1PLOTINUS AND THE PARMENIDES:PROBLEMS OF INTERPRETATION

Matthias Vorwerk

The second part of Platos Parmenides with its dialectical exercises on the Onehas received remarkable attention in the history of Platonism.1 Interestingly, themore-or-less systematic interpretation of the hypotheses seems to have begunonly with Plotinus, who understood the hypotheses of the Parmenides onto-logically and referred the first three of them to the three hypostases of his ownmetaphysical system, that is, the One (or Good), Intellect, and Soul.2 While it isundisputed that Plotinus adapted the first three hypotheses and exploited themfor the formulation ofhis version of Platonic metaphysics, it still remains a matterof discussion whether Plotinus depended on the first hypothesis of the Parmenidesto invent, as it were, the absolutely simple One, transcending being and predication, or whether he merely used it as justification for his metaphysical innovation.I will argue that the answer lies in between: Plotinus was both inspired by the firsthypothesis and needed it as evidence for his Platonic orthodoxy. In the following,I will first give a brief survey of the most relevant scholarship on Plotinuss interpretation of the Parmenides. Then, I will focus mainly on a close analysis of whatcould be called Plotinuss apology: namely, chapter 8 of Enn. 6.1 [101: On theThree Primary Hypostases, in which Plotinus explicitly introduces the Parmenidesin support of his metaphysics.

1. Proclus, In Parm. 630,37643,5 Cousin provides a survey of ancient interpretations ofthe Parmen ides, however, without giving names; in Theol. Plat. 1.10 = 1:42,49 Saffrey-Westerink, Plot.inus is named as one of the old, i.e., first, interpreters of the Parmenides. See Saffrey andWesterink 19681997, 1, lxxvIxjcxix; Brisson 1994,28591.

2. These three hypotheses of the Parmenides are I: 137c3142a6; II: 142b1155e2; and III:155e3157b4. III is actually a corollary to II, but Plotinus considers it to be a separate hypothesis; see Brisson 1994, 46 with n. 96.

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24 PLATOS PARMENIDES, VOLUME 2 VORWERK: PLOTINUS AND THE PARMENIDES 25

1. THE ORIGIN OF THE PLOTINIAN ONESTATUS QuAEsTIONIS

In his famous article The Parmenides of Plato and the Origin of the Neoplatonic One~ E. R. Dodds argued against attempts popular at the beginning of thetwentieth century to ascribe the origin of the Plotinian One to oriental religiousinfluences. Contrary to this line of interpretation, Dodds pointed to the secondpart of Platos Parmenides, namely the first hypothesis, as the main source for thenotion of a One that is beyond being and, hence, incapable of admitting any positive predication. With the help of a list of parallels between the first and secondhypotheses of the Parmenides and descriptions in the Enneads of the One and theOne-Being, namely Intellect and the ideas, respectively, he showed that the Plotinian One had Platonic roots.3 The question, of course, arises whether Plotinus wasthe first to interpret the second part of the Parmenides not merely logically butontologically, or whether he had predecessors. Against Proclus, who, in a surveyof interpretations of the Parmenides, names Plotinus as the first representative ofthe ontological interpretation,4 Dodds referred to Neopythagorean sources, whohad developed already a notion of two Ones, a transcendent One and a One thatis opposed to the Indefinite Dyad, or, in the case of Moderatus, perhaps even ofthree Ones.5 Ultimately, Dodds proposed, the origin of the Plotinian One shouldbe sought in the metaphysics of Speusippus, which, according to some sources,included a transcendent One.6

J. M. Rist, building upon Doddss observations, argued that Moderatus, notSpeusippus, was the first to interpret the Parmenides ontologically, since Moderatus speaks of three Ones, which are related to the first three hypotheses of theParmenides, while his predecessors knew only of two (Rist 1962, 38991, 397).According to Rist, Moderatus did not develop the notion of the transcendent Onefrom the Parmenides, since it could already be derived from the Idea of the Goodof Republic 6 (509b); rather he regarded the first hypothesis as a confirmation of

3. Dodds 1928, 13233. For a similar defense of Plotinus against the charge of mysticismsee Gurtler 1992. -

4. See n. 1 above.5. Dodds 1928, 13639. It is far from certain to what extent the report on Moderatuss

three Ones that we find in Simplicius, In Phys. 9:230,34231,24 Diels accurately representsModeratuss text, since Simplicius is not quoting first hand but from a lost treastise itepl ilxricby Porphyry (frg. 236 Smith). Saffrey and Westerink (19681997, 2,xxvixxxv) have arguedconvincingly that in Simpliciuss report the part that speaks of the three Ones is Porphyrian andthat, hence, Dodds falsely believed that Moderatus interpreted the Parmenides ontologically;see in particular xxxiixxxv. However, the question is not settled; see Tornau 2000, 2045 withn. 26.

