheremainingcandidates.TheexceptionisCambridge,Massachusetts,whichusesasingletransferrablevotesystem.

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Ontheonehand,somearguethatRVCwillreinvigoratelocalelectionsbyfostering

moredeliberativecampaigns.RCVistheorizedtoalterthedynamicsofcampaignsand

electionsby:(1)encouragingcollaborationandcivilityamongcompetingcandidates;(2)

allowingvoterstoprovideamorecompletereportoftheircandidatepreferencesonthe

ballot;(3)reducingvoterconcernsabout“wastedvotes”forweakercandidates;and(4)by

providingincentivesformorecandidatestorunforoffice(Horowitz1985;Reilly2001;

Donovan,Tolbert,andGracey2016).Reducingoreliminatingwastedvoteconcernsmay

reducesomeoftheperceivedcostsassociatedwithvoting.IfRCVindeedattractsmore

candidatesthentheadditionalcampaignsmaymobilizemorevoterstoovercomethe

typicalcostsassociatedwithvoting.SomearguethatRCVencouragesmorecooperation

andbargainingamongrivalpoliticalelitesthanthezero‐sumcontextofpluralityelections

(Horowitz1985,1991;Reilly1997;2001).Thus,forexample,RCVmayhelpbridgeracial

andethnicdivisions(Guinier1994;Reilly1997,2002).Ifsomevotershavebeen

discouragedfromparticipatinginthenegativecampaignscommontopluralityelections,

thenRCVmayincreasevoterparticipation.

SomepreviousresearchoffersreasonstobeoptimisticabouttheimpactofRCVon

voterparticipation.Across‐nationalstudyfindsthatvotersincountrieswithahigher

degreeofpreferentialvotingreportmoresatisfactionwiththefairnessofelection

outcomes(FarrellandMcAlister2006).ArecentstudyofRCVintheUnitedStatesfinds

thatvotersincitiesusingRCVreportlessnegativecampaigningandmoresatisfactionwith

thelocalelectionthanvotersincitiesusingpluralityvoting(Donovan,Tolbert,andGracey

2016).CandidatesalsonoteamorepositivecampaignexperienceinRCVcities(Donovan

2014).Whilethereisnoclearevidencethatnegativecampaigningdepressesturnout(Lau,

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Sigelman,andRovner207),votersmaybemorewillingtoparticipateinelectionswhen

theyaremoresatisfiedwiththeelectoralsystem.

Furthermore,inastudyoflocaljurisdictionsintheUnitedStates,Bowlerand

colleagues(2003)findthatcumulativevotinggeneratesmorevigorousvoteroutreach

efforts,andthusboostsvoterturnoutinlocalelections.Whilecumulativevotingprovides

candidatesandcampaignsadifferentmixofincentivesforvotermobilizationthanRCV,

bothsystemsarevariantsofpreferentialvotingandthusonemightexpectRCVtoproduce

similarvoterturnoutimprovements.Finally,exitpollsinAmericancommunitiesusingRCV

tendtorevealhighlevelsofunderstandingandsatisfactionwiththevotingsystem(e.g.,

Neelyetal.2005;2006;Mauter2014).

Ontheotherhand,somearguethatthetaskofrankingcandidatesinRCVelections

maybeconfusingforvoters,particularlyforAmericanvoterswhohavebeensocializedin

pluralityvoting.Newvotingruleswillimposecostsonvoterstounderstandandproperly

followthenewrules.Downs(1957)theorizesthatvotingcostsdisproportionately

disenfranchiselow‐incomevotersandotherslackinginresources.Thereisevidencein

Americanelectionsthatconfusingvotingequipmentorballotdesignsproducemorevoting

errors,andtheimpactofpoordesignfallsdisproportionatelyonlowincomeandminority

voters(Herrnsonetal.2008;KropfandKimball2012).Otherrecentelectionreformsinthe

UnitedStates,suchasexpandedearlyvoting,mayhaveworsenedsocioeconomicbiasesin

turnout(Berinsky2005).Somecriticssimilarlyarguethatthenovelandcomplexnatureof

RCV,includingthewayballotsarecounted,mayexacerbatesocioeconomicdisparitiesin

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voterparticipation(JacobsandMiller2013,2014).Ifvotershavedifficultyunderstanding

howRCVworks,theymaybediscouragedfromparticipatinginRCVelections.

ThereissomeevidencethatvoterparticipationinRCVelectionsmaynotbeashigh

asexpected.Onestudyfindsafairamountof“ballotexhaustion”inCaliforniaelections

usingRCV(BurnettandKogan2015).Thatis,ifsomevotersdonotmarkthefullarrayof

rankedpreferencesaffordedbytheballotoriftheyonlypreferrelativelyweakcandidates,

thentheirvotesmaynotfactorintothefinaldeterminationofthewinner.Intheelections

theyanalyze,thewinningcandidatetypicallydidnotreceiveamajorityofallballotscastin

theelection.McDaniel(2016)estimatesthatturnoutamongsomeracialgroupsinSan

FranciscodeclinedaftertheadoptionofRCV.Inaddition,ageandeducation‐related

turnoutdisparitiesaremorepronouncedinSanFranciscoaftertheadoptionofRCV

(McDaniel2016).Similarly,overvotesaremorecommoninminorityprecinctsinRCV

electionsinSanFrancisco(NeelyandMcDaniel2015).

