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The relationality of religion and scienceVollmer, Laura Jean

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The Relationality of Religion and Science

Toward a New Discourse-analytical Framework

PhD Thesis

to obtain the degree of PhD at the University of Groningen on the authority of the

Rector Magnificus Prof. E. Sterken and in accordance with

the decision by the College of Deans.

This thesis will be defended in public on

Thursday 8 June 2017 at 14.30 hours

by

Laura Jean Vollmer

born on 8 October 1983

in Missouri, USA

Supervisor Prof. C.K.M. von Stuckrad Co-supervisor Prof. C. Jedan Assessment Committee Prof. W. Bauman Prof. W.B. Drees Prof. A.L. Molendijk

Idedicatethistomydaughter,KayaLin.Wheneverwewereapart,itwassoIcouldwork.So,workIdid—tomakeourseparationmeansomething.Icouldneverhavedonesomuch

insolittletimewithoutyoursmilewaitingontheotherside.Iracedtothatend.

AcknowledgementsMydeepgratitudegoestoKockuvonStuckradandChristophJedan,myadvisors,mentors,andfriends.Thoughmyworkisindebttothemininnumerableways,Isometimesblatantlyignoredtheirsuggestions,asIamsuretheyarepainfullyaware.Assuch,Icannotattributeasinglefaultbutcangrantallthefluencieshereintothem.IalsowanttothankFrankK.Flinn.Thoughlosttous,hisfriendshipandsupportcontinuestobefeltandwillneverbeforgotten.Finally,Iwanttoacknowledgemyfather,Larry,andespeciallymymother,Sherry,whotookcareofmypreciousdaughterwhenIwasawayonbusiness.Icouldworkwitheaseofmindknowingthatshewaswelllookedafterandmuchloved.

[What]falseappearancesthatareimposeduponusbywords,whichareframedandappliedaccordingtotheconceitandcapacitiesofthevulgarsort:andalthoughwethinkwegovernourwords,andprescribeitwell,loquendumutvulgus,sentiendumutsapientes;yetcertainitisthatwords,asaTartar’sbow,doshootbackupontheunderstandingofthewisest,andmightilyentangleandpervertthejudgment.Soasitisalmost

necessaryinallcontroversiesanddisputationstoimitatethewisdomofthemathematicians,insettingdownintheverybeginningthedefinitionsofourwordsandtermsthatothersmayknowhowweacceptand

understandthem,andwhethertheyconcurwithusorno.Foritcomethtopassforwantofthisthatwearesuretoendtherewhereweoughttohavebegun,whichis,inquestionsanddifferencesaboutwords.To

concludetherefore,itmustbeconfessedthatitisnotpossibletodivorceourselvesfromthesefallaciesandfalseappearances,becausetheyareinseparablefromournatureandconditionoflife.

—FrancisBacon(1561–1626)1

1Bacon(2001),126.

Contents

Preface viii

Chapter1:ForgettingWords 11 MeaningIsFluid:TheProblem,theMotivation,&theAim 12 PastApproaches 43 AlternativeApproaches 8

3.1 DiscourseAnalysis 83.2 TheSociologyofKnowledge 11

4 PositionoftheProjectintheDiscipline,ResearchQuestions,&Outline 165 FinalRemarks 19

Chapter2:ForgettingBeings—RelationalTheory&Method 201 TheTheoryofRelationalism 20

1.1 RelationalMetaphysics,Cognizance,&Semantics 242 Methodology:RelationalityAnalysis 32

2.1 Terminology 352.2 MutualExclusivity 382.3 Identity 40

2.3.1 TheScientificationofReligion 412.3.2 TheReligionizationofScience 44

2.4 Inclusivity 462.5 Representation 47

2.5.1 TheScientificityofReligion 492.5.2 TheReligiosityofScience 50

3 TheStructureofDiscursiveChange&theRelationalModel 524 TheRelationalModel&theProblemofDefinition 55

Chapter3:Religion-ScienceMutualExclusivity 591 Scienceas‘NotReligion’ 592 Religion&ScienceEntangled 633 ScientificKnowledgeas‘NotReligiousKnowledge’ 644 ThePre-historyofScienceas‘NottheHistoryofReligion’ 67

4.1 Scienceas‘NotNaturalPhilosophy/Religion’ 684.2 Science/NaturalPhilosophyas‘NotReligion’ 70

5 TheHistoryofScienceas‘NotReligion’ 746 TheScientificEnterpriseas‘NotReligious’ 777 TheScientificProfessionas‘NotReligious’ 80

7.1 ScientificFieldsofStudyas‘NotReligious’ 817.2 Scientistas‘NotaPersonofReligion’ 837.3 TheScientificInstitutionas‘NotReligious’ 84

8 ConflictastheMaterializationofMutualExclusivity 899 ExclusiveScience:SignifiersofScienceas‘NotReligion’ 94

9.1 Rationalityas‘NotReligion’ 969.2 Naturalism,Materialism,andPhysicalismas‘NotReligion’ 989.3 OtherSignifiersofScienceas‘NotReligion’ 104

10 ReflectionsonMutualExclusivity 104

Chapter4:TheScientificationofReligion&theCaseoftheScienceofReligion 1091 Religionasa‘ScientificObject’ 1092 KnowledgeofReligionas‘Natural’ 1133 HistoryofReligionas‘Natural’ 1174 TheObjective&SubjectiveEnterprisesofReligionas‘Natural’ 1195 Religion‘Localized’intheBrain 1246 ReligionNegated:SignifiersofScientification 130

6.1 ScienceofReligionas‘Reductive’ 1316.2 ScientificatedReligion 136

6.2.1 ReligionasPathology 1386.2.2 ReligionasInsignificant 1436.2.3 ReligionasFalse 144

7 FromMutualExclusivitytoScientification 149

Chapter5:TheReligionizationofScience&theCaseoftheReligionofScientism 1521 Scientismas‘Religion’ 1522 Scientificationasthe‘ReligionofScientism’ 1563 HistoryofScienceastheSocialEvolutionofReligion 1744 TheScientisticEnterpriseas‘Religious’ 1795 ScientisticKnowledgeas‘Religious’ 1856 TheScientisticProfessionas‘Religious’ 1957 FromMutualExclusivitytoReligionization 199

Chapter6:Religion-ScienceInclusivity&theCaseoftheReligionofScienceReformation 2041 Inclusivityas‘NotMutualExclusivity’ 2042 ExclusivityNegated 2093 TheReligionofScienceReformation 2134 TheReligionofScienceas‘NotReductive’ 2195 TheReligionofScienceas‘NottheFalseTraditionofReligion-ScienceExclusivity’ 2296 Religion-ScienceDichotomiesas‘Complementarities’ 2377 FromMutualExclusivity&IdentitytoInclusivity&BackAgain 243

Chapter7:TheScientificityofReligion&theCaseofBuddhism 2511 Religionas‘Scientific’ 2512 Historyof‘Science’inBuddhism 258

2.1 Buddhismas‘NotChristianity’ 2592.2 BuddhismDifferentiatedfrom‘Religion’ 2642.3 BuddhismLikenedto‘Science’ 269

2.3.1 EarlyDevelopments 2692.3.2 Theosophy,Buddhism,&EsotericScience 2712.3.3 TheCarusCircle,Buddhism,&MainstreamScience 2742.3.4 Buddhism&ScienceinDialogue 277

3 BuddhistKnowledgeas‘Scientific’ 2834 TheBuddhistEnterpriseas‘Scientific’ 2915 FromInclusivitytoScientificitytoMutualExclusivity 298

Chapter8:TheReligiosityofScience&theCaseofQuantumMysticism 3061 Scienceas‘Religious’ 3062 Historyof‘Religion’inQuantumPhysics 312

2.1 Nonlocalityas‘Religious’ 314

2.2 Indeterminismas‘Religious’ 3172.3 Superpositionas‘Religious’ 3202.4 Consciousnessas‘Religious’ 323

3 ScientificKnowledgeas‘Religious’ 3374 ScientificEnterpriseas‘Religious’ 3455 FromInclusivitytoReligiositytoMutualExclusivity 353

Chapter9:ReflectionsonRelationalism 3601 RelationsasaConceptualMap 3602 RelationalityAnalysisinPerspective 362

2.1 PostmodernismandRelationalism 3632.2 Post-postmodernismandRelationalism 373

3 FutureDirectionsforResearch 3814 FinalRemarks 386

References 389

Preface

Myarmalreadyraisedagainsttheveneratedidols,Isuddenlystoptodisputewithmyselfovertheillusionsofprideandoverthelinewhichseparatescourageandtemerity,andsoafteralongenoughtimeIfindmyself

moretiredthanMoses,withouthavingstruckAmalec.—JosephdeMaistre(1753–1821)1

IwasmovedbythesewordsofthephilosopherJosephdeMaistrebecauseofhowmuchthey

reflectedmyownfeelingsinconductingthisresearch,battlingthegreatgoliathsofreligion

and science and particularly warring with how concepts are typically conceptualized. I

wonder if I have gone too far or not gone far enough in combating these idols. Many

academicsofreligion,naturalscientists,philosophers,andpopularwritershaveattempted

togiveafinalwordofwhatthereligion-sciencerelationshipentails,evenifthatansweris

justtopointtothecomplexityinvolved.Thoughmanyissueshavebeentackled,onethathas

beenoverlookedisthatwhenwearedebatingwhatthereligion-sciencerelationshipis,the

focusisonwhatismeantby‘religion’andwhatismeantby‘science,’withlittletonocritical

reflectiononwhatwemeanby ‘relationship.’Relations,Icontend,arecentraltomeaning

making.Intryingtoresolvethematter,Iteeteronthislineofcourageandtemerity,pride

andpretension.

When I was a child, watching my mother fix her hair in the bathroommirror, I

excitedlyexplainedtoherasuddenepiphany:“Thesinkcouldbecalledthefaucetandthe

faucetcouldbecalledthesink.”Ihaddiscoveredtheambiguityofwords.Itmademewonder

howwordsgottheirmeanings.Thedictionarydescriptionsofetymologycouldneversuffice

to answer the kind of questions I had inmind. Connecting an utterance to an object or

conceptorpreviousutterancewerenotthesortofanswersIwaslookingfor.WhatIwanted

toknowwasthestoryofthewords,theprocessofmovementfromonemeaningtoanother.

Like a story, theremust be some structure or rules that carry continuity even amid the

forwardmomentum of the fable. That structure, I came to think, was built fromwords

leaningonwordsleaningonwords.Itwasthestructurethatsynthesizedbetween‘onceupon

atime’and‘theend,’eachelementgivingmeaningtotheother.Icametothinkofwordsas

notentirelyarbitrary,butratherasrelational.Thisbookisastoryofstoriesofwords,ofhow

1QuotedinLebrun(1969),230.

Preface

ix

theyunfold,ofonestoryleaningonanotherstoryleaningonanother.Thestoriesareoftwo

ofmymostlovedandhatedwords,whichhaveleanedononeanotherquitealot:‘religion’

and‘science.’

While this dissertation was prepared in partial completion of a PhD in the

comparative study of religion, I hope that thiswill be read as a new foundation for the

structureofacademicsubjects—notstrictlymethodologyofreligiousstudies.‘Topics’canbe

thoughtofanewasrelationalnetworksofmeaningthatcutacrossdisciplinarylines.Infact,

inmanywaysIamrejectingthecategory‘religion’oranycategoryforthatmatterasableto

be independently conceptualized. Concepts, I argue thoroughly, are relational. The only

structure I offer iswhat I believe to be the very basis of knowledge—relationalization. I

suggestawaytoanalyzerelationshipsanduserelationsforanalysisandthusdepartfrom

howwethinkrelationallytoanalyzewhatwethinkofrelationships.‘Relationalityanalysis’

makesitquiteclearthatthe‘how’actuallycreatestheobject,andintackling‘religion’and

‘science’priortorelationswehaveputthecartbeforethehorse.First,weneedtoknowhow

wecreatetheobjectsbeforewecananalyzethem.And,indeed,suchanapproachseemsto

suggestthattheonlyenduringwaywecananalyzethemisbyexaminingthoseconstructive

processesthemselves.Relationalityanalysiscanbethoughtofasafieldofstudy,assubject

matter,aresearchperspective,andasamethodology.Itdoesnotfitneatlyintodiscourse

analysis,thesociologyofknowledge,orhistoricalontology—thoughcloselyrelatedtothese

views—or any other research perspective because what I have done (so I hope) is to

restructureperspective.

Inexaminingthereligion-sciencerelation,thequestionisoftenraisedwhich‘religion’

andwhich‘science.’Whatdothesetermsmean?Iproblematizethisexactissue.However,it

mayservetogiveanoverviewhereofthe‘religion’and‘science’coveredinthiswork.After

positioning the project in the discipline (Chapter One) and introducing my theory and

method(ChapterTwo),Iturntomycasestudies,whichrangefromapproximatelythe1800s

to the contemporary era. I focus on discourses emerging in the European and North

American context, but involving groups from a wide variety of backgrounds. Since my

emphasis is on the English language terms ‘religion’ and ‘science’ and their

conceptualization,thiscontextisdesirable,asisthepointthatthesourcesarelargelyEnglish

orEnglishtranslations,thelatterofwhich,ofcourse,becomepartofthediscoursepresent

Preface

x

intheEnglishlanguage.Howeverthetermshavebeenused,whethertoexplainaGerman’s

oraTibetan’spointofview,theimportantpointisthefocusonhowtheseEnglishlanguage

termsareunderstood.Furtherjustificationforthiscontextrestsinthefactthatitisthemain

sourceforthediscourseonthereligion-sciencerelationship.Eveninthecontextofreligions

that originated outside of Europe and America, the religion-science relationship is still

formulatedwithinthissamediscourse.Thisispartiallybecauseearlyhistoriesofscience,of

religion,andofthereligion-sciencerelationshipalmostexclusivelydrewfromtheEuropean

andAmericancontext,settingthebackdropforlaterdiscussions.Theresultwasthateven

whenalternativecontextswerediscussed,theywerediscussedinthespecificframeworkof

counter-examples as counter-examples, situated in response to the above-mentioned

discourse.

My first case study in Chapter Three deals mainly with the nineteenth-century

general profession of ‘science’ (rather than a specific discipline) andwith Christianity—

although, regarding the latter, I do not say asmuch. This is because early work on the

religion-sciencerelationshipabstractedageneralconceptofthatrelationshipbydrawing

upon the example of Christianity, and less so, Judaism. This abstraction was then

subsequently used in comparing other religionswith science. Since this is an account of

conceptualization, even though strictly speaking the ‘religion’was Christianity, for those

doing the conceptualizing Christianity represented a larger concept—‘religion.’ Chapter

Fourexaminesthedevelopmentofthescientificobjectofreligionfromtheearlynineteenth

centurytothepresentday,withthehistoryculminatinginthecognitivescienceofreligious

experience.ChapterFivelooksataparticulartakeonthescientificworldview—scientism—

andhowithasbeencomparedto‘religion’generallyconstruedinananalysisofsomeofthe

first religions of science, such as the nineteenth-century Saint-Simonism and Comtian

religion.ThefollowingcasestudyinChapterSixexplorestheplethoraofreligionsofscience

that developed in the 1860s to 1940s, which aligned a general ‘religion’ with a general

‘science.’ChapterSevendealswiththeconstructionofBuddhismasscientific,fromaround

the1860stothepresentday.ThelastcasestudyinChapterEightexaminestheconstruction

ofquantumphysics as religious, oftenas ‘mystical,’ from the1920s to the contemporary

period.Thesecasestudiesarerepresentativeofcertainwaysreligionandsciencehavebeen

put in relativeperspective—as, respectively,mutually exclusive, religionas reductively a

Preface

xi

scientificobject,scienceasreductivelyreligion,mutuallyinclusive,religionhavingscientific

character,andthereligiouscharacterofscience.Thecasestudiesactbothasanexplanatory

tool,aswellasanexploratorymeans,ofrelationalityanalysis—toillustratehowthevarious

relations translate to specific beliefs and practices and, above all else, how relations

structurethemeaningoftheterms‘religion’and‘science.’

Ifullyrealizethatthisprojectisinmanywaysoverlyambitious,afrequentfaultof

minethatmymentors,friends,andfamilycanfirmlyattestto.Inbeingoverlyambitious,I

amboundtofailinsomeregard,butIamalsoboundtopushlimits,andthatisallIaskfor.

And as my colleagues point out my failures (assuming anybody reads this damn

abomination),itwillonlypushmetopushmore,anddevelopthislineofthinkingfurther

pastthoselimitsinamorerefinedway.Iamacutelyawarethatthetheoryandmethodis

abstract and terminologically challenging. Some may find this to be an unnecessary

distraction, as this book can also be read as a collection of case studies complicating

simplified religion-science relationships. This latter readingworks because this is also a

book about how religion and science are understood in practice, practice by religious

advocates,byscientists,byacademics fromvariousbackgrounds,andbyspecialists. Iam

attemptingtoconnecttheorywithpracticeinsuchawaysothateachcaninformtheother.

Morespecifically,Iamattemptingtoconnecthowwetheorizeandconceptualizewiththe

practiceofcommunicationviadiscoursesinspecificsocial,cultural,andhistoricalcontexts.

Thisconnectionbetweentheoryandpracticeisthebestwaytounderstandhowwereify

concepts,whichisinherentlyanabstracttopracticalrelationalprocess.Assuch,Ideemed

theabove-mentionedchallengesunavoidable.

Ihaveattemptedtoaddressbothspecialistsandgeneralistsinavarietyoffields.This

is particularly daunting when considering the broad array of disciplines, themes, and

discoursesaddressed.Ihavealsoattemptedtodevelopthesubfieldofmethodandtheoryin

thestudyofreligionandscience,aswellasdiscourseanalysis,inordertoapplysomeofthe

bestavailableresearchtothestudyofthereligion-sciencerelation.Todojusticetoallthe

topics,themes,andhistoricaltimeperiodsItouchuponinthisbookrequiresnotonlyalevel

oftalent,butalsoalevelofknowledge,towhichImakenopretensions.Myapproachisa

specialization in a topic, rather than a discipline, but as such I must also advance my

argumentsbeyondmyareaofexpertise.That I amproposinganewmethodology that is

Preface

xii

interdisciplinaryrequiresthatIplaymyowngame.Moreover,Iamnotsimplycuttingacross

disciplinaryboundaries, Iamcuttinguptheboundariesthemselveswhichrequiresmeto

treadintounknownwatersthatnoparticularprogramofstudycanprepareonefor.Breadth

isalsonecessarytodemonstratethedepthoftheprocessesofrelationalconceptualization—

itshowshowdeeplyingrainedtheseprocessesareinhumanthinkingacrossawidearrayof

conceptualizations.Evenwithallthebreadthanddepthinvolvedinthisstudyandevenwith

the interdisciplinary approach, thiswork could still be regarded as a reconnaissance—a

preliminary investigation to gain information on recurring and dominant relational

constructs of religion and science and a prefatory examination of the applications of

relationalityanalysis.

The expansiveness of this work acknowledged, one thing that was regrettably

undertreatedwasrelationalsociology,whichhasbeendevelopinginthelasttwodecadesor

so.Certainly,relationalsociologyhassomeideasthatareapplicablehere,withafocusonthe

primacy of relations in the analysis of social facts, but it is too large a field to discuss

extensivelyhere.Anddespitethevarietyoftopicstoucheduponinthiswork,thereareso

manymorethatcouldhavebeenincludedaswell.Regrettably,thereisnotsufficientspace

toincludeallthatisrelevant.TheimpactoftheEnlightenmentonsuchimportantidentity

makers likeautonomyversusauthoritywere leftaside,even thoughthiscertainly isalso

discursivelyentangledwiththereligion-sciencerelation.Ialsofailedtodiscusstheroleof

esotericismduringtheEnlightenmentandinsteadfocusedonparticularnarrativesthatwere

operativeinthecasestudiesathand.AndtheinfluenceofRomanticismonreligion-science

relationswassorelyundertreated.Thetranscendentalistandenvironmentalistdebatesin

latenineteenth-centuryAmericacouldhavebeenexploredaswell,whichwouldhaveshown

theculturalreachofreligion-sciencerelations.ThoughItouchedonTheosophicalthinkers

hereandthere,thereisnodoubtthatTheosophyhadamuchlargerimpactontherelations

betweenreligionandsciencethanimplicatedhere.Insteadoffocusingonallmovementsthat

wereinstrumentalintheconstructionofthereligion-sciencerelation—whichisoutsidethe

scopeofasinglebookanyway—Itriedtofocusonperspectivesthatwereparticularlysalient

across thecasestudies.Differentcasestudiescouldhavebeenselectedaswell.Scientific

materialism alone would have been a sufficient case to demonstrate how science is

sometimesreducedtoreligion,butthishasbeenaddressedseveraltimesalready(though

Preface

xiii

withdifferentanalyticalperspectives).Therelationsbetweenreligionandecologywould

havemadeforabeautifulexampleofthereligiosityofscience,butthisissuchalargetopic

as to deserve a book of its own. And the scientificity of religion could also have been

thoroughlydemonstratedwithvirtuallyanyEasternreligion.IchoseBuddhismbecauseitis

arguablythemostinfluentialinthecontemporaryage.

Thecasestudieswerechosenbasedonacoupleofotherfactorsaswell.Forone,I

triedtosticktomyareaofexpertise:onthesideofreligion,thatincludesthephilosophyof

religion,EastAsianreligions,andAsianreligions in theWest;on thesideofscience, that

includesthephilosophyofscience,cognitivescience,andphysics.Ialsochosecasestudies

thatseemedtometobeunderstudiedorundervalued.Quantummysticismandthereligions

ofsciencearecasesinpoint.Finally,thecasestudiesareparticularlyeffectivebecausethey

show a continuity even as the perspectives of religion-science relations change. This is

partiallyduetotherelationalcontent inthecasestudies,butalsobecausetheirhistories

overlap.Assuch,thecasestudiescanalsobereadintermsofanewhistoryofreligionand

science, tracking changes from when religion and science were first put in relative

perspectivetoourcontemporaryage.Eachcaseisplacedinthecontextofatleastsomeof

theothercasestudies,givingsomecontinuity,aswouldbeexpectedinahistoricalaccount.

Thepersons, topics, and textsutilized inmycase studies, aswell as thehistorical

accounts,wereprimarilychosenfortheirexhibitionofspecificrelationsthathavedisplayed

enduranceovertheyears,nottosuggestthatthecasesareultimatelyinfluential.Inother

words,itisnotthespecificcasesthatareofcentralinterest,somuchasthewiderperspective

theyrepresent.Thevolatilityofthereligion-sciencerelationmakesitdifficulttosaywhich

casestudieswillremainimportantwithinthefield.Thesourcematerialdoesnotnecessarily

hold a privileged placewithin its position on the religion-science relation, as the lack of

consensusonthesepositionsmakesthisimpossible.Assuch,Ihavesurveyedalargesetof

textstoserveasthecorematerialforeachcasestudy,asaglanceatmybibliographywill

show.Theselectionofsourceshasbeenchosenbyawidesweepovertheavailableliterature,

ofwhichIhavefamiliarizedmyselfwithoverapproximatelythelasttenyears.Thesecase

studieswerealsoarrivedatbycross-referencingspecializedliteratureintheacademicfield

ofreligionandscience,especiallythe‘classic’authors,includingJohnWilliamDraper(1811–

1882),IanBarbour(1923–2013),JohnHedleyBrooke,andothers,aswellasdailyreadings

Preface

xiv

of internet news to feel the current pulse of the religion-science scene. Hopefully, this

approach has led to a somewhat comprehensive selection of the main religion-science

relations.

It is important to note that the relational construct analyzed in each case study

certainlydoesnotexhausttheperspectives.Putdifferently,therelationsareexamplesofthe

casestudies;thecasestudiesarenotexamplesoftherelations.Forinstance,‘scientism’is

notalwaysconstructedintermsofthereductionofsciencetoreligion,whichistherelation

Idiscuss.Thatrelationconstitutesonlyoneexampleofhowscientismisconceptualized.We

mustalwaysrememberthatthecasestudiesarenotconclusivelyonerelationoranother.This

isareflectionofrelationalityanalysis,asitismyattempttoshiftourfocusawayfromthe

conceptasareifiedthingandexaminethewaysinwhichrelationsgiverisetonovelideas.

Therelationalactproducestheentities,nottheotherwayaround.What‘scientism’isinone

instanceoranotherdependsontherelationapplied.Therewillbenoperfectcaseofany

relational construct, no true exemplar.Whether a given case is regarded as ‘science’ or

‘religion’orbothwilldependnotontheconceptortermemployed(here‘scientism’),buton

therelationutilized.Thecasestudiesshouldbereadinlightoftheotherrelationalconstructs

discussed here, which demonstrate contending histories, struggles over legitimizing

knowledge,andacomplexityofreligion-sciencerelations.

Besidestheindividualcasestudies,theworkasawholecouldbelookedatasacase

studyofreligionandscienceformywiderpurposeofrelationalizingconcepts.Assuch,this

workcouldhavebeenentitledRelationalityAnalysis,toemphasizethefactthatthisismainly

a contribution to theory and method in the academic treatment of concepts and their

definitions.Besidesforthereasonsofmyownpersonalinterest,Ichosereligionandscience

because in my view they are the two major knowledge systems that have guided our

philosophies, in a much deeper and wider way than the limits of their institutions.

Philosophy is central tohuman thought,whetherornot it is critically reflectedupon—it

underlieseveryutterance,whetherajoke,avulgarremark,orevennonsense.Allspeechand

materializations of speech both embody and construct how we see the world, how we

understandcomprehensibilityandtheprocessesofcommunicatingmeaning.Philosophies

ofreligionandscience,then,areubiquitous, thoughnotalwayseasilyrecognizable.From

Preface

xv

interpreting the significance of a polyp to a particle, religion and science define the

perimetersofandparametersformanyofourconcepts.

ThoughIhavediscussedthecasestudiesintermsofreligion-sciencehistory,Inot

only tracerelations in theirhistoricaldimensions,butalsoandmainly in theirdiscursive

ones. (On a related note, this means that all periodizations herein are heuristic.) This

producestwochronologies,thehistoricalchronologyandthediscursivechronology.Both

chronologiesarepartofthehistoryweareinterestedin—therelationalhistoryofdiscourses

of religion relative to discourses of science. The discursive chronology is sometimes

ahistorical—or,inaFoucauldiansense,genealogical—asmanyauthorssupplyanachronistic

traces of thought, applying their present-centered views on the past. I am aware of the

historiographicalissuesindoingso.Certainly,‘science’asaprofessionwasnotestablished

priortothenineteenthcenturyandtheearlyhistoriesofsciencedrewagrandnarrative,

taking the best elements of the past to argue for a ‘tradition’ thatwas in reality a novel

undertaking,butthesearenottheissueshere.Itreatauthors’views,includingthoseofthe

historians, as data not as facts. From a discursive perspective, history and the telling of

historyareeffectuallysimilar—bothcontributetothediscourseandconstructtheconcepts

in question. ‘Badhistory’ can be treated as a clue rather than a target. These ahistorical

histories provide a window to the inner workings of past and present convictions, the

underlyingmotivationsandaimsforconstructinghistoryasitwas.Discoursealsolaysthe

foundation forhow tradition, continuity, and changeare constructed.Despite the lackof

historical‘truth’insomeinstances,thesediscoursesleadtorealresults,shapingsocialand

culturalinstitutionsandpractices.Inthisanalysisofconceptualdevelopment,boththetruth

andthetaleareequallytelling.

The note of the ‘two chronologies’ is important to keep in mind when critically

examiningmysources.WhenIinvokeFriedrichA.vonHayek(1899–1992),forexample,to

justifytheinclusionofHenriSaint-Simon(1760–1825)andAugusteComte(1798–1857)as

part of the story of scientism, I am not presenting Hayek as evidence of history, but as

evidenceofdiscourse.Fromahistoricalperspective,datingscientismtothetimeofComteis

questionable.Theterm‘scientism’hadnotyetemerged.Butsinceinhistoricalaccountsof

Comte scientism is present (or, more accurately, presented), this history is part of the

discourse. Along the same lines, because I ammainly interested in discourse, what are

Preface

xvi

typicallyconsideredprimaryandsecondarysourcesappearsidebyside.Fromahistorical

reconstructionistperspective,thisseemsunconvincing.Fromadiscursiveperspective,the

separation of primary and secondary sources seems arbitrary. I suspend judgments on

nearlyallmysources,astheimportantpointhereisnotonthehistoriesashistories,buton

theauthors’accountsasconduitsofdiscursivechange.Themainexceptionstothisareinthe

firsttwochaptersandtheconcludingchapter,inwhichmostofthesourcescitedareusedto

explainanddefendmytheory,method,andunderlyingphilosophicalpremises.

Inconclusion,Iseekheretoofferaglimpseintotheinnerworkings,assumptions,and

premisesofthevariouspositionsonthereligion-sciencerelationship.Iraisemyarm,butit

wouldbenaïvetothinkthatIhavestruckAmalec.WhereasdeMaistresuspendshisarm,

explaininghisinaction,Istillhopetohavestrucksomething.Idonottrytoargueforone

relationshipoveranother,butinsteadtrytopresenttheviewsthemselvesnotasanswers

butasobjectsofinquiry.Understandingthenatureofthepositionsprovidesinsightintothe

limitsandpotentialsofouranalyses.Iammakinganappealtoreflectontheselimitsandthe

implicithumilitywithinthemandtofocusonthepotentialsforsocialandacademicbenefit

infuturework.Myapproachlooksatthemorefoundationalissueofhowsuchconceptstake

shapeingeneralandhowthisprocessleadstotheparticularsinagivencontext.Icontend

theprocessofconceptualizationinvolvedindiscursivechangeisrelational.Howdorelations

structuretheconcepts?Putdifferently,whatistherelationalityof‘religion’and‘science’?

1

Chapter1:ForgettingWords

Wordsexistbecauseofmeaning;onceyou’vegottenthemeaning,youcanforgetthewords.WherecanIfindamanwhohasforgottenwordssoIcanhaveawordwithhim?—Zhuangzi(ca.369–286BCE)1

1 MeaningIsFluid:TheProblem,theMotivation,&theAimIn the field of religion and science, the typical approach in determining the association

between thecentralconceptshasbeen todefine ‘religion,’define ‘science,’and,basedon

thesedefinitions,concludearelationshipbetweenthetwo.Despitethegeneraluniformity

ofthisdefinitionalapproachintheacademicfieldofreligionandscience(andacademiaat

large),identifyingthereligion-sciencerelationshipisstillamajorpointofcontention.The

questionsofdefinition,essentialism,explanation,andunderstandinghavefordecadesbeen

“deadlockedbecauseofalackofclarificationconcerningtheexactmeaningofthekeyterms

beingemployed.”2Onlyafewscholarshavedirectlyengagedwiththeissueeventhoughitis

clearly recognizedas centrally important.3This canbeconfirmedbyaquickoverviewof

worksinthefield,inwhichyouwillbehardpressedtofindanintroductionthatdoesnot

highlighttheproblemofdefinition.4AshistorianNormanHampson(1922–2011)argued,for

instance,thereisnopointinofferinggeneraldefinitions,as“suchadefinitionwouldhaveto

include somany qualifications and contradictions as to be virtuallymeaningless, or else

provesoconstrictingthatlogicwouldcontinuallybetryingtodebarwhatcommonsense

insistedonincluding.”5

1Watson(1996),140.Ihaveattemptedtoincludebirthanddeathdatesforallpeoplediscussedinthiswork.Myreasonfordoingsoissothatreaderscanhistoricallycontextualizequotes,comments,andanalyses.SinceItreatevenscholarlyworkasdata,suchinformationisrelevanttotheoverallresearchhere.ForindividualsofwhomIdonotprovidedates,theyare,tomyknowledge,stilllivingatthetimeofthefinalizationofthiswork.Iftheyarenotstillliving,butdatesarenotavailable,Idenotethisby“n.d.”2Penner&Yonan(1972),107.3 One exception includes Ingman et al (2016), an anthology surrounding the problem of the definition ofreligionandsecularitywithafocusonrelationaldynamics.4E.g.,on‘religion,’seeClouser(1991),9–16;andon‘religion’and‘science,’seeBrookeandCantor(1998),43–72.5Hampson(1968),10.WhileHampson’scommentsareinregardtodefining‘theEnlightenment,’Ithinkhisobservationsarespotonfortheproblemofdefinitionatlarge.

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Theproblemwiththedefinitionalapproachisthatitgivesprioritytowordsrather

than meaning making. I am using ‘meaning’ in the sense of knowledge representation,

categorization, and conceptualization.6Words are static, butmeaning is fluid. Somemay

argue that theproblemofdefinition is aproblem for essentialists, not for contextualists.

Indeed,termslike‘religion’and‘science’areemptysignifiersoutsideofagivencontext,but

alsocanvarygreatlyevenwithinaveryspecificcontext.Forexample,‘science’definedas

‘the natural investigation of the world’ will exclude mounds of data on the historical

conceptualizationoftheterm‘science.’7Furthermore,suchadefinitionwillmeansomething

different to a natural philosopherwho regardsnature as part ofGod’s creation and to a

nineteenth-centuryscientistwhounderstood investigationtobethatofnatural lawsthat

excluded considerations of God. Agreement on words does not indicate agreement on

meaning.

Contextualism is often thought of as an alternative to the essentialism that is

sometimespresentinhistoricalcomparison.Yet,thereisanessentialismtocontextualismin

thethoughtthatacontextualizeddefinitionwillsomehowconveythecoremeaningofthe

concepts in the chosen context. As Francis Bacon (1561–1626) noted, “even definitions

cannot cure this evil in dealing with natural and material things; since the definitions

themselves consist of words, and those words beget others […].”8 Clearly, ‘natural’ and

‘investigation’arealsocontextdependent.Theattempttoreachtheidealofcontextualism

restsonanunderlyingassumptionorperhapsanunconsciousdesire that, ifwedigdeep

enough, somewhere there is somethingessential thatwill begrasped in theutteranceof

words.But,themorewetrytoreignincontextualismwithevermorewords,thefartheritis

fromourgrasp.Nomatterhowcontextspecificweget,themethodologyofcontextualism

willneverbeenoughtoreachtheidealofcontextualism.Definitionsarenothingmorethan

6I.e.,inlinewiththeunderstandingof‘meaning’incognitivelinguistics.SeeStorjohann(2010),7.7E.g.,Cunningham(1988)tracesthehistoryofsciencebyappealingtoahistoricallineofnaturalinvestigation.Wemightbetemptedtoconcludethatsolongastheterms‘natural’and‘investigation’areusedinthesamewayonthesameoccasion,thentheproblemisresolved.However,thisdoesnotadvancetheissuebecausetheword‘same’mustalsohaveadefinitesense,whichcannotbeappliedacrossdifferentexamplesdrawnuponinordertoestablishthenotionofscienceunderstoodintheseterms.Furthermore,“Itisjustasdifficulttogiveanyaccountofwhatismeantby‘actinginaccordancewithmydecision’asitistogiveanaccountofwhatitwasto‘actinaccordancewiththeostensivedefinition’inthefirstplace.”Winch(1958),26–29.Seealsoibid.,29–31;andRoss(2009),63–64.8QuotedinHarris(2005),44.

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areplacementofonesetofwordsbyanothersetcarryingthesameissues.Thereisseemingly

noescapefromthissemanticcircle.Thismeansthatcontextualismisnotmakingtheobscure

anyclearerthanessentialism,everhistoricallycontingent.AsFriedrichWilhelmNietzsche

(1844–1900)said,“onlythatwhichhasnohistorycanbedefined.”9Thus,thedefinitional

approachwillalwaysfallshortofconveyingthemeaningofwords.

Thetypicalresponsehasbeentorecognizetheproblemofhistoricalanddefinitional

contingencies, but then to goonwithbusiness asusual.Definitionsof terms continue to

guideresearch.Assuch,“scholarsseethehurdleandrunarounditinordertoreachthegoal

ofexplainingreligion,butdisqualifythemselvesindoingso.”AsHansH.Penner(d.2012)

and EdwardA. Yonan argued,with the issue of definition left unresolved, the continued

debate over what constitutes the field of religion is a futile exercise, dependent on an

agreement as to the nature of religion.10 The argument to continuewith the definitional

approachisusuallyoneofutility—wedefinetermstosettheparametersfortheanalysis.

The thought is that the issue can be sidestepped in this way, but the efficacy of these

definitionsisdelusion,as“onemustfinallyimposeapersonalpatternontherichanarchyof

evidence.”11Thispatterndoesnotreflectthedata; itmakesthedatareflecttheanalytical

terms. A definition involves setting the scope of the domain after all. ‘Science’ is then

constructedasthatwhichthechosendatarepresents,like‘naturalinvestigation,’creatinga

circularargument.

‘Science’hasmeantandwillcontinuetomeanmanydifferentthings,andthesameis

truefor‘religion.’SinceIarguethatmeaningisfluid,wecannotrelyondefinitionsofreligion

andsciencetoanswerthequestionofthereligion-sciencerelationship,whichisthefirstand

foremostquestionguidingthisresearch.Theproblemsoutlinedabovecouldgreatlybenefit

froma shift of focus away fromdeterminingdefinitions to theprocesses involved in the

constructionofmeaning.Inotherwords,wecananalyzetheprocesses(meaningmaking)to

showhowvariousproducts(definitionsorsignifiersandrelationships)areproduced.This

willnotandcouldnotincludeadelineationofalltheproductssincemeaningissodynamic,

eventhoughintheoryitwouldbepossibleiftheprocessesandstructuresinvolvedcouldbe

9Nietzsche(1956),212.10QuotefromPenner&Yonan(1972),108.Seealsoibid.,109.11Hampson(1968),9,saidinregardtotheproblemsofperiodizationanddefinition.

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determined, as will be demonstrated in the following chapter. Developing a theory and

methodology, and accompanying analytical categories, that can capture thedynamismof

conceptualconstructsisthusthepurposeofthisresearch.Theincentiveofthisworkisto

delineateawaytotalkaboutanalyticaltermswithoutdefiningthem.Isuggestthiscanbe

accomplishedthrough‘relationalityanalysis,’whichIwilldiscussindetailinthefollowing

chapter.

Itistheaimofthisworktotestthishypothesisandtodemonstrateitsusabilityfor

analyzingdiscursivechangegenerallyandforthestudyofreligionandsciencespecifically,

withanultimategoaltoformulateameta-modelthatputsourvariousmodelsinperspective.

Before turning to my specific research questions and the fulfillment of these aims, it is

importanttofirstmakeclearthepositionofmyprojectinthediscipline,whichrequiresa

preliminaryexploration into thehistoryof theacademic fieldof religionandscienceand

otherapplicable researchperspectives.Thecentral research inquiryathandcan thenbe

madeclear.Thesub-questionsdirectingtheworkatthismomentare:whatapproachesto

the religion-science relationship have been used in the past and what problems are

associatedwiththem?Aretherealternativesthataddresstheseissues?Howcanweproceed

toanalyzefluidconceptswithinastableanalyticalstructure?

2 PastApproaches

Thereareatleastfourmainacademicthesesofthereligion-sciencerelationship,including

thewarfarethesis,theconflictthesis(thoughmanyscholarsdonotdistinguishbetweenthe

two), the complexity or contextualist thesis, and what might be called the ‘dynamism

thesis.’12

The‘beginning’ofthefieldisoftentracedtotheworkofJohnWilliamDraper(1811–

1882),HistoryoftheConflictBetweenReligionandScience(1874).13AccordingtoDraper,the

12ThissectionislargelybasedonthepublicationVollmer&vonStuckrad(2017).13Distributionmaynothavebeenuntil1875,howeverIcouldnotconfirmthisdateastheoriginalpublishingyear,astheprimarysourcedatedpublicationin1875,butnotedthatitenteredintheLibraryofCongressin1874.AlthoughIwillbehistoricizingthefield,itisgoodtokeepinmindthatmydefinitionofits‘beginnings’isa pragmatic one, necessitating vagueness. Periodization is always arguable and the literature supports the‘beginnings’rangingoveracenturyfromthemid-1800stothemid-1900s.Discoursebuildsmomentumand

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5

historyofscienceisanarrativeofreligion-scienceconflict.14Drapersupportedthethesesof

Andrew DicksonWhite (1832–1918)—his main work being A History of theWarfare of

SciencewithTheologyinChristendom(1896),inwhichconflictwasalsoemphasized.15The

thoughtof these two individualshasbeen joined inwhat is knownas the ‘Draper-White

thesis’or the ‘warfare thesis.’16Thoughalternativeviewsemergedalongside theDraper-

White thesis, it continued tohold sway, particularlywith theworkof Stephen JayGould

(1941–2002) in the late twentieth century, who characterized the religion-science

relationshipas“non-overlappingmagisteria”of“naturalantagonists.”17

Whileconflicthascertainlyoccurred,manyspecialiststodaynotethatthishasbeen

theexception,not therule.18 IanBarbour(1923–2013)rejectedthewarfarethesisas the

onlyapplicablemodelofreligion-sciencerelationsandsomeclaimhisbookIssuesinScience

andReligion(1966)markedtheemergenceofthespecializedfieldofreligionandscience.19

This periodization is supported by the fact that from the 1960s to the 1980s academic

research institutions and journals for the study of religion and sciencewere established

acrosstheworld.20Barbourwasalsoamongthefirsttosetoutatypologyofrelationships:

conflict, independence, dialogue, and integration.21 Though he critiqued the widespread

application of thewarfare thesis, his approachwas later criticized as assuming inherent

conflictby treatingthetwoconceptsas fundamentallydistinct that“forcesanontological

thusIwilldiscussperiodswheretherewas littlediscussionof theacademic fieldofreligionandsciencetodemonstrate the building blocks and growth of the discussion. For introductions to the academic field ofreligion and science and related considerations of periodization, see Brooke (2003), 749; van Huyssteen(2003),vii;Clayton(2006),1–2;andVollmer&vonStuckrad(2017).Onthehistoryofreligionandscience,asopposedtotheacademicfield,seeGrant(2004);andOlson(2004).14Draper(1875),vi–vii.15 Ferngren (2000), xiii; andWhite (1896). I couldnot confirm this date, as the text is elsewhere listed aspublishedin1895,1897,and1898.Consultationofthetextitselfcouldnotclarifythepublicationyear,aslatereditionsdonotstatetheoriginalpublicationdate.OnthecontextofwhichDraperandWhitewereassertingsuchclaims,seePrincipe(2015),45–48;andFleming(1972),123–125.16TheDraper-White thesis is sometimes referred toas the ‘conflict thesis,’ butbetterdifferentiatedas the‘warfarethesis,’anothercommonepithet,sincethe‘conflictthesis’issometimesusedtorefertothenotionof‘inherentconflict,’accordingtoCantor&Kenny(2001).17Gould(1999),passim;andGould(1977),141.SeealsoWilson(2000),4and8.18Brooke(2003),749;andRussell(1997),48.19E.g.,Peters(2005),8191.20Peters(2005),8185statedthatthisoccurredinthe1970s,butthemajorinstitutionswerefoundedacrossalargertimespan.21Barbour(1990).

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separation,” which has not always been present in the history of ideas.22 So despite his

contextualizedtypology,forsome,Barbourbecamethescholarassociatedwiththe‘conflict

thesis.’

Meanwhile, alternative religion-science theses continued to emerge, including the

‘complexitythesis’foundinJohnHedleyBrooke’sinfluentialworkScienceandReligion:Some

HistoricalPerspectives(1991).However,severalintellectualshadalreadyproblematizedthe

warfarethesisbasedonobservationsofthecomplexityandinterconnectednessofreligion-

science histories,whichwas sometimes found to exhibit positive relations. For instance,

EdwinA.Burtt(1892–1989)inMetaphysicalFoundationsofModernPhysicalScience(1924)

andAlfredNorthWhitehead(1861–1947)inScienceandtheModernWorld(1926)traced

the theological foundations of science. In the early 1970s, other academics revisited the

matter of the religious foundations of science, such as Reijer Hooykaas (1906–1994) in

ReligionandtheRiseofModernScience(1972)andStanleyL.Jaki(1924–2009)inScience

andCreation(1974).Still,Brooke’sworkwasofcentralimportance,asitbroughttolightthe

problemofthedefinitionalapproachwhenhenotedthevariantusesoftheterms‘religion’

and‘science,’includingtheshiftingboundariesbetweenthetwoknowledgesystems,which

ledtohisemphasisoncontext.23Brooke’sobservationshavebecomesalientinthefieldof

thehistoryofscienceandamongreligion-sciencespecialists.24

Whatmightbe called the ‘dynamism thesis’ hasbeendeveloped in suchworksas

MikaelStenmark’sHowtoRelateScienceandReligion(2004).Likethecomplexitythesis,this

approach treats ‘religion’and ‘science’asdynamicconcepts.However, itdiffers in that it

takes into account previous situations so that restriction and expansion of terms are

contextualized,demonstratingchangesintherelationshipthroughtime.Thus, itdoesnot

22 Cantor & Kenny (2001), 769, 777, and passim. Peter Harrison claimed that the conflict thesis has beengenerallyrejectedbyallhistoriansandcharacterizeditasa“myth”thatwas“invented”byDraperandWhite.However,thisoverlooksthefactthatreligionandsciencehaveandcontinuetoconflictinsomecircumstances.Harrison later offhandedly stated there are atypical occurrences of conflict, but claimed this was notrepresentativeofalargerhistoricalpicture.SeeHarrison(2010),4–5.However,ifconflictdoesoccur,itwouldnotbeappropriatetorefertothismodelasa“myth.”Itseemstomethatwhathewantstodenyisinherentconflict,whilerecognizingthepresenceofextrinsicconflict,buthedoesnotmakethisexplicit.23Brooke(1991),16and321.24Ferngren(2000),xiii.

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relyonessentialized‘startingpoints’fortheconceptsinquestiontoexpandorrestrictfrom

andinsteadfocusesonthedevelopmentsleadingtochangesofvariousperspectives.25

Contextualism is at presentwinning out as the favored approach to the academic

studyofreligionandscience,however,asDavidB.Wilsonnoted,

[thisapproach]hasthepotentialofleadinghistoriansastray.Pursuitofcomplexitycouldproduceevernarrowerstudiesthatarevoidofgeneralization.Moreover,awarenessofthegreatvariationofviewsindifferenttimesandplacescouldleadtothemistakenconclusionthatthoseideaswerenothingbutreflectionsoftheirown‘cultures.’26

Besidestheproblemsofcontextualismdiscussedintheintroductoryremarks,amajorissue

withalackofgeneralizationsistheaccompanyinglackofpremisesforhistoricalcomparison.

Furthermore,purecontextualismlacks justificationforaspecializedfieldaltogether,as if

thereisnoenduringsubjectmattertherewouldbenoobjectofstudytospeakof.Theother

approaches discussed are also problematic: taxonomies of the relationship generally

formulate religionandscienceas fundamentally separate.27Othershavepointedout that

assumedseparation forcesalternatives tobeartificially framed inopposition todivision,

obscuring the fact that religion and science have not always been distinct forms of

knowledge.28Moreover, historical evidence and discourse analysis demonstrate that not

onlydotherelationshipandtheuseofconceptsvaryindifferentcontexts,orevenwithin

veryspecificcontexts,butalsotheboundariesbetweendifferentformsofknowledgecanbe

very fluid.29 However the lines are drawn that demarcate religion and science, they are

perpetuallytransgressedandchallenged,givingrisetonewmeaningsandnewrealities.30

Thus,rigidanalyticalcategoriesareinherentlyproblematicastheyimposeartificiallimits

ondynamicphenomena.Itmaythenseemouranalyticalcategoriesareboundtofail.

25Stenmark(2004),passim.26Wilson(2000),10.27E.g.,theseminalwork,Barbour(1997).28E.g.,Cantor&Kenny(2001).SeealsoBrooke(1991).29E.g.,vonStuckrad(2013c).30vonStuckrad(2013b).

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3 AlternativeApproaches

3.1 DiscourseAnalysisDiscourse analysis, in its various manifestations, is an effective way to expose the

contingencies of knowledge formation and thus the changes of meaning through time.

Discourse analysis is exceedingly helpful in analyzing fluid concepts within a stable

analyticalstructure.Sincemyownanalysisdepartsfrommanyobservationspresentinthe

field of discourse analysis, a discussion of this research perspective and of the relevant

conceptsisneededtolaythetheoreticalgroundwork.31

Thoughthereareseveralmethodsforapproachingdiscourseanalysis,Iusetheterm

‘discourse’inthetraditionofMichelFoucault(1926–1984)andotherswhoapplytheterm

beyondalinguisticcontexttothatofculturalstudies.32Discourseisdefinedasfollows:

[P]ractices that organize knowledge in a given community; they establish, stabilize, and legitimizesystemsofmeaningandprovidecollectivelysharedordersofknowledgeinaninstitutionalizedsocialensemble.Statements,utterances,andopinionsaboutaspecifictopic,systematicallyorganizedandrepeatedlyobservable,formadiscourse.33

Discourses“aretobetreatedaspracticeswhichsystematicallyformtheobjectofwhichthey

speak.”34Togiveasimpleexample,imaginefarmlandthatgoesbarrenandisrepurposedas

a soccer field: theobject inquestionchangesdependingonhowwe talkabout it (fertile,

barren, or recreational) andwhat practices are associatedwith it (farming, lying fallow,

sports).Even‘land’canbechangeddependingonthecontext,sayintoacrudeparkinglot,

showingnotevenmaterialchangesareneededintheformationofanewobject.

Asdiscourseschange,sodoeswhatistakenforknowledge.InaFoucauldiansense,

‘knowledge’isallkindsofmeaningsattributedbypeopletointerpretreality,derivedfrom

31 On some of the guiding assumptions of critical discourse analysis (not all of which I abide by), seeHammersley(1997).32 This is in contrast toHansG. Kippenbergwhodiscusses the discursive study of religion in reference tospeech-acttheories.SeeKippenberg(1983).SeealsovonStuckrad(2003),266,foranexplanation.33vonStuckrad(2013a),10.Analternativedefinitionofdiscourseis:“[A]ninstitutionallyconsolidatedconceptof speech inasmuchas itdeterminesandconsolidatesactionand thusalreadyexercisespower.”Quoted intranslationinJäger(2001),34.OriginalquotefromLink(1983),60.SeealsoWodak(2001a),66:“‘Discourse’canthusbeunderstoodasacomplexbundleofsimultaneousandsequentialinterrelatedlinguisticacts,whichmanifestthemselveswithinandacrossthesocialfieldsofactionasthematicallyinterrelatedsemiotic,oralorwrittentokens,veryoftenas‘texts’,thatbelongtospecificsemiotictypes,thatisgenres.”34Jäger(2001),39,quotingFoucaultintranslation.SeealsoFoucault(1989),74.

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therespectivediscursivecontext.35Putdifferently,discoursesuppliestheconceptsandthe

knowledgeusedtocarveuprealityintothe‘shape’weunderstanditas.Scholarofreligion

Kocku von Stuckrad incorporated these notions, concluding ‘knowledge’ is “the cultural

responsetosymbolicsystemsthatareprovidedbythesocialenvironment[…]produced,

legitimized,communicated,andtransformedasdiscourses.”36Thismeansthatknowledgeis

sociallyandhistoricallyconstructed.37

Thehistoricaldimensioncomesinwiththefactthatdiscourseshavehistoricalroots

and can be understood as “the flow of knowledge […] throughout all time.”38Discourses

evolveasaresultofhistoricalprocesses,withnoindividualorgroupdeterminingitscourse.

Inthisway,itisanindependentprocess,eventhoughallindividualscontribute:discourseis

‘super-individual.’ Thus, in order to identify societal knowledge on specific topics, like

religionandscience,areconstructionofitsgenealogyisnecessary.39‘Genealogy’isdefined

byFoucaultas“aformofhistorywhichreportsontheconstitutionofknowledge,discourses,

fieldsofobjects,etc.,withouthavingtorelatetoasubjectwhichtranscendsthefieldofevents

andoccupiesitwithitshollowidentitythroughouthistory.”40Wordsorsubjectsare‘hollow’

andassuchagenealogymustavoidresortingtoanessential factorasthethreadholding

togetherhistoryandinsteadexaminethetapestryanditsaccompanyingpatternsofchange

andcontinuity.Thiscan involvea focusonparticular ‘discoursestrands’or “thematically

uniform discourse processes.”41 Discourse strands have both synchronic and diachronic

dimensions,sounlikecontextualism,thereissomethinglikeenduringsubjectmatterinthe

tapestrythatcanbeutilizedforhistoricalcomparison,butwithoutresortingtoessentializing

thethreadsnonetheless.

The social dimensionmust be attended to further aswell. Discourse analysis can

involve,forinstance:

35Jäger(2001),33.36vonStuckrad(2013a),4.37SeeFoucault(1980),discussedinrelationtothediscursivestudyofreligioninvonStuckrad(2013a).SeealsoBerger&Luckmann(1966);Wodak(2001b),9;andvanLeeuwen(1993).38Jäger(2001),34,quotinghimself,fromJäger(1993).SeealsoWodak(2001b),9.39Jäger(2001),37.40Quoted in translation in Jäger (2001), 37–38. See also Foucault (1978), 32.On othermethods for doingdiscourseanalysisinhistoricalperspective,seeJäger(2001),52.41Jäger(2001),47.

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[T]herelationshipamongcommunicationalpracticesandthe(re)productionofsystemsofmeaning,or orders of knowledge, the social agents that are involved, the rules, resources, and materialconditionsthatareunderlyingtheseprocesses,aswellastheirimpactonsocialcollectives.42

Social practice is considered a formof knowledge, representedby discourse or, in other

words,thethingssaidaboutsocialpractices.43Moreover,subjectsandtheiractions‘bring

knowledgeintoplay,’connectingdiscourseswithreality.44Forinstance,‘discursiveevents’

“influence thedirection andquality of thediscourse strand towhich theybelong.”45The

ScopesTrialontheteachingofevolutioninAmericanschoolswasamajordiscursiveevent

relativetoreligionandscience,asitresultedinpublicdebates,polemics,educationalreform,

andnewlaws,havingamajorimpactontheperceptionanddirectionofthereligion-science

relationship. Some suggest that this discourse event symbolized a political transition of

powerfromreligiontoscience.46Inthisway,socialactionsembodyknowledgeandthuswe

canseethisconnectionbetweendiscourseandtherealworld.

Sowhiletexts,speech,andotherformsoflinguisticsoftensetthescenefordiscursive

negotiationsofandstrugglesovermeaningstructures,discoursealsomanifestsinsignsand

symbolicactionsaswell,inadditiontootherextra-linguisticprocesses.47Discourseanalysis,

then,must also take into account ‘dispositives,’ or “the totality of thematerial, practical,

social, cognitive, or normative ‘infrastructure’ in which a discourse develops.”48 This

includes activities and materializations, such as research programs, professional

institutions,media,theInternet,television,oreducationalsystems.49AsvonStuckradnoted,

42vonStuckrad(2013a),10.SeealsoJäger(2001),33:“Discourseanalysis[…]aimstoidentifyknowledge(validat a certain place at a certain time) of discourses […] to explore the respective concrete context ofknowledge/powerandsubjectittocritique.”43Wodak(2001b),9,saidaccordingtotheperspectiveofvanLeeuwen(1993).44Jäger(2001),45.45Jäger(2001),48.Cf.Keller(2011),53–54,whodescribeddiscursiveeventsasthematerialformofwhichdiscourseappears.46Thomas,Peck,&DeHaan(2003),387–388;Flory(2003),401;andSmith(2003b),passim.47vonStuckrad(2003),263–265;andWodak(2001b),11.48vonStuckrad(2013a),10.Ondispositiveanalysis,seeJäger(2010);andBührmann&Schneider(2008).Formore literature, see von Stuckrad (2013a). Jäger (2001), 56–58, seems to hold a very different view ofdispositives than von Stuckrad, as a sort of triangulation between discursive practices, non-discursivepractices,andmaterializations.Cf.,also,Keller(2011),56.49While‘discursivepractices’canbethoughtofas“speakingandthinkingonthebasisofknowledge,”‘non-discursivepractices’ includeactingonthebasisofknowledge,while ‘materializations’ofknowledgearetheproductofacting/doing.SeeJäger(2001),33.

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“datacanbe found inall formsof communication thatareoperative in theattributionof

meaning.”50

3.2 TheSociologyofKnowledgeInagreementwithvonStuckrad,Iarguethatadiscourse-historicalapproachcanalsobenefit

fromtheobservationsandanalyticaltoolsofthesociologyofknowledge.Thisfieldexamines

patterned thought and action, habitualization, and persistent traditions, in the form of

institutionsforexample,ascentral inknowledgeconstructionthatcanbetracedthrough

time.Discourseanalysisandthesociologyofknowledgehavealreadybeenbroughttogether

inwhat isknownas the ‘sociologyofknowledgeapproach todiscourseanalysis’ (SKAD),

developed,inpart,bysociologistReinerKeller.Thisapproachexamineslanguageassocial

interactionandthesocialcontextsinwhichdiscourseisembedded.Inthisresearchprogram,

discourse is treated as concrete andmaterial, “a real social practice,” in that it tangibly

appearsinspeech,text,andsocialactions.“Indiscourses,theuseoflanguageorsymbolsby

socialactorsconstitutesthesocioculturalfacticityofphysicalandsocialrealities.”51Though

thisconstitutesa‘socialfact,’becauseofhistoricalcontingencies,thefactismutable.

Fromasociologicalperspective, ‘knowledge’doesnotrepresentrealitysomuchas

organizerealityaccordingtothewantsandneedsofsocietyanditsmembers.Thecommon

realitysharedbythemembersofasocietyis‘knowledge.’52Fromthisperspective,theworld

of ideation (systems of knowledge, ideas, concepts, ideologies, mentalities, belief, etc.)

originates in social groups and institutions, determined by ‘structural locations’ (e.g.,

community,class,culture,nation,generation,etc.)ofthemembersinquestionandthusis

functionallyrelatedtothehistoriesofsocieties.PeterBergerandThomasLuckmann(1927–

2016)havearguedthatideasarenotsimplydeterminedbysocialrealities,butthatsocial

realityisitselfaconstruct.53FromtheperspectiveofBergerandLuckmann,whodrawfrom

theworkofMaxWeber (1864–1920)andÉmileDurkheim(1858–1917),knowledgeand

socialrealityhaveadialecticalrelationship—theyaremutuallyconstitutive.Toputitsimply,

50vonStuckrad(2013a),14.51Keller(2011),48–49and51.Emphasisoriginal.52Fuller(2010),339–340.53McCarthy(2010),340–341.

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whatwe‘know’isbasedonourperceptionof‘reality’andthatperceptionisbasedonwhat

we‘know.’“Theproductactsbackupontheproducer.”

Howdoes this dialectic occur?Berger andLuckmannargued, “Society is a human

product. Society is an objective reality. Man is a social product.”54 The first statement,

“society is a human product,” means that human beings engage in activities, producing

objects—a house, for example—in a process known as ‘externalization,’ since they are

externalizing their inner expressions into outer behaviors and objects, which make up

society.Nowthehouse,oncebuilt,standsonitsownsotospeak,existingindependentlyof

thepeoplewhobuiltit.Itbecomesanobjectiverealityandthusisknownas‘objectification.’

Thishousebecomesa ‘frame forhumanactivity.’55Thearchitectureand functionsof the

house,forinstance,directhowthehouseholdinteractswithit.Thehousebecomesacenter

of the family unit, a social gathering place, and is attributed loving and memorable

connotations,forexample.Thesethingsaffectthepeoplelivinginit,wherebythemeaning

of the house becomes a subjective reality for its members, and thus is known as

‘internalization.’This inturnaffectstheinhabitants’expressionsandactions, forexample

passingonthe‘familyhouse’tothenextgenerationorturningthehouseofahistoricalfigure

intoamuseum,externalizingthehouseanew,andthustheprocessgoesfullcircle.Itisan

ongoing,reciprocalprocesswherebysociety isahumanproductandhumanbeingsarea

productofsociety.

Thesociologyofknowledgeinfluencedthebranchesofstudyknownasthesociology

ofscienceandthesociologyofscientificknowledge,whichmakemanyofthesameclaims

except that they take the observations of the sociology of knowledge to their logical

conclusion and apply it to the sciences, including logic, mathematics, and technology.56

Scienceisaprocessopentosociologicalanalysis“tonolesserdegreethanthoseinother

54BothquotesonBerger&Luckmann(1966),61.55Furseth&Repstad(2006),58.56See,e.g.,Varcoe(2010),517–519;Tsekeris(2010),520–521;andPinch&Bijker(1984),339–441.Priortothe emergence of these fields, sciencewas often perceived as immune to social influence—in some sense‘outsideofsociety.’SeeVarcoe(2010),518;andKnorr-Cetina(2005),548.Evenearlysociologistsofknowledgeexcluded the natural sciences from consideration, such as Karl Mannheim (1893–1947) and Max Scheler(1874–1928).SeeMannheim(1936);andScheler(1924).

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areasofsociallife,”aswellasopentodiscourseanalysisandthemethodologyIproposein

thefollowingchapter.57

If onewere examining ‘science’ from this perspective, the focuswould be on the

‘negotiation’ofscientificknowledgethroughexpressionsandactivities—forexample,peer

review,falsification,writingpractices,laboratorystandards,etc.—throughwhichascientific

‘object’canbesaidtobeidentified.58Thepatternoftheseactivitiesisthenapprehendedas

‘science.’ These practices are not purely objective and all can be understood as social

phenomena. ‘Truth’ and ‘objectivity’ are “managed” and “creatively enacted,” as well as

‘evidence’ and ‘experiment.’59 There is a certain degree of ‘interpretive flexibility’ in

determining the ‘results’ of experiments, as “the closure which stabilizes ‘knowledge’ is

broughtaboutbyarangeofsocialfactorsratherthansomethinginthedata.”60‘Hardfacts’

donotescapethisassessment,whichareregardedas“thoroughlyunderstandableinterms

of their social construction.”61 Thus, scientific activities are better understood as

constructive,ratherthandescriptive.62

These patterns of activities develop into institutions, which are habitualizations

appliedtoactionsinvolvingsocialrelationships.63Differentrolesinvolvedifferentialaccess

toanddistributionofthesocialstockofknowledge.Knowledgeis‘directed’byinstitutions

andthis,moreover,involvesalevelofsocialcontrol.Thissocialcontroldoesnotnecessarily

taketheformofmechanismsorasystemofcontrol,ascontrolalsooccursthroughdefining

inthefirstplacewhetheraformofknowledgeisregardedasalegitimatedomainofinquiry

ornot.

57Knorr-Cetina(2005),547.Onsomeofthesuccessesofthesociologicalapproachtoscientificknowledge,seeShapin(1982). Idonotdiscussreligionhere,associal influence ismorewidelyknownandacceptedinthestudyofreligion.Foranintroductiontothesociologyofreligion,see,e.g.,Turner(2005).58Varcoe(2010),517–519.59Tsekeris(2010),520;Shapin(1994);Harvey(1981);Restivo(1983);andDaston(1991).60Varcoe(2010),518.61 Latour&Woolgar (1986), 107. See also Fleck (1979); and Poovey (1998). Replication of results is alsoproblematized,asthisdependsonwhatareregardedassignificantvariablesintheexperiment.SeeCollins&Pinch (1998), 11, 25, 98, and passim. The laboratory itself has also been analyzed as a social construct—formulatedasatheoreticalnotionratherthansimplyaphysicalplacewherescienceisdone.E.g., ‘nature’ismodifiedinalaboratory,sothat‘raw’natureisnotevenconfronted,butrathertransformedintominiaturizedand remodeled forms and thus is subject to ‘social overhauls.’ See Knorr-Cetina (2005), 549. On theconstructionofknowledgeinthelaboratory,seealsoKnorr-Cetina(1981).62SeeKnorr(1977);Knorr-Cetina(1981);Latour&Woolgar(1986);andEriksson(2010),519.63TheSocietyforSocialResearch(n.d.).

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Institutions[…]bytheveryfactoftheirexistence,controlhumanconductbysettinguppredefinedpatternsofconduct,whichchannelitinonedirectionagainstthemanyotherdirectionsthatwouldtheoreticallybepossible[…]thiscontrollingcharacterisinherentininstitutionalizationassuch.64

We can see this in the example of how habitualizations are maintained by social

relationships, involvingtechniquessuchasdiscrediting(sometimeseminent)scientists—

whichcanbepurelybasedonsocialfactors—orsimplytheintimidationstemmingfromthis

possibilityshouldoneattempttogoagainstthegrain.65“Quackery”iscontrolledthrough“a

wholebodyofprofessionalknowledgethatoffersthem‘scientificproof’ofthefollyandeven

wickednessofsuchdeviance.”66Wecanalsopointtotheobvioussocialfactorsinvolvedin

theinstitutionalizationofscience,suchasfundingopportunitiesdeterminedbyeconomic

interestsforexample,andpoliticalinfluences,suchaspolicydecisionsthatcanopenupor

effectivelyclosedownresearchprojectslikestemcellresearch.Otheractionsofcontrolcan

includeassertionofauthority,thedeploymentofsanctions,positivereinforcementthrough

recognition and awards, etc. “[Scientific] knowledge is dependent on, and shapedby, the

contextsinwhichitiscreated.”67

‘Knowledge,’isalsoformulatedaccordingtoaparticularworldview.Inordertodirect

knowledge,institutionsmustsupplylegitimizationfordoingso.“Legitimationjustifiesthe

institutionalorderbygivinganormativedignitytoitspracticalimperatives.”Legitimization

implies both knowledge and values. One way this is done is by placing the institution,

knowledge,andassociatedactions“inacomprehensivelymeaningfulworld.”68Politicsand

governance,forexample,aregroundedinacosmicorderofpower,justice,law,etc.Inthe

sameway,scienceislocatedinaworldofnaturalknowledge,truth,andorder,forinstance.69

64Berger&Luckmann(1966),55.65Discreditingofscientificresultsalsosometimesoccursduetoothersocialfactors,likelossofinterestinthetopic,deathordiscreditingofinvestigators,orbecausemore‘interesting,’butsimilarissuesarise.SeeKnorr-Cetina(2005),551;andBerger&Luckmann(1966),85–92.66Berger&Luckmann(1966),88.67Eriksson(2010),519.SeealsoBerger&Luckmann(1966),62.Ontherelationsbetweenscientificknowledge,awards,andinstitutionalization,seeMerton(1968),56;Merton(1973a);andLatour&Woolgar(1986),192–194.68Berger&Luckmann(1966),61,92–97,and103.69Onthelegitimizationofscienceviainstitutionalvalues,seeMerton(1973b).Mertonfindsthatfoursetsofinstitutional imperatives direct the scientific ethos: universalism, communism (meaning the collectiveownershipofscientificknowledge),disinterestedness,andorganizedskepticism.Seeibid.,270–278.SeealsoMerton(1973a),inwhichoriginalityisalsoemphasized.HowexpansivetheinfluenceofascientificethosisandtheMertonianapproachingeneralhavebeenchallengedbyseveralindividuals.ForthecritiquesoftheMertonianapproachandseveralreferences,seeCameron&Edge(1979),23and25–26n.13.

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Religionissometimeslocatedinscience’sframeofreferenceof‘knowledge’aboutanatural,

explicable world. From this perspective, it would be inappropriate—a normative

statement—to treat religion as a source of supernatural knowledge. The ultimate

legitimization for how to treat religion ‘correctly’ in the naturalworld order is ‘located’

withinthenaturalcosmologyandthecommunityandaccompanyingpracticesofscience.

Knowledgeisalsosociallycontrolledviatheorderingofhistorythatoccurswithin

symbolic universes, linking past, present, and future in a “meaningful totality.”70 This is

particularlyevidentinrevisionist,specificallypositivist,historyofscience,whereelements

ofthe‘occult’and‘superstitious’practiceswereweededoutfromscientifichistoriesorat

theleastdifferentiatedfromwhatcountsas‘science,’eventhoughtodosoistodistorthow

‘occult science’ was viewed at the time—that is as ‘science’ as such.71 Science then is

sometimes represented as a red thread through time,weaving andwinding around, but

ultimatelyavoiding,‘pseudoscience,’thustellingataleofprogressandtruth.72Needlessto

say,thistalewasaroundwhen‘occultscience’wasthoughtofas‘science’assuchaswell.

The previously undifferentiated branches astronomy/astrology, alchemy/chemistry, etc.

came tobepolemically separated through time.And itwasnotuntil theperiodbetween

about1500and1800thattherewasanincreasingarticulationof‘truescience’incontrastto

‘pseudoscience,’thuswhatpresentlyfallsintothecategoryof‘genuinescience’ishistorically

andsociallysituatedaswell.73Assuch,thesociologyofknowledgeapproachtodiscourse

analysiscanshowtheprocessesthatledtothefundamentaldistinctionbetweenreligionand

sciencepresent inmany religion-science relationship theses. It canalsodemonstrate the

porous boundaries of concepts like ‘religion’ and ‘science,’ boundaries of which are

constructed via institutionalization, habitualizations, worldviews, and the ordering of

history.Itshowsthatscienceisjustasmuchconstructedastherestofsocietyandopenfor

analysis.

70Berger&Luckmann(1966),103.71 See, e.g., Hanegraaff (2013), which also contains references to many other sources relevant to thisobservation.72Thenotionsof‘progress’and‘truth’havebeeneffectivelychallengedinthephilosophyofsciencesincethe1960son,continuing tobedebatedtoday.Some importantcontributions in thisregardarePopper(1959);Popper(1962);Kuhn(1970[1962]);andLaudan(1977),tonameafew.Despitetherecognitionofthe‘problemofprogress’ in thephilosophy,history,andsociologyofscience, the ideaof ‘progress’continuestopervadetextbooksinthenaturalsciences.SeeNiaz(2009),175–186andpassim.73Bakker(2010),520–521.

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Incontrasttotherigidanalyticalcategoriespresentinthedefinitionalapproachand

someofthepastreligion-sciencerelationshiptheses,discourseanalysisandthesociologyof

knowledgedepartsfromadynamictheoreticalpositiontowardwordsandtheirmeanings.

Butdespitethefluidityofknowledge,concepts,andmeaningmaking,thereareinescapable

factorsthatshapeourunderstandingoftheworld—social,historical,anddiscursivefactors.

ThetheoreticalandmethodologicalapproachthatIwill followinthisworkrestsonsuch

factors,aswellastherecognitionoffluidity,intheconceptualconstructionandsubsequent

evolutionof‘religion’and‘science.’

4 PositionoftheProjectintheDiscipline,ResearchQuestions,&Outline

Discourseanalysisandthesociologyofknowledgeconfirmthemutableboundariesbetween

systems of knowledge. These perspectives provide a way to examine, in a highly

contextualizedandsociallysituateddiscourse,meaningsandtheircontingencies.Theycan

situatediscoursestandsrelativetoalargertapestryofmeaning,whichallowsforhistorical

comparison.Allofthesefactorsarebeneficial.However,therearesomechallengestothese

approachesaswell.Forone,despitethemanyanalyticaltoolsdiscussed,discourseanalysis

is commonly thought of as a research perspective, rather than a methodology, and the

sociologyofknowledgeisalsomoretheorythanmethod,andthuswestillneedsomefurther

directionforouranalysisofreligionandscience.74Nonetheless,asthisworkwillexamine

thehistorical transformationof discoursesof ‘religion’ relative todiscoursesof ‘science,’

taking into account social factors indiscursive change, it can certainlybe situated in the

sociology of knowledge approach to historical discourse analysis, while also offering an

innovativeapproach.Thisapproachisrelevanttothesecondmajorchallengetodiscourse

analysis.

74 Berger & Luckmann (1966), 14. Although there is more emphasis on perspective, various theoreticalapproaches and methodologies have been proposed for these research programs. See, e.g., Jäger (2001),containing rather specific processes formethodology and analysis; andWodak (2001a) for an alternativeapproachbasedonfourlevelsofcontextanalysis.

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Thischallengeisthatdiscourseanalysisisaninvestigationofproducts,notprocesses.

To be sure, the products are analyzed in terms of the processes, like through discursive

strands for example, but the processes themselves are not clear. To give an example, a

discourse analysis of alchemy and chemistry can show that the termswere polemically

separated from a previously unified concept of the ‘investigation of nature,’ via

demonstratingthatthetermscametobeentangledwithdifferent,opposingdefinitionslike

the ‘occult’and ‘science.’Buthow is thisdone? In thewordsofMartinHeidegger (1889–

1976)—albeit in adifferent context but applicablehere—“Howwould it be if, insteadof

tenaciouslyrepresentingmerelyacoordinationofthetwoinordertoproducetheirunity,

wewereforoncetonotewhetherandhowabelongingtooneanotherfirstofallisatstake

inthis‘together’?”75Putintermsrelevanttodiscourseanalysis,howwoulditbeifinsteadof

representingamerecoordinationbetweendiscursivestrands,weanalyzedhowdiscursive

strandscometogetherinthefirstplace?Whataretheprocessesofthis‘together’?Andhow

doestogethernessaffectbelonging?Insteadofaskingwhatthewordsmean,thisincludes

askinghowwordsmeanandhowrelationsareoperativeinthisprocess.AsIwillshow,this

hasthepotentialtoaddnuancetothemannerofwhichdiscoursesmanifestandwillsuggest

a structure to discursive change. This approach will also address the primary research

question ‘what is the religion-science relationship?’Wecannotapproach thisbydefining

‘religion’ and ‘science’ sincewe cannot answer the question ofwhatwordsmean. Since

words like ‘religion’ and ‘science’ lack a stable definitional structure, the issue can be

resolvedbyshiftingfocustothisprocedural‘how.’

Iarguethiscanbeaccomplishedbymakingrelationstheprimaryobjectsofanalysis.

Iwilldemonstratethatitisintheprocessofrelationalizing—puttingtwo(ormore)concepts

inrelativeperspective—thatgeneratesmeaningandproducesnewdefinitionsfortheterms.

Inshort,relationsarehowwordsmean.Myworkwilloffernewanalyticaltools,including

‘relationalityanalysis’andaccompanyingrelationalcategories.Themeta-modelofrelational

constructs Ipropose can replaceanalyticallyweak, rigiddefinitional categories.Oncewe

75The“two”refersto‘man’and‘Being,’butinalargercontextofthemeaningofidentityanddifference.SeeHeidegger(1969),30–31.

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understandthehowofmeaning,wecanforgetthedefinitionsofwords,whichareinconstant

fluxanyway.

Inthefollowingchapter,itismyintenttofirstjustifyanalyzingrelationsapartfrom

therelata—madepossibleviaaperspectiveknownas‘relationalism.’Iwillthenturntohow

relationalism can be utilized for analysis of meaning making. I will also discuss how a

relationaltheoryandmethodprovidesnuancetotheprocessesofdiscursivechange,aswell

ashowitanswersthechallengesofdefinition.OnceIhavedevelopedarelationaltheoryand

methodinChapterTwo,Iturntothequestionof‘howhavediscoursesoftheterm“religion”

developedrelativetodiscoursesoftheterm“science”andviceversa?’Thisconstitutesasort

ofFoucauldiangenealogy,butdiffersinsettingrelationalparameterstoanalyzetheconcepts

at hand.While thiswill be discussed inmuchmore detail in the following chapter, it is

important to note that the contribution of such an analysis is that it can explicate the

underlyingprocessesofmeaningattributioninthedevelopmentofdiscursivechange.This

will involvean in-depthexaminationof ‘relationalconstructs’ fromthe third through the

eighthchapter,situatedinspecificcasestudies.Whatwewillseeisthatthevariousrelational

constructsunfoldinadialogicmanner.Theorderofdiscussionofthevariousconstructsis

somewhat chronological, although there are some constructs that developed

contemporaneously. Thus, these chapters can also be read as an in-depth and critical

historical account of the development of perspectives on the religion-science relation. I

discusstheinterdiscursiveandhistoricalrelationsamongthevariousrelationalconstructs,

puttingtherelationalconstructsinperspectiveanddiscussingcontinuitiesandchangeinthe

intellectual trends involved. I examine context situated in the totality and bring to light

obscure, yet pervasive, ideologies. This includes explicating contending histories,

understudiedhistories,and, inamannerofspeaking,alternativehistoriesofthereligion-

sciencerelation.

Theconcludingchapterwillcriticallyreflectonmyownconstructofrelationalismas

a product of relational construction, situating the perspective in the context of larger

intellectualmovements.Iwillalsodiscusssomefuturedirectionsforresearch,andexamine

thewiderapplicabilityofrelationalityanalysiswithinandbeyondthefieldofreligionand

science.

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5 FinalRemarks

Fromgeneraltospecificterms,wehavequestionednearlyeveryanalyticalcategoryinuse.

Noword is safe.Conceptsarenodifferent—fromperiodizations togeographies,wehave

questionedthemandwitheachnewinsight,complicatedourwordsevenfurther.Itseemsa

miraclethatwecancommunicateatall.Perhapstheconsensusisimplicitlythatwecannot,

as theexplicitconclusionseemstobethateverybit, line,andstatementofresearch is in

dangerofconceptualobscurity.Onwhatpremisedowecontinuetoattempttomakesense

ofthingsthatseemtolacksense?Asdatachallengesouranalyticalcategories,werethink

them.Thetaskset inacademiaistoidentifytheinadequaciesofourconcepts,sothatwe

mightproducebetterones,asifnewwordscanescapetheseproblems.Buttheycannot.

Insteadoffacingthisgoliathheadon,wecontinuetochallengecategories,asifthere

could be a right way of doing things. We go around and round encountering the same

problems in conceptualizationandanalyzeourselves intoa stateof self-mockery.This is

because the inadequacies of concepts are inherent to the conceptualization process.We

drawlinesandcreateworlds.Webickeroverourcreationsandwherethelineoughttobe.

Itistimetomoveforwardandgainsomeclarityabouthowtheseanalyticalacrobaticsare

themselves creating and communicatingnew ideas. The line is theproblem, but also the

solution.Weneedtoshiftourfocusawayfromwherethelineistohowitgotthereandwhat

itdoes.Weneed to consider theprocessesofmeaningmakingat the levelofprocedural

conceptualization. So, I implore you, please forget the words. Please forget words as

reificationsandthinkofthemasperformances,whoseenactmentIamrecounting.Inthis

account of enactment, we can gain insight into how concepts are formed and how they

change.Wecanchoosemeaningoverwords.

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Chapter2:ForgettingBeings—RelationalTheory&MethodProcess,activity,andchangearetheonlymatteroffact.Ataninstantthereisnothing.Eachinstantisonlyawayofgroupingmattersoffact.Thussincetherearenoinstants,conceivedassimpleprimaryentities,thereisnonatureataninstant.Thusalltheinterrelationsofmatteroffactmustinvolvetransitionsintheiressence.

—AlfredNorthWhitehead1

Theonlyconstantischange.—Buddhistphrase

1 TheTheoryofRelationalism

Asalientargument thus farhasbeen thatweshouldnotget toocaughtupon thewords

‘religion’and‘science,’sincethemeaningchangeseveninveryspecificcontexts,developed

indiscourseandsocialandhistoricalsettings.IthinkIhavemademypointthatattempting

toexplaintheconcepts‘religion’and‘science’viathetraditionaldefinitionalapproachisan

impossible and useless task. By demonstrating the fluidity and contingency of facts,

knowledge, and concepts, we can entertain the notion of forgetting words. Thus, the

importantpointhere andnow is topropose an alternative to the customarydefinitional

approachtoconcepts,whichwillalsoprovidesomeclarityontheprocessesofdiscursive

change,asdiscussedinthepreviouschapter.Ifwearetoadvancetheoryandmethod—and

Ithinkthisappliestovirtuallyeveryfieldofstudy—wehavetoliterallycometotermswith

theemptinessofwords,meaningwemustfindawaytouseandanalyzelanguageinaway

thatdepartsfromtheobservationthatlanguageisfluid.Inordertodothis,though,weneed

toforgetbeings—weneedtoshiftourfocusawayfromtheideaofbeings,entities,orobjects

ofstudyasdistinct,in-of-itselfthingsandinsteadexaminebecomingoverbeing,processes

overstasis,andabstractionoverreification.

The problem facing us now is how can we say anything about the relationship

betweenreligionandsciencewhendefiningthesetermsinadefinitewayisimpossible?Put

differently,howcanweanalyzerelationshipifwecannotdeterminetherelata?Theanswer

1Whitehead(1958),200.

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issimplythatwecanmake‘relation’itselftheprimaryobjectofanalysis.By‘relation’Imean

aqualifyingaspectthatgivesexpressiontotwoormorethingsinrelativeperspective.AsI

have been problematizing definitions, thismay seem self-contradictory. The philosopher

JacquesDerrida(1930–2004),amongothers,arguedthatwecannotgetbeyondthelimitsof

language. However, the issue of language ever failing to transcend itself is based on the

notionthattheproblemislanguageitself.Instead,thisproblemcanberesituatedintothe

conceptualization of language use. Language is perfectly capable of communicating new

conceptualizations.2 As argued in the previous chapter, the problem of definition is a

problemof focusonwordsovermeaning.Making relation theprimaryobjectofanalysis

provides a means of ‘defining’ terms based on their relational content that leaves the

specificsopenandyetstructured.Thisallowsustodiscardtraditionaldefinitionsandfocus

onhowconceptsdevelopintheactofrelation.Thismeansthatwedonotneedtoeliminate

theuseofdefinitionsentirely,justofdefinitionsofthenon-relationalkind,whichinvolves

significantchangesintypicallanguageuse.Relationaldefinitionsaredefinitionsonahigher

level of abstraction, defining thepatterns inwhichdefinitions emerge, thus emphasizing

meaningmakingoverwords.

IfIdenyinherentmeaningandtheexistenceofindependentconcepts,howcanthe

continueduseofthetermsbejustified?Forone,justificationliesinthefactthatpeopleuse

thesetermsandthuswemustalsoifwewanttotakethedataseriously.Theintentofmy

analysisistomakesenseofhowthesetermsareusedinalltheirvarietyandtransformations.

Still,someoftheproblemsoflanguagearecontinuousandunavoidable.WhenIusetheterms

‘religion’and‘science’itcanappearattimesthattheseareindependentconcepts.However,

usingthemassuch isameanstoshowhowthetermsarerelationallyentangled.Wecan

conceptualize this relational language use by putting it in relative perspective to non-

relational use.3 The continued use of essentially misleading terminology can still make

2 Derrida, and his follower Paul de Man (1919–1983), argued that texts always ‘deconstruct’ themselves,meaningthatlanguageusesubvertsthecontentofwhatisbeingattemptedtocommunicate.SeeRorty(1995),172–173.However,ifthefailuretoachieveitsendscanbedetected,thentheremustbesomeunderstandingofwhatthoseendswereinordertoidentifyfailure.Thismeansthattheremustbeunderstanding,notfailure,makingitaself-refutingposition.3Intheconcludingchapter,Iwillputthetheoryinperspectiverelativetootherdominantmodesofintellectualthought and discuss conceptualizing the underlying theory of ‘relationalism’ in a relationalway (i.e., as incontrast to non-relational ways of thinking). In this way, the theory accounts for itself by showing thatrelationalismisitselfrelationallyconstructed.

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meaningfulcontributions,bydemonstratingadifferentperspective. Inordinary language

use, the terms are primarily used as independent concepts. And we must use this as a

departurepointtoexplainanalternativeperspective.Forexample,toexplainreligionand

scienceasnon-distinctinthemedievalworldview,wehavetotakenotethatthetwoterms

were conceived as one, even though this formulation is historically inaccurate. The

descriptionof‘religionandscienceasone’isactuallyafact(asperourperspective)thatis

completely obscure to medieval thinkers, exactly because they were not distinct. The

phraseologyisforthebenefitofourperspectivetoconceptualizealternativeperspectives,

not to claim that ‘religion and science as one’was how the historical actorswould have

described their own activity. Rather, medieval thinkers would not even apply such

categories. However, we cannot demonstrate this to our own perspectives without

entanglingwhatwetodayunderstandasdistinctdomains‘religion’and’science.’Thus,by

the very nature of discussing alternative perspectives, a utilization of terms regarded as

ultimatelymisleadingmuststillbeused.Butbybringingthisawarenesstolanguageuse,new

approachescanbeexplained.

Fromarelationalperspective,conceptscannolongerbeconceptualizedindependent

of one another. To describe such a thing, though, requires juxtaposing the terms use as

independentconceptstorelationalconcepts,explainedviacontrasttoordinaryuse.Thisis

torelationalizetherelationaluseoflanguagerelativetonon-relationalusage.Thisismuch

like theaboveexampleofexplainingmedieval religion-sciencenon-distinction tocurrent

daythinkers.Anywaythatrelationalconceptualizationcanbedescribedmustdepartfrom

anunderstandingofhowthetermsareprimarilytakeninanon-relationalmanner.Thisis

notanecessaryevil;itisjustnecessarywhenweconsiderthatallissituatedinperspective.

Ratherthantreatingitassomethingtoavoid,weneedtoembracewhatthisperspectivalism

istellingusaboutthenatureofmeaningmakinganduseittoouranalyticaladvantage.And

what it tells us aboutmeaningmaking is that discursive change is through a process of

comparisonandcontrasttopre-establishedmeanings,whetherit isbetweenreligionand

scienceorarelationalandnon-relationalperspective.

Detailsof relationaldefinitionsand the relational constructionof conceptswillbe

discussedextensivelyinthischapter,howeverfirstIwillturntothemostcommonobjection

tomakingrelationtheprimaryobjectofanalysis.Itisfrequentlyarguedthatrelationshipis

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derivedfromtherelataandthusit isnotpossibletoanalyzerelationindependentofthat

which is being related. However, I contend that relations are basic and relata are

derivative—aperspectiveknownas‘relationalism,’whichconstitutestheunderlyingtheory

of thiswork.Even if Icannotconvincethereaderof thispoint, it isonlynecessarythat I

establish the lesser claim that a relational perspective has merit for discourse analysis,

specificallythatrelationscontributetotheconstructionofconcepts.Afterexpoundingon

this theoretical framework, I will turn to relationality analysis—the methodology of

analyzingrelationsasprimaryandrelataasderivative.

Before turning to this task, a tangent on terminology is in order. What is

‘relationalism’?There isnounified ideaof ‘relationalism,’but rather the termrefers toa

generaltheoreticalpositioninwhichrelationsareprimary.Thiscouldincludeoneorallof

the following assertions: relations are the basic building blocks of reality, existentially

and/or structurally; the identityandpropertiesof entitiesaredefinedby their relations;

knowledge is enabled by relating objects/concepts; and cognizance of beings arises by

relational perception, in a dichotomous fashion of ‘this’ and ‘not this.’4 I use the term

‘relationalism’ to refer to the theory that relations generate meaning and ‘independent’

concepts(i.e.,therelata)emergeintheactofrelation.Asregardsdiscourseanalysisandthe

sociologyofknowledge,thismeansthattherelationalconfigurationofconceptsstructures

theconstructionofknowledgeanddiscursivechange.Whichrelationalconstructappliedis

determinedbydiscourse,society,andhistory,buthowtheconceptsinquestiongenerateand

changemeaningareinarelationalperspective.

Basedonmyproposeddefinition,Icouldlimitthediscussiontorelationaltheoriesof

meaning, but I think the argument carries more weight when we look at relational

metaphysicsaswell,sincesuchapositionsupportstheviewthatitispossibletoidentifyan

entitybasedonrelationsalone.

4Relationalismissometimesusedasanalternativetermfor‘relationism.’Somehavearguedthatthesetwotermsneedtobedistinguished,asthelatterreferstothenotionthatrealityisonlyrelations,whereastheformerreferstothenotionthatrealityisarelationalunity,bothpluralisticandunitaryatthesametime.See,e.g.,Oliver(1981), 160: “Both extremes [pluralism andmonism] are conserved in a relationalmetaphysic, but not asextremes.Theyareratherendsofaspectrum,or,asmightbesaid,elementsofahierarchyofrelations.”Itisnot essential to my argument to commit to either of these perspectives, however I use the former term‘relationalism,’since‘relationism’hasbeenmorefrequentlyassociatedwithrelativisminthepastandthisdoesnotapplytorelationalismasIusetheterm.Kaipayil(2009),8–10.SeealsoRestivo(1983),40–41;andGairdner(2008),3–5,22,and335n.1.

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1.1 RelationalMetaphysics,Cognizance,&Semantics

Sociologist Sal Restivo noted a “relational view of reality” has become increasingly

prominent. ThoughRestivo is largely speaking of the scientificworldview, he found this

orientationin“virtuallythefullrangeofintellectualdisciplines”and,indeed,relationalism

hasbeenpresentinmanyrealmsamongthehistoryofideas.5Andcloselyrelatedtothese

changes in the scientificworldview is the ideaof relationalism inmetaphysics.Polymath

Lancelot Law Whyte (1896–1972) argued that scientific and philosophical thought

throughoutthetwentiethcenturyhadbecomeprogressivelyorientatedtowardarelational

theory.6Andinthetwenty-firstcentury,theideathatrelationsarefundamentalhaseven

beendescribedas“thedefaultposition”inphilosophy.7

Fromtheperspectiveofrelationalmetaphysics,beingisbecoming.Thisreflectsmy

suggestion to ‘forget beings,’meaningwe need to shift our focus from beings (a sort of

ontologicalinventoryoftheworld)tohowbeingsbecomeapparent/ariseinthefirstplace

(astructuralanalysisofreality).Assuch,‘relationalmetaphysics’isamisnomer.Traditional

metaphysicsdealswiththebasicnatureofbeingsandnotwithhowbeingsariseorwiththe

nature of the illumination process by which beings are conceptually available. Martin

Heidegger(1889–1976)notedthisissuewhenhestated,“Metaphysicsisexcludedfromthe

experienceofBeingbecauseofitsverynature.”8Relationalmetaphysics,incontrast,isbetter

understoodastransmetaphysical,pre-metaphysical,orastructuralontology,sinceitdeals

withgenerationaltheoriesofbeing—howbeingsareconstituted,individuated,andrelated.9

AccordingtoHeidegger,thisistoconsiderthedifferencebetweenBeing(the‘how’of

existence) and beings (the ‘what’ of existence) or what he refers to as ‘ontological

difference’—a difference he thought was overlooked in traditional metaphysics.10 After

noting this ontological difference, Heidegger then proceeded to question the relation

betweenthetwo,butinsteadofinquiringaftercomponentsofrelation,Heideggertreatedthe

5Restivo(1983),40–41and119.6Whyte(1974),62–64and141–142n.5.7Heil(2012),142.8QuotedintranslationinSteffney(1977),323.9Steffney(1977),passim;Heidegger(1969),8;andDipert(1997),331.10Heidegger(1969),16;andRorty(1995),170.

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relationitselfastherelationbetweenBeingandbeings.Putdifferently,wemightsaythat

relationisthoughtofastheverythingthatconnectsthem,allrelataaside.Incontrast,inthe

historyofWesternphilosophy,identityistypicallythoughtofasunityofathingwithitself.