6. Dodds, 1928, 40; see also Halfwassen 1993; Dillon 2003, 57.

it and, in doing so, he incidentally discovered the famous three Ones of the Neoplatonic interpretation,7 which Plotinus in turn adopted.

After this strong trend to establish Plotinuss dependence on Pythagoreanizing or other Middle Platonic sources, B. D. Jackson proposed to reclaim Plotinussoriginality in interpreting the Parmenides.8 Going beyond Dodds, he not onlystudied verbal allusions to the Parmenides in the Enneads but also conceptualsimilarities, and he added to the parallel between the first two hypotheses of theParmenides and the first two hypostases of the Enneads also parallels between thethird hypothesis and the third hypostasis, Soul. Although he did not insist thatPlotinus was the first to interpret the Parmenides ontologically, he suggested thatPlotinus was original in adopting the notion of the one and the many of the Parmenides to develop his ontological hierarchy, and that it was in this respect thathe differed from Neopythagoreans and Middle Platonists.9

The most extensive analysis of Plotinuss reception of the Parmenides hasbeen presented by J.-M. Charrue in his study on Plotinuss reading of Plato.10He surveyed carefully references in the Enneads to the first three hypotheses ofthe Parmenides, both quotations and allusions, as well as conceptual parallels.Supposing Moderatus as the source of the ontological interpretation, Charrueinferred that Plotinus exploited only the first three hypotheses for his metaphysics, because Moderatus had done so too and had derived three Ones from them(Charrue 1978, 5658). In spite of the influence of Moderatus, Charrue arguesthat it was Plotinuss own reading of the Parmenides that led to the developmentof the Plotinian system and that his reading of the Parmenides in turn influencedhis understanding of other Platonic texts.

According to these interpretations it is clear that1. the first hypothesis of the Parmenides played an important role in partic

ular in the conception of Plotinuss first hypostasis, the absolutely simpleOne;

2. that Plotinus may not have been the first to interpret the first hypothesisontologically if, in fact, Moderatus had already developed three Onesfrom the first three hypotheses.

The question that still remains open is whether Plotinus depended on the firsthypothesis to develop the notion of the absolutely simple One or whether he

7. Rist 1962, 39899. Narbonne (2001) argues similarly that the Republic was sufficient forPlatonists to conceive of a first principle transcending being but that Plotinus provided with hisinterpretation of the Parmenides a structure that could support all this (p. 190).

8. Jackson 1967, 31516. Similarly, Szlezk (1979, 3436) denies significant influence ofPythagoreans on Plotinus, as Plotinus barely mentions them at all, and points to lamblichus asthe one responsible for the Pythagoreisierung des Neuplatonismus (p. 35).

9. Jackson (1967, 327), based on a combination of 5.1 [101.8.2526 with 4.2 [4] .2.5255:One/lv, Intellect/tv xoAX, Soul/gv Kal xoXX, form in bodies/isoAX Kal L~v, bodies/,toAX.

10. Charrue 1978, 43115 and 26466 on the Parmenides.

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26 PLATOS PARMENIDES, VOLUME 2 VORWERK: PLOTINUS AND THE PARMENIDES 27

merely welcomed the first hypothesis as evidence and justification from Platohimself that he was not introducing a new principle but observing faithfully thePlatonic tradition. As representatives of both views the following two statementsmay suffice.1 J.-M. Charrue asks with regard to Plotinuss use of negative predication of the One:

Plotin laurait-il imagine sil nen avait trouvles traits prcurseurs dans la premire hypothse du Parmnide? (Charrue 1978, 84)

And he concludes at the end of his book:

Cest la lecture du Parmnide qui paraIt faire faire a Plotin ses principales dcouvertes et lui fournir les themes majeurs de sa philosophie.... Linterprtationplotinienne du Parmnide marquait donc bien le point de depart dun systmehirarchisqui ... et la caractristique de linterprtation plotinienne de Platon.(Charrue 1978, 264 and 265)