Againstthesecompetinghypotheses,therearereasonstoexpectminimaleffectsof

RCVonvotingparticipation.Turnoutinlocalelectionstendstobeinfluencedbyfeatures

thatbearheavilyonthecost/benefitcalculusofvoting,suchastheelectionschedule,the

levelofcompetitioninlocalcampaigns,mobilizationefforts,andothercharacteristicsof

thelocalpoliticalcontext(Anzia2013;Oliver2012;Hajnal2010;GreenandGerber2015).

Incontrast,manyelectionreformsdonotfundamentallyalterthecostsandbenefitsof

voting.Priorreformstoutedasturnoutboosters,suchasthemotorvoterlaw(Hanmer

2012),theHelpAmericaVoteAct(KropfandKimball2012),votingbymail(Kousserand

Mullin2007),earlyvoting(Burdenetal.2014),andtermlimits(BowlerandDonovan

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2012)havehaddonelittletoincreasevoterparticipationintheUnitedStates(alsosee

Cain,Donovan,andTolbert2008).Berinsky(2005)classifieselectionreformsintotwo

groups:(1)thosethatstimulatenewvoters,and(2)thosethatretainexistingvoters.By

merelyallowingvoterstoindicateapreferenceformorethanonecandidateRCVmaynot

alterthebasiccalculusofvotingandthusmaynotstimulatemanynewvoters.

Ultimately,theimpactofRCVonvoterparticipationisaresearchablequestion.

However,muchoftheexistingresearchexaminesRCVelectionsinisolatedcasestudies.To

assesstherelativeadvantagesanddisadvantagesofnewvotingrules,itisimportantto

comparetheperformanceofthenewsystemtotheoldsystemitisreplacing.Thenext

sectiondescribesthedataandresearchdesignweusetoexaminetheparticipation

questionforRCVintheUnitedStates.

DataandMethods

InassessingtheimpactofRCVonvoterparticipationthisstudyusesaresearch

designsimilartothatemployedbyBowler,Donovan,andBrockington(2003)intheirstudy

ofcumulativevoting.Thebasicapproachistocomparea“treatment”groupofcitiesthat

haveadoptedRCVtoa“control”groupofcitiesusingpluralityvoting.Thecomparison

citiesinthecontrolgrouparesimilartotheRCVcitiesintermsofpopulation,region,

income,poverty,anddemographicdiversity.WecompareasimilarsetofRCVandmatched

pluralitycitiesasDonovanetal.(2016,Table1)andKropf(2015,Table1).

Inaddition,weusea“difference‐in‐differences”(DID)designtocomparetheRCV

andpluralitycities.Thisinvolvesgatheringdataonvoterparticipationinbothsetsofcities

fromelectionsheldbeforeandafterRCVwasadopted.Thereasonforthisapproachisthat

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thecitiesthathaveadoptedRCVtendtohaveastrongreputationforprogressivepolitics.

Assuch,theRCVcitiesmayhavecivicculturesandpriorpoliciesthatreducebarriersto

votingandpromotewidespreadvoterparticipation.Thus,itispossiblethatdifferentrates

ofparticipationexistedinthematchedRCVandpluralitycitiesevenbeforeadoptionof

RCV.TheDIDdesignassessestheimpactofRCVbymeasuringhowmuchthedifferencein

participationratesbetweenthetwogroupsofcitieschangesaftertheadoptionofRCV.In

ordinaryleastsquaresregressionanalysis,thetreatmenteffectisestimatedbyan

interactionbetweenatreatmentvariable(indicatingwhetheracityisinthetreatmentor

controlgroup)andatimevariable(indicatingwhetherthetimeperiodisbeforeorafter

adoptionofRCV).ForasummaryofthestatisticaltreatmentofDIDmethods,see

Wooldridge(2013,chapter13)orBailey(2016,chapter8).

Forbothsetsofcities,weexaminetherecentelectionsthroughthe2015cycleas

wellasthelastelectionortwopriortotheadoptionofRCV.Weleaveoutthecitiesthat

heldRCVelectionsin2012andotheryearsthatcoincidewithapresidentialcontest.Voter

participationinpresidentialyearsisstronglyshapedbythepresidentialcampaignandis

muchhigherthanturnoutinlocalelectionsinotheryears.Thus,wedonotexpectRCVto

haveasmuchofanimpactonturnoutinthoseelections.Furthermore,sinceCambridge,

MassachusettsadoptedRCVinthe1940s,wehavenotincludedvoterparticipationdatafor

CambridgeanditsmatchingpluralitycitiesbeforetheadoptionofRCV.Westillexamine

bothsetsofcitiesforthe2009,2013,and2015elections.Similarly,Portland,Maine

adoptedRCVin2011atthesametimethatitresumedelectingamayor.Priorto2011,

Portlandhadnotelectedamayorsincethe1920s.Therefore,wedonotincludedatafor

Portlandanditsmatchingcitiespriorto2011.Westillexaminebothsetsofcitiesforthe

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2011and2015elections.Table1liststhecitiesandelectionsthatarepartofthisstudy.

Oursampleincludesatotalof96elections,including19electionsusingRCV.

[Table1abouthere]

WegathereddatafromeachcityandelectionlistedinTable1tocreateseveral

measuresofvoterparticipation.Voterturnoutisacommoncommunity‐widemeasureof

participation.Wemeasurevoterturnoutasthepercentageofeligiblevoterswhocasta

ballotintheelection.Wecollectdataonthenumberofballotscastfromcityandcounty

electionoffices.Wemeasurethenumberofeligiblevotersineachcitybasedonestimates

ofthecitizenvotingagepopulation(CVAP)reportedintheCensusBureau’sAmerican

CommunitySurvey(ACS).TheACSreleasesfive‐yearaveragepopulationestimatesfor

Americanmunicipalities.Weusethemostrecentlyreleasedestimateforthecitizenvoting

agepopulationin2013,2014and2015.Forearlieryearsweusethefive‐yearaverage

centeredontheyeartheelectionwasheld.