But,fromHeidegger’sperspective,identityisarelationofbelongingtogether,meaning“the

relationfirstdeterminesthemannerofbeingofwhatistoberelatedandthehowofthis

relation.”11

Forcenturiesinthehistoryofphilosophy,entitieshavebeenregardedasbasicand

relations as derivative, dating back to Plato (ca. 428–347 BCE) and on through Gottfried

WilhelmvonLeibniz(1646–1716),amongothers.12Aristotle(384–322BCE), forexample,

suggested that relationsare simplywaysof talkingaboutwhat isultimately reducible to

basicentitiesortheirmonadicproperties.13Putsimply,thethoughtisthattheremustbea

distinct and identifiable ‘thing’ first before this thing can ‘enter into’ relations, making

relationssecondary.Inanalyticalmetaphysics,forlongthestrongestcurrentcenteredonthe

assertionthatthereexistbasicentitiesthat‘have’properties,whiletheissueofwhatisthe

basicstructureofthesepropertiesandofrelationshadnotbeengivenasmuchattentionin

thepast.However,theseissuescannotbeignored,astheideaofentitiesbeingbasichasbeen

extremelyproblematic—themainissueinphilosophybeingwhatarethe individualsthat

havepropertiesandhowaretheyindividuated?14Thisbringsusbacktothequestionsraised

inrelationalmetaphysics.Moreover,ifthingsarethebasicunitsofreality,howcanrelations

be‘between’them?Itisimpossibleforrelationstolaybetweenrealities,forrelationsmust

either be nothing or be realities themselves. And if relations are realities it cannot be

11QuoteonHeidegger(1969),12.QuotebyStambaughintheintroductionofHeidegger’swork.Seealsoibid.,8.12AlthoughLeibniz did give a crucial role to relations, he still viewed themas reducible to the relata. SeeRescher(2013),68–91,esp.71–76.Nonetheless,Leibnizisoftencreditedwithcertainobservationsthatledtorelationalmetaphysics.SeeOliver(1981),18–24.13 Dipert (1997), 348–349. Though Aristotle believed that relations were secondary, he still attributedimportancetothemintheconceptualizationofphenomena.Forinstance,Aristotlearguedthat“Comparisonand definition, not similitude, described nature exhaustively and unambiguously.” Aristotle suggested anexhaustive definition required “the identification of the closest genus and the specific difference.” SeeFunkenstein(1986),35.Ontheclassicalconceptionofrelations,seeCavarnos(1975).Onlaterconceptionsofrelations,seeOliver(1981),101–130.Onaphilosophicalexplanationofproperties,seeSwoyer&Orilia(2015).14Dipert(1997),331–332,335–337,and349.Forissuesofindividuatingentitiesbasedonproperties,seealsoLowe(2009).Onthesameissue,explicitlyaddressedinreferencetorelationalmetaphysics,seeZaidi(1973),412–437.

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between things, but must be a thing itself.15 These problems have given momentum to

relationalviews.

Alreadyin1903,philosopher,logician,mathematician,andNobellaureateBertrand

Russell (1872–1970)madeaconvincingargument that relational termsare ineliminable,

which stands to reason that relations are, at least possibly, ontologically fundamental.16

Further substantiating this view, philosopher and logician of relations Randall R. Dipert

arguedthatthedistinctnessofrelatacanbeestablishedviarelationsalone.17Thismeans

thatwhatisbasicneednotbemonadicandstronglysupportstheviewthatlikelynothing

basicismonadic,butratherdyadicrelationsare“necessaryandsufficientfordescribingthe

structure of theworld.” Itmay seem counterintuitive, but a small examplemay serve to

restoreintuition.Dipertstated,“toperceiveanobject,toconsiderathingasanobject,isto

notice or attribute contrasts of various perceivable ‘properties’ against a background.”18

Dipert used the example of an apple.We identify ‘apple’ based on its outlineagainst its

surroundings,basedonitsrednesscomparedwiththegreengrass,andonitsseparability,as

we can move it from the tree. Contrast, comparison, and separability are relational

phenomena.Fromthisperspective,relataarisedueto‘bi-perspectivalviewing,’aperception

ofarelation thatnaturally lends itself tobifurcation in theperceivingprocess.19 Inother

words,ifoneinspectsarelation,then‘this’and‘notthis’becomemanifest.Whileweperceive

theappleandthetreeasindependentrelata,thatperceptioniscontingentonbi-perspectival

viewingor‘relationalization,’asIrefertoit.Furthermore,whatpropertiesareassignedwill

dependonwhatiscastinrelief.Forinstance,ifanappleisheldtoamirror,then‘shiny’will

notbealikelycandidatefordescription,whileanappleonadirtfloormayprovokesucha

portrayal.Itisthesameformanyofouranalyticalterms,like‘religion’and‘science,’which

areunderstoodintermsoftheirrelationalstance.

15Zaidi(1973),417;andHeil(2012),139–141.16Russell(1903),218–226;andHeil(2012),135–137.17Dipert(1997),349.OtherimportantcontributorstothedevelopmentofthistheoryareLudwigFeuerbach(1804–1872),MartinBuber(1878–1965),andSyedZaidi.SeeOliver(1981),133–151,foradiscussionoftheseindividualsandtheircontributionstorelationalmetaphysics,aswellasreferencestotherelevantliterature.18QuotesonDipert (1997),339and350.Emphasisoriginal.For furtherdevelopmentofDipert’s ideasandnotionsrelatedtorelationalmetaphysics,seeBird(2007),esp.138–145.Asachallengetotheviewofgraphicalstructuralism(ofDipertandBird),seeOderberg(2011).InresponsetoOderberg,seeShackel(2011).19Oliver(1981),156–157.

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Thepointofcommonalitybetweendiscourseanalysis, thesociologyofknowledge,

andrelationalmetaphysics is thatconceptsandknowledgeareunderstoodasconstructs.

However,relationalmetaphysicssometimestakesthisfurtherinspecifyingthatallentities

andtheverystructureofrealityandthoughtare“purelyrelational.”20Assuch,eventhough

allindividualentitiesmaybeconstructedinasense,theystillhaveaframeworkandthus

somestability.Thisstabilitythoughislikeabridgeswayinginthewind—itisdynamic,but

itsmovementisguidedbyitsstructure.Or,moreprecisely,realityisthisstructure,asetof

relations.21 Similarly, scholars of religion have begun to look at agency as a “relational

engagement,” the product of “entangled networks” between humans and things, thus

positioning relations as the underlying structure.22 From this perspective, objects and

conceptsgainmeaningintheactofrelatingthemtootherthings.Andrelationaltheoryin

sociology has also put forth challenges to positing discrete units as departure points for

analysis,insteadplacingrelationsasprimary.Thisrelationalturninsociology,withafocus

on dynamics and processes, is increasingly evident along philosophical, theoretical, and

empiricallines.23

Theseviewsarealsoconnected in thatrelationalmetaphysics iscloselyrelated to

relational cognizance, which also makes claims about how concepts are constructed

relationally. As philosopher Harold H. Oliver (1930–2011) put it, “Experience is itself a

relation,a‘relating.’Thisrelationalmetaphysicsisempiricalthereforeinthissense[…].”24

The relationship between relational metaphysics and relational cognizance is so close

because relational metaphysics makes a statement about the world as it arises in the

illumination process—the process of cognizance—and moreover asserts that empirical

things only have individuated ‘reality’ due to a relational bifurcation that occurs in

perception. Since reality is fundamentally relational, if there were no perceptions there

wouldbenorelata tospeakof.Thus,wecan thinkofrelationsas theultimatereality—a

metaphysical claim—while relata are found in conventional reality, the world of

experience—aclaimaboutcognizance.

20Dipert(1997),329–330.SeealsoRobinson(1975),106–120.21Robinson(1975),109.22Quotedin,respectively,Ingmanetal(2016);andvonStuckrad(2016a).23Emirbayer(1997),281–282.SeealsoDonati(2010);andCrossley(2010).24Oliver(1981),158.

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Relationaltheoriesofcognizancehavealongandvariedhistory.Oneoftheoldestcan

befoundinBuddhistthought.ManyBuddhistphilosophersrejecttheinherentexistenceof

allthings.However,thingsdoexistasdependentlyrelatedevents.Anditispreciselybecause

things exist in dependence on certain causes and conditions that give rise to them that

phenomena lack an individualized essential nature.25 This ontology encompasses all of

reality, from physical objects to mental categories and knowledge. According to this

perspective,theoriginofeveryconceptionisanactofdichotomy.Buddhistlogicianshave

argued,“therelationofconceptualthoughtandtheobjectdevelopsthroughexclusion.You

perceivewhatsomethingisbyexcludingwhatitisnot.”26AccordingtotheBuddhistview:

The intellect isdialectical, i.e. it is alwaysnegative. Its affirmation isneverdirect, neverpure, it isaffirmationofitsownmeaningnecessarilythrougharepudiationofsomeothermeaning.Theword<<white>> does not communicate the cognition of all white objects. […] But it refers to a line ofdemarcationbetweenthewhiteandnon-white,whichiscognizedineveryindividualcaseofthewhite.

Thepositivemeaning of theword ‘white’ is nothingwithout the negativemeaning ‘non-

white,’meaningthetwoareco-arisingandthattheyare“merelyrelative”andnomore.27The

DaoistphilosopherZhuangzi(ca.369–286BCE)madeasimilarclaimregardingthemutual

implicationofperspectives:“WhatisItisalsoOther,whatisOtherisalsoIt.”28Thismeans

boththatourunderstandingofanobjectasanindividualisrelationalandthat,assuch,the

individuationofanobjectislimitless—“ontheonehandnolimittowhatisit,ontheother

nolimittowhatisnot.”BrookZiporyn,analyzingZhuangzi’sviews,asked,“Istherethenno

contrastbetween‘this’and‘that’?”29Sheobserved,therecannotbeacontrastbecausethe

twoaremutuallyimplicatoryintermsofconstitution.However,therecannotbenocontrast

becausethatishowthingsariseasindividuatedobjects.Theparadoxisresolvedbyshifting

our thinking away from contrast between things to an understanding of contrast as the

thing—relationsarefundamentalandrelataarederivative.

Thenotionofrelatainlanguageandcognitionasaconstructwithtenableconnections

to the real nature of things appears inWestern thought aswell, put forth byWilliamof

Ockham(1288–1348),GeorgeBerkeley(1685–1753),andDavidHume(1711–1776).And

25Stcherbatsky(1958),248;andHoushmand,Livingston,&Wallace(1999),35.26Hayward&Varela(1992),190.27QuotesonStcherbatsky(1958),401,460,and481.Seealsoibid.,459.28Graham(2001),53.29Ziporyn(n.d.).

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thethoughtofGeorgWilhelmFriedrichHegel(1770–1831)isquitesimilartotheBuddhist

andDaoistviewsabove.Hegelstated:“TheUniversalityofaconcept[…]ispositedthrough

itsNegativity:theconceptisIdenticalwithitselfonlyinasmuchasitisanegationofitsown

negation.”30 We might rephrase this in more concrete terms by saying that ‘white’ is

universally‘white’onlyinasmuchasitisnot‘non-white’—theonlythingtheconcept‘white’

hasincommonacrosstheboardisitsconceptualizationasnot‘non-white.’Furthermore,to

havea‘distinctidea’ofwhite,inthewordsofJohnLocke(1632–1704),canonlyoccurwhen

“themindperceivesadifferencefromallothers.”31Toillustrate,supposetherewerenoother

colorsintheworldthanwhite.Wewouldseeit,butwewouldnotbeabletoidentifyit;we

would not know or notice that it is white. To know ‘white’ we must ‘create it,’ give it

conceptualspacebydifferentiatingitfromnon-white,themindmustperceivea‘difference

fromallothers’inorderfor‘white’tobedistinct.

With the linguistic turn of twentieth-century Western philosophy, “language is

conceivedofasaself-containedsystemof‘signs’whosemeaningsaredeterminedbytheir

relations to each other […].”32 This can, in part, be traced back to the work of linguist

Ferdinand de Saussure (1857–1913) and particularly his Course in General Linguistics

(1916).Saussurearguedthatwordsbythemselvesarefundamentallymeaninglessandonly

are attributed meaning due to their relations with other words. Saussure claimed that

language is “nothing but differences,” as philosopher Richard Rorty (1931–2007) put it.

Rorty explained: “[W]ords have meaning only because of contrast-effects with other

words.”33Languagewasno longerviewedasa tool forexposition,but ratheras thevery

component of construction.34 Though Saussure is considered to be part of the school of

structuralismanddeconstructionistsareoftenregardedaspoststructuralists,bothschools

upheldsimilarviewsontherelationalnatureoflanguage.ThedeconstructionistDerridaand

hisconstructionistfriendMichelFoucault(1926–1984)arguedthatlanguageexhibitsbinary

opposition.Foreveryonethingthatisasserted,somethingisbeingdeniedandthiscontrast

30QuotedintranslationinStcherbatsky(1958),484–485.Seealsoibid.,441.31Locke(1690),vol.3,ch.29,§4.32Toews(1987),882.33Rorty(1995),172–173.Onthelinguisticturn,seeHacker(2013).Onstructuralisminliterature,seeScholes(1974);andonSaussure,ibid.,esp.13–22.34Rorty(1967),3;andHacker(2013),7andpassim.

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isthesourceofmeaningwithinalinguisticsystem.35

Anemphasisonrelationsisalineofinquirythathasthingsincommonwiththeories

inthefieldofsemanticsinthetwentiethcenturyaswell.Forinstance,inhislatethought,

LudwigWittgenstein(1889–1951)madeapointedattemptto leavebehindessentializing

definitions, instead understanding language as a family resemblance concept. ‘Family

resemblance’restedonanotionthattheuseoftermsisrelatedinmanyways,through“a

complicatednetworkofoverlappingsimilarities.”36AndNoamChomskyarguedthatsyntax

and semantics are inseparable or, put differently, the relational setting of words is

inextricably joined to the meaning of words.37 Similarly, ‘meaning holism’ in semantic

theories suggest that themeanings of allwords are interdependent. The origins of such

theoriesareoftentracedtoWillardvanOrmanQuine(1908–2000)andhisassertionthat“It

ismisleadingtospeakoftheempiricalcontentofanindividualstatement.”Similarly,Carl

GustavHempel(1905–1997)claimed,“thecognitivemeaningofastatementinanempirical

languageisreflectedinthetotalityofitslogicalrelationshipstoallotherstatementsinthe

language.”38 Such semantic theories of meaning in philosophy, addressing the relational

meaningofwordsandsentences,havehadrelatively littlesupport.However,aswehave

seen,therearemanyimportantthinkersinseveralareasofthoughtthathavesimilarlyheld

a relational view of conceptual development. These above examples and others in this

intellectualtraditionarecompatiblewithmyrelationalismapproach,buttheymightalsobe

seenasontologicallyweakertheories.Incontrast,Iamarguingforanevenstrongerclaim—

thepriorityofrelations.

Relational theories of cognizance and semantics has also had support from the

cognitivesciences.Therelationalbifurcationdiscussedaboveisnotverydifferentfromhow

someneuroscientistsdescribetheconstructionofmeaninginthebrainviathecreationof

binaryoppositions:“[E]achoppositeinthedyad,insomeways,derivesitsmeaningfromits

contrastwiththeotheropposite.Inthissense,theoppositesdonotstandcompletelyontheir

own, but require each other in order to define themselves individually.”39 Relational

35LibertyUniversity(2015);andGairdner(2008),250–252.36QuotedinGlock(1996),33.SeealsoWittgenstein(1963),43eand46e.37Speaks(2015).Foranoverviewoftheoriesofmeaninganddefinition,seeibid.andGasparri(2015).38BothquotesinJackman(2015).39d’Aquili&Newberg(1999),55.

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thinking—thinkingreducibletotherelationalrolesofthings,ratherthanthepropertiesof

thosethings—hasbeenarguedtobeabasicfeatureofperceptionandcognitionoreventhe

veryfoundationofhumanthought,actingasabuildingblockformorecomplexreasoning

abilities.40Inthepsychologyoflanguageandcognition,suchasinrelationalframetheoryfor

example,thereisalsotheobservationthat“derivedstimulusrelationsconstitutethecoreof

verbal behavior.Verbal behavior is the action of framing events relationally” and “Verbal

stimuliarestimulithathavetheireffectsbecausetheyparticipateinrelationalframes.”41

Frommetaphysics tocognitivescience, relationalism ison therise.Still, relational

metaphysics is far from producing a consensus in the field.42 And there are numerous

theoriesofcognitionandsemantics.Furthermore,Iamnotsuggestingthattheseindividuals

andthephilosophiesdiscussedheresupportmyviewofrelationalismexactly.RatherIam

showinghowrelationalismcapturesthemoodoftheagebythinkingabouttheworldina

certainway.Themainpointhereisthatweneednotidentifytheproperties/variablesofthe

realities, knowledge systems, and conceptswe are discussing in order to say something

meaningful and analyzable about them. We can forget the entities, the properties, the

‘beings,’andinsteadexaminerelationsthemselves.Oneneednotbeconvincedonthepoint

oftheontologicalprimacyofrelationstoentertaintheideaofrelataasderivative.Andone

neednotsympathizewiththisvieweithertograntnonethelessthatrelationscancontribute

totheconstructionofconcepts.

40Andrews&Halford(2002);Gentner&Rattermann(1998);Goswami(2001);andGoswami&Brown(1990).SeealsoKrawczyk(2012),15.Toprovidesomespecificexamples,relationalthinkinghasbeenfoundtobethecornerstoneoftheabilitytocomprehendvisualscenes;tolearnandimplementrules;comprehendanalogiesbetweenthings,situations,andknowledgesystems;tounderstandandengageinlanguage,science,art,andmathematics; and to detect basic perceptual similarities. Biederman (1987); Green & Hummel (2004);Anderson& Lebiere (1998); Lovett & Anderson (2005); Gentner (1983); Gentner (1989); Gick &Holyoak(1980);Gick&Holyoak(1983);Holyoak&Thagard(1995);andMedin,Goldstone,&Gentner(1993).Relationalthinking has also been found to be the foundation of progress from similarity-based to structure-basedcognition.SeeGentner(2003);Gentner&Rattermann(1991);andHalford(2005).41Hayes,Barnes-Holmes,&Roche(2001),43–44.Emphasisoriginal.42 On the lack of consensus, see, e.g., Ainsworth (2010). Moreover, relational metaphysics remainsunderdeveloped. Few philosophers have dealt with the ideas. See, e.g., Russell (1903); Russell (1984);Bergmann(1992);Hochberg(1987);Fine(2000);Fine(2007);MacBride(2007);andLeo(2008).

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2 Methodology:RelationalityAnalysis

NowthatIhaveexplainedthetheoryofrelationalism,thequestionbecomeshowcanthisbe

implementedforthepurposesofdiscourseanalysis?Howcanwemakerelationstheprimary

objectofanalysis?Theanswers to thesequestionswillunfoldover theremainderof this

chapter.

In these developments described above, we see an intellectual trend toward

relationalism in terms of the focus on the relative contingencies of language and more

specificallytherelationalconstructionofconcepts.WhatIthinkmaybelacking,butwhat

seemstofollowtheintellectualdirectionhere,ishow(theprocedural‘how’)theserelational

constructs set the parameters formeaningmaking, in the context of historical discourse

analysis. Relational type perspectives are not totally absent in this field. As Kocku von

Stuckradhasargued,thebordersbetweenknowledgesystems“areshiftingconstantlyand

thusitismorefruitfultoaddresstheirnegotiationasanongoingdiscourse[…]ratherthan

tryingtofixthedistinction[…].”43Andinframeanalysisofdiscourseithasbeenarguedthat

inordertounderstandaconceptorconcreteevent,onemustknowwhatcontextualframe

it isoccurring in.Forexample,hittinganotherpersonwillbeconsideredaverydifferent

activitydependingonwhetheroneisplayingtagoroneisinanargument.AsOrtegayGasset

(1883–1955),astudentofHeidegger,putit,“Beforeunderstandinganyconcretestatement,

itisnecessarytoperceiveclearly‘whatitisallabout’inthisstatementand‘whatgameis

being played.’”44 This interactive notion of frame highlights the importance of relational

understandings inthesocialconstructionofreality.Still,arelational theoryhasnotbeen

systematicallyappliedtodiscourseanalysis.

Inordertoapplyarelationalperspectivetohistoricaldiscourseanalysis,thefirststep

istoexaminehowdiscoursesoftheword‘religion’haveevolvedrelativetodiscoursesofthe

word ‘science’ andviceversa. I argue that it is in theprocessofputting twoconcepts in

relativeperspective(‘relationalizing’)thatmeaningisgeneratedandnewdefinitionsofthe

termsareproduced.Ifweknowthestructureofhowmeaningisproduced,wecantalkabout

43vonStuckrad(2013c),120.44Tannen&Wallat(2001),348.

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religionandsciencewithout (non-relationalandrigid)definitionsanddefer to thismore

fundamentallevelofmeaningmaking.Thismeanssettingasideallotherdefinitionssothat

the parameters for understanding these analytical terms are strictly in terms of their

relationalconstruction.Examininghowreligionandscienceareunderstoodrelativetoone

anotherinvolvesaskingwhethertheyareconstructedasoppositional,identical,similar,etc.,

andhowcomparisonandcontrastoperate in thedevelopmentandchangeofdefinitions.

Thisapproachpositsaparticularwayofthinkingaboutideasandtheircommunicationin

termsoftheprimacyofrelationsintheconceptualizationandtransformationofterms.This

iswhatIrefertoas‘relationalityanalysis.’

Relationality analysis is not history or sociology exactly; but it must reflect the

operations of history and sociology, insofar as they structure discourse involved in the

conceptualization of religion and science. Relationality analysis is a systematicmodel of

communicativepracticeandprocess,withanunderlyingtheoryoftherelationalbecoming

ofconcepts.Inthisway,andconsideringthatconceptsareconstructedbycertainhistorical

contingencies,dispositives,andtangiblesocialfactorsasdiscussedinthepreviouschapter,

itmight be thought of as something akin to IanHacking’s notion of ‘historical ontology.’

Historicalontologyis“concernedwiththecomingintobeingoftheverypossibilityofsome

objects,”keepinginmindthat“Thecomings,incomingsintobeing,arehistorical.”45Once

thebeingshavebecomeItreatthemas‘socialfacts’—thatisnotasmerelysubjective,butan

objective, though contingent, fact that has been built into the historical development of

societies.46Thisdirects“whatitispossibletobeortodo,”whicharisesashistoryunfolds.

WithinthisapproachisaperspectivethatHackingreferstoas“dynamicnominalism”inthat

“itsostronglyconnectswhatcomesintoexistencewiththehistoricaldynamicsofnaming

andthesubsequentuseofname.”Ontheotherhand,Hackingalsoacknowledgedthathe

couldalsobecalleda“dialecticalrealist,”sincesuchapositionfocusesonthe interaction

betweenrealityandourconceptualizationofit.47

45Hacking(2002),2and4–5.46I.e.,aspercriticaldiscourseanalysisandthesociologyofknowledge.Ontheformer,seeHammersley(1997),240.Regardingboth,seeChapterOne.47Hacking(2002),2,22–23,and26.

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IagreewithHackingthatthisapproachmustbecalledphilosophical,ifanything,asit

isconcernedwiththeanalyzingandunderstandingtheconditionsofknowledgeformation.

Atthesametime, it ismyintentionthatarelationalanalysiswillprovidesomehistorical

specificitytothewaysinwhichrelationalconceptualizationstructuresdiscursivechange.As

statedpreviously,whichrelationalconstructapplied isdeterminedbydiscourse,buthow

conceptschangemeaningwithinadiscourseisguidedbyrelationalization.Iamnotsaying

thatrelationsarenotinfluencedbydiscourse,butratherthatdiscourseisrelational.Assuch,

it is not contrary to my argument that discursive events and dispositives impact the

relationality of things. Rather my focus is on the articulation of such impacts that are

explained and conceptualized anew by invoking relational construction. By ‘discursive

change’Idonotmeanhowthetermsaretreateddifferentlyindifferenttextsforexample,I

mean how new meanings emerge—a procedural ‘how’—specifically in the

articulation/communication of novel conceptualizations. One way of understanding

‘discourse’isas“structuredpracticesofsignusage.”48Iamsuggestingthatthisstructureis

relational.

What this breaks down to is a sort of etymological account of the term ‘religion’

relativetotheterm‘science’andviceversa.However,itismuchbroaderthanetymology,as

itexaminesthesocial,historical,discursive,anddispositivefactorsandinthiswaycanbe

thoughtofasakintoFoucault’snotionof‘genealogy’asanaccountofwhatmakesutterances

possible and sensible,with the exception that I strictly employ a relational structure for

analysis.49 To test my hypothesis that relations structure discursive change, we must

examine what role relationalization plays in the construction of ‘religion’ and ‘science,’

specificallywhether this results in gainingmeanings, losingmeanings, and transforming

meanings.Thisisthefocusofmyworkatlarge.

Ithinkthebestwaytoexplainhowrelationalityanalysisworksistodemonstrateit.

Perhaps,astheformersoccerplayerandcoachJohanCruijffsaidinregardtoplays,“You

onlyseeitonceyou’veunderstoodit.”50Andthebestplacetostartisthebeginning—when

religionandsciencewerefirstputinrelativeperspective.However,beforegettingintothe

48Keller(2011),51.49Hacking(2002),77–79.50Winsemius(2009).OriginalDutch:“Jegaathetpaszienalsjehetdoorhebt.”TranslatedbyChristophJedan.

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detailsofthismethodology,someclarificationoftermsisinorder.

2.1 Terminology

Asfortheterms‘religion’and‘science,’thequestionoftheirmeaningisexactlywhatwillbe

unpackedthroughoutthiswork.Throughouttheremainderofthisresearch,whenIreferto

‘religion,’Imeanthetermorconcept‘religion’andusuallynothingmore,sinceItreatterms

asinherentlyempty.Thesamegoesfor‘science.’Ihavenodefinitionsinmindotherthanthe

concepts themselves,withoneexception.Theonly framework fordemarcatingtheterms

underconsiderationwillbedoneinarelationalsetting,suchthathow‘religion’isrelatedto

‘science’andviceversaconstitutetheparametersforthemeaningofthetermsinquestion.

Anyexceptionstothisrelationalusagewillbenoted.Suchparameterscreatewhatwemight

calla‘relationaldefinition’thatisstrictly‘other-referential.’‘Religion’means‘thatwhichthe

term/concept“religion”meansrelativetotheterm/concept“science”’;and‘science’means

‘thatwhich“science”meansrelativeto“religion.”’Relationaldefinitionsaremonisticinthat

thetwoconceptsarealwaystreatedasaunit,meaningthatifsomethingissaidofscience,it

necessarilyspeaksofreligionaswell.Thisalsomeansthatachangeinrelationsisachange

inwhatisrelated.Thisisnottodefinetheterms’relationshiptooneanother,butratherthis

isthetermsrelationallydefined.

Still, ifwithin therelevantdata ‘religion’ is likenedto ‘theology’or ‘morals,’ thenI

considerthatfairgame.Whateverisinterpretedas‘religion’or‘science’iswhatIwillrefer

toas‘religion’or‘science.’Forinstance,inthefollowingchapterIstate,“Bythe1830s,there

was increasingdiscontentabout theusageof theword ‘science,’andseveral intellectuals

voicedtheiropinionsthatthewordshouldexcludemorals,theology,andothertermsrelated

to religious considerations.” What I mean by ‘religious considerations’ is those things

identifiedasreligiousbytheseintellectuals,whichinthiscaseincludedmoralsandtheology,

amongotherthings.Putdifferently,whatisconsidered‘religion’isthatwhichthesources

link to the terms ‘religion/religious,’ relative to science, here specifically as ‘that which

excludes science.’ This is not a matter of tacit definition, but of explicit discursive

construction,whichwillbecomeclearintheanalysisofthecasestudies.

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Throughoutthiswork, Iwilloftenspeakof ‘signifiers’ofreligionandofscience.A

‘signifier’iswhatisinterpretedwithinthesourcematerialasdescribingordefining‘religion’

or ‘science’ inaspecific instance,withtheabovequotesuggesting ‘morals’and ‘theology’

signify religion since the texts themselves draw these connections. Signifiers could be

anything, asmeaning is fluid. Just aswith the signified terms ‘religion’ and ‘science,’ all

signifiersareconstructedrelationallyandthuswhenIrefertosomethingasasignifierof

science,forinstance,thatisnottosaythisisthedefinitionofscienceinmyanalysis.Iam

makingtheclaimthatthisiswhatisunderstoodasrepresentativeofscienceinthecontext

ofmydata,eventhoughitisnotalwaysexplicitinsomeinstances.Forexample,withinthe

argumentthatreligioncanbescience-likebecausereligionisnaturalisalsotheimplicitclaim

that‘natural’signifiesscience.If‘natural’werenotthoughttosignifyscience,theargument

wouldbenonsensical.Signifiershelpusdeterminehowtermsarerelationallyconstructed,

asinthecasehere,‘religionasnatural’suggestsreligionislikenedtoscience.Itisimportant

tokeep inmind,however, thatwhen I refer to signifiers, theywill vary fromexample to

exampleandwearenotsomuchinterestedinthesignifiersthemselvesaswhattheytellus

aboutthereligion-sciencerelation.Nonetheless,somesignifiersareparticularlysalientin

thediscourseandtheirrecurrencesarenotable,aswillbediscussed.

‘Relationship’referstoconnectionsbetweenthings.Iwillusetheterm‘relationship’

fromtimetotimetorefertohowothersperceivethereligion-scienceinteraction.However,

I am primarily interested in describing ‘relational constructs,’ a term I use to refer to

qualifyingaspectsthatgiveexpressiontotwoconceptsinrelativeperspective.Relationships

comparepre-establishedmeaning;relationalconstructsestablishmeaningasitarisesinthe

act of putting concepts in relative perspective, orwhat I refer to as ‘relationalization’ or

‘relationalconstruction.’SometimesIrefertothereligion-science‘relation’asashorthand

way of referring to religion and science in relative perspective. I prefer to use the term

‘relation’over‘relationship’inmostcasesinordertoemphasizeprocessoverstasis.

To relationalize, one must engage in particular ‘relational processes.’ ‘Relational

constructs’ refer to relatively stable (though contingent) structures, while ‘relational

processes’refertomore fluidactions.By ‘relationalprocesses’ Imeantomaketherelata

differentoralike.Iwillreferto‘differentiation,’inthestrictsenseof‘tomakedifferent,’and

‘liken’as‘tomakesimilar,’withastrongemphasisontheconstructiveaspectoftheaction.

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Putdifferently,differentiatingandlikeningarenottoobservedifferencesandsimilarities,

buttocreatethem.Therelevantdifferentiationsandlikeningsmainlyincludetomakeunlike

religion, to make unlike science, to make religion-like, and to make science-like. Since

‘religion’and‘science’arefluidterms,Idonotmeantosaythattomake‘science-like,’for

instance,willbedoneinthesameway,aswhat‘science’meanswillchangeintheseactsof

comparisonandcontrast.Tomake‘science-like’isreallyaboutaclaimtothenameandso

thedefinitionofsciencewillvaryinmostcases.Thisisbecausearelationalprocessisnotto

makescience-likesomuchastheprocessofmakingscience(orreligion).

The relational constructs include ‘mutual exclusivity’—religion and science as a

mutuallyexclusivedichotomy; ‘inclusivity’—religionandscienceasanon-exclusive,non-

oppositionalpair; ‘identity’—religionasreductivelyidenticaltoscienceorviceversa;and

‘representation’—a non-reductive similarity between religion and science. Degrees of

commonalityaside,itiseitherthecasethatreligionandsciencearethesameordifferent,

conceptuallyspeaking.Ifdifferent,theirdifferencemostoftenappearsinthediscourseas

either oppositional (mutual exclusivity) or non-oppositional (inclusivity). If they are the

same, they are usually constructed as either reductively the same (identity) or non-

reductivelysimilar(representation).Theseconstructscanoverlapinimportantwaysthat

leadtonewconstellationsofmeaning,asIwilldiscuss.

These constructs are not exhaustive. But I cannot go into detail about additional

relationalprocessesandconstructshere.Sufficeittosaythatrelationalityanalysiscouldalso

lookattriadicrelationsandtheroleofsuper-andsub-ordinatedconcepts.Ichosetofocus

on these processes and constructs, as upon examining how discourses of ‘religion’ have

evolvedrelativetodiscoursesof‘science,’Ifoundthattheseconstructsconstitutethemost

salientwaysthatreligionandsciencehavebeenrelationalized,thoughtherepresentation

constructinparticularhashadlittletreatmentbyscholars.Ialsochosetofocusonthesefour

constructssince,assomeofthemostbasicconstructs,theyprovidesomefirststepsinthe

developmentofarelationalmethodology.Iwanttomakeclearthattherelationalityanalysis

offeredhere isnotmeant tobedefinitive,but rather reflects theway that a theoretician

mightproceedinfindinganalternativetothetraditionaldefinitionalapproach.

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NowthatIhavediscussedthemostrelevantterminology, Iwilldemonstratewhat

relationalityanalysisentailsbyprovidinganoverviewofthecasestudies.Thepointofthe

casestudiesistoshowhowrelationalityanalysisisappliedinordertotestthemethodand

theory that I propose here. Being an overview, I will speak in some generalities below,

thougheverythingwillbediscussedanddemonstratedinmuchmoredetailthroughoutthe

remaining chapters. The overview also acts as a reader’s guide in that the thrust of the

individualchaptersismuchclearerfromtheperspectiveoftheworkasawhole.

Eachcasestudyhasafocusononeofthefourrelationalconstructslistedabove.A

conversationofsortscanbeseenbetweentheseconstructsthatenablestheidentificationof

howweget fromone to theother, that is,howrelational constructs structurediscursive

change.Thismeansthateachchapterprovidesacrucialpiecetotheoverallargument.

2.2 MutualExclusivityIn order to understand how religion and science have been constructed relative to one

another,wemustconsiderthecontextpriortowhichrelationalizationfirstoccurred.Under

themedievalunifiedviewofknowledge,religionandsciencewerenotdistinctconcepts,but

rather fell under theumbrella of natural philosophy.51This lackof independence largely

remaineduntil‘religion’and‘science’weredifferentiatedrelativetooneanother.Onegained

meaningbycontrastingitwiththeother.Whentwoconceptsareinsuchcloseassociation,

inorder to conceptualize themseparately,differencesmustbe created. It is aprocessof

carvingout conceptual space that necessitates a focus onopposition.Thus, ‘science’was

conceptualized in an oppositional contrast to ‘religion.’ This actually involved many

historical expositions on the meaning of the terms in which ‘science’ was specifically

explained as ‘not religion.’ In the case of the mutual exclusivity construct, ‘religion’ is

relationallydefinedas‘notscience’and‘science’as‘notreligion.’Isometimesrefertothisas

‘exclusivereligion’and‘exclusivescience,’respectively.

51Becausereligionandsciencewerenotdifferentiatedinthemedievalworldviewandtherewerenoconceptsofreligionandsciencetospeakof,priortothis,therecouldbenorelationalconstructtoconstructthisnon-differentiationmodelinrelativeperspective.Theideaofnon-differentiationwasconstructedatalaterpointtoexplainthestancefromoursituatedperspectiveofdifferentiation.

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Inthefollowingchapter,Ishowhowscientificknowledge,thehistoryofscience,the

scientific enterprise, and the scientific profession were all conceptualized in contrast to

religion.Makingtheobservationthat‘scienceisnotreligion’wasnotconsideredatautology;

itwasconsideredaninnovation.Becauseamongthefirstandprimarywaysthetwoconcepts

were clearly distinguished independently at this time was in terms of their relative

differences,theynaturallycametobethoughtofasrepresentinganoppositionaldichotomy.

Differentiationgaverisetomutualexclusivity,whichthendominatedthewaythetwoterms

wouldevolve.Theresultisthatcommonwaysofwhich‘science’isdefinedbeyondthecontext

of religion-science discussions reflect this opposition to religion. The same is true for

commonunderstandingsof‘religion.’Forinstance,sciencecametobedefinedintermsof

‘natural’investigationasaproductofitscontrasttoreligion,whichresultedinreligionbeing

assignedtherealmofthe‘supernatural.’Priortothisrelationalization,thesetermswerenot

consideredsignifiersofreligionandscience.Andtoday,scienceasnaturalinvestigationand

religionasconcerningthesupernaturalaredefinitionsthatholdoutsideofareligion-science

context.Anypresent-daydictionaryprovesthispoint,thoughhistoricalaccountshaveyetto

identify this relational etymology. This confirms my point that it was in the process of

relationalizationthatthemeaningofthesetermsevolved.

Observingreligionandscienceareconstructedasmutuallyexclusiveisverydifferent

fromtheconflictthesis,thoughmutualexclusivitycertainlyperpetuatesconflictualviews.

Conflicthasalsobeenconstructedinmanyinstances,byreadingintothepastmorethanwas

present,withtheresultthathistoricalfictionsweretakenasfact.Forspecialistsinthefield,

thishasbecomeasalientpoint.Whilethisisimportant,mymainpointisnotthatmutual

exclusivityandconflictareconstructed,buthowmutualexclusivityhasstructuredchanges

in themeaningsof the terms inquestion,which inpartmade it conceptuallypossible to

formulatetheconflict thesis.So,asregardstheabovecommondefinitionsofreligionand

science, the two do not conflict because their definitions happen to highlight a natural-

supernaturaldichotomy; thenatural-supernaturaldichotomywasconstructed, inpart, to

contrastreligionandscienceand,forsome,tomakethetwoconflict.Therelationalconstruct

structuredthesediscursivechangeswherebyreligionandsciencecametobeassociatedwith

suchdichotomies.Differentiationprecededdefinition.Thesameistruefortherationality-

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superstitiondichotomy,aswellasthecontrastbetweenmaterialismandphysicalism,onthe

onehand,andtheimmaterial,subjective,andspiritual,ontheother.

Fromthisonerelationalconstructalone,wefindthatrelationsareprimaryandrelata

arederivative.Tofullyseehowrelationalconstructsstructurediscursivechange,however,

wewillneedtoexaminehowmutualexclusivitysettheparametersfornewconstellations

ofmeaningforreligionandscience.

2.3 IdentityNowwith the concepts ‘religion’ and ‘science’ clearly differentiated, comparison became

possible.Ifmyhypothesisthatrelationalconstructsstructurediscursivechangeiscorrect,

thenwewouldexpectthattomake‘science-like’intheactofcomparisonwillreflectwhat

‘science’meansinthecontextoftherelationalconstructofmutualexclusivityandthatthe

samewillgofor ‘religion.’Andthat isexactlywhatweseeoccur.Religion-sciencemutual

exclusivityandthelikeningofreligionandscienceemploytheexactsamesignifiers,listed

above like naturalism/supernaturalism and rationalism/superstition and these signifiers

retaintheirrelationalcontentasoppositionaldichotomies.

Thesignifiersonlyeffectivelylikenreligionandsciencebecausetheywereonceused

todifferentiatereligionandscience.Forinstance,ifreligionandscienceareconsideredin

opposition because of a supernaturalism-naturalism dichotomy, then to counter the

argument, religion can be constructed as natural to liken it with scientific ideas. This is

simplyandonlybecausenaturalismisalreadyframedasadefiningfeatureofscienceandof

religion-science opposition. In this way, the pre-existing relational construct sets the

parametersfordiscursivechange.

Mutualexclusivitynotonlyprovidesthesignifiersofwhichtoworkwith,italsogives

rise to how this likening of religion and science will be interpreted in terms of a new

relationalconstruct.Sincereligionandsciencearetakenasopposites,tomakethetwoalike

will in this case lead to theconclusion that it excludes theotherdomainandonewillbe

reduced to the other. Such a reduction to a single framework of meaning can only be

conceptually coherent if one grants that the two frameworks in question are mutually

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exclusive, otherwise themultiplicityofnarrativeswould remain intact.52Thus, reduction

breachestherelationalconstructofreligion-sciencemutualexclusivity,whileatthesame

timereinforcingit.

Inthecaseoftheidentityconstruct,‘religion’isrelationallydefinedas‘nothingmore

thanscience,’reducibletoscientificframeworksofmeaning.‘Science,’inturn,isrelationally

definedasreducibly‘religion.’Accordingtothisrelationalconstruct,oneconceptcanexplain

away the other, so that the secondary concept is nothing more than the primary one.

Whether‘religion’or‘science’actsastheprimaryframeworkofmeaningresultsintwovery

differentviews,thusIproposetwosubcategories—the‘scientificationofreligion’andthe

‘religionization of science.’ I sometimes refer to ‘scientificated religion’ and ‘religionized

science,’respectively,toexpress‘religion’and‘science’aspertheidentityconstruct.53Iwill

discuss each of these subcategories in turn before turning to the third major relational

constructofrepresentation.

2.3.1 TheScientificationofReligionVonStuckraddescribed the ‘scientificationof religion’ as “Thediscursiveorganizationof

knowledge about religion in secular environments.” I further limit it to the framework

outlinedabove—thatis,religionreductivelyconstructedasascientificobject.Onereason

fordoingsoisbecause,asvonStuckradnoted,accordingtohisviewofthescientificationof

religion,onecouldalsospeakofthe‘religionizationofscience’torefertothesameprocess.

Iwould like todifferentiatebetween theseprocesses. It is true that the scientificationof

religion and the religionization of science involve the samediscursive entanglements, as

notedbyvonStuckrad,asboththeterms‘scientification’or‘religionization’indicateare-

52Thatisnottosaythatitisalwaysthecasethatreductionisstructuredbymutualexclusivity.Forinstance,both religion and science could be reduced under a super-ordinated concept like knowledge, making therelationalconstructionofreligion-to-scienceauniqueone.However,inthecasesexamined,whatweseeisthatmutualexclusivityisusedtojustifyreduction,exemplifiedinsuchargumentsas ‘sincereligionisnatural, itcannotbesupernatural,thereforeeverythingthereistoreligionisaccountedforbyscience.’Inthisgeneralizedargument,mutualexclusivityisstructuringthediscursivechangetotheidentityconstruct.Ifonedoestakeamutuallyexclusivepositionandlikensreligionandscience,thenreductionismwillnecessarilyresult.53Asasidenote,Isometimesuse‘scientification’asashorthandwaytorefertothe‘scientificationofreligion,’‘exclusivity’for‘religion-sciencemutualexclusivity,’etc.However,itisimportanttokeepinmindforpurposesoffuturedirectionsofresearchthattheseconstructsarenotrestrictedtotheirrelationswithreligion,aswewillseeparticularlyinthelastchapter.Arelationalanalysiscouldbeappliedtoanytwotermssolongastheyhavesomehistoryofbeingunderstoodrelativetooneanother.

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constellationofreligionandsciencerelativetooneanother.54However,thescientification

of religion and the religionizationof science could also beused to express asymmetrical

relationshipsbetweenthesediscoursesandthuswouldthennotbeexchangeablefromthis

perspective.Inasymmetricalrelationships,whichsideoftheperspectiveoneisoncanresult

inawholedifferentview.Thus,Iusetheterm‘scientification’notonlytoexpressafocuson

the‘environment’ofscienceasdoesvonStuckrad,butalsotoemphasizetheperspectiveof

scientificunderstandingsoftheworldandmeaning-makinginvolvedintheconstructionof

religion—an asymmetrical relationship whereby the meaning of religion is guided by

scientific frameworks. In contrast, the religionization of science suggests themeaning of

‘science’isguidedbyreligiousframeworks,accordingtohowIusetheterminology,aswill

bediscussedinthefollowingsubsection.

Toexemplifythescientificationofreligion,Iexaminethecaseofreligionconstructed

as a scientific object in the natural scientific study of religion in Chapter Four. The

progressionofthescientificationofreligionreachesacrossmanyfields,howeverIfocuson

theirconvergenceincontemporarycognitivescienceofreligion—arelativelynewfieldthat

continuestolargelyholdtoreductionistassumptions,whereasmanyotherdisciplineshave

moved toward more interdependent and holistic models. Similar to how scientific

knowledge, the history of science, and the profession of science were constructed in

oppositiontoreligioninthecaseofmutualexclusivity,knowledgeofreligion,thehistoryof

religion,andthestudyofreligionwereconstructedasreduciblyscientific.Inmakingreligion

science-like, these aspects of the concept ‘religion’ were subsumed under scientific

knowledgeandnaturalisticapproachesinboththeacademicandnaturalscientificstudyof

religion.Inmakingreligionscience-like,‘science’istreatedintermsofitssignifiersasper

54AbovequoteandobservationsonvonStuckrad(2014),180.Theterminology‘scientificationofreligion’andrelatednotionshavebeenusedelsewhere,inaslightlydifferentway.KnutAukland,definesthe‘scientizationofreligion’astheprocessofappealingtoscience,includingusingscientificmodelsandexperiments,inthinkingandcommunicatingaboutreligion.Aukland(2014).SeealsoAukland(2016).Similarly,MetteBuchardtusestheterm‘scientification’—withoutexplicitlydefiningit—toexpress,ontheonehand,presentingreligiononthe basis of scientific results in education,while on the other hand, the term is used to describe religiousindividualsusingscienceasameansoflegitimizationinsocietyinordertoappearobjective.Buchardt(2013),128,and130–131.Usingscience,scientificterminology,andscientificmethodsasalegitimizationstrategyisalsotermed‘scientification’byOlavHammerandJamesR.Lewis.Hammer&Lewis(2010),8and20.Accordingto Stephanie Gripentrog, ‘scientification’ is the process of ‘taking over’ religious concepts of abnormalphenomenatobereplacedbypsychologicalones.Gripentrog(2014).

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mutualexclusivity.Themostimportantsignifierthatcomesintoplayhereis ‘naturalism,’

which is discursively entangled and often conflated with physicalism, materialism, and

localizationism.Sincethesesignifiersarethoughttoexcludesupernaturalismandreligion

aspermutualexclusivity,theonlyframeworkofmeaningleftisthatofscienceandtheresult

isthatreligionisreducedtoscience.

Thismeansthatwiththereductionofreligiontoscience,religionlosesmanyofits

pre-establishedandconventionalmeanings(meaningsaspermutualexclusivity).Thisisnot

onlybecausesignifiersofscienceexcludesignifiersofreligion,butalsobecausetolikenthe

twoconceptsinanywayistotakeawaytheirprimarymodeofdistinction—theircontrast

tooneanother.Ifindeedreligionandscienceareprimarilyconstructedasmutuallyexclusive

concepts, then to make them alike will necessarily make the terms ambiguous. These

ambiguitiesleadtoquestionsaboutwhat‘religion’meansinthecontextofscience,suchas

‘Isthescientificobjectreligion“really”religion?’and‘Doestheexplanationofthescientific

objectofreligionsuggestreligionisillusion/false/insignificant?’Thedoubtexhibitedinsuch

ontologicalquestionsisaproductoftheassumptionsofmutualexclusivity. Incontrast, if

religionwere framedas likemysticism, thiswillnotraisethequestionof if itcanstillbe

consideredreligion—becausereligionandmysticismarenotthoughtofasoppositional.So,

why should religion as science-like say anything about truth or falsity? That is only a

question if you already consider the domains to be mutually exclusive in some way,

suggestingthecentralroleofrelationalconstruction.

Since these questions are products of mutual exclusivity, we can expect that the

answer will reinforce held assumptions. In response, religion, apart from the scientific

framework,hasoftenbeensuggestedtobepathologicaldelusionorjustplainfalse,meaning

theonly‘true’religionisthescientificobjectwhichisdecidedlyfixedinbrainstructuresand

functions, devoid of any significant meaning. Reduction is more than identifying with

signifiersofsciencetotheexclusionofreligion;itistheexclusionofreligiontosuchadegree

thatevenitsontologicalstatusisthrownintoquestion.Theadoptionoftheassumptionsof

mutual exclusivity in the development of this identity construct shows how relational

constructsstructurediscursivechange,determiningsignifiersforlikeningandstructuring

how likeningwill be interpreted, resulting in a new relational construct. This relational

construct,inturn,givesrisetonewsignifiersfortheterm‘religion’apartfromsignifiersof

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scienceaspermutualexclusivity,namelyreligionasontologicallydemotedandwithlittle

significanceattheleveloftheindividualandsociety.Thisrelationalconstructalsogaverise

to new signifiers for the term ‘science,’ specifically that science is about the physical,

material,andlocalizableandthatscienceissignifiedbyreductionism.Thesenewsignifiers

ofreligionandsciencelatercomeintoplayinsubsequentdiscursivedevelopments,which

willfurtherestablishthatrelationalconstructsstructurediscursivechange.

2.3.2 TheReligionizationofScienceAbouttwodozenarticlesusetheterm“religionize”andapproximatelyfiftypublicationsuse

theterm“religionization,”mostinpassing,withoutexplainingthemeaningoftheterm.The

relatedterm‘religionation’hasbeenlittleused.ThebroadestuseofthetermIfoundisto

refer to “the general task of developing a theory of religion.”55 The overall sense of its

common usage is to ‘make religion-like.’56 Eric L. Saak defined ‘religionization’ as “a

descriptivetermfortheevolutioninthedefinitionsandexpressionsof‘beingreligious.’”57

Thereisalsoadistinctsenseofreligionexpandingbeyonditsbordersinmanyinstances.58

AccordingtohowIusetheterm,‘religionization’referstothereductiontoreligion.

Asstated,thescientificationofreligionresultedinsciencebeingcloselyassociated

withreductionism,notonly inregard to itsanalysisof religion,butmoregenerally in its

worldview.The reductionismof sciencebecameamajor identitymarker for science and

manycriticsarosewhowerediscontentwiththisintellectualhegemony.Reductionismwas

associated with science expanding beyond its domain, since it was under this umbrella

interpretationthatalldomainsoflifewereaccountedfor.Theideaofscienceastheultimate

frameworkofknowledgewaslabeled‘scientism,’adogmatismorideologythatwaslikened

toandreducedtoreligioninmanycasesandinmanyways.Forinstance,scientismhasbeen

55Larson(1995),308n.99.Seealsoibid.,166–177,199,and281–283.Similarly,DavidTracydescribedtheverbto“religionize”as“developingaphilosophicalunderstandingofreligion.”Tracy(1994),306.56See,e.g.,Herberg(1962)44–45.57 Saak (2002), 723.WhileEric L. Saak is referring to specific historical developments in eleventh to earlysixteenth-centuryChristianity,wherebytobe‘religious’expandedfromitslimitedapplicationtomonks,hischaracterizationofreligionizationisapplicablehereaswell.58See,e.g.,Shenhav(2007),11;Velikonja(2003);andJuergensmeyer(2004),226.MarkJuergensmeyeralsousedthisterm‘religionize’throughouthisvariouspublications,howeverthiswastheonlypublicationIfoundthatdirectlyofferedadefinition.Othersvaguelyrefertoplacingsocialandpoliticalsituationsintoreligioustermsorsentiments.

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describedasthe“attempttohavesciencetakeovermanyofthefunctionsofreligion,and

thusitselfbecomeareligion.”59Assuch,Ichosescientismtoexemplifythereligionizationof

science,thereductiveidentityofscienceasreligion,exploredinChapterFive.

Ifmutual exclusivity structures the termsof engagement ashypothesized, then to

makesciencereligion-like,‘religion-like’willmean‘religion’aspermutualexclusivityand

thiswillbethoughttoexcludeprevioussignifiersofscience,resultinginreduction.Inthis

casestudy,itisdemonstratedthat,indeed,inthedevelopmentofthediscourseofscientism

quareligion,thelikeningofsciencetoreligionisaspermutualexclusivity,structuringthe

changetothereligionizationofscience.Iexaminethedevelopmentofideasofscientismin

thecontextoftheestablishmentofsomeofthefirstreligionsofscience,suchas inSaint-

SimonismandtheComtianReligionofHumanity,inwhichsciencewaslikenedtoreligion.

Thiswasanalyzedbylaterthinkersaspermutualexclusivity,sothat‘scientism’wasreduced

toreligionbytheassociationwithsignifiersofreligionthat,besidesdogmaandideology,

included ethics, morality, supernaturalism, superstition, faith, belief, conversion, and

salvation.

Thisinturnledtothedisassociationwithsignifiersofscienceandthequestionofthe

ambiguityofsciencearose.However,inthiscasetheambiguityofthetermwasoftenthe

intention behind the religionization of science, to suggest that scientismwas not ‘really’

science.Itwasacritiqueofwhatsciencehadbecomecontrastedwithwhatitshouldbe.And

what science was considered to be in this case was reductionist, largely due to the

scientificationof religion. In fact, the term ‘scientification’ firstemerged in thecontextof

critiquingthereductionismofsociallifetoscientificframeworksofmeaning.60Whereas,the

aboveformulationof‘scientification’hasafocusonitsrelationwithreligion,thetermwas

originallyusedtoexpresshowscienceimpactsthecharacter,formulation,andmeaningof

society. Its sister term ‘scientization,’ has also been used to capture the intentional and

unintentionalconsequencesofscientificexpertsonthediscursiveconstructionofmeaning

inthecontextofsocialgroups.61Thereligionizationofsciencewasthusasortofrhetorical

59Stenmark(2013),2104.60‘Scientification,’inreferenceto‘thesocial,’isyetagainwithoutacleardefinition.SeeTurner(2007).61Theterm‘scientization’inreferencetothesocialisusedinZiemannetal(2012),aswellpassimthroughoutthevolume.JürgenHabermashasalsousedtheterm‘scientization’similarly,butasanormativewarningfor

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reaction to thescientificationof religionspecificallyandof reductionismgenerally,while

reflecting the assumptions of mutual exclusivity. Thus, we can see how this sort of

conversationisunfoldingbetweenmutualexclusivity,scientification,andreligionization.

2.4 InclusivityThusfar,wehaveseenthatthedifferentiationofreligionandscienceviamutualexclusivity

set the stage for likening and eventually reducing the two. Contrast set the stage for

comparisonandnewrelationalconstructsemerged.Meanwhile,therewasalotofdiscontent

abouthowthereligion-sciencerelationshipdeveloped.Specifically,therewasconcernabout

thedisenchantmentthatscientificationgaverisetoinframingreligionasmerelyrealand

thusoflittlesignificance,whilethedogmatismofreligionizedscienceleftsciencenobetter

thanthereligionitattemptedtoovercome.Manyfeltthatbothreligionandsciencehadfailed

intheseways,whichwaslargelyattributedtonotionsofmutualexclusivityandtheidentity

construct. Thus, the problem was approached through the argument that religion and

science are ‘notmutually exclusive.’ This iswhat I refer to as the ‘inclusivity construct,’

discussed in Chapter Six. Inclusivity is constructed in relative perspective to these other

constructs, as the exclusion of mutual exclusivity and reductionism as well (since

reductionism is a product ofmutual exclusivity). In the case of the inclusivity construct,

‘religion’ is relationally defined as ‘not excluding science’ and ‘science’ as ‘not excluding

religion.’Isometimesrefertothisas‘inclusivereligion’and‘inclusivescience,’respectively.

Todemonstratethedevelopmentoftheinclusivityconstruct,Idiscussthe‘religions

ofscience’thatdevelopedinforcefromaroundthe1860stothe1940s.Thesereligionsof

sciencewere framedaspartofa ‘reformation,’specificallyareformationofscientificated

religion, religionized science, and religion-science exclusivity. I refer to a ‘reformation’

becausethosewhosoughtto formthesereligionsofscienceweredoingso inreactionto

previousformulationsandspecificallytargetedreductionistaccountsandmutualexclusivity

intheirquesttoconstructanalternativereligion-sciencerelationalconstruct.Theinclusivity

construct thus shows the continuity of the above-mentioned ‘conversation’ between

relationalconstructs,asthediscourseevolvedrelativetothesepre-existingconstructs.

the social sciences’ colonizationof political deliberation in favor of technocratic calculation. SeeHabermas(1970),62–80.

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There are severalways that inclusivity has been constructed. Besides positioning

religionandscienceassimplynotmutuallyexclusive,inarelatedarrangement,signifiersas

permutual exclusivity are oftentimes rejected as not representative of ‘real’ religion or

science.Otherapproachesarerathernuancedandsophisticated.Whilethescientificationof

religion and the religionization of science constructed similarities between religion and

scienceasanalternativetomutualexclusivity,theinclusivityconstructchallengesthenature

ofreligion-sciencedifference. Inclusivitysuggests thatreligion-sciencedifferencesarenot

oppositional. For example, dichotomies as per mutual exclusivity, such as

naturalism/supernaturalismandmaterialism/spiritualism,havebeensuggestedtobetwo

sides of the same coin. Likening is not thought to negate its ‘opposite’ as per mutual

exclusivityand insteaddichotomiesare transformed intocomplementarities. In thisway,

reductionismisrejected,aswellasmutualexclusivity.

Hence,therelationalconstructsofmutualexclusivityandidentityarestructuringthe

discursivechangetoinclusivityinseveralways.Theseconstructsarethecontextofwhich

inclusivityisconstructed,providingacontrastcaseforrelationalconstruction.Thesignifiers

of religion and science as per these relational constructs are specifically rejected as

inauthentic.Meanwhile,thosesignifiersthatarenotrejectedaresubjecttoareorganization

oftheirrelationalcontentinawaythat isrelativetothepreviousrelationalconstructs—

complementarities are constructed in contrast to dichotomies. Thismeans that the pre-

existingrelationalconstructsprovidethestructureofwhichinclusivityisconstructed.

Inclusivity is a relational construct that largely focuses on the non-opposition of

differences.Thenon-oppositionofdifferencesnaturally lends itself totheconstructionof

similaritiesinanon-reductiveway,resultingintherepresentationconstruct,asdiscussed

below,withinclusivitystructuringthetermsofengagement.

2.5 RepresentationThoughinclusivityandanon-reductiverelationalconstructarecloselyrelated,asaremutual

exclusivityandtheidentityconstruct,itisnotthesamethingtosaythatreligionandscience

arenotoppositesastosayreligionandsciencecanbenon-reductivelyrelated.Thisnon-

reductivereligion-sciencerelationalismiswhatIrefertoasthe‘representationconstruct.’

Justaswesawinthecaseofmutualexclusivity,likeningreligionandsciencewillfollowthe

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structureofthepre-existingrelationalconstruct,structuringthechangesthatwillresultin

a distinct relational construct. In the context of mutual exclusivity that construct was

identity.Whenthereisaninterplaybetweeninclusivityandlikeningreligionandscience,

theresult is therepresentationconstruct.Aswesaw,when likeningreligionandscience,

mutualexclusivitygivesrisetoreductionismbecauseifreligionisscience-like,forexample,

then it excludes being religion-like and religion is reduced to the science. In the case of

inclusivity,constructingreligionasscience-likedoesnotexcludesignifiersofreligionsince

religion and science are not thought of as exclusive domains. Thismeans thatwhatever

similaritiesareconstructedwillbeunderstoodinnon-reductiveterms.

Thenon-reductiverelationalizationofreligionandscienceasthespecificinterplay

betweeninclusivityandlikeningreligionandsciencewillconstitutethefollowingtwocase

studies.Asinthecaseoftheidentityconstruct,dependingonwhetherreligionorscienceis

perceivedastheprimaryenvironmentofinteractionwillresultintwoverydifferentviews.

Thus, the representationconstructalsoconsistsof twosubcategories: the ‘scientificityof

religion’andthe‘religiosityofscience,’inwhich‘religion’isunderstoodasnon-reductively

science-likeand‘science’asnon-reductivelyreligion-like,respectively.

Historically,therepresentationconstructhashadlittletreatmentbyscholars.When

historicalactorsconstructreligionandscienceasnon-reductivelysimilar, theanalysison

thepart of academics typically reflects scientification and religionization. Putdifferently,

representation isusually interpretedasaconflationofreligionandscience,with theend

resultbeingareductiveanalysis.However, thisdoesnotreflecthowthehistoricalactors

themselvesunderstoodtheiractivitiesorconcepts.Whenlikeningisapproachedwiththe

perspective of inclusivity, we get relational constructs that do not conflate religion and

science.Asshouldbeapparentatthispoint, ‘conflation’and ‘reduction’areconceptsthat

hingeontherelationalconstructapplied,asitmeanslittletoreducereligiontoscienceor

vice versawhen these terms areporous and contested anyway.Thus,when I speakof a

rejection of ‘reduction’ and of an avoidance of ‘conflation,’ I am using these terms

heuristically to describe one relational perspective. Of course, we can argue whether

conflation is in factavoided,butdetermining the factof thematterwillhingeuponwhat

definitionsof‘religion’and‘science’areappliedandhowtheyareunderstoodrelativetoone

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another,bringingusbacktotheprimaryissueathand—ananalysisofmeaningmakingasa

relationalprocess.Thus,thetaskfacingusnowistotakethedataseriously.

2.5.1 TheScientificityofReligionThoughitappearsinprintasearlyas1888,theterm‘scientificity’islittleused.Thegeneral

thrustofthewordindicatestobe‘science-like’or“thequalityofbeingscientific,”asisthe

relatedterm‘scientificness.’62Tomyknowledge,therehasnotbeenanypastusageofthe

terminology ‘scientificity of religion.’ However, there has been use of the phrase the

‘scientificityofBuddhism,’whichisthecasestudyIusetoexemplifythisrelationalconstruct

in Chapter Seven. The usage demonstrates a focus on the construction of scientific

character.63AccordingtohowIusetheterm,the‘scientificityofreligion’referstoreligion

constructedas‘science-like’inanon-reductive,inclusiveway.

In thediscussion thus far on the various relational constructs, the focushasbeen

mainly on the likening of religion and science as ameans of relationalization. However,

differentiationalsoplaysanimportantrole,particularlyinmycasestudyofthescientificity

of Buddhism. One important way that Buddhism was likened to science was by

differentiatingBuddhism from those things that signified ‘not science,’ including religion

generallyandChristianityspecifically.ItwasexactlybecausereligionandChristianitywere

definedasmutuallyexclusivewithsciencethatdifferentiatingbetweenthetwo,ontheone

hand,andBuddhism,ontheother,thatBuddhismwasconstructedasscience-like.However,

the‘religion’thatBuddhismwasdifferentiatedfromwasspecificallyreligionaspermutual

exclusivity.TheargumentwasthatwhatmarkedtheBuddhistreligionasdistinctfromother

religions was that it was scientific. Buddhism is then constructed as religion as per

inclusivity.

Inasecondmove,thisinclusivereligionislikenedtosignifiersofscienceandtothe

generalterm‘science’aspermutualexclusivity.Thatis,theemergenceoftheEnglishterm

‘Buddhism’was constructed in comparison to ‘science.’Buddhismwas said to ‘scientific,’

often in reference to signifiers such as empiricism, rationality, freedom of thought and

inquiry,andplacingevidenceaboveauthority.Yet,becausereligionandscienceweretreated

62Simpson(2016g);andSimpson(2016h).63McMahan(2004).

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from an inclusive perspective, these signifiers of science were not thought to exclude

signifiers of religion and the scientificity of religion ensued. Furthermore, points of

differencethatweremaintainedweretreatedasnon-oppositional,suchasmaterialismand

spirituality,constructedascomplementary.

As such, the pre-existing relational constructs set the terms of Buddhism-science

engagement inmanyways.Tomake science-likewasbasedonnotionsof science asper

mutualexclusivity,includingitssignifiers.Tomakeunlikereligionwasalsobasedinnotions

of mutual exclusivity, thus constructing Buddhism in contrast to religion specifically

conceptualizedasexcludingscience.Furthermore,thisofteninvolvedadirectengagement

withtheparametersoftheterm‘religion’suchthatitscontrastwithreligionwasnotthought

tonegatereligion,butrathertoredefineitsboundariesinaninclusiveway.Atthesametime,

likeningthereligionofBuddhismandsciencewasalsodonefromaninclusiveperspective,

suchthatthescientificcharacterofBuddhismwasnotthoughttoexcludeornegatereligious

considerationsnorreligioussignificance.Onthecontrary,scienceisthoughttoenhancethe

religion, making the likening specifically non-reductive, resulting in the scientificity of

religion.

2.5.2 TheReligiosityofScienceLiketheterm‘scientificity,’‘religiosity’islittleused.Aboutonedozenacademicpublications

employ the phrase the ‘religiosity of science.’64 Typical usage is to apply the notion of

‘religiosity’—usedintermsofsocialphilosophyanddefinedasacertainkindofbeliefand

believing—to the context of science.65 The phrase has elsewhere been similarly used to

express religious feelingsarising from thepracticeof scienceor theknowledgeofwhich

scienceproduces.Thereareseveralinstancesinwhichtheterminologyisusedinamanner

similartowhatIhaveidentifiedasthe‘religionizationofscience,’todescribeaperspective

thatreducessciencetoreligion,typicallywiththatreductionutilizedasameansofcriticizing

science.66Aboutanotherdozenacademicpublicationsemploythetermthe‘religiousnessof

64TheearliestuseIfoundwasinanarticledatedto1967,whichunfortunatelydoesnotexplaintheterm.SeeKlein(1967),123.65E.g.,Kasak(2011a);Kasak(2011b);andBerne(2006).66E.g.,Rivas(2008);andVogel(1994).

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science,’ typically used in one of the above variations of the ‘religiosity of science.’67

According to how I use the term, the ‘religiosity of science’ refers to the construction of

scienceasreligion-likeinanon-reductive,inclusiveway,exploredinChapterEight.

With the mutual exclusivity construct and the scientification of religion, a very

distinctideaofwhatitmeanttobeascientificobjecthademerged—sciencewasaboutthe

natural,physical,material,andlocalizable.Withtheadventofquantumphysicsinthe1920s

however, this all changed. The idea of science noted above faced paradigm-shifting

challenges. Reality at the quantum level displayed nonphysical/immaterial and

nonlocalizablequalities,inadditiontodiscontinuity,uncertainty,andprobability.Thiswas

contrastedtothecontinuityofphysicalsystemsatthelevelofclassicalphysicsthatallowed

fordeterministicoutcomes thatcouldbeaccuratelypredicted. ‘Classicalphysics’ came to

refertothescientificworldviewpriortoquantumphysicsthatcouldnowonlybeappliedat

themacro level.Conceptualizingquantumphysics inspecificcontrast toclassicalphysics

enabledthelikeningofreligionandquantumphysics,sinceclassicalphysicswasunderstood

intermsofexclusivescience.Asquantumphysicstookonthe‘opposite’signifiersofscience

aspermutualexclusivity,thosesignifiersofquantumphysicsweretheverysameasthose

ofreligion.Italsoenabledthelikeningofreligionandscienceinaspecificallynon-reductive

waybecausebothkindsofphysicsweresimultaneouslyupheld,oneatthemacroleveland

oneatthemicro.

The fact that quantum physics came to be signified by the opposite of ‘exclusive

science’ and thus signifiedby ‘religion’ didnot escapenotice.All the founding fathers of

quantumphysicsatleasttoyedwiththeidea,drawingsimilaritiesbetweenthenewscience

andreligiousworldviews.Itcouldhardlybeignoredconsideringthatwhat‘religion’meant

inthiscontextwasexactlyduetohowscientiststhemselves,amongothers,hadconstructed

the concept. Since the localizable had been previously constructed as the opposite of

religious transcendence and the nonphysical world, the ‘nonlocal’ was likened to

interconnectedness,panpsychism,andothertranscendentalnotions.Atthesametime,there

wasagreatdebateinthefieldaboutthenatureoftheobserverandtheroleofthemindor

67Ontheuseof‘religiosity,’seeO’Neal(2014).On‘religiousness,’seeDurbin(1999);andEinstein(1949),28–29.

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the immaterial in the construction of reality. Though not all agreed, the standard

interpretationofquantumphysicssuggeststhattheobserverplaysapart.Theobserver,for

many,means consciousness, giving subjectivity a role in objective reality. This, too,was

likened to religiousperspectives since, aswe saw, religionhadalreadybeen signifiedby

subjectivity, the mind, and immaterialism as per mutual exclusivity. With physicalism,

materialism,andlocalizationabandonedatthequantumlevel,itcomesasnosurprisethat

naturalismcameunderfireaswell.Manybegantoconstructquantumphysicsintermsof

supernaturalism,whilemaintainingaspacefornaturalismatthesametime.

Now that signifiersof religionandsciencehadbecomepartofoneanother,many

began to interpret quantum physics as holding a non-reductive similarity to religion, a

source for science and transcendent inspiration, a religiosity of science. New signifiers

emerged to express this non-reductive similarity between religion and science, namely

‘mysticism.’Infact,thereligiosityofscienceinthecontextofquantumphysicshasevenbeen

labeled ‘quantum mysticism.’ ‘Mysticism’ was constructed as a commonality across all

religions,leavingproblematicsignifiersaside.Assuch,manycametoseequantumphysics,

withitssimilaritytomysticism,astherealmofwhichreligionandsciencecouldbelikened

inagenuineway,thatdidnotsacrificethereligionorthescienceandthatdidnotfavorone

overtheother.

3 TheStructureofDiscursiveChange&theRelationalModel

In summary, religion and science came to be contrasted to one another to carve out

independentconceptualspaceforeachterm.Asthemainsourceforidentificationwasthis

contrast,thetwocametobethoughtofasmutuallyexclusiveopposites.Insomeways,this

process gave science the upper hand in knowledge acquisition and eventually science

became the dominant episteme. Scientific frameworks of meaning expanded and even

religionbecameanobjectofscientificinvestigation.However,becausethetwowerethought

ofasopposites,makingreligionscience-likeinitsconstructionasascientificobjectmeantit

couldnotbereligion-like,resultinginthereductionofreligiontoscience.Inresponsetothis

epistemologicalhegemony,sciencewas increasinglycriticizedasbeingreligion-like in its

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dogmatism,amongothercritiques.Similartowhatoccurredwithreligioninthecontextof

science,sincereligionandsciencewerethoughttobemutuallyexclusiveopposites,thinking

of science as religion-likemeant it could not be science-like and sciencewas reduced to

religion.Manycametobedisenchantedwithscientificatedreligionandreligionizedscience.

Bothreligionandsciencewerethoughttohavefailedsocietyandthesourceofthatfailure

was often said to bemisconception. Thatmisconceptionwas identified as the notion of

mutual exclusivity, with reductionism (the identity construct) as its handmaiden. A

‘reformation’cameaboutduringwhichthereligion-sciencerelationshipwasconceptualized

anew.‘Real’religionandsciencewerenotoppositional,advocatesargued,norcouldonebe

reducedtotheother.Onceitwasthoughtthatreligionandsciencewerenotoppositional,

making religionscience-likeandscience religion-likeno longer ran the riskof reduction.

Similaritycouldbeinterpretedinsteadasreligionnon-reductivelyrepresentingascience-

likequalityandsciencerepresentingreligioninthesameway.

Throughoutthisevolutionof thereligion-sciencerelation,weseeastructure from

pointAtopointB.Mutualexclusivitywasaproductofthenon-differentiationofthemedieval

worldview;reductionistidentityaproductofmutualexclusivity;inclusivityanalternative

tomutual exclusivity; and representation as product of inclusivity and an alternative to

reductionism.Thoughthisisasimplification,wecanseehoweachpre-establishedrelational

construct structured the discursive change to the following relational construct.

Furthermore, the relational constructs provided the signifiers of which also structured

changingmeanings—religionas‘natural’tomakeitascientificobjectortohavescientific

character; science as ‘supernatural’ tomake it reducibly religious or to have a religious

character, for instance. Thus, how to make religion and science alike in a new way is

dependent on how they were previously understood relative to one another.What this

demonstrates is that the signifiersand their relational content, like the supernaturalism-

naturalismdichotomy,bornfrommutualexclusivity,becometheconceptualstructurefor

articulatingnewmeanings.Whichsignifiersdifferentiatethetwoareusedtocomparethem.

So,tomake‘science-like’or ‘religion-like’ isapurelyrelationalactivity,dependentonthe

relationalconstructsettingthetermsforengagement.

On several levels, the relational constructs unfolded in a dialogic manner,

conceptually developed relative to one another. Foucault’s genealogical methodology

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similarlyfounda“historicalaprior”dependingonthecontext.“Thehistoricalapriorpoints

atconditionsonthepossibilitiesofknowledgewithina‘discursiveformation.’”Thereisa

similarideainhistoricalepistemologythatsuggests,“presentideashavememories;thatis,

a correct analysis of an idea requires an account of its previous trajectory and uses.”68

Indeed,hereweseethatpre-existingrelationalconstructssettheparametersforhownovel

constructionscouldbeformed.Atthesametimeandindespiteof thisaprioricharacter,

knowledgeisstillhistoricallycontingentandcanundergoprofoundtransformations.

Whatthisoverviewhasshownus is thatrelationalconstructsstructurediscursive

change. This is not necessarily a causal relationship between relational constructs and

discursive change, but rather demonstrates the process underlying the formation and

communicationofnovelconceptualizations.Relationalityanalysisallowsustoanalyzeand

understandthetransformationprocessfrompointAtopointB.Throughrelationalization,

concepts gain meaning, lose meaning, and change meaning. Furthermore, each

relationalization can be seen as a structured response to the other. These interactions

suggestalargerunderlyingrelationalconstructionofmutualexclusionandimplication.Put

differently,relationalconstructsarethemselvesrelationallyconstructed—relativetoother

relationalconstructs.Eachrelationalizationbuildsonthelast.Relationalconstructsareboth

structured—the product of pre-existing structure-forming processes—and structuring of

proceedingconstructs.

Eventhoughweseeanenduringstructurethroughoutthesediscursivechanges,this

structureisincrediblydynamicconsideringwhatreligionandsciencemeancanvaryfrom

one pole to another, from one dichotomy to its opposite, from being identical to being

mutuallyexclusivetobeingcompatible,evenwithdifferentsetsofsignifiersineachcase.All

ofthesemanifestationsfeaturestronglythroughouthistoryandifwewanttotakethedata

seriously,weneedamodelthatreflectsthedatainbothitsstructureanddynamism.The

relationalmodel is not, however, anothermodel of religion-science relationships on the

same level as thewarfare thesis, the conflict thesis, or the complexity thesis, nor is it a

typology.AsJohnHedleyBrookeandGeoffreyCantorhavenoted,thesetheses“possessa

high degree of relativism depending on how an individual conceives both science and

68Hacking(2002),5and8.

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religion.”69 As an alternative, the model I am proposing here engages with the act of

conceivingassuch.Iamnotarguingthatthereligion-sciencerelationshipcanbereducedto

certaintypes;Iamsuggestingtheprocessesbywhichwecometotypologize.Itisameta-

modelabouthowweconstructourmodels,puttingvarioustypologiesandthesesinrelative

perspective. A relational analysis can demonstrate the conceptual development of such

theses, includingrelationalismitselfasaproductoftherelationalizationofrelationaland

non-relationalmodels,whichwillbediscussedintheconcludingchapter.Itcanshowthe

proceduralhowofdiscursivechange;itcanshowhowwordsmean.

4 TheRelationalModel&theProblemofDefinition

Discourse research isnonethelesspotentially limitless and thus the researchermust still

makesomedecisionsintheselectionofdata.Theselectionofdata,though,neednotdistort

theoverallpicture.Ifselectionsarebasedon“agroupofcontrolleddecisions,”asFoucault

suggested,andifthosedecisionsdepartfromthislimitlessnessasamethodologicalbasis,

thenthis limitlessnessbecomestheverywayinwhichthedata isunderstood.70 If,asthe

Buddhists say, ‘the only constant is change,’ then let’s make change our constant, our

underlyingstructureofanalysis.Somehavearguedthatthediscursiveapproachshiftsthe

problem of definition from the term ‘religion’ to that of ‘discourse,’ which works as a

substitutedefinition.Yet,theterms‘religion’and‘science’arenotbasedonanydefinitions,

butratherbasedontheuseoftheterms,embracingthelimitlessqualityinthetreatmentof

thetermsthemselves.ChristianFunkeandLisaZüfleargued,“Toanalyzewhatisspecifically

religiousindiscourses,thishastobedefinedinatheoreticallysoundwayfirst.”71Fromthe

perspectiveofrelationalityanalysis,theterms‘religion’and‘science’aredefinedintermsof

therelationalparametersandspecificallyfocusontheuseoftheverytermsthemselves—

notonanyselectionofwhatis‘religious’exceptforwhatissaidinthedatatobe‘religious.’

Thisdoesnegateotherrelationalconstellations,suchas‘religion’relativeto‘secularism,’for

69Brooke&Cantor(1998),66.70QuotedinvonStuckrad(2016b),221.71QuotedintranslationinvonStuckrad(2016b),217.Inibid.,thereisalsothediscussionoftheproblemofdefiningdiscourse,inwhichtheauthorrespondedinalikemannerasIhavedonehere.

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example, but rather simply provides ‘a group of controlled decisions’ that takes the

limitlessnessofdata,definition,anddiscourseasatheoreticaljumping-offpoint.

Onemightstillbetemptedtopointtosignifiersasmechanismsofdiscursivechange.

Thesignifiersemployedintherelationalprocessesoflikening/differentiatingareproducts

oftherelationalconstructs;andtheconstructs,inturn,structurehowrelationalprocesses

areinterpreted,settingthetermsofengagementandresultinginnewconstructsandnew

signifiers.Whilesignifiersare importantfortrackingthechangesintheterms, it isreally

relational constructs that set the parameters formeaningmaking. For example, tomake

science-like will be interpreted as a reduction to science if one understands science to

exclude religion; whereas to make science-like will be interpreted as a non-reductive

similaritybetweenreligionandscienceifoneunderstandsreligionandscienceintermsof

inclusivity. Thus, relational constructs structure not only the way in which particular

signifierswillresultindiscursivechange,butalsostructuretheevolutionoftermsinaway

thatisoutsidethereachofthosesignifiers,or,putdifferently,inawaybeyondthetraditional

definitional approach. Saying science is about the natural and religion the supernatural

meansnothingfortherelationshipwithoutassumptionsaboutwhetherthosesignifiersare

oppositionalorcomplementary.Thesignifiersalonecannotleadtoanyconclusionaboutthe

religion-sciencerelationship.Ourpresumptionsabouttherelationalcontentoftheconcepts

dothat.

This and the observation that relational constructs are themselves relationally

constructed strongly supports the hypothesis that relations are primary and relata are

derivative. Put simply, this means the traditional definitional approach is analytically

backward.Definitionsor signifiersmeannothingwithout relational content.As stated in

ChapterOne, the typicalapproach toananalysisof thereligion-sciencerelationship is to

define‘religion’anddefine‘science’and,basedonthesedefinitions,concludearelationship

betweenthetwo.Inthisapproach,therelationshipissetinthepremiseofthedefinition,as

thedefinitionwilldemarcatethetworelativetooneanothersothattheycanthenberelated.

Putdifferently,theactofdemarcationistoestablisharelationshipthatisthenusedtoargue

forthatrelationship.Instead,whatweshouldbeaskingishowthisrelationaldemarcation

constructsthemeaningof‘religion’and‘science.’Andthisiswhatarelationalityanalysiscan

show.

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Relationalityanalysisdirectlyengageswiththeproblemofdefinition(onwhich,see

ChapterOne).Theissueofdefinitioniscentraltotheprogressofanyfieldofstudy,including

religiousstudies.The firststep inresolving this issue is tohaveaclearunderstandingof

definitionaldevelopment.Definitionsareoftentreatedasiftheymustbeuniversallyapplied,

atleastwithintheconfinesofagivenstudy’sdata.Yet,toopposeamultiplicityofdefinitions

istoopposetheoveralldata.Thismeansthatanygivendefinitionwillmostcertainlynotbe

acceptabletoeveryone.But,whyshouldwesupposethatthisisthepurposeofdefinition?72

If it is granted that ‘religion’ and ‘science’ are fluid concepts, the traditional

definitionalapproachlosesappeal.Howcanwederiveanymeaningfromdynamicconcepts

inananalyticallyvaluableway?Weneedtoshiftourattentionawayfromgenericdefinitions

to the way ‘religion’ and ‘science’ are organized, discussed, and otherwise discursively

materialized.73 Analyzing limitless meaning seems an impossible task. And while it is

impossible to enumerate meanings, to determine meaning structures is within grasp.

Relationalityanalysisshowsthattheproblemofdefinitioncanberesolvedbyabandoning

thispreoccupationwiththeproblemofvarietytoasolutionfromvariety—thatis,allowing

theevolutionandfluidityoftermstodictatehowwetreatdefinition.

A focus on relations is already a huge step away from rigid analytical categories.

Treatingrelationsasprimaryintheconstitutionofconceptsmeans‘being’isunderstoodas

‘becoming,’asintheHeideggerianview.Thisisbecausethingsarerelational“inthesenseof

firstbeinginternally(constitutively)relatedtoprioractualentities,thenexternallyrelated

to(constitutiveof)subsequentactualentities[…],”asclaimedinprocessphilosophy.74As

such, “it isprocess, rather thansubstance, thatshouldbe takenas themost fundamental

metaphysical constituent of theworld.”75 Relations are not static because being is “pure

activity.”76Toputit insimplebutseeminglyparadoxical language,tobeanindividual,an

objectmustbeinarelationship.77Fromarelationalperspectivewecannotspeakofanobject

72 For some history of definitional theory and philosophical understanding of the nature of definition, seePenner&Yonan(1972),114–117.73I.e.,asvonStuckradsuggestedforthestudyofreligioninvariouspublications.SeevonStuckrad(2003);vonStuckrad(2010);andvonStuckrad(2013a).74Griffin(2001),6.75Irvine(2015).SeealsoGriffin(2001),1,5–7,and117–120;andtheseminalworkWhitehead(1929).76Zaidi(1973),414.77Onindividuation,includingvariousperspectives,seeLowe(2009).Mycharacterizationisincontrast—butnotunprecedented—totheclassicaltheoryofindividuation,includingtheclaimthatindividuationhingeson

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in-itself,butwecanspeakoftheappearing-of-an-object,theindividualappearingfromthe

processesofrelationalization.

Ifwecandeterminetheactionsorprocessesofrelationalization,weneednotknow

whatwords,definitions,andmeaningsareappliedtotheterms,aseverythingweneedto

know will be present in the relation itself. For example, if religion and science are

constructedasmutuallyexclusive,thenwhateverscienceissaidtobe,weknowapriorithe

definitionofreligionwillbeitsopposite.Ifscienceissaidtobeaboutfact,thenreligionis

aboutbelieforwhateverisconstructedastheoppositeoffact.Scienceistruth;religionis

superstition, falsity, pseudoscience, for example. The relational structure of negative

correlation tells us that ‘religion’ is relationally bifurcated against ‘science.’ Knowing the

applicablerelation,allrelata(ordefinitions)are,intheory,knowable.Thisis“notbecause

the relational framework includes the particulars of ordinary conception, but because it

includes every ‘intentional’ act (‘directed towards’ suchparticulars)—and the rest of the

physicalworldbesides.”78Whatthismeansfortheendgamehereisthatifwecandetermine

therelationalstructurebetweentwoconcepts,wecanalsoseehowtheconceptsbecome

‘directed towards’ certain definitions and include every possibilitywithout enumerating

them.Inthisway,wecanaccountforthefluidityofconceptswhileretainingstablestructures

foranalysis,namelyrelationalconstructs.Focusingonhowrelationalconstructsmaketerms

‘act’incertainwaysspeaksvolumesmoreaboutwhatatermmeansthananydefinitioncan

do.

the fact that an object is capable of independent existence, that it could exist in the absence of any otherobject(s).Sociologistsofsciencealsogenerallyagreethatentitiesareonlyindividuatedandencounteredaftertheyhavebeenarticulatedanddefined,althoughthisisnotnecessarilyunderstoodintermsofrelationalism.Entitiesareunderstoodasculturallydefinedandshaped,asclassificationsandcharacteristicsassociatedwiththemwillvaryfromculturetoculture,inafrequentlyconflictingmanner.Itissometimessuggestedthatwehavenoaccesstoanyrealityindependentofuniversesofmeaningandpractice.SeeKnorr-Cetina(2005),549.78Zaidi(1973),433–434.

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Chapter3:Religion-ScienceMutualExclusivity

Weshallusetheword‘science’inthesense[…]asexpressingphysicalandexperimentalscience,tothe

exclusionoftheologicalandmetaphysical.—WilliamGeorgeWard(1812–1882)1

1 Scienceas‘NotReligion’TheologianandphilosopherWilliamGeorgeWardmadetheabovecommentsin1867inan

environment in which the use of the term ‘science’ was rather ambiguous, specifically

regardingitsdemarcationfromreligiousconsiderations.Theideathat‘science’excludedthe

theological was not at all obvious and indeed its usage often did involve discursive

connectionstotheology,metaphysics,andreligion.Thus,suchremarksmarkatransitionin

theuseofthetermtorefertoincreasinglynarrowsubjectmatter.Trimmingdowntheusage

of‘science’meant,inpart,excludingdiscoursesof‘religion.’Relationallydefiningsciencein

contrasttoreligionenablednotonlyfurtherspecificationoftheterm,butalsobroadenedit

bygivingitindependentconceptualspaceandarealmofinquiryandauthorityofitsown

thathadbeenpreviouslyco-occupiedbymanyoverlappingconcepts.2

As stated in the previous chapter, my approach is to examine how ‘religion’ and

‘science’havebeenconceptualizedrelativetooneanother.Howhavethediscoursesofthe

term ‘religion’ been constructed relative to the term ‘science’?3 In this first case study

chapter,Iexaminethebeginningsofreligion-sciencemutualconceptualization.Thisclose

discursiveconnectionbetweentheformulationoftheterm‘science’andtheconstructionof

theterm‘religion’isduetotheMedievalunifiedviewofknowledge,inwhichtherewasno

1QuotedinSimpson(2016f).Emphasisadded.2 Science has been relationally defined in contrast tomechanics, philosophy, and the classics aswell. Therelationbetweenscience,theclassics,philosophy,andreligionarediscussedextensivelyinGay(1966–1969).Onthedifferentiationbetweenscienceandmechanics,seeGieryn(1983).Despitetheimportantrolesthesehaveplayedinconceptualizing‘science,’boundaryworkbetweentheseconceptsandsciencedonotappearinnearlysomanyrealmsofsocietyasdoesthecontrastwithreligionnordoesitfeatureascentrallytodayasithasinthepast.3AccordingtoCunningham&Williams(1993),420n.34,therehasbeennocriticalanalysisofthechangingmeaningsof‘science.’Tomyknowledge,thisisstilltruetoday.Ontheetymologyandsemanticsof‘science,’seeRoss(1962);Williams(1976),232–235;andHarris(2005).

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notion of ‘science’ apart from ‘religion.’ Since the two were united (from our present

perspective)undertheumbrellaofnaturalphilosophy,inordertoarticulatethesetermsas

independentconcepts,itwasnecessarytoconstructdifferences.Scientificknowledge,the

history of science, the scientific enterprise, and the profession of science were all

conceptualizedincontrasttoreligion.Thoughthereismuchoverlapamongthesedivisions,

inthischapter,Iwilldiscusseachinturn.Themutualexclusivityconstructwasdeveloped

acrossmanydiscourses,socialrealms,andhistoricaltimeperiods.Numerousprofessionals

andacademicssawtheautonomyofsciencefromreligionasaprerequisiteforitssuccess.4

Atthesametime,religiousinstitutionsstrivedtomaintainauthorityandthuswouldassert

dominance, in various ways, over scientific knowledge that only fueled the fire. And

philosophersandintellectualsusedscientificrhetoricfortheirownpolemicalpurposesthat

often involvedaseparationfromreligiousthought.Earlyhistoriesofreligionandscience

reflected this relational construction and this, in turn, framed how generations to come

wouldunderstandthereligion-sciencerelationship.

Inthischapter,wewillseeatransitionfromdifferentiatingsciencefromreligionto

understandingtheconceptsofreligionandscienceintermsoftheirrelativedifferences.This

resultedinarelationaldefinitionofscienceas‘notreligion.’Asoneofthemainsourcesfor

theidentificationof‘science’wasthiscontrast,religionandsciencecametobethoughtof

not simply in contrast but asmutually exclusive opposites and the mutual exclusivity

constructwas firmlyestablished.Putdifferently,whereaspreviouslyreligionandscience

were usually explicitly contrasted as a means of exposition, from around the twentieth

centuryon,definitionsof religionand thatof science—evenoutsideof a religion-science

context—reflectedconceptualopposition.Fromthistimeperiodon,religion-sciencemutual

exclusivityhasbeenappliedimplicitlyorexplicitlyframedasinherent,appealingtothese

definitionsasproofofthedichotomy.

Themutualexclusivityconstructisanassumptionthatrunsdeepeveninmethodand

theory.Evenifhistoricalcontingenciesofthereligion-sciencerelationshiparerecognized,

astheytypicallyarebyspecialiststoday,thereisoftentimesstillanimplicitacceptanceof

4E.g.,DenisDiderot(1713–1784)expressedsuchaviewandthisviewistakenforgrantedinthecontemporaryera.Onthis,seeByrne(1996),170–171.

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thedichotomy.Forexample,OlavHammerandJamesR.Lewisstated,“themostcommon

waytomakesciencefunctionasalegitimatingwarrant[ofreligion]istoreinterpretscience”

and“Usingscienceasawarrant forreligion, then,onlyworkswhenscience issubsumed

undera religiousstrategy.Onlya sacralisedsciencecanconfirmascientific religion.”5 In

HammerandLewis’view,ifscienceispartofreligion,itisreligiousscience,notscienceas

science.Putdifferently, if it isreligiousit isnecessarilynotscientific.Thus, it invokesthe

relational construct of religion-science mutual exclusivity, while framing alternative

formulationsas invalid. Iwill show that this isnot a given—despitehowobvious sucha

demarcationmayseemtoourpresenteyes.Rather thenotionof scienceas ‘not religion’

developedthroughalonghistoricalprocessofconceptualizingscienceindirectcontrastto

religion—bringing us to the point today that the invocation of the mutual exclusivity

constructisoftentimesnotevenrecognizedoreasilyrecognizable.IntermsofFoucauldian

discoursetheory,itistacitknowledge.

Itwouldbeinvidioustopickjustoneout,asIcouldrefertovirtuallyanyscholarto

make thispoint of theongoing influenceof themutual exclusivity construct in academic

analyses.Andyet that is exactly thepoint—mutual exclusivityhasbecome convention—

evenappearingpainfullyobvioustostatethatscienceis‘notreligion.’But,asnoted,thiswas

notobviousforthosesuchasWardandmanyothersofhistimetothepointthatreligion-

sciencedemarcationhad tobediscussed inordertoclearlyarticulatethemeaningof the

conceptsinquestion.Andeventhoughspecialistsarequiteawareofthispoint,whatthey

failtorecognizeisthatthedevelopmentoftheterm‘science’wasstronglystructuredbythis

mutualconceptualizationwithreligion.Becauseofthislacuna,thedichotomoususeofthe

terms ‘religion’ and ‘science’ has not been seriously problematized—or at least not

problematizedenough.

For example, common definitions of religion as ‘regarding the supernatural’ and

scienceas‘naturalinvestigation’arewidelyusedincontextsfarbeyondthereligion-science

situation,whichinfactwereadirectresultofrelationalizingreligionandscience.Thus,this

5Hammer&Lewis(2010),6and8.SeealsoHammer(2001),203andpassimforadiscussionofthenotionthatscienceandspiritualityareoftentimesviewedas twosidesof thesamecoin,demonstratinghecertainly isawareoftherelevantcontingencies.Nonetheless,hispresumptionsaboutreligion-sciencedistinctionstructurehisconclusions.