B. R. Dodds, on the other hand, writes:

But these Platonic texts are not the true starting-points of his philosophy: hedoes not believe in the One because he has found it in the Parmenides; on thecontrary, he finds it in the Parmenides because he already believes in it. Nor doeshis exposition normally start from Plato: ... he will cite for confirmation a textfrom Plato. (Dodds 1960, 2)

Dodds sees Plotinus defending himself against charges of unorthodoxy and compares his practice of quoting Plato to that of seventeenth century philosophersquoting Scripture. He bases his claim in particular on Plotinuss apology in 5.1[10] .8, which is the key passage to a proper understanding of Plotinuss interpretation of Plato and his self-conception as a Platonic philosopher.

2. PL0TINUss APOLOGY

In ch. 8 of Enn. 5.1 [10]: On the Three Primary Hypostases, Plotinus defends himself against possible allegations of introducing new doctrines, with the help of adoxographical account that starts with Plato. His main intention is to show thatalready Plato had conceived of three hypostases, if only implicitly:

Therefore also Platos divine principles are three: ~dl things are around the Kingof allfor he means the first thingsand the Second is around the secondarythings and, and around the tertiary is the Third.12

In the text preceding the quote Plotinus had shown that Soul is an image ofIntellect (3.7) and Intellect an image of the One (7.1). These three hypostases constitute the realm of divine principles (i.i~pt toi~tav Ta Oria, 7.49). Nowhe sets out to identify these same three principles in Plato and refers to a passage from the Second Letter, which by modern scholarship is not considered tobe authentic.3 In 3 12de the author of the letter writes about the first principle(itepi Tfjc rot itpthtot, qn~aewc), but only in the form of a riddle Cot aivry~.t&v).Then follows the passage that Plotinus quotes: All things are around the King ofall and for his sake, and he is the cause of all noble things; the secondary thingsare around the Second and the tertiary around the Third.14 The text speaks ofthree Kings, as it seems, and in particular of a first King, who is described as thefinal cause of all things (Ke~vov L~vica xvta).5 The term King appears in theRepublic in connection with the Idea of the Good and its offspring, the sun, whoare said to reign the one over the intelligible kind and region, the other over thevisible (I3aatXei~etv To 11V vor~ toO yvouc te ical rxov, TOO cth OparoO, 509d23).16 In this context there are only two kings, not three as in the Second Letter,but Plotinus may not have had this passage in mind, since the term King hadbecome already a common predicate for the first principle in earlier Platonists.17It was Numenius who first conceived of three Godsif we disregard the dubiouscase of Moderatus18, but the fragmented state of his works does not allow usto determine with certainty whether he made reference to the Second Letter. Thisseems to be probable, however, because Numenius calls the first God exempt

12. Kal & roi3ro ical ta flXflrwvoc rptrr r itvrct irepl toy itvrwv 3arnXaq90iyap icp&TctKal &i~r~pov ~tspi r &1~Tepa iccil itepi r tpira tpIrov Enn. 5.1 [101.8.14. Alltranslations are mine.

13. See Brisson 1987b, 8184, 12728; also Saffrey and Westerink 19681997, 2, xxxxvi,and Atkinson 1983, 188 with further references.

14. itpi tOy itvtcov ~3ctciiX~a itvt CciTt Kat CiceIvou ~VEKci ,tvtct, icat CKEIVO ctittovitvtwv tthv icaA&v. &6repov & nCpi r &iirepa, Kal tp[rov itCpt t-rpIra, 312e14. Plotinusquotes it also in 1.8 [511.2.2732 and alludes to it more frequently; see Atkinson 1983, 188.

15. For the One as final cause in Plotinus see Bussanich 1996, 5 155.16. Cf. 597e68: ToUr flpa ~arai icalO rpayqoiroi, thrsp ~u~ujrijc Ccitt, rpItoc rtc iurO

IlaatXCw iatt ri~ Xq9e(ac itepuicthc, icai itvre oL XA0L ~u~ii1tai.17. E.g., Apuleius, Apol. 64; Numenius, frg. 12,1213 des Places. See DOrrie 1970, 21735

repr. 1976, with OBrien 1992. For a history of the exegesis of the Second Letter in antiquity seeSaffrey-Westerink 19681997, 2, xxlix, on Plotinus xliiixlix. Whether Moderatus had usedthe Second Letter, as Saffrey and Westerink (ibid., xxxiixxxv) propose, remains a matter ofspeculation.