Weexamineturnoutinlocalprimary,general,andrunoffelections.Incitieswitha

pluralitysystemtherearetypicallytwoelectionsheldtochooselocalofficials:(1)a

primaryelectionanda(2)runoffelection.Thetopcandidateswhoreceivethemostvotes

intheprimaryelection(usuallythetoptwo)advancetotherunoffelection.Thewinnerof

therunoffelectionthenwinstheoffice.Insomecases,ifacandidatewinsatleast50

percentofthevoteintheprimary,thenshewinstheseatwithouttheneedforarunoff

election.Also,insomecitiestheprimaryoccursinthespringorsummerandtherunoff

takesplaceonthegeneralelectiondateinearlyNovember.Inothercitiestheprimary

occursinNovemberandtherunoffelectiontakesplaceamonthorsolater.Turnouttends

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tobehigherintheNovembergeneralelectionthaninsummerprimariesorwinterrunoff

electionsbecausetheNovemberelectionoftensharestheballotwithotherstatewideor

federalconteststhattendtoattractmorevoters.

InRCVsystems,wherevotersrankcandidatesinorderofpreference,justone

electionisheldtoselectgovernmentofficials.RCVisthusdesignedtocombinetheprimary

(firstchoiceselections)andrunoff(re‐allocationofvotesforlosingcandidatestothe

voter’ssecondorthirdchoice)inoneelection,whichiswhyRCVissometimescalled

“instantrunoffvoting.”TheRCVelectionsinoursamplealltakeplaceinNovember.Asa

result,wemakeseparatecomparisonsofturnoutinRCVelectionstoturnoutingeneral

electionsaswellasinprimaryorrunoffelectionsinpluralitycities.Similarly,wecompare

thedropinvoterparticipationfromthefirstroundtothelastroundofvotetabulationin

RCVcitiestothedropinvotesbetweenthefirstround(primaryelection)andthelast

round(runoffelection)inpluralitycities.2Inoursample,45ofthe77cityelectionswith

pluralityrulesheldaseparateprimaryorrunoffinadditiontotheNovembergeneral

election.

Toassesspotentialconfusionamongvoterswemeasuretheresidualvoterate

(AnsolabehereandStewart2005)inthetoplocalcontestontheballot(usuallyamayoral

race).Theresidualvoterateisthedifferencebetweenthetotalballotscastandthenumber

ofvalidvotesrecordedforthecontestinquestion(asapercentageoftotalballotscast).

Residualvotescanoccurbytwomechanisms:(1)overvotes(whenavoterselectstoomany

candidatesinacolumn),or(2)undervotes(whenavotermakesnoselectioninacolumn).

                                                            2ThankstoRobertMontjoyforaconversationaboutthiscomparison.

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Overvotesarealmostalwaysanindicationofvotererror,whileundervotesmaybedue

votererrorortheymaybeintendedbyavoterwhowantstoskipaparticularconteston

theballot.Theresidualvoteratemeasureisnotperfectsinceitcombinesboth

mechanisms.Unfortunately,mostjurisdictions,includingmostcitiesinthisstudy,donot

reportovervotesandundervotesseparately.Nevertheless,previousstudiesindicatethat

theresidualvoterateisavalidmeasureofpoorlydesignedballotsandvotingequipment

(AnsolabehereandStewart2005;seeKropfandKimball2012forareview).Inpresidential

elections,aresidualvoteratesubstantiallyabove1%isusuallyasignofsometypeof

problemwiththeballotorvotingmachinery(KnackandKropf2003).

ThereisanadditionaldecisioninhowtoapplytheresidualvotemeasuretoRCV

elections.Inpluralityelections,wherethevoterhasjustonevote,theresidualvote

calculationisstraightforward.InRCVelections,wherethevoterhasmultiplechoices(and

hencemultiplevotes),thereareseveralpossiblewaystocomputethemeasure.Shouldit

bebasedonallofthevotesavailabletothevoter?Itappearsthatthevastmajorityof

votersinRCVsystemsrecordafirstorsecondchoice,butmanymaypurposefullyabstain

fromathirdorfourthchoice.Itmaynotmakesensetointerpretthoseabstentionsasasign

ofvoterconfusion.Toallowforascloseacomparisonaspossibletopluralityelections,we

computetheresidualvoterateinRCVelectionsjustbasedonthefirstchoicevotes.Ina

casestudyofvotinginMinneapolis,weusesomeadditionalmeasuresofvoterconfusion

andballotcompletionthatwedescribebelow.

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TurnoutResults

Asimpleversionofthedifference‐in‐differencemethodcanbeillustratedwitha

graph.Startingwiththebroadermeasureofparticipation,Figure1plotsthemeanturnout

rateforNovemberelectionsinRCVandpluralitycitiesbeforeandaftertheadoptionof

RCV.IntheelectionspriortoRCVadoption,turnoutintheRCVcities(40.1%)isalmost

elevenpointshigherthanmeanturnoutinthepluralitycities(29.3%).Thissupportsour

suspicionthatthecitiesadoptingRCValreadyhadhigherturnoutratesbeforeadoption.In

electionsaftertheadoptionofRCV,thedifferenceinmeanvoterturnoutinRCVcities

(34.1%)andpluralitycities(28.4%)isroughly6points.Asthegraphindicates,the

differenceinturnoutbetweenthetwogroupsissmalleraftertheadoptionofRCV,

suggestingthatRCVreducesgeneralelectionturnout.