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relationalconstructcontinues toperpetuateconflictualnotionsby theverydefinitionsof

religionandscienceinourpresentdayandage,definitionsthatareinvokedwithatotallack

of awareness that common understandings of these terms were actually due to mutual

conceptualization of religion and science in direct contrast. While these definitions and

conflictualrelationshipsareregularlycontested,byofferingcounterexamplesforinstance,

this does not get at the heart of the issue, because the source of the problem is not the

definitions,butrathertherelationalizationofthetermsthatresultedinthesedefinitions.

Thisobservationhasnotbeenmade transparent in the relevant literature,otherwisewe

wouldnotbepreoccupiedwithofferingcounterexamples toconflictandsimplyconclude

thatreligionandsciencearedichotomousbecausethetermshavebeenhistoricallydefined

insuchawayastomakethemoppositional.

Withabetterunderstandingoftheconceptualoriginsofreligion-scienceconflict,we

canbegintotacklerelatedsocialissuesatamorefundamentallevelofmeaningmakingsince

itisthehistoryofourdefinitionsthatbroughtustothispointtobeginwith.Theoriginsof

thewarfarethesis—andthecloselyrelated‘conflictthesis’(onwhich,seeChapterOne)—

havealreadybeenexploredintherelevantliteraturetimeandtimeagain.Thoughitiswidely

recognized that there is not as much of a historical basis for conflict as was originally

suggested by early commentators on the relations of religion and science, this does not

resolvetheissueofmutualexclusivity.Mutualexclusivityisnomyth,butratherhasastrong

historyandanongoingoneatthat.Thewarfareandconflicttheses(ofwhich,forsimplicity’s

sake, Iwillrefertocollectivelyasthe ‘conflict thesis’ fromhereonout,sincethetwoare

historicallyandconceptuallyrelated)andthemutualexclusivityconstructareverydifferent.

Thischapterwillexaminealotofhistoricaldatathatcouldbereadassupportingtheconflict

thesis,with its focusonnotionsof thereligion-sciencedichotomy.Yet,mypoint isnot to

show this for the purposes of explaining or supporting the conflict thesis, but rather to

exemplifytheprocessesofrelationalconceptualization—specificallyhow‘science’hasbeen

relationallyconstructedasmutuallyexclusivewith‘religion.’Thekeydifferencehereisthat

whereas the conflict thesis suggests that historically religion and science conflict, the

relationalthesisisthattheterm‘science’itselfemergedasanindependentideaintheactof

contrastingitto‘religion,’whichlaterresultedinconceptualopposition.Infact,theconflict

thesiswasitselfaproduct(thoughalsoaproducer)oftherelationalconstructionofreligion-

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sciencemutual exclusivity. ‘Conflict’ is a secondary derivative thatwas created after the

mutual exclusivity construct provided the conceptual apparatus for its emergence—two

thingscannotconflictuntiltheyaredifferentiatedrelativetooneanotherafterall.

In short, this chapter will trace these developments of the mutual exclusivity

construct and the accompanying notion of conflict situated in a historical, discursive

perspective.Myapproachistoexaminehowdiscoursesoftheterm‘science’evolvedrelative

todiscoursesoftheterm‘religion,’specifically,forthiscasestudy,inthemodeofcontrast

andmutualexclusion.

2 Religion&ScienceEntangled

[I]nthebeginningofthemodernagewhen,withtheriseofscience,theunityofcivilizationandcultureenjoyedbrieflybythemedievalworldwassplitasunder.Fromthatpointon,religionandsciencehavegonetheirseparateways,occupyingseparatehalvesofthesplitmindofman.6

Sothestorygoes.Thoughthisisinmanywaysfiction,itisnonethelessapowerfulstorythat

hasimpactedthewayalternativereligion-sciencerelationshavebeenpresented.Themain

fictitiouspointisthatthisstoryobscuresthefactthatreligionandsciencehavehappilyco-

existedandevenintegratedinmanyinstances.Thetruthofthisstory,however,isthatthe

terms‘religion’and‘science’werecertainlysituatedasdivorcedfromoneanother,resulting

inparticularconceptualizationsthathaveenduredtothepresentday.

ThestorybeginsintheMiddleAges,whentheideasof‘religion’and‘science’were

notclearlydifferentiated.IntheMedievalworldview,“Science,cosmology,society,history,

andtheologyallexpressedthesamepatternofmeaning.”7Whilewemaylookatthepastand

seesomeelementsthattoourpresenteyeslooklikescienceandotheronesthatlooklike

religion,thetwowereunifiedundernaturalphilosophy.Naturalphilosophywasasystemof

knowledgethat“foritspractitionersmostdefinitelydidnotconsistofscienceandtheology

insomeodd(oreveneasy)amalgamation,butwasadisciplineandenterprisesuigeneris.”8

6Harrington(1966),97.7Barbour(1997),9.8Cunningham(1991),389.Emphasisoriginal.Onthemeaningof‘science’intermsofnaturalphilosophy,seealsoCunningham(2000a).Cunningham(2000a),261noted:naturalphilosophywasscience“butnot inthemeaningwhichthehistorianofscienceusuallyintends.Thereverse,however,wasnotthecase:sciencewas

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ThecentralaimofnaturalphilosophywastoinvestigatethenaturalworldasGod’screation,

an embodiment of God’s power and purposes. As the natural world was open to

investigation, itprovidedameanstoexamine,understand,andpraiseGod.9IntheMiddle

Ages,sciencewasnotanautonomousfield,butratherreferredtoaspecializedbranchof

knowledge that today is divided intomany different fields, including logic,mathematics,

rhetoric,grammar,astronomy,music,andtheology,thelatterofwhichwasevenreferredto

as the ‘queen of the sciences.’10 The idea of ‘theology,’ in turnwas closely connected to

‘religion,’ increasingly used from the twelfth century on to refer the academic or

philosophicalstudyof‘religion,’whichalreadyatthistimewasoftenunderstoodasa‘system

ofbeliefs.’11Thus,therewasnoclearconceptualdifferencebetweentheterms‘religion’and

‘science’asweunderstandthesewordstoday.

ThischaracterizationoftheMedievalworldviewis,ofcourse,anoversimplification

ofamorecomplexhistoricalsituation.Thereisnotsufficientspaceorneedtogointothe

detailshere.Theimportantpointforourpurposesistomakeitclearthattherewasahigh

degreeofconceptualentanglementandthusinordertoclearlydifferentiatetheconcepts

‘religion’and‘science’theconstructionofcontrastwasneeded.

3 ScientificKnowledgeas‘NotReligiousKnowledge’

The first knownuse of thisMiddle English term ‘science’was in the fourteenth century.

‘Science’wasfirstusedasasynonymfor‘knowledge,’andquicklygainedtheconnotationof

accurate and systematized knowledge.12 Gradually, the phrase ‘scientific knowledge’

emerged to express the distinction between knowledge generally construed in natural

notnaturalphilosophy[…]Forwhatthisassertionmeansisthat(modern)scienceintheirperiodwentunderthe titleof ‘philosophy’or ‘naturalphilosophy,’which I trust is self-evidently absurdas ahistorical claim.”Emphasisoriginal.Thereisalsoongoingcontestationaboutwhethernaturalphilosophybelongstothehistoryofscience,aswillbediscussed,andtheargumentspresentedarecontingentonwhatrelationbetweenreligionandsciencewasconsideredtobepresentinnaturalphilosophy.However,naturalphilosophywasnotreligion,norscience,norreligionandscience—itwasnaturalphilosophy.9Cunningham&Williams(1993),421;andBarbour(1997),5.10Cunningham(1991),387;andCunningham(2000a),260.11Simpson(2016l);andSimpson(2016e).12Ross(1962),66.

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philosophy (which included theology andmetaphysics) and a more systematic and less

fallible knowledge associated with science alone.13 The term ‘science’ itself has been

representedbyhistoriansintermsof“secularasdistinctfromgodlyknowledgeofthenatural

world.”14Thisnewmeansof conceptualizing sciencegave rise to the firstmajorwaveof

constructingreligionandscienceinopposition.Overtime,scientificknowledgewasclearly

delineatedasperitscontrastwithreligiousknowledge.

Itwasonlyinthetimespanfromtheseventeenthtotheeighteenthcenturythatthe

distinctionbetweenexperienceandexperimentfirstemerged,thelatterunderstoodas“an

arrangedmethodicalobservationofanevent”thatwasattributedtoscientificknowledge,

formingforthefirsttimethenotionofscienceasthetheoreticalandmethodicalstudyof

nature. As regards ‘experience,’ it was considered to consist of two branches: one, the

practical,external,andobjective;andtwo,theinternalandsubjective.Theformerwaslinked

totheemergenceofexperiment,andthustoscience,whilethelatterreferredtotheoryand

methodforallelse,oneareaofwhichwasspecificallymetaphysicalandreligious.Itwasa

science/non-sciencelinethathadbeendrawn.Inthiswayreligioncouldbe“markedoffas

notsciencebutsomethingelse.”15

Itwasapproximatelybetween1620to1830thatscientificknowledgebecamefirmly

associated with observation and experimentation, shifting away from earlier notions of

deductive logic derived from intuited first principles.16These earlier notions involved an

investigation of causality as a search for the purpose of objects as placed in a cosmic

hierarchy,“thecreationofapurposefulGod.”17Assuch,thischangeintheidentificationof

thesourceofscientificknowledgewasaccompaniedbyadifferentiationbetweenreligious

considerationsand the ‘newmethodology’of science,withanorientation to theexternal

worldandmethodicaldemonstration.A“particularandhighlysuccessfulmodelofneutral

methodicalobserverandexternalobjectofstudybecamegeneralized,notonlyasscience,

butasfactandtruthandreasonorrationality[…].”Andthisformulationwascontingenton

13Onvariousconceptionsofscienceintermsofthetypeofknowledgeitproduced,seeMcMullin(1990).14Cunningham&Williams(1993),427.15Williams(1976),233–234.16Ross(1962),66–67;andWilliams(1976),232–234.Onthe‘invention’ofscienceinthenineteenthcentury,seeSchaffer(1986);Cunningham(1988);andCunningham&Williams(1993).17Barbour(1997),5.

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thedistinctionmadewithsubjectivefactsandtruthsofwhichwasassignedtotherealmof

thereligious(aswellastheartisticandpsychological),deemedinappropriateforscience.18

Scientificdatawasalsooftenputinacontextofdemonstratingapopularbeliefwas

incorrectorthatasimpleexplanationwasactuallycomplex.Sciencewassuggestedtoreveal

the‘mysteries’oflife,likethosefoundinreligiousthinking,byexplainingthattheywerenot

mysteriousatall.19Forexample,nineteenth-centurypopularizersofscienceoftenpresented

scientificknowledgeinanegativecampaignagainstsuperstitionand/orreligiongenerally.

In 1873, William P. Atkinson (1820–1890) claimed scientific education would liberate

humankind as it “explodes old superstitions.”20 Already since the fourteenth century,

‘superstition’ referred to ‘unfoundedreligiousbeliefs’ and itwascommonpractice in the

nineteenth century to conflate mysticism, superstition, and religion.21 Atkinson sees a

transitionfromreligioustoscientificknowledge:“Atfirstthepriestisthedivinely-appointed

monopolistofallhigherknowledge[…]Now[…]sciencehassofarenteredintoothercallings

astomakethemworthyfieldsfortheexerciseofthehighestfaculties.”Hecontinued,“Itmay

safelybeaffirmedthattheviewofearthlylifeofmedievalasceticswhichhasleftitstraces

sodeeplyimprintedinmuchofoursectariantheologyisfastvanishinglikeanuglydream

forever.”22

Inspecificcontrasttoreligiousconsiderationsinnaturalphilosophy,“‘science’was

thenewcollectivenameofthenewseculardisciplinesforstudyingthenaturalworldasa

secular object […] for acquiring knowledge in a secular sense […].”23 In the discourse

surrounding these historical developments, religion and science were framed as “two

antitheticalmeanstoknowledge,inherentlyincompatiblekindsofclaimstotruththathave

beeneverbattlingeachotherforhumanallegiance.”24ChristianSmithobservedthatwhile

thisisnotwhollyhistoricallyaccurate,itwasanideologicalframeperpetuatedbycertain

18Williams(1976),235.Emphasisoriginal.Seealsoibid.,211–214.Thissubjective-objectivedivide,specificallyrepresentingalinebetweenreligionandscience,continuedintothethoughtofscientificnaturalistsinthelatenineteenthcentury.SeeTurner(1974),19.19Burnham(1987),164–165.20Atkinson(1917)266.21Simpson(2016k);andBurnham(1987),21.22Atkinson(1917),269.23Cunningham&Williams(1993),424.24Smith(2003a),9.Emphasisadded.

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nineteenth-centuryacademics.25Thiswasnotanidlechoice—‘religion’actedasaneffective

foiltodemarcatethenewconceptof ‘scientificknowledge’givingitconceptualspaceand

shape.Putdifferently, ‘scientificknowledge’gainedidentitybyframingitas ‘notreligious

knowledge.’

4 ThePre-historyofScienceas‘NottheHistoryofReligion’

Whilescientificknowledgewasstillbeingarticulatedasdistinctfromreligiousknowledge

inthenineteenthcentury,atthesametime‘science’washistoricized—itwasbornwitha

past. The history of science was an early nineteenth-century innovation. Establishing a

historyofatraditionestablishesthe‘tradition’asatradition,bringingwithitauthoritative

precedent and legitimization, for the purpose of endorsing science and explaining its

importance.Ithasbeensuggestedthattheaimofthesehistorianswasparticularlytodraw

agrandnarrativeof‘science’inthesensethattheywishedtopromote.26“Theinventorsof

scienceandtheirimmediatesuccessorsunselfconsciouslyrewrotethepastinawaywhich

showed themselves to be the heirs to a grand tradition” and in doing sowere “actually

makingnovelassertionsaboutwhere the ‘natural’ subject-boundaries of knowledgenow

lay.”27 In other words, while the historical accuracies of such accounts are dubious, the

historicalaccountstellushowtheboundariesofknowledgewerebeingconstructedinthe

midstofestablishingthescientifictradition.Itwasinthisprocessofwritingandconstructing

historythatgavescienceanewidentityandthis,too,wasdoneviaadichotomizationwith

religion.

TheClassicalscholarJohnBurnet(1863–1928)claimedthatscienceoriginatedwith

theGreeksandtakespainstodiscountthereligiouselementsoftheearlyGreekthinkers.For

instance,Burnetarguedtheword‘theos’(typicallytranslatedas‘God’)is“non-religious”and

suggestedGreektheoriesareindicativeofarejectionofreligiousideas.Burnet’sanalysiswas

followed bymany others who located scientific development in ancient Greece, such as

25Smith(2003a),9.26Cunningham&Williams(1993),408–410andpassim.27Cunningham(1988),386.Emphasisoriginal.Seealso,e.g.,onthe‘inventionofphysics,’Cannon(1978),111–136.

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BenjaminFarrington(1891–1974)andG.E.R.Lloydtonameonlyacouplefromthevast

numberofindividualswhocontributedtothishistoricalstory.Intheseaccounts“asingle

semantic contrast is being taken as definitional and everything else is ignored. Burnet,

FarringtonandLloydelecttoseescienceasopposedprimarilytoreligion.”28Inotherwords,

thehistoricalemergenceofscienceismarkedbytheexclusionofreligion.

Thehistoricalbeginningsofsciencehavealsooftenbeenplacedinmedievalnatural

philosophy.WilliamWhewell(1794–1866)suggestedthattheendofnaturalphilosophywas

thebeginningofscienceinhisseminalworkHistoryoftheInductiveSciencefromtheEarliest

tothePresentTime(1837).Similarly,historianH.FlorisCohenargued,“theemancipationof

sciencefromanoverarchingentitycalled‘naturalphilosophy’isonedefiningcharacteristic

oftheScientificRevolution.”29Placingnaturalphilosophyasthehistoricalsourceofscience

has been done in two ways relative to religion: (1) science is historically located in its

separation from natural philosophy/religion; or (2) natural philosophy/science is

historically located in itsseparation fromreligion.Despite thecontradiction in these two

approaches,bothframereligionandscienceinconceptualopposition,makingthehistorical

emergenceofsciencecontingentontheexclusionofreligion.Andnomatterwhich is the

‘true’history,thefactsandthefictionshavebothcontributedtohowtheconceptsinquestion

areunderstoodtoday.

4.1 Scienceas‘NotNaturalPhilosophy/Religion’Thedistinctionbetweenscienceandnaturalphilosophy,“thesinglegreatestdifference,”has

beendescribed in termsof its relation toreligiousconsiderations,discursivelyrelated to

‘God’:

NaturalPhilosophywasanenterprisewhichwasaboutGod;Sciencebycontrastisanenterprisewhich(virtuallybydefinition)isnotaboutGod.[…]itwasonlywhenmenstoppedlookingforGodinNature

28Harris(2005),29–32.Ontheanachronisticapplicationof ‘science’and ‘scientist’ toantiquethinkers,seeibid.,5–24.Ontheproblematicapplicationof‘science’and‘scientist’tolaterthinkers,seeibid.,25–46.SeealsoDear(2001a).29Cohen(1994),167.SeealsoSchaffer(1986),408:“After1800,theorganizationoftrainingandresearchandthestructureofnaturalphilosophyweretransformed,andhistoriesofthescienceschangedtoo.Historiansnowtransferredthewonderofnatureandofnature’sdivineauthortonaturalscienceanditsheroicauthors.”

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thattheystoppeddoingNaturalPhilosophy.TheGod-lessactivitytheystartedtodowasScience.30

Whatscholarsfailtorecognizehere,however,isthatthis‘virtualdefinition’ofsciencewas

actuallyaproductofthisexacttypeofanalysis—i.e.,‘science’wasconstructedbyexcluding

religion.Accordingtothisperspective,whenreligiousconsiderationswerenolongerplaying

arole“theynecessarilystoppeddoingnaturalphilosophy”andthisisthenunderstoodasthe

historicalemergenceofscience.AndrewCunninghamarguedthatunderstandingscienceas

notaboutGod“isoneofthemostbasicthingsthatthemembersof themodernscientific

community hold in common.” Religious consideration, “more than anything else,

distinguishesit[naturalphilosophy]fromourmodernscience.”31

Here,weseethatthehistoryofsciencewasconstructedasultimatelythefreedom

fromand/ortheendofnaturalphilosophy,takingthebestpartsofnaturalphilosophyalong

withitandspecificallyabandoningthereligiousaspects.Theeffectofdifferentiatingscience

andnaturalphilosophybasedonreligiousconsiderationsistoconstructreligionandscience

asmutually exclusive.The reason for this is simple. Prior to this everything that science

meantwassubsumedinnaturalphilosophy.Oncethatistakenaway,withthesingledividing

linebeingreligion,thentheonlythingthatmakessciencewhatitisiswhatitisnotandthat

thingisreligion.InadditiontoCunningham’sargument,wecanseetheinfluenceofthistype

of thinking in those such as Cohen and John A. Schuster, as well.32 There are certainly

30 Cunningham (1988), 383–384. See alsoCunningham (1991), 388; Schuster (1990), esp. 224–225;Koyré(1957);Funkenstein(1986);andLindberg&Numbers(1986)—allofwhichattributeconnectionsbetweennaturalphilosophy,science,andreligion.31Quotes onCunningham (1991), 381–383 and388. Emphasis original. There are some inconsistencies inCunningham’s argument that baffleme. He argued therewas a historical conceptual separation of naturalphilosophy—based on religious considerations—and science and yet argued for natural philosophy to beincludedinthehistoryofscience.Thishasledmetoconcludethatheimplicitlyviewsnaturalphilosophyastheprecursortoscienceifwedisregardthereligion.Andyet,healsonotedthatheisattemptingtoavoidthereligion-science opposition paradigm since the science category is “misplaced for the medieval and earlymodernperiods.Withoutoneoftheparticipants[speakingofreligionandscience]itisdifficulttohaveaduel,oranyotherkindofrelationship.”SeeCunningham(2000a),267and267n.10.Atthesametime,Cunninghamsuggestedthatinsteadofarguingforacontinuityofsciencepredatingtheemergenceoftheuseoftheconceptasitisunderstoodas‘modernscience,’wecanrefertoa“historicalsequenceofphilosophy(ancientperiod),natural philosophy (medieval and early modern period), and then science (modern period),” each one adisciplinefulfillingdifferentrolesindifferenttimeperiods.However,heunitedthemintermsof‘invokingorinvestigatingNature,’whichIidentifiedasproblematicinChapterOne.Seeibid.,277–278.Describingthisviewas ‘cherry picking’ the science from natural philosophy is admittedly not a very generous reading, butultimatelyitismyviewthatthisargumentcanbereducedassuch.32IonlytentativelyincludeCohenwhowasprimarilyofferinguptheviewsofothers.Moreover,itisnotclearhowCohendefinednaturalphilosophyotherthan“theframeworkofacomprehensiveviewoftheworldandmanandhowtheseareconnected.”SeeCohen(1994),167.Seealsoibid.,166.Hedid,however,extensively

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historicaldifficultiesinsuchanessentialistaccount.33But,whatisimportantforouranalysis

hereisthatthesehistoriansmake“thisessentializingmove,ofcourse,soastodistinguish

naturalphilosophyfrommodernscience.”34Thismeansthattheprimarywaythatscienceis

conceptualizedandplacedinitsintellectualhistoryisviatheexclusionofreligion.

4.2 Science/NaturalPhilosophyas‘NotReligion’While some differentiated science from natural philosophy/religion to establish the

historicalemergenceofthefield,asdiscussedabove,othersdifferentiatedscience/natural

philosophyfromreligionforthesamepurposes.Inthehistoricalstudyofscience,natural

philosophyhasoftenbeendivorcedfromreligiontojustifyitsinclusioninthe(pre-)history

ofscience.Forexample,EdwardGrant’smethodofanalyzing‘science’innaturalphilosophy

wasspecificallyaccomplishedbynotingthelackofreligiousconsiderationswithinnatural

philosophy.35Moreover, Grant claimed thatwhen religious considerations are taken into

discusshowhistorianshavecharacteristicallytreatedmodernscienceinspecificcontrasttonaturalphilosophyand the signifierof religiondoesappear.Therearealso contrastsbetweennaturalphilosophyand sciencebasedonsignifiersthatarefrequentlydiscursivelyentangledwithreligion,suchas ‘magic,’ ‘mysticism,’and‘superstition.’SeealsoSchuster(1990).33Thisviewthatnaturalphilosophyisnecessarilyreligiousischallengedbysome,e.g.,Grant(2007),xiand250–251.SeealsoGrant(1999);andDear(2001a).Grant(2007),251,suggestedthatthereisonepointthatnegatesCunningham’sview: “Thosewhobelieve thatnaturalphilosophy isalwaysaboutGodwouldsurelyinterpretnaturalphilosophyanditsimpactquitedifferentlythanthosewhofailedtorecognizethatprofoundtruth […]”andyet,heargued, “notasingle importantconsequence […] flows fromtheseradicallydifferentapproaches.”However,thereisasignificantconsequencethatGrantisoverlooking—thosewhoresistedtheassociationbetweennaturalphilosophyandreligionusedthisasameansforjustificationforincludingitinthehistoryof science.Whetherornotnaturalphilosophy counts as sciencehingeson these radicallydifferentviews, which manifested first in Whig history, representing one end of the spectrum, and later inhistoriography,ontheotherend,whichrecognizedtheneedforcontextualanalysisofnaturalphilosophyonits own terms rather than on preconceived notions of what ‘science’ is. Nonetheless, whether we canconvincingly thinkofnaturalphilosophyasreligiousornot is irrelevant to the fact that thisdifferentiationbetweennaturalphilosophyandreligion,ontheonehand,andscience,ontheother,hascontributedtothediscourse constructing science as ‘not religion.’ For the exchange between Cunningham and Grant, seeCunningham(2000a);Grant(2000);andCunningham(2000b).34 Dear (2001a), 381. See also the exchange between Cunning andDear in Cunningham (2001); andDear(2001b).35Grant(1996);Grant(1999);Grant(2000);andGrant(2007).TheeditorsofanopenforumbetweenGrantandCunninghamtakesomemiddlegroundbetweenthetwo,suggestingnaturalphilosophyisa“disciplinethatis obviously co-extensive with neither ‘science’ nor ‘philosophy.’” See Thijssen & Lüthy (2000). David C.Lindbergcouldbecitedasanotherexamplethatregardsnaturalphilosophyaspartofscience,althoughheignorestheroleofreligionaltogetherinhisdefinitionofthisenterprise,ratherthanusethenaturalphilosophy-religiondistinctionasameansof justification to include it in thehistoryofscience,asGrantdoes. ‘Naturalphilosophy’isdescribedasthe“investigationsofthenaturalworldthatconcentratedonquestionsofmaterialcausation[…].”Thoughhedoesnotcitereligioninhisdefinitionofnaturalphilosophy,hedoesdiscussitinotherregards.SeeLindberg(2007),3.

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account, it isno longernaturalphilosophy: “Theologyand faith couldnot enter it in any

significantmannerbecausetodosowouldtransformnaturalphilosophyintosupernatural

philosophy, natural theology, or theology.”36 However, this is to invoke a natural-

supernaturaldichotomythathadnotyetbeenestablishedinthiscontext,which,infact,was

constructedviathereligion-sciencemutualexclusivityconstruct,aswillbediscussed.Grant

madeitquiteclearthattheexclusionofreligionfromnaturalphilosophyisthegroundsfor

including it as science: “[F]rom the Middle Ages onward, natural philosophy remained

relativelyfreeoftheologicalencroachments.Anditalsomakesitquiteplausibletobelieve

thatnaturalphilosophyistherealprecursorofmodernscience.”37

AsCunninghamaptlynoted,Grant“maintainsthescience/religionappositionashis

analyticaltool,andsincehetreatsnaturalphilosophyassimplyanearlyversionof(modern)

science,wheneverhespeaksofa‘naturalphilosophy/religion’(ortheology)appositionthis

meansjustthesamething.”38Inotherwords,suchathesisputsreligionandscienceinan

oppositionalconstructbysuggestingthatscienceishistoricallyrootedinnaturalphilosophy

specificallybecause it isnotreligious,makingthedividing linebetweenscienceandnon-

sciencethatofreligion.Thisisanotherexampleofthediscursivecirclethatstartswiththe

tacit knowledge of mutual exclusivity and constructs the historical evidence to meet

presumptions.AsThomasF.Gierynanalyzedit,“scientistssoughttokeepselectedelements

ofreligionoutofnaturalphilosophy;here,therhetoricalgoalistokeepelementsofscience

outofreligion.”39

The two forms of this history of science as ‘not religion’ result in two very different

36Grant(2000),290.Asimilarstatementoccursinibid.,288:“Wheneveratheologicalexplanationisgiveninnaturalphilosophy,itconvertswhatshouldhavebeenanaturalexplanationtoasupernaturalexplanationand,consequently,defeatstheverypurposeofatreatiseonnaturalphilosophy,whichistoexplainphenomenabynaturalcauses.Ifthisweredonetoanyconsiderableextent,thetreatiseinquestionwouldnolongerbeaworkin natural philosophy, butwould have been converted to one on supernatural philosophy, or theology, orperhapsatreatiseonnaturaltheology.”37Grant(2000),290.Grant(2007),303–316,tracedtheseparationof‘science’and‘naturalphilosophy’backtothe thirteenth century. However, sciencewas still considered to bewithin the ranks and order of naturalphilosophyandwhatispertinentistheseparationofnaturalphilosophyandscienceasconstitutingtheirownsuper-categories.38Cunnigham(2000a),267–268and267–268n.11.Though,aswehaveseen,Cunninghamisguiltyofasimilarthing.39Gieryn(1988),591.Seealsoibid.foradiscussionoffurtherexamplesofthescience/religiondivideinrelationtonaturalphilosophyinearlyaccounts.

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arguments:one,thefreedomfromnaturalphilosophywasthecausefortheemergenceof

science; and, two, natural philosophy was the precursor of science. Yet whatever the

historicalreality,bothaccountsconstructreligionandscienceasmutuallyexclusive.Infact,

bothmighthavebeentrueinregardtothevarietyofthehistoricalactors’ownviewsandin

regardtothespecifictimeperiod.Therewasabrieftimewhen‘philosophy’and‘science’

wereusedsynonymously(mainlyca.1800–1850),thoughtheseparationofthesetermswas

alsoincreasingduringthisperiod,withtheassignmentof‘philosophy’tothetheologicaland

metaphysicaland‘science’totheexperimentalandphysicalbranchesofknowledge.40Either

way,mutual exclusivity ensued and this is demonstrated above by the observation that

‘naturalphilosophy’isonlyconsideredpartofthehistoryof‘science’insofaras‘religion’is

specifically excluded.41 In a similar vein, thepresenceof religious thinkinghas evenbeen

suggestedtoprecludetheemergenceofscienceinsomesocieties.Forexample,historianof

scienceSeyyedHosseinNasrargued,“themainreasonwhymodernscienceneverarosein

ChinaorIslamispreciselybecauseofthepresenceofmetaphysicaldoctrineandatraditional

religiousstructurewhichrefusedtomakeaprofanethingofnature.”Fromthisperspective,

science is understood in terms of “the substance and stuff of nature so depleted of a

sacramentalandspiritualcharacter”or“purelysecular.”42

Inthisway,wecanthinkofthewritingofhistoryasahistoricalproductwherebattles

40 Ross (1962), 69. See also Grant (2007), 316–319. There were some exceptions to this time period ofsynonymy.41 Some readersmightbewonderingat thispoint, sowhat is thehistorical reality?Was the freedom fromnaturalphilosophythecausefortheemergenceofscienceordidnaturalphilosophymakesciencepossible?AllIcanconcludemustbebasedonmyanalysishere,fromadiscursiveandrelationalperspective—myconcernis about the nature of the construction of concepts and I care little about historical realities that did notsignificantlyimpacttheformationoftheconceptsinquestion.Thus,fromthisperspective,Iwouldarguethattheyarebothpartiallycorrect,butincomplete.Theboundaryworkbetweennaturalphilosophyandsciencehelpedcreateconceptualspaceforscienceasadistinctdiscipline—inthiswaytheformationofsciencewascontingentonboththecontiguitywithandseparationfromnaturalphilosophy.Asisthecasewithanycontrastcase,bothabsenceandpresenceplayequallyimportantroles.(Thoughthispaintsageneralpicture,realityisneversoblackandwhite.Therewereindividualswhoarguedfortheabandonmentofnaturalphilosophyinfavorofscience,aswellas individualswhoarguedfortheintegrationofnaturalphilosophyandscience,assciencebegantotakeonitsownflavor.)Thereisanotherimportantaspecttoconsiderregardingthehistoricalreality—therelationbetweenreligionandscience.Intheirownways,bothoftheseformsofhistory‘ignore’theroleofreligiontopaintapictureofscience.However,asthischaptersuggests,religionwastheprimarycontrastcasethatconstructed‘science.’Thesehistoriansfailtoseethatbydisregardingtheroleofreligion,theyareactuallycontributingtothediscourseathandandconstructing‘science’viathisexclusion.ItalsoseemsprudenttogiveareminderherethatIamnotsuggestingthemutualexclusivityreadingissomehow‘wrong’—butnorisit‘right’—itissimplyconstructed.42Nasr(1968a),97–98.SeealsoNasr(1968b),whichcontainsasimilarformulation.

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overtheconstructionoftheconcepts ‘religion’and‘science’arefoughtout.GalileoGalilei

(1564–1642)isacaseinpoint.Earlyhistoricalworksonthereligion-sciencerelationship,

suchasthosebyJohnWilliamDraper(1811–1882)andAndrewDicksonWhite(1832–1918)

(discussedinChapterOne),portrayedGalileo,aswellasGiordanoBruno(1548–1600),as

defendersofscienceandtruthagainstreligioussuperstitionandirrationality.Andtothis

day,inuniversitytextbooksNicolausCopernicus(1473–1543),forexample,iscreditedwith

having “revolutionized humankind’s understanding of science and religion,”marking the

“beginningofthedisagreementsbetweenscienceandreligionthatwouldquicklybecomea

persistentthemeofhistorythereafter.”43Yet,atthistimetherewaslittleconflict(interms

of physical violence, censorship, persecutions, etc.) between religion and natural

observations.Infact,toapplytheterm‘conflict’inthissenseisananachronisticuseofthe

term;itwasnotpartofthevocabularyofthistime.44

Thisstoryofthehistoryofsciencewasacreationonthepartofsomenineteenth-

centuryhistorianswho framed religion as the enemyof free thinking andpresented the

emergenceofscienceasthedefeatofreligion.45Forotherhistorians,especiallypresent-day

academicslikeCunninghamandGrant,thisdoesnotseemlikeanexplicitgoal,whichwould

be counter to historiographical considerations, but nonetheless the tacitly understood

religion-sciencedistinctionstructuresthewayinwhichthehistoricalbeginningsofscience

areanalyzed.WhetherlocatedinancientGreeceorinnaturalphilosophy,thepre-historyof

sciencehasbeenconstructedspecificallybywayofexcludingreligion.Asamatterof(social)

fact,therearenosuchclear-cutlines,asreligiousthinkingandreligiouspersonshavegreatly

contributedtoscienceinmanydifferentways.And,aswewillseeinsubsequentchapters,at

a social level, there has never been a time that science has been totally independent of

religion. Nonetheless, this does not negate the fact that, historically and discursively

speaking,thepre-historyofsciencewasconceptualizedandunifiedalongthelinesofone,

veryspecific,consideration—theexclusionofreligion.

43QuotedinAechtner(2015),211.44Cantor&Kenny(2001),767.45French&Cunningham(1996),273–274.

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5 TheHistoryofScienceas‘NotReligion’

Whilethe‘beginnings’ofsciencewereshiftingamongtimeperiods,theheydayofscience

wasfirstpositionedintheScientificRevolutionandtheEnlightenmentinearlyhistories.46

CunninghamandPerryWilliamsidentifiedthreemainwaysthatsciencewascharacterized

in early historical accounts. The first was defining science in terms of the nature of its

methodology,asregardsnaturalismintermsofcausallaws,explanation,andprediction.The

secondmethodforcharacterizingsciencewastoformulatetheenterpriseinmoraltermsof

freedom, rationality, truth, and progress. The thirdway of characterizing sciencewas to

frameitasauniversalhumanenterprise,theexpressionofthefundamentalhumandesire

for knowledge and understanding.47 While these characterizations certainly have their

distinguishingfeatures,theyallshareincommonthattheywereexplainedandunderstood

inspecificcontrasttoreligion.Tothisday,theScientificRevolutionandtheEnlightenment

“actasmotifsfordescribinghistoricalreligion–scienceconflict.”48

Whilemanyoftheabove-mentionedthemesfeaturethroughoutthisworkinvarious

contexts,hereIwillofferabriefexplanationofhowthesethreehistoricalcharacterizations

of sciencewereconstructed incontrast to religion. In the first characterization, scientific

methodology is contrastedwith religious revelation, by the earlymodern differentiation

betweentheBookofNatureandtheBookofGod,andbythedistinctionbetweenreasonand

faith andobjective and subjective inquiry, for instance.49 Sciencewas identifiedwith the

growthofakindofknowledgethatwas‘independent’ofhumankind,toemphasizethatitis

notpeoplewhomaketheseideas,asreligionwascriticizedofdoing,butratherwasdictated

bynature.Thisindependencealwayscamealongwithemphasisonfreedomfromhegemony

ofthoughtthatwaslargelyidentifiedwithreligionandthusdirectlyrelatestothesecond

characterization.

46Periodizationsforthesemovementsvarywidely.Thoseeventsandhistoricalpersonsofinterestmentionedinconnectionwiththesemovementsgenerallyfallbetween1500and1800.47Cunningham&Williams(1993),411–412.48Aechtner(2015),212.49vanBerkel&Vanderjagt(2006).Themetaphorofthe‘BookofNature’wasinstrumentalingainingsociallegitimacyfornewapproachestoinvestigatingnature.Thoughthemetaphordatesbacktoantiquity,itonlybecamepopularinearlymodernhistory.Ontheearlieruseofthistrope,seevanBerkel&Vanderjagt(2005).See Williams (1976), 233–234 on the etymological differentiation of religion and science based on asubjective/objectivedemarcation.

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In the second characterization, framing science as the embodiment of freedom,

rationality, truth, and progress was explained in terms of its contrast with religious

hegemony, irrationality, superstition, and repression. In thisWhighistorywas a storyof

science,representedasatranscendentandeternalenterprise,elucidatingandovercoming

the failuresand faultsofreligion. In the thirdcharacterization,science isheraldedas the

unifyinghumanenterprise,whichwas indirectcontrast tothecontemporarynotionthat

religion,specificallyitsmoralityandethics,wasthewaybywhichsocietybecameasoleunit,

as in the thoughtofÉmileDurkheim(1858–1917) (on religionasa socialunifierand its

connectiontodevelopmentsinscience,seeChapterFour).50Thisthirdcharacterizationalso

directlyrelatestothechallengestoreligioushegemonyintheacademicworld,asoutlinedin

theupcomingsections,inthatframingscienceasauniversalhumanenterprisehasutility

when vying for a more central place in society generally and in the university system

specifically. All three characterizations of science in early histories involve one specific

characterization—scienceas‘notreligion.’

Theseabovecharacterizationswereconsolidatedtoformtheconceptofthe‘Scientific

Revolution,’onlyfirmlyformulatedinthenineteenthcentury,withtheterminologynoteven

regularlyappearinguntilhistorianAlexandreKoyré(1892–1964)introducedthephrasein

the1930s,laterpopularizedbyhistorianHerbertButterfield(1900–1979).51Historiansof

sciencewere inventing science and they did so in specific contrast to religion.52 AsR. S.

Westfall(1924–1996)stated,“In1600,WesterncivilizationfounditsfocusintheChristian

religion;by1700,modernnaturalsciencehaddisplacedreligionfromitscentralposition.”53

Even general history, not specific to the history of science, was divided according to a

superstition/myth (discursively associated with religion) versus reason/science

dichotomy.54

WecanseemuchofthesameinregardtothefieldofthehistoryoftheEnlightenment.

As Thomas Aechtner noted, “the narrative describing the Enlightenment as an age of

movementfromreligiousignorancetoscientificreasonisverymuchjustthat;anarrative

50SeealsoThackray(1984),esp.402–405and411.51Cunningham&Williams(1993),410andpassim.52Cunningham(1988);Schaffer(1986);Cunningham&Williams(1993);andStump(2001),244–245n.4.53Westfall(1973),ix.54Harrison(1990),14.

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primarily shaped and imparted to us by the philosophes.”55Thoughmuch of the above-

mentionedhistorieswereconstructed,religiondoesindeedseemtohavebeenthepointof

referenceandtheexplicitandprimarytargetofmanyoftheEnlightenmentphilosophers.56

ReligionwasalsotheimplicitcontextofwhichEnlightenmentthinkingwasreactingto,both

initshistoricalanddiscursivecontexts.Religiondominatedlifeandthusformedthebroad

socialcontextoftheemergenceofscientificknowledge.Inthehistoricalprimarymaterials

andinpastandcontemporaryhistoriesreflectingontheEnlightenment,religionissetasthe

contextualbackdrop,abackgroundthatdrawstheforegroundofscienceinrelief,evenwhen

religion does not feature as an explicit object of inquiry.57 The conceptual opposition

constructedbetweenreligionandscienceisubiquitous.Thistimeperiodhasbeendescribed

as “the model” of scientific rationalism against religious superstition and the theocracy

preceding it as ‘antiscience.’58 As such, there was certainly a lot of material for later

historianstoexemplifythisperspective.

Reflecting religion-science mutual exclusivity, the ‘Enlightenment’ has also been

definedbyscholarsasamovement“groundingknowledgeontheexerciseofcriticalreason,

asopposedtotradition,establishedreligion,orconventionalpoliticalandsocialthinking.”59

In fact, the presumptions about the relation between divine and human reason set the

parametersforhownotionsofscientificreasonwouldevolve.Intheseventeenthcentury,it

wasassumedthathumanreasonwasameansofunderstandingthemindofGod,indeedthat

madeuslikeGod.Constructingtherelationbetweenhumananddivinereasoninthisway

“cancallintoquestiontheneedfordivinereasonatall,asonceassuredofourownpowers

ofreasonwemaydecidenottolookforanyfurthergrounding.”Andsuchashiftisexactly

whathappenedintheeighteenthcentury.“Reasoncametobeseennotsomuchasawayof

penetratingtotheeternaltruthsofthedivinemind,butratherasawayofinvestigatingthe

55Aechtner(2015),212.56Hammer(2001),3;andByrne(1996),25.57 E.g., Hampson (1968); and Cohen (1994). From my understanding, Cohen’s work is one of the mostcomprehensiveworksonthehistoriographyoftheScientificRevolution,and,assuch,itisaverygoodresourceformakingthispoint.TimeandagainthehistoriesoftheScientificRevolutionbringreligionintoplay,eventhoughthisisnotexplicitlyidentifiedasacentralthemeofthework.TheclassicswerealsoacommonfoilforEnlightenmentthinking,whichnonethelessalsobroughtintheologicalconsiderations,whichhavehistoricallybeendiscursivelyrelatedtoreligion.58Zafirovski(2011),123and125.59Byrne(1996),1.Emphasisadded.

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hereandnowoftheempiricalworld.”60Byexplainingnature,thisleftopenthepossibility

thatknowledgeneedednorecoursetodivineactivity.

Whether the heyday of science was placed in the Scientific Revolution or the

Enlightenment, it is regularly identified by the specific exclusion of religion. Across the

board,‘science’wasconceptualized,articulated,andexplainedbyitscontrastwith‘religion.’

Thismayseem likeanobviousapproach.However,whenwe take intoconsideration the

meaning of ‘science’ prior to this, under the Medieval unified view of knowledge, this

relationalconstructisbynomeansagiven.Itwasnotobviousorevenestablishedpriorto

thesediscursivedevelopmentsthat‘science’meant‘notreligion.’Rather,mutualexclusivity

wasconstructingthehistoricalevolutionoftheterm‘science’innovelways.

6 TheScientificEnterpriseas‘NotReligious’

At the same time, scientific knowledge continued tooften involve religious interests and

theologicalconsiderationsandexplanations.61Thoughtheabove-discussedboundarywork

surroundingnaturalphilosophywasinseveralwaysaprecursortoreligion-sciencemutual

exclusivity, the separationof scienceand religionwas still a radical idea indevelopment

throughthetimeoftheEnlightenment.62

As stated above, it was only in the seventeenth to the eighteenth century that

scientific knowledge was first firmly differentiated from knowledge more generally

construed.Scientificknowledgegainedsignifierslikefactandreason,whichgavesciencethe

upperhandinknowledgeacquisitionandeventuallysciencebecamethedominantepisteme.

The act of differentiating between science and other knowledge systems created a

systematic purposeful activity for science—it created the scientific enterprise. That

enterprisewastoilluminateandliberatetruthinthefaceofreligiousdarkness,ignorance,

60Byrne(1997),99.61Besidesthepreviouslycitedmaterial,seealsoBrooke(1991),esp.16–51,whichdiscussedbothinstancesinwhichreligionwasandwasnotcentraltonaturalphilosophyorearlyscience.SeealsoHarrison(2003),781;andTurner(1978),364andpassim.62Zafirovski(2011),107–115.TherearemanymonographsdedicatedtotheEnlightenmentattitudetowardreligion.SeeGay(1966–1969);Byrne(1996);andBarnett(2003).SeealsoHampson(1968).OntheongoinginfluenceoftheEnlightenmentonreligion,seeOwen&Owen(2010).

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andsubjugation,whichconstitutedonecommonway‘science’asatermwasexplainedat

thistime.

Even the phrase the ‘Enlightenment’ was terminologically designated in negative

relation to religion. Though this time period was certainly characterized by broader

strugglesbetweenautonomyandauthority, religionwasverycloselyassociatedwith the

latter.The‘Enlightenment’illuminated(French:Illumination;German:Aufklärung)andthus

overcame “the ‘darkness’”of religionandsuperstitionandemancipated thehumanmind

from religious ignorance and society from religious authority “by the ‘light’ of reason,

science,knowledge,andprogress.”AsMilanZafirovskinoted:

[T]heEnlightenmentistheaxiomaticmovementandprocessofculturaldestruction(‘deconstruction’)ofunreasonandirrationalism,inparticularreligiousandothersuperstition,prejudice,ignorance,andrigidoppressivetradition,assymbolizingliteralorfigurativedarknessinsocietyandhumanlife.63

The Enlightenmentwas understood as “the light of Reason and opposing darknesswith

superstition,ifnotwiththeChurchitself.”64ThesepointscanbeappliedtotheworkofJohn

StuartMill(1805–1873),CharlesSandersPeirce(1839–1914),KarlPearson(1857–1936),

and others who framed science as an agent of liberation.65 ‘Enlightenment’ has been

famouslydescribedinImmanuelKant’s(1724–1804)dictumasanageinwhichpeoplethink

for themselves inregard toall things, includingmattersof religion.66Oneexampleof the

materialization of this discourse is the enthronement of theGoddess of Reason inNotre

DamecathedralduringtheFrenchRevolution(1789–1799)—symbolicallyexpressingthe

usurpation of religion with reason.67 As irrationalismwas often understood in terms of

religionandsuperstitionandreasonwasalreadyassociatedwithscience,asstated,science

wasunderstoodtoembodythisliberation.

More generally, Enlightenment thinking “fromDiderot andKant toHume, aims at

eliminating religious andother ‘superstition andobscurity’ in society via its ‘substantive

principles’ofhumanreasonandknowledgeservingas‘incentivestoprogress.’”68Themajor

63Zafirovski(2011),121.Seealsoibid.,119–128,regardingtheprecedingcomments.64Gombrich(1979),194.Onlightmetaphorsrelatedtoknowledge,science,naturalphilosophy,andreligion,seeAshworth(1989).65Hollinger(1996),157.66Byrne(1996),x.67Gombrich(1979),189.68Zafrovski(2011),123.

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intellectual works of this time period have been collectively characterized as stringent

attacksonreligion,alsoassociatedwiththeworkoftheleadingfigureoftheEnlightenment,

Voltaire(FrançoisMarieArouet;1694–1778).ForanincreasingamountofEnlightenment

thinkers, each scientific advance was interpreted in terms of the negation of particular

religious beliefs, and though there were important exceptions, histories of the

Enlightenmentreflected thisnarrative.69Andwesee that thiswas thecase formoreand

more of those coming from a religious perspective as well—science was thought to be

counter to religion. For example, in 1858, one religious newspaper publication based in

Irelandstated:

[W]ehavenohesitationinmaintainingthatifinthejudgmentoftheChurchthepromulgationofanyscientifictruthwasmorelikelytohinderman’ssalvationthantopromoteit,shewouldnotonlybejustifiedinhereffortstosuppressit,butitwouldbeherboundendutytodoherutmosttosuppressit.70

Similar to Denis Diderot (1713–1784), Adam Smith (1723–1790), in Wealth of

Nations (1776), argued: “Science is the great antidote to the poison of enthusiasm and

superstition.”71ThomasPaine(1737–1809)inhisAgeofReason(1794–1807)pointedtothe

abuseofscienceintheformofsuperstition,juxtaposingitwithreligiousauthority:

Thereisscarcelyanypartofscience,oranythinginnature,whichthoseimpostorsandblasphemersofscience, called priests […] have not, at some time or other, perverted, or sought to pervert to thepurposeofsuperstitionandfalsehood.72

Kant distinguished between the realm of religion and that of scientific inquiry,

arguing the two constitute distinct methods, systems, and ways of thinking. Knowledge

about the world has to do with objective certainty; religion is about faith or subjective

certainty.73 Science describes the natural world, while religion belongs in the sphere of

69Byrne(1996),1and11.70 Quoted in Ellegård (1958), 98–99, from theDublin Review. See also ibid., 104, quoted from theBritishQuarterlyReview(1869):“[T]heageyearnsforreligiousfaith,andisdisquietedonlybecauseitreligiousfaithisdisturbedbythereadjustmentswhichtheadvanceofsciencenecessitates.”71Smith(1995[1776]),82;andGriswold(1998),11,wherethisisalsoquotedanddiscussed.72Paine(1954),128.73Kant(1998).Thischaracterizationsimplifiesamorecomplexviewonthelimitsofreasonandthefutilityintheapplicationofreasonbeyondthephenomenalworld.Astheinnerrealityofthingsastheytrulyare—thenoumenalworld—includestherealmofreligiousbeliefandisnotaccessibletorationalthinking,religionisnecessarily a separate sphere, according toKant. See alsoByrne (1996), 203–228. Faith produces anothercommon dichotomy positioned relative to fact that is in play in religion-sciencemutual exclusivity. Smith(2003a),9,notedthatreligionandsciencearehistoricallyrepresentedasfactionsin“anenduring‘warfare’offactagainstfaith.”

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moralityandethics.Whilethemajorpointofdifferencebetweenreligionandsciencehas

often been identified as regards truth claims, differentiation was also often based on

understanding religion as concerning social values,meaning, and other such concerns.74

Kant’s idea of separate spheres of religion and science continued in the later thought of

existentialists(SørenKierkegaard[1813–1855]andhissuccessors)andcontinuestoecho

throughtheyearsinthecommonsentimentthatscienceisaboutfacts(or‘how’questions)

and religion is about values (or ‘why’ questions). This places the scientific enterprise as

solelyoccupyingthequestfortruthindirectcontrasttoreligion.

7 TheScientificProfessionas‘NotReligious’

Due tohistoriographical considerations, aswell as the rise of contextualism in academia

generally, it isnowwellestablished thatourconceptof theScientificRevolutionand the

Enlightenment need to be problematized accordingly.75 New histories have complicated

these characterizations of science by focusing on specific contexts that reveal not only a

spectrumofviews,butalsothatreligionmayhaveevenhelpedfacilitatethedevelopmentof

scienceintermsoftherationalandempiricalinvestigationofthenaturalworld.76Theresults

of such developments were that the invention of the history of science, the discursive

formulationoftheterm‘science,’andtheinventionofscienceitselfcametobepositionedin

thetimeoftheprofessionalizationofscienceinthenineteenthcentury.

Professionalsworkedtobuildthescientificcommunityviadevisingcodesofethics,

consolidatingprofessionalorganizations,institutingprofessionalschools,anddisseminating

information to thegeneralpublic.77At this time, the sciencesbegan to feature in amore

74Evans&Evans(2008),100.Furtherreferencesavailableinibid.SeealsoEvans(2011);Evans(2013);andGeertz(1973),87–125.Thisisjustasmallsample,astheliteratureframingreligioninthiswayisubiquitous.75See,e.g.,Lindberg&Westman(1990).Alsorelevanttotheproblematizationofaunifiednotionof‘science’aswellas itshistoryaredevelopments inthephilosophyofscience.SeeFeyerabend(1975)onthevariousmethods of producing scientific knowledge and Kuhn (1970 [1962]) on the contextualized, paradigmaticnature of scientific methodology. For an overview of the various intellectual movements towardproblematizingthenotionofunifiedscience,seeCunningham&Williams(1993),esp.413–417.76Merton(1970[1938]);Hooykaas(2000[1972]);andJaki(1974).77Turner(1978),359.Seealso,ibid.,362–363.

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centralplace ineducational institutions’curriculum.78 Itwasalsoduringthis timeperiod

that a research site specifically dedicated to the production of scientific knowledge of

nature—thelaboratory—firstbecamecommon,whichwaspolemicallyseparatedfromthe

long-establishedlaboratoriesdedicatedtoalchemyandwereinsteadlabeledaccordingto

particulardisciplines,likephysicsandphysiology.79Inshort,withtheprofessionalizationof

science,weseearealsocialstructureinplacethatcouldwarrantthehistoricalplacementof

theemergenceofscienceatthistime.And,pertinenttoourdiscussionhere,alongwiththe

professionalization of science, we see religion-science mutual exclusivity materialize in

muchfirmerwaysthaniteverhadbefore.

7.1 ScientificFieldsofStudyas‘NotReligious’Concreteexamplesincludetheformationofspecializedscientificfieldsofstudy,specifically

accomplishedbytheexclusionofthereligiousaspectsofthepre-existingfieldsofstudyin

natural philosophy. Georges Cuvier (1769–1832), Charles Lyell (1797–1875), and others

formedthefieldofgeologyasasecularhistoryinwhichreligiousquestionsaboutGodand

purposewereframedasinappropriate.Thiswasareplacementof‘sacredhistory’thatwas

an attempt in the factual establishment of the Biblical account of creation.80 Conversely,

geological questions were framed as inappropriate for religion. For instance, Anglican

minister Henry Cole (1792–1858), in his work Popular Geology Subversive of Divine

Revelation!(1834),asked“WhatwasGoddoingbeforethefirstofthesixdaysofcreation?,”

answering“Hewasdecreeingfromeverlastingahellforallinfidelinquirers.”81Atthesame

time, many thought “Geology disproved Genesis,” concluding science and religion had

“opposedconclusions”andchallengestotheBibleacrosstheboardwerelabeled‘science.’82

As such, this line between religious and scientific fields of study also contributed to the

demarcationbetweenreligiousbeliefandscientificfact—anobviouspersistentthemeinthe

78Harrison (2003), 781. There aremany sources that established the professionalization of science in thenineteenthcentury.E.g.,forBritain,seeHall(1984);onFrance,seeFox(1984);andforGermany,seeTurner(1971).79Cunningham&Williams(1993),423;Landbrecht&Straub(2016),33and35;andSimpson(2016d).80Cunningham&Williams(1993),422;Klaver (1997),1;andBrooke&Cantor (1998),58.SeealsoKlaver(1997),inentirety;Brooke&Cantor(1998),57–62;Rudwick(1990),xvi–xviii;andKolbl-Ebert(2009).81QuotedinMoore(1988),438.82Chadwick(1972),3.

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literature.

Similarly, Lamark (1744–1829) and Gottfried Reinhold Treviranus (1776–1837)

formulatedthefieldofbiologyaround1800toreplacethestudyof‘animatednature,’the

investigationofthosethingsendowedwithasoul.The‘soul,’whichhadpreviouslyunified

thisfieldofstudy,wastobedismissedaltogetherandevenframedas‘unscientific’dueto

thereligiousnotionsentangledwiththeconcept.Chemistrywasdelineatedfromalchemy,

describedas“notan‘alternative’toalchemy;itwasawholesaleexchangeofignoranceatits

most rococo for genuine knowledge.”83 ‘Alchemy’ came to be specifically delineated as

‘nonscientific,’ signified by ‘mysticism’ and the ‘occult,’ which were and are frequently

discursively entangled with ‘religion.’84 Astrology and astronomy constitute another

example of the polemical separation of previously united fields of study along religion-

sciencelines,re-formulatedasmutuallyexclusive.85Theboundaryworkbetweenreligion

and science was instrumental in the delineation of physics, physiology, psychology, and

botanyaswell.86

Asthesefieldsandthegeneralfieldofscienceemerged,aswellastheirprofessional

roles,theywereformulated,defined,andexplicatedincontrasttothereligiousaspectsof

previousfieldsofstudy.Asintheotherfactorsconsideredthusfar,thislineofdemarcation

wasnotpre-existing;itwasconstructed.Sacredhistoryandgeology,thestudyofanimated

nature and biology, alchemy and chemistry, and astrology and astronomy, were all

concernedwith‘naturalinvestigationoftheworld,’howeverthesenewfieldswereproposed

as‘scientific’alternativestoreligiousconsiderations.Theempiricalcontentwasnotmuch

changed.Rather,itwasthecommunicationaboutthecontentthatchanged.Forexample,God

was still a point of reference in many works of nineteenth-century science, though the

relationbetweenGodandnaturehadbeentransformed,suchthatGodbecameinoperative

innaturalaccounts.87Assuch, thereligion-sciencedichotomywas,again, largelydefining

whatconstituted‘science.’

83Harris(2005a),14.84Simpson(2016c);Simpson(2016a);andvonStuckrad(2014),56–64andpassim.85vonStuckrad(2013c),126;andvonStuckrad(2014),25–38andpassim.86Cunningham&Williams(1993),422;Turner(1974),21–22;andShteir(1996),151–169.87Dear(2001a),385.

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7.2 Scientistas‘NotaPersonofReligion’Itwasalso inthenineteenthcenturythattheprofessionalcategoryof ‘scientist’emerged

(the coinage attributed to the aforementioned Whewell in 1834), specifically excluding

clergy,whohadhithertoplayedacentralroleinthestudyofnaturalphilosophy.88Samuel

TaylorColeridge(1772–1834)providesanotherexampleofearlyuseoftheterm,whichhe

usedtorefertothenewgroupofresearcherswhowereleavingasidetheprofoundquestions

ofnaturalphilosophersformorepracticalapplications,likethedevelopmentoftechnology.

For Coleridge, being a romantic, the label ‘scientist’ was somewhat derogatory, with its

abandonmentofcosmological,moral,religious,andphilosophicalquestions.89Whetherwith

positive or negative connotation, ‘scientist’was conceptualized to a significant degree in

contrasttothoseconcernedwithreligiousconsiderations.

Manymembers of this new group, identifying themselves as ‘scientists,’ ridiculed

clerical practitioners of science and framed the clergy as incapable of being genuine

scientists,sometimeseven framingtheclergyasawholeas theenemiesofscience.90For

example,thisfeaturedasathemeinEnglishMenofScience:TheirNatureandNurture(1874),

inwhichFrancisGalton(1822–1911)stated,“Thepursuitofscienceisuncongenialtothe

priestly character.”91 Galton argued for his position based on his observation that few

scientistscamefromclericalbackgroundsandonhisownexperiencesoftheineptitudeof

clergyforvaluablescientificwork.Thoughclearlythisisnotanaccurateassessment,asprior

toandduringthistimeperiodclericalsinsciencewerecommonplace,andmuchscientific

workeventookplacewithinchurches,itnonethelessdemonstratesthattheconstructionof

‘scientist’wasdone in specific contrast to religion.92Galton’sassessmentand tacticwere

typicalfortheemergingprofessionalgroup.Itwasameansto“persuade”thepublic:

88Turner(1978),360,364andpassim;Harrison(2003),781;Ross(1962),71;andSimpson(2016j).89McMahan(2008),86.DavidMcMahancreditedColeridgewithcoiningthetermin1833.ItwasactuallyduetoaconversationwithColeridgethatledWhewelltodiscusstheterminhisaccountoftheirmeetingattheBritishAssociationfortheAdvancementofSciencein1833,inapublicationin1834oftencitedasthefirstuseoftheterm.Thissuggeststhat indeedthewordhadalreadybeenintroducedat leastby1833,thoughfromWhewell’s comments it is not clear who actually coined the term. Still, he does refer to some “ingeniousgentleman,”whichRoss(1962),72claimedwasWhewellhimself.Seealso[Whewell]Anon.(1834),59;andSchaffer(1986),409–410.OnthepointthatthisanonymousworkwaswrittenbyWhewell,seeRoss(1962),71.90Turner(1978),365;andChadwick(1972),27.91QuotedinTurner(1978),365.92Hampson(1968),24;Grant(1996),84–85and174–176;Cunningham(2000a),275–276;Heilbron(1989);andKozhamthadam(2002),5–9.

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[T]hatsinceclergymenbyvirtueoftheirtheologicalvocationcouldnotbegenuinescientistsandcouldnot honestly teach science, professionalmenof science seeking to serve thematerial needs of theentire community should occupy those positions of research and teaching in the universities andpublicschoolspresentlyoccupiedbyclergyorpersonsappointedandcontrolledbyclergy.

Excludingclergyfromthecategoryofscientistormenofsciencewasconsideredessential

forreachingthegoaloftheprofessionalizationandprogressionofscience.93

This common formulation indeed seems to have been persuasive. Already in the

1870s, people found a devout scientist to be something remarkable, an “exhibit,” even

thoughreligiousscientistswerenotuncommon,asstated.94Nonetheless,theconstructionof

scientists as religiouswas uncommon. By 1875, JohnRuskin (1819–1900) noted, “It has

becomethepermittedfashionamongmodernmathematicians,chemists,andapothecaries

to call themselves ‘scientific men,’ as opposed to theologians, poets, and artists.”95 Even

before the emergence of the term ‘scientist,’ the terminology applied to practitioners of

sciencewas juxtaposed to the terminologyapplied toreligiouspractitioners, theologians,

andclergymen.Forexample,‘scientificpractitioner’and‘manofscience’or‘scientificman’

were formed in the model of ‘man of letters’ and ‘clergyman,’ utilizing the delineation

betweenthetwogroupsasamethodofidentity.96

7.3 TheScientificInstitutionas‘NotReligious’Partofthereasonthattheprofessionalizationofsciencewassituatedincontrasttoreligion

wasbecausereligionwasseenasachallengetotheexpansionofandresourcesaccordedto

science,whilereligiousdogmaandauthoritywerethoughttoimpedescientificresearch.97

‘Dogma’hasoftenbeenidentifiedwithreligion,asa“negativeterminthepreachmentsof

thesciencepopularizers”againstthepersecutionofinnovativethinkersandthesuppression

ofprogress.98Religionwasseenasanobstacletopublicsupport,funding,andeducational

opportunitiesforthescientificprofession,aconcernthatisimplicitinGalton’scomments

above.99Infact, inearlynineteenth-centuryscience,thereligiouscommunitydidexercise

93AbovequoteandthisobservationonTurner(1978),366.94Chadwick(1972),6.95QuotedinRoss(1962),70.96Dewitt(2013),23.97Gieryn(1983),785;andTurner(1978),357.98Burnham(1987),25.99Gieryn(1983),787.

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control over access to scientific patronage and employment in scientific institutions,

universities, and public schools and influenced the evaluation of work. Self-censorship

occurredaswell,onthepartofclergyaswellasfellowpractitionersofsciencewhowere

alsopeopleofreligion,outoffearofoffendingthereligious-mindedcommunity.Solongas

theauthorityofreligionandthesepracticescontinued,thescientificcommunitycouldnot

gaintheculturalandsocialinfluenceneededfortheestablishmentandadvancementofthe

scientificprofession,or,atleast,sothethoughtwent.100AsIanBarbour(1923–2013)noted,

“Inanagedominatedbyreligion,itwasnecessarytoasserttheindependenceofscience.”

As such, religion was criticized in its contrast to science partly to advance the

scientific establishment. For instance, ThomasHenryHuxley (1825–1895), a high-profile

publicist and defender of Darwinian evolution (known as ‘Darwin’s Bulldog’), criticized

Christianity inpart to “defend the independenceof scienceasanewprofession fromthe

influenceoftheestablishedchurch.”101Huxleybelievedscience“hadtobedefined[…]apart

fromthereligiouscontextinwhich[…]ithadincubated.”102Sciencewasframedasthe“rival

profession” to the Church. Specifically, Huxley targeted “Theology& Parsondom” as “the

natural&irreconcilableenemiesofScience.”103Heframedopponentstoevolutionasnon-

scientific and theologically prejudice.104Notably, in France, CharlesDarwin (1809–1882)

was not initially popular in biology, but gained support from the anticlericalmovement.

ThereinFrance,“[a]sinothercountrieswherechurchauthoritiescriticizedDarwin,some

scientists defend him partly to assert as a newly emerging professional group their

independencefromclericalinterference.”105AsimilarsituationoccurredinBritain,where

pairing the advancement of science and anti-Catholicism aided the cause of

professionalizationof sciencebybenefiting from theubiquitous anti-papist sentiment.106

Someofthoseinfluentialfigureswhoraisedotherissuesofthechallengesofreligiontothe

progressionof science included the aforementionedLyell,Darwin, JosephDaltonHooker

(1817–1911),HenryMaudsley(1835–1918),andHerbertSpencer(1820–1903),tonamea

100Turner(1978),361,364,and372.101PrevioustwoquotesinBarbour(1997),29and57.SeealsoLightman(1987),156.102Levine(1990),226.103Desmond(1997),253.ThefirstquoteisDesmond’swords;thelatterquotesarethoseofHuxley’s.104Chadwick(1972),12.105Barbour(1997),54.106Turner(1978),373.

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few.107

John Tyndall (1820–1893) contributed many influential public addresses and

popularwritingsthatareanexcellentsourceonhowthescientificinstitutionwasspecifically

demarcatedfromreligion.Tyndalloftenusedreligionasa‘contrastcase’whenengagingin

thisboundaryworkofsciencetopresentthenewprofessiontothepublic.ThomasF.Gieryn,

likemyself,specificallydescribedthiscontrastingbehavioras formulating ‘scienceasnot

religion.’108Tyndallinvokedmanydichotomiestoestablishthemutualexclusivityofreligion

andscience.Heassociatedsciencewithtechnology,materialprogress,andpracticality,while

religionwasdeemedforemotionaluses,ifusefulatall.Tyndallargued,“thattheknowledge

broughttousbythoseprophets,priestsandkingsofscienceiswhattheworldcalls‘useful

knowledge,’thetriumphantapplicationoftheirdiscoveriesprove.”Incontrast,religionwas

seenas“capableofadding,intheregionofpoetryandemotion, inwardcompletenessand

dignity to man.” In another example, science was associated with empiricism,

experimentation,andtruthofthenaturalworld,whilereligionwasassignedtotherealmof

metaphysics,spirituality,andatruththatcannotbeverified.Tyndallstated,“whilescience

cheerfullysubmitstothisordeal[offact-checkingviaobservation],itseemsimpossibleto

deviseamodeofverificationoftheirtheorieswhichdoesnotrouseresentmentintheological

minds.”109Sciencewasalsoassociatedwithskepticismandframedassubservientonlyto

fact,whilereligionwasconnectedtodogmaticauthority.Sciencewasseenasobjectiveand

freeofbiases,whilereligionwasregardedassubjectiveandemotional.110

AndinhisfamousBelfastAddressin1874,Tyndallthrewdownthegauntlet:

[G]rotesqueinrelationtoscientificcultureasmanyofthereligionsoftheworldhavebeenandare—dangerous,nay,destructive,tothedearestprivilegesoffreemen[…]We[representingscience]claim,andweshallwrest,fromtheologytheentiredomainofcosmologicaltheory.Allschemesandsystems,whichthusinfringeuponthedomainofscience,must,insofarastheydothis,submittoitscontrol,andrelinquishallthoughtofcontrollingit.111

107Turner(1978),357and357n.8forseveralrelevantreferences;andGieryn(1999),44.108Gieryn(1983);andGieryn(1999),43.SeealsoGieryn(1995),393–443,ontheboundaryworkofscience.109QuotedinGieryn(1983),785.110Gieryn(1983),785–786.Seealso ibid.;andGieryn(1999),37–64, for furtherquotesandexplanationofTyndall’sviews.Onthedemarcationofreligionandscienceviaempiricism,skepticism,andpracticalutilityintheboundaryworkofTyndall,seeibid.,46–51.111Tyndall(1874),61.Emphasisoriginal.Thiswaswidelyinterpretedasaddressedtoallreligiousinstitutions,thoughTyndall laterspecifiedthathewasreferringtoRomanCatholicisminparticular.SeeTurner(1978),373–374.

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AsGierynnoted,Tyndall’sdecisiontoformulatescienceas‘notreligion’wasnotanarbitrary

choice,butservedaparticularandpressingpurpose—togarnersupportforscienceduring

atimeinwhichreligionwasanimpediment(bothapparentandrealinvariousways)tothe

growth of science. And this strategy seems to have been a success—following Tyndall’s

death, science became an established part of the educational system that enjoyed

unprecedentedfreedomfromclericalinterferenceandpublicfundingforscientificresearch

greatlyincreased.Thescientificprofessionconstructedincontrasttoreligioncontributedto

the legitimization of the scientific institution, as well as public support for science, and

provideda“rationaleforthesuperiorityofscientists.”112

Thiswasnotasimpleclashofworldviewsbasedonpre-establishedmeaningsofthe

concepts, but a systematic, structured, and often deliberately constructed separation of

religion and science on the part of scientists in the quest of professionalization. This is

exemplified in the case of St. George JacksonMivart (1827–1900).Mivartwas a Roman

Catholic biologist and a student of Huxley, a supporter of naturalism, and a secondary

memberoftheDarwincircle.However,Mivartalsoheldtheconvictionthatevolutionwas

perfectly compatiblewithChristianity. ItwasMivart’s hope to reconcile Catholicism and

scienceinthisenvironmentofincreasingantagonismashasbeendiscussedthusfar.113And

Mivart was not alone; many leaders in science and theology regarded evolution as

compatiblewithreligiousbeliefsorevensawreligionandscienceasmutuallyreinforcing.114

BiologistHenryDrummond(1851–1897)evenwentsofarastoarguethatitwasincorrect

todiscussareconciliationbetweenChristianityandevolutionsincetheywereoneandthe

same.115Ifreligionandsciencewereonlyclashingbasedonworldviewsanddoctrines,this

wouldseemanaturaldirectionforthediscoursetotake,findingameanstoaccommodate

themboth.Andyet,Mivart’sownteacher,Huxley,viciouslyattackedhiswork.Asreligion-

scienceantagonismwasthoughttobecentrallyinstrumentaltotheprogressionofscience,

scientists largely saw this clash aswithin the interests of their community.According to

112Gieryn(1983),784and787.113Turner(1978),369–371.SeealsoPleins(2013),84–88.OnthelifeofMivart,seeGruber(1980).114 Cantor (2005), 2; Ellegård (1958), 99, 102–103, and 108–110; Livingstone (1987); and Numbers &Stenhouse(1999),thelastsourceofwhichdiscussedevolution,religion,andscienceinseveraldifferentareasoftheworld,aswellasinseveralsocialcontexts.115Brooke(1991),16.

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Turner,“TothoseofHuxley'sprofessionalpersuasion,itwasessentialthatevolutionnotbe

embracedbytheRomanCatholicChurch.”Huxleywentthroughgreatpainstoarticulatethat

evolutionwasinnowaycompatiblewithCatholicteachingsandarguedthatnooneshould

entertaintheideathat“heis,orcanbe,bothatruesonoftheChurchandaloyalsoldierof

science.”116AsTurneraptlynoted,Mivart’smistakewasinthathe:

[L]ikemostof thehistoriansafterhim,assumed that theantagonismbetweenscienceandreligionrelatedprimarilytoideas,wheninfactitwasalsoprofoundlyinvolvedwithmenandinstitutions[...]hehadquiteunderstandablyfailedtoperceivethattheissueatstakewasnotonlythesubstanceoftheory but also the character of the scientific community and the right of itsmembers to set theparametersoftheirthought,education,epistemology,employment,andsocialutilityindependentofconsiderationsforreligiousdoctrineorecclesiasticalorganization.117

Not only is the content of science not the exclusive nor evenmain source of the

misalignmentof religion and science, but rather the relationbetween themwas (and is)

strongly shapedbypeople and institutions involved in the advancement of the scientific

profession.Forinstance,asProfessorFloweroftheNaturalHistoryMuseumnotedin1889:

BothHuxleyandTyndallwereanti-religiousinadogmaticsenselongbeforetheyhadmadeanymarkinscience,and…theirviewsonthesesubjectscannotthereforeberegardedasthelegitimateoutcomeofscientificthoughtandscientificknowledge.118

As we have seen, these developments were generally a reflection of a major historical

perspectiveemergingthatsuggests‘scienceiswhatreligionisnot.’Thedifferentiationwas

most thoroughly accomplished by the construction of what ‘scientific knowledge,’ the

‘historyofscience,’the‘scientificenterprise,’andthe‘scientificprofession’meantindirect

contrastto‘religion.’Theseconceptsgainedtheirparticularmeaningsthroughahistorical

anddiscursiveprocessofrelationalization.Religion-sciencemutualexclusivityhaslittleto

do with content and a lot to do with conceptualization. Furthermore, conceptualization

constructedthecontentandthiscontentthenisabletoactbackupontheconstruct,further

stabilizingthediscourseoftheconceptualconstructs.This,asdiscussedbelow,isevidenced

by the subsequentdevelopmentof the conflict thesis—bothaproductandaproducerof

mutualexclusivity.

116Turner(1978),370.ThefirstquoteisTurner’s.Thelatter,TurnerquotedHuxley.117Turner(1978),370–371.118QuotedinChadwick(1972),4.

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8 ConflictastheMaterializationofMutualExclusivity

Becausesciencewasalreadyconceivedofas‘notreligion,’itcomesasnosurprisethatwhen

theterm‘conflict’cametorefertoaclashbetweenviews,discursivelylinkingthetermto

conceptualopposition,itwasreadilyappliedtothereligion-sciencerelationship.Priortothe

latethenineteenthcentury,useoftheword‘conflict’wasrestrictedtoreferencesofbattles

or collisions. Itwas not until Draper’sworkHistory of the Conflict Between Religion and

Sciencewaspublishedin1875that ‘conflict’cametorefertoreligious,philosophical,and

politicalopposition.Draperwaslikelyresponsibleforaddingthisnewconnotationtothe

term.119

Conflictwentthroughfiftyprintingsbytheearly1930sandwastranslatedintoten

languages.120 Itwas likely due to the success of this publication that the religion-science

dichotomybecamecommonknowledgeandthatthisconceptualdichotomywasredefined

asahardfact,i.e.,conflict.121Draper“createdamythofthereificationsScienceandReligion

wrestling together for dominance.”122 One example that Draper utilized to demonstrate

religion-scienceconflictwasthejuxtapositionoftheChristianflat-Earthcosmologyandthat

ofsphericityupheldinthescientificcommunity.Priorto1870,historytextsseldomreferred

to the flat-Earth cosmology. Yet, following the emergence of the warfare thesis and the

popularization of such views, this Christian myth appeared in nearly all history texts

following 1880. Althoughwe cannot be certain about the causal link, the coincidence is

striking,suggesting,attheveryleast,culturalcurrencyofthereligion-scienceconflict.123In

fact,somehavelinkedthisdirectlytoDraperandhisfellowwarfaretheoreticianWhitesince

they exaggerated the degree of reception of flat-earth cosmology.124 Draper’s work was

119Cantor&Kenny(2001),766–767.E.g.,overthefollowingdecade,otherauthorsfollowedsuit,using‘conflict’asameanstoexpressintellectualopposition,includingTheConflictofChristianitywithHeathenism(1879)andTheConflictBetweenLiteratureandScience(1881).See, respectively,Ropes,Smyth,&Uhlhom(1879);andTilden(1881).120Fleming(1972),134.121Russell(1997),38.SeealsoFleming(1972),126–129.122Fleming(1972),128.123Russell(1997),x,43,and90–91n.84.Ontheflatearthmyth,seealsoCormack(2009);andGarwood(2007).124Principe(2015),48;andGarwood(2007),10–13and23.Thereweremanyotherfalsehoodsandhalf-truthsabout thehistoryof religionandscienceperpetuatedbyDraperandWhite.SeeNumbers (2009),1–3;andPrincipe(2009),100.BesidesthecasesofDraperandWhite,ingeneral,thehistoryofreligionandsciencehas

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certainlyconstructive,andnotasimplehistoricalaccount,asitemergedinacontextofwhich

therewerestillresidualusesoftheterm‘religion’within‘science’andviceversa.Assuch,

Draperiscontributingtotheconstructionofreligion-sciencemutualexclusivitybyframing

thetwointermsofcompetingknowledgeclaims.

Atthesametime,Draper’sworkalsodrewuponpre-establishedsignifiersofreligion-

science mutual exclusivity—he invoked the religion-science dichotomy by associating

science with freedom and progress, while religion was connected to repression and

superstition.So,whatweseeisthatthecontentconstructedbymutualexclusivityisdrawn

uponinordertoargueforaparticularreligion-sciencerelationship.Therelationalconstruct

andthedefinitionalcontentitproducedstructuredhowtherelationshipwasconceptualized.

Put differently, relations preceded and produced definitions. In a second move, those

definitionswereused to argue for a relationship. In thisway,we see that the contentof

mutual exclusivity is acting back upon the construct so that the conflict thesis is both a

productandproducerofthisdichotomousrelationalconstruct.

Thenotionofreligion-scienceconflictnotonlysuitedthealreadydevelopednotion

ofreligion-sciencemutualexclusivity,butalsotheincreasingtensionsbetweenreligionand

scienceinsociety.Atthetimeofthisthesis’emergence,thereweremanysocialissuesthat

broughtreligion-scienceconflicttothefore,suchastheEcumenicalCouncil(1869–1870)

underPopePius IX (1792–1878). In these sessions the relationsof religion—specifically

Catholicism—to science were discussed extensively.125 Though the Church attempted to

formulate a positive (but dominant) relationship with science, the result, according to

Draper,wasconflictbetweentheCatholicChurchandseveralEuropeanstates,todissension

withintheChurch,tothebanofcertainCatholicpublicationsinsomelocales,tothecharge

thatthepopewasaheretic,andeventotheItalian-Romanwarthatendedinthecaptureof

Rome in1870.126ThoughDraper’sagenda-basedworkdoesnotdepictall thenuancesof

these historical developments, it does nonetheless tell us something about the public

reception of these conflicts as being based on religion-science confrontation.Meanwhile,

beenseverelyskewed.E.g.,thechurch’sprohibitiononthedissectionofhumanswasamyth.OnwhichseePark(2009).SeealsoNumbers(2009),inentirety.125Draper(1875),330.SeealsoRussell(1997),36–48.126VaticanCouncil(1870);Draper(1875),330–339;andVollmer&vonStuckrad(2017).

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discussionswere underway across theWesternworld on the role of religion in politics,

governance,academia,education,and,importantly,inscience.Thiswasalsothetimeofthe

beginningsofthecreationism-evolutiondebatethatcontinuedthroughtheScopesMonkey

Trial inthe1920sandonwardtothepresentday,manifestingindebates, legalsuits,and

protests.127Today,thiscontinuestobeoneofthekeyissuescitedasevidenceofconflict.And

withthesocialsuccessofsuch‘(social)factsofconflict,’mutualexclusivitywasstabilizedby

thesematerializationsordispositivesofthediscourse.

ReligionandsciencescholarPeterHarrisonarguedthat,foradherentsofthe“conflict

myth,” the lackof aunifiednotionofscience is compensatedbyanegativedefinition in

which“scienceisunderstoodbywhatitisnotorwhatitisinoppositiontoandthatthingis

[...] religion.”128 Indeed, that is what the research has shown here, though not only

perpetuatedby‘adherents,’asideasofscienceas‘notreligion’havespreadacrosshistory,

fromscience,academia,philosophy,politics,andsociety,inbothexplicitandimplicitforms.

And this was not pure myth either, but rather “a potent intellectual force that greatly

influenced thinking about both science and religion.”129 Furthermore, it was one of the

primarysourcesofscientificintrigueforthegeneralpublic,whoweremuchmorecaptivated

by religion-scienceconflict thanbysciencealone,as religionwasan interestexceedingly

morecommonamongpeopletheworldoverthanscientificstudy.130

Whileconflicthasindeedoccurredinsomeinstances,historicallythesesocialfactors

didnotcauseconflictsomuchastheywereframed inpresentationandrepresentationas

conflictual.Scientificfactshavebeenfrequentlyinterpretedintermsofreligion,specifically

intermsofthenegationofreligiousviews.Manyleadingscientistshavelinkedevolution,for

instance,withtheirownatheistbeliefsandother‘liaisonsofscientifictheoryandattackson

religion’haveoccurredaswell.131Theimplicationsofevolutionhaveoftenbeenframedin

127TheScopesMonkeyTrial(TheStateofTennesseev.JohnThomasScopes,1925)isafamousAmericanlegalcaseregardingtheteachingofevolutioninschools.See,e.g.,Larson(1997).Forfurtherdetailsonthesocialsituationsurroundingthewarfarethesis,seeDraper(1875),330–340;Turner(1978),373;Wilson,(2000),4;andVollmer&vonStuckrad(2017).128Harrison(2011).Ontheconflict‘myth,’seealsoNumbers(2009).129Lindberg&Numbers(1986),7.SeealsoChadwick(1972),1–35;andChadwick(1975),161–188.130Chadwick(1975),175.131ParaphraseofBarbour(1997),57.SeealsoAechtner(2015),whichcontainsmanyexamplesofscientificknowledgepresentedintermsofthenegationofreligiousviews,anarrativethatpersiststoday.

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specificregardtoreligiousunderstandingoftheworldandofhumannature.Forinstance,in

popularBritishperiodicalsfrom1859–1972,therewaslittlementionofDarwiniantheory

exceptintermsofitsrelationtoreligion.132Evolutionwaspresentedintermsofitsspecific

exclusionofpreconceivednotionofhumankind’splaceintheworldandinasupernatural

cosmology.133Andinamuchlargercontextintermsoftimeandplace,asLorenEiseleyput

it:

Man,theologically,hadforsolongbeenaccordedaspecialandsupernaturalplaceincreationthattheevolutionists,instrivingtocarry theirpointthathewasintimatelyrelatedtotherestoflife,soughttoemphasisethosecharacteristicswhichparticularlyrevealedourhumbleorigins.134

The story of Swiss naturalist Abraham Tremblay (1710–1784) provides another

example of the formation of scientific ‘facts’ constructed in specific contrast to religion.

Tremblayconductedexperimentsonthefreshwaterpolyp.Afterdividingthepolypintwo,

hediscoveredthateachpartwoulddevelopintoaseparatepolypnomatterthenumberof

timeshecontinuedtosplitit.Thoughthisprocessisbetterunderstoodtodayinthefieldof

molecularbiology,atthistimeitwaspresentedasproofthattherewasnosuchthingasan

indivisible‘soul’ineachlivingorganism,aswascommoninChristianthinking.Itwasexactly

becauseofthesereligiousimplicationsthatTremblaybecamefamousthroughoutEurope.

His work was thought to offer substantial evidence for materialism to the exclusion of

religious worldviews.135 The scientific results were presented in terms of religious

understandingsoftheworldandthescientist’ssuccesshingedonthatframing.Ofcourse,

thereisnothinginherenttoTremblay’sobservationssuggestingreligion-scienceconflict,as

there is no need for biology to say anything about non-physical processes. Rather, the

materializationofthisconflictwascontingentonpreconceivednotionsofmutualexclusivity.

What thisperspectiveamounts to is “An increase in theabilityof science tomake

credibletruthclaimsleadstoadeclineinreligion’sabilitytomaketruthclaims.”136Historian

of science Gerald Holton argued the perspective of scientific advances interpreted as

religiousfailuresisaresultof“theancienttendencytoprovetheexistenceofGodbypointing

132Ellegård(1958),98.Whilethisformulationwasmorefrequentinreligiouspublications,itwasnotrestrictedtothem.Seeibid.,95–113.133Turner(1974),27–29.134Eiseley(1958),238.135Byrne(1996),165–166.136Evans&Evans(2008),92.Emphasisadded.

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to problems which science could not solve at the time,” making the advancement of

knowledgeinevitablyappearasreligion-scienceconflict.137WhiletheGodofthegapsrolein

religion-scienceconflictisnottheonlycontributingfactor,itdoesdemonstrate,inrelational

terms,thattheenterpriseof ‘religion’wasalsobeingdefinedintermsofitscontrastwith

science.Advocatesonbothsidesofthedebatewereframingscientificfactsintermsofthe

mutualimplicationofreligionandscience.

Bytheendofthenineteenthcentury, framingscienceas ‘notreligion’hadevolved

beyondasimpleconceptualboundary lineandbecomeameansof interpretingempirical

facts,aswellasameansformaterializingopposition.Putdifferently,theveryactofreligion-

sciencedichotomizationinanalyzingfacts,likeintheinstanceofthepolyp,doesnotreveal

conflict; it creates it. Though this is a construct, the conflict becomes concretized in the

successofscientifictheoriesthathingedontheirchallengestoreligion,asseenhere,butalso

in legal proceedings and judgments and even in empirical studies of the religion-science

relationship.138

Asrecentas2015itwasfoundthat:

[C]ontemporarypostsecondarytextbooksandreferencematerialsofvariousdisciplines[“aroundtheworld”] still present the conflictmodel’snarrative as thehistorical accountof religionand scienceinteractions. Hence, the conflict model persists not merely as a popular artifact, but also as aconspicuoushistoricalnarrativeinmodernuniversity-levelpedagogicalandreferencematerials.139

Notionsofareligion-scienceconflicthaveledmanytoconcludethat“theadvancementof

scienceisservedbyanattackonitsantitype...religion.”140Conflictperpetuatesconflict,all

thewhilewith little tono awareness that thenotionof conflict is basedona contingent

historicalformulationofscienceas‘notreligion.’The main reason there is conflict is

137Holton(1973),449.138Onlegalmatters,see,e.g.,thevaryingdescriptionsof‘science’attheScopesMonkeyTrialandtheMcLeanCreation-Science Trial (McLean v. Arkansas Board of Education, 1981–1982)—regarding the role ofevolution/creationismineducation—whichdemonstratethatultimately,thefinaljudgmentofthecasesrestedon the demarcation of religion and science. See Gieryn, Bevins, & Zehr (1985); Prelli (1989), 219–236;Holtzman&Klasfeld(1983);andLarson(1997).Whilethisdoesnotcomeasasurprise,whatshouldbetakenaway from thispoint is that, again, science is conceptualized in thisparticularmodeof religiousexclusion,which is bynomeans a standard related to some idealizedvisionof science as outsideof social influence.Regardingthe latterpoint,earlyempiricalstudiesonthereligion-sciencerelationshipputdisproportionateemphasisonreligion-sciencemutualexclusivity,framingthestudyintermsofaninverseratiobetweenbeingreligiousandbeingscientific.SeeEvans&Evans(2008),93;andStark&Finke(2000),73.139Aechtner(2015),210and220.140Harrison(2011).

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becausereligionandscienceweredefinedasconflictual,adefinition,wehaveseen,thatwas

due to the historical conceptualization of religion-science mutual exclusivity. This

etymologicalevolutionwasanovelty,notanecessity.

Though it is increasingly recognized that religion-science conflict is contingent,

nonethelessdiscussionsaboutthereligion-sciencerelationship—fromtheacademictothe

popular—arelargelypreoccupiedwithconflict,appearingasamajorthemeeveninthose

works that suggest alternative perspectives. I argue that this is because of a lack of

awarenessof the rootof theproblem,which ismisidentifiedas the thesis itself.As such,

challengestothethesisareviadifferingthesesorcounterexamples,allthewhiledrawing

uponcommonunderstandingsofreligionandsciencetomakethesepoints.Forexample,

somecounterconflictbyarguingthatnaturalismandsupernaturalismarenotnecessarily

opposed (as discussed in Chapter Six and Chapter Eight). And yet, these common

definitions—like religion as regarding the supernatural and science in reference to the

natural—arealsoresultsofmutualexclusivity.Theconflictthesisresidesprimarilyinthe

realmofhistoricalideasofreligion-sciencerelationalizationandthusthisiswhatneedsto

be addressed in order to understand the underlying issues.Working fromdefinitions to

countersaidthesisremainsproblematicbecausethesignifierspresentinthesedefinitions

arealsotheproductofrelationalization.

Iwillnowturntosomeofthemainsignifiersofreligionandsciencebornfromthe

mutualexclusivityconstructthatarestilloperativetodayintheconceptualizationofthese

terms,aswellasoperative in there-constellationof theseconcepts in thearticulationof

alternative perspectives. In order to seriously challenge theses of the religion-science

relationship,weneedtounderstandhowthetermsanddefinitionsusedinthesethesesare

constructedandconstructingthereligion-sciencerelation.

9 ExclusiveScience:SignifiersofScienceas‘NotReligion’

Scientific knowledge, the history of scientific, the scientific enterprise, the profession of

science,and‘fact’-basedconflicthaveallbeenconceptualizedbyrelationalizingreligionand

scienceinadichotomousfashion.Theresulthasbeenthattheactualtermsthemselvescame

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tobedefinedinsuchawayastoreflectthisrelationalconstruction.Fortheremainderofthis

chapter,Iwillexplorehow‘religion’and‘science’havegainedspecificsignifiersasaresult

ofthemutualexclusivityconstruct.Iamnowgoingtostepawayfromthelargelyhistorical

focus of the last sections to discuss how religion-sciencemutual exclusivity appears via

particularsignifiersinthediscourse,whilemaintaininganeyetowardthehistory.

The notion of religion-science mutual exclusivity is so deeply engrained that it

appears even in instanceswhere there is no direct engagementwith discussions on the

religion-sciencerelationship.Forexample,substantivedefinitionsofreligioninsociology:

[T]ypicallyinvolvesplittingtheworldintosomeversionofthesacredandtheprofane.Theprofaneworld operates rationally, explainable by human reason and able to be observed. The sacred,commonlycalledthesupernaturalortranscendent,operatesoutsideoftheabilityofrationality(e.g.,science)toexplainit.

Directlyconfirmingmyformulationofscienceas‘notreligion,’JohnH.EvansandMichaelS.

Evanscontinued:“Thesesubstantivedefinitionsofreligionhaveessentiallydefinedreligion

asconcerningthe ‘irrationalities,’ the ‘notscience.’”Howreligion is typicallydefined is in

suchawaythatmakesitincompatiblewithconventionalconceptionsofscience,bythevery

virtueof thedefinition itself.Forexample,one(declining,butstill)commondefinitionof

‘religion’refersto“Anysystemofbeliefsandpracticesconcernedwithultimatemeaningthat

assumestheexistenceofthesupernatural.”141Asanisolatedstatementthiswouldlikelynot

be thought tobehistoricallyrelevant toscience,however,asdiscussed,sciencehasbeen

historicallydefinedasnaturalobservationof theworldand thiswas todelineate it from

religion.Thus,ouranalytical categories for ‘religion’ as relating to the supernaturalhave

followedthedelineationsetoutinthehistoricaldefinitionofscienceas‘notreligion.’Beyond

analytical definitions, religious identity is also frequently conceptualized in contrast to

science.Forexample,ininterviewswiththosewhoself-identifiedashaving‘noreligion,’it

wasfoundthat“‘religion’isunderstoodasconsistingofimpossiblepropositionalbeliefsthat

aredisplacedbyscientificknowledge.”142

‘Science,’too,hasbeendefinedinsuchawayastoreflectmutualexclusivity.Bythe

1830s,therewasincreasingdiscontentabouttheusageoftheword ‘science,’andseveral

141PrevioustwoquotesonEvans&Evans(2008),90and99.142Wallis(2013).Emphasisadded.