18. See above n. 5.11. For further references see Gatti 1996, 1037.

28 PLATOS PARMENIDES, VOLUME 2 VORWERK: PLOTINUS AND THE PARMENIDES 29

of all works and king (pyv ... ~pyuv av1nrvrwv Kal ~3ctatX~a, fr. 12,13 desPlaces), which comes close to the description in the Second Letter of the King ofall as final cause.19 Since we know that Plotinus read Numeniuss works in classand was even accused of plagiarizing him,20 it may be legitimate to infer thatPlotinus was following him in giving the Second Letter a prominent place in hisapology: especially as the Plotinian hypostases were prefigured by Numeniussthree gods.2

Plotinus continues:

He [Sc. Plato] also says that there is a Father of the Causecalling IntellectCause, for he considers Intellect to be the Demiurge; he [sc. the Demiurge], hesays, makes the Soul in that mixing-bowl. Intellect being the Cause, he meansby Father the Good, i.e., that which is beyond Intellect and beyond Being; butoften he calls Being and Intellect Idea.22

The second reference Plotinus provides is a short quotation again from a pseudo-Platonic letter, this time the Sixth Letter (323d). In that passage the authormentions the God and Ruler of all things, of those that are and those that will be,and the Father and Lord of the Ruler and Cause.23 Plotinus identifies the Causeas Intellect and explains that Intellect corresponds with the Demiurge of PlatosTimaeusnot without reason, since the Demiurge is presented as the best ofall causes and as intellect.24 Plotinus refers the causality of the Demiurge tothe mixing of the world-soul, which is described in detail in the Timaeus (35a136b6). However, he introduces subtle distinctions. Since the Timaeus speaks ofthe mixing of the world-soul and later (41d47) of the mixing of individual soulsin the mixing-bowl, Plotinus infers that three kinds of soul can be distinguished:

19. See Saffrey and Westerink 19681997,2, xxxvxxxvi.20. Porphyry, Vita Plot. 14.12 and 17.16.21. Cf. frg. 15,45 des Places: ~sv o~v Trp&toc itepl t vo9t, 6 & &6TEpOc nepi r

voqt Kal cdaOqr. There are, of course, two notable differences: Numenius first god is both abeing and an intellect; his third god is either the world-soul or the ensouled cosmos, at least notan undescended soul According to Vita Plot. 17.46 Amelius wrote a book On the DogmaticD~/7erences between Plotinus and Numenius (Hapi tfic Kar r &y~1ata toO flXwt(vou itpc tOyNou~ujvtov &wpopdc).

22. AyEL & xcsi toO alriou elvaL 7tar~pa a.ITLOV ~iv tOy voOv A~ywv. &ijILoupVOc V~P6 voUc ct~rr~ -roOtov & pqot r?~v ~pu)(1~v itoteiv v t lcparfipt KeIvW. toO atrlou & yoU Ovtocitar~pa pqai tyaOOv ial tO ~7tL~KeLVa yoU Kal ~7cKatVa oOc~iac. ltoXXct)(OU & tO OV Kal tOyvoUv tt~v i&av Aiyat, 5.1 [101.8.49.

23. rOy tfiv nvtwv eeov iiye~sva r&v te Ovtwv Kal TfiV ~saXAOvrcov, toO re iiyeisOvoc icalairiou 7tat~pa icOptov, 323d24.

24. Tim. 29a6 (ptotoc tfiv airIwv), 39e7 (voU); cf. the distinction between t & yoUq~uoupyq~va and t & VyKqc yiyv~teva, 47e45. For the identification of the Demiurge

with the Plotinian Intellect see 5.9 [51.3.26; 5.20 with Vorwerk 2001, 9 194.