[Figure1abouthere]

AmorerigorousimplementationoftheDIDmethodusesregressionanalysisto

controlforotherfactorsthatinfluencevoterturnout.Weincludecontrolsforthetimingof

theelection,thenumberofcontestsontheballot,andthelevelofcompetitioninthe

mayoralcampaign.Thebasichypothesisisthatturnoutishigherwhentherearemore

contestsontheballotandwhenthecampaignsaremorecompetitive.Electionsineven‐

numberedyearsareexpectedtoproducehigherturnoutbecauseotherstateandfederal

contestsareontheballotineven‐numberedyears.Thecompetitivenatureofthecontest

formayorismeasuredwithadummyvariableindicatingwhetherthemayoralelectionis

anopenseatcontestortheoutcomeiscloserthana60‐40marginofvictoryforthewinner.

[Table2abouthere]

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Themodelresultsforturnoutingeneral(November)electionsarereportedinTable

2.Theestimatesindicatethataveragevoterturnoutwasroughly9percentagepoints

higherinRCVcitiesthanincontrolcitiesbeforetheadoptionofRCV.Thetestoftheimpact

ofRCVisthecoefficientfortheinteractionterm(RCVCity*AfterAdoption).Inthiscase,

thecoefficientisnegativebutbarelylargerinmagnitudethanitsstandarderror,suggesting

thatRCVisnotassociatedwithastatisticallysignificantchangeinvoterturnoutin

Novemberelections.Theothermodelestimatesindicatethatturnoutis,onaverage,almost

9pointshigherwhentherearemorethanthreecontestsontheballot.Inthissample,the

additionalcontestsareoftenstatewideracesorballotmeasureswhichareboundto

includemoreintensivevotermobilizationcampaigns.Furthermore,turnoutisalmost10

pointshigherineven‐numberedyears,andacompetitivemayoralcontestbooststurnout

byroughly5points,onaverage.

ForthesecondparticipationanalysiswecompareRCVturnouttoprimaryorrunoff

electionturnoutinpluralitycities.Weexclude22pluralityelectionswhereaprimaryor

runoffelectionwasnotheld,leavingasampleof64elections.Figure2plotsthemean

turnoutrateforprimaryorrunoffelectionsinRCVandpluralitycitiesbeforeandafterthe

adoptionofRCV.ThefigureagainshowsthatprimaryorrunoffturnoutwashigherinRCV

citiesthaninpluralitycities.IntheelectionspriortoRCVadoption,turnoutintheRCV

cities(22.3%)isapproximately7pointshigherthanmeanturnoutinthepluralitycities

(14.8%).InelectionsaftertheadoptionofRCV,thedifferenceinmeanvoterturnoutinRCV

cities(31.7%)andpluralitycities(16.9%)is14.6points.Thedifferenceinturnoutbetween

twosetsofcitiesislargeraftertheadoptionofRCV,suggestingthatRCVincreasesturnout

whencomparedtopluralityrunofforprimaryelections.

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[Figure2abouthere]

TheregressionestimatescomparingturnoutinRCVcitiestoprimaryorrunoff

turnoutinpluralityelectionsarereportedinTable3.AsinFigure2,theestimatesindicate

thataveragevoterturnoutwasroughly5percentagepointshigherinRCVcitiesthanin

controlcitiesbeforetheadoptionofRCV.Inthiscasethecoefficientfortheinteraction

termispositiveandstatisticallysignificant.ThissuggeststhattheadoptionofRCVis

associatedwithan8percentagepointincreaseinturnoutoverwhatwasobservedin

primaryorrunoffpluralityelections.Theothermodelestimatesindicatethatturnoutis

alsohigherineven‐numberedyears,whentherearemorethanthreecontestsontheballot,

andwhenthereisacompetitivemayoralcontest.

Theseresultsareconsistentwithotherstudieswhichconcludethatthescheduling

oflocalelectionshasamajorimpactonvoterturnoutandpoliticalrepresentation(Hajnal

2010;Anzia2013).LocalelectionsheldinNovember(particularlyineven‐numberedyears

tocoincidewithstatewideandfederalcontests)generatehighervoterturnoutthanlocal

electionsscheduledduringoff‐cycleperiods(e.g.,outsideofNovember).Thus,theturnout

effectofRCVreportedinFigure2andTable3maybeduetotheelectionschedulerather

thantheRCVvotingrules,perse.

[Table3abouthere]

ResidualVoteResults

Turningtoameasureofvoterconfusion,Figure3plotsthemeanresidualvoterate

inRCVandpluralitycitiesforthetoplocalcontestontheballotbeforeandafterthe

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adoptionofRCV.3InelectionspriortoRCVadoption,theresidualvoterateintheRCVcities

(7.5%)isslightlylowerthanthemeanresidualvoterateinthepluralitycities(8.0%).In

electionsaftertheadoptionofRCV,thedifferenceinthemeanresidualvoterateinRCV

cities(4.8%)andpluralitycities(6.9%)isabout2points.Thus,itappearsthatresidual

votesdeclinedaftertheadoptionofRCV.

[Figure3abouthere]

TheregressionresultsinTable4indicatethatthechangeinthedifferencebetween

groupmeansisnotstatisticallysignificant.Thus,theadoptionofRCVdoesnotappeartobe

associatedwithanoticeablechangeintheresidualvoterateforthetopcontestonthe

ballotintheselocalelections.Meanwhile,acompetitivemayoralcontestdoesappearto

reducetheresidualvoteratebyroughly3.7percentagepoints,onaverage.Residualvote

ratesalsotendtobehigherinlocalelectionsheldineven‐numberedyears,whenstateand

federalcontestslikelydrawattentionawayfromthelocalelection.