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intellectualsvoicedtheiropinionsthatthewordshouldexcludemorals,theology,andother

termsrelatedtoreligiousconsiderations.Thoughthiswasdoneinpartbythosewhothought

these considerations were ‘higher’ than science, it was also promoted on the part of

advocates of the professionalization of science who deemed their own views more

prestigious.143ThepublicdebatebetweenHuxleyandBishopSamuelWilberforce(1805–

1873)ataBritishAssociationmeetingin1860madetheconceptualizationof‘science’as‘not

religion’quite famous.Thediscussionwas in regard toDarwin’sOn theOriginof Species

(1859),whichhadasignificantinfluenceonhowthegeneralpublicunderstoodthemeaning

oftheword‘science.’AsRoyHarrissuccinctlyputit:

IfDarwinwasatypicalscientist,andTheOriginofSpeciesatypicalworkofscience,andiftheproblemwasthatacceptingDarwinianbiologymeantrejectingtheaccountofcreationgivenintheBible,thenwhatscience‘stoodfor’assumedaquitespecificpublicprofilethatithadnothadpreviously.SciencecametobeseenasalternativetoChristianity,whichinturnwasseenasalong-standingobstacletoscientificprogress.144

In the nineteenth century, Christians contributed to the dichotomy as well, with many

labelinganychallengetotheBibleas‘science.’Whetheritemergedfromthehistoricalstudy

oftheBibleornot,thepublicfailedtomakesuchadistinction.145

Outsideofthereligion-sciencecontext,‘science’continuestobedefinedinwaysthat

canbespecificallytracedtoreligion-sciencemutualexclusivity.‘Science’asdealingwiththe

natural,material,andphysicalamongothersignifiers,wereallassignedtoscienceduetothe

dichotomizationofreligionandscience,while‘religion,’inthespiritofnegativecorrelation,

waslikenedtosupernaturalism,dualism,andthesubjectiveorspiritual.

9.1 Rationalityas‘NotReligion’Thegrowthofmodernscience,particularlytheaspectofrationality, iscitedasoneofthe

mainsourcesofsecularization.146Andrationalism,wehaveseen,hasfeaturedasameansof

delineatingsciencefromsuperstition,faith,dogma,andmoregenerallyreligion.147Thestory

ofrationalityandsecularismsuggeststhatonceconfrontedwith ‘secularreason,’religion

143Cannon(1978),146.144Harris(2005),34.SeealsoChadwick(1972),9–11.145Lindberg&Numbers(1986),7.146Evans&Evans(2008),92;Norris&Inglehart(2004),7–9;andStark&Bainbridge(1985),430.SeealsoBruce(1996),48–52and117,whoemphasizedrationalityoverscienceasthesourceofsecularization.147Besidesthesourcesalreadymentionedinthisdiscussion,seealsoChadwick(1972),13.

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engaged in “an immensebargainingprocesswith secular thought,”whereby religionand

theology took place with “constant regard” for the secular intellectuals and what they

deemed to be acceptable knowledge. “It is with them that the necessary intellectual

compromisesare ‘negotiated,’”suggestingapushandpullbetweenreligiousandrational

thought.148Though‘rationalism’seemstobethemostrecurrenttheme,thisisconsistently

tied to empirical standards of evidence, scientific knowledge, and technological

advancement—inotherwords,itformsadiscursiveknotwiththesamestrandscommonly

tiedtoscience.

Moreover,objectivemethodicalobservationhasetymologicallybeengeneralizedas

bothscienceandrationalityandthiswasinspecificcontrasttoreligion.Thatthiswasdone

in contrast to religion is quite evidentwhenwe consider the fact that the term ‘reason’

emerged in theological contexts, thus to extrapolate rationality to other contexts would

require such differentiation.149 The changes in what constituted ‘reason’ from being

regardedasderiveddeductivelyaprioritotheemphasisoninductiveempiricismwasthe

resultofredefiningscientificknowledgeasdistinctfromnaturalphilosophyandreligious

considerations.150 The term ‘rationalization,’ etymologically linked to ‘rationality,’ even

gained themeaning of “explaining away the divine or the wonderful” in the nineteenth

century.151Forexample,WilliamEdwardHartpoleLecky(1838–1903), inAHistoryofthe

Riseand Influenceof theSpirit ofRationalism inEurope (1865),positioned thegrowthof

reasonandscienceasthedeclineofsuperstition.Leckystated,“Itsdeclinemarkstherise,

anditsdestructionthefirsttriumph,ofthespiritofrationalisminEurope.”152

Thus, the rationality-religion relation not only contributed to the science as ‘not

religion’formulation,ithasitselfalsobeenconstructedinamutuallyexclusivemanner.And

we see this appear in construals about how rationality changed the role of religion. For

instance,therationalworldviewhasbeensaidto:

[H]averenderedthecentralclaimsoftheChurchimplausibleinmodernsocieties,blowingawaythevestigesofsuperstitiousdogmainWesternEurope.Thelossoffaithwasthoughttocausereligiontounravel,erodinghabitualchurchgoingpracticesandobservanceofceremonialrituals,evisceratingthe

148Berger(1967),158.149Williams(1976),211.150Onthechangingconceptionsofscienceasitrelatestodeductionandinduction,seeMcMullin(1990).151Williams(1976),213.152Lecky(1919[1865]),vol.1,103.

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social meaning of denominational identities, and undermining active engagement in faith-basedorganizationsandsupportforreligiouspartiesincivicsociety.153

Weseethisdichotomyreinforcedonthesideofreligionaswell.Forexample,somehave

suggested that the riseof fideismwasa twentieth-century reinterpretationof religion in

reaction to the mechanistic and materialistic outlook of the scientific worldview. This

religiousmovementisidentifiedontheprimarybasisofitsemphasisonfaithoverreasonas

themodeforprocuringtruth.154Sociologicaltheoryemphasizingtheriseofsecularismand

rationalitywassometimestreatedwithdisdain,exemplifiedinthereactionoflatetwentieth-

century Catholic officialswho argued for a distinction of ‘facts’ and ‘truth’ to emphasize

religiousoverscientificknowledge.155

The idea that a rational worldview, embodied by science, would undermine the

foundationsofreligionandall thingssupernaturalormagicalwasstrongly influencedby

MaxWeber’s (1864–1920) The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism (1904) and

EconomicsandSociety(1933).Manyleadingsociologists,suchasPeterBerger,DavidMartin,

andBrianWilson,alsoarguedforsuchaperspective,whichgainedpopularityinthe1960s

and1970s.156And evendatingback to theEnlightenment era,manyphilosophers, social

scientists, andnatural scientists suggested religious superstitionswouldbeoutgrownby

reasonintheimminentfuture.Attheturnofthetwentiethcentury,sociologistEnricoFerri

(1856–1929) made the continually common argument, “[…] science and religion are in

inverseratioonetotheother;theonediminishesandbecomesfeebleinthesamemeasure

astheotherincreasesandisstrengthenedinitsstrugglewiththeunknown.”157

9.2 Naturalism,Materialism,andPhysicalismas‘NotReligion’Becauserationalityhadbeenconstructedassignifyingscienceindirectnegationofreligion,

themutualexclusivityconstructgavescienceaprivilegedpositioninknowledgeacquisition.

The scientificworldviewbecame thepredominantmeansof interpreting reality and that

worldviewcametobeconstructedintermsofnaturalism,materialism,andphysicalism.By

153Norris&Inglehart(2004),7.154Grassie(2010),160.155Dols&Paul(2016),101.156Norris&Inglehart(2004),7.SeealsoBerger(1967);Wilson(1966);andMartin(1978).157Ferri(1906),48.

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the nineteenth century, a “fundamentally negative element in naturalistic explanation

became more prominent and characteristic,” namely its contrast with religion.158

Naturalism,a“definingcharacteristicofscience”onlysincethesamecentury,meant“the

exclusionofsupernaturalorreligiousmatters.”159

The dichotomy of naturalism and supernaturalism is a major theme in religion-

sciencemutualexclusivity.HugoGrotius (1583–1645),a contemporaryofGalileo’sanda

philosopher,amongotherthings,claimedsciencemustbeconducted“asifGodisnotgiven.”

Thishasbeenquotedasanexampleofhowmethodologicalnaturalismactsasaconstraint

onscientificactivity.160Thisconstraintisnotonlywidelyacceptedinthefieldofscience,but

alsoitiswithinthecommonstockofknowledgethatsciencedealswiththenaturalworld

andnaturalexplanations.However,lesswellknownisthatthisassociationbetweenscience

andnaturalismdidnotemergebyhappenstance,orbysomenaturalaffinitybetweenscience

and nature, but rather came about in the specific context of differentiating science from

naturalphilosophyandreligiousunderstandingsoftheworld.Inotherwords,‘science’was

again being defined in negative relation to ‘religion.’ Naturalism was emphasized in

particularcontrasttoreligiousconcerns:sciencecannotappealtosupernaturalagency,in

propositions,hypotheses,theories,data,norterminologicallyorcategorically.161

Thisdevelopmentcanbeseeninthechangingusageoftheword‘science’itself.Early

on,thetermreferredtoknowledgegenerally,graduallygainingthedominantmeaningof

‘naturalandphysicalscience.’Asthephysicalsciencesgrewinprestige inthenineteenth

century,thisjustifiedtheuseofthetermthatwaspreviouslyusedforallknowledge.162And

the“usage,onceestablished,gavelinguisticsupporttothecrudebelief[…]thattheonlytrue

knowledge is that of the material world as explored by physical science.” If it was not

‘science,’itwasnescience.Withthisshiftofusageoftheword‘science,’allknowledgethat

158Burnham(1987),24.159Stanley(2015),1–2.160Plantinga(2015).161Plantinga(2010),304;andTurner(1974),24.162Harris(2005),40.Cunningham&Williams(1993),420statedthatpre-nineteenthcenturyuseoftheterm‘science’referredtothetheoreticalsideofalldisciplines.The‘arts’referredtothepracticalsideofstudyandthusalsoincludedwhatwaslaterdesignatedasstrictly‘science,’suchaschemistryandastronomy.SeealsoHarris(2005),41;andWilliams(1976),233.

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wasnotofthematerialworldwasexcludedfromscienceandknowledge.163AsCharlesAlan

Taylornoted,thefamiliarfeaturesofscience,likeempiricism,objectivism,etc.,arepresumed

associationsand“Theepistemicbaseofpowerforsuchpresumptionsisthattheyaretaken

as ‘natural’ reflections of science and scientific practice.” There is no natural association

betweenscienceandthesefamiliarfeatures,butrather“theyarevariablydeployedinorder

tofulfillparticularrhetoricalends,thatis,toserveparticulargoalsinparticularrhetorical

situations.”164

Theassociationofsciencewithanaturalisticapproach,aswellaswiththeempirical

method,was intimatelyrelated to theprofessionalizationof science.That theassociation

betweenscienceandnaturalismwasbornoutofthenegativecorrelationwithreligionand

supernaturalismisevidencedbynaturalistattacksontheauthorityofreligion in the late

nineteenthcentury.165This“constitutedbothacauseandaweapon”againstreligiousdogma,

natural theology, and the influence of religious authorities. By laying claim to their own

epistemologyandmethodologyas theexclusivedomainof science,aswellas thecorrect

modelofknowledgegenerally, sciencewaspositionedasan independentprofession that

both differentiated it and legitimized it in the face of alternative knowledge systems,

specificallyreligion.Theadoptionofnaturalismandempiricism“providedan intellectual

solventtocleansecontemporaryscienceofmetaphysicalandtheologicalsurvivals.”166Inthe

late nineteenth century, those who spoke of the miraculous and the supernatural were

increasinglyframedasanti-scientific.167InTheTwilightofChristianity(1929),HarryElmer

Barnes(1889–1968)madethatclaimthatscienceisnaturalismandanti-supernaturalism

and,inaword,anti-religion.168

Ofcourse,itcomesasnosurprisethatnaturalismiscontrastedtosupernaturalism,

however it shouldbenoted thatnaturalism is (largely) specifically regarded asnegating

supernaturalism, in terms of explanatory accounts. This is no minor distinction. Many

163 Quote in Ross (1962), 70. See also ibid., 75. Regarding ‘nescience,’ this is a particularly apt usage ofterminology, in that ‘nescience,’ fromtheLatinnescientia,means lackofknowledge.Note, theLatinrootof‘science’isscientia.Thus,wemightinterprettheuseof‘nescience’tomeanthelackofknowledgeisequatedtothelackofscientificunderstanding,furtherreinforcingthisrelationalconstruction.164Taylor(1996),90.165Asprem(2010),636.SeealsoHuxleyetal.(1889).166Turner(1978),364.167Chadwick(1972),32.168Ransom(1931[1930]),8.

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believethatdivineaction,forexample,occursthroughnaturalmeans,thusnaturalismand

supernaturalism are not necessarily mutually exclusive. However, in this discourse on

naturalism,supernaturalismwasandisnotonlyatargetforcriticism,butmoreoveracentral

pointofrepudiationasasourceofexplanation. In fact,supernaturalismisdefinedinthis

discourseinthespecificsenseofproblematicallyaccountingfornaturaloccurrences,which

ought to be done via naturalism.169 Furthermore, naturalism is specifically positioned as

sciencenegatingreligion,withtheappealtonaturalismandreasondescribedas‘counter-

rhetoric’toreligionandscientificaccountsofthe‘supernormal’asreplacingthecategoryof

the ‘supernatural.’170 Natural explanation is often thought to eliminate possibilities for

supernaturalsourcesofcausality.171

Alvin Plantinga has argued that one source of the naturalistic worldview is the

rejectionoftheism.Naturalismwaspartofaprocesstoremoveourselves—thesubjective

factor—fromtheworldbeingstudied,to‘objectifyinquiry,’ashumanstendtopersonifythe

world and, in the case of theism, see creation, governance, and purpose as sources of

explanation.Forscientificpurposes,thereisarejectionofthistendency,pavingthewayfor

natural accounts. Objectifying inquiry also involved rejecting teleology, as teleology

positionshumanityasaculminationofpurposeordesignandthusneedstoberemovedto

alsoremoveourselvesfrom‘thepicture.’ThisPlantingatracedbacktoFrancisBacon(1561–

1626), who regarded the tendency toward teleological explanations as having “relation

clearly to the nature ofman rather than to the nature of the universe.”172 Supernatural

explanationwasseenasinhibitingtheadvancementofscience,ofnaturalaccounts,andas

‘defilingphilosophy,’toparaphraseBacon.Plantingastated,“Theclaimisthatscience[…]

hasnoneedforthesupernaturalorspiritualforitsproperprosecution,andindeeditisbest

donebydeletinganysuchreferences.”Naturalism,Plantingaargued,canbesummedupas

“secularismwithrespecttoscience”or,inrelationalterminology,scienceas‘notreligion.’173

Anotherwaynaturalismwasdefinedincontrasttoreligionwasthroughtherejection

169Asprem(2010),637.170Dyrendal(2010),897–898;andAsprem(2010),639.171Turner(1974),31;andDyrendal(2010),887–888.172QuotedinPlantinga(2010),304.Seealsoibid.,303.173 Plantinga (2010), 304–305. It is important to note that naturalism does not necessarily precludesupernaturalisminotherareasoflife,thoughtherearethesemoreextremeclaimsaswellsuggestingthatthesupernaturalshouldbeeliminatedfromallconsiderations.

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of metaphysical concerns, both as subjects of inquiry and as sources of explanation.

AccordingtoFrankM.Turner,thepursuitofnaturalisticscienceinvolvedadisplacementof

metaphysics,aswellasteleologyandtheology,asameanstoplacescienceintheserviceof

the profession and the general public. This service was understood as a substitute to

religiousdoctrineandreligiousauthority.Itwasalsoameanstoassertthatsciencewasno

longersubordinatetothereligiouscommunity.174

Naturalismisnotjustaconceptuallinebetweenreligionandscience,buthasresulted

in certain materializations of the discourse. According to Judge Jones in the Dover trial

(TammyKitzmiller,etal.v.DoverAreaSchoolDistrict,etal.)—thefirstchallengetopublic

school requirements to include intelligent design in the curriculum—treating intelligent

design as science “violates the centuries-old ground rules of science by invoking and

permittingsupernaturalcausation.”175Inthiscase,severalscholars,includingatheologian,

philosopher,andabiologist,providedexpert testimony, leadingtothe judge’sconclusion

that:

[S]incethescientificrevolutionofthe16thand17thcenturies,sciencehasbeenlimitedtothesearchfornaturalcauses toexplainnaturalphenomena[…]sciencehasbeenadiscipline inwhichtestability,ratherthananyecclesiasticalauthorityorphilosophicalcoherence,hasbeenthemeasureofascientificidea’sworth […] Indeliberately omitting theological or ‘ultimate’ explanations for the existenceorcharacteristicsofthenaturalworld,sciencedoesnotconsiderissuesof‘meaning’and‘purpose’[…]supernaturalexplanations[…]arenotpartofscience.176

Again,herewesee that itwasnotanaturalaffinitybetweenscienceandnaturalism,nor

happenstance,butacontrastwithreligiousunderstandingsthatborethescience-naturalism

association.Asstatedpreviously,innaturalphilosophy,thenaturalobservationswerenot

thoughttonegatesupernaturalismandonthecontrarytheywerethoughttoaffirmGod’s

design.‘Naturalismversussupernaturalism’wasnotevenadichotomyatthistime,further

demonstratingthatthisisindeedaconstructandbynomeansconceptuallyobvious.

Another major theme in the negative correlation of religion and science is the

dichotomyofmaterialism(oftenconflatedwithnaturalismandphysicalism)andreligion,

discussedinmoredetailinthefollowingchapter.Here,howeveritisworthnotingthatas

materialismbegantotakehold inEurope intheeighteenthcentury, it tookthe formofa

174Turner(1978),365andpassim.175Crisp,Porter,&TenElshof(2014),28.176Jones(2005).Emphasisadded.

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combination of ancient materialist philosophies, anti-religious polemics, and scientific

rhetoric,oftenutilizinglessthanrigorousscientifichypothesisandconjecture.Materialism

becamethecredoofscientificphilosophy,asTyndallclaimed,“thephysicalphilosopher,as

such,mustbeapurematerialist.”177Itwasdevelopednotviascientificaccuracy,butasaway

toformulateanewphilosophyoflifethatleftbehindreligiousconsiderations,byforinstance

recastingthehumanbeingnotasacreatureofGodwithanimmortalsoul,butasacreature

ofnature,demarcatedfromtherestoftheanimalsbythefacultyofreason.Materialists—in

Franceinparticular—evenframedthemselvesastheinitiatorsofreligion’sdemise,framing

thebattleasoneinwhichscientificprogresswaspittedagainstreligion.Materialismwas

formulatedasanalternativetoareligiousworldviewanditcontinuestofulfillthatroleto

thepresentday.178

Scientificrationalitycoupledwithnaturalism,materialism,andphysicalismledtoan

understandingofscientificexplanationastheonlymeansofinterpretingtheworld,sinceall

elsewas constructed in termsof religion and superstition.This is part of the reason the

scientificworldview is typically reductionist. Though there ismore to it, ofwhich Iwill

discussextensively in thenextchapter,reductionismwasalsoaproductof therelational

etymologyoftheterm‘science’contrastedwith‘religion.’Theetymologyofthewordscience

isderivedfromtheLatinscire,toknow,whichhasbeenlinkedtotheLatinscindere‘tosplit’

and the Sanskrit chyati, ‘to cut off.’ Though there is disagreement among scholars, the

etymologyoftheword‘religion’isoftentracedtotheLatinverbreligare,‘tobindtogether.’

So,intheetymologyofthesetwowords,religionandscience,wehavesomeindicationofconflictbutalso a necessary relationship. Science is to split apart; religion is to bind the parts together. Theconceptsofreductionismandholismareembeddedintheveryetymologyofthetwowords.179

Evenregardingthenarrativeontheetymologyoftheindividualterms,weagainseereligion-

science mutual exclusivity. Others have suggested that ‘religion’ is rooted in the Latin

relegere, meaning “painstaking observance of rites.”180 If that is correct, then the other

177QuotedinEllegård(1958),111.178 Byrne (1996), 171.My remarks here paint somewhat of a generalized picture.Not allmaterialists sawconflictwithreligion. Inthischapter, though,Iamonlyconcernedwithaparticularrelationalconstruct.Asstated previously, all the histories of the various constructs should be read in light of one another,whichdemonstratescontendingvisionsofreligion-sciencerelations.179Grassie(2010),166.Emphasisoriginal.OntheLatinrootsoftheterm‘religion,’seealsoSmith(1978),19–23;andSimpson(2016e).180Simpson(2016e).

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etymologymaysimplyhavebeenaproductofthetacitknowledgeonreligion-sciencemutual

exclusivitythatdoesnotcorrespondwiththelinguistichistory.Whicheveriscorrect,this

formernarrativeon the etymology is still adiscursivematerializationof religion-science

relationalization.Andinthisdiscourse,sciencebecomesassociatedwithreduction,which

leads to the notion that it constitutes a complete explanation, something that strongly

structuresthefutureevolutionofthetermsinquestionaswillbediscussedinthefollowing

chapter.

9.3 OtherSignifiersofScienceas‘NotReligion’The many signifiers discussed that play a role in constructing religion and science as

mutuallyexclusiveareonlythetipoftheiceberg.Countlessotherexamplescouldbedrawn

upon,ofwhichthereisnotsufficientspacetoexplorehereincludingethical,normativevs.

empirical, descriptive; ideological, dogmatic, indoctrinating vs. free-thinking, humility;

conversion,faithandbelief-basedvs.investigativeandfact-based;regardingultimatenature

and limitlessness (e.g., omnipotence, omniscience, omnibenevolence, omnipresence) vs.

uncertainty, limited nature, skepticism; salvific role vs. practical, technological role; and

worship,idolizationvs.criticalthinking.Inthecourseofthischapter,manyofthesesignifiers

havealreadybeendiscussedinpassing.Allofthesearealsodiscussedinsomeregardinthe

following chapters. While this list is meant to be comprehensive, I do not claim it is

exhaustive.

10 ReflectionsonMutualExclusivity

Uponpresentationofmyresearchontheformulationofscienceas‘notreligion’toagroup

ofcolleagues,oneimmediateresponsewas“Isn’tthisobvious?”Thatthisquestioniseven

askedconfirmsmypointthatthemutualexclusivityofreligionandsciencehasdeveloped

into tacit knowledge. The reason it seems obvious is because mutual exclusivity is the

dominantrelationalconstruct,influencingalternativewaysthereligion-sciencerelationhas

been conceptualized, which is also why I have chosen this as my first case study. This

additionallyservesasalaunchingpointformyinvestigationofrelationalconstructsbecause,

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beingtacitknowledge,it isnotfullyunderstoodoreveneasilyidentifiableinmanycases.

Andseeingthecontingenciesofthisrelationalconstructcanhelpusunderstandthatthere

areotherways religionand sciencehavebeen constructed that are equally relevant and

operative.

Of course, it comes as no surprise that religion and science have a history of

conceptualdistinctionnorisitgroundbreakingtonotethatreligionandsciencehavebeen

formulatedasdichotomies,butthatisnotthe‘bigpicture’ofthischapter.Themainquestion

hasnotbeenwhetherthereligion-sciencedichotomyhasbeenconstructed.Thepointhere,

and formy research project in general, is about theprocesses and structuresof howwe

construct ‘religion’ and ‘science.’ I have attempted to show that these processes and

structuresarerelationalinnatureand,morespecifictothischapter,constructedbyputting

religionandscienceincontrastthatledtotheirconceptualizationasoppositesandledtothe

formationofspecificsignifiersanddefinitionsforreligionandscience,whicharealsoboth

products and producers of this opposition.What these termsmean today is a product of

relating them to oneanother.Why is ‘science’ opposed to ‘religion’?Because the concept

evolved (historically and discursively) in contrast to religion.What are the etymological

rootsof‘science’asregardingthenatural?Contrastwithreligion.Whataretheetymological

rootsof‘religion’asregardingthesupernatural?Contrastwithscience.Howhavediscourses

oftheterm‘religion’evolvedrelativetodiscoursesoftheterm‘science’?Inthiscasestudy,

via contrast and mutual exclusion. It is the relational construct of mutual exclusivity, a

qualifying aspect, that gave expression to these concepts by putting the two in relative

perspective. This is what itmeans to be a relational construct, to gain, lose, and change

meanings in the act of comparison and contrast. Though it is ‘obvious’ that religion and

science are oftentimes regarded as opposites, the contribution here is how this became

obvious.Thisbecameobviousbecause inthedevelopmentof theterm‘science,’ themost

dominantideasof ‘science’restonitsnegationof ‘religion.’Andit isthis latterpointthat

makesupthecentralargumentofthischapter.

WhenIsaythatreligionandsciencearemutuallyexclusive,thiscanbetakenintwo

senses—intermsoftheconflictthesisandofthatoftherelationalthesis.Theconflictthesis

suggests that religion and science conflict in particular historical circumstances, over

particular conceptual issues, that the twomake opposing, irreconcilable claims, etc. The

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conflictthesishasbeendiscussedextensivelyintheliterature.Iamnotoblivioustothisand

Iamnottryingtolayclaimtoalreadyestablishedviews.Inmyview,thisworkstillmisses

the central point, which is the relational sense of saying that religion and science are

mutually exclusive. The conflict thesis takes presumed understandings of religion and

sciencetobethedeparturepointforidentifyingconflict.Therelationalviewsuggeststhat

bytheveryprocessoftheconceptualizationofreligionandsciencetheyareconstructedas

dichotomous. Put differently, the objects of study are shapedby the relational processes

employedindefiningandanalyzingthem.Intheconflictthesis,conceptsgiverisetoacertain

relationship. In the relational thesis, relationalization gives rise to certain

conceptualizations, so the causal direction of the argument is reversed. The individual

definitions on their own are not determinative of the relationship, but rather it is the

relationaldefinitionorconstruct thatdetermines the individualdefinitions.Relationsare

primaryandrelataarederivative.Theideathatreligionandsciencearedichotomousinthe

conflictthesisisredundant,fromarelationalview,becausedichotomywashistoricallybuilt

intotheconceptsthemselves.Theconflictthesisisacircularargument,sincetheconclusion

necessarilyfollowsfromtheoriginalrelationalcontentofthedefinitionsandassumptions.

Historiansandotheracademicsinthefieldofreligionandsciencehavegonethrough

greatpainstocontextualizetheconflictthesis,offercounterexamples,andtacklewiththe

notion on various planes of philosophical, theological, and psychological grounds (many

exampleswillbeprovidedinthefollowingchapters).Whenscholarstakenoteoftheconflict

myth,thepoint isthatothershavereadintothepastmoreconflictthanwaspresentand

therebyconstructit,thusreflectingsomeobservationshereaswell.Thisisimportant,but

notcentraltomyargumenthere.WhenIstatethatreligionandscienceareconstructedas

mutuallyexclusive,Idonotmeanthisinthebanal,inanesensethatthetwoconceptsare

simply oppositional, rather I am suggesting something subtler—that the definition,

demarcation, and conceptualization of science has been accomplished in a process of

opposingittoreligionandviceversa.ThisisnottheconflictthesisbecausewhatIhavedone

isexamine thehistoricalandstructuralprocesses thatmade the ideaofconflictbetween

religionandscienceevenpossible.Assuch,thedataonreligion-scienceconflictissymbolic

in that it representschanges in the ideasorconceptsofpeople.Mycontribution ismuch

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moreetymologicalinasense,sinceIamsuggestingthattheterm‘science’actuallyevolved

viaitscontrastwith‘religion.’

Furthermore,whenscholarsspeakofthereligion-sciencedichotomy,theyaresaying

that the dichotomy was constructed in the specific context of religion and science. But

scienceunderstoodinthisfashionisnotallrestricted.Iammakingtheclaimthatreligion-

sciencemutualexclusivityhasbeenoneoftheprimarysourcesforhowtheindividualterms

areunderstoodoutsideofthereligion-sciencecontextandinmostcontexts.Thisiswhatit

meanstobetheproductofarelationalconstruct—aconceptisborninaspecificallyrelative

constellationofmeaning,suchthatitenduresbeyondthespecificcontext.Scienceasnatural,

empirical,rational,objective,andintermsofmanyothercommondefinitionscanbetraced

to itscontrastwithreligion.Moreover, science is implicitly treatedasrelating toreligion

even when there is no explicit connection. Today, religion remains one of the main

contrastingcategoriesintheconceptualizationofscience.181Itisdifficulttopickupabook

inpopularscience,historyofscience,oramediaarticleonscienceandnotfindmentionof

religion—the exception being some natural science journals and books. The scientific

worldview and the religiousworldview continue tomutually define each other in court

cases,education,andacademicfieldsofstudy,suchasbioethicsandcognitivescience.182So

much of how we understand science and how we understand religion continue to be

interrelated.

Iwould liketoprovideawordofcautionbeforeconcludingthischapter:wemust

remember thatmutual exclusivitywasnot theonly relational construct in thediscourse.

However,thereligion-sciencedichotomyhasbeenoneof,ifnotthemost,influentialwaysof

relationalizingtheseconceptsandofconstructingthedefinitionsofthesetermsoutsideof

the religion-science context. It is the dominant relationalmode as a direct result of the

construction of discourses of ‘religion’ relative to those of ‘science’ that has limited our

perceptionofalternatives,evenonthesideofhistorians.Andyet,religion-sciencemutual

exclusivityisjustonethreadofamuchgreaterconceptualtapestry.Thereweremanyother

importantmovementsthathappencontemporaneouslytothedevelopmentofthemutual

181Harris(2005),x.182 Regarding bioethics, see Evans (2002), esp. 72–98.On the development of cognitive science relative toreligion,seethefollowingchapter.

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exclusivityconstructthatcontributedtoconstructionofvariousrelations.Mutualexclusivity

isaratherlimitedviewofbothhistoryandtheuseofanalyticalconcepts,whichhasledto

the exclusion of much of the data on the religion-science relation and an impoverished

perspective. This relational construct cannot account for when ‘religion’ is identified as

‘rational’ and ‘God’ is placed in the realm of ‘nature’; when ‘science’ is associated with

‘metaphysical,’ even ‘supernatural’ claims, and ‘empiricism’ is problematized by

‘subjectivity.’Whathappenswhenwhatweknowas‘science’andwhatweknowas‘religion’

cannot coherently be described inmutually exclusive terms? Thoughmutual exclusivity

cannot endure under such circumstances, it continues to structure the evolution of

discoursesofreligionandscience.This, inturn, is indicativeoftherelationalstructureof

discursivechange,whichwillbecomeincreasinglyapparentwhenweseeinthefollowing

chaptershowmutualexclusivityhasguidedthesubsequentdevelopmentof theconcepts

‘religion’and‘science.’

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Chapter4:TheScientificationofReligion&theCaseoftheScienceofReligion

[O]urperceptionoftheworld,thewaywemove,interact,speak,andfeelmightalljustbeagiant,incrediblycomplexscienceexperimentinsideourheads.—DevenDayal1

1 Religionasa‘ScientificObject’Theabovequotewastheresponseofonetestsubjectofthe‘KorenHelmet,’morepopularly

known as the ‘GodHelmet.’2 The head researcher, neuroscientistMichael Persinger, has

claimed that ‘genuine religious experiences’ can be artificially inducedwith the device.3

Persinger’s GodHelmet—the earliestmodel looking something like amotorcycle helmet

withwireson theoutsideandelectrodeswithin—is said to inducea ‘visitorexperience,’

variouslyinterpretedasclosenesswithGodorinthepresenceofangels,saints,ancestors,

aliens, ghosts, and other paranormal agents. (One subject claimed the testing chamber

shouldbeexorcisedbecausetheDevilwasinthere,whileothershaveclaimedthepresence

of demons.)4TheGodHelmet stimulates thebrain via transcranialmagnetic stimulation,

creatinganenvironmentinwhichthelefthemisphereinterpretstherighthemisphereasa

separateentity.5Interpretationsvarywidely,buttheresearchismostcommonlyunderstood

asof“colossal importance” inestablishinga ‘clear link’betweenreligiousexperienceand

precisebrainactivity.6Thislinkisofteninterpretedaswhollyaccountingforreligionwithin

1Dayal(2013).2OtherdescriptionsofuseoftheGodHelmetandrelatedtechnologiescanbefoundatSt.Pierre&Persinger(2006),1095;andMurphy(n.d.).3See,e.g.,Persingeretal(2010).SeealsoMurphy(2012);andMurphy(n.d.).4Cotton(1995);andRatcliffe(2006),82–83,thelatterofwhichofferssixdifferentwaysofdescribingthe‘Godexperience.’Forothercommonthemesinsubjectreports,seeMurphy(2012);St.Pierre&Persinger(2006);Granqvist (2006), 134; Schojoedt (2009), 321;Khamsi (2004); Begley (2010);Hitt (1999); andBlackmore(1991).SeealsoWebofStories(n.d.)forBlackmore’sreactiontotheGodHelmet.Forsimilarresearch,seealso,Ramachandran&Blakeslee(1998).5Alston(2007),3;andSchojoedt(2009),321.Transcranialmagneticstimulationhasalsobeenusedtoelicitexperiences of unity, compared to those feelings achieved in meditation. See Yaden et al (forthcoming),discussedinYaden(2014).6Foster(2010),56;TheScienceChannel[Discovery](2010);andBBC(2003a).WhilePersinger’stheoreticalassumptions have been questioned and his results have been unable to be wholly replicated, his work is

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scientificframeworksofmeaning.TheGodHelmetresearchhasbeendescribedas“aperfect

scienceversusreligionstory;itwasthoughttodeeplychallengereligiouspeople[…].”7

This is because when religion is constructed as a scientific object, the questions

consistentlyariseofwhetherreligiousbeliefisincorrectandwhetherreligiousexperience

is‘real.’Thescientificdiscoveryoftheneuralcorrelatesofreligiousexperienceleadmanyto

conclude religion is false, merely a “hallucination,” or that religious experience is a

‘misactivation’or‘malfunction’ofcognitivesystems.8Whatcuriousconceptionof‘religion’

allowedforittobereifiedasascientificobjectwhileatthesametimenegatingitsrealityand

veridicality?Inthischapter,Iwillexaminehowreligionhasbeenconstructedasascientific

objectinareductiveway,arelationalconstructIrefertoasthe‘scientificationofreligion.’

Thescientificationofreligionisasubcategoryoftheidentityconstruct.Whereastheidentity

constructsuggestsreductiongenerally,religionreducedtoscienceandsciencereducedto

religionresultinverydifferentperspectives.TheformerIwilladdresshere,withthelatter

constitutingthefollowingchapter.

With the concepts ‘religion’ and ‘science’ clearly differentiated following the

development of the mutual exclusivity construct, as discussed in the previous chapter,

comparisonbecamepossible—comparisonrequirestwodistinctthingstobecomparedafter

all.Ifmyhypothesisthatrelationalconstructsstructurediscursivechangeiscorrect,then

wewouldexpectthatintheprocessofconstructingreligionasscience,tomake‘science-like’

willreflectwhat‘science’meansinthecontextofmutualexclusivity.Andthatisexactlywhat

wesee.Religion-sciencemutualexclusivityandthelikeningofreligionandscienceemploy

theexactsamesignifiersintheirdichotomousformation,whichIwillfurtherexplorehere.

These signifiers of religion as per mutual exclusivity are often the supernatural,

transcendent, immaterial, etc., as opposed to the natural, localizable, and material, for

historicallysignificantinthatherepresentswiderintellectualtrendsintheconstructionofreligionasscience.SeeAaen-Stockdale(2012).ForadetailedandmultifacetedexaminationofPersinger’sresearch,includingbutnotlimitedtotheGodHelmet,seeRunehov(2007),67–136.SeeGranqvistetal(2005),1–6,whichfoundthatsubjectshadhighscoresonasuggestibilityscale,indicatingthatmysticalexperiencemayhavebeenaproductofsuggestion.However,Persingerhasresponded,saying“Theydidn’treplicateit,notevenclose.”QuotedinKhamsi (2004). See also Persinger & Koren (2005); and Larsson et al (2005). In response to the role ofsuggestibility,seeSt.Pierre&Persinger(2006);andMurphy&Persinger(2011).Amorerecentindependentreplicationofthestudysuggeststheeffectsareperhapsnotduetosuggestibility.SeeTinoco&Ortiz(2014).7Beauregard&O’Leary(2007),86.8BBC(2003a);Paloutzian,Swenson,&McNamara(2006),162;Pigliucci(2002);andCheyne(2001).

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example(dependingoncontext)thatareregardedassignifiersofscience.Howtomakethe

twoalikeisbasedonhowtheyhavebeendifferentiatedinrelativeperspective.

Furthermore, if my hypothesis is correct, not only will the signifiers of mutual

exclusivity set the terms of engagement for religion-science likening, but also this pre-

existingrelationalconstructwillstructurehowthese likeningswillbe interpreted,giving

rise to a new relational construct. Departing from the notion that science has been

historicallyconceptualizedas ‘notreligion,’ thentoconceptualizereligionasscience is to

deconstructpreviousnotionsofwhatismeantby‘religion’andreconstructitintonotionsof

what‘science’is.Thismeansthatconstructingreligionassciencevialikeningtonaturalism,

forinstance,isthoughttoprecludesupernaturalism,asthesignifier‘naturalism’isapplied

asperthedichotomousdemandsofmutualexclusivity.Atamoregenerallevel,constructing

religionasscienceisthoughttoexcludereligionintermsofitspre-existingsignifiers,since

scienceisalreadyunderstoodtobetheveryantonymofreligion.Withthisexclusion,science

isleftasthesoleframeworkofmeaningandthereductionismofidentityensues.9

Demonstrating thatmutual exclusivity set the terms for engagement in the above

waysillustrateshowrelationalconstructsstructurediscursivechange,whichisthecentral

claim of this overall work. My hypothesis here and now is that the mutual exclusivity

constructstructuredthelikeningofreligiontosignifiersofsciencetoproducetheidentity

construct.Formycasestudy, I examine thehistoryof religionconstructedasa scientific

objectofinquiry.10Thischapterexaminestheprogressionofthescientificstudyofreligion

across many fields converging in contemporary cognitive science of religion.11 The

9WhileItypicallyuse‘reductionism’torefertothereplacementoftheconceptof‘religion’byasoleframeworkofmeaningsubsumedunderscience,Ialsouse‘reductionism’intermsofscientificreductionism,whichcanrefer to at least twodifferentpositions.One ismethodological reductionism,which is to examine complexprocessesintermsofitsparts.Thesecondpositioniscausalorexplanatoryreductionism,whichisthepositionthatthemind,behavior,andexperiencesarecausedbythemostfundamentalbuildingblocksofphysicsandchemistry,whichconstitutesacompleteexplanation.Bothpositionsareevidentinthescientificationofreligionandinsciencemoregenerally—althoughrecentlycausalreductionismhasbeenmorerigorouslychallenged,particularlybyrelativelynewdiscoveriessuchasneuroplasticityandtheroleofagencyinitseffectiveness.Brown(2003),616.Myuseof‘reductionism’shouldbeclearinthecontext.10Thoughthefocusisquitedifferent,seealsoHarrison(1990)forahistoryofthescienceofreligionaspertainstotheconceptualdevelopmentoftheterm‘religion.’11 The cognitive sciences are usually said to include neuroscience, psychology, and philosophy of mind—sometimes artificial intelligence and linguistics are included aswell. Here I amprimarily interested in thecognitivescienceofreligion,butasthisishistoricallyconnectedtotheotherfieldsmentionedabove,Iwillalsorefer to various pertinent developments in broader field of the natural science of religion. On an insider’s

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proposition that ‘naturalism’ can account for religion provides the bridging concept that

unitesthisstory.Accordingtothispointofview,religionistheproductofphysical/material

make-up, localized in particular brain structures and functions, and explained inwholly

naturalistictermsofevolutionarybiology,psychology,andphysiologythoughttoconstitute

a complete explanation. Naturalism is entangled and often conflated with physicalism,

materialism,andlocalizationism.12Thesesignifiersallowedtheconceptualtransitionfrom

largelyconceivingof‘religion’inoppositionto‘science’totheconstructionof‘religion’asa

‘legitimate’objectofscientificstudy.

Ialreadyshowedthatnaturalismisasignifierofsciencethatemergedasaproductof

mutual exclusivity, so to confirm my hypothesis that mutual exclusivity structured the

relevant discursive changes, I now need to show that likening religion to science via

naturalism led to the reduction of religion to science, specifically by the exclusion of

signifiers of religion. By ‘naturalism’ I mean the concept in its particular relational

constructionassignifyingnotonly‘science,’butalso‘notsupernaturalism’and‘notreligion.’

Naturalism is treated as such due to the mutual exclusivity construct and its related

discourse,which creates a constellation ofmeaning,whereby the signifiers also become

mutuallyimplicative.Becauseboth‘naturalism’and‘notreligion’signify‘science,’theyalso

cometosignifyoneanotherinmanycontexts.Assuch,whenreligionisnaturalizedsoasto

constructitasscience,italsotakesonthisconstellationofmeaningas‘notreligion,’resulting

intheabove-mentionedambiguitiesabouttherealityandveridicalityofreligion.Theend

resultisthatreligionwillbecomedisassociatedwithitsprevioussignifiers,sincesignifiers

ofreligionarealreadythoughttobeexclusivewithsignifiersofscience.

I will discuss how religious knowledge, the history of religion, the objective and

subjectiveenterprisesofreligion,andreligiousexperiencehavebeenconstructedasscience

via likening to naturalism to the exclusion of supernaturalism and pre-existing

perspectiveofthedevelopmentofcognitivescience,includingadiscussionofthevariousfieldsinvolved,seeMiller(2003).12Thediscoursesonnaturalism,materialism,physicalism,andlocalizationismarenotonlycloselyrelated,theyhavealsobeenhugelyinfluentialineverybranchofscience,multiplephilosophies,andmanyreligioussystems,aswellasinthecontextofsocietyatlarge.Thus,whileIoffersomeintroductoryinformationonwhatthesetermsmeanandhowtheyoriginatediscursivelyspeaking,Ilargelylimitthediscussiontotheirrelevancetotheconstructionofreligionasareductivelyscientificobject.‘Localizationism’isalsosometimesreferredtoas‘localizationalism’inthediscourse.

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understandings of ‘religion’ as per mutual exclusivity, with the end result of reduction.

(ThoughIhavedividedupthischapteraccordingtotheseabove-mentionedelements,they

are all intimately interconnected.) In demonstrating the connection between mutual

exclusivityandtheidentityconstruct,eachsectionon‘religionas“natural”’canbereadin

termsof three subpoints: (1) religionasnaturalmakes it science-like; (2) thenatural is

thoughttoexcludethesupernatural/religion;(3)signifyingthenaturaltotheexclusionof

supernatural/religionleadstothereductionofreligiontoscience.Thesepointscollectively

showthatthediscursivechangetotheidentityconstructisstructuredbymutualexclusivity.

I will then turn to how this negation of pre-existing notions of religion resulted in new

signifiersforthenewconceptof‘religion’asa‘scientificobject.’Iwillalsodiscusshowthis

ledtothesignifierof‘reduction’for‘science.’

2 KnowledgeofReligionas‘Natural’

InthissectionIwillshowthatlikeningknowledgeofreligiontothenatural,conflatedwith

thematerial,ledtothescientificationofreligion.Oneconsiderationinthiscomplextaskis

howthenaturalscienceofreligionisdiscursivelyrelatedtotheacademicstudyofreligion.

Partofthereasonforthis linkisthatthehistorical,cultural,andsocialscientificstudyof

religion has been and is frequently incorporated into the natural science of religion.

Moreover,boththeacademicstudyofreligionandthenaturalscienceofreligioncameto

treatreligionintermsofnaturalknowledge.Indeed,thediscursiveconstructionsof‘religion’

underthesetwodomainsarehistoricallyentangled.

While religiousexperienceandGodare todaygenerallyunderstood tooccupy the

domainofthesupernatural(ifonlyconceptually),religionhasbeen‘broughtdowntoearth’

since antiquity, positioning it in a natural setting. One way this has been commonly

accomplishedis throughthephilosophyofmaterialism.13Viamaterialism,the immaterial

13PhysicalismandmaterialismaresometimesusedinterchangeablyandIrefertobothheresincetheyarenotonlyconceptuallyverysimilar,butcloselyentangledinthediscourseaswell.However,physicalismholdsthatultimatelyeverythingiscomposedofthefundamentalentitiesofphysics,whichincludesthingslikefields,forexample,whilematerialismisanarrowerviewthateverythingismadeofmatterandthatrealityissufficientlyexplainedbythenatureofmatter.Asadoctrineofthecognitivesciences, it is thepositionthatthemindis

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aspectsofhumanity—likethesoul,emotions,andreligiousexperiences—areplacedinthe

realmofthebrainandthepsyche.Formsofmaterialismhavebeenaroundatleastsincethe

emergenceofGreekphilosophyinthesixthcenturyBCE.Fromthistimeonthroughhistory

tothepresentday,materialismhasbeenthoughtof intermsof itschallengestoreligion,

resulting both in its reinterpretation, as well as the categorical rejection of religion,

particularlyfollowingthedevelopmentofreligion-sciencemutualexclusivity.14

Despitematerialism’searlydevelopments,itwasnotuntiltheseventeenthcentury

that this ancient thought saw a revival largely attributed to the empiricist and Roman

CatholicpriestPierreGassendi(1592–1655),whoextendedmaterialismacross(whatwould

todaybethoughtofasthefieldsof)physicsandpsychology,whileotherssoughttoapplyit

to the moral and philosophical realms, creating the foundation for many European

materialistsoftheeighteenthcentury.15Thereachofmaterialismcontinuedtospread.With

thepublicationofDavidHume’s(1711–1776)NaturalHistoryofReligion(1757),weseethe

beginningsofa“paradigm-shiftfromareligioustoanaturalisticframeworkforthestudyof

religion”thatfiredupinthenineteenthcenturytothespecificexclusionofsupernaturalor

transcendentcausesororiginsofreligion.16Thisworkwas,inmanyways,“thefoundation

of themodernscientificstudyof religion.”Notonlydid thisbookposition theoriginand

growth of religion in natural phenomena, it was also interpreted from the outset as in

oppositionto“theinterestsofthepopularreligion”andas“establishingAtheism,”despite

Hume’sprotestsagainstsuchviews.IntheintroductiontoHume’swork,JohnM.Robertson

(1856–1933)describedthethrustofthebooktobecenteredaroundtheobservations:

reducibletoafixedbrain,thatmentalprocessesarenothingmorethanneuralprocesses,and,moregenerally,that all of what constitutes the human—including personality, behavior, attitudes, and emotions—can beexplainedbyneural happenings. In somediscussions in philosophyofmind, this position is referred to asidentitytheory,suggestingmentalstatesandpropertiesareneurologicalstatesandproperties.Thenotionthatmental processes can be explained away by biological processes is sometimes further specified as‘physiologicalmaterialism.’ This is how the termwill be used in this study.While there are forms ofnon-reductivephysicalism,when the term ‘physicalism’ isused in thediscourse, this strong formofontologicalphysicalismasIhavedefineditisusuallyassumed.SeealsoBielfeldt(2003a);Jammer(2003),538;andStoljar(2015).Physicalismcanalsorefertoseveralotherpositions—seeBielfeldt(2003a)—ascanmaterialism—seeJammer(2003).14Gregory(2000),177.Foranearlyhistoryofnotionsofthesoulinthebody,seeZimmer(2004),9–23.15Jammer(2003);andBen-David(1971),182.16Preus(1987),xv,84–103,and207.SeealsoSegal(1994).

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Thatdeitiesarethemerepersonificationsofunknowncauses;[…]thatreligioushistoryisaprocessoffluxandrefluxbetweentherefinedandthecrudeconceptions,ignorancenowdegradingadoctrine,andreasonagainrevoltingfromthefolliesofignoranceandseekingtopurifyitsideas.17

Robertsoncharacterizedthepublicationintermsoftheprogressofnaturalismequatedto

religious decline, as well as naturalistic explanation negating religious meaning. For

Robertson andmanyothers, as knowledgeof religionwasnaturalized, itwas thought to

excludeallotherwaysofknowing.

Whiletheacademicstudyofreligionpredatesthenineteenthcentury,itwasnotuntil

thistimeperiodthatthenaturalstudyofreligionbegantobetreatedasacoherentfieldof

research.18 In the mid-1800s, the academic study of religion had unprecedented

developments.19 Religion at large came to be objectified and externalized—placed in the

realmofsocietyandculture,whichwasregularlypairedwiththereductionofreligionto

naturalaccounts.LudwigFeuerbach(1804–1872)positionedreligion in thematerialand

social realm in his work Essence of Christianity (1841), arguing that God is a human

projection of wishful thinking. Karl Marx (1818–1883), departing from Feuerbach’s

observations, claimed religion needed to be regarded as purely social and political. The

publicationofCharlesDarwin’s(1809–1882)OntheOriginofSpecies(1859)reinforcedthe

philosophical notion of a material world and its mechanical processes—as well as a

naturalistic account—as paramount and the philosophy of materialism became deeply

entrenchedinthescientificworldview.Althoughmanydidnotagreewithmaterialism,of

course,itwasfromthispivotalpointthatthediscourseofmaterialismcouldnotbeignored

indiscussionsaboutthenatureofrealityandofscientificknowledge.Scientificknowledge

andexplanationshouldbeconfined,itwasargued,tothematerialworld,theworldofthe

senses—and this confinement should apply to explanations for religion according to an

increasingnumberofacademics.However,sincescientificknowledgewasalsoconstructed

17Hume(1889),v,vii,andxxii–xiii.18Wheeler-Barclay(2010),1–2.Inthissense,thehistoryofthescienceofreligionhasbeentreatedalreadyinmanypublications.See,e.g.,Sharpe(1997).Foranoverviewofthecognitiveapproachestoreligion,seeGeertz(2004), 355–363.However, examining the history of the science of religion in terms of social and culturalcontextsismorelimited.Forthisapproach,seeKrech(2000),e.g.,whichcontainsafewotherreferencestosimilarapproaches.Foranextensiveoverviewof thehistoryof thestudyofreligion,seeStausberg(2007);Stausberg(2008);andStausberg(2009).Toclarify,the‘academicstudyofreligion’doesnotmeantheacademicfieldofreligiousstudies,butratherreferstoamoregeneralizedpracticeofreflectingonreligioninscholarship.19Whenthisfieldactuallyemergediswidelydebated,spanningjustabouteverymajoreraofhumanhistory.SeeStausberg(2007),298.

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astheonlylegitimateknowledge,aswesawinthelastchapter,thismeant,formany,that

there was nothing beyond the natural world. Materialist theories of mind, increasingly

divorced from the soul, grew in the twentieth century and scientific naturalism was

systematically defended as a comprehensive philosophy and became the dominant

worldviewoftheacademy.20

Withknowledgeofreligionpositionedinthenaturalworld,andnaturalknowledge

assignedtotheexclusivedomainofscience,andwithscienceassociatedwithatrue,certain,

andcompleteexplanation,religioncametobethoughtofasreducibletoscientificaccounts.

If, as I argue, tomake religion science-like is to construct it in opposition to established

understandingsofreligion,wewouldexpectthatthesechangeswillalsoexhibitarejection

ofpopularnotionsofreligion.Infact,thenotionofreligionasamaterialobjectofacademic

studywasoftenaccompaniedbyantireligioussentiments.Feuerbachthoughtthatreligion

was a delusion and, moreover, fueled dogmatism and bigotry, while Marx famously

proclaimed religion to be the ‘opium of the people.’21 Someworks onmaterialismwere

extremely antireligious, such as Karl Vogt’s (1817–1895)Köhlerglaube undWissenschaft

(Implicit Faith and Science) (1855) and Ludwig Büchner’s (1824–1899) Kraft und Stoff

(Force and Matter) (1855).22 Vogt, even in textbooks on science, claimed that physical

observationsnecessarilynegated religion,God, the soul, anda spiritual realm.23Büchner

concluded that because matter is eternal, creation is impossible and spiritual force is

nonsense.Hecharacterizedpriestsascharlatansanddevoteesaszealots.24

Whatweseethroughoutthesedevelopmentsisthatnaturalismandmaterialismwere

thoughttoimplicatethefalsityofreligiononmanydifferentlevels.PhilosopherJohnSearle

arguedthe“unstatedassumptionbehind[…][materialist]viewsisthattheyrepresentthe

only scientifically acceptable alternatives to the antiscientism thatwentwith traditional

dualism, the belief in the immortality of the soul, spiritualism, and so on.”25 From this

perspective,materialismisthealternativetothe‘antiscientism’ofreligiousviews.26Many

20Gregory(2000),180;andDavis&Collins(2000),203.21Aldridge(2000),61–62.SeealsoNielsen(2010),523.22Jammer(2003),541.23Chadwick(1975),167–168.24Chadwick(1975),170–171.25QuotedinDavis&Collins(2000),204–205.26Onthediscursiveconnectionbetweenreligionandspirituality,seeChapterEight.

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correlated the advance of materialism with the decline of religion, that “to promote

materialism”was“attheexpenseoftraditional,spirituallyorientedideasofhumannature.”

“Objectivity came tomean, amongother things, hostility to anonmaterialist approach to

RSMEs[religious,spiritualand/ormysticalexperiences].”27Wecanseenotionsofmutual

exclusivityinplayhereassciencewasthoughttonegatereligion,evenwhenaccountingfor

it.Putdifferently,ifreligionisascientificobjectitcannotbereligiousandallthatisleftisa

scientificframeworkofmeaning.Thismutuallyexclusivecontentofnaturalismvs.religion

leftscienceasthesoleinterpretiveframeworkandreductionensued.

3 HistoryofReligionas‘Natural’

During and following the time of Marx and Darwin there was a wide social interest in

historical determinedness regarding the development and origins of different cultural

phenomena,includingreligion.Inordertoreconstructtheoriginsofreligion,agenealogical

methodrootedinscientific-historicalperspectiveswasadopted,borrowingfromDarwin’s

theoryofevolution.28However,priortotheemergenceofDarwinianevolution,religionhad

already been treated in evolutionary terms of developmental stages from ‘primitive,’

‘mythological,’or‘pagan’religionsculminatingoftentimesinChristianity,humanism,oreven

science(onthelatterofwhich,seeChapterFive).29Positioningthehistoryofreligionwithin

the objective, natural realm of culture, society, and evolution greatly contributed to the

constructionofreligionasanaturalscientificobjectofstudy.Thedevelopmentofthestudy

ofreligionintermsofevolutionarytheorywasthe“onesingleguidingprincipleofmethod

whichwasatthesametimealsoabletosatisfythedemandsofhistoryandscience.”30Infact,

historywasamong themainsourcesofnaturalizationof the ‘moral’ andhumansciences

fromtheearlyeighteenthintothemid-nineteenthcentury.31

27Beauregard&O’Leary(2007),93.28Krech(2000),245–246.SeealsoWheeler-Barclay(2010),19–21andpassim.29Gaukroger(2016),335–342.30Sharpe(1997),26.31Gaukroger(2016),119and308.

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Naturalizing the history of religion was framed as the exclusion of supernatural

origins, as well as of any inherent value to religious feelings. From an evolutionary

perspective, religion is functionally related to the fitness of individuals and communities

alongsimilarlinesofexplanatoryframeworksforothersocialinstitutions.EdwardBurnett

Tylor(1832–1917)wasamongthefirsttoapplythebiologicalevolutionaryconcepttothe

historyof religions in1871. InThePrinciples of Sociology (1874–1896),Herbert Spencer

(1820–1903)expandedonevolutionarytheoryinthesocialsphere,includingreligion,and

arguedthat“civilizedmenhavenoinnatetendencytoformreligiousideas”andthatreligions

“haveanaturalorigin”forwhichtherewere“abundantproofs.”Godsweresaidtooriginate

in apotheosis,which in turnwas said to give rise to the priestly function, alongwith its

governingrole,andthustheformationofecclesiasticalinstitutionsaswell.32

Severalotherinfluentialauthorsappliedevolutionarytheorytothedevelopmentof

religionaswell,atraditionthatcontinuestothisday.33Forexample,inthecognitivescience

of religion, we see the claim that the brain’s capacity to experience a ‘felt presence,’ as

inducedby theGodHelmet for instance, is theprototype for theGodexperienceand the

source of belief about supernatural beings, which can explain the evolutionary origins

religion.34Religionisthoughttoservespecificevolutionaryfunctions,aswhenPersinger,for

example, suggested that the God concept serves to temper existential anxiety. Persinger

described thisas, “Abiologicalcapacity […]critical for thesurvivalof thespecies.”35And

backinguptheclaimthatreligionmanagesdisposition,JeffreyKlugerfoundthatreligious

belief releases the same chemicals in the brain as Prozac and other anti-depressants.36

‘Natural’accountsofthese‘supernatural’experiencesaretypicallyarguedto‘explainaway’

religion,accordingtoadvocates.37

That religion is a product of evolution is regularly linked to arguments against

veridicality.SeveralrespondentstoPersinger’sworkconcludedwesimplyare“programmed

32AbovequotedinKrech(2000),249.Forprecedingcomments,seeibid.,246–247.33 See, e.g.,Atran (2002);Boyer (2001);Wilson (2002); andLinden (2007). For anoverviewof the roleofevolutionarytheoriesinthecognitivescienceofreligion,seeGeertz(2004),355–363.34TheScienceChannel[Discovery](2010);andSchojoedt(2009),320.35Persinger(2002b),274.SeealsoPersinger(1985);andPersinger(2002a),290.36Thornton(2011),154.37BBC(2003a).

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to believe in God.”38 Another respondent suggested that such work “has ousted the

traditionalGodofSinai.”39DevenDayal,reflectingonhisexperienceswiththeGodHelmet,

claimed,“religiousexperienceshavethepotentialtobecompletelyexplainedbyscience.[…]

Thesensationofagreaterpowerseemstoreally justbeacertainchemicalresponsetoa

certainpatternofbrainactivity.”40Similarly,biologistDavidSloanWilsonhasarguedthat

religiousbeliefisfalsesince“Manyfeaturesofreligion,suchasthenatureofsupernatural

agentsand their relationshipswithhumans, canbeexplainedasadaptationsdesigned to

enablehumangroupsto functionasadaptiveunits.”41Assuch, thenaturalaccountof the

originsofreligionisthoughttoexcludealternativeunderstandingsaboutthenatureandrole

ofreligion.

Morespecifically,naturalaccountsoftheoriginsofreligionarespecificallythought

to preclude supernaturalism. Büchner, one of the most famous scientific materialists,

proclaimed supernatural knowledge impossible and the soul nonexistent.42 Unifying the

explanationforreligionundertheauspicesofscience,materialism,andnaturalismledtothe

reductiveconstructionofreligionashavingfunctioninsteadofvalueandadaptationinstead

ofmeaning.Toappealtothefunctionofreligionasanexplanationmakesexplanationnot

simply causation, but also, in a sense, teleology. The explanation becomes the role, the

purpose, themeaning of religion and that explanation is thoroughly reductive. This is a

consequence of the dichotomous understanding of naturalism/supernaturalism and

religion/science—whenreligionislikenedtonaturalism,itexcludesanyunderstandingof

religionthatdoesnotreflectexclusivescience.

4 TheObjective&SubjectiveEnterprisesofReligionas‘Natural’

Inthenineteenthcentury,thefunctionalanalysisofreligiongrew,particularlyintermsofits

38BBC(2003b).SeealsoTheScienceChannel[Discovery](2010).39Foster(2010),57.40Dayal(2013).41Wilson(2002),51.ThoughWilsondidnotoutrightsay‘religionisfalse,’itisstronglyimpliedinthetext.Forexample,hespokeofadaptivenatureof“fictitiousbeliefs”andfollowedwithexamplesofmoralsystemsthat“departfromnarrowreasoningonthebasisoffactualevidence”andsupernaturaleventsthat“neverhappen.”Seeibid.,41–42.42Gregory(2000),179–180.

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potentialasasourceofsocialunificationinitscommonreferenceamongthecommunity.43

Thiswastoconstructasystematicpurposefulactivityfor‘religion’asawhole—itcreated

thereligiousenterprise.AccordingtoÉmileDurkheim(1858–1917),oneofthefathersof

sociology, themain function of religion is to preserve social unity.44 Preoccupationwith

religionwasofcentralconcernofclassicalsociologicaltheory.Themajorityofthefounders

of the fieldof sociologywerenotonlyatheists,but largelyconcernedwith thedeclineof

religionanditsreplacementbyothersocialinstitutionsandsystemsofthought,including

science.This legacyof classical theorizing strongly influencedcontemporary sociologyof

religion, laying the foundation for secularization theses,whichoftenpair theprogressof

science with the decline of religion.45 Furthermore, the natural geneses of humankind

presented in early sociologywere in the specific context of ‘revealing’ the lack of divine

origins.46

Socialandevolutionarytheoriesintersected,asreligionwasseenasnecessarydueto

itsevolutionaryfunctioninhumansocietyinachievingunificationviaultimatevaluesand

commongoals.Inorderforreligiontoworkforunificationhowever,religionwasstripped

of thedistinctivenessofseparatetraditionsthat inevitablygivesrisetodifferingdogmas.

Thisessentializationoftheterm‘religion’wasinsomewaysnecessaryinordertounitethe

disparatetraditionsunderoneconceptthatallowedforempirical investigation,makinga

science of religion possible.47 One frequent way the religions were united during the

nineteenth centurywas by identifying religionwithmorality and ethics.48Durkheim, for

instance—thoughheregardedreligiousclaimsas false—arguedreligion is fundamentally

basedinmorality,leadingtotheequationofreligionandsociety.Therealityofreligionis

onlywithinsocietyand in itspsychological functions,makingGodnothingmorethanthe

“symbolicexpressionofcollectivity.”49And,withreligionplacedinsociety,it“isnecessarily

naturalistic.”50

43Onthefunctionalanalysisofreligion,seeKrech(2000).SeealsoMerton(1957),19–84.44Lewy(2005);Nielsen(2010),523;andAldridge(2000),65.45Aldridge(2000),56.Ontheconnectionbetweentheriseofsociologyandthe(atleast,perceived)declineofreligion,alongwiththeriseofthestudyofreligion,seeibid.,56–88.SeealsoEvans&Evans(2008),89.46Turner(1974),31–32.47Harrison(1990),1–2.48Krech(2000),251–252.49AstranslatedbyKrech(2000),254.SeealsoDurkheim(1965),257;andAldridge(2000),62–66.50Nielsen(2010),523.Emphasisoriginal.

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However,nowwithmoralityandethicsseparatedoutasindependentfromspecific

religious traditions, there was an increased distinction between ‘objective religion’ and

‘subjectivereligiosity’tomarkthisdifferencebetweenvaryinginstitutionalizeddogmasand

an inner essence. For example, Feuerbach equated theology to psychology, as did Søren

Kierkegaard(1813–1855).51InthecaseofKierkegaard,“Thewholesignificanceisdisplaced

fromtheobjective(dogmatic)poletothesubjective(psychological)pole.”52Inacademiaand

various social movements—including agnostic humanitarianism and behaviorist social

engineering—‘objectivereligions’intermsofsocialinstitutionswerenolongerregardedas

asuitablebasisforsocialunityandreligionincreasinglygainedsignificanceatthelevelof

thesubjectiveindividual.

Duringthesedevelopments,largelyinthenineteenthcentury:

Contentsandinstitutionsoftraditionalreligionbecamemoreandmoreobsolete.Atthesametimethebourgeoisieremainedreligious,foritalwayscriticizedreligiononlyinaspectsofcertaindoctrinesanddogmaticsystems,butneverthereligiousconvictionassuch.53

In linewithsuchthinking,GeorgWilhelmFriedrichHegel(1770–1831)arguedifreligion

was to continue to serve the important practical purpose of social activism, it must be

subjective,notobjective,religionthatisappealedto.54Therejectionofobjectivereligionalso

correspondedtotheriseofbiblicalhighercriticisminthenineteenthcentury—analysisof

the Bible from historical, anthropological, and archeological perspectives, also often

departingfromevolutionarytheoriesofreligion.Thisledtotheconclusionthatquestions

pertainingtoreligioustexts“arenotinanysensereligiousbutpurelyscientific.”55Thehigher

criticismofreligion,theapproachofreligionas‘purelyscientific,’duetoitsexternal,natural

constitution,wasthoughttoimplicatetheinsignificanceofobjectivereligionintermsofits

roleinthespiritualgrowthofsociety.Allthatremainedwassubjectivereligion.

However,atthispoint,moralityandethicshadalreadybeenconstructedintermsof

thenaturalismofsociety,aspreviouslynoted.Theyalsoweresubjectedtoempiricaland

philosophicalinvestigationinthesamewayasthecategoryreligionwas.Thus,thesubjective

51Feuer(1974),121.Ontheexternalizationoftheconceptofreligion,seealsoSmith(1978),40–44andpassim.52QuotedinFeuer(1974),121.53Krech(2000),256.54Williamson(1984),13–16.55QuotedinMcLoughlin(1978),161.SeealsoHart(2000),79–82.Thefirstphaseofbiblicalcriticismarosetowardtheendoftheseventeenthcentury,particularlyregardingthephilosophyofmiraclesanddivineagency.

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poleofreligionwasalreadyshowingtendenciestowardbeingobjectifiedinthenaturalstudy

ofreligion.Forexample,Feuerbachreducedthedivinetohumanaspirations,aspirationsof

whichwerereifiedandnaturalizedtothespecificexclusionofreligiousunderstandings.He

arguedthattheentitiesposedbyreligionsare“nothingbutthesubject’sownnaturetaken

objectively.”56Andthisemphasisonconceivingreligionintermsofthesubjectiveresulted

in placing religionprimarily in the realmof the psyche, corresponding to the rise of the

psychologyofreligion—thoughnotyetasaspecializedfield.Assuch,subjectivereligionalso

cametobethoughtofintermsofnaturalknowledge.

Thepsychologyofreligionbegantotakeshapeasanempiricalsciencearoundthe

endofthenineteenthcentury,alongsidethedevelopmentofpsychologyatlarge.Duringthe

mid-twentieth century, the focus of psychology shifted to experiments and theories

regarding human behavior, though there had already been tendencies to understand all

humanbehavior scientifically since the secondhalf of the nineteenth century. Gradually,

psychologycametobecombinedwithmorerigorousempiricalmethodsinthemid-tolate

twentieth century, including a neuroscientific bent, leading to the rise of cognitive

psychology.57Whilepsychologywasbecomingmore‘scientific,’religionwastoo,sinceitwas

thoroughlysituatedinthepsycheatthispoint.Ironically,thoughsubjectivereligionemerged

in part as a means to reconcile the idea of religion as a social unifier and the obvious

conflictingclaimsofvariousdogmas,withthispsychologizationofreligion,religionlostits

privilegedstatus.Oneoftheconsequencesofdividingreligionintoinnerandouterpartswas

that the external world came to represent the ‘real world,’ while the inner portion lost

significance.Thoughthoughttohavesomedegreeof‘reality,’itcertainlywasregardedas

lessthantheouterworld.58

Moreover, psychology came to be a “campaign against mysticism of every kind.”

‘Mysticism’ is historically discursively entangledwith ‘religion,’ and has been frequently

usedtorefertothesubjectivesideofreligion,unitingallreligionunderitsauspices.In1920,

KnightDunlap (1875–1949) claimed, “Noone can accept the fundamental hypotheses of

56QuotedinGaukroger(2016),340.Seealsoibid.,309.57Krech (2000),255–259. Seealso Jeeves&Brown (2009),7 and13;Carlson (2009),157; andBen-David(1971),127–128.58Jevons(1923),4–5.

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scientificpsychologyandbeintheleastmystical.”59Understandinghumankindscientifically

wasspecificallyexplainedintermsofcounteringsuch“falsebeliefs”asinreligion.60Early

works on the psychology of religion treated the reduction of religion and exclusion of

religiousviewsaspartandparcel to the scientific analysis.Forexample,GordonWillard

Allport(1897–1967)claimedthat“‘Psychologywithoutasoul’becameitsbadeofdistinction

andofpride.’”Becausespiritualissueshadbeenconsideredsolelythedomainofreligion,“In

ordertobringtobearthedemonstratedmeritofthescientificmethodandinductivethinking

psychologistswereforcedtochartanewcourse”ona“psychologicalunderstandingofthe

natureandfunctioningofthereligioussentiment.”Thisincludedaseparationofpsychology

“sharply from religion.”61 It was largely in playing this role of contrast to religion and

mysticismthatpsychologybecametheadvocateofscience.62

Theemphasisontheprogressionofscienceinpsychologywasaccompaniedbyan

emphasisonthevigorousapplicationofscientificmethod,includingthefocusonobjectivity

andtheexternalworldofbiology,inwhichevensubjectivereligionwasincreasinglyplaced.

In the twentieth century, psychological factors came to be regarded as ‘explaining away’

religionasan‘illusion.’Religionwasnolongerhailedforitspreservationofsocialunity,but

instead this interpretationwas turned on its headby SigmundFreud (1856–1939),who

spreadthenotionofreligionasasocialneurosis.63Freud’sviewsonthenatureandfunction

ofreligioncontinuetobeinfluentialinthepresentday.64Similarly,anthropologistGiuseppe

Sergi(1841–1936)reducedreligiousbelieftoapathologicalpsychologicalphenomenon.65

B. F. Skinner (1904–1990) was notably reductive as well—God was reduced to the

psychological function of positive reinforcement.66 Moreover, Skinner, among other

behaviorists, had an exclusive focus on observable stimuli and outer behavior such that

behaviorism might be considered the psychological analogue to materialism.67 Put

differently,psychologyobjectifiedthesubjectivebyfirmlypositioningitinnatural,external,

59QuotedinBurnham(1987),111.60Burnham(1987),111.61Allport(1969[1950]),ix–xi.62Burnham(1987),111.63Jeeves&Brown(2009),13–14;Nielsen(2010),522;andAldridge(2000),61.64Browning&Cooper(2004),33.65Soper(1921),19.SeealsoSergi(1904[1885]).66Jeeves&Brown(2009),7,15,and20.67Caldwell(2010),23.

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andmaterialphenomena.Bytimethespecializedfieldofthepsychologyofreligionemerged

aroundthe1980s,religionhadalreadybeenreducedtopurelypsychologicalaspectsinthis

context.68

Inshort,whatweseehereisthataspsychologycametodevelopalongthelinesof

natural science, psychological explanations of religion increasingly became objectified,

naturalized,andreductive.Theresultwasthatthepurposeandsignificanceofreligion—the

religious enterprise—whether it be objective or subjective was reduced to natural

explanations.Thenaturalisticexplanation,inmanycases,wasthoughttospecificallyexclude

the understanding of religion in any other manner, particularly concerning a positive,

spiritual,moral,and/orethicalrole.Furthermore,formany,theroleofreligionhadbecome

negative, representing false beliefs, delusion, or socialwoes.Whenwe keep inmind the

contingencyofthemutualexclusivityofreligionandscience,aswellasofnaturalismand

supernaturalism,thesedevelopmentscanbereadinanewlight,asaproductofrelational

conceptualization.Thenaturalonlynegatesreligionandreducesreligiontoscienceinsofar

asonealreadyunderstandstheseconceptsinaparticularrelationalnetworkofmeaning.

5 Religion‘Localized’intheBrain

Religion likenedtosciencevianaturalismandmaterialism isalsocloselyassociatedwith

localizationism.Religionandmorebroadlytheimmaterialaspectsattributedtohumanity,

like the mind and soul, have been localized in the physical world since antiquity.

‘Localization’ is the notion that specific behaviors and accompanying mental states,

characteristics, andother immaterial aspectsof livingbeingsareassociatedwith specific

locationsofthebodyandlocalizationistsattempttodeterminethoseassociations.69Though

wehavealreadydiscussedplacingreligioninthepsyche,thisdiffersfromlocalizationismin

thatthemindwasoftenthoughtofasseparatefromthespaceofthephysicalworld.The

mindwaslongregardedashighlyinaccessibletomeasurementduetoitsimmaterialnature

anditwasonlywiththelocalizationofpsychologicalphenomenainthephysicalbrainthata

68Paloutzian(2013),1905.Onthehistoryofthepsychologyofreligion,seealsoWulff(1996).69SeeUttal(2009),6–14forabriefhistoryoflocalizingcognitioninthebrain.Seeibid.,212–214foralengthylistoftheunderlyingassumptionsoflocalizationismincognitivescience.

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clearlinkbetweenthemindandbodywasthoughttobewidelyestablished.Bybridgingthe

divide between the study of the brain and specific behaviors, phrenology constitutes a

historical link between early psychology—primarily a branch of philosophy and

epistemology—andlaterempiricalpsychology.70Thisbridgeallowedpsychologiststorelate

theirfindingstothoseofneuroscienceandrelatedfieldsofnaturalscience.71Assuch,the

widespread interest in phrenology helped feed the growth of the related disciplines of

human psychology, anthropology, and sociology, dealingwith similar issues of localizing

mentalfunctionsduringvariousstagesofthefields’development.72

Whilelocalizationismhasalonghistory,thefirstextensivetheorymappingcortical

gyritocognitivefunctionswasinthefieldofphrenology,nowconsideredapseudoscience.73

Phrenology,developedbytheGermanphysiciansFranzJosephGall(1758–1828)andJoseph

CasperSpurzheim(1776–1832)inthelateeighteenthcentury,isthepracticeofidentifying

personality,intelligence,andcharactertraitsandaptitudesbyexaminingthevaryingshapes

andunevennessonthesurfaceoftheskull.Forexample,apronouncedforeheadsuggestsa

well-developed benevolence ‘organ,’ localizing a benevolent disposition. Some other

relevant traits categorized according to the phrenological brain sections are religious

sentimentanddevotion.74Thegoalofsuchamaterialistphilosophy,oratleastthenarrative

ofthegoal,wasspecificallytoestablishthenon-existenceoftheimmaterial,includingthe

soul,andtodelegitimizenaturalphilosophyandtheology.75

Justaswithotherstudiesofreligionatthetime,phrenologydrewfromtheoriesof

social evolution that looked for objective knowledge of divinity, design, and purpose.76

70Jeeves&Brown(2009),31.Ontheimportanceofphrenologyinthedevelopmentofpsychology,seeYoung(1990).71Carlson(2009),157.72 Jeeves & Brown (2009), 31; and Uttal (2009), 103. Phrenologywas sowidely popular and socially andscientificallyacceptedthat itwasrankedat the levelofDarwin’s theoriesandananthropometriccharacterreadingcouldevenbeusedasareferencewhenapplyingforemployment.Thisnew‘scienceofmind,’asitwaslabeled, became popular in the nineteenth century in Europe, North America, andAustralia—found in thehighestelitecircles.SeevanWyhe(2000);andAnon.(1879).73Onthelanguageof‘mapping’asspecifictolocalizationdiscourse,seeThornton(2011),37–45.74Brown(2003),611–612;andJeeves&Brown(2009),31.75Shapin(1979),142,144,167,and169.StevenShapinclaimedthatthiswasthecaseforGall.However,Gallhasalsobeen said tohavebeenattempting toprove theexistenceofGod. See Jeeves&Brown (2009),33.Whichever is the case,we can see how this formernarrative conforms to the relational content ofmutualexclusivity.76Dalton(2000),513–514;andBrown(2003).

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Phrenologywassaidtobeanewversionofthematerialistictheory,reducinghumankindto

thebrain.ThiswasthoughtnotonlytodenyaroleforthesoulandforGod,butalsothen

placedtherealityandsignificanceofreligionandmoralityinquestion.Acommonsentiment

seemed tobe that “Whenphrenologistsoffereda ‘scientific’ theory that religiositywasa

functionofthesizeofone’sorganfor‘veneration,’thedomainofreligionhadobviouslybeen

encroachedupon.”77Infact,thesuccess,inpart,ofphrenologyhasbeentracedtoitsanti-

religiouspolemics.78Phrenologywasnotlonglived,butlocalizationdidnotdieanditcarried

withitthesameexclusionsofreligionandthereductionofreligiontoscientificframeworks

ofmeaning.

Fromaboutthenineteenthcenturyon,alongsidetheriseofphrenology,localization

became the predominant frame for the study of the brain—andmapping brain areas to

specific behaviors the focus of neuroscientific research as it emerged.79 While Pierre

Flourens(1794–1867)hasbeencreditedwithdiscreditingphrenology in favorofamore

global view on brain functions, localization theories lived on through the work of Jean

BaptisteBouillaud(1796–1881),PaulBroca(1824–1880),andCarlWernicke(1848–1904

or1905),forexample,andthroughKarlKleist’s(1879–1960)mapofbrainfunctionsin1934,

W.I.Welker’s(1926–2007)taxonomyofmentalprocessesof1976,andJerryFodor’sinput

processes put forth in 1983.80 Such research continues to the present day. Smaller and

smallerbitsofthebrainwereidentifiedashavingspecificroleswiththediscoveryofthe

elementaryunitofthenervoussystem,theneuron,asanindividualcellbySantiagoRamon

yCajal (1852–1934)and thesynapseas thecommunicativeconduitbetweenneuronsby

Cajal,alongwithCharlesScottSherrington(1857–1952).81

Despitethefactthat“muchofthe‘localization’researcheffort,nowandinthepast

hasbeenbasedonassumptionsthataredemonstrablyincorrectorthatcannotbevalidated

either in principle or in practice,” localization remains one of the main underlying

assumptions in thenatural scientific studyof religion.82These fundamentalassumptions,

77Gieryn(1983),788.78Shapin(1979),143–144.79Thornton(2011),13–14and36;andAlston(2007),3.Seealso,Finger(1994);andUttal(2001).80Jeeves&Brown(2009),28–29;andUttal(2009),109–115.OnFlourens,seealso,ibid.,105–107.81Brown(2003),612;andCarlson(2009),156.82Uttal(2009),205;andSchojoedt(2009),316–317.E.g.,itislargelyundisputedthattherearecertainbrainareasassociatedwiththeprimarysensoryandmotorprocesses,howeverassociationsarenotsoclearwhen

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these phrenological ideas have “a wide, if cryptic and implicit, acceptance in modern

cognitive neuroscience.”83 “Cognitive neuroscience is motivated by the precept that a

discoverablecorrespondenceexistsbetweenmentalstatesandbrainstates,”exemplifiedby

thefactthatphotosofimagingandfMRIdataidentifyingthelocationofmentalprocesses

dominateworld-leading scientific journals, likeScience.84 Because, from this perspective,

structure-function is ‘hardwired’ and biologically determined, once the location is

determined,anyexperiencecanbecontrolledandrecreatedinthelab,includingreligious

experience,whichinturnisthoughttoconfirmitsnaturalnature.85

PsychologistWilliamR.Uttal,amongothers,hasarguedthatlocalizationissimplythe

‘newphrenology,’ascognitiveprocessesareexaminedthroughlocatingthemviaimaging

technology, while within the same studies observations of behavior are almost totally

absent.86With this absenceof behavioral observations is the implicit constructionof the

mentalstatesasnothingmorethanneuralprocesses.Despitethedisconnectbetweenthe

imagesandobservingbehavioranddespitethesimplifiedschemeofthismappingmethod,

theseimagingtechniqueshavebeendescribedashaving“revolutionizedthebrainsciences”

withthepotentialto“revolutionizethescientificstudyofreligion.”87Suchapproachesare

regardedasthevery“basis”forthislineofresearch,demonstratingthecentralroleofthese

images,thecentralroleoflocalization,intheresearchunderconsiderationhere.88

Likematerialism,localizationismhasoftentimesbeenframedasspecificallynegating

religiousworldviews,andthusconstructingreligionasreductivelyscientific innature. In

HistoireNaturelle de l’Ame (NaturalHistoryof theSoul), JulienOffrayde laMettrie (also

welookatsensoryinputsandmotoroutputs.SeeUttal(2009),13–14.Uttalclaimed,“althoughthebrainiscertainlydifferentiated,mosthigh-levelcognitivefunctionscannotbejustifiablyassociatedwithlocalizedbrainregions.”Ibid.,25.Forcritiquesoflocalizationism,seeibid.;andFarah(1994).83Uttal(2009),103.84Schall(2003),23;andUttal(2009),xiii.85However, inrecentdecades,thecomplexityandwidedistributionoffunctionsthroughoutthebrainhavebeenincreasinglyrecognized.See,e.g.,Uttal(2009).Others,suchasAndrewNewberg,havefoundthatduringspiritualexperiences,someareasofthebrainare‘turnedon’andsome‘off,’makinghimconcludeanetworkofstructuresareinvolved.BBC(2003a).Seealsod’Aquili&Newberg(1999),esp.47–76.86 Uttal (2009), passim. Satel & Lilienfeld (2013), 3, also discussed the notion of brain imaging as‘neophrenology.’Thoughtheauthorsclaimedthecharacterizationisunfair,theyofferedfurthercriticalworkontheoversimplificationofimagingtechniques.SeeSatel&Lilienfeld(2013),1–24.JournalistJeffreyGoldbergsimilarlyquestionedimagingofbrainstates,stating,“Iwonderedtowhatdegreethiswastrulyscientificandtowhatdegreeitwas21st-centuryphrenology.”Goldberg(2008).SeealsoJeeves&Brown(2009),37.87Carlson(2009),159.88Newberg(2003),310.

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known as Lamettrie) (1709–1751) accepted the Cartesian view that animals are mere

machines and thus allmental phenomenawere alsomechanistically explicable. Hewent

furtherthoughandclaimedthatifanimalscanfeelandperceiveandengageinothermental

activitieswithoutasoul,asRenéDescartes(1596–1650)claimed,thenthereisnoreasonto

concludethathumansareanydifferent—noreasontoassumeahumansoul.Hisprofessional

goalwaslargelytodiscreditthereligiousnotionofanimmaterialandimmortalsoulandhis

approachwastodothisbylocalizingthemind.89Manyothersmadesimilarlinksbetween

localizationandexplainingawayreligion.EtienneCondillac(1715–1780)reducedhuman

facultiestoasensorybasisandthusconcludedallideationisbasedinmaterialexperiences,

includingnotionsofadeityandofthesoul.Thus,weseelocalizationismservedtojustify

materialisticandreductionistdiscoursesand, in turn, thescientificationofreligion.Later

work by Luigi Galvani (1737–1798), Gustav Theodor Fritsch (1838–1927), and Eduard

Hitzig (1838–1907) found that stimulating different parts of the brain produced specific

effects.90Thistypeofresearchtoowasthoughttoconfirmtherewasnoneedtoappealto

immaterialentitiestomoveandanimatethematerialbody.91Theviewformanytodayis

that“youhavetochoosebetweenthescientificmaterialistviewoftheoriginofthemindon

the one side, and the traditional religious view that the spirit and the mind are

independent.”92

Betweenthe1920sandthe1940s,therewasanotablelackofreligiousexplanation

asitrelatestopsychologyandcognitionincollegetextbooks,howeverwhenreligionwas

mentionedthediscussionexhibitedanemphasisonreductionistunderstandings:“Because

thegodsofreligionareempiricalgods,theybelongtoscience.”93Yet,reductionisttendencies

towardreligioncoalescedinthe1940sand1950swiththeworkofneurosurgeonWilder

Penfield (1891–1976), who is commonly associated with the rise of the notion of a

neurological‘Godspot,’alsoreferredtoasthe‘GodModule,’whichisalsothetargetofthe

previouslymentioned God Helmet.94 Keeping patients consciouswhile performing brain

89Gregory(2000),178.90Brown(2003),612;Jeeves&Brown(2009),28–29;andCarlson(2009),156.91Jeeves&Brown(2009),28.92Paulson(2006).93QuotedinVandeKemp(1995),206.94See,e.g.,BradleyHagerty(2009),146.Foradiscussion,seeibid.,147–148;Paloutzian,Swenson,&McNamara(2006),161–162;andBlume(2011),307–309.Asimilarlocalizationandreductionofreligionoccurswiththe

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surgery,Penfieldwasabletogainsubjectivereportswhilestimulatingvariousregionsofthe

brain,findingthatproddingthetemporallobescausedsomepatientstoreportout-of-body

experiences, auditory hallucinations (e.g., hearing voices), and visual hallucinations (e.g.,

seeingapparitions).95

For some, Penfield’s work, or sometimes the work in the 1950s to the 1970s of

scholars such as Herbert Simon (1916–2001), GeorgeMiller (1920–2012), Allen Newell

(1927–1992),andNoamChomsky,markedthebeginningofthecognitivescienceofreligion.

Such researchwas also conducted by British psychiatrists Eliot Slater (1904–1983) and

AlfredW.Beard(1920–1985)inthe1960s.96Eitherway,historicizingthefieldassuchfirmly

situates localizationismas the theoretical foundationof the field.97 Similar localizationist

work todayhas ledPersinger toclaim thathehasmappedspecific typesofmysticaland

religiousexperiencestoprecisepatternsofmagneticpulsesandstimulation,leadingmany

to conclude “God resides in ourbrains.”98Andneuroscientist Francis Crick (1916–2004)

tookathoroughlyreductivestancewhenheconcluded,“you—yourjoysandyoursorrows,

yourmemoriesandyourambitions,yoursenseofpersonalidentityandfreewill—areinfact

nomorethanthebehaviorofavastassemblyofnervecellsandtheirassociatedmolecules.”99

Thus,whilephrenologywasleftbehindintherefuseheapofscience,itenduredintheoretical

postulations of localizationism and reductionism “that dominate neuroscience even

today.”100

Itmightbesaidthat“thehistoryofbrainsciencecanbetoldasahistoryoflocalization

theoriesandmethods.”101Localization,afterall,hasbeenoneofthefewmajorperspectives

thathavepersistedthroughoutthehistoryofthebrainsciences.Aswehaveseen,oneofthe

notionofthe‘GodGene.’DeanHamer,whohypothesizedabouttheconnectionbetweenreligionandparticulargeneticmakeup,wasgiventhecoverstoryonTime(Europe)magazine,showingthediscursiveimpactislarge.SeePaloutzian, Swenson,&McNamara (2006), 162–164;Kluger (2004); andTime (2004). See alsoHamer(2004);Eaves(2004);andKoenigetal(2005).95Penfield&Rasmussen(1950),esp.164–177;Penfield(1955),454–461;andPenfield&Perot(1963).96Slater&Beard(1963).97E.g.,Guthrie(1980);andSperber(1975).Barrett(2013)markedthe1970sascontainingtherootsofthefield.SeealsoSlone(2007).98TheScienceChannel[Discovery](2010);andPersinger(2001).99Crick(1994),3.100Carlson(2009),156;andBielfeldt(2003b),716.101Thornton(2011),36.Forahistoryofneuroscience,seealso,McHenry(1969);Clarke&Jacyna(1987);Star(1989);Finger(1994);andZimmer(2004).

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waysthatlocalizationismhasdefinedthishistoryisintermsofitsimpactontheconstruction

ofreligionasnothingmorethanthebrainstates it is located in. Indeed, theperspectives

evident in many historical and clinical overviews are committed to physicalism and

reductionism.102Neuroscienceinthiscontextistypicallyunderstoodas:

[A] commitment to a materialist premise that virtually all mental functions are products of thebiological brain. Mapping the brain is thus consistently articulated as a way for science to gaincompleteknowledgeabouthumannature.103

Knowledgeabouthumannatureincludesanaccountofreligion.AsUttalpointedlystated,

merelyaskingthequestionhowthebrainandcognitionarerelatedbycognitivescientists:

[P]resupposesanimplicitacceptanceofamonisticontologyandanaturalisticphilosophicalapproach[…].Simplyput,everystudyofthelocalizationissueandeverytheoryaboutitispremisedontheideathatvariations inthepsychologicaldomainare issomeverydirectwayrelatedtovariations intheneurologicaldomain.Makenomistake,suchdirectnessistantamounttoidentity.104

Inthecontextofreligion,thismeansthatreligionisunderstoodasidenticalwiththe

scientific object of analysis. There is nothingmore to religion. This is reflected in social

response to themeeting of the Society ofNeuroscience in 1997, inwhich neuroscientist

VilayanurRamachadranreemphasizedthehistoricalclaimthatthereis“aneuralbasisfor

religious experience.” This was widely reported and typically described as ‘radical,’

‘shocking,’ and ‘iconoclastic.’105 This is because many have thought that this research

amountstoaforcedchoicebetweenreligionandscience.106Sincereligionandscienceare

understoodasmutuallyexclusive,thenascientificaccountofreligionexcludesallbutthe

scientific object religion and one is left with the reductionist framework of the identity

construct.

6 ReligionNegated:SignifiersofScientification

102Brown(2003),611and616.103Thornton(2011),40.104Uttal(2009),4.105Foster(2010),13.SeealsoBegley(2010).106Cf.Foster(2010),13.

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Justasthemutualexclusivityconstructgaverisetospecificsignifiersforreligionandscience,

the scientification of religion led to a newnetwork ofmeaning surrounding the concept

‘religion.’Because‘religion’hereisascientificobject,thisnetworkofmeaningincludednew

signifiers for ‘science’aswell.Obviously likeningreligiontosciencevianaturalismledto

naturalismsignifyingreligion,buttheidentityconstructalsogaverisetoitsownsignifiers

aswell.

6.1 ScienceofReligionas‘Reductive’

With religion naturalized, and naturalism precluding supernaturalism, among other

signifiers, religion came to be constructed in a reductively scientific framework. In a

relational manner, reduction came to signify the science of religion. That is, reduction

becameoneofthewaysinwhichthescienceofreligionwasdifferentiatedrelativetoreligion

orrelativetoalternativewaysofconstructingreligion.

We have seen thatwhile religionwas being subjectified and ‘placed’ in themind,

individualthoughtandbehaviorswerebeing‘located’inthebrain—phrenologydeveloped

alongside the development of the psychology of religion. In themid-nineteenth century,

phrenologywasevendescribedastheforminwhich“psychologyandphysiology,marching

hand in hand, left metaphysics at a remote distance…the light of modern civilization

succeeding to the darkness of the middle ages.”107 With religion being subjectified and

reduced to psychological states andmental states being localized in and reduced to the

physicalbody,itwasnotafarsteptodevelopthethoughtthatreligionmightbeasspecifiable

asaparticularmentalstateistoaphysicallocationinthebrain.Thiscametobethoughtof

astheessenceofreligion,accompaniedbythereductionismthatisessentialization.Finding

theessenceinaphysical locationwasthoughttoprecludeanythingdivine,aspermutual

exclusivityanditsnatural-supernaturaldichotomy.Ifreligioncouldbelocatedinthebrain,

thethoughtwent,thenreligionwasnotspecialatall,butratherutterlynormal.

Theideathatreligiousexperience,inoneformoranother,constitutestheessenceof

religionhasbeenpresentinEuropeandNorthAmericasinceatleastthenineteenthcentury,

particularly dominating the academic study of religion in the last century, advanced by

107QuotedinBurnham(1987),167.Ellipsisoriginal.