one that is in the mixing-bowl, which Plotinus equates with the undescendedhypostasis Soul; one that is descended but pure, namely the world-soul; and onethat is descended but somehow inferior to the world-soul, so that it descendsdeeper into matter and animates individual bodies.25 Hence, with the help of theTimaeus, Plotinus extrapolates from the term Cause, which is more fully characterized in the Sixth Letter as Ruler of all things, of those that are and those thatwill be: two hypostases, Intellect as the paradigmatic cause of the cosmos andSoul as that by means of which Intellect orders the cosmos. The Father of theCause is then easily identified with the first hypostasis, the Good. The Idea ofthe Good of the Republic is beyond being (509b), a phrase that Plotinus quotes,but extends: beyond Intellect and beyond Being (~irKeLva yOU Kai 1t~KELVaoiiaIa).26 The passage from the Republic provides support only for the generation of the ideas by the Idea of the Good, but it does not mention any Intellect.27That is why Plotinus adds that Plato equated Being, Intellect, and Idea. If the Ideaof the Good is the cause of all other ideas and the ideas are identical with Intellect,then the Idea of the Good is the cause of Intellect, namely, its Father. Moreover,if the Idea of the Good is beyond Being and Being is identical with Intellect andthe ideas, then the Idea of the Good is beyond Intellect and the ideas. There is noobvious passage in Plato that equates Intellect and ideas, but Plotinus interpretedthe Timaeus in such a way that he located the paradigm of the Timaeus within theDemiurgic Intellect.28 Thus Plotinus deduces from the Sixth Letter three hypostases: the Father of the Cause/the Good, the Cause/Intellect, and that which iscaused/Soul, perhaps again following Numenius.29

Plotinus concludes:

Consequently, Plato knew that Intellect derives from the Good and Soul fromIntellect; and these teachings are not new, and they have not been formulatednow but long ago, however not explicitly; my present teachings are merely interpretations of those earlier ones and they prove that these doctrines are old withthe help of references to the writings of Plato himself.30

25. Cf. 4.3 [271.18, esp. 7.812; 4.8 [61.8; also 5.1 [101.12.26. Cf. 1.6 [11.9.3639; 6.8 [391.16.34; 1.7 [54].1.1920, and Whittaker 1969, 91104.27. tO elval te ical t?~v oOiIav Oit ~KeIVou cu~rroZc 1tpoc~eivai, 509b78.28. See 5.9 [5].8.17 with 6.7 [381.8.2232; 39.2834 and Sophist 248e249d4; also 5.9

[51.9.18 with Timaeus 39e79 and Vorwerk 2001, 134.29. Cf. frg. 12,23 des Places: toO &~~noupyoUvro & OeoU ~ etvai vopi~eoOat itat~pa

rOy itp&-rov OeOy, and 1314: rOy &iJUOUpyLKOV & OeOv i1y4sovei~ & oOpavoU iOvra.30. ~icyre HAroiva ei&vaL ~Ic ~i~v ryaOoU rOy voUy, Lic & toO yoU rf~v ~IJux1~jv. ~ai elvat

roO AOyou tol~a& ~si~ icatvoOc ~u~& vOy, nAat sty eipiiaOat ~d1 vairewra~vw, roO &~Uv Xyouc t~9yqrc ticeivuiv ~EyOV~VcLL saprupioic lTLcrrwacqsvovc -rc 6~ac rai5tac iraXatelvat rotc a6roU toO HXtoyo yp~taaiv, 5.1 [10].8.914.

30 PLATOS PARMENIDES, VOLUME 2 VORWERK; PLOTINUS AND THE PARMENIDES 31

At this point Plotinus has concluded his apology. He has presented the principal passages in Plato that support his metaphysical system and shown that heis no innovator but merely an interpreter of Plato.31 One might wonder why itis that he has not introduced the Parmenides here if it is so fundamental for thedevelopment of the three hypostases? The answer may be that the Parmenides wasnot that fundamental after all, at least not for a justification of the three hypostases. Therefore it is only within the doxography which Plotinus provides in chaps.8.149.32reaching from Parmenides over Anaxagoras, Heraclitus, Empedodes, Aristotle to Pythagoras and Pherecydesthat he introduces the first threehypotheses of the Parmenides as a correction of Parmenides himself:

Platos Parmenides speaks more accurately when he distinguishes from eachother the First One, which is the One more properly speaking, and a Second,whith he calls One-Many, and a Third, the One-and-Many. Thus, he also is inagreement with the three natures.32

In the preceding passage (8.1423) Plotinus criticized Parmenides, particularlyfor calling being one in spite of its multiplicity. It is with respect to. the notionof unity that he considers Platos Parmenides to be more accurate because of hisdifferentiation of three degrees of unity: the absolutely simple One (tv, Parm.137c4-142a7), the One-Many (~v noAX, 144e5), and the One-and-Many (~v icalicoAX~ 155e5). Only then does he add that this distinction corresponds with thethree hypostases, the three natures (8.23).