[Table4abouthere]

VoteDrop‐off

Ourfinalcomparisonexaminesthedrop‐offinvotesbetweenthefirstandlast

roundsofvotesineachsystem.Inelectionswithmultipleroundsofvotingortabulatinga

fundamentalquestioninvolveshowmanyvotesstillcountwhencandidatesareeliminated

ateachstage.Somehavehighlightedhighratesof“ballotexhaustion”asashortcomingof                                                            3Therearethreeelectionsinoursampleexcludedfromthisanalysis.TwoelectionsfromLowell,Massachusettsaredroppedbecausetherewerenomayoralcontestsineitherelection,andthecityusesanat‐largesystemforelectingthecitycouncil.At‐largeelectionsdonotproduceacomparableresidualvotemeasure.WealsoexcludetheTulsaelectionof2005becausetherewasnomayoralraceinthatelection.

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RCVvotingrules.Thus,thevotesforthewinningcandidateinthefinalroundoftabulation

foranRCVelectionmaynotcompriseamajorityofallballotscastintheelection(Burnett

andKogan2015).However,asimilarcritiqueappliestothemorefamiliarprimaryelection

withpluralityrulesandlaterrunoffelectionforthetopprimaryfinishers.Intheelections

usingthefamiliarpluralityrulesthenumberofvotescastintheprimaryorrunoffelections

tendtobesubstantiallysmallerthanthevotescastinthegeneralelection.Acommonclaim

ofRCVproponentsisthatreplacingtwoelections(primaryandrunoff)withoneRCV

electionyieldsgreatercontinuityinvoterparticipationbetweenthefirstandlastroundsof

voting.DoesballotexhaustioninRCVelectionsunderminethisclaim?

ForRCVelections,wecomputevoterdrop‐offasthedifferencebetweenthetotal

ballotscastintheelectionandthenumberofvalidvotescountedinthefinalroundofRCV

tabulation(aspercentageoftotalballotscast).Thus,thevotesthatdropoffinRCV

electionsincludeblankballots,overvotes,andexhaustedballots.Forpluralityelections,we

computevoterdrop‐offasthedifferencebetweenthetotalballotscastinthegeneral

electionandthevalidvotesforthetoplocalcontestintheprimaryorrunoff(againasa

percentageoftotalballotscast).Thus,thedrop‐offincludespeoplewhovoteinthegeneral

electionbutnotintheprimaryorrunoffelection.Weexclude22pluralityelectionswherea

primaryorrunoffelectionwasnotheld.Weexcludetwoadditionalpluralityelections

whereaprimaryorrunoffwasonlyheldforonecouncildistrict,ratherthanfortheentire

city.4Thisleavesasampleof62elections.Figure4plotsthemeanvotedrop‐offinRCVand

pluralitycitiesbeforeandaftertheadoptionofRCV.Asthefigureshows,thedropinvoting

participationbetweenprimaryandrunoffelectionsisverysubstantialincitiesusing

                                                            4TheseelectionsoccurredinDesMoines(2013)andWorcester(2013).

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pluralityrules.Onaverage,thedrop‐offisequivalenttoroughlyhalfofthevotersinthe

generalelection.IntheelectionspriortoRCVadoption,drop‐offintheRCVcities(50.3%)

isonly3pointslowerthanmeandrop‐offinthepluralitycities(56.8%).Inelectionsheld

aftertheadoptionofRCV,thedifferenceinmeanvoterdrop‐offinRCVcities(13.1%)and

pluralitycities(45.8%)is32.7points.Thedifferenceinvotedrop‐offbetweenthetwosets

ofcitiesismuchlargeraftertheadoptionofRCV,suggestingthatRCVsubstantiallyreduces

thedropinvotesbetweenthefirstandlastrounds.

[Figure4abouthere]

Theregressionestimatescomparingvotedrop‐offinRCVcitiestopluralitycitiesare

reportedinTable5.AsinFigure4,theestimatesindicatethataveragevotedrop‐offwas

roughlythesameinRCVandpluralitycitiesbeforetheadoptionofRCV.Inthiscasethe

coefficientfortheinteractiontermisnegativeandstatisticallysignificant.Thissuggests

thattheadoptionofRCVisassociatedwitharoughly24percentagepointreductionin

voterdrop‐offcomparedtowhatisobservedinpluralityelections.Theothermodel

estimatesindicatethatacompetitivemayoralcontestalsoreducesvotedrop‐off,by

roughly11points.Thus,theevidenceonvotedrop‐offsupportsaparticularclaimmadeby

RCVproponentsaboutcontinuityinvoterparticipation.Again,thisseemstobean

advantageofholdingoneNovemberelectioninplaceoftwoelectionsheldonseparate

dates.Overall,withtheexceptionofimprovedturnoutcomparedtopluralityprimaryand

runoffelections,voterparticipationseemstobeinfluencedmorebythestimulusofa

competitivelocalorstatewidecampaignratherthanbytheadoptionofRCVrules.