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thinkers such as Rudolf Otto (1869–1937), Gerardus van der Leeuw (1890–1950), and

MirceaEliade(1907–1986).108Thisapproachofidentifyingtheessenceofreligiontypically

rested on the notion of religion as a unique form of experience, which made up this

essentialized core. In the past, philosophers of religion, theologians, historians,

anthropologists, and academics of religion from many other backgrounds have treated

religion as a special category, one that included special experiences, commitments, and

mentalhappeningsnotconduciveto‘regular’formsofinquiry.Thiswasincreasinglycalled

into question as it suggested religious experience is sui generis, it isolated the study of

religionfromotherdisciplines,allowedforthepresenceoftheologicalagendas,andbecause

itreflectedWesternpresuppositionsaboutreligion.109

However, the psychology of religion early on through today has focused on

discoveringthe‘essenceofreligion’identifiedwiththeexperienceof‘subjectivereligion.’110

Andthishas influenced itssisterdiscourseonthecognitivescienceofreligionaswell, in

whichmanytreatreligionasifthereissomecommoncore,though‘religiousexperience’has

come to refer to a plethora of phenomena in the field.111 While religion and religious

experience often continued to hold a special status as something unique in the natural

sciences, questions about their degree of uniqueness and the possibility for ‘normal’

scientific inquiry played an important role in the development of the scientification of

108SeeOtto(1923);vanderLeeuw(1938);andEliade(1987[1957]).109Foracritiqueofthesuigenerisargumentation,see,e.g.,Smith(1990),36–53;andMcCutcheon(1997).110Krech(2000),261and265.111 E.g., psychologist David Wulff stated that spiritual experiences being common across time and space“suggest[s]acommoncorethatislikelyareflectionofstructuresandprocessesinthehumanbrain.”QuotedinBegley(2010).Seealso,Andersenetal(2014),218,wheretheauthorsidentifiedessentialistviewsasoneofthemajortheoreticalpositionsinthenaturalscienceofreligion.AnnTaves,aleadingspecialistinthefield,hasattemptedtotackletheissueinTaves(2009).Tavessituatedherselfinthescholarlycontextoutlinedabovebycritiquingsuigenerisaccountsandbyshowinghowherapproachtothestudyofreligiousexperienceavoidsthe pitfalls that earlier approaches fell victim to. Her aim was to develop a naturalistic understanding ofreligiousexperienceaswellastoidentifyamethodologythatwillbringtogetherreligiousstudies,thesocial-psychologicalstudyofthemind,andtheneuroscientificstudyofthebrain,thusincorporatingthehumanitiesandscienceswherepastscholarshiphasfailed.Essentialismisquestionedinthefieldofneuroscienceaswell,althoughbyaseemingminority.See,e.g.,Slone(2007)wholooksatrecurringhistorical,social,andculturalfeatures to identify religion in a broaderway. See alsoGranqvist (2006), 134; andRatcliffe (2006), 95.Asregardstheroleofreligiousexperienceinthecognitivesciences,asJustinBarrettnoted,‘religion’isnoteventypically defined in the field of the cognitive science of religion, rather ‘religion’ is treated in a ‘piecemealfashion’byidentifyingwhatis‘generallyconsideredreligious.’SeeBarrett(2011),231.Today,thereisnoclearconsensusinthecognitivesciencesastowhatconstitutes‘religion.’SeealsoZinnbauer&Pargament(2005).

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religion.112Naturalscientistsincreasinglyarguedthatordinaryexplanationsweresufficient

fortheanalysisofreligion.Philosopher,psychologist,andphysicianWilliamJames(1842–

1910),forexample,arguedthatreligiousexperiencesdonotoccurthroughadistinctfaculty,

butratherthroughtheordinarysenses,accompaniedbytheperceptionofthedivine.113

Andwiththedevelopmentoflocalizationism,bridgingthegapbetweenthebrainand

specific behaviors and between psychology and ‘hard’ neuroscience, all experience was

increasingly understood as accessible,measurable, and thus to some degree ‘normal.’ E.

Thomas Lawson and Robert McCauley, in Rethinking Religion: Connecting Cognition and

Culture(1990),arguedthatreligious ideas,experiences,andactionscouldbeunderstood

through regular approaches to cognition.114 Some scholars suggest that this publication

marked the emergence of the cognitive science of religion, as this theoretical basis has

continued to shape the development of the field.115 And with normalization, scientific

frameworks of meaning were thought to be necessary and sufficient for explanation.

Reductionismbecameoneoftheidentitymarkersofthemethodandtheoryofthescienceof

religion.Forinstance,incognitivescience,reductionismhaslargelybecomea“principle”of

thediscipline;neuroscientifictheoryandresearchissaidtospecificallyexcludetheconcept

of immaterialism;and,aswehaveseen,psychologydevelopedin itsseparationfromand

reductionofreligiousworldviews.116

While centuriesago, itwas thought that theremightbea specializedorgan in the

brainthatisresponsibleforreligiousexperience,likethepinealglandforexample,which

thencontributedtoreligiousexperience’suniquestatus,todaythecommunisopinioisthat

thereisnoseparate‘religionorgan’tospeakof.117Religiousexperiencesengagethesame

organsasanyotherexperiencesandthereis“nouniversalpatternamongbrainstatesthat

onemighttermreligious.”118Thissuggeststhatthecorrelatemental/brainstatesofreligious

112Eventhoughtheinvestigationoftheuniqueaspectsofhumanreligiosityhasbeenakeythemeinthefield,thisuniqueness isquestionedanddebated in the fieldaswell.Paloutzian (2013),1904and1909.SeealsoBaumeister(2002).113Hay(1994);andGendlin(1962).114Forfurtherexamples,seealsoLawson(2000),344–345;Persinger(1984a);Saver&Rabin(1997),499;andRatcliffe(2006),84.115Slone(2007),593.SeealsoBarrett(2013);andNewberg(2003),passim.116Brown(2003),616.SeealsoBennett&Hacker(2003),355–377.117Saver&Rabin(1997),499.118Carlson(2009),164and168.SeealsoDepraz,Varela,&Vermersch(2003).

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experiences are likely not unique to those experiences and also may occur in other

situations.119Yet,thenotionthatreligioncanbeessentializedasexperienceremainedand

assuchtheideaof‘locating’religioninthebrainwasfurtherstrengthenedsinceexperiences

hadbecomeidentifiedwithbrainstates.

Such notions were central to the ‘Cognitive Revolution’ of the late twentieth

century.120Itwasduringthistimeinthesecondhalfofthetwentiethcenturythatcognitive

scienceandneuroscience joined, formingthefieldofcognitiveneuroscience—“oneof the

mostsignificantscientifictrends”ofthistimeperiod.121Thisunionissymbolicoftheidentity

betweencognitionandbrainstates.Theriseofthepsychologyofreligionandthecognitive

scienceofreligioninthelatetwentiethtoearlytwenty-firstcenturieswerepartofthiswider

intellectual trend as well.122 In this era, also referred to as the Neurocentric Age, an

increasingnumberofpeoplebegantothinkthat“thebrainiscentralnotonlytothebodybut

to our conception of ourselves.” And this has also created a “newway of conceiving the

soul.”123 This conception is illustrated by psychologist and neuroscientist JoshuaGreene,

who,whenperforming fMRI scans on subjects thinkingovermoral dilemmas, remarked,

“Somepeopleintheseexperimentsthinkwe’reputtingtheirsoulunder[a]microscopeand

in a sense, that’swhatwe’redoing.This iswhat your soul is, if anything is.”124Thenew

conceptionofthe‘soul’andof‘religion’hadbecomefirmlysituatedintheframeworkofthe

naturalscientificstudyofreligionandthiswasspecificallyreductive.InthisBrainAge(or

‘neuromania’assomehavecometocallit),mindandsoul,freewill,andreligiousexperience

119Brown(2003),615–616.Ramachadran,e.g.,claimedthatreligiousexperienceconstitutesauniqueclassandthusregardlessofaperson’sbackground,ifthebrainconditionsareright,thenthatpersonwillhaveareligiousexperience.Incontrast,Saver&Rabin(1997),499,claimedthatreligiousexperiencesarethoseidentifiedasreligious and can include feelings of deep significance, harmony, joy, etc., that another subject would notdescribeinreligiousterminology.120Miller(2003);Jeeves&Brown(2009),5–6;Geertz(2004),349;Brown(2003),614;Newberg(2003),310;andCarlson(2009),158–159.121Brown(2003),614.Thedistinguishingfactorseemstobethatwhileneurosciencefocusesonthenervoussystem, cognitive science focuses on cognition, and cognitive neuroscience has its core in the relationshipbetweenthenervoussystemandcognition.122Lawson(2000).Seealso,Zimmer(2004);Barrett (2000);Barrett (2011),230;Barrett (2013),409;andSaver&Rabin(1997),508.ImportantcontributionsincludeLawson&McCauley(1990);Guthrie(1993);Boyer(1994);andWhitehouse(1995).123Zimmer(2004),7.124QuotedinZimmer(2004),264.SeealsoTrimble(2007),onsituating‘thesoulinthebrain’(thetitleofthework).

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allcametobereducedtotheirmaterialaspectsinthenaturalsciences.125

Thoughreductivematerialismhadbeenaroundforasignificantperiodoftime,itwas

during this age of ‘brain culture,’ in which the individual came to be framed as a

‘neurochemicalself.’126Thehumanbeingcametobeexpressedinaformulaicandwholly

reductiveway:“[H]uman=self-consciousmind=brain.”127Thisisbecause:

Naturalistsoftenassumethatthemodesofexplanationadoptedinthephysicalsciences,withtheirrequirementthatexplanationsbegivensolelyintermsofnaturalcauses,areparadigmaticofwhatitistoexplainoreventounderstandaphenomenon.128

Oneofthefoundersofthefield,JustinBarrett,agreed:“Cognitivescientistsofreligionadopt

a methodological naturalism perspective, seeking strictly natural mechanisms for the

phenomenaunderconsideration[…].”129Tobeacognitivescientistofreligionistobestrictly

anaturalist,creatingareductiveframework.Tohavetrueknowledgeofhumanexperiences

and subjective reality is to speak in the language of physicalism, from this perspective.

Persingerargued,“inthehistoryofscience,thosephenomenawhichwereconsideredtobe

nonphysical,ultimatelywedidfindaphysicalbasisandwhenwefoundthephysicalbasis

thenweunderstoodit.”130AccordingtoPersinger,thebasisofcognitivescienceisto“tryto

understand thebrainbasis toall experiences.Theassumption is that all experiencesare

generatedbybrainactivity.”131 Inotherwords, there isnotanexperience ‘out there’ that

thenproducesbrain activity, nor is there aone-to-one correlateof experience andbrain

activity,butratherbrainactivitydeterminesexperience.Otheracademicslookatthiswork

and conclude the same: the correlation between certain brain activity and religious

experience suggests these experiences have a “physiological basis linked to brain

mechanisms.”132Religiondoesnotsimplyhaveaphysicalcomponent; it is fundamentally

125Oomen(2003),617;andSatel&Lilienfeld (2013),xivandxix.On freewillandagency, seealsoSatel&Lilienfeld(2013),125–147.126Thornton(2011),7and115–116;andRose(2007),187–223.SeealsoSatel&Lilienfeld(2013).127Gay(2009a),23.128Davis&Collins(2000),204.129Barrett(2013),409.130Skeptiko(2014).Emphasisadded.131 Skeptiko (2014). Emphasis added. See also in ibid.: “[O]ur research starts on the basic premise that allexperienceisgeneratedbybrainactivity”;“allexperience…mustbeassociatedtobrainactivity.”SeealsoSt.-Pierre&Persinger(2006),e.g.,inadditiontoPersinger’sotherpublications,inwhichhereiteratestimeandagainthatthebrain‘generates’experiences.131Martin(n.d.).132McClenon(2006),144.Emphasisadded.

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physical,fromthisperspective,withreductionismastheunderlyingbasisofthescientific

outlook. In another example, physicist Lawrence Krauss suggested that, “once we

understandthephysiologicalbasisofconsciousnessthetheologicalrealmof thesoulwill

retreat, to avoid conflict with experiment.”133 This formulation is one of the foremost

argumentsputforthintheliteratureonthescienceofreligionaswellasnaturalismmore

broadly—time and time againphysical sciencehas been able to explainwhatwere once

thoughtmysteriousorsupernaturalintermsofwell-supportednaturalisticprocessesand

thisamountstototalunderstanding.134Theresultwasthatviathescientificationofreligion,

‘science’ came to be signified by ‘reductionism,’ for many. And this signifier plays an

importantroleinfurtherdiscursivedevelopmentsoftheterm,aswillbediscussedinthe

followingchapter.

6.2 ScientificatedReligionAsreligiousexperienceisexplainedintermsofreductionist,physicalist,localized,natural

phenomena, it constantly brings forth the issue of whether we should then take these

experiencesseriouslyascognitiveclaimsandforthosewhodotakethemseriouslywhether

weshouldrejectthisexplanatoryapproach.Thoughmaterialisticaccountsofreligionhad

been around for centuries, it was not until the late eighteenth century that reductionist

understandings ofmaterialism becamewidespread—religionwas not simplymaterial, it

was nothing but physical phenomena and all immaterial aspects were consigned to the

sphereofuntruth.Ontheonehand,religionhadbecomereductivelyidentifiedasascientific

object.Ontheotherhand,reductionismhadbecomeidentifiedwiththescientificapproach,

thought to exclude religious views. Put differently, religion is taken seriously only in its

constructionasascientificobject,onlyintermsofthescientificationofreligion.Combining

thesetwothoughtsmeansthatnotonlycanreligionbewhollyexplainedintermsofscience,

butalsothatanyotherexplanationisfalse.Fromarelationalperspective,theconstruction

of thescientificobjectreligionasachallenge to theveridicalityofreligion ispredictable,

sincetoconstructreligionas‘science’istoconstructreligionas‘notreligion,’inamannerof

speaking,assciencehadalreadybeenconstructedassuch.Thiscreatesapeculiarsituation

133Krauss(1997),137.134Davis&Collins(2000),204.

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inwhichscienceismakingacaseforthenonexistenceofthethingtheyareinvestigating.In

differentiating the scientific object of religion from religion conceived in any other way

resultsinnewsignifiersforthetermthatreflectthisoddsituation.Inthisdiscourse,wesee

religionframedasapathologicalmistake,asillusionordelusion,andasinsignificant,allof

which take on this structure of the scientific object of religion negating religion

conventionallyunderstood(whichisexclusivereligion).Thisrelationalequationdevelops

inthediscourse.

For instance, thequestionconsistentlyarisesaboutwhether thescience indicates

religionisnotreligious.Evenwhenthisquestionisansweredinthenegative,thatitcouldbe

askedatall isdemonstrative thatan interplaybetween likeningreligionandscienceand

mutualexclusivityhasoccurred,as it isonly inthiscontextthatconstructing ‘religion’as

‘science’ can result in the construction of religion as potentially ‘not religion.’ This is a

reflectionofthestructureofchangingmeaningsoftheterm‘religion’and‘science’viathe

interplaybetweenvariousrelationalconstructsandprocesses.Inthefollowingsubsections,

I will examine how religion has come to be signified in ways that challenge its own

veridicalityasanexpressionofhowreligionconstructedasscienceisstructuredbymutual

exclusivity.Thusfar,wehaveseenmutualexclusivityinplaybydeterminingwhatsignifiers

wouldconstitutemakingreligionscience-likeandbydeterminingthatthosesignifierswould

betreatedinadichotomousformationtotheexclusionofreligion,resultinginthereduction

to science. Indoingso, signifiersof religionarenegated,but religion inaveryparticular

sense remains. Here, in contrast, we see mutual exclusivity in play in that to construct

religionasscienceistoconstructreligionas‘notreligion’andnegatetheveryveridicalityof

religion.Thoughwehavealreadyseensuchthoughtsrecurintheaboveaccounts,itisworth

emphasizing here that the scientification of religion is not just about reduction but a

relational construct that structures meaning making and discursive change in what the

concept‘religion’entails.

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6.2.1 ReligionasPathologyInthecognitivescienceofreligion,religiousexperiencesareoftenlocalizedinthetemporal

lobes.135 Such localization has a long tradition, in studies of patientswith temporal lobe

epilepsyforexample,whohavebeenfoundtobe‘hyper-religious.’136Ithasbeenfoundthat

thosewithheightenedactivityofthesespecificneurocircuitsaremoreconducivetoreligious

belief.Somescientistsnowthinkthatwhatoccursintemporallobeepilepticsmightjustbe

anexceptionalheighteningofwhatoccursinusall,tovaryingdegrees,resultinginreligious

experiencesandbeliefs.137

Thelocalizationofreligioninthetemporallobesandtheconnectionwithepilepsyis

onewayinwhichreligionischaracterizedasnotveridical,morespecificallyasinauthentic

and pathological. Epileptic seizures have been simultaneously associated with religious

experienceandbrainmalfunctionsinceantiquity,thusestablishingalinkbetweenreligion

andpathology.Thereisevidenceofprehistoricaccountsofepilepsyinvolvingbothphysical

andspiritualelements,amongmanyancientcultures.138Epilepticsaresuggestedtobelinked

tothedivine,demonic,andsupernaturalacrossmanysocietiesandthesereligiousaspects

inturnareassociatedwithdiseaseearlyoninhistory,ascanbeseenintheHippocraticwork

andthefirstmonographontheconditionOntheSacredDisease(ca.400BCE),aswellasin

Plato’s (ca. 428–347 BCE) Timaeus (ca. 360 BCE).139 The same associations can be found

centurieslater,inCaeliusAurelianus’(fl.fifthcentury)descriptioninearlymedievalmedical

glosses,inthethoughtofSt.HildegardofBingen(1098–1179),andinthepoetryofDante

135See,e.g.,Persinger(1983);Persinger(1987);Cook&Persinger(1997);Persinger(1984b);andSchojoedt(2009),321.Inthisfieldofstudy,sometimesotherlocationsareemphasizedinstead.SeeNewberg(2003),308.Anotherstudyhasfoundthatfiringmagneticpulsesintotheinferiorparietallobedecreasesspirituality.SeeCrescentinietal(2015).136Dewhurst&Beard(1970);Ramachandran&Blakeslee(1998);Ogata&Miyakawa(1998);Slater&Beard(1963),143–150;Devinsky&Lai (2008);Bear&Fedio (1977);d’Aquili&Newberg (1993);Saver&Rabin(1997);andSchachter(2006).Laterstudieschallengedthisview.NeuropsychiatristPeterFenwickconcluded:“Itislikelythattheearlieraccountsoftemporallobeepilepsyandtemporallobepathologyandtherelationshipto mystic and religious states owe more to the enthusiasm of their authors than to the true scientificunderstandingofthenatureoftemporal lobefunctioning.”QuotedinHughes(2005),135.SeealsoSaver&Rabin,(1997),499–504.Manyscholarsofreligion,particularlythosewithinneuroscience,donotendorsethisviewofreligiousexperience.See,e.g.,Austin(1998);Glassman(2002);Hoodetal(1996);McNamara(2002);Peterson(2001);Peterson(2002);andTeske(2001).137BBC(2003a).138See,e.g.,Margetts(1967);andBrown(2003),615.139Temkin(1971),3–6and155.Seealso,Trimble(2007),133–152.

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(ca. 1265–1321).140 During the age of the Renaissance, the surgeon Fabricius Hildanus

(1560–1634) agreed that “something divine can be observed in epileptics.”141 The

connection between epileptic disease and religion continued through time in Fyodor

Dostoyevsky’s (1821–1881) novelThe Idiot (Der Idiot, 1868), inAldousHuxley’s (1894–

1963)HeavenandHell (1955)written inresponsetoPenfield’sresearch inthe1950son

epileptic patients, and in Mark Salzman’s novel Lying Awake (2000).142 There is a long

discursivetraditionoflinkingreligiousconditionsandpathologicalstatesviaepilepsy.143

Clinicalobservationsoverthepastcenturyandahalfsupportanassociationbetween

religious experience and epileptic seizures, even gaining status as a uniquepathology.144

Those epileptics who have hyper-religiosity, along with some other symptoms like

hypergraphia, are said to have ‘Geschwind syndrome,’ named after neurologist Norman

Geschwind(1926–1984),whichisconsideredapersonalitydisorder,involvingobsession.145

Religiousexperienceshavealsobeencorrelatedwithotherpathologicalconditionsincluding

bipolardisorderandschizophrenia,which,inturn,arealsousedtostudytheneuroscience

ofreligion,asisepilepsy.146Sinceepilepsyisassociatedwithreligiousexperiences,including

hyper-religiosity, religious conversions, and mystical experiences, cognitive scientists of

religionregardtheepilepticasagoodsourcetodetermine“theneurobiologicalsubstrateof

spiritualexperience.”147

This association between religion and pathology is further strengthened by the

understandingofepilepticseizuresas‘misfirings’ofthebrainor‘electrical’or‘fire’storms,

suggestingturbulenceanddisturbanceofnormalactivity.148Thischaracterizationbringsthe

connotation of the abnormal and disorderly. Leaving aside the fact that simply because

epilepsy isassociatedwithreligiondoesnotnecessarilymeanreligion isadisease,many

140Temkin(1971),97–98.141Temkin(1971),142.142Horgan(2003),93.143Thediscursiveconnectionbetweenreligionandpathologyismuchlargerthantheknotthatoccurswithepilepsy.Forfurtherexamplesofdiscursiveconnectionsbetweenpathologyandreligion,seeHarrison(1990),120–126.Religionhasbeensaidtobeageneric‘mentalvirus,’bythosesuchasRichardDawkins,amongothers.See,e.g.,Dawkins(1993).144Devinsky&Lai(2008);Jeeves&Brown(2009),94–95;andTrimble(2007).145OnGeschwindsyndrome,seeWaxman&Geschwind(1975);andBear&Fedio(1977).146Carlson(2009),164–165.147Newberg(2010),129.148See,e.g.,Biello(2007);andBradleyHagerty(2009),143.

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jump from correlational conclusions to causational ones. For example, biologist Richard

Dawkins—a widely influential public figure in religion-science discussions—stated,

“religious behaviour may be a misfiring, an unfortunate by-product of an underlying

psychologicalpropensity[…].”149Similarly,biologistE.O.Wilsoncharacterizedreligionas

‘anerror’thatwillbeoutgrownintheprocessesofevolution.150Inthesecontexts,religionis

notsimplyframedasanerroneousmisfiring,butasasuperfluousbyproductandasanexcess

ofevolutionweneednotgive it furtherconsideration,strippingawayanysignificanceor

validityofreligionbeyondthescientificobject.151

The issue of religion as pathology is often framed as challenging the concept of

religionoutsideofthatcontext.Onewriternoted:

Themainstreampathologybooksarefullofexampleswhichindicatethatexperienceswethinkofasspiritual ormoral can be affected by damage to the brain. It has even been suggested that everymysticalgifthasapathologicalcorollarysomewhereinthemedicalliterature.Tellaneurologistaboutabeautifulpicturethatyouhaveseeninyourmeditationsession,andhewillgotohisshelfandshowyouablasphemousparodyofit,withEEGtracesandMRIscanstoboot.152

The use of the term ‘blasphemous’ suggests that a scientific ‘parody’ is necessarily not

religiousfromthisperspective.Inotherwords,thischaracterizationofreligionasdiseaseis

directlyrelevanttotherelationalconstructofreligionas‘notreligion’orblasphemy,treating

religionirreverently,andasirreligious.‘Parody’tooconnotesinaccuracyofdepiction.

ItisthisliteratureonthereligiosityoftemporallobeepilepticsthatPersingeralso

departedfrominhiswork.153TheinducedreligiousexperiencesinPersinger’slabhavebeen

describedas‘microseizures.’154Andsimilartothecharacterizationsabove,somewhohave

examined Persinger’s work concluded that religion might be a pathological “cerebral

mistake.”155OnereporterdescribedPersingeras“reframingreligioushistory,”noting“The

effecthasbeennottopresentthediseaseassacred”—referringtothecommonnotioninthe

149Dawkins(2006),174.Referencestoreligionas‘misfiring’canbefoundthroughoutthisworkpassim.150Gay(2009b),1.151Forreligionasabyproduct,see,e.g.,Bloom(2009).152Foster(2010),7.153Persingerreferredtotheroleofthetemporallobesinreligiosityinmostofhispublications,oftencitingsourcesabouttheconnectionbetweenepilepsyandreligiousexperiences.See,e.g.,Persinger(1987);Persinger(1991);Persinger(1993);St.Pierre&Persinger(2006);andBooth&Persinger(2009).154See,e.g.,Blume(2011).155Horgan(2006).

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timeofHippocrates—”but topresent thesacredasadisease.”156Anotherwriterclaimed,

“Persingerhasmadenosecretofhisbeliefthatreligionispathological.”157Suchworkissaid

to connect “holy visions with brain disorder.”158 Authors have made links between

Persinger’sworkandCrick’sobservationthatbeliefinGodisdueto“mutantneurochemicals

called‘theotoxins’”—aclearassociationbetweenreligion(‘theo’)anddisease(‘toxins’).159

As NPR’s religion correspondent Barbara Bradley Hagerty stated, “spiritual

experienceisatrickofthebrain.Itcanbetriggeredbyheadinjuriesandbraindysfunctions

such as epilepsy, by the earth’smagnetic fields, and bymachines like his ‘God helmet.’”

Elsewhere Bradley Hagerty stated, “If scientific journals are to be believed, most of the

world’sreligiousdoctrinesprangfromdysfunctionalminds.”160Forexample,accordingto

Seventh-day Adventists, the revelations of church founder Ellen White (1827–1915)

evidencesthatshewasaprophet,butaccordingtoepilepsyresearchers,she“instead”may

havebeenatemporallobeepilepticandthusherreligiousexperiencesweredescribedas

“notgenuinebutduetotheseizures,”byneurologistGregoryHolmes.Thiswasdescribedas

“shattering” for Seventh-day Adventists, suggesting the evidence conclusively negates

religious interpretations (outside of the scientific context). ‘Instead,’ aswell, suggests an

either/orrelationshipbetweenthereligiousandscientificviews,meaningsolongasthere

isascientificaccount,thenthereligiousonemustbeincorrect.AspokesmanforSeventh-

day Adventists and neurologist, Daniel Giang, denied it was temporal lobe epilepsy.

PositioningGiang’sviewasoneofdefenseagainstthescientificevidenceofanepilepticcause

creates an account that seems to further force a choice between religion and science,

betweengenuinenessandareductivelyepilepticaccount.Therewasnoconsiderationthat

Whitecouldhavehadbothgenuinereligiousexperienceandepilepsy,sinceoneisthought

tonegatetheother.

Other religious leaders have been suggested to be epileptic aswell,making them

“predisposed” tomysticalexperiences.Forexample, theChristianapostlePaul (ca.5–67)

experiencedGodasablindingflashoflight,similartosomeexperiencesofepilepticpatients,

156BradleyHagerty(2009),143.157Foster(2010),285n.13.158Persaud(2003).159Horgan(2003),93.160BradleyHagerty(2009),135and143.

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suggestingthepossibilityofbeingseizureinduced.Similarly,theAbrahamicprophetMoses

sawaburningbush.161Other religious figures thathavebeensuggested tohaveepilepsy

includeJesus(ca.4BCE–30CE),Muhammad(ca.570–632),JoanofArc(ca.1412–1431),St.

Teresa of Avila (1515–1582), Emanuel Swedenborg (1688–1772), Joseph Smith (1805–

1844),andAnnLee(1736–1784),amongothers.162Somehavearguedthatmanyreligious

visionariesdonothaveassociatedmentalimpairmentsthatoftenaccompanytemporallobe

epilepsyandinsteadhavemanynotableaccomplishments,theimplicationbeingthat,again,

epilepsyhastobediscountedifwearetovaluetheexperiencesandcontributionsofthese

individuals—a forced choice between the option of religion as reductively scientific and

pathologicalandthusasnotreligious,ontheonehand,andtheoptionofgenuineness,onthe

other.163

Pathologizingreligionisperceivedasnegatingreligion.MatthewRatcliffeobserved:

The tension between a malfunction explanation and the claim that the resultant experiences areveridicalbecomesunavoidableifoneacceptsanoncontingentconnectionbetweenfunctionandwell-formedbelief.Certaintheistsandatheistsalikehavearguedthatwell-formedbeliefsjustarethosethatare generated by properly functioning cognitive apparatus operating in normal environmentalconditions.Ifthisisthecase,thenanybeliefarisingasaresultofmalfunctionis,byimplication,nottobetrusted.164

Similarly,Jamesnotedthatthereductionofreligiontoscienceandtheassociationbetween

pathology and religious experience is a reading that implicitly affirms the materialist

worldviewbyspecificallychallengingthelegitimacyofreligiousexperience.Hepointedout:

MedicalmaterialismfinishesupSaintPaulbycallinghisvisionontheroadtoDamascusadischarginglesionoftheoccipitalcortex,hebeinganepileptic.ItsnuffsoutSaintTeresaasan[sic]hysteric,SaintFrancisofAssisiasan[sic]hereditarydegenerate.GeorgeFox’sdiscontentwiththeshamsofhisage,andhispining for spiritualveracity, it treatsasa symptomofadisorderedcolon […]Andmedicalmaterialism then thinks that the spiritual authority of all such personages is successfullyundermined.165

161BBC(2003a).162Begley(2010);Biello(2007);BradleyHagerty(2009),144;Ingram(2003);Hughes(2005);Trimble(2007),142–144,Table7.1;andSaver&Rabin(1997),501–502,Table1,bothtablesofwhichprovidesanoutlineofvariousreligious-historical figuressuggested tohaveepilepsywithin themedical literature,descriptionsoftheirsymptoms,thelikelihoodofadiagnosesofepilepsy,andotherpossiblediagnoses.163 Paloutzian, Swenson, & McNamara (2006), 156. Here can also be found several other critiques to thehypothesisassociatingtemporallobeepilepsyandreligiosity.164Ratcliffe(2006),97–98.165James(1917),13.

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Inconclusion,thelocalizationofreligiousexperienceinthetemporallobesresultsin

aspecificcharacterizationof thoseexperiences—asapathology,amisfiring,amistake. It

challenges the legitimacy of religion, the validity of religion beyond the scientific object

religion,creatingasituationofwhichthescienceisthoughttoaccountforreligionwhileat

the same time dismiss it. As the above comments show, pathology is often taken as a

demotion of religion as a genuine experience. As such, the scientification of religious

experienceisnotsimplyascientificdiscovery;itisadiscursivebirth.Scientificationisnot

simplytoconstructascientificobject,buttoattributecharacter;itisnotonlyathing,but

alsoaperception.

6.2.2 ReligionasInsignificantBeingpathological,religionisthoughttonolongerbemeaningful.Andinawidercontext,

thescientificationofreligionresultsinreligionbeingframedasinsignificantinmanyways.

Whenreligionisconstructedasscience,manyquestionitsrelevancyforpersonalgrowth,

the cultivation of virtues, and the betterment of society. In addition, for numerous

individuals,“Naturalismdeniesthatthereareanyspiritualorsupernaturalrealities,”making

religionirrelevant.166Ascientificaccountofreligionisthoughttopotentiallyexchange“one

Godexplanationforanother,theGodofScience.”167

Othersfeelsimilarlyaboutthislineofresearch,suggestingtheassociatedscientific

‘technologyreplacestheGodithelpsunseat.’168Onarelatednote,numerouspublications

addresstheissueofreductionbyquestioningifthesciencesuggeststhereisnoGod,which

in turn is placed in the context of the question of the insignificance of religion.169

NeuroscientistMarioBeauregardandsciencejournalistDenyseO’Leary,reactingtonotions

oftheGodspot,identifiedatensionbetweenartificialinductionofreligiousexperienceand

the reality of religious experience. For example, they stated: “So do RSMEs depend on

temporal-lobesensitivitytomagnetism?[…]Thequestionis importantbecause, ifRSMEs

are causedbymagnetism, theyare irrelevant to anyobjective spiritual realityoutsideof

166Nielsen(2010),519.167Hill(1998).168Hercz(2002).169See,e.g.,Horgan(2006).

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ourselves.”170Ofcourse,theyareonlyirrelevantif‘religion’isconstructedincertainways,

that is asmutually exclusivewith science, leaving nothing but a scientific framework of

understanding. From this perspective, if religious experience is a scientifically induced

experience, it must be only a scientific phenomenon and as a scientific phenomenon it

negatesreligion.

One test subject of theGodHelmet, J. Hitt, lamented, “Do I reallywantGod to be

renderedasexplicableandpredictableasanendorphinrushaftera3-milerun?”Hittfound

himself‘disappointed’and“letdown,”seeminglyduetothescientificinterpretiveframework

thatheregardedinzero-sumtermsofengagementwithreligion.Forexample,hepresented

theresearchas‘killingoffGod’by‘explainingawaymysticalexperience’as“nothingmore

thanabitofsquelchyfeedbackinthetemporallobes,”as“merelyasideeffect.”Althoughthis

subject himself did not seem totally convinced of this characterization of religion, he

certainlycharacterizedPersinger’sworkassuch,asdoothertestsubjects.Scientificationto

himseemsinevitablytogiverisetoanegationofreligion,suggestingmutualexclusivityis

theunderlyingpresumption.Thesubjectconcluded:

‘SeeingGod’isreallyjustasoothingeuphemismforthefleetingawarenessofourselvesaloneintheuniverse:alookinthatexistentialmirror.The‘sensedpresence’—noweasilygeneratedbyamachinepumpingourbrainswithelectromagneticspirituality—isnothingbutourexquisiteandsingularself,atonewiththetruesolitudeofourcondition,deeplyanxious.We’reitchingtogetoutofhere,toescapethistiredoldenvironmentwithitsfrayedcarpets,blastedfurniture,andshabbyoldGod.171

6.2.3 ReligionasFalsePersingerwasonceaskedifhisworkleadshimtoconcludethatGod,orthe‘Godexperience,’

ismerelythecreationofthebrain.Persingerresponded:“[I]fwehavetodrawconclusions

now,baseduponthedata,theanswerwouldbemoreonthefactthatthereisnodeity.”172

Moreover,thereligiousperspectiveofthe‘Godexperience’hasbeencorrelatedwiththose

whoaremore “fantasyprone,”while thosewho support the scientification construct are

labeled“rational.”173TheGodHelmethasalsobeenusedtowards‘ghost-busting.’In1993,

170Beauregard&O’Leary(2007),81.171Hitt(1999).172Martin(n.d.).SeealsoPersinger(2009).TheauthenticityofexperienceselicitedviatheGodHelmetisalsothetopicofAndersenetal(2014).173Shermer(2003),68.

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radio broadcaster Don Hill found himself under the ownership of a ‘haunted’ house.

Investigating his experiences, he ended up in Persinger’s lab, in which he sensed the

presenceofthesameghosthehadencounteredathisprevioushome,leadingHilltoconclude

thattheghostwasnothingotherthanacreationofhisbrain,thathisghostwas‘literallyin

hishead.’174

Asanotherneurologistconclusivelyputit,“insteadofGodcreatingourbrains,our

brainscreatedGod.”175Othersinthefieldhavelookedatworkonthecognitivescienceof

religionandconcludedthesame.AscognitiveneuroscientistIrvingBiedermanputit,such

work confirms what the “vast majority” of neuroscientists already believe—that these

religiousexperiences“resideintheactivityofthebrain,ratherthantheexternalworld.”176

Similarly,RonBarrier,aspokesmanforAmericanAtheistsbasedinCranford,NewJersey,

stated, “The real commondenominatorhere is brain activity, not anything else. There is

nothingtoindicatethatthisisexternallyimposedorthatyouaresomehowtappingintoa

divineentity.”177PhysicistTanerEdisconcluded,intherelationallanguagewemightexpect,

thatsuchwork‘demystifiesmysticism’sinceitshowsreligiousexperienceisproducedby

thebrain.178

Asoneauthorsuccinctlyputit:

If a comprehensive functional accountmade no reference to the causal role of the supernatural inproducingtheexperience,thiswouldimplythatthesupernaturalhadnoroletoplayinthegenesisoftheexperience.Otherwisetheaccountwouldbeincomplete.

Fromthisperspective,itispossiblethatthereisnointrinsicreligiousexperiencewhatsoever

sinceemotionallychargedsituationsthatareinterpretedasreligiouscouldaccountforthe

phenomenon.179Reactingtosuchaccounts,manyconcludedthat,“Neurosciencewillsoon

relegate‘God’totheashheapofhistory.”‘God’as“anabsolutethatexistsindependentofthe

humanbrain”isan“illusion.”180

174DespiteHill’sconclusion,itisworthmentioning,thathiswifeandfriendshadsimilarexperiencesofghostlyapparitions, feelingsofdread,witnessingobjectsmoving, cold spots, andknocking andothernoises in thehome.ThiswasexplainedtoHillasaproductofgeophysicalconditionstherethatgiverisetoa‘haunting.’SeeHill(1998).SeealsoHill(1997a);Hill(1997b);Hill(1997c);andHercz(2002).175QuotedinHercz(2002).176Shermer(1999).Emphasisadded.177QuotedinHolmes(2001).178Edis(2006),118–119.179AbovequoteinRatcliffe(2006),98.Emphasisoriginal.Seealsoibid.,84.180QuotingPersingerinBradleyHagerty(2009),141.

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If religion is “an unavoidable by-product or side-effect of some other functional

cognitiveprocess” then “thiswould seriously threaten the case for veridicality,”Ratcliffe

noted.“Ifthehistoricalemergenceofsomethingcanbefullyaccountedforintermsofsome

otherwhollynon-mysteriousphenomenon,thenthereisnoneedtoresorttoanadditional

supernaturalelementtoexplainitspresence.”181Forexample,sciencewriterMichaelWhite

stated, “science became so overwhelmingly successful that, to many, the supernatural

becamealmostsuperfluous.”182Whenreligiousexperiencesareconstructedasreducibleto

scientificunderstandings,theideathatreligiousexperiencesarenot‘real’(ormerelyreal,

epiphenomena)oftenaccompaniesit.183Forexample,Crickclaimed,“Youarenothingbuta

packofneurons.”184

Theimplicationsofscientificationfortheveridicalityofreligionisaprominenttopic

throughouthistory,somephilosophersconsistentlyemphasizingthatmaterialismimplies

atheism, like philosopher Paul Henri Thiry d’Holbach (1729–1789). Many have

characterized Persinger’s interpretation of the research atheistically as well.185 As

physiologistPierre-Jean-GeorgesCabanis (1757–1808), a friendofd’Holbach,proclaimed

“Thenerves—that’sallthereistoman!”186Implicitinsuchclaimsisthatmentalproducts

aredevoidoftruereality,asFeuerbachdeclared,includingreligion,whichisidentifiedas

181Ratcliffe(2006),98.182QuotedinMellor(2003),528.183Somewoulddistinguishbetweenthesetwopositions:i.e.,ontheonehand,thatreligiousexperiencehasnoreality is called ‘elminativist,’ while, on the other hand, the position that religion ismerely real is labeledreductionist.See,e.g.,Bielfeldt(2003b),715.Whiletheconceptualdifferentiationisevident,thedifferentiationinthediscourseisnotsoopaque.Thesetwopossibleconceptualpositionsareoftenconfusedbytheindividualputting them forth or conflated by those responding to them. Suggesting that reducing religion to naturalphenomena,forexample—ratherthansimplysayingreligiousexperiencedoesnotexist—stilltonolesseradegreeleadstothequestionofwhetherreligiousexperienceshouldbetakenseriously.Moreover,someseekto circumvent the issue by adopting religious naturalistic positions, suggesting, for example, that thesupernaturalactsthroughnaturalmeans.Thisthenleadstothequestionofwhetherthisisstillnaturalismandif sowhether it is still religious.Nomatterwhat semantics are employed—reductionism, eliminativism,orreligiousnaturalism—thequestion remains: is religiousexperience real? SeealsoBarrett (2011),233; andBarrett(2013),410.184Crick(1994),3.Clearly,inlightofthediscursivehistoryathand,his‘astonishinghypothesis,’ashecalledit,is not so astonishing, but rather one that has a long and strong past. Similarly claiming originality,neuroscientist and critic of religion Sam Harris, along with his co-authors, argued they were the first tocharacterize belief at the level of brain activity, independent of propositional content. SeeHarris, Sheth,&Cohen (2008), 141. It is unclear whether these claims are due to historical ignorance or to the need forsensationalism—butwhatisclearisthatthesethoughtsareaproductofthetime.185E.g.,Oomen(2003),617;Bulkeley(2007);andHercz(2002).186QuotedintranslationinJammer(2003),540.

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“human experience, reflecting human capacities, values, and hopes.”187 This, Feuerbach

argued,isaself-identifyingpointofa“naturalscientistofthemind,”andindeedmanyofthe

fundamental axioms of scientificmaterialismwere derived from Feuerbach.188 Since the

emergence of scientific naturalism in the nineteenth century, naturalismwas thought to

asserttwothings:thatreligionwasasourceofsocialdysfunctionandreligionwasnothing

morethansuperstition.Asmentionedinthepreviouschapter,naturalismwasunderstood

specificallyasanegationofsupernaturalism,andthiswasunderstoodas“achallengetothe

actualvalidityofreligionitself.”189

At the same time, religionwas constructedashallucinationor illusion, suchasby

physician Henry Maudsley (1835–1918), who saw no difference between the visions of

saintsandtheinsane.190Freud’sinfluencewasgreataswellandhe,too,framedtheismas

illusion.HebelievedthatthenotionofGodwasfalse,createdbywishfulthinkingthatdoes

notreflecttherealityofthesituation.LikePersinger,Freudsawthisasameansofcoping

withexistentialanxieties,enabling thedevotee toendure thehardshipsof life.191Yet, for

Freud this was maladaptive, a “mass obsessional delusion,” leading to the decline of

society.192Adaptiveormaladaptive,theconclusionisthesame—religiousbeliefsareuntrue,

religiousexperiencesareunreal,religionisfalse.

Thescientificationofreligioncreatesadoublebindforreligion.Notonlyisreligionnegated

by reducing it to the natural science, but sincemany find nature to be ‘all there is,’ any

identificationbetweenreligionandthesupernatural is thought tosuggest thatreligion is

unnaturalandthusformanyunreal.193Nomatterhow‘religion’ is treated—asnaturalor

supernatural—thescientificationofreligionnegatesreligion.Inclosingthissubsectionon

‘religionnegated,’Iwanttoemphasizethatthesecharacterizationsoftheconcept‘religion’

alongwith thediscussionon the legitimacyof the scientificationof religionarepartof a

largerdiscourseonthechangingmeaningsof ‘religion’moregenerallyandtheboundsof

187QuotedinGregory(2000),179.SeealsoNielsen(2010),522.188Gregory(2000),179;andChadwick(1975),169.189Turner(1974),31.190Turner(1974),33.191Plantinga(2015).192Nielsen(2010),522;andJeeves&Brown(2009),13–14.193Conklin(1922[1921]),198.

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scientificknowledge.Itshows,thatformany,thequestionsraisedbythenaturalscienceof

religionarenot simply about theharddata, but about truth, thenatureof themindand

consciousness, thenatureof religiousandotherexperiences, and the limitsandscopeof

science.Questionsabouttherealityandsignificanceofreligionareaprimarytopicinthe

discourse,evenintheneuroscientificliterature.194

Thatreligionintheframeworkofscienceleadstothequestionabouttheveridicality

ofreligionandreligiousexperiencesinasignificantnumberofinstancesistestamenttothe

fact thatascientificationof religion isoftenamatterof framingreligionas ‘notreligion,’

which reflects the interplaybetween the relational constructsandprocesses. Indeed, the

developmentofthescienceofreligionwasmoreoftenthannotaquestionofwhatpeople

believed and whether it was true, with an underlying assumption that “Naturalistic

explanations are, of course, incompatiblewith religious belief.”195 The veridicality of the

beliefwasalreadybuiltintothepremise—theunderlyingnaturalisticworldviewasperits

exclusion of the supernatural and religious. Since science is ‘not religion’ as permutual

exclusivity, tomake religion science-like is tomake it unlike religion and confusion and

ambiguityensue,aswellasthefindingsof‘disproof’and‘disbelief’ofreligion.Thequestions

oftheveridicalityofreligionareproductsoftheassumptionsofmutualexclusivity.

AsmentionedinChapterOne,ifreligionwereframedaslikemysticism,thiswillnot

raisethequestionofif itcanstillbeconsideredreligion—becausereligionandmysticism

arenotthoughtofasoppositional.So,whyisitthatreligionasascientificobjectraisesthe

matteroftruthandfalsity?Itisbecausethetwodomainsarealreadytakentobemutually

exclusiveinsomeway,suggestingthecentralroleofrelationalconstructionintheevolution

oftheterm‘religion’here.Becausereligionandsciencearetakentobemutuallyexclusive,

when religion is constructed as science-like, religion is reduced to science and any non-

scientificobjectcalled‘religion’isnegated.

194E.g.,oneneuroscientificpublicationontheneuralcorrelatesofreligiousexperiencesmentionedintheveryfirst paragraph, “Religious experience is brain-based […] Determining the neural substrates […] does notautomaticallylessenordemeantheirspiritualsignificance.”Itisobviousfromthelocationoftheseremarksattheverybeginningofthearticlethatthisissueissomethingthatneedstobeaddressedbeforefurtherremarkscanbemade.Saver&Rabin(1997),498.195Harrison(1990),2;andNielsen(2010),525.SeealsoSmith(1978),40.

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7 FromMutualExclusivitytoScientification

Ifrelationalconstructsstructurediscursivechange,ashypothesized,thepredictionwasthat

signifiersofscienceaspermutualexclusivitywouldbeusedtofurtherrelationalizereligion

andscience.Oneofthemajorsignifiersofsciencehasproventobenaturalism.Ifitisthecase

thatnaturalismisasignifierofscienceaspermutualexclusivitythen,Ifurtherpredicted,

naturalismwouldgiverisetoreduction.Thisisbecausenaturalismisalreadythoughtofas

theexclusivedomainof science inspecificexclusionof religion.Wecansee that thishas

indeedbeenthecase,aswhenreligionwaslikenedtonaturalism,itwasnotjustlikenedto

naturalismasanindependentconcept,butarelationalone—thatis,naturalismasexcluding

supernaturalism. As such, the fact that likening religion to naturalism led to reduction

suggeststhatmutualexclusivitystructuredthisdiscursivechange.

Lookingatthisresearchontheconstructionofthescientificobjectofreligion,wesee

thisisnotasimplematterofplacingsomepre-establishedthing‘religion’intoascientific

framework.Itisnotasimplematterofmethodologicallysituatingreligioninscience;itisa

discursiveformulationof‘religion’tomakeitconceptuallycoherentintermsofsciencewhen

scienceisunderstoodas‘notreligion.’Inordertoaccomplishsuchatask,‘religion’hadtobe

signifiedbyconceptsthathaveconventionallybeenunderstoodindirectoppositionto it.

Furthermore, PeterHarrison found that the historical construction of the term ‘religion’

reflectedthescientificandrationalistworldviewinordertomaketheconceptintelligible

from this perspective.196 These discursive constellations have given rise to new

conceptualizationsof‘religion,’whichfollowedthepresumptionsofreligion-sciencemutual

exclusivity.J.SamuelPreusobservedthedevelopmentof‘thestudyofreligion’occurredin

specific contrast to theological considerations, pointedly “nonreligious.”197 As a result,

exclusivereligionwasnegated.Naturalists—inthetraditionofHumethroughFeuerbach,

Marx,Durkheim,andFreud—havebelieved“ithasbeenwellestablishedthatthereareno

soundreasonsforreligiousbeliefs:thereisnoreasonablepossibilityofestablishingreligious

beliefstobetrue;thereisnosuchthingasreligiousknowledgeorsoundreligiousbelief.”198

196Harrison(1990),2.197Preus(1987),x–xi,xiv,andpassim.198Nielsen(2010),521.

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Thismeans“alloftheseaccountsarereductionistic.”199

Inthisway,wecanseetheoveralldiscursivechangesfromthenotionofexclusive

religiontothatofthescienceofreligiondisplaysarelationalstructure.Thescientificobject

ofreligionwasstructuredbymutualexclusivityintermsofwhatsignifiersareemployedin

the likening of religion and science, in terms of how those signifiers are interpreted as

mutuallyexclusiverelative tosignifiersofreligion,and in termsofreducingreligionasa

reflectionofthezero-sumframeworkofmutualexclusivity.Thereductionofreligiontothe

scientific framework then resulted in a novel relational construct—the scientification of

religion,asonemanifestationof the identityconstruct.As such,wecanseecontinuity in

termsofarelationalstructureamongthediversityoftheconstructs.Inturn,theinterplayof

the scientification of religion and mutual exclusivity further structured changes in the

meaningof‘religion.’Theinterplayoccurredinthat‘religionasscience’(scientification)is

discursivelystructuredintermsofscienceas‘notreligion’(mutualexclusivity),resultingin

theconstructionofreligionas‘notreligion.’Thisinterplaycouldbeseenintheperception

that to construct religionas sciencewas tonegate religion (aspermutualexclusivity) in

termsofgenuineness,significance,andveridicality;itexplainshowaccountingforreligion

amountstonegatingit.Arelationalperspectiveilluminatestheconceptualprocessesofsuch

aparadox,asitisscientificatedreligionthatisaffirmed,whileexclusivereligionisnegated.

Thisbreachesthebordersofmutualexclusivitywhileatthesametimereinforcingthem—

religionisscience,butonlyinsofarasthescientificobjectofreligionisnotreligion.

Todaywecanseethepredominanceofnaturalizedreligionintheacademy,implicitly

framedastheonlyacceptablereligionforthescienceofreligion—inthatthosewhocriticize

evolution,argueforintelligentdesign,orsupportnotionsofmiraclesandsupernaturalism

countertonaturallawsarenotpublishedintherelevantjournalsandarenotinvitedtothe

significantconferences,inadditiontobeingsubjecttoridicule.200Thisdemonstrateswhat

thescientificworldviewentails:notthatreligionissimplynatural,butratherisnothingbut

anaturalphenomenonandthussubjecttoreduction.Reductionbecameinstitutionalizedby

making scientific naturalism the only acceptable framework of meaning in the

199Nielsen(2010),523.Emphasisoriginal.200Smith(2003),246.

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professionalized study of religion. However, aswewill see in later chapters, historically

speaking in the study of religion and of religion and science this has been a formidable

challenge, but not an enduring constraint. There are certainly many non-reductionist

explanationsofreligion.Asreductionwasbornfromrelationalization,sotooitcandieby

relationalization.Itallcomesdowntoourpresumptionsaboutwhatitmeansforreligionto

be science-like and science to be religion-like, which is only restricted by the relational

content of the concepts. Andwhen it comes to our presumptions, there is no fact of the

matter,exceptthesocialfactofthematter.

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Chapter5:TheReligionizationofScience&theCaseoftheReligionofScientism

Neverwillmanpenetratedeeperintoerrorthanwhenheiscontinuingonaroadwhichhasledhimtogreatsuccess.—FriedrichA.vonHayek(1899–1992)1

1 Scientismas‘Religion’

EconomistFriedrichA.vonHayekspoketheabovewordswhencommentingonthe

riseintheconfidencetowardscience.Thoughmanyweresweptupintheenthusiasm

ofthe‘scientificworldview,’Hayek,amongothers,wasconcernedaboutthegrowing

“scientistichubris.”HewastroubledbytheincreasinglypopularnotioninEuropeand

NorthAmericathatsciencecouldactasacatalystofsocialchange,aswellasbythe

applicationofscientificanalysistootherrealmsofthought.2Hedescribedthissocial

movementasa“pilgrimagetothenewtempleofscience,”pointingtotheprevalent

notion of the omniscience and omnipotence of scientific knowledge.3 Hayek

characterized this worldview as “decidedly unscientific,” labeling it ‘scientism.’4

Hayek popularized this use of the term and many have agreed with such an

assessment, partly because when science is seen as expansionist, reducing all

knowledgeunderitsdomain,itisfrequentlyunderstoodasreligion-likeandthus,as

permutualexclusivity,as‘notscience.’

Inthischapter,Iwillexaminehowsciencehasbeenconstructedasareligion

inareductiveway,arelationalconstructIrefertoasthe‘religionizationofscience,’

mostcommonlytermed‘scientism.’Thereligionizationofscienceisthesecondand

finalsubcategoryoftheidentityconstruct.Ifmyhypothesisthatrelationalconstructs

1Hayek(2010),169.2Caldwell(2010),24and30.3Hayek(1979[1952]),200andpassim.4Caldwell(2010),9;andHayek(1979[1952]),24.Seealsoibid.,204and207;andCaldwell(2010),18and35–37.

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structurediscursivechangeiscorrect,thenwewouldexpectthatintheprocessof

constructing science as religion, to make ‘religion-like’ will reflect what ‘religion’

meansinthecontextofmutualexclusivity.Indeed,whensciencehasbeenlikenedto

religion the same signifiers were employed in their dichotomous formation, as

discussed inChapterThree, like rationality/superstitionand free-thinking/dogma,

forinstance.Justasinthecaseofscientification,howtomakereligionandscience

alikeisbasedonhowthetwohavebeendifferentiatedrelativetooneanother.And,

inalikemanner,mutualexclusivitysetthetermsofengagementandinterpretation.

Thismeansthatsincereligionhashistoricallybeenconceptualizedas‘notscience,’to

make science religion-like is to deconstruct previousnotions ofwhat ismeant by

‘science’andreconstructitintonotionsofwhat‘religion’is,makingthisnewconcept

of‘science’‘notscience,’inamannerofspeaking.Putdifferently,scienceasreligion-

likeisthoughttoprecludesignifiersofscienceaspermutualexclusivity.Thisleaves

religionastheonlyframeworkofmeaningandscienceisreducedtoreligion.Similar

to the preceding chapters, I will trace this relational structure in the discursive

changes around the term ‘science’ as regards the conceptualization of its history,

enterprise,knowledge,andprofession—thoughagainmanyoftheseaspectsoverlap,

making these divisions more didactic than anything else. The main point in this

chapteristoshowhowpre-existingrelationalconstructsstructuredthechangesto

thereligionizationofscience.

Thenotion thatscience likened toreligion is transgressiveandzero-sumis

based on the presumption that the two constitutemutually exclusive territory to

begin with. In this way, mutual exclusivity is structuring the discursive changes.

However,thereisanadditionalrelationalconstructunderconsiderationhere—that

of scientification. With the concept ‘science’ clearly signified by ‘reductionism’

followingthedevelopmentofthescientificationofreligionandsociety—asdiscussed

inthepreviouschapter—thelikeningofreligionandsciencetookonnewforms.This

was,namely,thelikeningofreductivesciencetoreligion.Inthetimeperiodfromthe

eighteenthtonineteenthcenturies,therewasa“looseningofintellectualdiscipline”

thatledtothepopularizationandexpansionofscientificinterestsintootherdomains

of life. In the nineteenth century, the “scientific spirit” was used to justify the

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extensionofsciencetoeveryaspectofsociety.5Bythesecondhalfofthenineteenth

century,thescientificworldviewwasthoughtbymanytodeterminethelegitimacyof

allintellectualthought.6

Yet,at thesametime, thehegemonyof thescientificworldviewcametobe

severely criticized. The late nineteenth century saw an unprecedented

disenchantment with science, an extraordinary rejection of naturalism and

positivism,andanexceptionaloppositionagainstthescientificmovement.7Fromthis

timeonthroughtoday:

[T]heintrusionofscienceintotheterritoriesofthehumanitieshasbeendeeplyresented.Justasreviledistheapplicationofscientificreasoningtoreligion;manywriterswithoutatraceofabeliefinGodmaintainthatthereissomethingunseemlyaboutscientistsweighinginonthebiggestquestions.8

Theexpansionofsciencehadreachedapointsothatmanyfeltithadoversteppedits

bounds,inframingallofknowledgeunderitsreductiveframeworkofnaturalismas

acompleteexplanation.9Theterm‘scientism’emergedinreactiontothiscontextand

was largely used as a criticismof the reductive application of themethods of the

natural sciences to social phenomena (i.e., scientification).10 The objective of

scientismhasbeensuggestedtobe“Thetranslationofnonscientificdiscourseinto

scientific discourse,” which “is also the source of its intellectual perfunctoriness.”

LeonWieseltier,forinstance,characterizedthescientisticmindsetasan“attemptto

reducehumanexperienceandhumanfeeling[…]tomaterialisticscientificfactors.”11

In another example, Joseph Ben-David pointed to the ‘carelessness’ and

‘superficiality’ of scientistics’ over-application of scientificmodels to the study of

society.12Scientismisseenasanattemptto“colonize”beyonditsterritory,aposition

5Burnham(1987),168.6Lightman(2012),451.7MacLeod(1982),2–3.8Pinker(2013).9See,e.g.,Smith(2003),233–234.10Ziemannetal(2012),2;Hayek(1979[1952]);Olson(1982);Olson(1990);andHakfoort(1995),376. See also Stenmark (2001), 1–17, for an in-depth discussion on different formulations of‘scientism,’howtheyrelatetooneanother,andhowtheyrelatetoreligion.11Wieseltier(2013a).12Ben-David(1971),90.

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arguedforbyIainCameronandDavidEdge.13MikaelStenmarkarguedthat‘scientific

expansionism’—i.e.,whatisperceivedas‘science’traversingitsbounds—isinvolved

in various forms of scientism and this expansionism can involve the domain of

religion.14

Historians,philosophers,andculturalcriticsadoptedthisterm‘scientism’to

voice these very specific concerns about the scientification of society, with its

expansionism and reductionism striking groups on both sides of the debate as

religion-like.RoyMacLeodobserved:

As ideology, craft and practice, bent on demystifying theworld, the ‘creed of science’, theproject of scientific naturalism, the ideology of the scientists’movement, becamemission,mandate,andmetaphorforknowingallthatcouldbeknownaboutMan,NatureandSociety.15

Thisworldviewhasbeenregularlyconstructedas‘scientism,’inoffering“asubstitute

for traditional religion and ideology.”16 Scientismhas also beendefined as simply

“faith in science.”17 Though the literature on scientism “has not yielded a general

historical picture,” the reductive identity of science as a religion is commonly

associated with scientism.18 And it is often specifically the expansionism and

reductionism of science/scientism that is drawn upon in the construction of the

religionizationofscience.19Forexample,JohnBrookeandGeoffreyCantorarguedvia

‘scientificimperialism,’scientism“itselfbecomesareligion.”20Theideaofscienceas

the ultimate framework of knowledge has been repeatedly likened to religious

ideology and dogma and thus (from this perspective) as unscientific. In thisway,

scientificationsetthestageforreligionization.Assuch,weseetheevolutionofthe

13Cameron&Edge(1979),6.14Stenmark(2013),2104.SeealsoBarnes(1985),91,whoputforthasimilardefinitionofscientism.Itisworthnotingthatithasalsobeensaidthattheapplicationofsciencetoareaspreviouslythoughttobeinaccessiblebyscienceisthewayinwhichscienceitselfadvances,inthesenseofthelegitimateandappropriateexpansionofknowledge.Veryfewwouldargueforatotalrestrictionofscienceafterall.See,e.g.,Mulkay(1974).15MacLeod(2000),xix.16Stenmark(2001),viii.Seealso,ibid.,91–132.17Hakfoort(1992),542.18Hakfoort(1995),385.19See,e.g.,Stenmark(2001),123–132;Peters(2005),8185;Woelfel(2013);andMacLeod(1982),4–5andpassim.MacLeoddidnotmakethisanexplicitpointofargument,butitisclearfromthedataheprovidedthatoneofthemajorcriticismofthenew“creed”of“scientism”wasreductionism.SeealsoBurnham(1987),passim.Ibid.,154explainedhowthis“religionofscience”embodiesreductionism.20Brooke&Cantor(1998),46.

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term ‘science’ follow in the footsteps of its predecessors, setting the terms of

engagementforfurtherreligion-sciencerelationalization.

Whilethereareavarietyofpossiblepositions,forthepurposesofthischapter

‘scientism’refersto‘scientismquareligion,’specificallyintermsofthereligionization

ofscience.Yet,itisimportanttonotethatIalsousetheterm‘scientism’toreferto

others’useoftheterm,whichwillbeapparentinthecontext.Inthisdiscourse,itis

not always clear if the intention of advocateswas tomimic, duplicate, or replace

religion. And though there is a clear discursive connection between science and

religioninthesecontexts,asshownbelow,therelationalconstructofreligionization

wasoftennotapplieduntil othersanalyzed these intellectualmovementsas such.

Despite the objectives of these advocates, their work in framing

reductionism/expansionismasasignifierofscienceandlikeningthistoreligionset

thestageforthereductionofsciencetoreligion.Thoughthereareamultiplicityof

views on scientism, I chose this as a case study to illustrate the religionization of

science because it exhibits the structure of both science and religion in terms of

mutualexclusivity,aswellasscienceintermsofthereductionismofscientification.

Inthisway,itdemonstratesthehistoricalcontinuityoftheserelationalconstructs,

sincescientismemergedinandwasstructuredbythecontextofthedevelopmentsof

thepreviouschapter.

2 Scientificationasthe‘ReligionofScientism’

PaulFarberobservedthat“anincreasedsecularism[…],formany,erodedconfidence

intraditionalreligiousbeliefs.Thesearchofanalternativetoreligionasafoundation

forethicsledsometoconsiderscienceasapossibility.”21Inthenineteenthcentury,

theauthorityofsciencewasexpanding,and,asthesocialstatusofsciencegrew,its

influenceovertheideologicalrealmincreasedaswell.Manylookedtowardscience

21Farber(2000),199.

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forarenewedreligionandsometookthis to theextremeclaimthatsciencecould

replacereligionintotal.22

Thisledtotheestablishmentofsomeofthefirstreligionsofscience,thevery

advocates of which were intimately involved in scientific expansionism in the

establishmentofsociology—which,aswesaw,contributedtoscientificationandthe

identityof reductionismasa signifierof science.AugusteComte (1798–1857), for

instance,fatheredsociology,oneoftheaccursedsciencesintherealmofreligionand

society,andhealsodevelopedareligionbasedonsciencethatwasthoughttousurp

‘traditional’ religion, as did his predecessor Henri Saint-Simon (1760–1825). The

contextofsuchviewsincludedmomentouschangesineconomic,social,political,and

cultural life, such as the French Revolution (1789–1799), the Napoleonic Empire

(1804–1814),andtheRestorationinthe1820sand1830s.Thiscreatedasituationin

whichpeoplestrovefororderandstability,somethingsciencepromisedtoprovide.

Alreadyamongmanythinkers,sciencewasthoughttoholdthefutureofhumankind

in its hands, accelerating anddirecting theprogress of thehuman race, as canbe

foundinMarquisdeCondorcet’s(1743–1794)SketchforaHistoricalPictureofthe

ProgressoftheHumanMind(1794).Condorcet’sviewssumupthesentimentofthe

day. His Sketch, described as “the famous testament of the eighteenth century,”

reflectstheendlessoptimismandtheinfiniteendsofwhichsciencecouldpotentially

serve.23Condorcet,whosoughttocreateascienceofsociety,influencedSaint-Simon,

aswellasComte.24Anditwasthesemovementsthathavebeencommonlyassociated

with scientism. The origins of scientism are often traced to these very same

individualsandthoughtsystemsinturn-of-the-nineteenth-centuryParis.25

22Turner(1974),14.23Hayek(1979[1952]),192.24Pickering(1993),212;Pickering(1993–2009),vol.1,49;Hayek(1979[1952]),378;andWernick(2005),128.25Hayek(1979[1952]),185–186;Olson(2008);andCaldwell(2010),6.HayekhadoriginallyintendedtoexplorescientismincountriesotherthanFrance,butunfortunatelyhenevercompletedthisproject.Onthis,seeCaldwell(2010).Withthelackingscholarshiponthehistoryofscientism,itisdifficulttosaytowhatextenttheearlydevelopmentsofscientismmanifestedinotherpartsofEurope.However,Ben-David(1971),102,notedthatthewidesocialinterestinscientismwassimilarinEnglandtothesituationinFrance.AndOlson(2008)examinedscientisminnotonlyFrance,butalsoGermanyandBritain.Butler(1968)tracedthedevelopmentsofSaint-SimonisminGermanyaswell.

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Though the term ‘scientism’ did not emerge until later in the nineteenth

century,itwasthiscontextthatgaverisetotheneologism.26By1870(lessthantwo

decades after Comte’s death), the term ‘scientism’ was introduced to the English

language to describe the scientific worldview in general, but also to express

ideologicaltyrannyofhumanthoughtspecifically,withSaint-SimonandComteused

asprimaryexamples.27Bythe1880s,therewasastrongmovementofcriticismand

pessimismtoward“scientificarrogance,”identifiedwith“scientism,”thenew“creed”

ofscience,andattributedtoa“Radicalparty.”28Whilethereweremanyadvocatesfor

ascience-basedreligion,othersadamantlyargued,“Scientificmethods[…]couldnot

replacereligion;scientificreasoningcouldnotprovideamorality.”29

Weseethetermconstructedsimilarlyonintothetwentiethandtwenty-first

centuries. This notion of scientism as religion was increasingly widespread

throughoutEuropeandNorthAmericafollowingWorldWarI(1914–1918).Withthe

economic and political situation, some circles put much faith in technological

advances,intheabilityofsciencetoincreaseproductiveefficiency,andthepossibility

ofsocialismtoreplacefailingliberalfree-marketsocieties.30MaxWeber(1864–1920)

alsofamouslydescribedthemodernworldasoneof‘disenchantment,’asituationin

26Thoughitsusewasnotparticularlypopularuntilthetwentiethcentury.Turner(1974),11.Somehave suggested that ‘scientism,’ in its variousmanifestations canbedatedback to antiquity,whileothersplaceitsoriginsintheScientificRevolutionortheEnlightenment.SeeOlson(1982),62;Feser(2011/12);Feyerabend(2011),16–26and69–81;Stenmark(2003);Ben-David(1971),78–85and89–90;Sorell(1991),34–35;Hutchinson(2011),7;andHakfoort(1995),383–390.However,hereIfocusonthetimelineaspertheemergenceofthediscourse.Brooke&Cantor(1998),46.Literatureonthegeneralhistoryofscientismisratherscarce.Fortheperiodfromantiquitytotheearlynineteenthcentury(thoughnotasystematictreatmentof‘scientism’),seeOlson(1982);andOlson(1990);andfor the nineteenth century, see Hayek (1979 [1952]). See Sorell (1991), on the seventeenth andtwentieth centuries, but with a focus on scientism within philosophy; and Stenmark (2001), forcontemporary scientism (though primarily from a theoretical standpoint, examining differentconceptualizationsof‘scientism,’aswellascontainingacriticalanalysisofscientisticclaims).SeealsoCameron&Edge(1979),onthesocialaspectsofscientism,withreferencestomanyprimarysources.27SeeSimpson(2016i),withreferencestoearlyusesoftheterm.SeealsoUnusdemultis(1877),foranexampleoftheearly,pejorativeuseoftheterm‘scientism.’Forabroadexplorationofvarioususesoftheterm,seePeels(n.d.).28MacLeod(1982),4–5.SeealsoLevine(1990),231–232.29MacLeod(1982),8.30Caldwell(2010),24–29;andSorell(1991),13–15.Thiscanbecontrastedwithmycommentsonperceptions of science following the war in the following chapter. Of course, different circlesemphasized different views and all can be seen as historically representative. There is no need toassumeauniformityofopinionhere.

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whichscience,rationality,andother‘secular’realmswerevaluedoverreligion.31It

has alsobeenargued that scientism, aswell as sciencemoregenerally, fulfills the

psychologicalfunctionsofreligion.32Atthesametime,manysawthefaithinsocialism

andscienceasmisguidedandthenotionthatsciencewouldleadtotherationalization

of society as a reflection of the hubris of science and reason, characterized as

scientism.33Theriseof socialismandscientismwereevenregardedashaving the

same intellectual origins in Saint-Simon and Comte, put forth by ÉmileDurkheim

(1858–1917),aswellasbyHayek.34

Indevelopingthenotionof‘scientism,’Hayekwasalsospecificallyreactingto

Saint-Simonism, Comtian thought, and similar reductionist attitudes toward

subsumingallknowledgeunderscience.Henotonlyutilizedreligiousanalogiesand

signifiers toexplicate scientism(e.g., ‘pilgrimage,’ ‘temple,’ and ‘omniscience’),but

alsodiscussedSaint-Simon’sandComte’srolesincreatingreligionsfromscienceas

evidenceofscientifichubris.InhisanalysisofSaint-Simon,Comte,andfollowers,he

pointed to the ideal of creating a utopianworld via science and technology.35 He

referredtothisasthe“engineeringpointofview”ofsociety,whichheidentifiedas

oneofthecentralfeaturesofscientism—theexpansionofscienceintothestudyof

31Carroll(2011),120.32Hakfoort(1995),388;Fariasetal(2013);Haught(2005);Sorell(1991);Preston(2012);andSagan(2006). Though more nuanced and with a bit different focus, but nonetheless relevant to thisobservation,seealsoMidgley(1992),esp.51–61;andPlantinga(2015).33Caldwell(2010),29.34Hayek(1979[1952]),185–211;Caldwell(2010),14,24–25,and29;Ben-David(1971),78–83;andDurkheim(1958),104–105.Durkheimreferredto‘positivism,’ratherthan‘scientism.’Thediscursiveconnection between these terms will be discussed at a later point. On the connection betweensocialism and scientism see, e.g., Ferri (1906), which also brought in the motif of Darwinism(specificallyasthescientificfoundationofsocialism),discussedinconnectionwithscientismatalaterpoint in this chapter. It is additionally notable here that socialism has also been interpreted as areligion,andthusformsadiscursiveknotwiththereligionizationofscienceandscientismaswellthathasitshistoricalrootsinthismovement.Onsocialismasareligion,see,e.g.,Yeo(1977);andBurleigh(2000). The term ‘socialism,’ in the sense of the political movement, was first used in the Saint-SimoniannewspaperLeGlobe(1824–1832).SeeHayek(1979[1952]),282,and,regardingsocialism,scientism,andSaint-Simonism,seeibid.,passim.Twentieth-centuryscientisticsarealsoconnectedtosocialismandpositivisminSorell(1991),14–15.35 The utopian vision of scientistics vary significantly, further indicating the social, rather thanscientificorfact-based,natureofscientism.Cf.,e.g.,Mesthene(1947);andRapoport(1957).

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society.36Thisengineeringofsocietyisnowheremoreapparentthaninthefounding

oftheSaint-SimonianandComtianreligions.

Though,forHayek,theconnectionbetweenreligionandscientismisindirect

anddoesnotconstitutehismaincritiqueofscientism,hedidregularlydrawuponthe

connectionbetweenthetwo.Forexample,HayeksuggestedSaint-Simonsawhimself

astheProphetoftheLord,whoseinstructionwasrevealeddirectlytohim.Hayeksaw

atransitioninSaint-Simonismfromsciencetoreligion,equatingtheriseofthelatter

withthefalloftheformerandthusfollowingthestructureofthemutualexclusivity

construct.Further to thispointofnescience,Hayekwent intominutedetail about

Saint-Simon’slifetodemonstratehis“verysuperficialandill-digestedknowledgeof

the scientific literature.”37 He similarly emphasized Comte’s “cerebral hygiene”—

purposefullyrefrainingfromobtainingnewinformation—asevidencetothefactthat

hecouldhardlybeconsideredthe‘masteroftheworldandallthesciences’thathe

claimedtobe.38Inthisway,‘scientism’wasnotonlyevidentinthereligiousaspects,

but alsomarked off as ‘not science,’ as would be expected in likening science to

religionwhendepartingfromnotionsofmutualexclusivity.

ItwasalsoaroundthetimefollowingthatofSaint-SimonandComte,fromthe

mid-nineteenthtotheearlytwentiethcenturies,thatevolutionaryethicsandother

formsofSocialDarwinismwereontherise,whichwerethoughttoactassubstitute

religions as well, which will be explored further. So, while religion was being

explained away by science as discussed in the previous chapter, sciencewas also

positionedintermsofreplacingitssocialandmoralfunctions,ofreplacingareligion

thatwasincreasinglyregardedasinsignificantandfalseasperscientification.

36 Hakfoort (1995), 382; and Hayek (1979 [1952]) 25, 166, 202–203, and passim. Theconceptualizationofscientismastheapplicationofquantitativesciencetosocialplanninghasbeenone of themain associationswith scientism at least until the late 1970s (and perhaps later). SeeCameron & Edge (1979), 5, for relevant literature. As this is only indirectly related to thereligionizationofscience,Iwillnotgointothesehistoricaldevelopmentsfurther,butnoteithereasoneperspectiveontheroleofareligionofscienceintermsofspecificsocialdevelopmentcenteredonscientificideals.37Hayek(1979[1952]),223andpassimthroughout213–234.Seealsoibid.,283.38Hayek(1979[1952]),325.HayekclaimedComterefusedtoreadanynewpublications,howeveraccordingtoPickering(1993),230,Comte’s“cerebralhygiene”wastolimithimselftopoetryreadings.

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From Saint-Simonism to present-day scientism, scientism has been

understoodasthereductiveapplicationofthemethodsofthenaturalsciencestothe

study of society, including religion—or, in other words, as the conduit of

scientification.39Scientismhasbeendefinedas:

[The]attempttoreduce(ortranslate)somethingintosciencewhichhasnotpreviouslybeenunderstoodasscienceor,ifthatisnotattainable,todenyitssignificance.Theyallmaintainthat theboundariesofsciencecanbeexpanded, inonewayoranother, intonon-academicareasofhumanlife(suchasart,morality,andreligion).40

And this is exactly what we saw in the case of scientification—the reduction of

religiontoscientificframeworksandthenegationofitssignificancebeyondscientific

understandings.Asevidencetothispoint,scientificatorsareoftenlabeledscientistics

andviceversa.41Forexample,framingthequestionoftheGodbeliefasascientific

question, as we saw in the case of Michael Persinger and the God Helmet in the

previouschapter,hasbeensuggestedtobeimplicitlyscientistic.42

Whilescientificationisunderstoodasexpressingascientisticoutlook,itisat

thesametimeregularlyconnectedtoreligion.Forexample,scientismislikenedto

religionby“profferingnaturalisticanswersthatsupplantsupernaturalisticonesand

intheprocess[…]providingspiritualsustenanceforthosewhoseneedsarenotbeing

met by these ancient cultural traditions [i.e., religions].”43 This suggests that

scientificationbreedsthelikeningofsciencetoreligion—scientificationbothexplains

away religion, while positioning science as an alternative. For instance, Helga

Nowotnyclaimedthatthescientificworldview“hasnotonlyaddedtotheongoing

processofsecularizationofreligion,buthasledsciencetotakeovermanyfeaturesof

a religious institution.”44 Similarly,WilliamHamiltonWood (b. 1874) claimed the

scientist “feels that he has discovered the truth about religion and thus religious

truth,”againbringingtogetherthescientificaccountsofreligionandthesubstitution

ofreligion.45Inanotherexample,ithasbeenarguedthatscientificnaturalismwasan

39Foracontemporaryexample,seeGorski(1990),279.40Stenmark(2001),3.41See,e.g.,Wieseltier(2013a).42TheFaradayInstituteforScienceandReligion(n.d.).43Shermer(2002),35.44Nowotny(1979),10.45Wood(1922),20.

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attempt“toputscienceinreligion’splacenotonlyasanaccountofthenaturalworld,

butasaculturalauthority,asourceofvaluesintellectual,moralandspiritual.Thatis,

in replacing religion with science they were turning science into a religion.”46

Naturalismwasconstructedasacompleteworldviewthat “separatesNature from

God, subordinates Spirit to Matter, and sets up unchangeable law as supreme,”

accordingtoJamesWard(1843–1925).47Thisexhibitsallthreerelationalconstructs

discussed thus far—mutual exclusivity, scientification, and religionization (or,

regardingthelatter,simplytherelationalprocessofmakingreligion-like,depending

on one’s perspective), bringing the three together in defining, expanding, and

conqueringknowledgeforsciencerelativetoreligion.

Asscientificationislinkedtoscientismquareligion,weseethosecommitted

tothescientificationofreligionframedasreligious.Forinstance,DanielDennett,due

tohisuseofscienceto‘explainaway’religion,doesnotonlyappearinthediscourse

onscientification,heisalsosuggestedtohavean“arguablyreligiouscommitment”to

scientism.48Furthermore,thelikeningofsciencetoreligionwaspurposefullydonein

ordertoexpandscience.ThomasHuxley(1825–1895), JohnTyndall (1820–1893),

andHerbert Spencer (1820–1903) all thought of science as religion-like in that it

couldexplainandreplacethefunctionsofreligion.Thesemenpositionednaturalism

inmultiplewaysrelativetoreligionandsciencetoservethesegoals:asthatwhich

distinguishesreligionandscience,asthatwhichcanexplainawayreligion,andasthat

which can replace religion. As naturalistic explanation was a major source of

scientification,thisconstitutesanotherexampleoftheconstructionofscientification

asreligious.

Infact,sincetheterm‘scientificnaturalism’wasintroducedbyHuxleyin1892,

he and his fellows of the influential X-Club agreed that naturalism should be

presented as a system similar to religion, that could “still spiritual cravings,” but

foundeduponscience, installingthe“GodofScience.”49 Indeed, ithasbeenargued

46Dewitt(2013),33.47QuotedinTurner(1974),15.48Hutchinson(2011),191.Seealsoibid.,192–196.49QuotebyHuxleyinLightman(2012),454;andLightman(1987),160.Seealsoibid.,152–160;Levine(1990), 236; and Turner (1974), 8–37. Huxley and Tyndall were preoccupied with finding an

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that naturalism can fulfill the cognitive functions of religion.50 From Huxley’s

perspective,sciencewasunderstoodasacompetingmodeoffaithwithreligion,not

asawayofhavingnofaith.51Huxley’sviewshavebeencharacterizedasscientistic

andas“constructinganaturalistic‘theodicy,’”withitspowertoexplainandchange

theworld. “The true God is nature, the trueworship, science.”52 Tyndall, another

member of the club and a leader in the movement toward naturalism, has been

characterized as engaging in a “sage-like secularization of experience […] another

form of mystification.”53 Indeed, Tyndall argued that as with religion, “The same

impulse, inherited and intensified, is the spur of scientific action today.”54 Such

positionswereusedtoargueforthereplacementofreligionwithscience.Spencer

andhisgroupwentevenfurtherindrawingparallelsbetweenreligionandscientific

naturalism.55 And Spencer’s work has been said to be “as much religious as

scientific.”56Wardalsothoughtofnaturalismasanalternativereligion,whileWood

described the science-theology of the science-theologian as “naturalism.”57 Many

othereminentscientistsofthistimeperiodalsoframednaturalism,invariousways,

as the new “creed” or the “religion of science.”58 “The basis of the naturalists’

arguments[…]wasfaith,”aclusterofphilosophicalassumptionsthatwasperhapsa

“formofspiritualpride.”59Discussionsonwhatlabelshouldbeaffixeduponthisline

of thinking includedarguments for the terms ‘Naturalist,’ ‘Comtist,’and ‘Positivist’

(the latter also referring to Comtian thought), thus further intertwining these

discursivestrands,alongwith‘scientism.’60

Scientificationandreligionizationhaveoftenbeentreatedascloselyrelated

alternative to Christianity. Lightman (1987), 96–99. For further information on the X-Club, seeMacLeod(2000),305–322.50Plantinga(2015).Plantingacharacterizednaturalismasa‘quasi-religion.’51Midgley(1992),52.52Levine(1990),225.OnHuxley’sthoughtasscientistic,seeZeigler&Howell(1964).53Levine(1990),233;andMacLeod(2000),x.54QuotedinTurner(1974),33.55Lightman(2012),451–455.SeealsoLightman(1987),81–90.56Lightman(1987),90.57Turner(1974),17;andWood(1922),6.58MacLeod(1982),3–4;andTurner(1974),12.59Levine(1990),249.60Turner(1974),10–11.

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byacademicsinthefieldofreligionandscience,aswhenStenmarknotedthatone

definitionofscientismisthe“viewthatsciencealonecanexplainandreplacereligion,”

specifically noting the reductionist stance of science in its explanation. While

Stenmarknotedthatitisnotnecessaryforsciencetofullyexplainreligioninorder

forsciencetoreplacereligion,theimplicationisthatascientificaccountofreligionis

still instrumental in the scientific replacement of religion nonetheless.61 Similarly,

TedPetersnoted:

[Scientism] does not ignore religion; rather, it uses materialist reductionism to explainreligious experience and reassess theological claims. […] science provides a method fordiscerningreligioustruththatissuperiortothatoftraditionaltheology.[…]Herereligionisdefeatedinthewarbyconqueringandcolonizingit.62

Supporting this connection between explaining and replacing religion, biologist

EdwardO.Wilson claimed that science can explain religion as “awhollymaterial

phenomenon,” allowing its replacement by ‘scientific materialism,’ ‘scientific

naturalism,’or‘scientifichumanism,’anargumentpresentinSaint-Simon’snotionof

physicism.63

Saint-Simon contributed to the systematic development of science as the

ultimate framework of meaning via his development of ‘physicism,’ now called

‘physicalism’ in this tradition.Aswehaveseen inChapterFour,physicalismis the

reductiveaccountofallphenomenainnatural,physical,ormaterialterms.64Though

itsassociationwithreductionismandthegeneralscientificmethod iswellknown,

whatislesscommonlyunderstoodisthisphysicalisttraditionemerged,inpart,inthe

contextoflikeningsciencetoreligion.Whilethephysicalactedalsotodifferentiate

religionandscience(onwhich,seeChapterThree),theextensionofphysicalismover

all domains of knowledge corresponded with the construction of science as the

ultimatearbiteroftruthandgoodness,whichwasconstructedas‘religion-like.’Itwas

Saint-Simon’sgoalforsciencetoorganizesociety,buthebelievedbeforethatcould

be accomplished, sciencemust be organized as a systematic andunifiedwhole of

61Stenmark(2001),14and89–90.Emphasisadded.Seealsoibid.,78–132.62Peters(2005),8185.63Wilson(2004),192,201,and206.64Hayek(1979[1952]),224–226.

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knowledge.Hecoordinated this “fromthepointofviewofphysicism,”asdidOtto

Neurath(1882–1945)andotherpositivistphilosophers intheViennaCircle.65Ina

thoroughly reductionist move, Neurath claimed, “A new generation educated

accordingtounifiedsciencewillnotunderstandthedifferencebetweenthe‘mental’

and the ‘physical’ sciences, or between ‘philosophy of nature’ and ‘culture,’” a

statementthatturnedouttoberathertrueaswesawinthecaseofscientification.66

TheViennaCirclehadtheexplicitaimtoexplainawayreligiousclaims,metaphysics,

andtheology.67Indeed,thisunifiedwholewasregularlyreductionist—inoutlook,but

alsoinitsreductiveidentificationwithreligiononthepartoflaterthinkers.

Saint-Simon regardedphysicismasnotonly thenewscientificmethod,but

alsoasa“newreligion,”a“scientificcreed”thatwouldstructurealloflifeandbethe

basisformorality.68Andthisphysicalismhasbeenusedasasynonymof“reductionist

scientism.”69FollowinginSaint-Simon’sfootsteps,oneearlypublicationaimedata

popularaudienceregardinganchoringreligioninscience,theVestigesoftheNatural

History of Creation (1844) anonymously authored by Scottish geologist Robert

Chambers(1802–1871),arguedthatfaithcouldbederivedfromthelawoforganic

development.Despitethecontroversysurroundingthetext,orperhapsbecauseofit,

theworkwasabest seller,going throughat least fourteeneditions inBritainand

America and even read by Queen Victoria (1819–1901) and President Abraham

Lincoln (1809–1865).70 Many others held similar ideas. Francis Newman (1805–

1897)supportedtheideaoffaithderivedfromscience.Newmanfoundaplatformfor

hisbeliefsintheWestminsterReview(est.1852),alongwiththelike-mindededitors

JohnChapman(1822–1894)andGeorgeEliot(1819–1880),whichintheprospectus

expressedsomeunitingbeliefsthatguidedthepublication,including“theconviction

thatreligionhasitsfoundationinman’snature,andwillonlydiscardanoldformto

65QuotedinHayek(2010),194.SeealsoCaldwell(2010),17–18and32–33;andSorell(1991),10–13.66QuotedinSorell(1991),10.67Brooke&Cantor(1998),47.68Taylor(1975),102;andHayek(1979[1952]),224–226.SeealsoCharlton(1963),67.69Maxwell(2008),364.SeealsoHutchinson(2011),130.70Secord(1994),ix–x.

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assume and vitalize one more expressive of its essence” in its “uncompromising

pursuitoftruth.”71Thenewformwasoftentimesthatofscience.

Furthertothepointthatscientificationandreligionizationarecloselyrelated,

there are some significant historical connections that could be considered. For

example,LudwigFeuerbach(1804–1872)influencedKarlMarx(1818–1883),aswell

asFriedrichEngels(1820–1895),anddirectlythroughhisownworkandindirectly

through these thinkers, contributed to the conception of religion in a scientific

framework as something wholly social, external, and objective. He was a major

contributor of the scientification of religion. While lacking direct evidence, there

seemstobeagreatdealofcircumstantialsupportfortheinfluenceofSaint-Simonism

inhisthinkingaswell,suchasthefactthatintheformativeperiodofhisthoughtin

the early 1830s, Saint-Simonism was ubiquitous in intellectual discussion and

FeuerbachspentsometimeinParisaswell,wherethereligionofSaint-Simonenjoyed

its greatest success. It seems unlikely that hewould not have encountered Saint-

Simonism.Moreover,thereareobviousresemblancesbetweenhisandComte’swork,

somuchsothatitseemsimprobableitwascoincidental.72Furthermore,hedidagreat

deal of work on positivism, which was a Comtian system of thought that was

originallyformulatedasreligious.

Comte coined the term ‘positivism’—which came tobenearly synonymous

with‘scientism’—toexpressthepositionthatempiricalknowledgeisthebestform

ofknowledgeandtheonlykindthatbreedsjustifiedbelief.Thoughcommonlyknown

asexclusivelyphilosophicalorevenscientific,positivismwasfirstcharacterizedasa

religious system of thought.73 Comte claimed that he “dared to join … the name

[religion]tothething[positivism],inordertoinstitutedirectlyanopencompetition

71Moore(1988),424–425and434.Seealsoibid.,426–432.72Hayek(1979[1952]),304–305,speculatedontheconnectionsbetweenFeuerbachandSaint-SimonandComte.73Onthesynonymoususeofpositivismandscientism,see,e.g.,Pickering(1993–2009),vol.1,3;andScharff(1995),47.OthermaterialinHayek(1979[1952]),281–282;Bryson(1936);Kremer-Marietti(2005);andFumerton(1999).Theterm‘positivism’firstappearedinprintintheDoctrinedeSaint-Simon, Exposition (1830). Before Exposition was published, however, Comte was already givinglecturesonhispositivistphilosophybeginning in1826andwhilehedidnotauthorExposition,histhoughtcertainlyhadadegreeofimpactontheSaint-Simonianswhodidauthorthiswork.SeeHayek(1979[1952]),272.

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with all the other systems.”74 Followers of the Positivist Faith also described the

religionasa “scientific reality,” thecreedofwhich“couldneverbedoubtful, for it

rests on accepted science.” Early advocates also describedpositivism as religious,

oftentimesemployingthetermasanalternativetoComtianreligion,callingit“aform

ofworship,” “amode of religion,” and “duty as revealed by science.”75 In another

example,HuxleydescribedComte’s visionas “CatholicismminusChristianity” and

described the system of thought as more of a religion than a scientific body of

knowledge.76Positivismincludedbothsocialandpoliticalaspectsinwhichscience

would displace religion, as well as philosophy, as the basis of ideology.77 Today,

positivism—alsocalled‘positivephilosophy’and‘logicalpositivism’—isunderstood

asaphilosophicalsystembasedonempiricismandverificationism,thatis‘positive

facts’derivedfromthescientificmethod,whicharethoughttoconstituteacomplete

explanation or at least justified belief.78 This again demonstrates a connection

betweenthereductionismofscientificationandthelikeningofsciencetoreligion.

Another remarkable historical connection between the scientification of

religion and the religionization of science is related to Marx, who contributed to

scientification as seen in the previous chapter. Augustin Thierry (1795–1856)

profoundlyinfluencedMarx.ThierrywasapupilofSaint-Simonandcoauthoredwith

him De la réorganisation de la société européenne (1814). Moreover, one of the

strongest influences on Marx’s early development was Lorenz von Stein (1815–

1890),whogreatlycontributedtothespreadofSaint-SimonisminGermany.Marx

74QuotedinPickering(1993),233.SeealsoPickering(1993–2009),vol.1,688–690.75Bryson(1936),350and357.Emphasisadded.SeealsoBrooke&Cantor(1998),passimin47–57.76 Hayek (1979 [1952]), 355; Lightman (2012), 449; and Brooke & Cantor (1998), 55. Byway ofcomparison,itisrelevanttonoteherethatSaint-Simonlabeledhisreligionthe‘newChristianity’inhisNouveauChristianisme.SeeSaint-Simon(1825).77Hughes (2012);Kremer-Marietti (2005); andFumerton (1999). Seealso Jacob (1998),248–249.Comte’sReligionofHumanityandthedoctrineofpositivismwasthesourceofinspirationformanyhumanists as well, which is also considered a religion by some. Davies (2008), 28–31; AmericanHumanistAssociation(2002);andWinston(2015).Humanismisalsotakentobeadefiningfeatureofscientism. See Peters (2005), 8185; and Pinker (2013). Humanism is additionally linked toevolutionaryethics,whichhasalsobeenframedasscientismandhasbeenreligionized.Wilson(2004),206–207;LittleHersh(2010),541–542and544;Houts(2007a);Morris(2001);Smith(2003),247;Elwell(2010),40;andDunphy(1983),26.ThoughWilsondoesnotutilizetheterm‘scientism,’heisoften associated with this discourse and commonly characterized as being scientistic. See, e.g.,Stenmark(2013),2104.78Kremer-Marietti(2005).

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himselfdiscussedhowhewasexposedtothemovementandseveralscholarshave

pointed out the close resemblance of Marxian and Saint-Simonist thought.79

Moreover,MarxwasanaffineofComte,thoughtowhatdegreethetwoinfluenced

eachotherisuncertain.80AndEngelsshowsevencloserassociationswithComtein

hisworks.81

AnothernotableconnectionisthatComtewasalsoasupporterofphrenology,

influencedbythe“illustriousGall”whose“immortalworksareirrevocablyimpressed

uponthehumanmind,”asComteputit.82PhrenologywasonewayinwhichComte

materialized, localized, and objectified the humanmind and psychology,which as

discussedinthepreviouschapterplayedamajorroleinthescientificationofreligion.

And this leads to the most obvious connection between scientification and

religionization—Comtewasalsothefatherofsociology.Aswesawintheprevious

chapter, formulating religion in termsof sociologicalunderstandings resulted in a

majorreorientationof ‘religion’asnatural,objectivelyexplicable,andscientifically

accessible.Comte’sunderstandingofsociologyalsoshapedhowhewouldposition

science as religion-like. The sociological approach was preoccupied with the

scientification of religion and the progression of science was understood as the

decline of religion. Social problems have often been described as scientific or

technicalinnatureanddailylifehasbeensaturatedbyscientificexperts,whichmight

be interpreted as the “realization of scientistic ideals.”83 It laid the foundation for

secularizationtheoriesandhumanhistorycametobeidentifiedwiththegrowthof

the natural sciences.84 This in turn led to the placement of science, specifically

sociology, in the evolution of human thought, of which religion was but one

preliminarystagetotheepitomeofhumanpotential.85Thisframeworkwasoneway

inwhichComtearguedforareligionofscience.Otherswhofollowedinhisfootsteps

79Hayek(1979[1952]),230and306–308.80Wernick(2005),128.81Hayek(1979[1952]),306–308.82QuotedinHayek(1979[1952]),331.83Hakfoort(1992),543.84Aldridge(2000),56–57;andHayek(1979[1952]),345.85Laudan(2003),670;Wernick(2005),130;Hayek(1979[1952]),254,325–326,and332–338;andAldridge(2000),57.