The fact that the Parmenides is introduced by Plotinus last has been observedalready by Saifrey-Westerink, who explain:

Cela doit signifier quil procde du plus connue au moms connu, et que mmecest lui probablement qui introduit le Parmenide de Platon, dont il interprteles trois premieres hypotheses par les trois hypostases, comme une autoritnouvelle dans cette question des principes premiers.33

31. Atkinson 1983, 19 192 remarks quite appropriately that Plotinuss exegetical methodis reminiscent of allegorical interpretation ofmyths, in so far as it tries to uncover hidden doctrines.

32.6 & itap HXtwvt Hap~LEVI~9c ICpLI3OtEpOV XyLOV &cupei it XXr~Xwv tO np&rov~v, 6 KVpLthtEpOV isv, ical E6tEpOV nv itoXA A~ywv, ical tpIxov ~V icai itoAA ical IqKovoco6rw ical a~tOc ~OTL talc q~aea~ talc tpiaiv, 5.1 [101.8.2327. Proclus, In Parm. 1240,3237Cousin distinguishes similarly between the historical and Platos Parmenides: ical rcu~tfl6L~GT9KEV 6 itap flXtWVL flapllavi&lc to~ ~V toic ~1tOLV, Ott 6 ~iv dc tO ~V OV ~3XItEL icairoUte pi~rnv LIVaL itvtwv aitLov, 6 & tic tO ~v, lutO toO ~vO Ovro tic tO ~ivwc ~v ical npO toOOv-ro vapa1ithv. He probably has our passage in mind.

33. Saffrey and Westerink 19681997,2, xlv.

Saifrey-Westerink correctly see that Plotinus uses in his apology (8.18) wellknown Platonic passages, but I think they misinterpret the function of the Parmenides in 8.2327: it is not introduced primarily as Platonic support for thethree hypostases but as a criticism of the historical Parmenides; only then is itrecognized as providing further evidence (a~tpwvoc ot~rw Kai ai~tc) for thethree hypostases. The division of chapters devised by Ficino should not lead us tomisunderstand the structure of the text. The section on Parmenides (8.1427) isnot an addition to the preceding section on Plato (8.114) but the opening of thedoxography of philosophers other than Plato: Pre-Socratics, Aristotle, Pythagoreans (8.149.32). Hence, in 5.1 [101.8 Plotinus does not present the Parmenidesas the Platonic key-text for the three hypostases or for the absolutely simple Onebeyond being.34

3. CONCLUSION

Plotinus developed the system of three hypostases not primarily from the Parmenides but from other Platonic texts, continuing a tradition that had culminatedbefore him in Numenius. The Platonic passages to which Plotinus refers in 5.1[10].8.19 are Ep. 2.312e and 6.323d in combination with Tim. 35ab, 41d andResp. 509b. None of these allows Plotinus to say that Plato identified the firstprinciple with the One; however, he infers from them that Plato did assume threeprinciples (Ep. 2.312e, and implicitly 6.323d):

1. the Good: xv-rcov I3ctatXe~c, Ep. 2.312e; al-nov itattjp, Ep. 6.323d;tyct8v, Resp. 509b.

2. Intellect: &1~tepoc, Ep. 2.312e; ai-nov, Ep. 6.323d; Demiurge, Tim. 35ab,41d; ~7t~KELVG oi~a(a, Republic 509b.

3. Soul: -rpivoc, Ep. 2.312e; (the product of a(rtov, Ep. 6.323d;) icpa-ntjp, Tim.41d.

Obviously, Plotinus displays a fair amount of creativity in reconciling these passages, just as some of his Platonist predecessors had done before. He probably was

34. See above pp. 2425 with n. 7. It is interesting to see that in 5.1 [10] there is only oneallusion to the Parmenides outside ch. 8. In 5.2 Plotinus adapts the verb irocytatelv, which isused in the second hypothesis, and applies it to the soul: noAUc o~v o&roc 6 OeO irl rfl ~vvxii~t& inrpXeL v to&roLc Elvai cruvapOrkr~, ci ~ lutoataretv ~9~Xot; cf. Parm. 144b12: ~id itvrallpa ~toXA Ovra i~ oi)aia vav4tqtat ical o~cvO &itootarct ~rfiv Ovrwv. This may, in fact, bean allusion to the Parmenides passage, as in both texts reference is made to the multiplicity ofbeing; however, if Plotinus were consistent in his interpretation of the hypothesis, he should nothave used a phrase from the second hypothesis to qualify soul. Moreover, according to Sleeman and Pollet (1980, s.v.), Plotinus uses the verb itoatarclv quite frequently in a variety ofcontexts. Therefore the passage is of little significance. What is significant, however, is the factthat Plotinus does not use in 5.1 [10] the terminology of the Parmenides to characterize the threehypostases although he refers to the Parmenides in 5.1 [101.8 as evidence for them.