[Table5abouthere]

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ResultsfromMinneapolis:SocioeconomicBiasinVoterParticipation

Whiletheevidencethusfarindicatesanimprovementinoverallratesofvoter

participationduetotheadoptionofRCV,somehaveexpressedconcernsthatRCVfailsto

amelioratesocioeconomicbiasesinparticipation(JacobsandMiller2013,2014;Neelyand

McDaniel2015;McDaniel2016).ForAmericanvoterswhohavegrownaccustomedto

pluralityvoting,properlycastinganRCVballotmaytakesomelearningandskill,which

mayconferaparticipatoryadvantageonvoterswithmoreresources(i.e.,wealth,

education,andcivicskills).Inarecentpaper,JacobsandMiller(2014)reportonthe2013

Minneapoliselection,notinghigherratesofvoterparticipationinwhiteandhigh‐income

wardsthaninwardswithhighconcentrationsofracialandethnicminoritiesandlow‐

incomevoters.However,JacobsandMillerdonotprovideevidencetoindicatehowthe

disparitiesinvoterparticipationobservedin2013comparetopatternsinprevious

elections.IstheevidencefromMinneapolisin2013worsethanusual?Socioeconomic

biasesinvoterparticipationarehardyperennialsinAmericanelections(Leighleyand

Nagler2013;Schlozman,Brady,andVerba2012),particularlyinlocalelections(Hajnaland

Lewis2003;Oliver2012;Anzia2013).Thus,RCVelectionsneedtobecomparedto

similarlysituatedpluralityelections.Wetrytoprovideonesuchcomparisonbelowforthe

caseofMinneapolis.

[Figure5abouthere]

JacobsandMillerpresentevidenceshowingthatinthe2013Minneapoliselection

turnoutwasconsiderablyhigherinthethreewealthiestwards(11,12,and13)thaninthe

threeleastaffluentwards(2,3,and5).Theymeasureturnoutasapercentageofregistered

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votersineachward.WeusethesamedatafromMinneapoliselectionstoreplicatethis

findingandgeneratethesameturnoutmeasuresfromthesamewardsinthe2005election

(thelastlocalelectioninMinneapolisusingpluralityvoting).Bothelectionsincluded

contestsformayorandcitycouncil.5Ouranalysisincludestherestofthecity’s13wards,

labeled“Middleincomewards.”Voterturnoutwasslightlyhigherin2013(29%)thanin

2005(26%).AsFigure5indicates,thesame14percentagepointgapinturnoutbetween

lowandhighincomewardsinthe2013RCVelectionwaspresentinthe2005plurality

election.6TheincomedisparityinvoterturnoutisnotuniquetoRCVelectionsin

Minneapolis,butasJacobsandMillernote,thatdisparitydidnotgetsmallerinthe2013

RCVelection.

JacobsandMilleralsoexaminemeasuresofvoterconfusion.Onesuchmeasureis

thefrequencyofspoiledballots(asapercentageoftotalballotscast).Thespoiledballot

rateisnotspecifictoaparticularcontestontheballotbutreflectstheoverallvoting

experience.Thegoodnewsaboutspoiledballotsisthattheypreservetherighttovote.Ifa

mistakeisrecognizedbyavoterorthevotingequipment,thevotercanreturntheballotin

exchangeforanewone.Theballotwiththemistakeis“spoiled”andisnotcounted.The

votercompletesanewballot,whichiscounted.Nevertheless,spoiledballotscandiagnose

voterdifficultyincompletingtheballot.Inthe2013election,JacobsandMillerobservea

higherrateofspoiledballotsinlowincomewardsthaninhighincomewards.Figure6

comparesthespoiledballotrateinhighandlowincomewardsinthe2005and2013

                                                            5ThisisnotanidenticalgeographiccomparisonsinceMinneapoliswardboundarieschangedsomewhatbetween2005and2013.Smallergeographicunits,suchasprecincts,arepreferableforinferencesabouttherelationshipbetweenincome,race,andvoterparticipation,butprecinctboundariesalsotendtochangewhenwardsareredrawn.6Thesamepattern,notshownhere,holdswhencomparingthewardswiththehighestshareofwhitevoterstowardswiththesmallestshareofwhitevoters.

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Minneapoliselections.Thecitywidespoiledballotrateincreasedfrom1%in2005to4%in

2013,andtherateincreasedinbothlowincomeandhighincomewards.Moreover,as

Figure6shows,thegapinthespoiledballotratebetweenhighandlowincomewards

increasedonlyslightlyinthe2013RCVelection.

[Figure6abouthere]

Asomewhatsimilarpatternemergeswhenexaminingthemayoralcontests.The

residualvoterateishigherinlowincomewardsinbothyears,andthegapbetweenthe

twosetsofwardsincreasesslightlyfrom0.8percentagepointsinthepluralityelectionof

2005to1.7pointsintheRCVelectionof2013,astatisticallyinsignificantincrease.A

similarstudyofSanFranciscofoundthatresidualvotesdidnotincreaseaftertheadoption

ofRCV(NeelyandCook).In2013,theMinneapoliselectionsdepartmentbeganreporting

overvotesandundervotesforlocalelections.Theovervoterateinthemayoralcontestwas

low(0.2%ofballotscast),andtheratewasthesameatallincomelevels.Therefore,thegap

infirstchoiceresidualvotesbetweenlowandhighincomewardsin2013isduetoa

slightlyhigherundervoterateinlowincomewards.Voterscanrankuptothreecandidates

inRCVelectionsinMinneapolis.AsJacobsandMillernote,abitmorethan20%ofvoters

didnotrecordthreecandidatechoicesformayor.Whentabulatingundervotesacrossall

threechoicesformayorin2013theundervoterateissomewhathigherinlowincome

wards(24%)thanhighincomewards(21%).However,theundervoterateisevenhigher

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(26%)inmiddleincomewards.7Overall,theundervoteandovervotedatadonotreveal

substantialincomedisparitiesinthe2013Minneapolismayoralelection.