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regardedhisReligionofHumanitytobethepracticalmeans“bywhichsociologywill

make a polity for governing the world.”86 The development of sociology and the

spreadofthePositivistFaithoftenwenthandandhand,especiallyintheearlyyears

oftheirdevelopment.Thus,whatsomewouldcometoregardasthereligionization

ofsciencewasactuallyplacedinserviceofthescientificationofsociety.

Thereligionizationofsciencewasinmanyways,onmanydifferentlevels,in

historicalconversationwiththescientificationofreligion.Ontheonehand,therewas

agroupofpeoplewhowerebothattemptingtoexplainawayandreplacereligionin

one stroke, and, on the other hand, dissenters who saw this approach as the

replicationoftheverythingitthoughttonegate—religion.Andregardingthelatter

position,therewasgoodreasonforthat,asSaint-SimonandComte—oftenregarded

as the founders of scientism—not only contributed to scientification, but also

constructedscienceasreligious.

Saint-Simonnotonlyargued for the “superiority”of the “physical sciences”

overthe“theologicalsciences,”butalsousedthisasjustificationforsciencetoactas

a replacement religion.87 In Saint-Simon’s first publication, he called for the

establishmentofa“CouncilofNewton”asanextensiveinstitution,withfarandwide

divisionsinordertoguide“worship”andresearch.Instructioninthe“temples”was

toorganizetheexerciseofits“spiritualpower”andtoimplementdoctrine“toguide

humanintelligence.”FollowingSaint-Simon’sdeath,hisfollowersbegantopresent

their viewsmore systematically and inmore formal settings, including a seriesof

lectures on the Saint-Simonian “religion,” and, in time, the Saint-Simonian school

becametheSaint-Simonianchurch.88ThenewreligionofSaint-Simonismbeganwith

a vague pantheism and advocated human solidarity. Church services consisted of

teachings and confessing sins and other activities included proselytizing and

foundinglocalcenters.Eventually,amonastic-likecommunitywasfoundedinwhich

membersperformedmeniallaborandtookvowsofcelibacy.89Saint-Simon’sattitude

86Bryson(1936),344–345.87Taylor(1975),97.88Hayek(1979[1952]),217,220–221,272–273,and281–283.89Hutchinson(2011),79.

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towardscienceanditsroleinsocietywas“unquestionablyheldbymanypeopleat

thetime.”90Saint-SimonismspreadthroughoutEurope,NorthAmerica,andpartsof

Africa.91WhiletheSaint-Simonianmovementlastedonlyafewyears,peakinginthe

FrenchRevolutionof1830, it had enduring influence, particularly in its spreadof

earlyComtianpositivism,beforethetwostrandsofthoughtthoroughlydiverged.

ComtewasthefirsttorecognizeSaint-Simonashis“master”andmuchofthe

development of Saint-Simonian thought actually originated with him. Though

Comte’searlycareerwasheavily influencedbyhisclosecontactwithSaint-Simon,

Comte later regretted such an association and developed his own, largely

independent lineof thought.Oneof thesourcesofestrangementbetween the two

men was Saint-Simon’s departure from a strictly ‘scientific’ doctrine to a more

‘religious’one,asthoseonbothsidesof thedebatecharacterized it, thoughComte

eventuallywouldgothroughasimilartransformation.92Italsorankledothersinthe

group,leadingtosomedefections.93Saint-Simonturnedthereligiousrhetoricback

untoComteandclaimedhe“wantseverythingforscience,”adding“Ifwearenotwary

ofhim,thesescientistswillbecomeasintractableastheCatholictheologians.”94

Framing the issue in terms of religious critiques increasingly became a

commonwayofinterpretingthehegemonyofscience.BarthélemyProsperEnfantin

(1796–1864),oneofthefoundersofSaint-Simonism,criticizedComtianthoughtas

not scientificnor rational,butbasedonbeliefand faith, reflectingreligion-science

mutualexclusivity.Soonhisthoughtwasreducedtoreligionaswhenothersinthe

groupaccusedComteof irrationalism, arguing thathis science included “invented

facts”thatmadeitakintotheologicaldogmas.Atthesametime,theSaint-Simonians

90Hayek(1979[1952]),261.OntheinfluenceofSaint-Simonism,seealsoibid.,291–320;andMoore(1988),383–384.91Hayek(1979[1952]),283–284,288,and297–301.Seealso,Butler(1968);andPilbeam(2014).92Hayek(1979[1952]),234–235,259–260,and265.However,Pickering(1993),219,statedthattheSaint-Simonreligiondidnotplaya largerole intheearlyrupturebetweenComteandSaint-Simon,thoughPickering(1993),227alsonotedthatComteclaimedtohavedisassociatedwithSaint-Simonduetohisincreasingreligiousinclinations.ComtereportedhisbreakwiththejournalLeProducteurtoalsobeduetoitsSaint-Simonistreligiousinclinations.Pickeringsuggestedthatinrealitythebreakwasduetopersonalreasons.Pickering(1993),217.93Hayek(1979[1952]),286.94QuotedinPickering(1993),219.

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alsocriticizedComteforutilizingscientificargumentstounderminereligionandhe

was denounced for “atheism,” “materialism,” “irreligion and pride.”95 Thus while

reducing Comtian thought to religion, it was also positioned as negating religion.

Whilethismayseemcontradictory, it isexemplaryof therelationalization inplay.

Scienceasa religion isa challenge to religionexactlybecausescience isprimarily

understood in opposition to religion, allowing for such seeming inconsistencies.

Comteisframedasirreligiousandreligious,scientificandnonscientific,reflectingan

underlying presumption of religion-science mutual exclusivity while also

transgressingthesesupposedboundariesbetweenknowledgesystems.

Similarcritiquescontinuedoutsideofthecircle.Oneearlyeditorialfrom1877

referredto‘scientism’asbeliefandcriticizedtheComtianviewofhumankindasthe

“NewSupremeBeing,” creatinganovert religious tone.WilliamAllingham(1824–

1889),underthepseudonymUnusdemultis,sawthescientists’efforttoexplainthe

evolutionoftheuniverseas“anewefforttobuildtheTowerofBabeluptotheskies,”

andquotinga“Dr.Bridges”stated“Thescaffoldingisnolongeroftheold-fashioned

sort,firmlyplantedontheearth’ssurface;planksandbeamsaresuspendedinthesky

bythelargestballoonsthathypothesiscaninflate.”96Theconcernsexpressedbythis

authorseemtohavereflectedawideropinion,aswritersinpopularmagazinesofthe

1870s were increasingly expressing alarm at the perceived over enthusiasm for

science.97

ReactingtothereligionizationofComtianthought,Comte,inturn,wasoneof

thefirsttoreduceSaint-Simonismtoreligion,accusingthefollowersofadeficiency

inintellectualvigorthroughtheir“generalspeculations”and“sentimentalism”and

sawintheirreligion“asortofincarnationofthedivinityinSaint-Simon.”98InCours

dephilosophiepositive(1830–1842),Comtearguedthatthereconstructionofsociety

must be founded in scientific education. Though he did not mention the Saint-

Simoniansbynamehere, thiswork “wasactuallyengaged inadiscoursewith the

95Pickering(1993),220–221,224,and227.96Unusdemultis(1877),283.SeealsoMacLeod(1982),5;andMacLeod(2000),x.97Crimmins(1990),92.SeealsoSimpson(2016i),whichcontainsseveralreferencestoearlyusesoftheterm‘scientism.’98QuotedinPickering(1993),220–221.

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Saint-Simonians[…]asasoundingboardtoshowoffthedistinguishingfeaturesofhis

own[Comte’s]scientificsystem.”99WithComte’semphasisoneducation,intellectual

rigor, logic, and discipline, he is in effect accusing the Saint-Simonian religion of

lackingintheseaspects.InComte’sview,Saint-Simonismwasaninauthenticscience

thathadbecomenothingmorethanareligion.SimilartotheaboveSaint-Simonians’

analysisofComtianthought,Comtewasalsoimplicitlyapplyingmutualexclusivityto

interpret science likened to religion, as unrepresentative of ‘real’ science, leaving

religionasthesoleframeworkofmeaning.

While Comte saw the religious aspects of Saint-Simonism as something to

criticize,theSaint-Simoniansmoreorlessembracedtheseideasandalsoemphasized

sympathy over reason as the foundation of social progress. Though the Saint-

Simonians did stress the religious nature of their work, they also regarded this

religionasscientificor,moretothepoint,asasubstituteorreformationalreligion.

Eventually Comte followed suit, though he rejected the role of religion in social

progressatdifferentpoints inhiscareer.Comtebegan toemphasize theChristian

concept of love as the fundamental principle of social reality and expressed

admiration forCatholic conservative thinkers, including JosephdeMaistre (1753–

1821),whocriticizedtheweightgiventoreasonduringtheEnlightenment.100While

Comte once claimed that he would “never” be party to “the fabrication of a new

religion,” he followed the example of the Saint-Simonians and did exactly that,

accordingtohisowndescription,in1849.Comte’snewreligion,a‘positivistreligion’

ora“religionofscience”(inhiswords),wascalledthe‘ReligionofHumanity,’inwhich

humanity—the “Great Being”—replaced God.101 The religion was replete with a

systemofmorality,worshipandotherreligiousrituals,icons,adelineationof“saints,”

and positivist doctrine.102 Like Saint-Simonism, the Religion of Humanity enjoyed

99Pickering(1993),221and228.100Pickering(1993),216and229–231.101Livingstone(2013); Jacob(1998),248;andPickering(1993),232–234.OnComte’sreligion,seealsoComte(1973);Wright(1986);andWernick(2001).102Wernick (2005),132;Blackburn (2008);Pickering (1993),233;Hutchinson (2011),80;Bryson(1936),357–358;andBrooke&Cantor(1998),50–55.

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some success across Europe.103 Comte is perhaps most commonly identified as

representing “a ‘glacial’ scientism,”andhe seems tobe the figuremost commonly

associatedwithscientismquareligionaswell.104

Saint-Simonism and Comtian thought have involved likening religion and

science since their induction, in various ways. Thus, it is unsurprising that other

thinkers would apply a similar model in interpreting these thinkers in terms of

scientismquareligion.Both thesemenand their followersalsocontributed to the

ideathatsciencecouldbeexpandedtoorderallofsociety,reducingallknowledge

under its framework ofmeaning, a reductionism that was later criticized. In this

expanse,evenreligioncomesunderthecapabilitiesofthescientificenterpriseand

this ‘dogmatichegemony’becameoneof themajorsources for likeningscience to

religion in a reductive way. Put differently, those who scientificated society

constructedscienceas religion-likeand their thoughtwasconstructed in termsof

religionization.BothSaint-SimonandComtealsoappliedthepresumptionsofmutual

exclusivity in interpretingoneanother’sphilosophies,eachcriticizing theotheras

unscientificandnarrowlyreligious.Thisalsosetthestagefortheanalysisofreligions

ofscienceinazero-sumfashion,leavingonlyreligionastheinterpretiveframework

ofmeaning.

103Hutchinson(2011),80;deBotton(2012),300–301;Wright(1986);andBrooke&Cantor(1998),55–57.Asarelevantsidenote,AlaindeBottonarguedthatComte’sgreatestconceptualmistakewasto refer to thisworldview as ‘religion.’ Thus,we see that there is a continued attempt to excludereligion form what is “relevant and rational,” perpetuating the signifiers involved in the mutualexclusivityconstruct.Seeibid.,307.104 Pickering (1993), 220; and Stenmark (2013), 2104.However, Comte strongly disassociated hisearlierandlaterworks.Hefirsthadstressedindustryandscienceandlaterreligion.Comteeventuallycame to regret his aforementioned publication of Cours de philosophie positive and recanted hisassertionthatsciencealonewasabletoreconstructsociety.Hecametoberelievedthatreligionhad“freed”himfromanxietiesabout“scientificprestige”andclaimedinthelastpartofhislifethat“science…isaspreliminaryastheologyandmetaphysicsandmustbefinally…eliminatedbytheuniversalreligion.” Quoted in Pickering (1993), 235. Ellipses original. Comte also changed his view of thescientistinthepriestlyroleaswellthathelatersaidcouldbefulfilledeitherbyaphilosopherorpoet.Comtehadchangedhisperspectiveonthefoundationofhisreligioninscientificthoughtandevenfromtheoutsetofhisreligion,Comtealreadytendedtowardaesthetics.Ironically,however,asComtelostinterestinscience,thescientificaspectsofhisworkwerebecomingincreasinglypopularashisfamousdisciple Emile Littré (1801–1881) was making positivism one of the most powerful scientificmanifestosinhistory,whichhasalsobeenfurtherlikenedtoreligion.Ibid.,234–236.

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3 HistoryofScienceastheSocialEvolutionofReligion

NotonlydidSaint-SimonandComtemakereligionsoutofscience,theyalsoframed

thehistoryandfutureofscienceintermsofthesocialdevelopmentofreligion,which

gavefurther impetustothosewhowouldreducetheirsciencetoreligion.Andthe

historyofscienceasthepeakofthesocialevolutionofreligionoccurredinamuch

larger context than Saint-Simonism and Comtian thought. This was an important

sourceoflikeningsciencetoreligionthatledmanytoareductiveanalysisofscientism

quareligion.

Saint-Simon saw the reductionism of all knowledge under the scientific

worldviewastheculminationofreligiousevolutionfrompolytheism,todeism,and

finally culminating in his own vision.105 Comte, similar to Saint-Simon, argued for

developmentalstagesofhumanthoughtfromtheology,tometaphysics,andfinalizing

withscience—specifically“thequeenofthesciences,”sociology.106Comte’saccount

ofthefullexpanseofhumanhistorycouldessentiallybeidentifiedasahistoryofthe

growthofthenaturalsciences,beginningwiththe‘fiction’oftheologytothemature

positivism of science.107 Reverend FredericWilliam Farrar (1831–1903) similarly

claimed:

ScienceisitselfoneofthenoblestformsofTheology.Ithasdeepenedindefinitelyoursenseofthemysteriesaroundus; it is thereadingof thatworldwhichevenPlatocalled ‘God’sepistle toman;’andwhichCampanellasaidwas‘God’sprimaryautograph;’andwhichGalileodescribedas‘agreatbookeverlyingopenbeforeoureyes[…].’108

This inverts the notion in natural philosophy that theology is the queen of the

sciences,wherenowscienceisthequeenoftheology,whichisfurthermoreframed

asasuperiorsourceofknowledgeaboutGod.Knowledgeofthedivineisnotexclusive

to clergy, Farrar asserted, and,moreover, “Scientificmen, for themost part, have

105Hayek(1979[1952]),224–226;andTaylor(1975),103.106Laudan(2003),670;Wernick(2005),130;Hayek(1979[1952]),254,325–326,and332–338;andAldridge(2000),57.107Hayek(1979[1952]),345;andBrooke&Cantor(1998),48.108QuotedinMoore(1988),443.Emphasisoriginal.SuchaformulationmayhavebeeninfluencedbyFarrar’sinterestinStoicism.

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shown themselves quite as well acquainted with anything which can be called

theology[…].”109

Asexplainedinthepreviouschapter,thehistoryofreligionwasincreasingly

conceptualizedintermsofnaturalhistory,andsocietywasunderstoodintermsof

evolutionaryprocessesaspartofthescientificationofreligion.Thehistoryofscience,

too, became a part of this story. Science was understood as the peak of social

evolutionaryprogressandtheculminationofreligiousworldviews,whichhadalso

beenconstruedat this timeintermsofmoralityandethics(seeChapterFour).As

such,sciencecametobethoughtofastherealizationofasuperiormoralityandthe

cultivationofscience-basedethicsbecamethefuturegoalforthesocialevolutionof

religion.Suchapproacheswerepartofthewidertrendtounderstandallofhuman

behavior scientifically as we saw occur in the case of scientification—which was

opposed to conceptualizations in thehumanities, for example.110 For instance, the

developmentofexperimentalpsychology,whichwaspartofthistrend,wasalsopart

of a larger attempt to develop a science-basedmoral philosophy.111 Though there

werecriticsofthisundertakingbypsychologyprofessionals,amongothers,themoral

commentaryfoundinthefieldseemstohavecontributedtoitssuccess.112Andeven

todaysomehavearguedthatcognitivesciencewilleventuallyexplainthemindand

humannatureinentiretyandthusitwillandshoulddeterminehumanvalues,similar

toMichaelGazzaniga’sproposalofa“brain-basedphilosophyoflife.”113

109QuotedinMoore(1988),443.Seealsoibid.,425,438,and440–444.110Thisinpartledtothetwentieth-centurygapbetweenscienceandthehumanities,asidentifiedinC.P.Snow’slecturesonthe‘twocultures.’Snowmorespecificallyreferredtothescientificversustheliterarycultures,thelatteranarrowerconceptionofthearts,whichdidnotincludephilosophyandsome types of social history. Though at times this gap was more apparent than real, Snow’sobservationsareimportantnonethelessastheypaintapictureoftheintellectualcurrentofthetime—one in which the scientific worldview was demarcated and uplifted relative to all other ways ofthinking.Snow’sworkgivesthesensethatbeingpartofthescientificcommunityhasmoralvalueandimplies thatscientificculture ismorallysuperior to the literaryculture.SeeSnow(1964).SeealsoSorell (1991),98–99and106.Theconflictbetweenscientismand thehumanities,aswellasotherformsofknowledge, isamajorthemeinthe literature.SeealsoKitcher(2012);Olson(1982),1–3;Reedy(1983);Rosenberg(2011),275–315;andSorell(1991),12–18,and98–126.111Ben-David(1971),127–128.Seealso,Rieff(1961).112Rieff(1961),2.113Satel&Lilienfeld(2013),xviii.

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Something similar occurred in the then new science of anthropology.

Following the developments in the field, American scientist Lester Ward (1841–

1913)suggestedtheevolutionofreligioncouldbetracedfromprimitivesuperstition

tomagic, polytheism,monotheism, and finally culminating in science.114 And in a

similarvein,RichardvonMises(1883–1953),amemberoftheViennaCircle,drewa

parallelbetweenmetaphysicsandreligion,arguingbothare“primitive”approaches

to issues not yet addressed by science.115 He framed science not only as the

culminationof,butalsoasincompetitionwith,alternativedomainsofinquiry.116

ThepastovertreligiousformulationsfoundinSaint-SimonismandComtian

thoughtwereovershadowedbytheriseofDarwinianevolution,whichbecamethe

central interpretive frameworkfor thehistoryofscienceas thesocialevolutionof

religion. Following the emergence of Darwinian thought, these religious themes

persisted,butundertheguiseofevolutionarysymbolism.117Extensivediscussionsof

scientismasreligionaresomewhatlacking,howeverpartofthereasonforthisisthat

the literature on scientism, even in its broadest construction, is rather scarce.

However, takingDarwinismquareligion,andevolutionmoregenerally,asa focus,

the literature—which has been repeatedly interpreted in terms of scientism—

suddenlyappearsawholelotricher.Withthescientificationofsocietyontherise,it

comesasnosurprisethateversincethepublicationofCharlesDarwin’s(1809–1882)

OntheOriginofSpecies(1859),evolutionand thenotionofnatural selectionhave

beenappliedtoethics,politics,andsocietyatlarge,andeventothedevelopmentof

religion, as discussed in the previous chapter. And in the context of the rise of

religionsofscience,itisalsoeasytoseeaninclinationtowardinterpretingevolution

in terms of a religious, ethical, and moral system. At the same time, during the

emergenceofthenewfieldofbiology,itwasalreadycriticizedasthe“newidolatry”

andthe“newcreed,”asreductivelyreligious.118

114McLoughlin(1978),164.115Sorell(1991),16–17.116vonMises(1951),287–356.117Lessl(1996).OntheideologicalroleofevolutionpriortoDarwin,seeGreene(1959).118MacLeod(1982),3.

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Spencerarguedthatethicsaroseasanadaptivetraitintheevolutionofhuman

societies,asdidDarwin.Spencer,aswellasHuxley,furthersuggestedthatspecific

moral values could be derived from evolutionary studies, also known as ‘Social

Darwinism.’119SuchmovesledmanytotheconclusionthatDarwinism“symbolized

scientific naturalism, and the hubris of the ‘priesthood.’”120 Spencer has been

described as the “apostle of Social Darwinism,” who preached of the progress of

humankindtowardautopianfuture,whichhasbeenlikenedtoareligiousposition.121

Huxley deliberately sought to develop a substitute religion from Darwinism,

specifically in order to fulfill the psychological function of religion, providing

existentialmeaningandasystemofmorality.Huxleyevengave“laysermons,”ashe

referredtothem,andmissionizedabouthisworldview.Understoodasaninstitution

of science today,Huxley andhis colleagues built substitute churches according to

theirvision,whichtheycalled‘museumsofnaturalhistory’:

[P]laceswhere,insteadofgoingtoaChristiancathedralonaSundaymorning,afamilycouldgo on a Sunday afternoon and seen [sic] magnificent panoramas of past life […] On theprinciplethatimitationisthesincerestformofflattery,naturalhistorymuseumaftermuseumwasbuiltinthestyleofagothiccathedralorearlier.122

Darwin and Spencerwere both utilized by later advocates in developing a

complete systemof evolutionaryethics, includingbyLeslie Stephen (1832–1904),

Benjamin Kidd (1858–1916), John Fiske (1842–1901), Samuel Alexander (1859–

1938),WoodsHutchinson(1862–1930),JulianHuxley(1887–1975)—grandsonofT.

Huxley—, and C. H. Waddington (1905–1975), who are all associated with

scientism.123 Stephen regarded evolutionary theory as having a genuine religious

natureandhopedthatitwouldprovidethebasisforanewreligion,asdidFrancis

Galton (1822–1911) andWilliam Kingdon Clifford (1845–1879).124 J. Huxley and

Waddingtonarguedthathumanitycoulddirectevolutiontothepurposeofgreater

119Hughes(2012).SeealsoSpencer(1973);andHuxley(1973),209–215.120MacLeod(1982),7.Emphasisoriginal.121Phillips(2012).Thisarticleprovidesa lotofexamplesofreligionizingdifferentaspects thatarerelatedtoscience,howeversincetheattackofthis ‘newintolerance’ isaimedatsuchageneralizedgroupor,whenspecified,todisparategroups,itisverydifficulttograspwhoorwhatexactlyisbeingcriticized.122Ruse(2011).SeealsoRuse(2003).123Hughes(2012).SeealsoCameron&Edge(1979),28–33.124Lightman(1987),159–160.

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humanfulfillmentandtheachievementofhighervalues.J.Huxleyevenauthoreda

book entitled Religion Without Revelation (1927), in which he discussed the

normative directives of nature to preserve and aid humankind. More explicitly

formulatingthescienceasareligion,J.Huxleystated,“[…]thepassionforgettingat

thetruththatcharacterizessomegreatminds,includingthehighesttypeofscientific

mind[…]isindeedareligionoftruth.”125Hearguedwemustchange“ourpatternof

religious thought” from a “god-centered to an evolution-centered pattern.”126 J.

Huxleydepictedscienceasareligionandsuggestedthatreligionshoulddepartfrom

theknowledgegainedinsciencetoformulateits‘theology.’

Inasimilarexampleofevolutionquareligion,EnricoFerri(1856–1929)saw

positivesciencegenerallyandevolutionspecificallyasthescientificbasisofsocialism

andthislineofthinkingastheculminationofreligiousthought,thelastphaseofthe

“evolutionofreligiousbeliefs”being“therealisationofhappiness[…]inthecontinued

evolution of thewhole of humanity.” He goes on, “socialism is joined to religious

evolutionandtendstosubstituteitselfforreligion.”Socialism“canperfectlyreplace

the faith in the ‘somethingbeyond’of theoldreligions.”127 “[P]ositivescience”has

“substituted the conception of natural causality for the conception ofmiracle and

divinity,” “replacing thenotionof imagodeiwith the evolutionarydoctrine imago

natura.”128

While framing science as more evolved than religion certainly seems to

suggest derogatory assessment of believers, as Carie Little Hersh noted, an

interestingcounterobservationisthatitalsoplacesscienceinthesameevolutionary

family as religion, connecting the two.129And this assessment is also found in the

discourseonthereligionizationofscientism.Thoughmanyofthesethinkersdidnot

treat science as reducibly religious, framing science in the context of the social

evolutionofreligionandtheotherreligion-sciencelikeningsdiscussedledmanyto

analyzethemassuch.Forinstance,columnistMelaniePhillipsargued:

125Huxley(1928[1927]),7.SeealsoHuxley(1992).126Huxley(1992),220.127Ferri(1906),49.128QuotedinFerri(1906),51–52.SeealsoLessl(1996),393.129LittleHersh(2010),543.

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Darwinistsarethemodernequivalentof theGnostics, thepriestlymillenariancastewhosehigherknowledgeofperfecttruthsputsthemontoasuperiorplanefromtherestofhumanity[…] that all must comply with […] on pain of being excommunicated from the realm ofrationality. […] the religion […] has led atheist scientists to morph from science intoscientism.130

Scienceasreligion-likebecomesscientism,notscience,aspermutualexclusivity,and

scientismisreducedtoreligion.Whenscientismhasbeenassociatedwithaspecific

ethicalsystemithasusuallybeenthatofevolutionaryethics,whichstemmedfrom

this construction of the history of science as the culmination of religious

development.131Inturn,thereligionsofscienceandevolutionaryethicshavebeen

associatedwithscientismandcollectivelycharacterizedasreduciblya “religionof

evolution.”132Forinstance,someclaimthat“evolutionisreligion—notscience,”thus

invoking the zero-sum terms of mutual exclusivity.133 One author argued,

“evolutionistinterpretation[…]end[s]withastatementoffaith.”Thisisunderstood

aswithout a “scientific basis—they are beliefs based on one’sworldview” and on

“faithinthetheoryofevolution.”134Similarly,anotherindividualclaimed,“Thefactis

thatevolutionistsbelieveinevolutionbecausetheywantto.”Regardedasaformof

scientism,thisbelief“makesitareligion.”135ThisassessmentcomportswithThomas

M.Lessl’sfindingthat“scientismhasgrownintoamythico-religiousinterpretationof

evolutionaryfacts.”136

4 TheScientisticEnterpriseas‘Religious’

130Phillips(2012).Phillips’workisnotacademicandisratherunclearaboutwhoherattacksareaimedat,creatingageneralizedpictureof‘evil’allabout.Iincludeitherenotasanacademicargument,butasanexampleofhow thediscoursemanifests fromacademia topopularculture, in scienceand inreligiouscommunities.Regardingthecharacterizationofatheisticscienceasscientistic,see,e.g.,Feser(2011/12).131See,e.g.,Cameron&Edge(1979),28–33;Farber(1998),174;andStenmark(2001),67–77and137–138.Theliteratureon(includingcritiquesof)evolutionaryethicsisextensiveandcannotbefullyexploredhere.Foranintroductionandreferencestorelevantliterature,seeQuinton(1965);Nitecki&Nitecki(1993);andJames(2011).132Wood(1922),101.Onthereligionofevolution,seealsoMidgley(1986);andBarlow(1994),221–249.Ontheconnectiontoscientism,seeibid.,194,248,and268;andMidgley(1986),31.133E.g.,Houts(2007a);andHouts(2007b).Cf.Ruse(2000);andRuse(2011).134Houts(2007a).Similarcommentson“faith”canbefoundinHouts(2007b).135Morris(2001).Emphasisoriginal.136Lessl(1996),392.

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Drawing on such connections between scientism, the religions of science, and

evolutionary ethics, science came to be associated with a particular systematic

purposefulactivity—thescientificor,morepointedly,thescientisticenterprisewith

thegoalbeingnothingshortofacompletesystemofmorality, includingsalvation,

withevolutionasitsteleology.Theseassociationshavebeenamajorsourceforthe

religionizationofscience.

The idea of scientism as salvific is connected to notions of science as the

champion of free thinking. As discussed in Chapter Three, science as an agent of

liberation was a common motif during the Enlightenment. By the middle of the

seventeenth century, sciencehadalreadybecomean important andpossibly even

centralsymbolofanopenandadvancedsociety,theidealofmanypowerfulsocial

groups,quicklyspreadingthroughoutEurope.137Educationinsciencewasassociated

with virtue and as a “source of moral improvement.” In the eighteenth-century

Encyclopaedia, Denis Diderot (1713–1784) framed the consolidation of available

knowledgeintermsofsocialadvancement,claimingtheinstructionitprovidesmake

one “more virtuous and happy.”138 This view of science continued through the

centuries,advocatedbythosesuchasJohnStuartMill(1806–1873).Infact,Millwas

not only influenced by Saint-Simonism, but also was close friends with and a

supporterofComte.139Andinthenineteenthcentury,sciencewaspresentedasthe

path to salvation, anew religion.Thiswasaccompaniedbya growingnotion that

technology,thehandmaidenofscience,couldonedaycreateautopia,a‘heaven’on

earth.140ItseemsthatevenDarwinwasinspiredbysuchideas,specificallyWilliam

Graham’s (1839–1911) best-selling, but controversial, work The Creed of Science

(1881).141 Graham, who sought to rethink religion in the face of the findings of

evolution,arguedthatifreligionwouldembrace“theadvanceofknowledgeandthe

137Sorell(1991),35.138QuotedinSorell(1991),35.139Hayek(1979[1952]),358–363.SeealsoHutchinson(2011),80;Pickering(1993),215and231;andBryson(1936),345.ThoughMilladmiredmuchofComte’swork,healsoseverelycriticizedsomeaspects.SeeBryson(1936),361.140Wertheim(1995),152and162.141Pleins(2013),104;andMacLeod(1982),3.

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widervisionof truth,” thensciencewouldbeable to “infuse fresh life into theold

religiousdoctrines.”142

Though science as liberator was discussed previously in terms of framing

religionandscienceasmutuallyexclusiveopposites,withscience illuminating the

ignoranceandtyrannyofreligion,thesalvificroleofscienceisoftenthoughttobein

directcompetitionwithreligion,asanalternativetypeoffaith.Discussingthesalvific

roleofscience,MaryMidgleystated,“Theproject[…]mustbeabletopromiseglory

andimmortalityreminiscentofthestrongestoffersavailablefromreligion,butmore

seductivestillbecausetheyoffercompletesupremacy.”143Themutualexclusivityof

religionandsciencebothdistinguishesthetwoandputsthemincompetitionwith

one another.All dichotomies create a forced choice.But being alternatives to one

anotheralsoobscurestheirdistinction,asnowtheysharesomethingincommon—a

largerconceptualframeworkinwhichthealternativesareunderstoodassuch,inthis

relationalmannerofconnection.

In the early twentieth century, the idea that science was crucial to the

bettermentofsociety,amorevirtuoussociety,wasontherise.Ben-Davidarguedthat

this is onemarkerof scientism, a ‘belief in science’ as the “effectivemasteryover

natureaswellastothesolutionoftheproblemsoftheindividualandhissociety.”144

Those who advocated such views concluded that it was thus humankind’s moral

obligation to cultivate scientific growth, such as geneticist J. B. S.Haldane (1892–

1964).145CarlWilhelmWolfgangOstwald (1883–1943),a contemporaryofHayek,

was also inspired by Comte and similarly formulated a “substitute religion”

(Ersatzreligion)basedonscience,whichhasbeenlabeled‘scientism.’146Heclaimed

that science is, or at the least soon will be, omnipresent, omnipotent, and

omnibenevolent. Notably, Ostwald even spoke positively of the ‘intellectual

142 Graham (1881), 363. At the same time, Graham advocated the separation of scientific fact andscientificfaith.Graham(1881),xv–xvi.143Midgley(1992),51and164.144Ben-David(1971),78.145Wertheim(1995),161.146Hakfoort(1992);vonStuckrad(2014),82;Cantor(2003),717;andBrooke&Cantor(1998),46.OstwaldalsowroteabookpraisingComte.SeeOstwald(1914).

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imperialism’ofscience.147Hefirmlybelievedsciencewasthesaviorofhumankind.148

HewaspartofacircleknownastheMonistenbund(MonistLeague),alongwithErnst

Haeckel(1834–1919),themembersofwhichsoughttounifyreligionandsciencevia

monism.149

Thenotionthatsciencecouldprovidehumansalvationbecamean“immensely

powerful”culturalmilieu,withphysicistsattheforefront.150C.E.Ayres,inScience:

TheFalseMessiah(1927)—a“testimonyof thesciences”—rejected thenotion that

sciencecanbesociety’ssaviorandarguedthat“bytryingtomakeourbeliefsscientific

wehavesucceededonlyinmakingthemabsurd,”reflectingreligion-sciencemutual

exclusivity.Ayrescharacterizedhisworkas“heresy,”implyingtheculturalclimatehe

foundhimselfinwasoneinwhichscienceisunderstoodas“theinviolablefaithofour

newdispensation.”151Thepopularityofscience-basedmorality/evolutionaryethics

declinedforatime.However,thediscussiononscientismandevolutionaryethicsqua

religionalsopickedupagainfromaroundthe1970son.152

Michael Shermer saw the resurgence beginning with mathematician Jacob

Bronowski’s (1908–1974) popular book and television series, both entitled The

AscentofMan(bothdatedto1973).153Lessl, too, identifiedBronowski’sworkasa

representative example of this discourse, partly due to Bronowski’s attempt to

“constructaworldwhichhasscienceatitscenter.”LesslsawBronowski’sworkas

oneinthetraditionofSocialDarwinismdiscussedabove,asthecentralsymbolinhis

work is “ascent,” associating biological development with cultural progress. This

progress is continually expressed in terms of science, which is formulated as the

entiretyofculturalhistory.Itcontainsascientisticteleologythatimputesascientific

purposetohistory,fromthisperspective,a“uniformitarianschemaofDarwinism.”154

SuchviewsdatebacktoT.Huxley,whoarguedfora“teleology”thatwas“basedupon

147Hakfoort(1992),528;andHakfoort(1995),376.148Hakfoort(1995),389.149Holton(2005),10;Haeckel(1895),vii–viii;andvonStuckrad(2014),80–87.SeealsoChapterSix,inwhichIdiscusstheMonistLeagueabitmore.150Wertheim(1995),164;andMidgley(1992).Onreligionandphysics,seealsoChapterEight.151Ayres(1927),13–14and295.152Hughes(2012).153Shermer(2002).154Lessl(1996),383,388,andpassim.

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the fundamental proposition of Evolution.”155 Huxley regarded evolution as “the

scientificparallelof theChristiandoctrineofProvidence.”And, inawidercontext,

naturaltheologycametoincorporatetheevolutionarytelos.156

BesidestheteleologicalandmoralisticnatureofBronowski’svision, further

use of religious rhetoric couched in evolutionary terms occurred in the

anthropomorphizationofnature.Bronowskiendowednatureandnaturalselection

with character traits and personal attributes, like invention, creation,

experimentation, originality, novelty, and destiny. Lessl described this as “a

creationism all his own,” as evolution became the foundational metaphor for an

ideology that duplicated creationist assumptions.157 A. G. N. Flew (1923–2010)

argued,“thequestinbiologicalevolution[is]forsomeimmanentsubstituteforDivine

Providence.”158Lesslsimilarlyargued:

Bronowskimaynotwish topositaGodas theagentresponsible for theorderlinessof thenatural world, but he does wish to have a natural world that is uniquely susceptible toscientific analysis. For this reason his discourses attribute god-like, and also scientist-likeattributestothenaturalworld.Byunifyingthematerialfactsofnaturebeneaththeumbrellaof a generalized notion of scientific purpose, Bronowski turns conventional scientificmaterialismonitshead,transformingitintoaformofidealismthattreatsthedeadmechanismofnatureassomethingmorelikethespiritofscience.159

Such analyses reflect the assumptions of mutual exclusivity, in that as

science/scientismisconceptualizedintermsofreligionandsignifiersofreligion,itis

thought to negate science, resulting in reduction. If it is religious, it cannot be

scientificandreligionizationensues.

Sometimes scientism is defined strictly in terms of its salvific role, as “the

modernbeliefthatscientificinquirycanenableustoresolveconflictsanddilemmas

incontextswhere traditional sourcesofwisdomandpracticalknowledgeseemto

havefailed.”160Midgleyagreed,definingscientismas“theideaofsalvationthrough

sciencealone,”seeingthisscienceasisin“thebusinessofprovidingthefaithbywhich

155QuotedinLightman(1987),158.156Lightman(1987),158–159.157Lessl(1996),391–392.158Flew(1967),4.Seealsoibid.,27–30.159Lessl(1996),391.Seealsoibid.,387–390.160Gray(2012).

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peoplelive.”161“[S]cienceisabletoofferussalvation,tofulfilltheroleofreligionin

ourlives.”Becauseofthis,thereisanexistentialneedofscienceandassuch“Wecan

and must put our faith in science.”162 Characterizing scientistics outlook on life,

Wieseltierstated,“Theyneedtobesaved;theyneedtobesavedbysomethingother

thanthemselves;theyneedtobesavedbyscience.”Wieseltierregardedscientismas

‘superstitious,’inthe“businessofemancipation.”163Assuch,itisregardedasmore

representativeofreligionthanscience.

Oneofthecommonlyidentifieddefiningfeaturesofscientismisthat“factand

value are systematically confused” and indeed many of those identified with

scientism argue for this position explicitly or implicitly, including Michael Ruse,

Wilson, Anatol Rapoport, Ostwald, and Adam Smith (1723–1790).164 Scientism,

Stenmarknotedasonemanifestation,positionsscientific theoryasable to“justify

ethicalnormsandbeliefsandprovideuswithanew,scientificethic.”Thisincludes

theargumentthat“Ethicscanbereducedtoortranslatedintoscience.”165Ben-David

alsopointedtothe‘confusion’offactandvalueinscientisticthought,separatingit

from scientific thought, as we would expect in the relational construct of

religionization.166Asonescientistpointedout, “Perhapsnoareaofphilosophyhas

seenagreatereffort at appropriationbyadvocatesof scientism thanethics,” thus

bringing to light the transgressive act of appropriation, from this perspective.167

Similarly,Stenmarkanalyzedthisscientismas‘beyondscience’:

Anotherwayofexpandingtheboundariesofscienceistomaintainthatnotonlycansciencefully explain morality, but it can also replace traditional ethics and tell people how they

161Midgley(1992),37and57.162Stenmark(2001),14.163Wieseltier(2013a);andWieseltier(2006).164Gray (2012).Hakfoort (1995) offered several examples,with references, of is/ought confusion,whichhecharacterizedasoneofthemaintenetsofscientism.Thoughnotaboutscientismparticularly,butratherabouttheis/oughtconflationinevolutionaryethics,seealsoFlew(1967),31–51.SeealsoRuse&Wilson(1986),174;Wilson(1998);Rapoport(1957),798;Sorell(1991),161;Hakfoort(1992),534–537; and Olson (1990), 222–226. Notably, the is/ought distinction has not been uniformlyacceptedamongphilosophers.MarxistsandExistentialistshaveregardedthedistinctionasinvalid.165Stenmark(2001),viiiand12.Seealso,ibid.,67–77.166Ben-David(1971),90.167Hughes(2012).

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morallyought tobehave […] science is the sole, or at least themost important, source fordevelopingamoraltheoryandexplainingmoralbehavior.168

Stenmarkarguedthatwiththetraditionprovidingvaluesandanethicalcodeitcould

be considered a religion, but that would include extra-scientific claims.169 Put

differently, tobe religion-like is tobe ‘extra-scientific,’ tobeoutsideof science. In

being‘beyondscience,’itbecomesscientism,notscience,fromthisperspective.This

reflects anunderlying structureofmutual exclusivity in thediscursive changes to

religionizationoccurringhere.

5 ScientisticKnowledgeas‘Religious’

WilliamJames(1842–1910), inananonymouslettertotheeditorofTheNation in

1874,critiquedthescienceofthetimeasreflecting“themoodofFaith,notScience,”

a tendency toward the commitment to “vast theories […] unverified.”170 James’

concernregardingunwarrantedbelief reflectedawiderunease toward thenotion

thatscientificknowledgerepresentedalloftruth,characterizedbyomniscience,one

ofthemajorfeaturesidentifiedwithscientismfromthefirstusagesofthetermtothe

presentday.

AccordingtoDiderot’sdefinition,‘knowledge’isakinto‘science,’specifically

“clearandcertainknowledge.”171Diderot’sviewwasnotyetthenorm,butaswesaw

inChapterThree, itwouldbecomesoshortlyafterhis time.172During thisperiod,

therewasachangeoccurringfromthelargelyeighteenth-centuryideathatscientific

studyallowedfortheobjectofstudytodictatethemethodologytothenineteenth-

centurynotionthatscientificknowledgewasassociatedwithaprecisemethodology

andtheexactitudeoftheresults.AtthetimeofDiderot,themajoritywasstillruled

by more ‘traditional’ religious and political groups, which were viewed by the

168Stenmark(2003),784.169Stenmark(2001),129and131.170 Quoted in Woelfel (2013), 177. Though to my knowledge James does not employ the term‘scientism,’hisconcernsregardingtheoverreachingofscienceareoftencharacterizedascommentaryonscientism.Foranotherexample,seePutnam(1997),326andpassim.171QuotedinHutchinson(2011),6.172Hutchinson(2011),8.

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emergingprofessionalgroupofscientistsassuppressingfreedomofthought.Thus,

sciencebecamenotsimply‘clearandcertainknowledge’ofthenaturalworld,butalso

representedanewsocialorder.173Withthiscamechangesintheapproachtostudy

society,inwhichimitatingthescientificmethodbecamedominantandallknowledge

becamescientificknowledge.174

Bythistimesciencehadalreadyhadasignificantandoftenpositivelyreceived

impact on religious, political, and economic life over the previous two centuries.

Because scientific knowledge was increasingly presumed to be true and certain,

extending science to the realm of religious and social topics was all the more

appealing.175 Many felt that science needed to be socially, technologically, and

politically relevant, which in turn further fed its popularization, admiration, and

expansive applicability. The increasing success of the natural sciences in the

nineteenth century created an environment in which the intellectual and social

implications of science became exceedingly attractive, formingwhat is commonly

referred to as the ‘scientific worldview.’ In the process of scientific

institutionalization, a social valuewasplacedon science in termsof technological

development and social progress and change.176 “Scientific progress,”W. J.McGee

wrotein1898,“issocloselyinterwovenwithindustrialandsocialprogressthatthe

advanceofonecannotbetracedwithoutconstantreferencetotheother.”177Natural

knowledgewasthoughttohavea“progressive,ultimatelybenevolentcharacter.”178

At the same time, many were concerned with the ultimacy assigned to

scientificknowledge.Forexample,philosopherPaulFeyerabend(1924–1994),inhis

The Tyranny of Science (posthumously published in 2011), traced the growing

concernofscience’s‘ReignofTerror’—its‘tyrannical’and‘dogmatic’rule—andofits

proper role in society, dating back to the nineteenth century.179 Allingham, for

173Ben-David(1971),78–85;andHakfoort(1995),383.174Caldwell(2010),9;andBurnham(1987),27–29.175Olson(1990),9–12and93.176Ben-David(1971),78–85,89–90,and93;Hakfoort(1995),383;andSorell(1991),34–35.177QuotedinBurnham(1987),168.178MacLeod(1982),3.179 Feyerabend (2011); and Lightman (2012), 460. For a discussion of Feyerabend as related toscientism,see,e.g.,Feser(2011/12).

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instance,noted,“Sciencehasof lateunquestionablyshownatendencytooverbear

andtyrannizeinthedomainofHumanThought.”180Wecanalsoseesuchconcernsin

thethoughtofdeMaistre,whobelievedtheviewofscienceassocialsalvationwasa

dangertosocietyandstronglycriticizedthenotionthatsciencewastheonlymeans

toknowledge.Hesawanongoingtrendinconvertingscienceintoacomprehensive

“ideology of scientific rationalism,” beginningwithDiderot and his colleagues. He

referred to this tendency as ‘scientific dogmatism,’ the theories of which “have

becomeakindofreligion”thatis“suitedonlytoretardscience.”181Thusweseethat

scientificknowledgeasreligiousissetinoppositiontothegrowthofscience,or,in

otherwords,thatthisscienceisnotscientific.Putdifferently,scienceconstructedas

religionisnothingmorethanreligion,reducedtoreligion.Moreover, laterauthors

regarded de Maistre’s opposition to scientific ideology as one against scientism

specificallyandcriticizedsimilarthinkersas‘believersinscience,’forwhomscience

wasareligion.182

Acommonargumentagainsttheexpansionismofscientificknowledgeinthe

latenineteenthcenturywasthat“therewaslittlethatwasscientificaboutthecreed

of scientificnaturalism.”Beingunscientific, itwasbasedon faith justasanyother

religion.183Scientificnaturalismhasregularlybeencriticizedasbasedonbeliefand

resemblances to thedogmatismof religionhavebeen repeatedly emphasized. For

example,LewisWright (1838–1905), in1888, referred tomaterialismas the ‘new

dogma,’whichheequatedtoa‘creed.’184Scientificmaterialismisfrequentlyregarded

asadogma,inthatitisauniversallyappliedworldviewconstitutedbyasetofbeliefs

180QuotedinMacLeod(2000),xi.181Lebrun(1969),220and228.182 At times, deMaistre’s criticism of sciencewas all encompassing, but itwas not his position toabandonsciencealtogetherandhefocusedhisattacksspecificallyonthethemesdiscussedhere.See,e.g.,Lebrun(1969),227–229.SeeingashowdeMaistrecriticizedthisreligionofscience,butultimatelyargued foranaffinitybetweenscienceand religion, specificallyChristianity, thennotonlywas thereligionofscienceviewedasnotreallyscience,butthereligionwasnotquiterighteither.Whetherhearguedthatwithinthereligionofsciencethesciencewasnotproperscienceorthereligionwasnotproperreligion,weseetherelationalconstructinplaythat‘scienceasreligion’isrootedinthemutualexclusivity construct of ‘science as not religion,’ leading to reduction and again allowing for suchinconsistentviewsonthereligion-sciencerelationaswesawwithsomeoftheotherthinkersabove.183Lightman(2012),461and463.184Lightman(2012),449.

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and attitudes requiring intellectual and emotional allegiance.185 Dave Pruett

suggested the belief that the universe is onlymaterial iswhatmakes scientism a

“statementoffaith.”186Andindeedtheclaimhasappearedthatbecause“sciencecan

explainreligionasawholematerialphenomenon”“suggeststhatscientificnaturalism

or materialism should replace religion”—a clear discursive connection between

scientificationanditsreductionism,ontheonehand,andtheconstructionofscience

as religion-like, on the other.187 Stenmark even used ‘scientific naturalism’ as a

synonymforthepositionofscientismasareligion.188

The reductive stance of naturalism was traced to positivism by Austin L.

Hughes,whoobservedthat“Thepositivisttraditioninphilosophygavescientisma

strong impetus by denying validity to any area of human knowledge outside of

natural science.”Many scientists andother intellectuals have also expressed their

dismayattheincreasinglyubiquitousnatureof“thearroganceofthephilosophersof

the positivist tradition,” and of scientism generally, with the claim that science

constitutes “the entire domain of truth.”189 At the same time, ‘positivism’ and

‘scientism’ were and are often conflated in the relevant discourse. As mentioned

previously,thetermshaveoftenbeenusedassynonymsoratleastcloselyrelated,

185Sheldrake(2012),6–12providedasimilardefinitionandalsocategorizedthisbeliefasa‘creed.’SeealsoLightman(2012).186Pruett(2013a).187Stenmark(2003),784.SeealsoVoelker(2011).188Stenmark(2001),124.189Hughes(2012).Reductionismintherealmofthesocialsciencesandhumanitieswasnottheonlyconcern,but also theexpansionof science inphilosophy,which is closely connected topositivism.These different areas were related as well since reductionism was often framed in terms ofphilosophicalpresuppositions thatnotonlydictatedphilosophybutalso thephilosophyofhowallknowledgesystemsshouldbetreated.Thoughpositivismgavesciencethephilosophicalgroundingforadvancingscientism,“advocatesofscientismhavetakentheironicbutlogicalnextstepofdenyinganyuseful role forphilosophywhatsoever.”Hughes (2012). SeealsoLessl (1996).This replacementofphilosophywithsciencewasregardedastheverydefinitionof‘scientism’insomecases.SeeSimpson(2016i); Mish (2004); Berdyaev (1938), 12; and Quine (1969), 126. Furthermore, philosophy ingeneral and metaphysics specifically were typically thought to signify religion, as per mutualexclusivity.Thus,framingscientismintermsofphilosophywasonewayinwhichsciencewaslikenedtoreligion.Forcritiquesofscientismasregards its intellectualcolonizationofphilosophy,seealsoFriedland(2012);andSorell (1991).Ostwald,e.g.,believedthesystemof thesciencesaccordednoseparatespaceforphilosophy,butrathersubsumeddifferentbranchesofitwithindifferentsciences—epistemologywithinpsychologyandethicsinculturalscience,forinstance.SeeHakfoort(1992),533–534.

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sometimeswithpositivismsuggestedtobetheforerunnertoscientism.190Hayek,for

example,referredtoscientismasa“speciesofmodernpositivism.”191

Similartothepresumptivephilosophyassociatedwithpositivism,somehave

arguedthatsciencecanworkasanideology.192Pruettstated,“scientismistoscience

whatfundamentalismistoreligion:cocksureandinflexible.”193AsPascal-Emmanuel

Gobryexplainedit,science“hasanideologythatmustbeobeyed.”194Asearlyas1872,

scientificideologywaslikenedtoorthodoxy,bigotry,andblindfaith“asdogmatically

asthemostultraandfanaticalreligionists.”195Thelasttwodecadesofthenineteenth

century saw a revolt against the dogma of positivism, in addition to scientific

naturalismandthe ‘bigotryofscience’was likenedtothe ‘bigotryofthereligious,’

ofteninareductivemanner.196

On a related note, dogmatism has not only been associatedwith scientific

ideologyandpositivism,butalsowithscientismfromamongtheearliestusesofthe

term,whichinturnhasbeenassociatedwithreligion.197Justasallthegreatreligions

were labeled as ‘isms,’ such as Hinduism, Buddhism, and Confucianism, so too

‘science’ came tobe framedasan ism—‘scientism,’ specificallyconnoting ideology

anddogma,whichfromaroundtheEnlightenmentonthroughthepresentdayhave

been regular signifiers of religious institutions (onwhich, see Chapter Three and

ChapterFour).198DavePollardalsodrewaparallelbetweenscientisticdogmaand

religion when he compared scientism to the Inquisition and claimed “the

consequenceofthenewscientismdogma[…]becomesaforcefortyranny.”199Curtis

Whitearguedthatscientismissciencecombinedwithan“ideologyofcertainty”that

190 Laudan (2003), 670; and MacLeod (1982), 5. It is not uncommon in the literature to seeformulationssuchas“scientismorpositivism,”suchthattheyareformulatedassynonyms.See,e.g.,Woelfel(2013),175;andBurnham(1987),127.191Hayek(1979[1952]),185–186.192Reedy(1983),591.193Pruett(2013a).194Gobry(2014).195Anon.(1872b).SimilarargumentinJames(1948),97.196Lightman(2012).197Simpson(2016i);andSeiss(1913[1865]),vol.2,439.SeealsoLightman(2012),449.198Ferrao(2002),227n.2.199Pollard(2013).

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is “morally dangerous.”200 Others are similarly concerned about the dangers of

scientisticthinking.The“neworthodoxy”ofscientismisthoughttoentail“azealous

metaphysicalcommitmentandarequisiteorthodoxy.”201Speakingofscientism,one

writernoted,“faithsofideologyhavenotonlysoughttoreplacebiblicalreligionbut

haveusedthecharacteristicsofreligiousextremismtodoso.[...]intheirwarpedway

theyarealltypesofbelief,typesoffaith.”202

Thetwomaincomponentsoftheterm‘dogmatism’—unwarrantedarrogance

and insufficiently evidence-based conviction—both appear in the discourse as

suggestiveoffaith,belief,andreligionintheguiseofscientism.Alongwiththis,and

aswehaveseenelsewhere,thereductionismandexpansionismofthisaccount,along

withtheideologyandorthodoxyinentails,areofcentralconcern.Thissuggeststhat

the science—as per the reductionism of scientification—is a major target for

religionization. Furthermore, when science is likened to religion, it is thought to

precludethe‘genuine’scienceaspermutualexclusivity,illustratingagainthatpre-

existingrelationalconstructsarestructuringthediscourse.

OneformofscientismidentifiedbyStenmarkisfoundinthethoughtthat“All

genuine knowledge about reality […] is to be found through science and science

alone.”203‘Scientism’iscommonlyassociatedwiththeviewthatscienceistheonly,

or at least the most, reliable method for discovering the truth and setting the

boundaries forwhat is knowable.204 Several individuals associatedwith scientism

havearguedfortheacceptanceof“Science,astheonlybegetteroftruth,”including

RichardC.Lewontin,CarlSagan,andself-identifiedscientisticPeterAtkins.205Partof

thereasonthatscientismcametoviewedasdogmaticandreligion-likewasbecause

sciencewasincreasinglyframednotonlyastheonlysourceoftruth,butasthesource

tothewholetruth,asourceoflimitlessknowledge,ofomniscience.AsAtkinsclaimed,

thereisnothingscience“cannotilluminateandelucidate.”206Reflectingsuchaview,

200White(2013),10–11and97.201Williams(2015),3.202Phillips(2012).203Stenmark(2001),viii.Seealsoibid.,18–33.204Stenmark(2013),2103–2105.205QuotedinStenmark(2001),5.SeealsoAtkins(1995a).206Atkins(2011),104.

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Rudolf Carnap (1891–1970) similarly claimed, “When we say that scientific

knowledge isunlimited,wemean:there isnoquestionwhoseanswer is inprinciple

unattainablebyscience.”207ThisagaingoesbacktoT.Huxley,whoclaimed“thereis

but one kind of knowledge and but one method of acquiring it,” namely scientific

naturalism.208 This claim was the same as that found in Comte’s positivism. And

according to Pierre-Simon Laplace (1749–1827), science could even bestow

somethingofprescience,givensufficientinformation:

Amind that in a given instance knew all the forces bywhich nature is animated and thepositionofallthebodiesofwhichitiscomposed[…]couldembraceinonesingleformulathemovementsofthelargestbodiesoftheuniverseandofthesmallestatoms;nothingwouldbeuncertainforhim;thefutureandthepastwouldbeequallybeforehiseyes.209

Theideathatscientificknowledgeconstitutescompletetruthhasbeendefined

by some as “faith in science,” of a particularly religious kind.210 Atkins, for one,

described this commitment to the scientific method as “faith.”211 Similarly

constructing this in terms of signifiers of religion, one reviewer describedAtkins’

book as “a purely devotional work, and a Manichean one—a paean to scientism

intendedtofortifyAtkins’sco-religionists[…].”212

AccordingtoStenmark,scientismincludestheviewthat:

[E]ventually sciencewill answerallhumanproblems.All the taskshumanbeings facewilleventuallybesolvedbysciencealone.[…]Themostcommonwayofdefiningscientismistosaythatitistheviewthatsciencerevealseverythingthereistoknowaboutreality.

Notonlyisthisreductionist,italsoexpandssciencetoincludelevelsofknowledge

previouslyassignedtoreligion.Stenmarkelaboratedthisperspective:“[S]ciencehas

norealboundaries;thatistosay,eventuallyitwillanswerallempirical,theoretical,

practical,moral,andexistentialquestions.”213RichardDawkins,forinstance,claimed

thatbecauseofscience,peoplehave“no longer[…] toresort tosuperstitionwhen

facedwiththedeepproblems:Isthereameaningtolife?Whatarewefor?Whatis

207Carnap(1967),290.Emphasisoriginal.208QuotedinTurner(1974),17.Emphasisoriginal.209QuotedinHayek(1979[1952]),201.210Hakfoort(1992),542.211Atkins(2011),104.212Feser(2011/12).Emphasisoriginal.213Stenmark(2003),783;andStenmark(2013),2104.

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man?”214Thisfarreachofscienceisfrequentlyinterpretedasbestowingomniscience

upon science and signifying religion and specifically scientism.215 For example,

Pollard,warningofthe‘dangersofscientism,’claimed,“Scientismmakesapathetic

religion.[…]certaintyandabsoluteknowledgeofeverything[…]underliesthenew

cultofscientism.”216

Thisabsolute,certain,andall-encompassingknowledgehasbeenlikenedto

knowledge of God and, at the same time, within science’s grasp. For example,

theoreticalphysicistStephenW.Hawkingclaimedthatoncesciencehas found the

completetheoryoftheuniverse“itwouldbetheultimatetriumphofhumanreason—

forthenwewouldtrulyknowthemindofGod.”217MargaretWertheim,concerned

about this unwarranted hubris, stated, “Physicists today who equate a theory of

everythingwith‘themindofGod’[…]groundtheir‘theology’inscience.”218Similarly,

OliverBennettreferredtoattemptstodevelopatheoryofeverythingas“theological

aspirations.”219Claimstoperfectknowledgeinsciencehavealsobeenshowntobe

connected to esoteric discourse and can also be seen as forms ofhomoiôsis theôi,

constellationsweseerecurringfromthetimeoftheStoicson.220Thishasadditionally

beendescribedasascientistic“metaphysicalfiction,”reflectingnotionsofthefalsity

ofthissciencewhenconstructedasareligion.221Bringingthisbacktotheissuesof

reductionismandexpansionism,accordingtoPhilipKitcher,this“inspiresscientific

imperialism,”wherebyallcomestogetherina‘theoryofeverything’—everythingis

encompassedbytheultimateknowledgeofscience.222Indeed,similarthoughtonthe

limitlessness of science has endured and has materialized in concrete ways. For

example,scientistFreemanDysonwasinvitedbyNewYorkReviewofBookstoreview

JohnPolkinghorne’sBeliefinGodinanAgeofScience(1998),aworkontheology.This

214Dawkins(1989),1.215E.g.,Brooke&Cantor(1998),46,characterizedDawkinsasascientistic,asdomanyotherauthors.216Pollard(2013).217Hawking(1988),191.218Wertheim(1995),249–250andpassim.219Bennett(2001),103.Seealsoibid.,105and110.220vonStuckrad(2013c);andJedan(2013).221Hayek(1979[1952]),201.222Kitcher(2012).Notablythephrase‘theoryofeverything’wasthetitleofoneofStephenHawkings’largelysuccessfulpopularsciencebooks.SeeHawking(1996).

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suggests that scientists are qualified to answer theological questions,which some

haveanalyzedasamanifestationofscientisminculture.223

Those who adhere to the omniscience of science have been described as

“science believers” akin to the religious faithful, as “a science believer thinks that

sciencecanbeone’sreligioninthefunctionalsense,”leadingsometoconcludethat

“science can constitute a religion.”224 And this religion of science, this “scientistic

faith,”asStenmarkdescribed it, isnot science, from thisperspective.Thus,asper

mutualexclusivity,scienceisnegatedandthenreducedtoreligion.And,again,itis

specifically the reductionism of science that is framed as religion-like in many

contexts.Forexample,Wieseltierargued,“Thescientizersdonotrespecttheborders

between the realms [of knowledge/academic disciplines]; they transgress the

borderssoastoabsorballtherealmsintoasinglerealm,intotheirrealm.”And,as

Wieseltiernoted,withinthisideaofexplanationthenotionof‘intelligibility’“isavery

particular one”—scientific intelligibility, which is disguised “as the whole of

intelligibilityitself.”225Heelsewhereargued,“thebeliefthatscienceissupremeinall

thecontexts,orthatithasthelastwordonallthecontexts,orthatallthecontexts

await the attentions of science to be properly understood—that is an idolatry of

science,orscientism.”226And,assuch,“scientismisnotscience.Scientismisthebelief

thatsciencehastheanswerstoallquestions,includingnon-scientificquestions.Itis

notabeliefinthepropositionsofscience,butabelief,acertainbeliefintheplaceof

scienceinlife.”227

Atkins described “the limitless power of science” as “omnicompetence.”228

Withscienceinsuchaframeworkastheonlysourceofthetruthandofthewhole

truth, a sort of omnipotence comes to be assigned to science. Such views are

frequently closely associated with the signifier supernaturalism. For example, in

1956,E.H.Huttensaid,“Thisbeliefintheomnipotenceof[…]scientismrepresents

223Smith(2003),238–239.SeealsoDyson(1998).224 Stenmark (2001), viii and 126. See also ibid., 124; and Stenmark (2003), 784; andHutchinson(2011),183–185.225Wieseltier(2013a).226Pinker&Wieseltier(2013).227Wieseltier(2013a).228Atkins(1995b),132.

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thesame,superstitious,attitudewhich,inprevioustimes,ascribedsuchpowertoa

supernatural agency.”229 Scientism has frequently been compared to ‘magical

thinking’ and supernaturalism.230 Superstition is often described as an irrational

attitudeofmindtowardthesupernaturalandsuperstitionisevenmorecommonly

associated with scientism than the supernatural. In a straightforward example,

Wieseltierclaimed“Scientism[…]isasuperstition,oneofthedominantsuperstitions

ofourday.”Throughscientism, “science is transformed intoasuperstition.”231Via

this ‘transformation,’ again, the science is negated and religion and signifiers of

religionareleftasthesoleframeworkofmeaning.

Following the dictates of the mutual exclusivity construct, superstition is

contrastedwithrationalityandreason.Forinstance,Hughesstated:

Incontrasttoreason,adefiningcharacteristicofsuperstitionisthestubborninsistencethatsomething […] has powers which no evidence supports. From this perspective, scientismappears tohaveasmuch incommonwithsuperstitionas itdoeswithproperlyconductedscientific research. Scientism claims that science has already resolved questions that areinherentlybeyonditsabilitytoanswer.

Herewe find the invocationof thedichotomyof reason/superstition topoint toa

‘contradiction’ in scientism—while associated with scientific research, it is not

science. Commenting on “this latest superstition,” Hughes argued, “Continued

insistenceontheuniversalcompetenceofsciencewillserveonlytounderminethe

credibility of science as a whole.”232 With science framed as omnipotent and

superstitious,itisthoughttonolongerrepresentscience.Instead,itisidentifiedas

religion.Thereductionistexplanationsofsciencehavebeendescribedas“afunctional

equivalentofmonotheism,”“aunitarysystemwithinwhichallofnature fitted.” In

describing “standard scientism,” Burnham explained that the “firmness” of

knowledge, “the trust in facts,” and “an ever more rigorous reductionism” was

standardtothis“religionofscience.”Thisisidentifiedas‘howsuperstitionwonand

229QuotedinSimpson(2016i).230E.g.,Pollard(2013).231Wieseltier(2006);andWieseltier(2011).232Hughes(2012).

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science lost’—the title of his work, expressing a zero-sum relational construct as

instrumentalinthereligionizationofscience.233

6 TheScientisticProfessionas‘Religious’

As the ultimate arbiters of knowledge, truth, and ethics, “scientistsmust become

missionaries and bring the gospel to the pagans and unenlightened people.”234 In

otherwords,scientistsarethoughtofintermsofreligiousroles.Throughscience’s

omniscience, the “‘investigators’ acted also as spiritual leaders, turning piety into

‘character’ and ‘righteousness,’whichworkedout inpractical terms as ‘service’—

servicethatincludedproselytizingthepublicaswellasworkingasscientists.”235For

instance,Saint-SimonianswerecalledupontoactastherepresentativesofGodon

Earth, “whowoulddeprive thepope, thecardinals, thebishops,and thepriestsof

their office because they do not understand the divine science which God has

entrustedtothemandwhichsomedaywillagainturnearthintoparadise.”236Saint-

Simoniansthoughtofscientistsasthenewclergy,whowouldbethespiritualleaders

and science was thought to be the source to fortify and revive religion.237 Saint-

Simonismhadahierarchyof popes andapostles,withother ranking levelsbelow

them.238AndaccordingtoComte’svision,scientistsoughttobethe‘priests’ofsociety

andthepoliticalorder.239SimilartoSaint-Simonism,atonepointComteadvocated

thetotalreplacementofclergybypositivistphilosophersinthescienceswithComte

himselfasPopeorthe“GreatPriest.”240

Galton—discussedinChapterThreeinthecontextofseparatingoutpriestsas

unfit for the scientific profession—also expressed his hope that the presence of

233Burnham(1987),162and165–166.234Stenmark(2001),viii.235Burnham(1987),23.236Hayek(1979[1952]),217and220–221.237Pickering(1993),213and222.Although,theSaint-Simoniansalsothoughtthatpoetsandartistswerehighlysuitableforthepriesthood.Seeibid.,235.238Hayek(1979[1952]),283–284and297–301.239Laudan(2003),670.240Pickering(1993),219and232;Blackburn(2008);andWernick(2005),128.

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scientistswithineducationalandgovernmental institutionswouldeventually“give

risetotheestablishmentofasortofscientificpriesthoodthroughoutthekingdom.”241

PositivistA.W.Benn(1843–1915)noted,“agreatpartofthereverenceoncegivento

priests and to their stories of an unseen universe has been transferred to the

astronomer, the geologist, the physician, and the engineer.”242 The scientific

institution, “in amissionarymetaphor of its own choosing” referred to a “church

militant”of scientists.243AsMacLeodput it, inadiscussionof the latenineteenth-

century “creed of science,” “Nature’s Godwas the supreme legislator, theman of

sciencehisciviljudge,andthelaboratoryhisconsistorycourt.”244

Thishasbeenregularlyaddressedintherelevantliteratureasindicativeofthe

reductionismofscience,aswellasofthereligionsofscientismandofscientification.

Regardingthelatter,somehavearguedthatthereisacloserelationbetweenscience

in a competitive relationshipwith other knowledge systems, such as religion and

philosophy, and the ability of scientism to “transform the scientific culture into a

secularpriesthood.”245WhilethosesuchasGaltonwerearguingforsucharolefor

scientists, many intellectuals and scientists of the 1880s criticized this new

“priesthood”foritsfailureasscience.246Unusdemultis,thoughcarefultopointout

thathewasnot against science in general, aswell asnot anadvocateof religious

thought,wasveryconcernedwiththeintellectualtrendhesawamongthepopulace

toward scientific dogmatism and doctrine and satirically referred to various

scientistsand intellectualsas “modernprophets”and“HighPriests.”247Gobry, too,

criticizedscientificideologyintheformofscientistsas“highpriests.”248Wertheim

observedanoverconfidenceofscientistsinthat“theyseethemselvesassomesortof

241QuotedinTurner(1978),367.242QuotedinTurner(1978),359.Thecharismaticviewofscienceisexploredinsomescholarlyworks.E.g.,Ben-David(1991);andMerton(1970[1938]).243MacLeod(2000),x.244MacLeod(1982),4.245Lessl(1996),380and382.SeealsoLessl(1989).246 SeeMacLeod (1982), passim for several examples of advocates and critics of the scientific andscientisticpriesthoodduringthistimeperiod.247Unusdemultis(1877),273–292.248Gobry(2014).

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priesthood in theirownright.”249Othershavespokenof this “new ‘priesthood’”as

wellandhavearguedthatmanyacceptscientismortheideologyofscience“notas

simplyordinarysciencebutassomethingthatreplacesreligion.”250FrankJ.Tipler,

CasperHakfoort,andMidgleyagreedthatinsuchformulations“MantheScientistis

becomingtheSupremeBeing,”whichinturnisdescribedas“certainlymetaphysical

[…]andnotscientific,”reflectingmutualexclusivityinthereductionofscientismto

signifiersofreligion.251

Anotherwaythisdiscourseonthereligiousprofessionofsciencemanifestsis

viatheidolizationofscientistsandtheblindappealtotheirauthority.AsWesleyJay

Smithputit,“Thescientismfaithfulpresumethatallofusnonscientists[sic]should

bowdownbefore the scientific consensus.”252Similarly,othersattribute scientism

with“uncriticaladherence.”253SusanHaackreferredtoscientismas“anexaggerated

kindofdeferencetowardsscience,anexcessivereadinesstoacceptasauthoritative

anyclaimmadeby thesciences.”254Scientism isoftendefinedbyanexpressionof

excessive faith or exaggerated trust in science.255 In a discussion about the

misconceptionsof‘science,’Gobrystated,“whenpeoplesay‘science,’whattheyreally

mean ismagicor truth.” Gobry arguedmost peoplewould understand science as

“something that cannot possibly be understood by mere mortals. It delivers

wonders.”And,reflectingtheassumptionsofmutualexclusivity,this‘science’issaid

tobe“theexactoppositeofwhatmodernscienceactuallyis.”Gobryalsodescribeda

tendencytoendowscientistswith“magicalpowers,”athemethathasbeenpickedup

by sociologists aswell in reference to technology.256RobertMontenegro similarly

complainedthatscientistsaretreatedas“wizards,”whiletheabilityofscientiststo

advance societyhas beendescribed elsewhere as the “sprinkling ofmagic dust of

249Wertheim(1995),249–250andpassim.Emphasisoriginal.250Chittick(2007),30;andWertheim(1995),249–250andpassim.Lapp(1965)alsospokeofscienceas the ‘new priesthood,’ the title of his work, however the focus is more on science’s politicalrelationshiptosocietyandnottheconstructionofscienceasareligionperse.251Hakfoort(1995),389.SeealsoMidgley(1992),199;andTipler(1994).252Smith(2012).253Hughes(2012).254Haack(2003),17–18.255Simpson(2016i);andMish(2004).256Gobry(2014).Emphasisoriginal.SeealsoStahletal(2002),117–132.

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science on our disorders.”257 In a relatedway, another author claimed, “We show

deference to our leaders, pay respect to our elders and follow the dictates of our

shamans;thisbeingtheAgeofScience,itisscientism’sshamanswhocommandour

veneration.”258

Remarking on the positivist tradition, including within the present day,

Hughesarguedthereisan“auraofhero-worshipaccordedtoscienceandscientists.”

Hughes pointed out that “epistemic reliability” is identified not with rationality,

empiricism,or thescientificmethod,butwith the institutionsandpractitionersof

science,leadingtoan“unjustifiedroleforscientiststhemselves,”inwhich“whatis

believedbyscientistsandthepublictobe‘scientific’issimplyanyclaimthatisupheld

bymany scientists, or that is based on language and ideas that sound sufficiently

similartoscientifictheories.”This,fromhisperspective,is“thefollyofscientism.”259

HereweseethatHughesiscontrastingfaithinsciencewithjustifiedbelief,or,put

differently,heissuggestingthis‘science’isnotveryscientific.Relatedtothenotions

ofpriestsandproselytizers,tobeswayedbyscientismisdescribedasa‘conversion.’

LittleHershstated:

JustasCBN[ChristianBroadcastingNetwork]seekstoconvertthepublictoitsworldviewbywieldingtheauthorityoftheBible,scienceisunderstoodasseekingtoconvertthepublictoitsworldview (inevitably reductionist andatheistic)bywielding theauthorityof scientificmethodandfact.260

Thiswasalreadyaconcernintheearlynineteenthcentury,asLouisdeBonald(1754–

1840) criticized the ‘legacy’ of Enlightenment—the claim to science as the only

knowledge and truth—which he associated with ‘superstition,’ as well as

indoctrination.261 And in 1883, the editor of Sciencenoted that the “followers” of

sciencetaketheirauthorityfromthewondersofscience,which:

[A]ccomplisheseverydayfeatsthatwitches,ghosts,andmagiciansperformedonlyuponrareoccasions….It[sic]iscurioustoseehowthose,who,agenerationortwoago,wouldhavebeen

257Montenegro(2014);andGray(2012).258Shermer(2002),35.IdonotwanttomisrepresentShermer—formanysmall,subtlereasonsIfindhisarticletobesatirical,butquestionthisatthesametime,sincethereisnothingexplicitlystatingthathethinksscientisticshamansareaparticularlyundesirablething,thoughhedoesseemtohumorizeitabit.259Hughes(2012).260LittleHersh(2010),520.261Reedy(1983),586–587.

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thebelieversinwitchcraftandallthis‘supernatural,’arenowturningtobecaughtinthetoilsofscientificcharlantry[sic].

A century later, the same worries are echoed as educators called for a critical

approach to scientific understanding, without which “we are facing a new age of

superstitionandanewpriesthoodinwhichscienceistakingtheplaceoftheolder

dogmas.”262

Infact,scientistsandpopularizersatonetimespokeopenlyof“converting”

people,particularlysincetheriseofDarwinism.263Withthisproselytizingactivity,

scienceisoftenthoughttobenegatedandonlyreligionremainsastheframeworkof

interpretation.Forexample,Stenmarkarguedscientisticsarefacingadilemma:

[E]ither scientific naturalists [equatedwith religion]maintain thatwhat they are doing issciencebutthenhavetogiveuptheirmissionaryactivitiesortheirnaturalismandbecomemerelyscientists,orscientificnaturalistskeeptheirnaturalismbutthenhavetoadmitthattheyarenotdoingscienceanymore.264

Inotherwords, thechoice is theclassicalchoiceofmutualexclusivity—either it is

religionoritisscience,sincescienceisunderstoodas‘notreligion’afterall.Theresult

isthatreligion-likescienceisconstructedasjustreligion.

7 FromMutualExclusivitytoReligionization

Aswehaveseen,thereligionizationofscience—oftentimeswiththereligionlabeled

‘scientism’—involves the construction of science as ethical,moralistic, ideological,

dogmatic, and superstitious, to name a few important signifiers of religion in this

context.Thoughthesesignifierscouldalsobeanalyzedasdistinctmanifestationsof

scientism (e.g., scientism as an ethical system, scientism as epistemology, etc.) as

somescholarshavedone,alltheseformulationshavesomethingincommon:theyare

usedtoarguethatscientismisnothingmorethanareligion.265Whilethediscussion

has shown a variety of perspectives, all contribute to a certain construct of the

262QuotesinBurnham(1987),26.263Burnham(1987),23.264Stenmark(2001),132.Emphasisoriginal.265E.g.,Stenmark(2001).

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religionization of science. This has been described as making ‘the secular the

religious,’ understood as a “paradox,” reflecting the presumptions of mutual

exclusivityinthat‘scienceasareligion’isconsideredcontradictory.266

Furthermore,aspermutualexclusivity,thelikeningofsciencetoreligionhas

beenthoughttomakeitconceptuallycoherenttoarguethatthescienceinvolvedis

‘not science.’ This is a central feature of the discourse on scientism. As Stenmark

noted:

Themaincriticismdirectedagainstscientismisthatitsadvocates,intheirattempttoexpandthe boundaries of science, rely in their argument not merely on scientific but also onphilosophicalpremisesandthatscientismthereforeisnotscienceproper.267

Stenmark argued scientism “pretends to be” science, however it is not “proper

science.”268 Similarly, Edward Feser suggested, “Scientism is not itself a scientific

thesisbutaphilosophicalone,”whileBarryBarnesnotedthatbeingscientisticisthe

chargeofnotbeingscientific.269Makingtheroleofmutualexclusivityintheformation

ofthereligionizationconstructexceedinglyclear,W.Smithclaimed,“Scientism[…]is

notthesameasscience.[…]scientismisanideology[…]evensomethingofaquasi-

faith.”270Similarly,Wieseltierreferredtoscientismasa“faith”andthe“religionof

science.”Heclaimed:

Scientismisnotthesamethingasscience.[…]Science[…]isacutelyandadmirablyawareofitslimits,andhumblyadmitstotheprovisionalcharacterofitsconclusions;butscientismisdogmatic,andpeddlescertainties.[…]scientismtransformsscienceintoanideology.271

Putplainly,“Thereligionofscience,betterreferredtoasscientism,isnotscience.”272

Similar formulations are seen in the more general discussion of the ‘religion of

science’ that was identified with the late nineteenth and early twentieth-century

thinkersdiscussed:“[T]hedistinctionisclearlymadeto-daybetweenthetruemenof

scienceandthescience-theologians.Itisthelatteronlywhoeverspeakofareligion

266Levine(1990),225.267Stenmark(2003),784;andStenmark(2013),2105.SeealsoFeser (2010a);Feser (2010b);andPhillips(2012).268Stenmark(2001),viii–ix.269Feser(2012);andBarnes(1985),93.270Smith(2012).271Wieseltier(2011);andWieseltier(2013b).272Grassie(2008),300.

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ofscience.”273Thedifferentiationfromscience—thedictateofmutualexclusivity—is

what structures the discursive change from science to reducibly scientism qua

religion,fromthisperspective.Or,conversely,theassociationbetweenscientismand

religion structures the conceptual differentiation with science. Either way, the

formationofthereligionizationofsciencefollowsthestructureofthediscourseas

perthemutualexclusivityconstruct,demandingthatreligion-sciencelikeningfalls

underonlyoneinterpretivescheme—inthiscase,thatofreligion.

Thatthelikeningofreligionandscienceresultsinthereligionizationofscience

is a matter of definition, which I have claimed is relational. For instance, Gobry

argued, “science has made God irrelevant, even though, by definition, religion

concernstheultimatecausesofthingsand,again,bydefinition,sciencecannottell

youaboutthem.”Thereligionofscientism,Gobryasserted,“isthepredictableresult

ofasocietythathasforgottenwhat‘science’means.Becausewelumpmanydifferent

thingstogether,therearebitsof‘science’thataren’tactualsciencethatgetlumped

intosociety’sunderstandingofwhatscienceis.”Gobrycontinued:

Italsomeansthatforallourbleatingabout‘science’weliveinanastonishinglyunscientificandanti-scientificsociety.Wehaveplentyofanti-sciencepeople,butmostofour‘pro-science’peoplearereallypro-magic(andthereforeanti-science).274

Theclaimthatsciencecannotbereligion-likewithoutbeinganti-scienceisbasedon

whatispresumedtobetherelationalcontentofthetermsinvolved.Itisasimplistic

argument that science cannotbe religionbydefinition. Scientists, scientistics, and

anti-scientisticsallcontributetothisdiscourse.275Andyetthemeaningsoftheterms

inquestioncontinuetoevolve.Evenplayingbytherulesofmutualexclusivity,new

meaningsofthetermsemerge,aswellasnewrolesfortheirrespectiveinstitutions.

Thishasbecomeexceedinglyclearoverthisandtheprevioustwochapters.

Theprocessesinvolvedinthereligionizationofsciencearemuchthesameas

in the case of the scientification of religion. Scientificators of religion advocate

reductionismandtreatreligionasascientificobjectandthenquestionwhetherthis

273Wood(1922),22.274Gobry(2014).Emphasisadded.275Hakfoort(1995),386.

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‘religion’isstill‘religious.’Thosewhoreligionizesciencepointtothisreductionism

andotherphilosophicalassumptionsasevidencethatscienceisreduciblyreligious

andquestionwhetherthis‘science’isstill‘scientific.’Themajordifferencebetween

scientification and religionization is where the ‘work’ is being done—on what

constitutes‘religion’oronwhatconstitutes‘science.’

Despitethesignificanceofthisdifference,thelinkagebetweentheserelational

constructs is also important. If there did not exist the attempt to scientificate all

worldviews, including religion, then there likely would be little to no impetus to

religionizescience,sincethereligionizationofsciencewaslargelyacritiqueofthe

expansionism and reductionism of science involved in scientification. (Though

certainlyreligion-sciencelikeningwouldstilloccur.)Itisthisparticularworldview

thatmakesscience‘guilty’ofbeingreduciblyreligious.Indeed,thescientificationof

religion primes religion for replacement by scientific religious philosophies of

materialism, naturalism, humanism, and/or scientism. This makes sense since

religionasnatural,physical,explicable,etc.allowssciencetoreplaceitaspartofits

conceptualdomain.Putdifferently, religionandsciencemusthavesomepointsof

commonalitytobeincompetition.Furthermore,asthesignificanceofreligionwas

strippedawaybyscientification(seeChapterFour),theremainingmeaningwasleft

inthedomainofscience,creatinganewconceptualspaceforscienceasanultimate

framework.

Fromarelationalperspective,thisiswhatistobeexpected.Eversincereligion

andscienceweredefinedrelativetooneanother,itcreatedasituationinwhichany

redefinitions or reevaluations of the terms circle back around. Since religion and

science are conceptualized in relative perspective, changes to one term result in

changestotheother,whichthenchangestheoriginalterminquestion.Notonlydo

we see the relational structure in this reciprocity, but also in the fact that these

redefinitionsultimatelyreinforcethemutualexclusivitytheysoughttoviolate.This

isbecauseproblematizing the religion-sciencedichotomy throughnotions like the

scientification of religion and the religionization of science still cling to that

dichotomy in their reductive explanations that only allow for one or the other

mutually exclusive frameworks of meaning. Using the signifiers of ‘religion’ and

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‘science’aspermutualexclusivitytotrytoredefinethemresultsinthenegationof

religion as science and science as religion, and then traditional dichotomous

formulationsareconfirmed.

The main point of this chapter has been to show how pre-established

relationalconstructsset thetermsofengagement that ledto thereligionizationof

science.Thisispartofmylargerpointthatrelationalizationisthemodeofdiscursive

change. We found that the reductionism that came to signify science during the

scientificationofsocietyislikenedtosignifiersofreligionaspermutualexclusivity,

likefaith,belief,andsuperstition,forinstance.Andaspermutualexclusivity,those

signifierswerethoughttoexcludesignifiersofscience,resultinginthereductionof

sciencetoreligion.Thelasttwochapterscollectivelyshowthatthelikeningofreligion

andscienceareregularlyinterpretedintermsofmutualexclusivitygivingrisetothe

identityconstruct.Theyalsoshowthatthoughtheidentityconstructisdistinctfrom

mutual exclusivity, traversing the boundaries it set up, it also reinforces those

borders.Yet, it isnotanimpossibletasktobreakthiszero-sumpattern,aswillbe

shown in the following three chapters. It is possible to escape this dichotomous

structureunderlyingthesetwomajorrelationalconstructs.But,predictablythistoo

developsviarelationalization,onlynowtherelationalizationisnotbetweenreligion

andsciencedirectly,butratherbetweenoppositionalrelationalconstructsandnon-

oppositionalones.

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Chapter6:Religion-ScienceInclusivity&theCaseoftheReligionofScienceReformationAwake,arisetotheall-reconcilingreligionofscienceandvirtue,totheworld-widereligionofyourlongingwishes[…]Nowisthedayofdeliveranceforallnationsoftheearth.—AugustTheodore

Stamm(fl.1860s)1

1 Inclusivityas‘NotMutualExclusivity’Medical doctor August Theodore Stamm spoke the above words in a newspaper

advertisementinthehopesofgainingfollowerstohisproposed“religionofaction,”

based on science. Hewas an utter failure, depleting his fortune on his cause and

turningtodrugs,beforefadingfromhistory.2Andyet,despitehislackofnotability,

hewaspartofamuchlargerintellectualtrendthatwasjusttakingoffatthetimeof

hisproselytizationin1860.Inthisway,hislineofthinkingwasmuchmoresuccessful

thanhecouldhavepossiblyimagined.Asseeninthepreviouschapter,theformation

ofthefirstreligionsofscienceoccurredfromaroundthe1820sthroughthe1840s.

One of the chief features of the Enlightenmentwas the search for alternatives to

Christianity in the tradition of the physical sciences, a ‘religion of science,’ that

expressedbotharejectionofChristianfaith,aswellasarejectionofitsreplacement

byscientificnaturalism.3However,theseearlyattemptswerethoughtofasfailures.

Scientismwasseenas“completewithallthetrappingsoftraditionalfaiths,”without

any of their virtues.4 Scientism, even when conceptualized as religion, was also

thoughttohavefailedthereligious,asHustonSmithnoted,“Oneofthesubtlest,most

subversiveways it [scientism] proceeds is by paying lip service to religionwhile

demoting it.”5Reflecting suchperspectives, theestablishmentof these religionsof

1Stamm(1860b).2Brugsch(1992[1894]),s.v.“MyStudentYears.”3Turner(1974),ix.4Hutchinson(2011),79.Emphasisoriginal.5Smith(2003),241.

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science was immediately followed by criticisms of this failed religion, alongwith

accusationsofscientificimpiety,leadingtounprecedentedcritiquesofthescientific

worldviewinthesecondhalfofthenineteenthcentury.Bythe1860s,areligionof

science reformation of sorts was already developing, attempting to address the

problemsthathadbeenraisedagainstthinkerslikeHenriSaint-Simon(1760–1825)

andAugusteComte(1798–1857).Thisreformationconstitutesthecasestudyofthis

chapter,withafocusonhowthereligion-sciencerelationinthiscontextdevelopedin

relativeperspectivetotheotherrelationalconstructsdiscussed.

The religion of science reformation was largely a disenchantment with

religionized science and its failure to uphold ‘true’ science (see Chapter Five).

However, this movement also targeted the scientification of religion, with its

delegitimizationofreligion(seeChapterFour).Asreligionwasexplainedawaywith

anaturalistaccount,scientificatedreligionwasnotthoughttobegenuinereligion.

Withscienceconstructedasreligionandreligionconstructedasscience,therewasan

intellectual void and spiritual vacuum that were increasingly understood as

intimately related. That relation was religion-science opposition. The problems

associatedwiththefirstwaveofreligionsofscienceweretypicallythoughttohave

originatedwiththis‘misconception’ofthereligion-sciencerelationship.Theproblem

of reductionwas traced to presumptions ofmutual exclusion andmany began to

address the issues of mutual exclusivity directly, in an attempt to rethink the

conceptualizationofthereligion-sciencerelation.Inresponse,therewasacallfora

reformation,resultinginthedevelopmentofvariousreligioussciencesandscientific

religions that were framed as alternatives to the reductively constructed

relationshipsofthepast.Scientificationandreligionizationwereusedasfoilsinthe

demarcation of a new ‘religion of science.’ As we have seen in the previous case

studies,thisonceagaindemonstratesarelational‘conversation’thatstructuresthe

discursive changes of religion and science. The religions of science were

conceptualizedandarticulatedincontrasttoreductiveandexclusiveunderstandings

ofreligionandscience,withthegoaltoembodythevirtueswithoutthevices,and,

aboveall,tobe‘true’tobothreligionandscience.

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AccordingtothefindingsofChapterThree,thenineteenthcenturywasalsoa

keytimeforcrystallizationofthemutualexclusivityconstruct.Alongsidethegrowing

perceptionofantagonismbetweenreligionandsciencewasabuddingarticulationof

alternatives.Inthefirsthalfofthenineteenthcentury,whatformthosealternatives

wouldtakewasstillunclear,thoughtherewereclearlyoptimisticexpectations.“Hope

reclinesonher anchorwistfully looking forward to theperiodwhenReligionand

Scienceshallmakeallmenbrothers,”asonemid-nineteenthcenturyauthorputit.6

By 1940, the common sentiment had appeared that religion and science are “not

mutually exclusivebutmutually complementary,” asAmerican theologianEdgar J.

Goodspeed(1871–1962)declared.7Itwasthisrelationalconstructionofreligionand

science—as ‘not mutually exclusive’—that became the central point for the

articulationofthenewreligionsofscience.

Religion and science as ‘not mutually exclusive’ is what I refer to as the

‘inclusivityconstruct.’Constructedinspecificcontrasttothedichotomousconstruct

ofmutualexclusivity,thisisanon-oppositionalrelation.Intheprevioustwochapters,

we saw that thenotionofmutual exclusivity structured thediscourseeven in the

casesofwhichalternativestothereligion-sciencedichotomywereproposed.Inthis

andthefollowingtwochapters,Iwillexplorecasestudiesexemplifyingperspectives

onthereligion-sciencerelationthatdonot‘playbytherules’ofmutualexclusivity—

oronlydosoinsofarasisneededtobreakthoserules.Theargumentthatreligion

and science are ‘notmutually exclusive’ has been in circulation since themutual

exclusivityconstruct.Inclusivityandexclusivitymutuallydefinedoneanotherboth

conceptuallyandhistorically.Ideasofinclusivityrangefromharmonytointegration

tocriticalcomplementarity.8Nomatterwhatrelationshipisadvancedhowever,the

6Anon.(1847).7Goodspeed(1940),132–133.8 E.g., some frame ‘integration’ and ‘harmony’ as assimilating worldviews to conform toreligious/scientific dogmas, while a critical approach attempts to make careful and discerningjudgmentaboutthecontent.See,e.g.,Küng(2005),41.Someotherexamplesthataim—withvariousdegreesofsuccess—foracriticalapproachtocomplementarityareWilber(1998);andJones(2008).

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underlying relational construct is the same: religion and science are not in

opposition.9

Astheoppositeofmutualexclusivity,inclusivitycanbeconstructedinanyway

that negates mutual exclusivity. The rejection of mutual exclusivity is commonly

approachedinatleastfourdifferentwaysofwhichIwilldevoteseparatesectionsto.

Thefirstwayreligionandscienceareconstructedasinclusiverelativetooneanother

is by positioning the two, in a very straightforward manner, as ‘not mutually

exclusive.’Thisexactphraseisemployedin(atleast)hundredsofprintpublications

andinovertwentythousandelectronicpublications,oftenusedtoargueinfavorof

somehow likening religionand science.Others refer to a rejectionof an either/or

relationshipbetweenreligionandscience,whichboilsdowntotheforcedchoiceof

mutual exclusivity. Though I will discuss ‘exclusivity negated’ separately in the

followingsection,wewillalsoseethisargumentappearintheremainingwaysthat

inclusivityisconstructed.

A second argument for the non-opposition of religion and science is by

rejectingthevalidityofreductionisminthecaseof likeningreligionandscience.10

Thisiseffectivebecausethereductionismofscientificationandreligionizationrely

onmutualexclusivityintheirjustificationforsubsumingtheexplanationunderone

frameworkofmeaningtotheexclusionoftheother.Ifreligionislikenedtoscienceor

scienceislikenedtoreligion,buttheoneisnotreducedtotheother,thentheshared

signifiers cannotbeoppositional.A thirdwayofnegatingmutual exclusivity isby

arguingthereligionandscience(orsignifiersofreligionandscience)thatopposeone

anotherarenot‘really’religionandscience—theyarenot‘true,’‘good,’or‘genuine.’

Afourthwayofnegatingmutualexclusivityisbyrejectingtherelationalcontentof

those signifiers so that the opposition of dichotomies is reframed as a

9Initisimportanttonote,however,thatinclusivityisnotsomesortofa‘trueunion,’whichcouldonlybeconstructedrelativetosome‘falsedisjunction’anyway,therebyeverfailingtoreallybeaunionatall.Ratherinclusivitycontinuestodisplayrelationalmodesofmutualconceptualization.Inclusivityisconstructedrelativetomutualexclusivity,puttingthetwoinmutualopposition.10Therejectionofreductionismaloneisnotnecessarilyanargumentforinclusivity,asonecouldrejectreductionismonthegroundsofmutualexclusivity,likeinGould’sNOMA,suggestingthatreductionismis not possible because religion and science do not overlap. However, it can be an argument forinclusivitywhentherejectionofreductionismis inthecontextof likeningreligionandscience.SeeGould(1997).