32 PLATOS PARMENIDES, VOLUME 2 VORWERK: PLOTINUS AND THE PARMENIDES 33

not aware of the dubious authorship of the Letters; but even so, the philosophical context of the passages he quotes remains mysterious, and intentionally so(Ep. 2.312d). In Plato~s dialogues, on the other hand, there seems to be a lack ofconsistency in the description of the first principles: The Republic proclaims theidea of the Good as the cause of all other ideas, without explaining in detail therelationship between ideas and intellect or ideas and cosmos; the Timaeus illustrates the latter, introducing a divine Demiurge who creates both the cosmos as acopy of an eternal Paradigm and the Soul, but is silent on the first principle itself,the Good. Rather than understanding these puzzling discrepancies as differentversions of the same philosophical doctrine, for example, by identifying the ideaof the Good with the Demiurge, Plotinus interprets them as complementary, thatis, by subordinating Demiurge and Paradigm to the Good. Thus Plotinus acceptsthe identification of Paradigm and Demiurge current in most Middle Platonicphilosophers,35 but emphasizes the absolute transcendence of the Good beyondbeing, which is less clearly stated in the Republic, but logically necessary in viewof the simplicity of the first principle (see 2.9 [331.1.116).

It is the inconclusive nature of evidence in prominent Platonic texts concerning the first principle that must have drawn Plotinuss attentionor the attentionof those who might have taken a similar approach before himto the Parmenides.There he found in the first hypothesis a description of a One that does not participate in being and could be equated to the Good beyond being described inthe Republic. Furthermore, he referred the second and the third hypothesis toIntellect and Soul respectively, because he assumed that these hypotheses represented less unified versions of the One, the One-Many (Parm. 144e) and theOne-and-Many (Parm. 155e). Plotinus concludes in 5.1 [101.8.2327 that PlatosParmenides agrees with his theory of the three hypostases, but nowhere else; it isonly in this one passage that Plotinus explicitly points to the Parmenides in support of his system of three hypostases.

The reason for Plotinuss reluctance to present the Parmenides more openlyas Platonic evidence for the three hypostases is probably the fact that the firstthree hypotheses cannot be interpreted systematically so as to correspond exactlywith the three hypostases. Whereas the first hypothesis fits the nature of thePlotinian One well, because it negates all predicates that may be conferred onit, the second and especially the third pose greater difficulties.36 Plotinus quotesfrom the second hypothesis frequently, but neglects the fact that it includes theattribution of time to the second One, which he identifies with Intellect (Parm.151e155d), and that it makes this One the object not just of knowledge, but also

35. For an account of Middle Platonic interpretations of the place of the ideas see Drrieand Baltes 1999, no. 131 with the commentary pp. 31236; on Plotinus no. 131.7 with pp. 32936.

of opinion and sense-perception (155d). All these characteristics are irreconcilable with the Plotinian Intellect. To the third hypothesis Plotinus only refers forthe term One-and-Many, which he clearly links to the Soul in 5.1 [101.8.26, buthe disregards all other attributions.37

The fact that Plotinus did not fully explore the second and particularly thethird hypothesis and that he did not discuss problematic elements in them thatcontradicted the nature of Intellect and Soul, indicates that he did not intend tointerpret the first three hypotheses of the Parmenides systematically.38 Plotinusrealized that the first hypothesis provided Platonic evidence that supported hisdoctrine of the absolutely simple One and allowed him to identify it with the Ideaof the Good beyond being. Furthermore, the first and second hypothesis provedto be a fruitful conceptual source regarding the problem of the one and the many,as Jackson and Charrue have shown, and allowed him to explore the nature ofthe different Ones with the help of a rich set of terminology and phraseology.However, the hypotheses of the Parmenides were not suitable to derive the threehypostases from them.

37. See Charrue 1978, 10414, esp. 109, n. 129.38. Charrue 1978, 260 similarly concludes that Plotinus is eclectic in his interpretation of

the hypotheses.36. See Jackson 1967, 32227; Charrue 1978, 85114.