Finally,itisworthexaminingcitycouncilelectionsinMinneapolis,whichalsoused

RCVinthe2013election.Councilseatsforall13citywardswereupforelectionin2005

and2013.Therefore,wecanmakeasimilarcomparisonbetweenapluralityelection

(2005)andanRCVelection(2013).RCVseemstohaveencouragedmorecandidatestorun

forcitycouncilinMinneapolis.Thenumberofcitycouncilcandidatesalmostdoubled,

increasingfrom25candidatesin2005to47in2013.In2005,nowardfeaturedacampaign

withmorethantwocitycouncilcandidates.In2013,tenofthethirteenwardsproduced

morethantwocandidatesrunningforacitycouncilseat.8

JacobsandMilleralsopresentevidenceshowingthatinthe2013Minneapolis

electionvoterparticipationinthemayoralcontestwashigherinthewardswiththehighest

shareofwhitevoters(10,11,12,and13)thaninwardswherethenon‐whiteshareofthe

populationisatleast50percent(4,5,6and9).Weusethesamedatatocomparethe

residualvoterateinthecitycouncilracesforthe2013RCVelectionandthe2005plurality

election.Weincludetherestofthecity’s13wards,labeled“Mixedwards.”Figure7

comparestheresidualvoterateinthe2005and2013Minneapoliscitycouncilelectionsby

racialcompositionofthewards.Thecitywideresidualvoterateforfirstchoicecitycouncil

votingincreasedfrom4%in2005to5.9%in2013,buttheincreasedisconfinedtoracially

mixedwards.Asthefigureshows,the2005pluralityelectionproducesthefamiliarpattern

                                                            7TheMinneapolisratesforovervotes,undervotes,andfailuretorankthreecandidatesaresubstantiallylowerthanthosereportedforRCVelectionsinSanFrancisco(NeelyandCook2008;NeelyandMcDaniel2015).8The2009election(thefirstinMinneapolisusingRCV)alsoproducedahighernumberofcitycouncilcandidates.

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ofhigherresidualvoteratesinminoritywardsandlowerratesinwhitewards.However,

asFigure7shows,theresidualvoterateactuallydeclinedintheminoritywardsinthe

2013RCVelection.Thisisbecausetheminoritywardsfeaturedseveralcandidatesrunning

forcitycouncilseatsin2013.Theresidualvoterateincitycouncilcontestsissubstantially

lowerinwardswithmorecandidatesrunningforaseat.Furthermore,in2013overvote

andundervoteratesforcitycouncilcontestsappeartobeunrelatedtotheincomeorracial

compositionofMinneapoliswards.Overall,theMinneapolisevidenceindicatesthat

socioeconomicdisparitiesinvoterparticipationaresimilarinpluralityandRCVelections.

[Figure7abouthere]

Conclusion

SeveralAmericancitieshaveadoptedRCVrulesforlocalelections,andother

jurisdictionsmaybeconsideringRCVinthefuture.InassessingtheimpactofRCVvoting

rulesitisimportanttoevaluateRCValongsidethepluralitysystemsthatRCVreplaces.For

themostpart,wefindthatRCVelectionshaveminimaleffectsonratesofvoter

participation.Themainexceptioninvolvesthecomparisonwithprimaryandrunoff

electionsusingpluralityrules.Bycompressingthevotingandwinnowingofcandidates

intooneelectionscheduledinNovember,RCVelectionsincreasevoterparticipationwhen

comparedtopluralityprimaryandrunoffelectionsheldbeforeoraftertheNovember

generalelectiondate.Whencomparinggeneralelectionstogeneralelections,pluralityand

RCVelectionsgeneratesimilarturnoutrates.Wealsofindsimilarratesofresidualvotes,a

measureofvoterconfusion,inpluralityandRCVelections.

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OurcasestudyofMinneapolisalsorevealscomparableratesofparticipationand

voterconfusioninpluralityandRCVelections.Themainexceptionisthatweobserve

higherratesofspoiledballotsintheRCVelectionthaninthepluralityelection.Wealso

observethatthesocioeconomicandracialdisparitiesinvoterparticipationaresimilarin

pluralityandRCVelectionsinMinneapolis.

Thesefindingsarebasedonarathersmallbutgrowingsampleofevidence.Some

cautionisrecommendedindrawingconclusionsfromthisevidenceabouttheimpactof

RCVonvoterparticipation.Nevertheless,theresearchdesigncanbeusedtocontinue

examiningtheeffectofRCVadoptiononvoters.AsmoreresultsfrompastelectionsinRCV

andcomparisoncitiesareincludedinthedata,andasmorecitiescontinuetoholdRCV

electionsinthefuture,theevidencewillgrowandsupportmoreconfidentconclusions

abouttheresponseofvoterstoRCVrulesintheUnitedStates.Itwillbeimportantto

continuetomonitormeasuresofvoterparticipationinRCVandpluralityelectionsinthe

UnitedStates.