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complementarity.Allofthesemethodsforconstructinginclusivitywillbeexplored

andexplainedinmuchmoredetailthroughoutthischapter.

To demonstrate, I examine the case of the religions of science that were

articulated in specific contrast to notions of mutual exclusivity and reduction,

especially responding to religionized science. In its display of the mutual

conceptualization of these relational constructs, this case again illustrates how

relational constructs are constructed relative to one another and how relational

constructs structure discursive change. Publications on the “religion of science”

appearregularlyfromtheturnofthenineteenthcenturyon,withperhapsatmosta

couple of dozen a decade, until around the 1860s when we see hundreds of

publications emerge per decade. There was a sharp increase in the 1890s, when

approximatelytwothousandpublicationsemploythephrase,representingacritical

pointinwhichthistrendcarriedonuntiladeclinefollowingthe1940s.11Becauseof

this,aswellasthefactthatthereligionofsciencereformationfollowedtheformation

of thereligionizationconstruct, I focusonthetimeperiodfromapproximatelythe

1860sto1940s.

The phrase ‘religion of science’ has been employed to refer to all sorts of

disparate traditions.12 One common way it has been used is to refer to science

reduced to religion, aswe saw in the previous chapter.Here, however, I examine

when this terminology is used in an inclusiveway, setting theparameters for the

analysis.Whenwelookatthehistoricalmaterialfromtheadventofthisphrase,ithas

beenmostcommonlyusedintheprimarymaterialinthismanner,thoughlatermost

commonlyanalyzedinthesecondaryliteratureintermsofreduction.Thetendency

ofscholarstoanalyzereligionsofscienceasreductivelyreligiousismistaken.Froma

historiographical perspective, we must take seriously how the historical actors

11 Some early examples of the use of this phrase include H. [anon.] (1832); Stamm (1860a); andBlanchard(1860).InthecaseoftheanonymousH.’spublication,thephraseisusedtorefertohowsciencecansupportreligiousworldviews,likedesign.However,intheotherexamples,the“religionofscience”refersmoredirectlytoscienceasreligion.Thenumberofpublicationscitedwasarrivedatfromfirst-handresearch,cross-referencingresultsinHathiTrust,WorldCat,andGoogle.12 For a typology of religions of science in Victorian Britain, see Moore (1988), 383–467. Thisobservationwasalsobasedonfirst-handresearch,inwhichIexaminedtheuseofthisexactphraseinpublicationsfromthistime.

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described their ownactivities and to “reconstruct that activitywith the extension,

boundaries,aims,typicalproducts—inshortwiththe‘wholeness’—thatthatactivity

hadforitspractitioners,”asAndrewCunninghampointedout.13Religionizedscience

certainlydoesnotaccountforallunderstandingsofreligionsofscience.Thosewho

have thoughtof the ‘religionof science’as inclusivearenumerousandsignificant.

Beforeturningtothismovement,however,Iwilldiscussthewidercontextofwhich

religion-sciencemutualexclusivitywasbeingchallenged.

2 ExclusivityNegated

Asstated,themoststraightforwardwaythatinclusivityisconstructedisbyclaiming

that religion and science are not mutually exclusive. Some have argued that the

appearance of religion-science opposition is deceiving. For example, in 1848, one

contributortoScientificAmericannoted,“Risingfromdifferentsources,Scienceand

Religionareliketwomightyrivers,seemingsometimestoruninoppositedirections,

butyettendingtoemptytheirwatersatthesamepointintheocean.”Thisauthoralso

identifiedanalternativeperspectivetooppositionasontherise inthe intellectual

atmosphere:“Alreadyarethey[religionandscience]seentoapproacheachother;

words of friendly salutation are exchanged across the isthmus which yet divides

them.”14Onlyafewyearslater,weseenotonly“friendlysalutation,”butworktoward

higherdegreesofintegration.In1854,thepresidentofUnionCollegeinNewYork,

EliphaletNott(1773–1866),calleduponhumanityto:

[V]enerate and inculcate religion; teach it as key to all art and all sciences; as thatwhichsanctifiesallandwithwhichallharmonize.There isamistakeon thispoint tooprevalent.Scienceandreligionarefalselysupposedtobeatwar.Oh!truthisnolesstruthwhentaughtbythesunbeamsaboveorthefossiliferousrocksbelow,thanwheninscribedonparchmentorchiselledinmarble.[…]Godishere,andhere,andhere.[…]studynatureandyouwillfindherteachingseverywhere[sic]thesame.[…]Neverfeelthatthetempledevotedtoscienceissacredtoher,untilitissacredtoreligion.15

13Cunningham(1988),379.Emphasisoriginal.14Anon.(1848).15QuotedinAnon.(1854).

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Asonearticlefrom1870noted,the“antagonism”betweenreligionandscience

“ismore talkedabout thanunderstood.”16Assuch,by the latenineteenthcentury,

more andmore people sought to think through the issues in innovativeways. In

responsetotheDraper-Whitethesis(seeChapterOneandChapterThree),American

theologianCharlesWoodruffShields(1825–1904)arguedin1877thatreligionand

science “are related logically” and “are not only reconcilable, but actually being

reconciled.”17Similarly,ScottishministerandphilosopherHenryCalderwood(1830–

1897),whoalsospokeagainstJohnWilliamDraper’s(1811–1882)work,claimedin

1881 that “supposed conflicts between science and religion are often

misunderstandings andnothingmore […]” and argued that religion is in “rational

harmony with science” with a “clear warrant for claiming common ground.”18

Bacteriologist Victor C. Vaughan (1851–1929), dean of the medical school at the

UniversityofMichigan,feltcompelledtospeakagainsttheideaofthe“irreligionof

scientists”and“theconflictbetweenreligionandscience.”Contrarytotheseideasof

which“[m]uchhasbeensaid”and“volumeshavebeenwritten,”Vaughanarguedthat

religionandscience shareavery intimate relationship: “Themostbeneficent, and

indeed,Imightsay,themostsacredlaborinwhichmancanengageisthesearchfor

truthintheunderstandingofthelawsthatgovernlife.”Vaughanconcludedthatthe

averagescientistisa“religiousbeing”andscienceisa“meansofupliftingmankind

andimprovingtherace.”19

In 1884, only ten years after the appearance of Draper’s work, some had

already seen tremendous progress in religion-science relations. For example, one

anonymousauthorwriting“FortheAdvancementofScience,”claimed:

The last decade has seen an extraordinary improvement especially in the attitude of thedevoteesofscienceandreligiontowardeachother;anditseemstobemutuallyagreedthattheproblemsbeforemen’smindscanonlybesolvedbyallowingthelargestlibertyofthoughtandexpression[…].

16Anon.(1870a).17Shields(1877),11and431.RegardingDraper,seeibid.,29,56,229,andpassim.ForadiscussionofWhite,seeibid.,56and422.18Calderwood(1881),26,38,and66.ReferencestoDraperareinibid.,67–71.19Vaughan(1902),57,67,and74–75.

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Therewasasensethatthissentimentwasprevalent,theauthorpointingtothetwo

meetings were the bodies of the American Association for the Advancement of

Science (AAAS) and the British Association for the Advancement of Science came

together in the1880s inMontreal andPhiladelphia,duringwhich religion-science

inclusivity“hasbeenmademoreconspicuousmorethanever[…].”20EvenThomas

Henry Huxley (1825–1895)—who purposefully perpetuated religion-science

oppositioninmanyinstances(seeChapterThree)—notedalreadyin1894thatthe

religion-scienceconflicthadlargelydeclined.Indeed,bythelate1890s,thescientific

movementtoadvancescienceacrossalldomainsoflifediscussedintheprevioustwo

chaptershadshiftedfocus,droppingthecentralengagementithadhadwithreligion

andpositive,non-oppositionalrelationsbetweenreligionandsciencecontinuedto

rise.21

InanaddressofthepresidentoftheAAASgivenin1901onthe“progressof

science,” physicist Robert S. Woodward (1849–1924) made note of the religion-

science ‘conflict,’ but expressed hope in a future of cooperation or a “kindly

reasonableness on both sides.”22 It was also in the early twentieth century that

processphilosophywasfirstdeveloped,withoneofitscoreprinciplesidentifiedas

“theintegrationofscienceandreligionintoasingleworldview,”“asoneofthecentral

tasks of philosophy in our time.” The “heart” of process philosophy has been

identifiedas“[o]vercomingtheapparentconflictbetweenscienceandreligion.”23The

father of process philosophy, Alfred North Whitehead (1861–1947), stated that

philosophy “attains its chief importance by fusing the two, namely, religion and

science,intoonerationalschemeofthought.”24

By1923,amanifestodeclaringthatreligionandsciencearenotirreconcilable,

antagonistic, or mutually exclusive, but rather consonant and even mutually

supplementary, was signed by forty-five prominent scientists, clergymen, and

20Anon.(1884).21MacLeod(2000),xii.22Woodward(1901),312.23Griffin(2001),5,18,and20.24QuotedinGriffin(2001),20.

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educators in Washington DC.25 The manifesto’s chief proponent was the leading

scientist,NobelPrizewinner inphysics,andreligion-science inclusivityproponent

Robert A. Millikan (1868–1953), an exceedingly influential public figure.26 In a

semiformal,preliminarystatement,Millikanannouncedtheaimofthemanifestoto

beas follows: “Toassist in correcting twoerroneous impressions that seem tobe

currentamongcertaingroupsofpersons.Thefirstisthatreligionto-daystandsfor

medieval theology; the second that science is materialistic and irreligious.”27

Concedingmaterialismmeantto“abandonallfurtheroppositiontoreligionassuch,”

meaning materialism was conceived in opposition to religion, while also being

disassociatedwithscience.Byleavingmaterialismbehind,aninclusiverelationship

couldbeformed.Theclericals, inturn,agreedto“modernize”theirfaithandleave

behindthemostdatedaspects.28ForMillikan:

[S]cience, imbuedwith the spirit of service, which is the essence of religion, and religionguidedbytheintelligence,theintellectualhonesty,andtheobjectiveness,whichistheessenceof science, can between themwithout a shadow of a doubt […] transform thisworld in ageneration.29

Millikanrepeatedlyarguedfora“completelackofantagonismbetweenthefieldsof

scienceandreligion”andclaimedthatthetopdozenscientistsinAmericadidnotsee

aconflicteither.Furthermore,manyevensupportedreligiouspositionsandprovided

theirtestimonialstoMillikan.30Millikan,withaneyetothefuture,claimedthat“the

spiritofreligionandthespiritofsciencearegoingtojoinhands,”andthis,hethought,

wasofutmost importance.31Millikaneven framedreligion’s lackof scienceas the

causeofreligiousdogma,bigotry,andpersecution,and“alltheotherdisasters”that

wereattributedtoreligion.32Thusitisspecificallythe‘notscience’partofreligion

thatistheproblem,orinotherwords,theproblemofexclusivity.

25Knoll(1976),116;andRansom(1931[1930]),8–16.ThefirstthreearticlesofthemanifestoarereprintedinRansom(1931[1930]),11.Notably,noneofthesignatorieswereRomanCatholics.26MillikanevenfeaturedonthecoverofTimemagazinein1927andwassaidtobethespokesmanforscienceinthe1920s.Time(1927);Kevles(1969);andRansom(1931[1930]),8–9.27QuotedinRansom(1931[1930]),9.28Ransom(1931[1930]),9.29Millikan(1923),57.30QuotedinKevles(1969),21.31Millikan(1923),58.Emphasisoriginal.32Kevles(1969),21.

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Theideathatreligionandsciencearenotmutuallyexclusivewasacausetaken

upbythereligionofsciencereformersaswell.Infact,thefoundationoftheentire

movement was challenging the relational content of the concepts ‘religion’ and

‘science.’Andthesuccessoftheinclusivityconstructcanbeattributed,toasignificant

degree,tothisreformation.Beforeturningtotheadditionalmodesofconstructing

inclusivity,Iwillfurtherintroducethismovement.

3 TheReligionofScienceReformation

From around the second half of the nineteenth century, a religion of science, in

various forms,wasarticulatedby influential figures throughoutEuropeandNorth

America,includingmanyofthemovementsthatwerelateridentifiedwithscientism

andreducedtoreligion.33Theturntowardareligionofsciencereflectedthewide

culturalclimateofthenineteenthcenturyinwhichthereseemedtobeaforcedchoice

between religion or science, faith or rational knowledge, and in which mutual

exclusivity and reductionism prevailed. Inclusivity began to take shapewhen the

problemwithpreviousreligionsofsciencewasarticulatedasthereductionofscience

toreligionorreligiontoscience,asaproductofexclusivity.Forexample,somehave

claimed that religion-science conflictwas in fact a conflict between scientismand

religion, displacing the problem space to reductive science and the reduction of

science to religion and not science proper.34 And with a new religion-science

relational construct advocating inclusivity, religions of science enjoyed

unprecedentedsuccess.

InGermany,forinstance,a“religionofscience”movementwaspropagatedby

the distinguished German biologist Ernst Haeckel (1834–1919), Russian-German

chemistandNobellaureateWilhelmOstwald(1853–1932),andtheircircleknownas

33Turner(1974),ix,5,and248–249.34E.g.,Principe(2015);andKozhamthadam(2002).

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theMonistenbund(MonistLeague).35Haeckel,inMonismasConnectingReligionand

Science(1895),identifiedaculturalturntowardintegration:

Therisingfloodofpamphletsandbookspublishedonthissubject,demonstratesthatsuchanaturalunionoffaithandknowledge,suchareasonablereconciliationofthefeelingsandthereason,aredailybecomingamorepressingnecessityfortheeducatedclasses.36

Haeckel andOstwald agreed thatmonism couldprovide theneeded link between

religion and science.37 Ostwald, similar to Haeckel, saw in his time a distinct

movement,thoughhedifferedinreferringtoitas“scientificmysticism”(discussedin

regardtophysicsinChapterEight).Ostwaldidentifiedthisintellectualtrendinthe

revivalof thestudyofParacelsus (1493–1541) inGermany; thestudyofEmanuel

Swedenborg(1688–1772)inEngland;intheFrenchseriesBibliothèquedessciences

maudites(1907);the“mysticalphysic-chemist”ofAugustStrindberg(1849–1912);

andinthenewcommentariesonandthenewmovementsinspiredbyphilosopher

FriedrichWilhelmJosephSchelling(1775–1854).38

PaulCarus(1852–1919),whowasamajorfigureandaprolificwriterinvolved

inthismovement,similarlypredictedin1892that“theReligionofScienceisbound

tobethereligionofthefuture.”39However,bytheendofthatcenturyheannounced

the “Dawn of aNewReligious Era” had arrived, one inwhich science formed the

intellectual basis of religion.40 English sociologist Beatrice Webb (1858–1943)

likewisenotedthatthe“religionofscience”wasalreadyubiquitousandpowerfulin

latenineteenth-centuryEngland.41Thisisempiricallysupportedbythefactthatthe

latenineteenthcenturysawanunprecedentednumberofbooksandarticlesemerge

with the titleThe Religion of Science, ranging from the critical to the charitable.42

35Holton(2005),10.36Haeckel(1895),vii.37Haeckel(1895),vii–viii;andvonStuckrad(2014),80.38vonStuckrad(2014),81–82.Seealsoibid.,80–87.Ostwald’srelationalconstructionofreligionandscienceisambiguous,asitisunclearifhisintentwastoreductivelyreplaceor,instead,renewreligion.Inmanycases,bothseemtobeoperative.39[Carus]P.C.(1892),606.40Carus(1916).Quotedfromthetitle,discussedpassim.Seealsoibid.,v–vii.Anoldereditionofthisworkisdatedat1899,howeveritincludesalotlessessays.41 Webb (1926), 81 and 87. Webb also claimed that many of her contemporaries had replacedChristianitywitha“religionofscience.”SeeEdwards(2009),214.Seealsoibid.,90and94.42See,e.g.,Tuttle(1872);Kuklos[JohnHarris](1878);Brown(1882);[Carus]P.C.(1892);[Carus]Editor (1893a); andCarus (1896 [1893]).Otherworks donot employ this exactwording, but use

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Therewasalsoagrowingpublicawarenessofthereligionsofscience,evenfeaturing

in an annual address at a statewide educational convention in Ohio in 1881 and

appearingasatopicinuniversitycourseworkbyatleastthemid-twentiethcentury.43

Following the 1890s, this phrase has appeared regularly in the relevant

discourse and has become mainstream relative to its earlier level of presence,

particularlyintheearlyvigorandprosperityofquantumphysics,aswillbediscussed

extensively in Chapter Eight. Though theseworksweremaking it to the press, it

seems that most of the authors only felt the idea of a religion of science to be

ubiquitous insocietybeginninginthetwentiethcentury.This isdueinparttothe

socialandhistoricalsituationoftheearlytwentiethcentury,whichgreatlyimpacted

thegeneralpopulace’sperceptionsonreligionandscience.WiththeonsetofWorld

War I (1914–1918), faith in science sharply waned in some circles and criticism

ensued as the destructive potential of science and technology became evermore

apparent.44Withbothreligionandscienceontheoutsinvariousways(refertothe

previous twochapters), therewasanatmosphereof “generalagreement” that the

Westernworldwas“onthevergeofaspiritualrebirth.”Andthisrebirthwasonethat

wouldmakeroomforbothreligionandscience.CaryF.Baynes(1883–1977)noted

thatduringtheinterwarperiodtherewasanincreasingrecognitionthat“areligious

similar ideas. See, e.g., Strauss (1873)describeda ‘new faith’ grounded in science and technology;Graham(1881)spokeofa“creedofscience,”discussedinthepreviouschapter;andOliphant(1888)depicteda“scientificreligion.”Ofthesepublicationsemployingthephrase“religionofscience,”mostare inEnglish (although there aremany inGermanandFrench aswell and there arepublicationsemployingthisphraseinatleasttwenty-eightlanguages).Thoughthisphraseonlyregularlyappearsinthelatenineteenthcentury,accordingtomyresearch,theideawasincirculationalready,asseveralpublicationsrefertoa“religionofscience”asnotaninnovativeterm,butratherasanexistingidea,andoneofwhichwealreadysawdevelopingintheearlynineteenthcenturythoughtofSaint-SimonandComte.43 House of Representatives (1882), 208–209. On university coursework, see, e.g., Union College(1940),56.44 InChapterFive, IdiscusshowWorldWar I ledmany toputmore faith in science.Bothof thesedepictions are found in the relevant literature andwere instrumental in the construction of thesedifferentrelations.Historicallyspeaking,bothportrayalsarelikelycorrecttosomeextent,consideringboth have support in the source material provided. However, the different depictions are alsodiscursivelyinteresting,astheyexhibithowhistoryisconstructedtofitparticularunderstandingsofthereligion-sciencerelation.

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attitudetolifeisasessential[…]asabeliefintheauthenticityofscience.”45Historian

H.V.Routh(1878–1951)summeditupnicely:

Having resigned his traditional religion under the influence of science, and then havingdiscarded thematerialismof science under the influence of experience (especially inwardexperience),heisnowlookingforanewspiritualitywhichbeauthorisedbyscienceandyetcontainareligiousvalue.46

Thisilluminatestherelationbetweenscientification,religionization,andinclusivity,

withthelatteremerginginresponsetothefailuresofothertwo.

In 1921, biologist Edwin Grant Conklin (1863–1952) (who later served as

presidentoftheAAAS)statedweare“inthemidstofareligiousrevolution”involving

“greatchangesintheattitudeofthechurchesonthequestionsoffaithandscience.”

Conklin continued, “The spirit of science has entered into religion. This spirit

demandsnotuniformityofbeliefbutuniformityofaim,notabsoluteandperfecttruth

butbestavailable truth,notauthoritybutevidence,notwordsbutworks.” In this

discussion,Conklinquestionedwhetherthis“religionofscience”—whichhesawas

alreadyrealizedinsociety—canbeincorporatedintotheorganizedreligionsofthe

world.Apositiveanswertothisquestionwasontherise,andatthetimeofitsfull

realization“religionandsciencewillbeatone,”Conklinclaimed.47

WilliamHamiltonWood(b.1874),whoauthoredabookundertheverytitle

TheReligionofScience(1922),declared the“concrete fact facesus that there isat

presentadefinite, clearlyoutlinedand rounded-out religionof science.”Thus, the

“age of the religion of science” ensued, reflected in the continuing wave of

publications on the topic.48 Astrophysicist Arthur Eddington (1882–1944) saw

relateddevelopments.Heclaimed, “religion firstbecamepossible forareasonable

45Baynes(1933),vii–viii.SeealsoTurner(1974),247.46Routh(1937),369.47Conklin(1922[1921]),242–244.48Wood(1922),4,7,and15.Woodalsoreferredtoa“ProfessorCrampton”whowasalsosuggestedtosupportareligionofscience.Presumably,hewasreferringtoHenryEdwardCrampton(1875–1956),who did show some tendencies toward a scientifically informed religion, onwhich see Crampton(1912),306–307.SeealsoVaughan(1902);Aiya(1910);Lee(1912);andWroughton(1918),thelatterof which includes a writing style that inmanywaysmimics sacred texts, repletewith revelation,religiousicons,tenetsofbeliefandpractice,andapathtosalvation.SeealsoBurtt(1939),167–196;Unger(1976);Peck(2002[1978]),193–197;andJastrow(1992),103–108.

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scientificmanabouttheyear1927.”49In1930,AmericanliterarycriticJohnCrowe

Ransom(1888–1974)agreedwiththemanyotherfiguresmentionedhere,whosaw

this“newreligion”as“onthepointofhavingestablisheditself”intheUSandperhaps

inthemajorityof theWesternworld.50ClergymanHarryEmersonFosdick(1878–

1969)respondedtothissituationwiththeobservationthat“Theforemostreligious

mindsarebecomingmorescientific,andtheforemostscientificmindsarebecoming

morereligious.Itisthelittlemindsinbothcampsthatcausethetrouble.”51

By1939,philosopherofreligionEdwinA.Burtt(1892–1989) identifiedthe

‘religionofscience’asoneofthesevenmajortypesofWesternreligiousphilosophy

of the contemporaryperiodand forecasted increasing success.Hispredictionwas

likelyinfluencedbyhisownenthusiasm:“Wereharmonyonsuchabasistakenfor

grantedbyacivilization,itwouldexperiencethesameperfectunitybetweenreligion

and science thatmedieval civilization realized […].” He argued that alongside the

emergence of “modern science”was a new religion that “reinterpreted themajor

conceptsandtruthsofreligionsoastoharmonizethemwiththepresuppositionsof

science.”Burttcontinued:

Itmadeareligionoutofscience,focusingupontherationalorderoftheuniverse,aspicturedbymoderninquirers,thepiousattitudesandattachmentscharacteristicoftraditionalreligion,andthusfindingthesupremegoodwhichmenhavealwayslookedtoreligiontoprovide.

This“religiousphilosophy,”asBurttcalledit, includedthenotionthattheorderof

natureisthe“supremeobject”ofthereligionofscience.Understandingandloveof

the truthof this orderwas seen as thehighest good,whichprovided anobject of

“intimatedevotion”thatwasthesourceofenduringhappiness.Inthisview,though

humans are mortal, knowledge was considered eternal and apprehending true

knowledgewouldthenallowthehumanmindtotranscenditsfinitude,providinga

sortofeternallife.Thinkingonthefuture,Burttclaimedthatsincesciencepresentsa

49Eddington(1928),350.50Ransom(1931)[1930]),6.51QuotedinRansom(1931[1930]),7.

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“unique religious value,” the religion-science relationship is potentially one of

constructive,mutuallyreinforcingharmony.52

The problems science presented for society became even more painfully

evidenttomanywiththeeventsofWorldWarII(1939–1945)andtheatombomb.

Theproblemsofsciencewereincreasinglyunderstoodtoinvolvewidespreadsocial

concerns. This contributed to the development of a common interest in the

reconciliationofscienceandreligionamongasubstantialportionoftheintellectual

andacademic community, thoughagain thereweredeepdivisionsabouthow this

shouldbeaccomplished.53Nonetheless,bythe1940s,somesawthe“FaithofScience”

tobeoneofthepillarsofdemocracyandthe“fervorofanewreligion[ofscience]”

“theworldover.”54Thereligionofsciencehadfinallygainedadegreeofpopularity

farexceedingthereachofSaint-SimonismandComtianreligion.Yet, followingthe

1940s,discourseonthe“religionofscience”sharplydeclined.Ontheonehand,the

movementwas short lived. On the other hand, it did have lasting influence in its

reformationofthereligion-sciencerelationasoneofinclusivity.Thelegacyofthese

religions of science lived on as the presumptions of inclusivity structured the

formation of quantum mysticism and scientific Buddhism that were on the rise

aroundthesametimeperiod,asdiscussedinthefollowingtwochapters.

As we have seen, the religions of science were developing and becoming

popularinacontextofchallengingmutualexclusivity,byframingreligionandscience

asnon-oppositionalorinclusive.Iwillnowturntohowadvocatesofthereligionsof

science understood their movement as reformational, constructing these new

52 Burtt (1939), 169, 171, 190–191, and 194. Burtt compared this religion of science to a kind ofhumanismwhichalso“givesadistinctivereligiousvaluetoscientificknowledgeand loveof truth.”Betweenthereligionofscienceandhumanismathis time,Burttsaw“noclearborderlinebetween[them].”Seeibid.,193n.24.Aswesawinthepreviouschapter,humanismhasoftenbeenconstructedasareligionofscience,thoughoftentimesinareductivemanner,whichisclearlynotwhatBurtthadinmindhere.53Gilbert(1997),278.OntheimpactoftheWorldWarsregardingtheperceptionofscience,seealsoAppleyard (2004), 110–137.The reconciliationof religion and sciencewasnot restricted toNorthAmericaandEurope,butwasalsoamovementinAsia,aswillbediscussedfurtherinChapterSeven.54 Goodspeed (1940), 23. On the influential movement to reconcile religion and science in earlytwentieth-centuryBritain,seeBowler(2001).

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religions in contrast to previous religions of science, via the final threemodes of

constructinginclusivityasmentionedintheintroductoryremarksofthischapter.

4 TheReligionofScienceas‘NotReductive’

Theframingofreligionsofscienceasreformswasacommonthemeinthenineteenth

centuryandhasbeenidentifiedasoneofthemajorformsofreligionsofsciencein

VictorianBritain, for instance. It canbeseenasacommondiscussionpoint in the

relevantliteratureinanevenwidergeographical,aswellastemporal,context.55The

spokespeople for a religion of science understood their work as reformational,

oftentimes with the reformation relative to previous religions of science, as

mentioned.Atthesametime,therewasthesenseofabroaderreformationaswell.In

Britain, for example, those advocating religions of science sought to place their

movementinahistoricaltradition.TheydrewfromtheEnglish,Scottish,andPuritan

reformations,whichprovidedthemwithacontextofnewreligiousandintellectual

liberties. Thus a ‘new’ or ‘second’ reformation sometimes became the point of

referenceaswell,inthetraditionofreligiousreformationsintheWest.56And,more

generally,throughoutthehistoryofscience,religionshaveadaptedtothescientific

outlookandarguedforconciliationinvariousways,whichhavealsobeeninterpreted

as ‘reformations.’57 Furthermore, from the nineteenth century to the present day,

Comtianreligionandscientismhaveservedascontrastcasesforarticulatingnewand

improvedreligionsofscience.

The religions of science that formed between the 1860s and 1940s were

preoccupiedwithaddressingthefailuresofpreviousreligionsthattookscienceasits

basis.Wehavealreadyseenthatpartoftheproblemwasidentifiedasreligion-science

mutual exclusivity. Those failures were also associated with the construction of

religion as reducibly science and science as reducibly religion. In other words,

55Moore(1988),383–467.E.g.,Anon.(1872a).56Moore(1988),383–467.57Pupin(1927),3–4,31,and273;Carus (1916),v–vii.Regarding theAbrahamicreligions,e.g., seeRubenstein(2003).

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attentiontotheidentityconstructwasarecurringtheme,whichdemonstrateshow

notionsofinclusivitywereconstructedbyarelationalinterplaywithotherrelational

constructs.AmericansociologistCalvinBlanchard(1808–1868),forexample,noted

thatpastattemptsatreligionsofsciencewerecharacterizedby“undueconsolidation”

andrelinquishedduetotheirfailures,failuresofwhichembody“theveryextremeof

theeviltheyrebelledagainstandsoughttoavoid.”58Theconcernwaswhatledthem

toabandonreligiontobeginwith“reappearedinsecularguisewithinthecontextof

scientificnaturalism.”59Whiletheoverwhelmingsentimentseemedtobethatthere

wasaneedfora‘religionofscience,’therewasalotofconcernabouthowitcouldbe

reasonablyformed.

Blanchardrejectedreligionizedscience,howeverhealsoarguedforascientific

religion, but in the specific context of taking a new approach to the earlier failed

attempts.Blanchardnotedthathecouldhavesimplyentitledhiswork“TheReligion

ofScience,”however,herealized,this“wouldhaveledmanyintothesuppositionthat

this was but another of those ridiculous attempts to reconcile the fragmentary

knowledge which so absurdly passes for science, with the Protestantish [sic]

contradictions which exhibit ‘supernatural’ Catholicity’s decay; and which with

corresponding absurdity, are accepted for Re-ligion [sic].” It is this trend that

Blanchardwished to counter,which he stated is amatter of “how to reverse the

present bottom upwards, wrong end foremost, mutually condemnatory state of

things.”This‘mutualcondemnation’canbecounteredby“areligious,governmental,

andsocialsystemwhosebasiswillbetheknowable.”Blancharddeclaredthathewas

well aware “that many attempts to substitute departmental science and art, for

religionhavebeenmadeand failed,” andaptlyobserved that there is still a social

longingforareligionofsciencethatcanexpressa“harmoniouslyconnectedwhole.”60

Thus, Blanchard recognized a general sense ofmutual exclusivity between

religionandscience,aswellasthefaulty‘consolidation’ofpastreligionsofscienceto

addressthe issue, framinghisversionofwhathealsoreferredtoasa“Religionof

58Blanchard(1860),74.59Turner(1974),251.60Blanchard(1860),11,43,and131.Emphasisoriginal.

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Science”asovercomingthesechallenges.ThoughBlanchard’sreligionofsciencewas

onethatchallengedtheoldforms,thiswasnottosupplantreligioninitsentirety.This

resistancetoreduction,too,isdemonstrativeofaninclusiveapproach.Andsuchan

approachisvital,fromhisperspective,since:

[R]eligionofmysterywasthegerm—theembryo—oftheReligionofScience;andwecannotlose sight of this, without forgetting the vital truth that it is the function of the latter toaccomplishwhattheformer—raisingaglimmeringideaof—humanperfection.

SimilartoBlanchard’sconcern,therewassignificantworrythatthereligions

of science developed thus far may just have been a one-to-one replacement of

Christiandoctrineandclergywithscientificdogmaandasecularpriesthood,oneas

corrupt as the other. This concern was expressed by those such as Englishmen

philosopher Henry Sidgwick (1838–1900), English novelist Samuel Butler (1835–

1902), and English psychologist and philosopher JamesWard (1843–1925).61 For

instance,ButlerwasconcernedaboutthereligionofsciencesurroundingDarwinism

andstated,“Itmaywellbeweshallfindwehaveescapedfromonesetoftaskmasters

tofallintothehandsofothersfarmoreruthless.”62Hecomparedscientiststopriests

andthetyrannicaldogmaticDarwiniststoChristianfanatics.Nonetheless,heargued

thatprovidedproperconceptualization,religionandsciencewereneverinconflict.

He understood science as “the raw material of religion,” with religion as “the

quintessence of science,” and thus supported science-based religion despite his

reservationsabouttheDarwinists’religionofscience.63

The opinion that science could not develop a system of ethics in a logical,

rational, or adequate way was on the rise. By the nature of science, from this

perspective,itfellshortoffulfillingthefunctionofreligionintermsofaguidetolife.

Science was criticized for its seeming lack of responsibility for moral actions, of

assuranceofanafterlife,ofaffirmationforlifeandevenexplanationsofnature,and

lackofobjectivedisinterestedness,andrejectedforitsrepressionoffreethinkingand

the liberal pursuit of truth. Science could not account for the validity of human

61Turner(1974),35;andLightman(2012).62QuotedinParadis(2007),130–131.63Paradis(2007),123.

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experiencesandquestions,northenotionoffreewill,andcouldnotprovideadequate

answerstoexistentialquestions.64Andthesewerethoughttobethesamereasonsfor

whyreligionhadbeenproblematic.

Sidgwick,Butler,andWardallagreedwithageneralviewthat,inthewordsof

psychicalresearcherFredericW.H.Myers(1843–1901):

[J]ustastheoldorthodoxyofreligionwastoonarrowtocontainmen’sknowledge,sonowtheneworthodoxyofmaterialisticscienceistoonarrowtocontaintheirfeelingsandaspirations;andconsequentlythatjustasthefabricofreligiousorthodoxyusedtobestrainedinordertoadmit the discoveries of geology or astronomy, so now also the obvious deductions ofmaterialistic science are strained or overpassed in order to give sanction to feelings andaspirationswhichitisfoundimpossibletoignore.65

Something new was needed. Like the others mentioned here, Myers struck a

reformationaltonewhenheargued:

Ourdutyisnotthefoundingofanewsect,noreventheestablishmentofanewscience,butrather is the expansion of Science herself until she can satisfy those questionswhich thehumanheartwillrightlyask,buttowhichReligionalonehasthusfarattemptedananswer.66

Sincehewasinanenvironmentofwhichreligionsofsciencehadbeenontherise,

Myerswaslikelyreactingtothesituationwithhisdeclarationagainstthefoundingof

anewreligion.Andinthespiritofthereformationofinclusivity,heattemptedtooffer

analternative.Putdifferently,thecontexthewasrespondingtowasoneinwhichthe

formation of religions of science was considered undesirable. And while a new

religionwasnotthegoal,theimplicationherewasstillthatsciencecanbereligious.

Inthisway, therewasanexpansionofscience intotheboundsofreligionwithout

divorcing it from its signifiers andwithout reducing one to the other. Thephrase

‘Science herself’ suggests the absence of transformation, carrying the air of

authenticity; science is not being reductively constructed as religion via the

associationwithreligioussignifiers,asseeninthecaseofscientism.‘Science’endures,

evenwithitsdiscursivecontactwithreligion,fromthisperspective.

TheFrenchphilosopherErnestRenan(1823–1892)isanothergoodexample

ofthecallforaninclusivereformationandmorespecificallyofonewhodoessoviaa

64Turner(1974),7and251–252.65Meyers(1970[1886]),liv–v.66QuotedinTurner(1974),118.

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rejectionofreductiveapproaches.Renanwaseducatedforthepriesthood,butlater

decidedtoinsteadbecomeanacademic.67Hetookthedevelopingnineteenth-century

religion-scienceconflictasapersonalissue.Inhisview,thescientificworldviewhad

to be accepted and he abandoned his Catholic faith because he saw science and

supernaturalism asmutually exclusive. However, he also held the conviction that

religionandsciencewerenotmutuallyexclusive,asbothwereanecessarypartof

beinghuman,accordingtohisperspective.SciencewasinRenan’sviewautonomous

andunconstrainedbyanythingelse.Itwassocomprehensiveinfactthatithasthe

potentialtobeareligionitself.Sciencehasthecapabilitytorevealthemeaningoflife

anddestinyofhumankind.However,healsothoughtthatreligionshouldbevalued

foritsownsake,notexploitedforsomeotherpurposes,includingthoseofscience.

Renanadvocateda ‘religionofscience,’butthiswasnotthesimpleglorificationof

science as is, but an inward-looking religion focused onmoralworth and dignity,

albeitgrounded ina rational, scientificoutlook.Hebelievedsciencecouldprovide

humankindwithfaith,solongasthatsciencewas‘rightly’understoodandreligion

broadly conceived. Renan envisioned a religion specifically divorced from

supernaturalism and likened to science, though he did not identify science with

positivist materialism, which he regarded as lacking in spiritual considerations.68

Sciencehasthepotentialtoaddressthosespiritualconsiderationsandtherebyfulfill

areligiousrolebynotonlyrevealingthetruth,butalsobycultivatingaspiritofcosmic

awe and the accompanying religious affections. Renan stated, “The true way of

worshippingGodistoknowandtolovethatwhichis.”Truereligion,Renanargued,

is“intellectualculture,”andthusthereligioushierarchywouldconsistofpeopleof

spiritualandintellectualprowess,likescientists,philosophers,artists,andscholars.

Embracing scientific knowledgewas seen as themeans to be religious, as Renan

stated,“Forustoobeynatureistocollaborateinthedivinework.”“Truetheology”to

Renanwas“thescienceoftheworldandofhumanity.”69

67Anon.(1892).68Reardon(1985),237–239and248–251.SeealsoReardon(1989).69QuotedinReardon(1985),247,249,257,and260.

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This appears to be very similar to the religions of science associatedwith

scientismandthusonemightbetemptedtoreducehisviewstoareligiousframework

ofunderstanding.YetforRenan,thereligionofsciencewasspecificallynotreductive.

Heparticularlyrejectedthe ‘rationalreligions’ thathademerged in theeighteenth

century,whichheregardedasunsatisfyingwiththeirsolefocusonprovingrational

truths and lacking the ability to elevateone spiritually andmorally.Thoughoften

identified as a prominent follower of Comte, who has been a major target of

religionization(seeChapterFive),RenanhimselffocusedonhiscontrastwithComte.

ComtianreligionwasdistinguishedfromRenan’sinthattheformerwasidentifiedas

fallingshortof‘respecting’theinstitutionsofreligionandscience.Scholarofreligion

BernardM.G.Reardonobserved:

ForwhatComtehad inmindwasnomorethancontrived formsoforganizationandritualwhichheimaginedwouldservethenewpositivistsocietyinmuchthesamewayasCatholicinstitutionshadfunctionedinthepast,whereasRenanistryingtocombinehisrationalbeliefin thestandpointandmethodsofmodernsciencewith theethosofa faithhecontinues torespect.70

On the onehand, Comtewas identifiedwithmisusing religion and science, as the

suggested absence of ‘respect’ and presence of ‘contrivance’ indicate a lack of

authenticity.Ontheotherhand,Renanwasinterpretedasbeingtruetobothreligion

and science or at least as having aspired to do so. His religion of science is both

religion and science. Even in contemporary discourse on religions of science, the

contrastwithComteisarecurringtheme,suggestingarejectionofreductionism.71

Renanreflectsalargerandgrowingenvironmentofdiscontentwithmutual

exclusivityandtheidentityconstructandalongingforsomekindofreformation.Still

yearningfora ‘true’religionofscience, thatcouldbesaidtobebothreligiousand

scientificcontributed to theproliferationof the inclusivityconstruct.For instance,

Ransomarguedthatmodernizingreligionstillleavesuswanting,thatthe“evenmore

importanttaskofreligion”isto“developasuitablesupernaturalism,atheology,ora

systemofmythsuponthescientificknowledgeofnatureasitsbase.”Asinthecaseof

Renan, a religion based on science is contrasted with Comtian religion, which is

70Reardon(1985),251.Seealsoibid.,237and259.71E.g.,Grassie(2010),159.

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described as completely lacking of religion.72 Many found Comtian religion to be

unsatisfyinginthatit“wasnotreligiousenough”;it“wouldhavetooffermorethan

eulogy of science”; while still others saw its failure in distorting the science or

becomingtooreligious,asdiscussedinthepreviouschapter.73

In another example, Carus also propagated his own vision of a “religion of

science.”AswithRenan,hetookthereligion-sciencerelationshipasapersonalissue

and worked to “construct a new cosmology which would be both scientifically

responsibleandreligiouslysatisfying.”74Hisintentwasforthesciencetobescience

and the religion to be religion, preserving the essential truth, as he saw it, of the

mythologiesofallthereligions.75Religionandsciencecouldbelikenedtooneanother

without reducing one to the other. As in the case of Renan, Carus’ views were

differentiated fromComte’s and even called “theNewPositivism.”76EvenComte’s

viewshavebeenanalyzedaccordingtothislinebetweenscientismandthereformed

religionsof science,with earlyComte as a scientistic differentiated from the later

Comteasapromoterofareligionofscience.Thethingthatdifferentiatesscientism

andthereligionofscience, fromthisperspective, is the former isunderstoodasa

replacementofreligion(signifyingreductionism),whilethelatterisunderstoodas

an actual religion, based on science. In this way, we again see how the inclusive

religion of science was constructed by contrasting it with the reductive

religionizationofscience.77Calderwoodsimilarlydefendedhisviewsforinclusivity

byarguingagainstconflation:

Wedonotaimatsomeagglomerationofmaterials[…]broughttogetherwiththedesignofconstructingacompactanddurableunity.Neitherfromthesideofreligion,norfromthatofscience,couldsuchaproposalfindcountenance.Eachmustworkfromitsownbasis[…].78

Thispositionedreductivereligionsofscienceandsciencesofreligionasthatwhichis

beingreformed.

72Ransom(1931[1930]),13–14.73Bryson(1936),360–361.74Meyer (1962),597;Lopez (2002),25;and Jackson (1968),74and83.Carusalso referred tohisworldviewas‘monism’and‘positivism.’75[Carus]Anon.(1893b),3674.76Carus(1896[1893]),113.77Kracher(2012),134–136.78Calderwood(1881),38–39.

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Reductionismwasnotonlyrejectedbecausethesciencehadbecomereducibly

religious,butalsobecausereligion-scienceidentityexcludedreligiousperspectives,

as in scientification.Walter Lippmann (1889–1974), in hiswidely-readPreface to

Morals (1929), claimed “nothing is sodeadas the scientific religionofyesterday.”

Lippmann rejected “pseudo-religions” “with a resident scientist behind the alter,”

which he regarded as ‘disguised conflict.’ The terminology of “pseudo-religions,”

synonymouslyreferredtoas“gospelsofscience,”suggestsanimplicitbutperceivable

rejection of previous religions of science. He described these devotees as doing

“violencetothe integrityofscientificthoughtandtheycannotsatisfythe layman’s

needtobelieve.”Andyet,Lippmannnotedarisinginterestinsomesortofconciliation

orevena“highersynthesis”ofreligionandscience,aswehaveseenhere.79

Alsotakingissuewithscience’sdelegitimizationofreligion,Goodspeedargued

in1940thatmostpeopledonotthinkthatsciencehasanyspiritualaspectbecause

they “see in it the triumphofmaterialism […].”Andyet “sciencehas ceased tobe

identifiedwithmaterialism,”andassuchthe“faithofscience”isworthexploration,

heargued.Heidentifiedpolitics,humanism,religion,andscienceas“trulyprovinces

ofhumanspirit.”Inthisway,allareconnected:

[W]earenotsomeofusscientists,someofushumanists,someofuspatriots,andsomeofusreligious,butallofushumanbeings,withabirthrightinallfour.Sowhensomethoughtwehadleftthemfarbehind,weareagainthroughsciencebroughtfacetofacewiththegreatoldinstitutions,oftruth,andfaith,andrightandwrong.

ForGoodspeed,“scienceisseentobejustonemoreofthosegreatflightsofaltarstairs

that lead through darkness up to God.”80Whitehead,whowas a contemporary of

Goodspeed, also disassociated science with scientific materialism, of which he

attempted to offer his process philosophy as an alternative. He regarded the

association of science and scientificmaterialism to be one of themain sources of

religion-science conflict. Scientificmaterialism, its accompanying reductionism, its

79Lippmann(1929),123–125and131.80Goodspeed(1940),19–20and54–55.

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constructionasnotrepresentativeofrealscience,and itsnegationof religionwas

delegitimizedand,assuch,theconflictwasthoughttoberesolved.81

Aroundthistime,manysecularhumanistsemerged,suchasAldousHuxley

(1894–1963),GeorgeOrwell(1903–1950),andC.P.Snow(1905–1980),whocame

toagreewithandexpressthesameconcernsastheirintellectualcounterpartsofthe

nineteenthcenturydiscussedabove.Thoughthecallforanon-reductivecombination

ofreligionandsciencehadbecomeprominent,the‘religion’oftheirtraditionandthe

‘science’ that had developed “permitted no such spiritual synthesis.” Notions of

mutualexclusivityandthefreshfailuresofthereligionsofsciencemadeitseemthat

suchasynthesiswasnotonlyculturally,butconceptually impossible. Inresponse,

advocatesofthenewspirituality“reachedoutwardtodiscoverevidenceofaspiritual

dimensioninnatureorsearchedinwardlytoperceivearealityqualitativelydifferent

fromthatdescribedbyscience,”orboth.82Theintelligentsiawasdeterminedtofind

anewapproach.

It was also in the early twentieth century that various traditions were

establishedthatengagedwithsciencetosuchadegreeastobemarkedbytheirown

epithetsdifferentiatingdistinctreligions,suchasanthroposophy, forexample,and

quantum mysticism (the latter of which is discussed in Chapter Eight).

Anthroposophyhasbeendescribedas“theosophyremoldedtosuitGermanrather

thanAnglo-Saxontastes”andintheosophicalbelief,asdiscussedinChapterSeven,

the inclusive likening of religion and science is of central importance.83 The

philosophical founder of anthroposophy was Austrian philosopher and social

reformerRudolfSteiner(1861–1925),whoarguedforanobjectivespiritualworld.

81 Griffin (2001), 22–24. In another example, present-day research psychologist Peter B. Toddchallenged materialistic reductionism, a challenge of which he equated to new possibilities for‘integrating’religionandscience.Todd(2012).Anothercontemporary,priestandphilosopherVictorFerrao,arguedthatthereductionismpresentinbothscienceandreligionareresponsibleforreligion-scienceconflict,howeverthisreductionismcanalsobedifferentiatedfromreligionandscience,thusopeninguppossibilitiesforinclusivity.Ferrao(2002),220.Similarly,theologianJohnHaught,whohasmade the religion-sciencequestioncentral inmanypublications, argued that scienceand scientificmaterialismaredistinctandthisisinterpretedasevidencethatreligionandsciencearenotmutuallyexclusive.Michaud(2010),912.Seealsoibid.,forreferencestoHaught’sprimarymaterial.ForarathercoherentaccountofHaught’sviews,seeHaught(2004).82Turner(1974),246–247and252.83Campbell(2007),157.

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Anthroposophy was further developed by Carl Unger (1878–1929), one of the

original members of the executive council of the Anthroposophical Society (est.

1912),whichisactiveinoveronehundredcountries.SteinerandUngerdescribed

anthroposophy as “spiritual science” and later the School of Spiritual Sciencewas

established.84 In this case as well, we see explicit attention to a non-reductive

understandingofreligion-sciencealignment.Ungerstated:

When,therefore,itissaidthatspiritualsciencesubsumesinitselfsuchtrueknowledgeastheother world views contain, we must not conversely believe that by simply putting theindividualworldviews,basedonthestandpointsofnaturalscience,philosophy,religion,andperhapsofart,togetherweshallobtainapictureofspiritualscience.Spiritualsciencemustbeunderstoodoutofitself.85

Meanwhile, critiques of previous religions of science occurred in a wider

contextofawidespreadcounterculturalmovementagainstthedominanceofscience

in intellectual thought and culture. From this perspective, scientific ideologywas

colonizing religious thought, violating both true science and true religion. More

generally, asAustrianphysicistErwinSchrödinger (1887–1961)noted in1932, in

nearlyeveryrealmoflife,acallforchangeemerged,“aprofoundskepticisminregard

totraditionallyacceptedprinciples,”whetherinreligion,science,thereligion-science

relationship,oranyotherareaofhumanthought.86Atthesametimethatsciencewas

beingchallenged,therewaswidespreadrejectionofreligiousdogmainintellectual

circles, but this did not mean that there was no hope for religion. As British

philosopher,historian,andsocialcriticBertrandRussell(1872–1970)noted,“when

thedogmashavebeenrejected,thequestionoftheplaceofreligioninlifeisbyno

meansdecided,”and,formany,thatplacewasthoughttobeperhapsonewhereboth

religionandsciencecouldbereformed.87And theskepticismtowardconventional

principleswasextendedtowhatcouldbeincludedasrepresenting‘true’religionand

science.

84Campbell(2007),158;Unger(1976),3;andGoetheanum(n.d.).85Unger(1976),27.86QuotedinFeuer(1974),158.87Russell(2009),545.

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5 TheReligionofScienceas‘NottheFalseTraditionofReligion-ScienceExclusivity’

Aswehaveseen, inthesametimeperiodalargenumberof intellectualsputforth

revisedversionsofreligionsofscienceasanalternativetoreligiousdogma,aswellas

analternativetodogmaticscience.Thehopewasthatreligionmightcountertheanti-

spiritualismanddisenchantmentincreasinglyassociatedwithscience,whilescience

could temper the blind faith associated with religion and substitute it with a

commitmenttotruth instead.Therejectionof themainstreamscientific ideologies

wenthandinhandwiththerejectionofthemainstreamdogmasofreligion,ascanbe

seeninthecaseofButlerwhospenthis lifetimefightingagainsttheauthorityand

corruptionofbothreligiousandscientificinstitutions.88Inshort,thesereformations

were often presented as a counter to religion-science conflict, and, conceptually

speaking, as a counter to mutual exclusivity. For instance, Myers advocated the

applicationofthemethodsandtheoriesofsciencetoinquireintoreligiousquestions

andeven interpreted certain featuresof science in termsof religious feelings and

considerations,drawingparallelsbetweenuniformityandcatholicity,conservation

andjustice,andevolutionand“anever-ascendingIdeal.”89Theseideasdonotoccur

inisolation,butratherareformulatedincontrasttonotionsofmutualexclusivity,as

Myersrecognizedthe largerculturaldisconnectbetweenscienceandreligion,and

responded “Science, while perpetually denying an unseen world, is perpetually

revealing it.”90 And in these conversations, the ‘religion’ and ‘science’ of mutual

exclusivityincreasinglycametobeframedasnotrepresentativeof‘real’religionand

science.Thisconstitutesthethirdwayinclusivityiscommonlyconstructed.

SaraS.Hennell(1812–1899)providesanotherexampleofonewhotackledthe

religion of science from a reformative perspective, placing her argument in the

contextofpastfailurestoestablishjustsuchafaith.Shenotedthatthe“tenorofthe

whole preceding argument” for a “religion of science,”which she associatedwith

88Paradis(2007),59.89QuotedinTurner(1974),120.Seealsoibid.,118–120.90QuotedinTurner(1974),121.

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FrancisW.Newman(1805–1897),JamesMartineau(1805–1900),andBadenPowell

(1796–1860),“hasbeentopointouttheindependenceofthephysicalorderofthings

andthespiritual.”91Hennelllamented:

[T]he very notion of any such thing as isolation, or disconnection, or independence, is aninherentinfractionofthespiritofthegreatprincipleoftheUnityofComposition[ofreligionandscience]whichisgrowingandgaininguponuswitheveryextensionofinvestigation.

Despitethesetrendsofseparationinpastreligionsofscience,thesearchforthe“real

nature”ofreligioniscontingentonthe“impossibilityofanylongerholdingbackfrom

seeking aid in the ‘uncongenial alliance’ with science.”92 Here we find that new

arrangementsofthereligion-sciencerelationshiparerelationallypositionedtoold

arrangements, with a specific rejection of mutual exclusivity as representative of

reality.

Christian minister Reginald John Campbell (1867–1956), who became an

exceptionallysuccessfulpreacher,spokeofa“NewTheology”whichhedescribedas

the“religionofscience.”93Thisheconveyedinaclearlyrelationalway,byrejecting

religion-scienceexclusivityasfalse.Hestated:

[The religion of science] is the denial that there is, or ever has been, or ever can be, anydissonancebetweenscienceandreligion;itistherecognitionthatuponthefoundationslaidbymodernscienceavasterandnoblerfabricoffaithisrisingthanthatworldhaseverbeforeknown.ScienceissupplyingthefactswhichtheNewTheologyisweavingintothetextureofreligiousexperience.

Ratherthansciencediscreditingreligiousbelief,“sciencehasonlysucceededingiving

usavaster,granderconceptionofGod.”Bydescribing‘God’as“themysteriousPower

which is finding expression in the universe” and crediting the expansion of our

understanding of the universe to science, Campbell thereby framed science as a

conduitofreligiousknowledge.94

Focusinginonthefalsityofreligion-sciencemutualexclusivity,Calderwood

argued, in 1881, “some of the alleged conflicts between science and religion are

delusively so described, on account of misunderstanding ormisrepresentation of

91Hennell(1860),135.Emphasisoriginal.SeealsoNewman(1988);Hall(1906),103–106;andCorsi(1988).92Hennell(1860),136–137.Emphasisoriginal.93Bowler(2001),226.94Campbell(1907),14–15and17–18.Seealsoibid.,24and64;andBowler(2001),224–232.

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religion.”95Thisrepresentsacommonsentimentinthediscourseontheinclusivityof

thereligionsofscience.The‘religion’and‘science’thatexcludeoneanotherareused

asafoiltoexplainhow‘real’religionandsciencearenotinopposition.“[T]hereal

battleisnotbetweenscience,whichis‘real,’andreligion,whichis‘bogus,’butrather

betweenrealscienceandreligion,ontheonehand,andbogusscienceandreligion,

ontheother,”fromthisperspective.96

InTheBibleoftheReligionofScience(1882),HenryS.Brown(n.d.)arguedthat

“theGodofthesciencesisthetrueGod,andtheplanofthescientiststhetrueplan,

andtheworksofthescientiststhejustworksthatwillharmonizethepeopletoeach

otherandtothetrueGod.”Brownproclaimed,“thescienceswillbeknowntobethe

saviorsoftheworld”as“thewaytoknowledgeisthewaytoheaven,andpeace,and

joy, while on earth, or in spirit life […].”97 One early twentieth-century author

described the religion of science as “themainspring ofmodern science” and “the

sacredsignofthescientificspirit,”thusemphasizingthetruenatureofscienceinhis

view.98Twodecadeslaterthesentimentremained,aswhenin1921,Conklinclaimed

truthwasthemediatingfactorforreligion-scienceconflict,stating“Theaimofreal

science,aswellastruereligion,istoknowthetruth[…].”99

Thetruthof inclusivity iscontrastedwiththe ‘false’ ideaofreligion-science

mutualexclusivity:“Therearenottwoantagonistic truths,onereligious, theother

scientific.Thereisbutonetruth,whichistobediscoveredbyscientificmethodsand

appliedinourreligiouslife.”100Carus,forexample,“believedthattruthwasone,that

science was the search for truth, and therefore that religion must be based on

science.”101 Carus stated, “The ultimate goal of religious development is the

recognition of the truthwith the aspiration to live in conformity to the truth.”102

“Genuine truth being uncontrovertible [sic], the truths taught by religion and by

95Calderwood(1881),66.96Wilber(1998),169.97Brown(1882),vand380–381.98Sabatier(1904),212–213.99Conklin(1922[1921]),xiv.Emphasisoriginal.100Carus(1896[1893]),8.101Meyer(1962),601.102Carus(1891–1892),8–9.

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sciencemustagreeintheend.”103Carusspokeofthepotentialtouniversalizereligion

basedonscientifictruthandargued,“Truthisone,andtherecognitionoftruthisthe

basisofallgenuinereligion.”104

Carusmaintained,“theReligionofScienceisnotaradicallynewreligion,but

areligiousreform[…]inwhichthemostradicalfreethoughtisreconciledwiththe

most rigorous orthodoxy.” Carusdenied the accusation that this is an attempt “to

reconciletheerrorsofthepastwiththetruthsofmoderntimes,”norisit“pandering

topopularsuperstitions.”ContrastingCarus’ownreligionwiththe‘failed’religions

alsoservedto legitimizehisbeliefsystem:“TheGodwhomtheReligionofScience

proclaimsisnotanewGod,butitistheoldGodproclaimedbyeverygenuineprophet,

among the Jewsandalsoamong theGentiles,onlypurifiedof itspaganism.”Here,

Carusalsotraditionalizedhisreligionbyemphasizingtheroleofthe“oldGod.”The

samewasdonebydrawinguponorthodoxy:“WhattheRomanchurchclaimstobe,

thereligionofscienceis.Thereligionofscienceisthecatholicandorthodoxreligion.”

Hesuggestedthatforthosewhosawhisworkasaninnovationhavemissedthe“most

importantside”ofhisposition,hiscommitmenttoorthodoxy:

[I]ftobeafreethinkermeanstobepurelynegativeandtorejectwholesaleeverythingthathasbeenestablishedbythemillennialevolutionofreligion,Iamnotafreethinker,butIamanorthodoxamongtheorthodox;nay,anarchorthodox[…].

Legitimizingthereligioninquestionasrepresentativeof ‘true’religion,Carus,too,

constructedhisreligionofsciencerelativetothefalsereligionofmutualexclusivity.

Carusarguedthathisversionof“TheReligionofScienceisnotintendedtobe

anewsectamongthemanyothersectsthatnowexist.” It isnotnew,becausethe

religionisacommitmenttotheultimacyoftruth,scientificallyproven:“Thereligion

ofscienceisthatreligionwhereinmanaspirestofindthetruthbythemostreliable

andtrulyscientificmethods.”105AsCarusnoted,“Inordertoindicatethecriterionof

truthforreligionistheverysamethingasthecriterionoftruthforscience,wehave

103Anon.(1872a).104Carus(1896[1893]),8.105Carus(1896[1893]),iv,7,10,105,112,and117.Seealsoibid.,8.

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proposed to call the religion we advocate, ‘The Religion of Science.’”106 This

equivocationofcriterionisameansbywhichthetwoarelikened,butnotreducedto

one another, rejecting exclusivity. This is evident in Carus’ denial that this is “an

annihilationofreligioninfavorofscience.”107Rather,“TheReligionofSciencewill

notabolishthereligionsofthepast,butitwilldevelopthem,perfectthem,intothe

cosmicalreligionofhumanitarianism,”inhisview.108Caruscontendedthatscienceis

“religiousrevelation”and“Scientists,asseekersoftruth,areprophetsofthereligion

ofscience,”thoughtheirauthoritydoesnotcomefromthefalliblescientist,butrather

comes from timeless scientific truth.109 He also argued for particular “doctrines,”

whilerejectingtheerrorsofscripturalrevelation,supernaturalrevelation,mystical

intuition,creed,anddogma.110Ashethoughtofscienceasreligiouslyproductive,he

identified himself more as a theologian than a philosopher or scientist and

understoodthereligionofscienceasa “faith,”or “trust in truth,”whiledescribing

science in termsof “holiness” and the “sacred.”111 Carus claimed, “TheReligionof

Sciencecomestoprotestagainsttheidolatryofourchurchesandagainsttheirpagan

spiritwhichalonebringsthemintoconflictwithscience.”Yet:

[This isnot] to abolish theold religions, butonly topurify themanddevelop theirhigherpossibilities.[…]Itisintendedtopreserve[sic]oftheoldreligionsallthatistrueandgood,but to purify their faith by rejecting superstitions and irrational elements, and to discard,unrelentingly,theirerrors.

Hesuggested,“noconflictispossiblebetweengenuinescienceandtruereligion,”thus

excluding the exclusivity construct and instead relocating the conflict to one

“betweenscienceandpaganism.”112

106[Carus]Editor(1893a),353–354.Seealso[Carus]P.C.(1892),604–606;andCarus(1896[1893]),8.107[Carus]Editor(1893a),354.108[Carus]P.C.(1892),606.109Meyer(1962),601;andCarus(1896[1893]),11–13.110Thisissomewhatofasimplification,asCarusbelievedtherevelationofGodinNaturetobedivineandarguedthatsuchrevelationcouldappearinscripture,thoughanyerrorsinscripturearesaidtonotbetruerevelation.Thus,Naturebecomestheultimatearbiteroftruthinrevelation.Therejectionofsupernaturalrevelation,moreover,didnotnegaterevelationfromGod,butratherwastheassertionthatGodrevealsthroughNature.Meyer(1962),601;andCarus(1896[1893]),7and11–12.Seealso[Carus]Editor(1893c);[Carus]Anon.(1890);and[Carus]P.C.(1893d).111Meyer(1962),606;andCarus(1896[1893]),7–9.112QuotedinMcMahan(2008),106.

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The“religionoftruth”isthe“ReligionofScience,”whichCarusclaimedhad

beeninvented“toproclaimaprinciplewhichopposes”dogmatismandrituals.Again

andagain,weseethatCarus’ideaofareligionofscience—its“principle”—isoneof

oppositiontothe‘religion’ofmutualexclusivity,creatingaconceptualframeworkfor

itbyplacing it innegativerelativeperspectivetoanundesirablereligion,onethat

failstobe‘true.’Thefaithofthereligionofscienceisspecificallycontrastedto“blind

faith,”whichisframedas“irreligiousandimmoral,”thusdelegitimizingthis‘religion’

as representativeofreligion.113Furthermore,he claimed that antipathy to science

wasitself“irreligious,”a“grievousfault”anda“moralerror,”delegitimizingexclusive

scienceandfirmlyplacingreligionandscienceinaninclusiveconstruct.114

Inasimilarmove,AndrewDixonWhite(1832–1918)—oneofthefoundersof

the warfare thesis—displaced conflict to othermutually exclusive pairs. In 1870,

Whitespokeof“cheeringomens”forthefutureandimplored:

LettheWarfareofScience,then,bechanged.Letitbeawarfareinwhichreligionandscienceshallstandtogetherasallies,notagainsteachotherasenemies.Letthefightbefortruthofeverykind against falsehoodof everykind—for justice against injustice—for right againstwrong—for beauty against deformity—for goodness against vice—and the great warfarewhichhasbroughtsomanysufferings,shallbringtoearthGod’srichestblessings.115

Also responding to the context of a discussion on religion-science conflict, an

anonymous contributor to Scientific American in 1871 stated, “There will not be

ultimately any incongruity between true science and true religion.”116 Blanchard

likewisemaintainedthatpastreligionsfailedtotrulybereligionsandpositionedhis

ownreligionincontrast.Hestated:

TheReligionofSciencealone,canbetheantidotetotheReligionofMystery[…]Religiontobetrue,tobeReligion,mustbeapresent,living,dynamical,intelligible,actuality;notaby-gonespeculative abstraction, ormoral fossil—a spectre of the past, beckoningman backwards,encouragingarejectionofthenewfortheold,andmysteriouslypointingatlife,throughthedarkportalsofdeath.

Blanchard’smessagewasthat‘Traditionalreligion’orthe‘ReligionofMystery’fails

to“beReligion,”whilethe“ReligionofSciencewillbetheconstantlyhigherandhigher

113Carus(1896[1893]),iii–ivand9.114QuotedinMcMahan(2008),103.115Anon.(1870b).116Anon.(1871).

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law,” which “will ever clearer andmore efficiently reveal and develop, up to the

perfectionpoint.”The“truereligion—TheReligionofScience—supersedesallfalse

religions […].” In Blanchard’s view, “Man can be ‘saved,’ ‘redeemed,’ ‘born again,’

‘created anew,’ in short,actually perfected, only by Scienceas a religion.” This, he

proclaimed,is“TrueReligion.”117

Haeckelsimilarlyemphasizedthe‘truth’ofreligion-scienceinclusivitywhen

he founded theMonist Leaguewith the intent of substituting a “true religion” of

scienceandreasoninplaceofChristianity.Hebelievedthat“truthunadulteratedis

onlytobefoundinthetempleofthestudyofnature”and“theonlyavailablepathsto

itarecriticalobservationandreflection—theempiricalinvestigationoffactsandthe

rationalstudyoftheirefficientcauses.”118Theimpactofsuchthinkingisevidenced

bythefactthatmanyGermannaturalscientistsjoinedtheMonistenbundandsimilar

associationsbetween1906and1914and,alsoinGermany,from1900to1930,“there

emerged a whole movement of scientists, philosophers, and lay authors who

speculated about the spiritual dimensions of nature,” thus taking an inclusive

approachtothereligion-sciencerelation.119

ThismovementalsoinfluencedintellectualsinNorthAmerica.IntheUnited

States,theinclusivereligionofsciencemovementwasmainlypropagatedbyCarus

andhiscircle.120ThejournalsTheOpenCourtandTheMonistwereformedaround

thistimewiththepurposeofunifyingreligionandscience,bothfirstpublishedby

The Open Court Publishing Company (est. 1887) and both under the editorial

managementofCarus,atonetimeoranother.121Haeckelcontributedtobothofthese

magazines and Carus, among other contributors to the magazines, in turn, have

writtenabouthisandOstwald’sideasaswell,creatingacommunityofintellectuals

involvedinthesamediscourse.122TheOpenCourt(1887–1936),was“Devotedtothe

WorkofEstablishingEthics andReligionupon a ScientificBasis,” “Devoted to the

117Blanchard(1860),5,8,40,and130.Emphasisoriginal.118QuotedinLynch(2007),373.SeealsovonStuckrad(2014),77–80;andBurtt(1939),192–193.119vonStuckrad(2014),83and85.120Holton(2005),10.121Haeckel(1895),viii.SeealsoMeyer(1962),598.122OpenCourtPublishingCompany(1908),s.v.“Prof.ErnstHaeckel(Jena),”189ands.v.“HaeckelandMonism,”71and73;andCarus(1907).

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Science of Religion” and the “Religion of Science,” and “Devoted to the Work of

Conciliating Religion with Science.”123 Carus, and the founder of the magazine,

EdwardCarlHegeler(1835–1910)(wholaterbecameCarus’father-in-law),agreed

that the aimof themagazinewas tobe aplatform for religious andphilosophical

reform.124

TheMonist(est.1888),nowpublishedbyOxfordUniversityPress,isoneofthe

oldest journals in philosophy. It has contributed to the professionalization of the

disciplineandhasfeaturedmanyprominentscientistsfromtheUSandEurope,such

as American philosopher and chemist Charles S. Peirce (1839–1914) and Czech-

Austrian physicist and philosopher Ernst Mach (1838–1916).125 The Open Court

PublishingCompanyalsopublishedaseriesentitled“TheReligionofScienceLibrary”

(est.1893),whichincludedsixty-onevolumes,bymanydistinguishedscientistsand

intellectuals includingMach and German philologist FriedrichMaxMüller (1823–

1900), one of the founders of comparative religion.126 The library’s general

professionalaimwasdescribedas“topropound,develop,andestablishtheReligion

ofScience.”127

Thoughthevariousintellectualmovementsandindividualsdiscussedabove

represent a wide array of interests and opinions, we see not only historical

connectionsinthevariousrelationsbetweenthegroups,butalsoacentralconceptual

positionunitingthem—thereligionofsciencemovementwasareformationtoward

inclusivity.Andinclusivitywasconstructedbydirectlycontrastingitwithexclusivity

andthe‘falsity’ofreligion-scienceconflictorconceptualopposition. ‘True’religion

andsciencefollowtruth.

123TheOpenCourt(1887),frontmatter;andTheOpenCourt(1889),masthead.124Meyer(1962),598;Anon.(2015d);andCarus(1910).125TheMonist(n.d.);andCarus(1891–1892),4.126 Open Court Publishing Company (1908), 179–186. Notably, not all volumes seem to directlyaddressa‘religionofscience,’butratherthespiritoftheseriesseemstobeacelebrationofscienceandphilosophy,includingstandardtreatisesandclassics.127Carus(1896[1893]),iii.

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6 Religion-ScienceDichotomiesas‘Complementarities’

Rejecting reductionism and exclusivity is a relatively ‘easy’ conceptual change,

however there remains to be discussed the additional, largermatter of the entire

constellation of meaning surrounding religion and science that positions the

signifiersofthetwoasdichotomies.Thisdidnotescapethenoticeofthesereformers.

Asmentioned,afourthwayofconstructinginclusivityisbyrejectingtherelational

content of those signifiers so that the opposition of dichotomies is reframed as a

complementarity.Inlinewiththisobservation,these‘religionsofscience’havebeen

characterized as a struggle to assimilate religious aspirations and the scientific

worldviewinthefaceofseemingincommensurability.128Inrejectingtheconstruction

ofdichotomiesasoppositional, thebinaries thatrepresentreligion-sciencemutual

exclusivity are negated and the religion-science relation can be constructed in an

alternative,inclusiveway.

Present-day philosopher Victor Ferrao saw the decline of dichotomous

thinkingasindicativeofthebreakdownofthereligion-sciencedivide.Hestated:

Todaythebinaryoppositessuchasbody/soul,matter/spirit,heaven/earth,male/femaleareunder tremendous fire. Thus the boundaries between nature and super-nature are slowlyebbing.Scientistshavebeguntoseetheirtaskasasacredenterprise.129

This, however,was already developing in the late nineteenth and early twentieth

centuries.Forexample,Conklinrejectedthenaturalism-religiondivideasameansof

negating mutual exclusivity between religion (or oftentimes ‘theology,’ which he

closely identified with religion) and science.130 He also rejected the dichotomous

formulationofspiritualphenomenaandnaturalism,as,heargued,thespiritualhas

not been shown to be “uncaused, undetermined, unlawful,” qualities of which he

identifiedwithsupernaturalism.Thoughnatureis“stated,fixed,andsettled,”“Thisis

nottosaythatnatureislackinginmanyofthequalitieswhichtimeoutofmindhave

been ascribed to the supernatural, such as mystery, infinity, and super-human

128Turner(1974),4.129Ferrao(2002),214.130 See Conklin (1922 [1921]), 185–186 for the identification between religion and theology andbetweenthereligion-theology-naturalismrelationshipandthereligion-sciencerelationship.

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power.” He noted, “Usually all that ismeant by theword ‘supernatural’ is super-

humanorwonderful,andthemodernconceptionofnaturehasonlymagnifiedthese

qualities.”Withthecontinualadvanceofscience,we“wouldonlyprovethatwhathad

beentermedsupernaturalisreallynatural.”Conklinrecognizedthatmanyidentify

religionwith supernaturalismand findnatural religion “a contradiction in terms,”

whichheclearlyrejected,andheadditionallycommentedpositivelyonthecontinued

advanceofscienceinreligion.Thiswasnotconsidereda lossoftheenchantments

supernaturalismhastooffer,however,as“nature,ratherthanthesupernatural,isthe

greatestofallmiracles.”131

Renanfollowedasimilarapproachtoconstructareligionofscienceinanon-

oppositionalway,thoughhemoreexplicitlydivorcedreligionfromsupernaturalism

andlikeneditwithnaturalism,whilesciencewasdisassociatedwithmaterialismand

likenedtospiritualism.Thedisassociationwithsupernaturalismisnotequatedtothe

adoptionofastrongversionofnaturalism,whichwouldnotallowforspiritualism.

Andtherejectionofmaterialismisnotreducedtoastrongversionofspiritualism,as

this would not allow for naturalism, as per the oppositional dictates of mutual

exclusivity.Inotherwords,thedisassociationofsignifiersofreligionandscienceare

not accompanied by reduction to their relative dichotomies as per the mutual

exclusivity construct. Furthermore, ‘contradictory’ signifiers like naturalism and

spiritualism are simultaneously maintained. In this way, the relational construct

exhibitsarejectionofmutualexclusivityandofreductiveunderstandings,evenwith

there-constellationofsignifiers.Asstatedindifferentcontextsthroughoutthiswork,

which signifiers are in play is not as central as how those signifiers represent

relationalconstruction.

Similar to how both the ‘contradictory’ signifiers of naturalism and

spiritualismweresimultaneouslymaintainedonthepartofRenan,othershavefound

aplaceforbothnaturalismandsupernaturalism.Forexample,Blanchardargued“If

supernaturalismwasnotnatural,mancouldneverhavehadanythingtodowithit;

nor could he have exercised the least shadow of thought upon it.” That which is

131Conklin(1922[1921]),193–194,197,and201.

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outside of nature, Blanchard referred to as “ultranatural,” of which he claimed is

devoidofreality—“thereexistsnothingultranatural.”132Thisiscomparabletohow

Renanseparatedoutspiritualismfromsupernaturalismsoastoalignnaturalismand

spiritualism.Here,Blanchardseparatedouttheultranaturalfromthesupernatural,

so as to include the supernatural as part of naturalism and position religion and

scienceasinclusive.This,inturn,issimilartoRudolfOtto’s(1869–1937)separation

of ‘lower supernaturalism’ and ‘higher supernaturalism.’He used the terminology

‘lowersupernaturalism’torefertothepositionthatdivineagencyviolatesnatural

laws,whichOttothoughtoughttobereplacedby‘highersupernaturalism.’Thislatter

ideaisthepositionthatGodworksstrictlywithinnaturallaws,naturallawsofwhich

arethepurposivedesignofthedivine.133Inthiswaysupernaturalismandnaturalism

arealignedinanon-oppositionalway.

In a much simpler approach, and one that highlights the central issue of

definition, Canadian biologist George John Romanes (1848–1894) argued, “Once

grant that the supernatural is ‘natural’ and all possible ground of dispute is

removed.”134Romanesfurthermaintainedthatnon-rationalimpulses(asignifierof

religion,aswehaveseen)wereatthefoundationofhumanthoughtandevenlaidthe

groundworkforrationalthought.Romanesstatedevenscientifictheorieswere“at

bottomahumanconstruction,variableandrelative,andthattheysupposeanactof

faithattheirroots.”135Inthisway,Romanesadoptedtherationalandnon-rational

and science and faith dichotomies as not oppositional at all, but rather as

complementary.

Carusidentifiedwiththisposition,stating:

Wedenytheexistenceofthesupernaturalinadualisticsense;butsupposewecallsuchhigherfeatures of nature as appear in man’s ethical aspirations hyperphysical or supernaturalbecause they rise above the lower andpurely physical elements of the universe,wemust

132Blanchard(1860),22and64.133Griffin(2001),27.Cf.Turk(2013),esp.256–257.SeealsoOtto(1907).134QuotedinCarus(1916),64.135ObservationsandquotefromTurner(1974),248–249.OnRomanes,seealsoRouth(1937),331–332;andCarus(1916),52–73.RegardingtheWesternturnagainstrationalism,seeCampbell(2007),329–333andpassim.

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confess that the supernatural lies hidden in the natural and is destined to grow from itaccordingtothecosmiclawofexistence.136

Carusfoundothermeansbywhichtopositionsupernaturalismandnaturalisminan

inclusiveway.Hearguedthat‘God’canbeunderstoodinmanywaysthatreflectan

enduranceinreality,frommathematicaltheoremstoethicalinjunctions,andclaimed

“ifthewordsupernaturalhasanysense,hereitisapplicable;forhere[…]itwould

remainsuchasitis,evenifnaturedidnotexist.”137

Carus provides other examples of the simultaneous maintenance of

dichotomouspairsaswell.Carusbelieveditwasnecessarytocountertheprevalent

notionthatscienceandmoralityconflictspecificallyduetothecontradictionbetween

free will—necessary for moral responsibility—and determinism—as a guiding

principleofscience.Forhim,thisboileddowntoareligion-scienceissue.Caruswas

convinced that science and ethics do not conflict and accepted both freewill and

determinism.Hearguedthatapersoncouldactfreelywithinonlythelimitationsof

physical force and those of their own character. In the spirit of contradicting

oppositionaldichotomies,Carusstated, “Wedeny that the issue isdeterminismor

freewill;inoppositiontospiritualandmaterialdualism,weclaimdeterminismand

free will.”138 Placing this view in ‘oppositional’ regard also demonstrates

relationalizationofinclusivityandexclusivity,definingtheformerincontrasttothe

latter.This isevidentinCaruswords,“Wemaintainthatmoraltruthandscientific

truth, that religion and science, regularity according to law, and free will are no

irreconcilablecontradictions.Theyareoppositionscomplementarytoandexplanatory

ofeachother.”139Evenifthedichotomyordifferentiationismaintained(anditoften

is so as to avoid conflation), the relational content of ‘dichotomy’ is rejected. This

meansthatontologically‘dichotomy’becomesthedifferentiationoftwothingsthat

arecomplementary,ratherthanoppositional.Carus,forexample,alsoarguedthatas

religionandsciencearebothworldviewsfoundedinfacts,accuracy,andtruth,andas

our views change in light of new information, “scientific ideas become religious

136QuotedinCarus(1916),64n.*.Emphasisadded.137Carus(1896[1893]),114.138Carus(1888).Emphasisoriginal.SeealsoMeyer(1962),603.139Carus(1888).Emphasisadded.

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ideas.” Carus continued, “thisway unites two apparently contradictory, but really

complementaryqualities.”140

Wood noted that the “separation between faith and reason created the

opportunity” to delineate religion and science, the process of relationalizing via

mutual exclusivity. Thus, it is with the recasting of religion as rational that this

delineationisclosed,asscience“ispracticallyidenticalwithreasonandreligiousfaith

oughttoberational.”Woodstated,“Moralconfidencemayhavewaned;moralfaith

mayhaveturnedtodoubt;butthereisonefaithwehavenotlostamidthewreckof

things,—our faith in modern science.” With this in mind, one can depart from

traditional faith andmove toward a religion of science. However, contradictorily,

‘science’ is described as “general, universal, unbiased, rational,” in contrast to

‘theology’ that is formulated as “local, limited, narrow and practical.” This is

contradictoryinthesensethatifscienceandtheologyaredichotomousinthisway,it

problematizesareligionofscience.Butthiscontradictorinessisinstrumentalinthe

recastingofreligion.Thisishowtheconstructofinclusivityissometimesachieved—

theformulationtakescontradictionsasadeparturepointforreformulating‘religion’

inawaythatdoesnotcompromise‘science’—arejectionofconceptualizingcertain

pairsasoppositional.Forexample,Woodfurthernotedthatinthereligionofscience

the“distinctionbetweentheoryandbelief isneglected.[…]anduponahypothesis

desiredintoabeliefhe[thedevotee]rearsamostastoundingstructureofreligious

thinking and creates models for religious living.” Wood argued the “difference

between hypothesis and fact, between metaphysics and physics, between the

creationsofnatureandthecreationsoftheimaginationisnotonlyslurredoverbut

forgotten.” In otherwords, these dichotomous pairs are not taken to bemutually

exclusive.

Wood noted that the “concept of development and a certain definition of

religion form the starting point whence a religion of science is deduced.” Put

differently,itisinthenegotiationoftheconceptsathandthatisthefoundationfor

aligningreligionandscienceinaninclusiveway.Hearguedthatthenotionofreligion-

140Carus(1891–1892),8–9.

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science incommensurability “is another of those gratuitous problems created by

definition.Ifscienceandreligionaresodefinedastomakethemincommensurables,

thenfortheproblem-makertheywillbe.”141Inthesewords,wecanseetheastute

observationofhowthereligion-sciencerelationship isamatterofreligion-science

relationality,ofhowtheconceptsareunderstoodintermsofoneanother.Similarly,

Ransompinned the issue on the nosewhen he stated, “the point lies inwhat the

officialmeaningofthatterm[‘religious’]isgoingtobe.”Forhim,‘religion’inthesense

usedbytherelevantscientiststodescribetheirownworldviews,“isacomparatively

poorkindofreligion—thatitisbarelyreligiousatall,thatitisasirreligiousascan

be.”Thenthereisa‘forcedchoice,’accordingtoRansom,“betweenareligionwhich

seemstorepudiatesciencefromthestart,andasciencewhichseemsnevertorise

into a religion.”142 However, when we shift our perspective to how religion and

scienceareunderstoodinrelativeperspective,theseobstaclescanbeovercome.

Theyearof1927sawthepublicationofMichaelPupin’s(1858–1935)TheNew

Reformation:FromPhysicaltoSpiritualRealities,inwhichthisphysicistdiscussed,in

part, how science canbe a “service to the soul.”He likenedphysical and spiritual

realitiesandthisinturnwasthoughttobesuggestiveofreligion-scienceinclusivity:

“[T]he physical and spiritual realities supplement each other. They are the two

terminals of the same realities […] Here is one of the fundamental reasons why

ScienceandReligionsupplementeachother.”Pupinbelievedthismovementnotonly

tobewidespread,butconstituteda“universaldrift”and“TheNewReformation,”and

thisreformationwasoneinwhichdichotomieswerecomplementarities.143

Similar developments continued on into the 1940s, such as in the process

philosophy of Whitehead, in which the rejection of supernaturalism was key to

resolving the apparent conflict between religion and science. He understood the

associationofreligionwithsupernaturalismtobeoneofthetwomainsourcesofthis

misguided conflict—the other being the association of science with scientific

materialism. Divorcing religion and science from these problematic signifiers has

141Wood(1922),1,4,9–10,12,19,38–39,and41.Emphasisoriginal.142Ransom(1931[1930]),10–12.143Pupin(1927),133and273.

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been described as a “new form of naturalism, one that is equally religious and

scientific.”144Alsointhe1940s,Goodspeedarguedthatthe“FaithofScience”reveals

itself inthereasonhumansdesiretoknow.Heclaimedthat thisdesirewas“nota

naturalistic attitude,” sincewedonot share this uniquelyhumanqualitywith the

animals.Rather,thedesiretoknowandconductscienceisa“profoundunderlying

conviction”thatinscience“laynothinglessthanthehopeoftheworld,”“thegreat

cause towhichmanshoulddevotehimself, thegreat function inwhichhe ismost

noblyoccupied.”Goodspeedarguedthatscienceisa“faith”partlybecausesciencehas

a“moralbasis”:“Itnotonlyseekstruth,butitworksthroughtruth,andcanworkno

otherway.”Factsand findingsare“holyground”and“sacred.”ThoughGoodspeed

recognized that science was executed in thematerial world, this non-naturalistic

attitudewasthefoundationofthe“FaithofScience.”Fromtheperspectiveofscience,

theuniverseexhibitstruth,truthisthehighestgood,thustheuniverseembodiesthe

good,givingit“genuineandindubitablespiritualvalue.”Thescientistbelievesthat

the unknown is simply unfound knowledge and truth—this is “faith.” Goodspeed

continued,“Thesefaithsarenotthemselvesdefinitelyreligious,buttheyreachout

towardthefaithofreligion,andfindtheirsynthesisandtheircompletionthere.”145It

isthedifferencesthatformthebasisforagreaterwhole,thatis,thecomplementarity

foundindichotomies.

7 FromMutualExclusivity&IdentitytoInclusivity&BackAgain

Theideaofareligionofsciencewasloved,buttheexecutionwasnot.Thefirstwave

ofreligionsofsciencewasthoughttohavefailedreligionontwocounts:notonlydid

science disappointedly adopt the undesirable workings of religion, it also poorly

performedthedesirablefunctionsofreligion.Thesereligionswerealsothoughtto

have failed science, falling short of knowledge in its hubris, free-thinking in its

dogmatism,andtruth in its ideologicalstance.Theaiminarticulatingthese issues

144Griffin(2001),21.Emphasisoriginal.Seealsoibid.,23and25–26.145Goodspeed(1940),29–30,35,37,and132–133.

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was to fulfill the desire these reformers had to negotiate between scientific and

religious thought while being ‘true’ to both. This situation naturally led to the

formulation of alternatives in contrast to the mutual exclusivity and identity

constructs.

Assuch,whatoftenoccurredwasthatinthesamebreaththata ‘religionof

science’was critiqued, a ‘religionof science’waspromoted, as canbe seen in the

sentimentsofBlanchard,Sidgwick,Butler,andWard,amongothers,above.Thisisnot

asnonsensicalasitfirstappearswhenwerememberthatwhat‘religion’and‘science’

meanwasexactlywhatwasbeingnegotiatedandthusmeantdifferentthings—we

mightevensaytheyreferredtodifferentobjects—inthecontextofmutualexclusivity

andreductiverelationalconstructsontheonehand,andinclusivityontheotherhand.

Whilethisisunderstandable,itcancertainlybeconfusing,astheterms‘religion’and

‘science’ are continuously employed inconsistently. This, however, is in turn

consistentwiththepurposesofredefinition.AsGordonW.Allportnoted,“Anarrowly

conceived science can never do business with a narrowly conceived religion,”

arguing,“thevocabularyofreligionandofmodernsciencediffermarkedly,though

theirmeaningsareessentiallythesame.”146Clearly,conceptualizationanddefinition

arekeyandthedifferentmeaningsof‘religion’and‘science’beingemployedinthese

discussionsisinstrumentalintherelationalconstructionofmeaninggoingonhere.147

Thoughthephrase‘religionofscience’hasbeenonthedeclinesincethemid-

twentiethcentury,theideasofreligiousscienceandscientificreligionhavenot,asthe

followingtwochapterswilldiscussregardingthecasestudiesofscientificBuddhism

and quantummysticism—both ofwhich continue to play a significant role in the

religiouslandscapetoday.Furthermore,bytheendofthetwentiethcentury,theidea

of an increased cooperation based on the idea that “science and religion are not

mutuallyexclusive”wasidentifiedasoneofnineglobaltrendsinreligion.148Inrecent

146Allport(1969[1950]),xand97.147Incontemporaryexamples,AndrewM.SteaneandKenWilbersimilarlyarguedthatreligion-scienceintegrationiscontingentonhowwedefinetheterms.SeeSteane(2014),4–5;andWilber(1998),9–10and160–163.148Sellars(1998),3.Notably,increasedclashesbetweenreligionandscienceconstitutedoneoftheotherninetrends.Thisindicatesapolarizationinthedebate.Seeibid.,2–3.

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scholarship we see this relational construct continue to be perpetuated, with

multitudesofstatementslike“religionandsciencearenotmutuallyexclusive.”149The

decline of the ‘religion of science’ movement has been largely a decline of this

particularphrase,as inclusivityendures to thisday inseveralotherscience-based

religionsandreligion-basedsciences.Yet,wecanalsoseethedeclineofthereligion

ofscienceinitslackofacademictreatment.

For example, Donald Harvey Meyer argued that “Carus the man and his

Religion of Science have been all but forgotten, and one is at a loss to name any

importantthinkerwhowasdirectlyinfluencedbyhisideas.”150Actually,Caruswas

influential (on which, see also Chapter Seven), but Meyer’s comments reflect his

legacyinthesensethathehasbeenlargelyignoredbyscholars.Indeed,itseems,itis

notjustCarus’religionofscience,butratherallthereligionsofsciencethathavebeen

forgotten.ThoughCaruscontributedmuchtodefiningthisdiscursiveconstellationof

inclusivitythatisstillapplicabletoday,thishasnottranslatedtonamerecognitionin

the general public nor to regular academic treatment.151 He has been regularly

overlookedorrejected,leavinghimunknowntomany.152Moreover,Ifoundverylittle

currentacademicresearchonthereligionsofsciencefromthenineteenthcenturyto

the present day,with the exception of the fields of Buddhism and science and of

scientism,whicharesometimescharacterizedas‘religionsofscience.’153Onereason

thislacunahasremainedsolongisundoubtedlyduetotheunfavorablereceptionof

suchviews.154Thevariousreligionsofsciencehaveoftenbeenrejectedoutofhand

forfailingbothreligionandscience,justasthepastformswere,andanalyzedinterms

of the identity construct. Though inclusivity developed partly in contrast to this

149Forsomeexamplesfromawidearrayofstudies,seeMichaud(2010),912;Fletcher(2005),545;Kettell(2014),384;Krasnodębski(2014),40–41;andWeller&Yilmaz(2012),26.150 Meyer (1962), 607. Open Court Publishing Companywas also severely criticized. Carus (1896[1893]),112.151E.g.,Asprem(2014)didnotmentionCarus,eventhoughalotofthehistoricalmaterialinthisworkoverlapswithwhatiscoveredhere.152OntheinfluenceofCarus,seeMeyer(1962),esp.605–607.153Whenreligionsof sciencearementioned in thecontemporarydiscourse, it isoftentimeswithareference tosomething“newlyconceived,”suggestingaperceived lackofhistory.See,e.g.,Kracher(2012),131;Peck(2002[1978]),228;Rothschild(1989),2;andDawkins(2003).154 Regarding the reception of Carus, see Corvinus (1894a); Corvinus (1894b); Corvinus (1895a);Corvinus(1895b);Corvinus(1895c);andCorvinus(1895d).

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reductiveconstruct,weseeatransitioninscholarshipfromidentitytoinclusivityand

backagain,withthepresumptionsofmutualexclusivityre-emerging.

Carus,forexample,wascharacterizedassufferingfrom“reconciliationmania”

in apublicationunder thepseudonymCorvinus.155 Carus sawhisdenunciation as

based on the critic “[i]dentifying the negativism of his peculiar free-thoughtwith

Science,andReligionwithsuperstition.”Thus,itwasamatterofframingreligionand

scienceasmutuallyexclusive.Forexample,Carus’criticsarguedthathisreligionof

sciencedisplayed “inconsistency”and “ambiguity.”His rejectionofapersonalGod

andyethis claim thatGodwasa “super-individual reality”was taken tobe “a flat

contradiction” and a “tergiversation.”156 According to Carus, these were

“misrepresentations”ofhisideas,andhelamentedhiscritics’misunderstandingof

how he usedmany “oldwords,” like ‘religion,’ ‘soul,’ and ‘immortality,’ “in a new

sense.”157Herespondedtothesecritiquesbyarguinghisreligionis“NotIrreligion,

But True Religion,” the title of one such response.158 Though for Carus the

construction of ‘religion’ certainly had to do with his own convictions about the

natureoftruth,healsonotedhowhismeansofreligion-sciencelikeninghadmuchto

dowithusingthesewordsinnewwaysandwithnegotiatingmeaningsoftheterms

involved.HequotedHamletinhisdespair:“Words,words,words,”andproclaimed

hewouldnotquarrelabout“names.”Henotedhiscritics’deeplyrootedmisgivings

aboutterms,like‘God,’theuseofwhichcanbeavoided,asthesamemeaningcanbe

appliedto“cosmicorder”or“law,”“ornecessity,ortheeternal,ortheimmutable,or

theomnipresent,theabsolute,ortheprototypeofmind,orthestandardofrationality,

or the Universal Logos, or the authority of conduct.” This tirade on terminology

reflectsCarus’desperationtobeunderstood,begginghisreaderstofocusonmeaning

overwords. He argued that ‘God,’ understood in thisway, is an “undeniable fact,

scientificallyprovablebyunfailingevidence,”thatevenhiscriticswouldagreeistrue,

ifonlytheycouldhavegraspedthemeaningofhisideas.159Somedidanddefended

155Corvinus(1894a),543–544.156AsnotedbyCarus(1896[1893]),103and112.157Carus(1896[1893]),103.158[Carus]P.C.(1895).159Carus(1896[1893]),111–112.

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Carusagainsthiscritics.HudorGenone(1843–1921)sawthepointofcontentionto

belanguage,justasCarusdid.GenoneseverelycriticizedCorvinusforhislanguage

games,andthoughdoneinaharshmanner,reallybroughttheissuetolight:

The name ‘God’ is retained, not to perpetuate the errors that have been imposed uponmankindinhisname,butasawordfortheco-ordinationofprinciple,theunityoftruth,theindividualityoftheuniverse.Dr.CaruscallstheAll‘God,’ashewoulddoubtlessaddresshiscriticas‘Mr.Corvinus.’‘Corvinus’didnotnamehimself;Dr.CarusdidnotnameGod;hefoundthenamereadymade.WouldCorvinuscareformetorefertohim,whenspeakingofhisfineflowofrhetoric,as‘Mr.Language?’orwouldIbejustifiedinalludingtohismisconceptionofideasasthefaultyworkingofMr.Eventuality,HerrComparison,orMonsieurCausality?160

The point is that language is the problem and the solution. Understanding how

relations between religion and science change the terms is key. Certainly, the

question is still out on the ultimate ontological constitution of binaries, and both

complementarity and exclusive dichotomous perspectives have had sufficient

supportforconsideration.Andwhetherdichotomiesareexclusiveorcomplementary

doeslittletochangethedata,whichdemonstratestherelationalconstructionofsuch

ideas.