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Table 1 Cities and Elections for Voter Participation Comparisons

RCV City

Matched Plurality Cities

Elections Before RCV

Elections After RCV

Minneapolis, MN Boston, MA; Cincinnati, OH; Tulsa, OK; Seattle, WA

2005 2009, 2013

St. Paul, MN Cedar Rapids, IA; Des Moines, IA; Madison, WI; Spokane, WA

2009 2013, 2015

Cambridge, MA Ann Arbor, MI; Lowell, MA; Stamford, CT; Worcester, MA

2009, 2013, 2015

Berkeley, CA Alameda, CA 2002, 2006 2010, 2014 Oakland, CA; San Leandro, CA

Anaheim, CA; Santa Ana, CA; Santa Clara, CA; Stockton, CA; Richmond, CA

2002, 2006 2010, 2014

San Francisco, CA San Jose, CA 2002 2006, 2010, 2014, 2015

Portland, ME Lewiston, ME; Dover, NH 2011, 2015

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Table 2 Predictors of General Election Turnout in RCV and Plurality City Elections

Independent Variable

Coefficient (Std. Error)

RCV City 9.1* (3.2)

After RCV Adoption 0.9 (2.0)

RCV City * After Adoption -4.1 (3.8)

Even-Numbered Year 9.6* (2.1)

More than 3 Contests 8.9* (2.2)

Contested Mayoral Contest 5.5* (2.0)

Constant 16.7* (2.1)

N R2 Root MSE

96 .58 7.9

The dependent variable is voter turnout in city elections (ballots cast as a percentage of the citizen voting age population). Cell entries are ordinary least squares coefficients (standard errors in parentheses). *p < .1, two-tailed

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Table 3 Predictors of Turnout in RCV Cities and Primary/Runoff Elections in Plurality Cities

Independent Variable

Coefficient (Std. Error)

RCV City 5.4 (3.4)

After RCV Adoption 1.9 (2.5)

RCV City * After Adoption 8.2* (3.8)

Even-Numbered Year 4.8* (2.4)

More than 3 Contests 8.8* (2.3)

Contested Mayoral Contest 6.4* (2.1)

Constant 6.8* (2.4)

N R2 Root MSE

64 .69 6.9

The dependent variable is voter turnout in city elections (ballots cast as a percentage of the citizen voting age population). Cell entries are ordinary least squares coefficients (standard errors in parentheses). *p < .1, two-tailed

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Table 4 Predictors of Residual Votes in Top Contest in RCV and Plurality City Elections

Independent Variable

Coefficient (Std. Error)

RCV City -2.7 (1.8)

After RCV Adoption 0.2 (1.2)

RCV City * After Adoption -0.0 (2.2)

Even-Numbered Year 5.6* (1.2)

Contested Mayoral Contest -3.7* (1.2)

More than 3 Contests 1.1 (1.3)

Constant 5.0* (1.3)

N R2 Root MSE

93 .40 4.6

The dependent variable is the residual vote rate (as a percentage of the number of ballots cast). For RCV elections, the residual vote measure is based on the first choice votes. Cell entries are ordinary least squares coefficients (standard errors in parentheses). *p < .1, two-tailed

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Table 5 Predictors of Voter Drop-off between First and Last Rounds in RCV Cities and

Primary/Runoff Elections in Plurality Cities

Independent Variable

Coefficient (Std. Error)

RCV City -10.6 (9.8)

After RCV Adoption -8.7 (7.4)

RCV City * After Adoption -24.4* (11.2)

Even-Numbered Year 4.5 (7.1)

More than 3 Contests -1.5 (6.8)

Contested Mayoral Contest -11.3* (6.2)

Constant 58.7* (6.9)

N R2 Root MSE

62 .48 19.9

The dependent variable is voter drop-off between the first and last round of voting in city elections (as a percentage of ballots cast). Cell entries are ordinary least squares coefficients (standard errors in parentheses). *p < .1, two-tailed

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Figure 1 Mean Voter Turnout in RCV and Plurality City Elections:

General Elections

0

10

20

30

40

Me

an V

ote

r T

urno

ut (

Pe

rce

nt)

Before Adoption After Adoption

Plurality RCV Plurality RCV

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Figure 2 Mean Voter Turnout in RCV and Plurality City Elections:

Primary/Runoff Elections

0

10

20

30

Me

an V

ote

r T

urno

ut (

Pe

rce

nt)

Before Adoption After Adoption

Plurality RCV Plurality RCV

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Figure 3 Mean Residual Vote Rate in Top Contest in RCV and Plurality City Elections

0

2

4

6

8

Me

an R

esi

dual

Vot

e R

ate

(P

erce

nt)

Before Adoption After Adoption

Plurality RCV Plurality RCV

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Figure 4 Mean Voter Drop-off Between First and Last Rounds in RCV and Plurality City Elections:

Primary/Runoff Elections

0

20

40

60

Me

an V

ote

r D

rop

-off

(P

erce

nt)

Before Adoption After Adoption

Plurality RCV Plurality RCV

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Figure 5 Voter Turnout by Ward Income:

2005 and 2013 Minneapolis Elections

38.1

28.5

24

41.7

31.4

27.7

0

10

20

30

40

Vot

er

Tu

rnou

t (P

erc

ent

)

2005 2013

High income wards Middle income wardsLow income wards

Income Level

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Figure 6 Ballot Spoilage by Ward Income:

2005 and 2013 Minneapolis Elections

.7

1.2

1.8

3.5

4.3

5.2

0

1

2

3

4

5

Spo

iled

Ba

llots

(P

erce

nt)

2005 2013

High income wards Middle income wardsLow income wards

Income Level

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Figure 7 Residual Vote for City Council (1st Choice) by Ward Race:

2005 and 2013 Minneapolis Elections

3.43.9

5.5

3.9

9.4

3.8

0

2

4

6

8

10

Re

sidu

al V

ote

Ra

te (

Pe

rce

nt)

2005 2013

White wards Mixed wardsMinority wards

Racial Composition of Wards