Religionsofsciencewereattackedandrejectedatadeeperlevelofanalysisas

well.Theconflationargumentand the identityconstructcontinue tobeproduced,

appearingbothasawaytointerprettheprimarymaterialandasawaytocounterthe

validity of conciliatory claims, despite the fact that conflation and reductionwere

specificallyrejectedinthisdiscourse,asIthoroughlydemonstrated.Whatweseeis

thatcriticsbothaccusedreligionofscienceadvocatesascommittingconflation,as

wellasarguedthatthesereligionscannotbescientificbecausetheyarereligious,thus

reducing it to religion. Putdifferently, critics havebeen theones constructing the

conflationtheydescribedandtheninterpretthedatabasedonthisconstruct.Seeing

ashowreligionofscienceadvocatescontrastedtheirworldviewtothereductionism

of the identity construct throughout time, displaying an ongoing struggle to be

understood,Ifeelthereisadeeperrorintheacademicandsocialunderstandingof

these traditions, in which a categorical differentiation of ‘religion or science’ has

strippedmuchoftherichnessofmeaning.Theperceivabletendencyinacademiato

160Genone(1895),270.

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equate religionized science andan inclusiveperspective is amistake.The specific

demarcation between these two traditions in the discourse reminds us that in

reducingalltoreligion,weareintroducingourownrelationalconstructstothedata.

Thedemarcationof the inclusive religionof science from religionized science is a

significantidentitymarkerforadvocatesandshouldbetakenseriously.

Thoughtheconflationandreductioncriticismshavebeenprettyfarspreadin

academiccircles,fromthehistoryofsciencetophilosophy,mostdisappointingisthat

we see this on the part of scholars of religion aswell. Discussions of religions of

science thatmightbeperceived inanywayasadvocatingconciliation (sometimes

includinghistoricalobservationsofreligion-sciencealignment)istabooand,insome

cases, “academicsuicide,”asonecolleagueofmineput it.Thus,academics thatdo

tackle these issues are sure to pay close attention to all thewrongs done to ‘real

science’ and often refuse to take these religions/sciences seriously on their own

terms.This isreminiscentofhowscholarsofreligionusedtotreatthecategoryof

‘cults’asmisrepresentativeof ‘realreligion,’totheembarrassmentofallinlightof

thefieldofnewreligiousmovements.Therelationalanalysisthusfarhashopefully

beenconvincingenoughtoshowthatwhatconstitutes ‘religion’and ‘science’ is in

advocates’termsasmuchasourownandwecannotbetooquicktoputafinalword

onthematter.

Andwhatwehaveseenherefurtherdemonstratesthatrelationalizationiskey

tochangesindiscourse,includingintheanalysisofsuchacademicsdescribedabove

whoemployed thedictatesofmutualexclusivity to interpret inclusivityasmerely

anothercaseof religionizedscience.Again,wehaveseen that theevolutionof the

terms‘religion’and‘science’werestructuredbypre-existingconstructs.Aninclusive

relationwasconceptualizedandarticulatedrelative to theexclusivityand identity

constructs. Inclusivity was suggested to be non-oppositional by a rejection of

reduction that demands a sole framework of religion or science as per mutual

exclusivity. Exclusivity was further negated by arguing that is was a conceptual

mistake,thatexclusivereligionandsciencewerenot‘true’religionandscience,and

that the relational content of dichotomieswas complementary, not conflictual. As

regardsthere-constellationofdichotomies,wehaveseenthatnegatingexclusivity

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can also involve rejecting the signifiers of religion and science as per mutual

exclusivitythatarethoughttobethesourceofthatantagonismandthusarethought

to be inauthentic. The thought goes that the problematic signifier is not

representative of real religion or science. We saw this in several examples,

particularly as regards ‘supernaturalism.’ Since supernaturalism continues to be

thought of asmutually exclusivewith science (in some instances), thismakes an

effectiveargumentforinclusivity,asifneitherreligionorscienceisassociatedwith

it, thensupernaturalismcanno longerholdasevidenceofreligion-sciencemutual

exclusivity. In this way, mutual exclusivity does continue to structure discursive

change here. It is exactly because supernaturalism is a signifier of religion as per

mutualexclusivitythatthedifferentiationofreligionandsupernaturalismworkto

framereligionandscienceasnon-oppositional.Atthesametime,thisalsosignalsa

significantshiftawayfromthestructureofmutualexclusivitysincebreakingupthe

association between religion and signifiers of religion as per mutual exclusivity

creates new terms of engagement. This is also a substantial departure from pre-

existingconstructsbecauseinclusivity,thoughusingmutualexclusivityasasounding

board,isalsotheveryantithesisofthatconstruct.

At every turn, we see relational constructs structuring the terms of

engagement for novel religion-science relationalization. Whereas the last three

chapters have largely focused onhow the terms ‘religion’ and ‘science’ changed in

relativeperspective,herewehaveseenthattherelationalconstructofinclusivitywas

constructed relative to other constructs. Relationalization occurs on these various

levels—conceptualizing terms relative to one another, as well as conceptualizing

relationsrelativetooneanother.Withthischapter,wehavecontinuedtogainalarger

perspectiveonrelationalconstructsinrelativeperspective.

Withthoseconsiderationsinmind,Iwillextendtheanalysisofinclusivityto

two case studies in the following chapters, exploring the relationalization of

inclusivity and likening religion to science and science to religion. In the case of

exclusivity,wesawthatlikeningledtothereductiveidentificationbetweenreligion

and science. In the case of inclusivity, likening leads to a non-reductive affiliation

betweenreligionandscience, resulting inwhatmightbe called the scientificityof

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religion and the religiosityof science—two formsof the representation construct.

AccordingtoFerrao,adialoguebetweenreligionandscience:

[W]ould sacredize science and secularize religion. It can protect religion from blinddogmatism and science from arrogant scientism. This ensciencing of religion andenreligionizingofscienceisindeedrequiredfortheverysurvivalofhumanity.161

In this relational language, we see a call for an inclusive likening of religion and

science, a call that has been met in various forms, from quantum mysticism to

contemplativescience.

161Ferrao(2002),211.

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Chapter7:TheScientificityofReligion&theCaseofBuddhism

[W]hatevertruthssciencemayreveal,nonewillbeopposedtothevitalpointsofBuddhism.—HenryAlabaster(d.1884)1

1 Religionas‘Scientific’

HenryAlabaster, a diplomat and interpreter to theKing of Siam,made the above

statement from theperspectiveof amodernSiamese (Thai)Buddhist in1871.He

creditedtheBuddhawithscientificdiscoveriesandcharacterizedhimasexceeding

all his contemporaries in scientific understanding. He even depicted Buddhist

practice,suchasmeditation,asscience.2Thoughsuchideashadbeenincirculation

sincethe1820s,itwasonlyaroundthetimeofAlabaster’spublicationthatBuddhism

came to be well known in theWest. As scholars, intellectuals, and sympathizers

becamefamiliarwiththereligion,thediscoursesurroundingBuddhismrepeatedly

stressed its supposed scientific character. And when Buddhists first actively

presentedBuddhismtoEuropeansandAmericans—duringtheWorld’sParliament

of Religions in Chicago (1893)—scientific compatibility was emphasized, while

broader cultural contexts of the religious traditionwere deemphasized.3 It is this

discourseonBuddhismasscientificthatmakesupthecasestudyofthischapter.

1Alabaster(1871),xxi.2Alabaster(1871),xxxiii,5,16,88,103,137,144,182–183,192–194,202,and232.3 For a discussion, see McMahan (2011), 119. This is a commonly cited date and context for theintroductionofBuddhismtoAmerica,howeverthereissomeevidencethatChineseBuddhistsmayhavecometoNorthAmericaasearlyasthefifthcentury.SeeFields(1992),25–30.Furthermore,thereisevidencethatEasternculturehashadsignificantinfluenceonWesternculturesinceantiquity.SeeCampbell(2007),148–152andpassim;andOldmeadow(2004),3–6.InEurope,Buddhistimmigrantsdidnothaveagreatimpactpriortothemid-twentiethcentury,thoughBuddhistthoughthadcertainlyimpactedEuropeanssignificantlybythispoint,aswillbediscussed.SeeBaumann(2002),86.Fromthese time periods through today, there aremany examples of Buddhist contactwith theWest invarious forms, thus it is best to think of the late nineteenth century in terms of the discursiveconstructionofthescientificityofBuddhism,asakeymoment.Thatthisisasignificanttimeperiodisalsoevidencedbythefact that itwasaroundthemid-nineteenthcenturythatthenumberofAsianimmigrantssharplyincreasedinAmerica,whonaturallybroughttheirculturalandreligiousidentitiesalong with them, and established migrant and transnational communities all over the world. See

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ThoughmanyearlyscholarsofBuddhismupheldsuchviews—inadditionto

themultitudesofpresent-dayBuddhists,Buddhistsympathizers,andpopularizers—

today,itiswidelyrecognizedintheacademicfieldofBuddhiststudiesthat‘scientific

Buddhism’isaparticularlymodernandrelativelynewmanifestationofBuddhism.

AccordingtoDavidL.McMahan,‘modernBuddhism’is:

An actual new form of Buddhism that is the result of a process of modernization,westernization, reinterpretation, image-making, revitalization, and reform that has beentakingplacenotonlyintheWestbutalsoinAsiancountriesforoveracentury.4

It has been argued that one of the defining doctrines ofmodern Buddhism is its

professedcompatibilitywithscience.5InthecaseofmodernBuddhism,weseemany

elementsoftheBuddhisttraditionlikenedtoscience,accompaniedbythepurgeof

mythological elements and ‘superstitious’ ritual from the religion, constructing a

scientificBuddhismthatwasusedtofirstdescribethetraditiontotheWesternworld,

aswellastoreintroducetoandrevitalizethetraditionintheEast.SituatingBuddhism

in themodern context resulted innewphilosophical interpretationsof cosmology

and psychology, vast changes in ritual and other practice, new speakers for the

tradition, and an emphasis on the intellectual trends, social implications, and the

languageofmodernity. ‘ModernBuddhism’ isnotsimplyBuddhisminthemodern

period, but specifically refers to formsofBuddhism thathave “emergedoutof an

engagementwiththedominantculturalandintellectualforcesofmodernity.”6

Campbell(2007),70–82;Kuhn(2008),3andpassim;andHsu(2000).Additionally,thesameyearastheWorld’sParliamentsawthefirstBuddhistconversiononAmericansoil.SeeFields(1992),129.Acentury after the World’s Parliament, at least one million Americans identified themselves asBuddhists.SeeFields(1992),369.4McMahan(2008),5.‘ScientificBuddhism’isoftentimesassociatedwithWesternBuddhism.However,advocatesofthescientificityofBuddhismhaveincludedintellectuals,religiousrepresentatives,andenthusiastsfromallovertheworld,withagreatdealofdialogueandotherexchangebetweenthem.Moreover,whileBuddhismwasbeingconstructedasscientificintheWest,thecompatibilitybetweenBuddhismandsciencewasemphasizedinAsiaatthesametime,withJapanandCeylonbeingamongthefirst.AllofthismakesthedivisionofWestern-EasternBuddhismsparticularlyproblematic.SeeLopez(2012),10;andMcMahan(2008),6and63–64.Becauseof thegeographic limitationsof theanalyticalterm‘WesternBuddhism,’ithaslargelybeenabsorbedintothestudyofmodernBuddhism.‘ModernBuddhism’isalsosometimesusedtorefernotonlytothegeographicallimitationsofEuropeandNorthAmerica, but also toBuddhism in any location outside of its nativeAsian context or tochangesinBuddhismthathavelargelydevelopedoutsideofthenativecontext,butofwhichmayormaynothavebeenintroducedtoAsiaaswell.Borup(2013),290.SeealsoCroucher(1990);Clasquin(2002);andUsarki(2002).5Lopez(2012),122;andMcMahan(2008),67.6McMahan(2008),6and67.SeealsoBorup(2013).

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Despitethehistoricalcontingencies,Buddhismwasandcontinuestobewidely

understoodashavingavoided“allthoseproblemsofreligionandsciencebybeinga

religionthatisalsoscience.”7Buddhismwasthoughttomeettherequirementof“a

bringing together of religion and science so that religion becomes scientific and

science becomes transcendent.”8 This was accomplished by ‘finding science in

Buddhism,’ that is by constructing a scientificity of Buddhism, the likening of

Buddhism and science in a non-reductive way. This is what I refer to as the

‘scientificity of religion’ construct, one manifestation of the ‘representation

construct,’whichpositionsreligionasnon-reductivelysimilartoscience.Thesecond

manifestation, on science as non-reductively religion-like,will be discussed in the

followingchapter.

Though there are exceptions to this perspective on the Buddhism-science

relation,thenon-reductivelikeningofBuddhismandsciencehasbecomelegitimized

throughprofessionalizationof the specializeddiscipline ofBuddhismand science,

takingshapeinresearchinstitutions,projects,andscientificstudies,forexample,to

thepointthatithasbecomearespectedfieldofstudy.Sincethebeginningsofthis

discourse, the scientificity of Buddhism has had a vast array of supporters, from

apologists and amateurs to scientists and scholars. This makes Buddhism a

particularlygoodcasestudyforthetopicathand,asscientificdataandotherresearch

outputsgreatlycontributetothe‘scientific’portionoftheconstruct,whilethearray

of enthusiasts and scholars maintain the infrastructure of ‘religion.’ Nonetheless,

religionandsciencearefoundonbothsidesaswell.Oftentimes, thesetwogroups

overlap,asmany in the fieldarebothpractitionersofBuddhismandofscienceor

academia. It is also a particularly good case study because “the dissemination of

Buddhism into the modern scientific milieu plays with the Western distinction

betweenthereligiousandthesecularinparadoxicalwaysthattendtoquestionand

unseatthismostWesternwayofdividingtheworld.”Thisisbecausethescientificity

ofBuddhismisdemonstrativeoftherepresentationconstruct,inwhich‘religion’is

7Lopez(2012),112.8DuPré(1984b),146.

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constructedasboth‘scientific’andsimultaneously‘religious,’aBuddhist“scientific

religion”that“bridgestwoantitheticalspecies.”9

Buddhism’sintroductiontotheWestcouldnothavebeenmoretimelyforthe

construction of a non-reductive scientific religion. This religion came to be

constructedashavingascientificcharacterpartlyduetothefactthatintheverysame

decades thatWesternerswere first learning of and constructing this religion, the

religions of science were on the rise. As discussed in the previous chapter, the

inclusivityconstructwasfirmlyformulatedduringthetimeofthereligionofscience

reformation from the 1860s to the 1940s. The 1860swas also a key time period

duringwhichBuddhismcametobeconstructedasscientific,largelyinEuropeand

America. At this time, Buddhismwas becoming intellectually trendy and popular

interestgrew,particularlybytheturnofthecentury.10Itbecamefashionabletocall

oneselfaBuddhistacrosstheWesternworldandateverylevelofsociety,fromthe

average Joe to the quality Joe. This highlights the importance of these early

impressions, suggesting the central role of science in the rise of this religion’s

popularity.11And the discourse on religions of science in terms of inclusivitywas

quicktoincorporateBuddhisminthediscussion.

ThepopularizationofBuddhismintheWestalso“coincidedwiththeinterest

insciencethatemergedfromthepost-Darwinianneedtogroundreligiousbeliefin

new scientific understanding of reality,” an active time for the growth of

scientification.12 At the same time, therewere ongoing critiques of this relational

construct, critiques of the reduction of religion to science, that took shape in the

religionizationconstruct.Therewasanintellectuallongingtounderstandreligionin

termsofscience,buttoavoidthedisenchantmentofscientificationandthehubrisof

sciencereplacingreligionintotal.Aswesawintheprevioustwochapters,therewas

9Cho(2012),276and282.10Theprimarysourcematerialthisperiodizationisbasedonwillbediscussedinpassingthroughouttheremainderofthiswork.Lopez(2012),10,concurredwiththetimeframe.SeealsoNumrich(2012),138–140.TherewereexceptionstoapositivealignmentofBuddhismandscience,ofcourse.Oneearlywork identified Buddhism as “weak intellectually” because of “their collision with the results ofexperimentalinvestigation,”citingthecosmiccenterofMountMeruasanexample.SeeNeale(1859),446.11Batchelor(2011),256.12Nakasone(2003),76.

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alargeintellectualmovementtowardthere-conceptualizationofthereligion-science

relation to address the problems of scientification, religionization, and mutual

exclusivity.Religionreducedtoscienceandsciencereducedtoreligionleftaspiritual

void and intellectual vacuum that leftmuch to be desired from both religion and

science.Theanswerformanywastakinganinclusiveandnon-reductiveviewtoward

scientificreligionorreligiousscience.Toaccomplishsucha thing,manysought to

create new religions, like anthroposophy, or reform the old, as in the case of the

religionofsciencereformation(seeChapterSix).However,manythoughtwhatthey

werestrivingforhadalreadybeenrealizedintheexoticreligionofBuddhism.

FromtheoutsetofWesterninvestigationsofBuddhism,thereligionhasbeen

related to discourses of science, while in many cases maintaining ‘religion’ as a

signifier.13 This has been quite a success. Buddhism has been suggested to be

‘rational’ and ‘empirical,’ a ‘philosophy of life’ that is “uniquely compatible with

modern science.”14 Prior to the mid-nineteenth century, Western publications on

Buddhismwereratherrare,withtheEnglishtermonlyhavingbeeninusesincethe

beginningofthesamecentury.15‘Oriental’scholarshiphadonlyrecentlybeenformed

at this point, with ‘Buddhism’ first being constructed as a pan-Asian religious

traditionandoneofthemajorworldreligionsaroundthesametime.16Thiswasalso

the time that Buddhists from around the globe first became acquaintedwith one

another’s manifestations of the religion and worked toward international

cooperativesofBuddhists.Thus,forthefirsttimewesee‘Buddhism’constructedas

a whole and this whole included ‘science.’17 Put differently, there are strong

etymological and discursive connections between the English term ‘Buddhism,’

Buddhists’ownunderstandingoftheirreligioninglobalperspective,andsignifiersof

science. The very growth of the term ‘Buddhism’ and the discourse of this ‘world

religion’coincidedwiththescientificityofBuddhism.

13Borup(2013),295.14McMahan(2008),11.SeealsoOldmeadow(2004),86;andYiu(1946),65–76and141.OntheissueofunderstandingBuddhismas‘rational,’seeCho(2002).15Borup(2013),291.SeealsoSimpson(2016b).16Lopez(2012),39.17Fields(1992),115,117,andpassim;andLopez(2012),25.

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Just as in the two case studies of the identity construct in which mutual

exclusivitystructuredthe interpretationofreligion-science likening, inclusivityset

theparametersforrepresentation.Specifically, inclusivenotionsofnon-opposition

allowed thenon-reductionof similarities. If religionand scienceare thoughtof as

non-oppositional,thenthereissimplynoconceptualimpetustoreducesimilarities

tooneframeworkofmeaning.Ifthereisnoconflict,thereisnoissuewithmaintaining

multiplenarratives.Fromtheperspectiveofexclusivity,makingreligionscience-like

demands itmustbenothingmorethansciencesincescience is thoughttoexclude

religion. It is a zero-sum game. But if one is departing from the perspective of

inclusivity, religion-science likening must not exclude religion or science and

therefore likening will be non-reductive. Since inclusivity sets the terms of

engagement,Iwilldiscussitalotinthischapter.However,whereasintheprevious

chaptertheintentwastoemphasizenon-oppositionintheinclusivityconstruct,my

discussionofinclusivityhereistoemphasizeitsstructuralroleinthenon-reductive

likeningofreligionandsciencethatmakesuptherepresentationconstruct.

If my hypothesis that relational constructs structure discursive change is

correct,notonlywilllikeningbenon-reductive,butwewouldalsoexpectthatinthe

processofconstructingreligionasscientific,tomake‘science-like’willreflectwhat

‘science’meansinthecontextofinclusivity.The‘science’of‘Buddhismandscience’

hasreferredtoastronomy,physics,biology,andecology,amongotherbranchesof

study.Despitethisvariety,the‘science’istypicallyunderstoodintermsofthehard

sciences(thoughhistorically,psychologyhasalsoplayedanimportantrole).18Yet,no

matter which branch of study is invoked, we repeatedly see the perspective of

inclusivity in the vast majority of the material, such that ‘science’ means ‘not

excluding religion’ or ‘non-oppositional toward religion.’ Still, most signifiers of

scienceaspermutualexclusivityaremaintainedand,consideringthatthisconstruct

ishowthetermhistoricallycametobedefined,this isunsurprising. ‘Religion’and

‘Buddhism’aretreatedinalikemanner—asinclusive,butwithsomesignifiersasper

exclusivity.

18Borup(2013),296;andMcMahan(2008),14and52–57.SeealsoMetcalf(2002).

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The ‘Buddhism’ of ‘Buddhism and science’ has also meant many things,

referring to many sects and even some more specific movements within certain

groups.This‘Buddhism’isparticularlyinclusive,notonlyinrelationtoscience,but

also toward various denominations of Buddhism and religion in general. While

individualsectsandlineagesaremaintained,‘scientificBuddhism’issuchadispersed

movement that some refer to it as a “transnational Buddhist sect” and a “global

phenomenon,”understoodasuniversal,democratic,andegalitarian.19Assuch,Ifocus

onindividuals,publications,researchinstitutions,andrelatedoutputthathavebeen

influential in both the East and theWest—if they can so be divided—in order to

highlightthegeographicaldispersalofthescientificityofBuddhism.Fromthatangle,

itisapparentthattheWesthasoftenbeenthecenterforinspiration,innovation,and

growth,whichwasthendispersedthroughouttherestoftheworld.Assuch,Iwill

oftenspeakofBuddhismintheWest,butcontinuallykeepaneyetothelargercontext.

Yetdespitethesequalificationsforthesecentralanalyticalterms,aswithallcentral

termsinthisstudy,theparametersforunderstanding‘Buddhism’and‘science’arein

relativeperspective—thatis,‘Buddhism’refersto‘Buddhismrelativetoscience’and

‘science’ to ‘science relative to Buddhism.’ And that perspective, specifically the

relationalconstructofrepresentation,isexactlywhatweareunpackinghere.

ThoughthischapterlargelyfocusesonlikeningBuddhismandscience,being

non-reductive,similaritiesarenotidentitiesand,assuch,differencesareoftentimes

maintained. And these differences are important to the relational structure of

representation, which allows for multiple frameworks of meaning in its non-

reductivestance.Fromaninclusiveperspective,differencesarenottreatedaspoints

ofantagonism,but ratherpointsof contact.Forwhat religion-sciencedichotomies

persistthereis“thetendencytoseeinthedifferencesbetweenBuddhismandscience

thebasisforadichotomizingofthefieldormodeofknowledgethatmakesofeacha

part that, when united, creates an even greater and more worthwhile whole.”20

Rejectingtheoppositionofdifferences,complementarydichotomiesareembraced.

19McMahan(2008),6,8,and21;andBorup(2013),293–294.20Cabezón(2003),50.Emphasisoriginal.

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Forexample,insuchdiscussionswewilloftenseethefollowingarguments:science

isabouttheexteriorworld,Buddhismtheinterior;scienceisconcernedwithmatter,

Buddhismwithmind;scienceisquantitative,Buddhismisqualitative;sciencegives

usmaterialadvancements,Buddhismgivesusspiritualones.

JoséIgnacioCabezónexplainedthatthisparticularmodelnegotiatesnotonly

differences, but similarities aswell. Since differences are part of a greaterwhole,

whensimilaritiesarethendrawnuponfromthisbroaderperspective,“holdingfirmly

to the notion of irreconcilable differences it refuses to allow either Buddhism or

science to be reduced to the other.”21 More precisely this is the rejection of

dichotomies characterizedas irreconcilabledifferences, instead regarding themas

noncontradictorypairs,makingreductionismbothredundant(thetwoarealready

identified in thewhole) and conceptually incoherent (one half of the pair cannot

representthewhole).Wesawthisalreadyintheconstructionof inclusivity, inthe

exampleoftherelationalcontentofdichotomiesinterpretedascomplementarities.

This means that differentiation is upheld, while simultaneously maintaining a

similarity in the binaries, united under some larger conceptual schema. Such a

perspectiveispartandparceltotherepresentationconstruct.

2 Historyof‘Science’inBuddhism

Though thisdiscoursewasnot firmly formulateduntil themid- to latenineteenth

century,the‘tradition’ofscientificBuddhismwasbornwithapast.Itwassuggested

thatfromtheoutsetofBuddhism,thereligionexhibitedscientificcharacteristics,thus

constructing a history of ‘science’ in Buddhism. Science was presented as ever

present, by making claims such as “Buddhists have freely adopted the practical

scientifictechnologiesofeachepochandplace.”22

Therewereatleastthreemajordiscoursesthatcontributedtothis,including

that of ‘Christianity,’ ‘religion,’ and ‘science,’ carving out a socially relevant

21Cabezón(2003),50.22Nabeshima(2003),81.

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interpretivespaceforthereligion.23Inthefollowingthreesubsections,Iwilldiscuss

thehistoryof ‘science’ inBuddhismrelationallyconstructedvis-à-vis ‘Christianity,’

‘religion,’and‘science.’ThoughIwillbediscussingbothhistoricalfacts,ontheone

hand,andconstructsthatarenotsosensitivetohistoricalrealitiesinthehistoryof

Buddhismandscience,ontheotherhand,whicharewhichshouldbeclearwhenwe

keepinmindtheabovediscussionandperiodizationofthescientificityofBuddhism.

2.1 Buddhismas‘NotChristianity’Christianityhasbeena“sourceofcreativetension”forBuddhists,asMcMahanputit,

which is indicative of the relational constructionof these two religions.McMahan

identifiedanothersourceofcreativetensionaswell,thatofscience,andthesetwo

sourcesareintimatelyrelated.Fromasearlyasthesixteenthcentury,Buddhismwas

confrontedbyChristianmissionarieswhopresentedBuddhismasinferiorduetoits

lackofscientificsupport.Christianmissionariessawscienceasatool,a“reasonfor

conversion.” Sciencewas identifiedwithEuropeancivilizationmoregenerallyand

waspresentedasanoblecauseforcolonization.Itwasinthiscontextthatnineteenth-

centuryBuddhistreformers—intheEastandWest—“oftentookChristianityasthat

towhichBuddhismhadtorespond,eitherbyimitationorcritiqueorboth.”24

Buddhists began to present their religion as the truly scientific one, thus

turning Christians’ own rhetoric against them, adopting the discourses of the

dominant group.25 In an evidently relational construction, the argument was

presentedasfollows:

ChristianityhasacreatorGod,andBuddhismhasnoGod;Christianityhasfaith,Buddhismhasreason;Christianityhasdogma,Buddhismhasphilosophy;Christianity[…]haspublicritual,Buddhismhasprivatereflection;Christianityhassin,Buddhismhaskarma;Christianityhasprayer,Buddhismhasmeditation;Christisdivine,theBuddhaishuman.26

23McMahan(2008),61–69;andLopez(2008),32–33and115.SeealsoHeine&Prebish(2003);andVollmer&vonStuckrad(2017).24McMahan(2008),10–11and67.SeealsoMcMahan(2011),120–121.TheimitationofChristianityon the part of Buddhists has a significant history and wouldmake for an interesting and fruitfulrelationalanalysisonitsown,buthereIwillfocusonthecontrast,asthisbecamethenormandwashugelyinstrumentalinaligningBuddhismandscience.25Lopez(2012),10–11;Batchelor(2011),345;andMcMahan(2008),20and93.26Lopez(2012),11–12.

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Thoughduringthetimeoftheseearlymissions,Christianityandsciencewere

intimatelyconnected(andnotevenclearlydifferentiated), theChristianity-science

relationwasontherocksbytheendofthenineteenthcenturyinamuchlargersocial

context(seeChapterThree).Christianitywasquestionedduringthe‘Victoriancrisis

of faith’ across Europe and America, a period of which there was a lot of doubt

surroundingtraditionalformsofthereligion.27Somehavearguedthatitwasexactly

becauseof thiscrisis thatVictoriansweredrawntoBuddhism.BecauseBuddhism

wasthoughttohaveascientificcharacter,itprovidedanalternativereligiontothe

religion that was problematic—namely, religion to the exclusion of science. One

publicationfrom1903,authoredbyaphysicianandchemist,recountedamovement

awayfromthecrisisofWesterntheismbroughtaboutbyevolutionarytheorytoward

aresolutionviathescientificdoctrinesofBuddhism.28Withanincreasingantipathy

towardChristianity“asintellectuallysterileandscientificallyabsurd,”manyfeltthe

need for an alternativemeans tomeaningful fulfillment, “a new religion inwhich

spiritandintellect,thereligiousandthescientific,couldco-exist.”Someresponded

by constructing rational religions, others were comforted by religions of science,

whilestillotherslookedtotheEastforsomethingaltogetherdifferent,a“scientific

Buddhism.”29

JustaswesawinChapterThree,oftentimessupportforsciencewasdirectly

connected to anti-Christian sentiments, as in the case of Darwinism in France.

Similarly,heresomeofthesupportforBuddhismwasmoretheresultoftakingissue

with Christianity rather than a direct endorsement of Buddhist thought. The

introductionof theBuddhainBritain, forexample,coincidedwithananti-Catholic

period,“acausetowhichGautamawasalsoco-opted.”TheBuddhawasidentifiedas

the“HinduLuther”andBuddhismasthe“ProtestantismoftheEast.”AroundEurope

moregenerally,thepoweroftheChristianchurchwasonthedeclineand“itbecame

common practice to use Buddhism as a means of discrediting Christianity.”30

27McMahan(2008),90;andMcMahan(2011),118.SeealsoHelmstadter&Lightman(1991).28Tweed(1992),105.29Jackson(1968),91–92.30Batchelor(2011),262–263.SeealsoMcMahan(2008),7.

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FriedrichWilhelmNietzsche (1844–1900), for example, inhis anti-Christianwork

TheAntichrist(DerAntichrist,1888),arguedthatBuddhismis“abletofaceproblems

objectivelyandcoolly,” “yieldingtoreality,”andthus“Sharplydifferentiating itself

fromChristianity.”31

The mythological and irrational components of Christianity were severely

criticized by nineteenth- and twentieth-century skeptics, proponents of scientific

naturalism, and advocates of historicism in Christian theology. This provided an

opportune contrast case for Buddhism to carve out a conceptually and socially

relevantspaceforthetraditionthatwaspresentedasthe“oppositeofChristianity,”

whichwasinturnframedasacorrectiveinreligion-scienceopposition.32Thisroleas

thereligionthatcouldbridgethereligion-sciencegaphascontinuedtothepresent

dayasanimportantfactorinclaimsoflegitimacy.33Forexample,thefirstZenmaster

inAmericaandoneofthefirstAsianBuddhiststopresentthereligiontotheWest,

SōenShaku (1859–1919),argued thatbothBuddhismandscienceunderstand the

cosmostoberegulatedbythelawofcauseandeffect,incontrasttothecentraltenet

ofthemiraculousinChristianity.Furthermore,Sōengavealessliteralinterpretation

ofreincarnationastheimmortalityofhumanlegacies,whichhesuggestedis“more

in accordance with the result of modern scientific investigation.”34 Sōen

demythologizedBuddhismandthenpresenteditas“morescientificthanadecidedly

nondemythologizedChristianitywiththrones,heavens,andangels.”35

Similarly,anotherimportantrepresentativeinthescientificityofBuddhism,

Anagarika Dharmapala (1864–1933), noted that it was not Christianity, but

Buddhismthatcouldbridgethedividebetweenreligionandscience.Asevidenceto

this,DharmapalaarguedthatbecauseBuddhismdoesnotbelieveinaCreator,there

arenomiraclestospeakofincontradictionto“scientific”facts.36Hefurtherclaimed

that the reason for the rejection of a Creator was because Buddhists took “the

31Nietzsche(1920[1888]),69.32Lopez(2012),11.SeealsoVollmer&vonStuckrad(2017).33Cho&Squier(2016),1;andMcMahan(2008),11.34QuotedinMcMahan(2008),68.35McMahan(2008),68.36Fields(1992),126.

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doctrineofevolutionas theonly trueone,with its corollary, the lawof causeand

effect.”DharmapalaelsewherearguedthatChristianmissionariesinAsia“areutterly

deficient in scientific knowledge”; Buddhism, in contrast, “is free from theology,

priestcraft, rituals, ceremonies, dogmas, heavens, hells and other theological

shibboleths.”TheBuddhataught,accordingtoDharmapala,“ascientificreligion[…]

in harmony with geology, astronomy, radioactivity and reality.” Dharmapala

predictedthatwiththespreadofscienceinEurope,peoplewouldshiftawayfromthe

“unscientific”beliefsofChristianity,andBuddhismwouldthenenjoy“asympathetic

reception.”37ConstructingBuddhismincomparisonwithscienceviaitscontrastto

Christianitywasameansbywhich“Allthatwasgoodwascollectedfromeverysource

andembodiedthereinandallthatwasbadwasdiscarded,”asDharmapaladescribed

it.38

TherelationalconstructionofBuddhism incontrast toChristianitywasnot

peripheral. In fact, one of the first dozen or so English-language books thatwere

writtenaboutBuddhismwasacomparisonofBuddhismandChristianityandmany

moreweretofollow.39Thesignifier‘science’hasconsistentlyappearedasapointof

demarcation,whethertheauthorsfavoredBuddhismorChristianity.40Forexample,

in one relatively earlyworkon the topic from1893, Y.Mayeda (n.d.) argued that

Buddhism“is,ofcourse,inexactaccordancewithscientifictruths,soitisfardifferent

fromthedoctrinesofChristianitywhicharealwaysatvariancewithscience.”Once

acquaintedwith the relevant doctrines,Mayeda claimed, onewould “perceive the

superiorexcellenceofBuddhism”toChristianity.41PaulCarus(1852–1919),whowe

37QuotedinMcMahan(2008),9196,and111–112.BecauseofthestrongrelationalhistorybetweenCreationismandevolution,theroleBuddhismhasplayedasa‘non-theisticreligion’intheconversationwithevolutionandreligion-sciencerelationswouldmakeforanotherrelevantrelationalanalysis.38QuotedinFields(1992),127.39 See, e.g., Armstrong (1870); Hungerford (1874); Wordsworth (1877); Mohattiwatte & De Silva(1878);Reynolds (1884); Collins (1885); Lillie (1887);Monier-Williams (1889); Scott (1890); andLillie(1893).40ThereisasignificantbodyofliteraturefromChristianauthorswhotakeissuewithreincarnation.Thisisrelevanttothetopicathand,inthatifreincarnationisseenasunscientific,thenthosedoingthecritiquingareeffectivelyaligningtheirownviewswithscience.Thisagaindemonstratestheroleof‘science’ indemarcatingreligionsat this timeandthepushandpullbetweenconceptualizationsof‘Christianity’ and ‘Buddhism.’ Unfortunately, there is not sufficient space to explore this strand ofdiscoursehere.41Mayeda(1893),17–18.

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encounteredinChapterSixinhisroleintheconstructionofareligionofscience,also

aligned Buddhism and science in specific contrast to Christianity, as well as the

generalconceptof‘religion.’Caruswasoneofthemostimportantadvocatesofthe

scientificityofBuddhismandoneofthemostimportantpopularizersofAsianthought

in general. He stated that regarding the differences between Buddhism and

Christianityon“creationandthenatureofthesoul,”science“willcertainlysidewith

Buddhism.”42HeclaimedthatBuddhism,unlikeChristianity,isbased“solely[…]upon

provabletruth.”43

Inavarietyofcontexts,contrastingwithChristianityallthewhile,Buddhism

wasdemythologizedandassociatedwithnaturalism,rationality,andskepticismasa

counter to supernaturalism, blind faith, and dogma, thus placing Buddhism as a

cohorttoempiricismandthescientificspirit.44ByconstructingBuddhismincontrast

toChristianity(whichcarriedmanyofthesignifiersof‘religion’asperexclusivity),

the associations with many signifiers of ‘science’ easily followed. Relationally

speaking,thisisbecausebothBuddhismandsciencehavebeendefinedincontrastto

Christianity—thelatterofwhichwasamajorsourceforunderstanding‘religion’in

theformativeperiodofexclusivity.Thus,Buddhismandsciencecametohavemany

signifiersincommon.Cabezónobserved:

Influenced by the prevailing rationalism, empiricism, and free-thinking views of theEnlightenment,thesemensawinBuddhismalackofcredaldogmatismthattheybelievedwasinmarkedcontrasttothetenetsoftraditionalChristianity.Buddhismwasthereforelike,orconcordant with, science precisely because it partook of those elements that, lacking inChristianity,madeareconciliationbetweenthelatterandscienceimpossible.45

BeingunlikeChristianity,Buddhismcametobeconstructedasthereligionthatcould

bridgereligion-scienceoppositionandbecauseitwasunlikeChristianity,Buddhism

wasscience-like.

42Carus(1899),130–131.Still,itisimportanttonotethatCarusneveractuallyrejectedChristianityintotalandwassympathetictothereligioninmanyways.SeeJackson(1968).43Carus(1894),viii.44Batchelor (2011),351;McMahan(2008),65;andMcMahan(2011),121–122.Foramorerecentexampleofthiscontinuingtrope,seeKirthisinghe(1984).45Cabezón(2003),46.

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2.2 BuddhismDifferentiatedfrom‘Religion’McMahan summed it up nicelywhen he stated, “Buddhism becomes, in effect, an

inversereflectionofwhatskepticsandliberalChristiansbelievedtobeproblematic

aboutorthodoxinterpretationsofChristianityinlightofscientificdevelopmentsand

biblicalcriticism.”46As‘religion’hasbeenhistoricallyconstructedwithChristianity

astherepresentativetradition, itcomesasnosurprisethatBuddhismwasalsoan

‘inversereflection’ofthemoregeneralconceptof ‘religion’aswell.Andoneofthe

most appealing differing aspectswas its scientific character.47 In fact, Jason Slone

found that “the scientific nature of Buddhism is defined vis-à-vis traditional

religion.”48Indeed,inthediscourseonthescientificityofBuddhism,Buddhismhas

beenfrequentlycontrastedwiththebroadcategoryof‘religion,’therebyconstructing

thetraditionasacounter-examplewherebyreligionandsciencecanbealigned.For

instance,Buddhismissaidtobescientificbecauseitrejectssupernaturalism,blind

faith,anddogma.Andthisiseffectivesince‘religion’hashistoricallybeenconstructed

intermsofthesesignifierssaidtorepresent‘notscience.’Putdifferently,Buddhism

iscontrastedtoexclusivereligion.Atthesametime,Buddhismretainsthesignifier

‘religion,’butofaninclusivekind.Thus,Buddhismas‘science-like’doesnotresultin

reductionandthescientificityofBuddhismensues.

Francisca Cho and Richard K. Squier argued that the “non-theism” of

BuddhismhasbeenthemainpointofcontrastintheWesternconcept‘religion,’which

cultivatedBuddhism-sciencealignment.49Buddhismwassuggestedtobeatheisticor

sometimes just without a Creator, while religion was unfashionably theistic.

Buddhismwasdemythologizedandhumanized.50However,thereweremanymore

points of contrast that were instrumental as well. Buddhism was constructed as

individualized,religionmoregenerallyasinstitutionalized;Buddhismwassaidtobe

freeofritual,whileliturgicalreligiouslifewasthoughttobeconstraining.

46McMahan(2008),69.47Tweed(1992),103.WhileTweedhadafocusonAmerica,thewiderapplicationofhisobservationisdefensibleinlightoftheoverallresearchhere.48Slone(2013),2097.49Cho&Squier(2016),151.E.g.,thenon-theismofBuddhismwasamajorpointforcompatibilitywithscienceaccordingtoCarus.Tweed(1992),105.50Batchelor(2011),351;Lopez(2012),38;andMcMahan(2008),5–7and64.

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[I]nBuddhism,thereisnodivinegod,saviourorauthority.Therearenodogmas,andsonofaithtoacceptthem.Itisthesethings—divineauthority,dogmaandblindfaith—whichmakesChristianityandvirtuallyeveryotherreligionincompatiblewithscience.ButBuddhismdoesnothavethem.51

Buddhismwascharacterizedasareligionofreason,areligionofscience,asareligion

that is science, as solely a religious philosophy, or something in between, like a

“synthetic”and“philosophicalreligion”;whilereligion,aswehaveseeninChapter

Three,wasoftentimesconstructedastheexactoppositeofscienceandreason.52For

example, Brian Houghton Hodgson (ca. 1801–1894), who greatly contributed to

Western understandings of Buddhism, described Buddhism as a “philosophical

scepticisminreligion.”53Sowhiledifferentiatedfromreligion, inmostcases,being

unlike Christianity and other religions is not thought to exclude understanding

Buddhismasareligion.

Atthesametime,compatibilitywithscienceissomethingsoopposedtothe

conventionalconceptionof‘religion’thatitwasseenasachallengetothetermitself.

Forinstance,AlanWatts(1915–1973),amajorproponentofunifyingBuddhismand

Western psychology, argued, in Buddhism, “we do not find either philosophy or

religion as these are understood in the West. We find something more nearly

resemblingpsychotherapy.Thismayseemsurprising,forwethinkofthelatterasa

formofscience.”ClassifyingBuddhismasareligion,science,orbothismisleading,

Wattsargued,as“departmentalizationisforeigntothem[i.e.,Buddhists].”54Similarly,

Thupten Jinpa claimed, that in Buddhism “no dichotomous separation between

philosophy, religion, and science has occurred. It is a tradition that shuns

reductionism,”astatementmadeearlierbyChristmasHumphreys (1901–1983),a

friend ofWatts, andR. G. de S.Wettimuny (1925–1974) aswell.55 Buddhadasa P.

Kirthisinghe(n.d.)assertedthatBuddhism“hasnotevenrecognizedthatthereisa

differencebetweenitandscience,whichinitselfwouldmakerivalrynugatoryand

51DuPré(1984b),147.52QuotesfromDharmapala,quotedinFields(1992),127.SeealsoLopez(2005),1;Lopez(2012),5;andMcMahan(2008),7.AsanexceptiontoBuddhismasinclusivereligion,Buddhismhasalsobeenconstructedasnotareligionatallinsomeinstances.53QuotedinLopez(2008),163.SeealsoBatchelor(2011),235.54Watts(1961),3and7.OnWatts’influence,seealsoFields(1992),186;andCampbell(2007),25.55Jinpa(2010),881;Humphreys(1951),76;andWettimuny(1962),7.

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nonsensical.”56B.AlanWallace also suggested thatBuddhismdidnot develop the

differentiation between science, philosophy, and religion found in the West, but

ratherthethree“weretraditionallyregardedasfundamentallyinterrelated,”which

wasusedasanargumentforlikeningBuddhismandscienceinanevidentlyrelational

way.57 Wallace made the argument that while Buddhism “includes profoundly

religiouselements,”italsohaselements“thatmaybedeemedscientific.”Constructing

Buddhismasa‘religion’isthusproblematicinthatitdoesnotfitintoourexclusive

categoriesofreligion,science,andphilosophy.58Buddhismiscompatiblewithscience

exactlybecauseitcannotbeputinsuchWesterncategories.Thus,weseethattaking

an inclusive perspective allows for the likening of Buddhism to science in a non-

reductiveway.AstheDzogchenPonlopRinpocheput it, “Byclosely lookingat […]

Buddhism,wethusfindthatitisapurepath,pureteachings,apurescience,ascience

ofmind.Inthissense,Buddhistspiritualityisnotwhatisordinarilymeantbytheterm

‘religion.’”59 So while the differences between Buddhism and ‘religion’ were

instrumental in theprocessof likening itwithscience,alignmentwithsciencehas

thenledtoredefinitionsoftheterm‘religion’inareciprocalprocess.

Further to this point, ‘religion’ is completely relationally redefined in the

context of Buddhism as “the science of man, and not the revelation of God,” but

nonetheless “deeply religious,” as it “connects man with the Infinite.” In this

redefinitionofreligion—ideasofwhich“differsomuchfromEnglishideas”—wesee

theconceptualdevelopmentoftheEnglishword‘Buddhism’constructedasreflecting

a scientificity of religion, something that is both scientific and religious in non-

reductive way.60 There was general agreement that Buddhism could not be

understood in termsof ‘conventional religion’—i.e., exclusive religion—but rather

ought tobeconceptualizedas“ascienceof themethodicaldevelopmentofcertain

internalfaculties.”61Buddhismwasunderstoodtobedifferentfromallotherreligions

56Kirthisinghe(1984),7.57Wallace(1996),147.58Wallace(2003),4–6.59DzogchenPonlopRinpoche(2007).60Alabaster(1871),xvi.61Batchelor(2011),269.

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specificallyinitsconnectionwithscience:“Itisnottoomuchtosaythatitconstitutes

theonlyreligioussystemthatblendsitselfeasilywiththephysicaltruthsdiscovered

bymodernresearchin[…]science.”62

Carusisagoodexampleoftherelationalredefinitionofreligioninthiscontext.

InhisTheGospelofBuddha(1894),Carusdescribedtheaimofthebookas“tosetthe

reader a-thinking on the religious problems of to-day,” namely religion-science

conflicts.CarusthenarguedthatBuddhismqualifiedasa“religionofscience”sinceit

isaphilosophyandsystemofethicsbasedonreasonratherthanrevelation.Carus

presented Buddhism as established by its founder for the particular purpose of

replacingtheprevailing‘religionasbelief’witha“religionbaseduponfacts.”Carus

reconstructedthereligion-scienceconflictastheconflictbetweenreligion-as-belief

andscience,asareligionofbeliefwasthoughttobe“thoroughlyunscientific.”63The

religion of fact then was likened to science. In contrast to other religions, Carus

claimed, Buddhism is based “solely upon man’s knowledge of the nature of

things,uponprovabletruth.”64Carusconcludedthat“aconflictbetweenreligionand

scienceisimpossibleinBuddhism,”asentimentrepeatedbyothers.65

With ‘religion’ relationally redefined, religion-science conflict is precluded

fromtheperspectiveoftherepresentationconstruct.Andweseethisinthecaseof

thescientificityofBuddhism.InaninfluentialarticleonBuddhismandscienceinthe

late 1950s, K. N. Jayatilleke (1920–1970) constructed Buddhism as an inclusive

religioninadistinctiveway,arguingthatifsciencehaddevelopedinthecontextof

Buddhism,theschismbetweenreligionandsciencewouldneverhaveoccurred,since

Buddhism is in accord with the method, content, and conclusions of science.66

Buddhism-sciencealignmenthascontinuedtobeinterpretedintermsofthewider

issueofreligion-scienceconflict,whichservesasacontrastcaseintheidentification

ofascientificityofBuddhism.

62Sinnett(1883),197.63Jackson(1968),80.64QuotedinVerhoeven(1998),221.65QuotedinTweed(1992),105.Seealsoibid.,68.AnotherexampleisKirthisinghe(1984),4–6.66Jayatilleke(2008[1958]).TheinfluenceofthisarticleisnotedinCabezón(2003),47.

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Buddhism constructed as the exception to religion-science conflict is a

commonmotif fromthe latenineteenthcenturyto thepresentday.AliceLeighton

Cleather (1846–1938) stated, “while science progresses, religions are gradually

losing ground, but the scientific truth of Buddhism is becoming more and more

evident.”67 Chinese Buddhistmonk Taixu (1890–1947) argued, “what is a gain to

scienceisalosstoreligion,”withtheexceptionofBuddhismwhich“benefitsbythe

discoveriesofscience.”68BurmeseBuddhistThaduMahaThraySithuUChanHtoon

(1906–1988)claimed:“[W]herescienceisabletoconfirmtheteachingsofreligion,

asitdoesinthecaseofBuddhism,itchangesitsrolefromthatofadestroyeroffaith

tothatofanallyandmostvaluablefriend.”69Buddhismhasbeendescribedas“the

one religionwhichhasnoquarrelwith science”with “its insistenceupon rational

inquiryandcriticalexamination,asopposedtoblindfaithanddevotion.”70Andthe

AmericanastrophysicistandpopularspokespersonforscienceNeildeGrasseTyson

recently stated, “In Buddhism, there’s not a challenge to reconcile with science,

because the spirituality doesn’t really prevent Buddhists from having those

thoughts.”71AshistorianMartin J. Verhoevenobserved,Buddhismwas seenas an

“alternativealtar”thatcouldbridgethedividebetweenreligionandsciencecleaved

bythecrisisoffaith.72

Similarly engaging with Buddhism at the intersection of religion-science

conflict, Cho and Squier wrote a book that “imaginatively constructs a Buddhist

response to thequestionofreligionandscience.”ChoandSquierpointedout that

Buddhist epistemology suggests that conventional reality exhibits all sorts of

competingandcontradictorynarratives,suchasweseeinthecaseofsomereligion-

sciencequestions,andacceptingallnarrativesasequallyvalidallowsforBuddhism

andscienceto‘harmonize’withoutissue.ChoandSquiernoted:“Buddhistsaremore

apt to practice narrative pluralism […], accepting different and even mutually

67Cleather(1928),21.68QuotedinPittman(2001),167.69UChanHtoon(2008[1962]).70Burns(1965),22–23.71QuotedinLion’sRoarStaff(2016).72Verhoeven(2001),77.Seealsoibid.,82.

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contradictoryaccountswithoutanycompulsiontoreconcilethem.[…]Rather,each

narrativeisacceptedonitsownterms[…].”Notonlycanbothnarrativesbeaccepted,

but also this suggests that the “narratives are not engaged in a zero-sum

competition.”73 If competing worldviews can be simultaneously maintained,

inclusivity ensues and likening will be taken as non-reductive. Appropriating the

‘secular’labelasChonotedelsewhere,andmorespecificallythe‘scientific’label,with

disregardforitsanti-religiousmeaning,hasbecome“theverypathbacktoreligion

itself.” Shedescribed this as a “heedlessnessof fundamental cultural dualities,” as

expectedintheinclusivityandrepresentationconstructs,whichembracesmultiple

frameworksofmeaningasnoncontradictory.74

ThatBuddhismwas constructed in contrast to ‘religion,’while at the same

time framed as a scientific religion, is not necessarily contradictory, but rather

indicative of the relational process of construction going on here, as the concept

‘religion’ isexactlywhatwasbeingnegotiated.AsDonaldS.Lopez,Jr.,aptlynoted,

“Buddhismhasbeenembraced in theWest asboth an alternative religion andan

alternativetoreligion,” it is“thereligionthat isnotareligion.”75This ‘religion-not

religion’positionBuddhismfindsitselfinstronglyreflectstheprimacyofrelations

overrelata intheprocessofmeaningmaking.Asamaverickreligion,Buddhismis

alsothereligionthatisthoughttobemostsuitableforreligion-sciencealignment.Put

differently, it is precisely because Buddhism is not like other religions that it is

thought tobe capableof alignmentwith scienceandexactlybecauseBuddhism is

constructedrelativetoscienceinaninclusiveandnon-reductivewaythatitisunlike

otherreligions.

2.3 BuddhismLikenedto‘Science’2.3.1 EarlyDevelopmentsThe most obvious way science has been constructed as part of the history of

Buddhism is by likening Buddhism to science, which has been extensively done

73Cho&Squier(2016),1,2,and4.Seealsoibid.,39.74Cho(2012),285.75Lopez(2005),2;andLopez(2008),35.

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outsideofthecontextsoftheconstructionofthescientificityofBuddhismvis-à-vis

‘Christianity’ and ‘religion.’ Of the dozen earliest English-language books with

BuddhisminthetitlethatIhavefound,sevenmentionsomepositiverelationwith

science, with two of the exceptions engagingwith science nonetheless.76 And the

exceptionsaretelling,forafailuretoalignreligionwithsciencewasstillperceivedas

adelegitimizing force.So rather thancountermyargument, it confirms the larger

pointofthesalienceofthenon-reductivelikeningofreligionandscienceatthistime.

Forinstance,ChristianreverendErnestJohnEitel(1838–1908),thoughhisargument

wasthatChristianitywasbestsuitedforscience,alsoarguedthatthe“childishand

absurdnotionsconcerningtheuniverseandphysicalscience”foundinBuddhism“do

notconstituteBuddhism.”Heclaimedthattheseassociationsareentirely“accidental”

andthataBuddhistmayadopt“modernscience”and“yetremainaBuddhist.”77

Afewexceptionsaside,mostoftheearlyscholarshiponBuddhismdescribed

thereligionasoneinwhichsciencewasever-presentormadeupsomeessentialized

core.Forexample,oneoftheearliestscholarsofBuddhism,ThomasW.RhysDavids

(1843–1922),constructedBuddhismas“scientific,rational,andreasonable”andasa

“scienceofmind.”78AccordingtoanotherearlypublicationonBuddhism,Buddhism

isa“sublimemysticismandscience,”asentimentrepeatedlyechoedelsewhere.79One

of the scholarswho did sowas Hodgson, whose views became amajor basis for

Europeans’constructionof‘Buddhism.’80Inoneofthemostwidelyread(andearliest)

76ThefirstEnglish-languagebooktohaveBuddhisminthetitleonlymentionedaconnectionbetweenBuddhismandsciencebasedonsomeastronomicalobservations thatweregathered inaBuddhistcontext,butdoesnotexplicitlyemphasizereligion-sciencealignment.SeeUpham(1829),10,58,80,85,and91.TheconnectionbetweenBuddhismandastronomyisnotedinmanyotherearlyworksaswell.See,e.g.,Schlagintweit(1863),273–275.77Eitel(1871),14.InthecontextofthechallengestoChristianitydescribedabove,itmakessensethatthistypeofliteraturewouldemergeatthistime.AsimilarapproachtolikenChristianitywithsciencewhileemphasizingthelackofscienceintheBuddhistcontextistakenupinotherworksaswell.See,e.g.,Hardy(1874),10,13,and90.AlsorelevanttothisinterpretationofBuddhismandscienceisHardy(1866).ThisBuddhism-scienceconflict is turnedbackonChristianity inCarus(1899),263–271, inwhichtheauthorpointedouthowHardyonlyseemedtosupportscienceinsofarasit iscountertoBuddhism,butrejectssciencewhencountertoChristianity.78FirstquoteinFields(1992),106;secondquoteinMcMahan(2008),52,bothsaidinregardtoRhysDavids.RegardingRhysDavids’influence,seeLopez(2012),94.79Schlagintweit(1863),309.HespecificallyreferredtoBuddhistastrologyhere,butthesamehasbeenapplied toBuddhismmoregenerally.E.g., seeMills (1876),37; andHodgson (1829),237. SeealsoHodgson(1835).80Batchelor(2011),235.SeealsoLopez(2004),49–76.

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papersonBuddhisminthenineteenthcentury,hedepictedcertainBuddhisttextsas

“workofascientificcharacter,capableofbeingunderstoodonlybymenofscience.”81

ThereisaplethoraofexamplesofthescientificityofBuddhisminearlyworks.

WhilemanydonothaveanexplicitfocusonBuddhism-sciencealignment,butrather

make these connections in passing, that is not to say that this growing ideawent

unnoticed.In1871,Alabasterexplicitlycharacterizedthe“modernBuddhist,”aswell

astheBuddha,assupportingcompatibilitywithscience.82Andbythe1880s,theidea

ofBuddhismasascientificreligionbecamewidelyknownininfluentialcircles.

2.3.2 Theosophy,Buddhism,&EsotericScienceThe first book to draw a strong connection between science and Buddhism in

general—ratherthan‘modernBuddhism’orspecificbranchesofBuddhism—didnot

emergeuntil the late nineteenth century. Thisworkwas the extremely popularA

BuddhistCatechism(1881),byHenrySteelOlcott(1832–1907).83Olcottwasoneof

thefoundersoftheTheosophicalSociety(est.1875),whichsignificantlycontributed

totheentanglementofdiscoursesofreligionandthoseofscienceinanumberofways.

The Theosophical Society was founded in America but became an international

organization—withbranches inEurope, India,andAustralia—working toward the

integration of science, spirituality, and religion, often with Buddhism as the

representative tradition.84 This group has greatly contributed to the general

conceptualization of Buddhism in theWesternworld and to revitalizations in the

East.

Olcott thoughtofBuddhismas “not a creedbut aphilosophy,”while at the

same timecharacterizing the traditionasa “scientific religion.”85 InhisCatechism,

OlcottdrewbroadconnectionsbetweenBuddhismandscienceandarguedfor the

scientificityofBuddhism.HelikenedBuddhismtoscienceinanon-reductivewayby

81Hodgson(1829),241.SeealsoLopez(2008),165.82Alabaster(1871),xxi,5,and16.83 Though Olcott did emphasize certain branches of the tradition, he represented them as ‘pureBuddhism’andthusasthecoreofBuddhismatlarge.84Oldmeadow(2004),64–67.85QuotesinFields(1992),97;andMcMahan(2008),101.

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suggestingthatBuddhismandscienceareinagreementwithcoredoctrinescommon

toboth.Hedeemphasized“Charms,incantations,theobservanceofluckyhoursand

devil-dancing”ascorruptmanifestationsofthereligion,whereasinits ‘pure’form,

Buddhismwascharacterizedasempiricalandrational.86Hisworkcontributedtothe

BuddhistrevivalinCeylon(SriLanka)andwastranslatedanddisseminatedacross

EuropeandAmericathroughtimeandmanyeditions.87

Weseemuchofthesameintheexamplesofothertheosophists,suchasHelena

PetrovnaBlavatsky(1831–1891)andAlfredPercySinnett(1840–1921).Co-founder

oftheTheosophicalSociety,BlavatskywroteabouttherelationshipbetweenEastern

philosophiesandWesternscience, similar toher friendOlcott, inher IsisUnveiled

(1877),amongotherinfluentialpublications.ShedrewheavilyuponBuddhisminher

work.88BlavatskyformulatedBuddhismas“incomparablyhigher,morenoble,more

philosophicalandmorescientificthantheteachingofanyotherchurchorreligion.”89

Afewyearslater,Sinnett,anacquaintanceofOlcottandBlavatsky,published

whatwaslikelythefirstbooktodiscussthetopicofBuddhismandscienceatlength:

Esoteric Buddhism (1883). Sinnett was a ‘custodian of esoteric science,’ as he

understood it.90 Throughout his work, ‘esoteric science’ was treated as nearly

synonymouswith‘esotericBuddhism’andthis,inturn,wasunderstoodintermsof

the religion-science representation construct.91 “Esoteric Buddhism”—which is

suggested to culminate in a sort of “spiritual science”—invoked a scientificity of

Buddhism.Sinnettstated,“Theesotericdoctrinefinds itselfundernoobligationto

keep its science and religion in separate water-tight compartments […] they are

intimatelyblendedtogetherandinterdependent.”Moreover,thisscienceissaidtobe

“wholly free from the logical error of attributing material results to immaterial

86QuotedinMcMahan(2008),101.87Oldmeadow(2004),87;andBatchelor(2011),269–270.88Campbell(2007),157.89QuotedinBatchelor(2011),269.90Sinnett(1883),xii.SeealsoFields(1992),95–96.91Onsynonymy,see,e.g.,Sinnett(1883),3:“Buddha[…]undertookthetaskofrevisingandrefreshingtheesotericscienceoftheinnercircleofinitiates”;Sinnett(1883),202:“[T]heexhaustiveresearchesoftheesotericscienceofwhichBuddhawasnolessprominentanexponentthanhewasaprominentteacherofmoralsforthepopulace”;Sinnett(1883),177:Buddhistadeptsare“wondrouslyendowedrepresentativesofoccultscience.”

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causes,”rejectingreduction.Notonlyisthissciencetakenasthebestmanifestation

of science generally, no other approach is “more spiritual than those of occult

science,”thusmaintainingbothsignifiersofreligionandscienceaswell.Itisthought

tobethebestofboth:“Esotericscience,thoughthemostspiritualsystemimaginable,

exhibits,asrunningthroughoutNature,themostexhaustivesystemofevolutionthat

thehumanmindcanconceive.”

The esoteric doctrine of Buddhismwas framed as “really themissing link

between materialism and spirituality,” which in turn was translated to a non-

reductivelinkbetweenscienceandreligion.Sinnettstated:

Asitcannotbetoofrequentlyorearnestlyrepeated—itistheunionofSciencewithReligion—thebridgebywhichthemostacuteandcautiouspursuersofexperimentalknowledgemaycrossovertothemostenthusiasticdevotee,bymeansofwhichthemostenthusiasticdevoteemayreturntoEarthandyetkeepHeavenstillaroundhim.

This isexemplaryofascientificityofBuddhism,wherebythereligionis likenedto

sciencewithoutreducingonetotheother, insteadconstructingthetwoinawider

context embracing both. We can see Sinnett’s further tendencies toward a non-

reductivealignmentwhenhestatedthatadoptingtheesotericscienceofBuddhism

constitutes“nosacrificeinanydirectionoftheattributeswemayfairlyexpectofa

truereligiousscience.”92

Cleather,whowasalsoatheosophist,contributedoneofthefirstmonographs

onBuddhismandscience,entitledBuddhism:TheScienceofLife(1926),whichwas

circulatedinEnglish,Chinese,andRussian.Cleatherconcludedthat“Buddhismgives

usaScienceofReligionandaReligiousScience,”thedoubleformulationexhibiting

therepresentationconstructthatputsreligioninthecontextofscienceandscience

in religion without reducing one to the other. She also described Buddhism as a

“spiritualscience.”93

92Sinnett(1883),8,22,29,184,194,and196–197.Seealsoibid.,39and187.Theimportanceofbothscienceandreligionwasalsoemphasizedonibid.,52–53.93Cleather (1928),22and40.The firstEnglishmonographemerged in1913, entitledBuddhism&Science, translated from the German Buddhismus als weltanschauung (1912), by physician andBuddhistconvertPaulDahlke(1865–1928).However,thisworkconstructedBuddhismassuperiortoscience.Dahlke(1913),x,21,and255–256.

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Humphreys,whowasinfluencedbyTheosophyandeventuallyconvertedto

BuddhismandfoundedtheBuddhistLodgeof theTheosophicalSociety inLondon

(est.1924),contributednumerousbooksonBuddhismaimedatgeneralreadersfrom

the1920sthroughthe1970s.94HecontributedtothescientificityofBuddhismwhen

hedefinedBuddhism inoneofhismostpopularbooksas “a systemof thought, a

religion,aspiritualscienceandawayoflife,whichisreasonable,practicalandall-

embracing.”95 Hemade the even stronger claim that “the Buddhist attitude to all

phenomenaandtoallteachingaboutithaseverbeenthatofthemodernscientist.”96

Though these interpretations were more influenced by Theosophy than

Buddhism, through these works, many Europeans became convinced that such

theosophicalviews,includingascientificityofBuddhism,accuratelyrepresentedthe

teachingsofBuddhism.Theosophistshadan“enormousandrespectablefollowing”

and greatly increased Western interest in the religion, thereby contributing

significantly to the conceptualization of Buddhism as ‘scientific.’97 Furthermore,

manyAsianBuddhistswhohadhadanysignificantengagementwiththeWestduring

the formative years of the scientificity of Buddhism were quite familiar with

Theosophy.Therewasalotofpersonalcontactbetweenthetwocommunities,asin

thecaseofDharmapala,whoseinvolvementwiththeTheosophicalmovementgreatly

influencedhisemphasisonthescientificaspectsofBuddhism.98

2.3.3 TheCarusCircle,Buddhism,&MainstreamScienceDespite theosophical influence, the restriction of Buddhism-science alignment to

‘esotericscience’wasnevertotalandwaseventuallycastasideinfavorof‘science’

moregenerallyconstrued.AlreadymanyBuddhistsocietieswerespringingupacross

EuropeandAmericaaroundtheturnofthetwentiethcentury,praisingBuddhismas

94Onhisbackgroundandinfluence,seeOldmeadow(2004),91–94,261;andBaumann(2002),90.95Humphreys(1951),76.SeealsoBaumann(2012),119.96Humphreys(1951),222.97Batchelor(2011),270.SeealsoBaumann(2002),87.98McMahan(2008),77and97;Lopez(2008),24and191–192;andBaumann(2012),117.Still,manyBuddhistswerenotsoenthusiasticabout theosophyor,at times, their interpretationofBuddhism.Whiletheosophicalworksandfiguresweredrawnuponwhenitsuited,someBuddhistswereatthesametimecriticalofTheosophy.SeeLopez(2008),190–191.

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the “religionof reason,”drawinguponmainstreamscience,whilenewlyemerging

specialist journals like The Buddhist Review, emphasized the rational aspects of

Buddhism, rather than the esoteric.99 In fact, the rationalists were the prime

opponents of esotericism and constructed their views by way of contrast, as did

Carus.100At thesametime,notionsofascientificityofBuddhismwerealsostrong

amongthisgroup.101And,likeOlcott,Carusappealedtoa‘pure’Buddhism,whichto

bothmenmeantwhateverwasinagreementwiththescientificworldviewasscience

wasseenasthearbiteroftruth.102

Carus aligned Buddhism specifically with mainstream science, making his

contributions particularly important for the endurance of Buddhism-science

likening.103Heunderstoodthisasastepinthedirectionofhisvisionforthefuture.

Thereligionofthefuturecannotbeacreedonwhichthescientistmustturnhisback,becauseit is irreconcilablewith the principles of science. Religionmust be in perfect accordwithscience….[sic]Scienceisdivine,andthetruthofscienceisarevelationofGod.ThroughscienceGodspeakstous;byscienceheshowsusthegloryofhisworks;andinscienceheteachesushiswill.104

Carus defended several differentmanifestations of such a religion of science (see

Chapter Six), however one in particularwas a Buddhist religion of science, or, in

relational terms, a scientificity of Buddhism. Drawing from the presentations of

Buddhismas science-likeat theWorld’sParliament,Carusbecameconvinced that

Buddhismwasthebestrepresentativeforhisscientificreligion,withtheBuddhaas

“thefirstprophetoftheReligionofScience.”105Carusargued,“Buddhismisareligion

which recognizes no other revelation except the truth that can be proved by

science.”106Thoughsufferingfromalackofacademictreatmentandrecognitionas

mentioned in the previous chapter, Carus was extremely influential, the

99Baumann(2002),88.100Tweed(1992),60;andMcMahan(2008),102and106–107.101Tweed(1992),104.102McMahan(2008),99and104.103 Jackson (1968), 74 and 86; McMahan (2008), 102; and Verhoeven (1998). Carus not onlycontributed in the realm of ideas, but also took action to promote dialogue through a series oforganizations.104QuotedinMcMahan(2008),102.105McMahan(2008),103and106;Lopez(2002),24;[Carus]P.C.(1896),4845;andCarus(1899),309.106Carus(1899),114.

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aforementionedGospelbeing hismostwidely readwork, translated into over ten

AsianandEuropean languages. LikeOlcott, his interpretationof the traditionwas

even adopted by Asian Buddhists, employed at Tokyo Imperial University, in the

CeyloneseBuddhistrevival,andusedtotrainpriestsinasectofJapanesePureLand

Buddhism.107

Carus,perhapsmorethananyotherAmericanatthistime,hadextensiveand

intimate contactwithEasterners.108At theWorld’sParliament, hebecame friends

withseveralBuddhistdelegates,includingDharmapalaandSōen,bothmenofwhich

contributedgreatlytothespreadofBuddhismintheWestandtoBuddhism-science

alignment. These men all influenced one another to a significant degree.109 After

meetingtheseindividuals,Caruscametotheconclusionthata“neworthodoxy”of

“scientifictheology”hadarrivedsoonerthanheexpected.110Whilehereportedonly

a few years before that he was terribly misunderstood and rejected in most

intellectualcircles,hefoundkinshipintheBuddhismandsciencemovement,which

relativelyspeakingwasmuchmoresuccessful(andcontinuestobeso)thanCarus’

religionofscienceeverwas(seeChapterSix).

Dharmapala, in contrast to Olcott and Carus who argued for a universal

religion based on scientifically founded truth, regarded Buddhism as the sole

representativeofascientificityofreligion.DharmapaladrewheavilyfromWestern

accountsofBuddhisminordertoconstructBuddhismasrationalandscientific,with

great emphasis on the meditative and ethical features of the tradition. He

disassociatedBuddhismwithsuperstitionandritual,arguingthattheseaspectswere

acorruptionofthereligion,therebydelegitimizing‘religion’thatexcludesscience.111

Such a move has been interpreted relationally as a “strategic occidentalism,” a

‘reversal of Orientalism,’ that aligns the tradition withWestern worldviews, thus

107Fields(1992),136;McMahan(2008),103;andJackson(1968),85.108Jackson(1968),89.109 Regarding Sōen, see Fields (1992), 109–113, 136, and 139; and McMahan (2008), 64 and 97.RegardingDharmapala,seeibid.,91–97.RegardingCarus,seeibid.,103.110Carus(1916),v–vi.111McMahan(2008),95and112.

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carving out a space for the religion that was both in contrast to Western

understandingsof‘religion,’whilespeakingtoWesternvalues.112

SōenpresentedBuddhismasintellectualandrationaland“alwayswillingto

stand before the bar of science.”113 Sōen’s disciple D. T. Suzuki (1870–1966)—

perhaps the biggest name in bringing Buddhism to the West and Westernizing

Buddhism—also later became close with Carus.114 Suzuki was inspired by Carus’

work, including his The Religion of Science (1893). As Carl T. Jackson noted, “If

Suzuki’swork has been one of themost important bridges to theWest’smodern

understandingofBuddhism,Carusmustbeaccountedoneofthechiefengineers.”115

Suzuki,inturn,impactedthethoughtofmanyimportantthinkersincludingCarus,but

also American Buddhist Dwight Goddard (1861–1939), Carl Jung (1875–1961),

AldousHuxley(1894–1963),ErichFromm(1900–1980),andThomasMerton(1915–

1968).SuzukihadasignificantimpactinJapanwiththerevitalizationofZenandthe

KyotoSchool,aphilosophicalcommunitydrawinguponBuddhismandcontinental

philosophy.116 Suzuki perpetuated a view of Buddhism as rational, modern, and

scientific,andadvocatedareconciliationofreligionandscience.Healsocontributed

totheZenboominthe1950sthroughthe1970s,duringwhichZenwassuggestedto

confirmemergingtheoriesinpsychology,psychotherapy,andphilosophy.117

2.3.4 Buddhism&ScienceinDialogueThusfar,theconstructionofBuddhismasscientificwaslargelyrestrictedtotexts—

withafewimportantexceptions liketherevitalizations inJapaneseandCeylonese

Buddhism. However, in the twentieth century this discourse materialized in

unprecedentedways.Duringthefirsthalfofthetwentiethcentury,BuddhistsinAsia

112McMahan(2008),96.113QuotedinFields(1992),173.114 Lopez (2002), 24–25, 35, 54–55, and 68; Borup (2013), 292; Fields (1992), 138–139 and 204;McMahan(2008),122;andJackson(1968),89–90.115Jackson(1968),90.116Verhoeven(1998),218;Sharf(2005),8885–8886;Lopez(2008),19–20;andMcMahan(2008),122.117Fields(1992),196,221,248–249,287,294andpassim;Verhoeven(1998),218;Baumann(2002),92; andBaumann (2012), 124. Later in Suzuki’s life, however, he came to question the ability forsciencetoserveasabasisforreligion.Verhoeven(1998),223;andVerhoeven(2001),83–84.

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increasinglyconsideredhowtheirreligionwouldhavetoaccommodateelementsof

modernism,includingscience,inordertosurviveintheirindigenousenvironments.

Chögyam Trungpa (1939–1987), the British Theravadin bhikkhu

Sangharakshita(DennisPhilipEdwardLingwood),andtheDanishlamaOleNydahl,

for instance, have all consciously emphasized the importance of an inclusive

Buddhismthatisinlinewiththevaluesofmodernity.118Goddardalsoactivelysought

tomodernizeBuddhisminhisTheBuddha’sGoldenPath(1930).Hearguedthatthe

Buddhist cosmology is “naïve,” “unconvincing,” and “improbable” and must be

reinterpreted “in a more scientific way that can be tested by our enlightened

experienceandlogic.”However,healsoclaimed“itisnotentirelyfalse.”119Inanother

example, Taixu often spoke on the matter of Buddhism-science relations and

dedicatedhimselfto“modernizingandrationalizing”ChineseBuddhisteducationand

doctrine.120SciencewasarguedtobeanaidtoBuddhism,inthatit“canproveand

postulate the Buddhist doctrine,” offering “a stepping stone” in the attainment of

wisdom.121 In a reciprocal fashion, Taixu also claimed that Buddhistmetaphysics

“wouldgreatlyhelpScienceand tend tobringaboutaunionbetweenScienceand

Buddhism[...].”122“Buddhismistheonlyreligionwhichdoesnotcontradictscientific

truth,”heclaimed,whilemaintainingthatthetwoweredistinct,yetcomplementary,

therebyavoidingreduction.123

As a result of thesemodernizations, the contemporary forms of Pure Land

BuddhisminChinaandTibetgenerallydrewuponscienceasaguidinglightinsocial

reform.124 The 1940s and 1950s seem to have been a relatively quiet time for

Buddhism and science (and the time of the decline of the religions of science

discussed in the previous chapter),with a few exceptions noted here, like Zen.125

DespitethisdeclineinBuddhismandsciencespecifically,thetimeperiodfollowing

118Borup(2013),294.119Goddard(2002[1930]),2.SeealsoMcMahan(2008),83.120Jones(2003),128–129.121QuotedinLopez(2008),19.OnTaixu,Buddhism,andscience,seealsoPittman(2001),passim.122QuotedinLopez(2008),19.123Pittman(2001),165.124Jones(2003),139.125Lopez(2008),25.

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World War II (1939–1945) and especially the 1960s on through the 1970s saw

rampantexponentialgrowthofEasternreligiousorganizations in theWestandof

generalinterest.126Andbythe1970s,thescientificityofBuddhismwasontherise

again, with a number of books that described very particular points of contact

betweenBuddhismandscience,suchasBuddhistmetaphysicsandquantumphysics,

incontrasttoearliertimeswhenalignmentswereoftenmorevague,drawingvery

generalcomparisonsto‘science,’‘rationality,’and‘empiricism.’127

Whilepriortothistimeperiod,theBuddhisminBritainwaslargelyTheravada

andintheUSwasprimarilyMahayanaandVajrayāna,fromthe1970son,aplethora

ofBuddhistschoolswasestablishedoutsideofAsiaandacrosstherestoftheworld,

including Europe, North and South America, Australia, and Africa.128 Despite this

Buddhist pluralism, Tibetan Buddhism came to replace Zen as the central

representative of Buddhism and science. While the Zen era was on the decline,

Tibetan Buddhism saw a rise of popularity in the 1970s and a boom of

institutionalization in the 1980s, with the rate of new establishments sometimes

outnumbering all other Buddhist traditions.129 Publications, both academic and

popular,dedicatedtothetopicofBuddhismandsciencegreatlyincreasedfromthe

1990s on, dominated by discussions of and with the (current, 14th) Dalai Lama

(TenzinGyatso),thereligiousleaderoftheGelugsectofTibetanBuddhism.130This

wasalsotheperiodforsomeofthefirstmonographsonBuddhismandsciencethat

wereauthoredbyscholarsofBuddhism,suchasJoannaMacy’sMutualCausalityin

Buddhism and General Systems Theory (1991).131While critical scholarship on the

126 Baumann (2002), 92–93; Oldmeadow (2004), 245–269; Campbell (2007), 14–15, 25–28, 40;Batchelor(2011),275;andBaumann(2012),124.127McMahan(2008),169.TogiveanexampleoftheincreasedlevelofsophisticationinthefieldofBuddhismandscienceinthistimeperiod,onepublicationanalyzedsubjectiveexperiencethroughthelens of cybernetics, cognitive science, psychology, and artificial intelligencewhile utilizing TibetanAbhidharmaconceptstocategorizementalfunctions.SeeVarela,Thompson,&Rosch(1991).128Borup(2013),292;andBaumann(2002),85.129Baumann(2002),92and94;andBaumann(2012),124.OnearlierencountersbetweenTibetanBuddhismandscience,seeJinpa(2003);andJinpa(2010),872–873.130 Lopez (2012), 13–14. A few examples of themany publications emerging at this time include,Badiner (1990); Hayward & Varela (1992); Goleman (1997); Varela (1997); Austin (1998); andHoushmand,Livingston,&Wallace(1999).131Macy(1991);andCho&Squier(2016),22n.10.

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topic was taking off, dialogue and exchange became the predominant mode of

constructionofthescientificityofBuddhism.

Besides the Dalai Lama, many other important Buddhist leaders have

embraced science aswell, like ChögyamTrungpa and ThichNhat Hanh.Rinpoche

TrungpahasworkedcloselywiththeDalaiLamaandhefoundedtheNaropaInstitute.

Sinceitsinception,theNaropaInstitutehasemphasizedthealignmentofEasternand

Westernworldviews.Thishasincludedthealignmentofexperienceandmeditation

crossedwiththeintellectual-criticalmind,“aplacewhereintellectandintuitioncould

cometogether,”accordingtotheoriginalbrochuresin1974advertisingcoursesat

the center. The courses included, for example,meditation sessions, anthropology,

cybernetics,andphysics.ItwasthefirstBuddhist-basedcollegeinAmericatoreceive

accreditation,whichwasgivenin1986.132

VietnamesemonkNhatHanhco-foundedtheAnQuangTemple(est.1950)in

Saigon(HoChiMinhCity),whichwasthefirstBuddhistseminarytooffercoursesin

Westernscience.133NhatHanhbecameoneofthemostvisibleBuddhistsinAmerica

andEuropeinthe1980s,secondonlytotheDalaiLama.134NhatHanhhasspecifically

emphasizedconnectionsbetweenBuddhismandpsychology,arguing“Buddhismand

psychotherapycancometogetherandlearnfromeachother.”135

Thoughtherearemanyinfluentialfigurestospeakof,likeningBuddhismto

science in a non-reductive way has been particularly popularized by the Dalai

Lama.136TheDalaiLamahasbeendescribedas“theprimarysymbolofTibetanand

globalBuddhism,”“themostfamousproponentforthelinksbetweenBuddhismand

science,”and“thequintessential[Buddhist]modernizer.”137Sincehisreceiptofthe

Nobel Peace Prize in 1989, the Dalai Lama has achieved celebrity status and has

playedasignificantroleintheBuddhism-sciencerepresentationconstruct.138Having

132Fields(1992),278,316–317,and371.133Batchelor(2011),356and364–365;andFields(1992),374–377.Seealso,forahistory,withafocusonNhatHanh,Batchelor(2011),353–369.134Fields(1992),374–376.135QuotedinFields(1992),377.Emphasisoriginal.136Lopez(2012),13–14.137Borup(2013),293;Lopez(2012),12;andMcMahan(2008),247.138Fields(1992),378.

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contributedsomuchtothediscussion,documentedinnumerouspublications,some

ofwhichwere bestsellers, the Dalai Lama has created something of a Buddhism-

science ‘canon,’ as Lopez put it.139 The doctrine of such a canon amounts to the

convictionthat“Buddhistexplanationscancontributetoscientificresearch,andvice

versa,” a sentiment on non-reductive interdisciplinarity repeated elsewhere as

well.140Andthegeneralhopeinthisandsimilarenvironmentsisthatasciencebased

onBuddhismmightleadtoinnovativemethodsofobservation,experimentation,and

theories of reality.141 With the Dalai Lama strongly supporting religion-science

dialogueviatheMind&LifeInstitute,forexample,argumentsforthecompatibility

between Buddhism and science have becomewidely known and inmany circles,

widelyaccepted.Thisincludesacceptanceatthelevelofprominentscientificresearch

institutesandmedicalfacilities.142

TheMind&LifeInstitutewasestablishedin1987,aculminationofthevisions

of theDalaiLama,AmericanbusinessmanAdamEngle,andChileanneuroscientist

Francisco Varela (1946–2001). The three men “were convinced that well-refined

contemplative practices and introspectivemethods could, and should, be used as

equalinstrumentsof[scientific]investigation.”TheInstitutewasformed“tobridge

thisdivide.”143TheirvisionfortheInstituteillustratestheequal,inclusive,andnon-

reductivestandingofBuddhismandscience:

ToestablishmutuallyrespectfulworkingcollaborationandresearchpartnershipsbetweenmodernscienceandBuddhism—twooftheworld'smostfruitfultraditionsforunderstandingthenatureofrealityandpromotinghumanwell-being.144

139Lopez(2008),214.See,e.g.,DalaiLama(2005);Harrington&Zajonc(2008);DalaiLama(2011);andSinger&Ricard(2015).140DalaiLama(2002),54.SeealsoBegley(2007),13:“Buddhismandsciencebothstandtobenefitfromtheinteraction.”141Nakasone(2003),80.142E.g.,Slone(2013),2096and2099.Thatthisisthecasecanalsobededucedfromtheoverallcontentsofthischapter.E.g.,theimpactoftheMind&LifeInstitutehasbeennarratedinnumerousbest-sellingbooks, the Institute’s support has led to dozens of significant studies, over twohundred academicpublications, and over three hundred public talks. Furthermore, the Institute’s researchers haveacquired esteemed faculty positions, fellowships, and directorshipswithmore than fifteenmilliondollarsinfunding.SeeMind&LifeInstitute(n.d.).143Mind&LifeInstitute(n.d.),s.v.“Mission.”144Mind& Life Institute (expired). Thiswebpage is no longer available and their presentmissionstatementhasbeenrevised.

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Thestanceoftheinstitutehaselsewherebeendescribedasaforumbetween“equal

partners,eachwithdeeprespectfortheintegrityoftheother,”meaning“bothsides

mustavoidanyhegemonictendency,especiallythetemptationtoreducetheother

intoone’sownframework”—asexpectedfromtheperspectiveoftherepresentation

construct.145 At the first Mind & Life Conference, where unprecedented dialogue

betweenBuddhistsandscientistswasbeingestablished,theDalaiLamasaid,“Itismy

view that generally Buddhism […] is very close to a scientific approach,” one of

“empirical means.”146 Furthermore, he claimed the authority of “logic” for both

enterprisesanddescribedthe“basicBuddhistattitude”as“analysisandexamination

throughreasoning.”147Firstandforemostistheemphasisonempiricismhowever,as

theDalaiLamastated,“whenitcomestovalidatingthetruthofaclaim,Buddhism

accordsgreatestauthoritytoexperience,withreasonsecondandscripturelast.”148

Nonetheless, the Dalai Lama has rejected materialism, along with most

Buddhists across theworld, though he has continued tomaintain that Buddhism

shouldacceptscientificfindings.149TheDalaiLamahasmadetherepeatedconviction

thatifsciencecanprovesometenetofBuddhismtobefalse,Buddhismshouldchange

accordingly.150TheDalai Lamahas even introduced scientific study aspart of the

Tibetan monastic curriculum.151 Tibetan Buddhists have integrated the natural

sciences, medicine, and pharmacology into Buddhist identity.152 Like Olcott and

Carus,theDalaiLamaiswillingtosubjectBuddhismtoanon-Buddhiststandardof

belief,whilearguingthatthisscientificbarisinherenttoBuddhism,thusconstructing

ascientificityofBuddhism.153Still,Buddhismisthoughttobeabletocontributeto

scienceaswell.154Thoughthereisasignificantleveloflikeningtosciencegoingon

here,thereisaninsistenceonthecontinuingroleofreligionintheperseverationof

145Jinpa(2010),877.146FirstquotedinHayward&Varela(1992),31;andsecondquoteinDalaiLama(2005),25.147QuotedinHayward&Varela(1992),32.148DalaiLama(2005),24.149Cho&Squier(2016),26.Seealsoibid.,120–129.150McMahan(2008),116;andDalaiLama(2005),3.SeealsoFlanagan(2014),243.151Jinpa(2003),76;Begley(2007),23and50;Yee(2009);andScienceforMonks(2016).152Nabeshima(2003),82and84–85.153McMahan(2008),115.154Lopez(2008),151.

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humanmeaningandontherejectionofreduction.Suchsentimentsareubiquitousin

the field of Buddhism and science and are echoed at all the Mind & Life

Conferences.155Forinstance,theDalaiLamastated,“Ihavearguedfortheneedfor

andpossibilityofaworldviewgroundedinscience,yetonethatdoesnotdenythe

richness of human nature and the validity of modes of knowing other than the

scientific.”156 In other words, what is needed is inclusive and non-reductive, a

scientificityofreligion.

Whetherfringeormainstreamscience,whetherZenorTibetanBuddhism,theterms

‘Buddhism’ and ‘science’ have been repeatedly likened to one another in a non-

reductive way. This has been ongoing since the introduction of the English term

‘Buddhism’intheearlynineteenthcenturythroughtoday.Buddhismascontaining

scientificcharacter—totheinclusionofreligiouscharacter—hasbeenbuiltintothe

historyofBuddhism,presentedasever-presentinmanycases.Whensciencewasnot

constructedasahistoricalpartofBuddhism,itwasbuiltintothestoryofBuddhism’s

developmentnonetheless,withactiveengagementwiththetrendsofmodernityand

emphasisonadaptationandprogress.Sciencehasbeenpresentedascontributingto

Buddhism, Buddhism as aiding science, and Buddhism and science have been

presented as mutually informative. At every turn, we see the scientificity of

Buddhism.

3 BuddhistKnowledgeas‘Scientific’

Intheabovediscussion,wehavealreadyseenthatBuddhistknowledgewas,atleast

implicitly, constructed as scientific, with themany references to the rational and

empiricalnatureofBuddhistthought.FramingBuddhistknowledgeasscientificwas

alsoexplicitlydone.For instance,RhysDavids’ translationof the centralBuddhist

term bodhi as ‘enlightenment’ was done in specific connection to the European

155Foranoverviewofmeetings,conferences,andevents,seeMind&LifeInstitute(n.d.).156DalaiLama(2005),207.

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Enlightenment and its connotations of rationality, empiricism, emphasis on

individual observation over authority, and freedom of thought, for example. His

enormouslyinfluentialinterpretationofBuddhismbecamethestandardnotonlyin

theWest,butinAsiaaswell.157Followingthismotif,oneChineseauthorinthemid-

twentieth century described Buddhism and science as “two brilliant lamps of the

world,”with“theirilluminatingpower”destroying“ignoranceandsuperstition”and

“biased views and dogmatism.”158 The Buddhist existential transformation of

‘enlightenment’hasbeenregularlyassociatedwithideasofscientificenlightenment

or‘illumination’(seeChapterThree)fromthenineteenthcenturytotoday.

In perhaps the single most influential text on the history of Buddhism,

Introduction à l’histoire du Buddhise indien (1844), Eugène Burnouf (1801–1852)

described theBuddha’senlightenmentasbeing in “thepossessionofanunlimited

science,whichgavehimaclearviewoftheworld[…]theknowledgeofphysicaland

morallaws.”TheBuddha’ssciencewasnotasgoodascontemporaryscience;itwas

better: “[S]uperhuman science,” with which “he perceived, in a form clear and

complete,thepastandthefuture.”159OthershavesimilarlydescribedBuddhismasa

“super-science.”160SciencehasalsobeenfirmlyplacedinthepracticeofBuddhism.

For instance, one of the first monographs on the Buddhist religion in 1857 by

Friedrich Max Müller (1823–1900)—the most famous Orientalist scholar of the

nineteenthcentury—suggestedthat“science”isconsidereda“virtue”intheBuddhist

pathtonirvana,asdidEitel.161

InalettertoDharmapala,Caruswrote“InmyopinionBuddha’sintentionwas

nothingelsethantoestablishwhatwecallaReligionofScience.‘Enlightenment’and

‘science’areinterchangeablewords.”162Buddhism,Carusclaimed,“isthereligionof

enlightenment, which is but another word for Religion of Science,” a “religious

157McMahan(2008),18and52.158Yiu(1946),69.159QuotedinLopez(2012),36;andLopez(2008),170–172.160Yiu(1946),33.161Müller(1857),16;andEitel(1870),90.ThoughMüllercontributedtothelikeningofBuddhismtoscience,hewasagainsttheosophicalinterpretationsofBuddhism.SeeLopez(2008),177–180.162QuotedinTweed(1992),103.

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mythologyexplained inscientific terms.”163Dharmapalaconcurred.164Dharmapala

argued“Buddhismisforthescientificallycultured.Thediscoveriesofmodernscience

areahelptounderstandthesublimeDhamma[…]ThesublimeDoctrineoftheLord

BuddhaisaperfectsciencebasedontranscendentalWisdom.”165Andin1907,ina

pamphletentitled“WhatIsBuddhism?,”enlightenmentwasagaindescribedasthe

attainmentofscientificknowledge.Inthiswork,theBuddhawastranslatedassaying,

“Ihavestriventoobtainthesupremeandperfectscience.Ihaveattainedit.”166Suzuki

also claimed “Buddhism never discourages the scientific, critical investigation of

religious belief” because science “is certainly able to direct us to the path of

enlightenment.”167

AtaconferenceonWhatIstheRoleofReligioninanAgeofScience?inNew

Hampshirein1958,thetopicof“Buddhism,theReligionoftheAgeofScience”was

discussed.Thespeaker,UChanHtoon,claimed“Buddhismwelcomesscienceasthe

promoter of knowledge.More than this, it looks confidently tomodern science to

bringaboutthatchangeofoutlookwhichisessentialifmanistorealizethehigher

spiritualtruths.”168Similarly,TrinhXuanThuanarguedthatBuddhismisa“science

ofawakening.”169Academics,scientists,andBuddhistsalikehaveclaimedthatboth

“knowledge” and “truth” are conceptualized in the same way in Buddhism and

science,basedon“empiricism,”while“rationality”hasbeensuggestedtobethepath

toenlightenment.170

Thediscourseonenlightenmentdoesnotconstitutetheonlyparalleldrawn

between Buddhist and scientific knowledge. Philosopher, historian, and Nobel

laureate Bertrand Russell (1872–1970) claimed that Buddhism “advocates the

scientific method,” as did Kirthisinghe, who added that by doing so “the Buddha

proved that hewas, indeed, a scientist.”171 Dharmapala constructed Buddhism as

163Firstquote[Carus]P.C.(1896);secondquotedinJackson(1968),82.164Tweed(1992),103.165QuotedinLopez(2008),192.166Peebles(1907),26.167QuotedinLopez(2008),23.168UChanHtoon(2008[1962]).169Trinh(2001),206.170Slone(2013),2098–2099.171FirstquotedinVerhoeven(2001),88;secondquoteKirthisinghe(1984),4.

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generallyscientific,asscientificadvancesweresuggestedtobenothingnewtothe

Buddhistworldview:“Everynewdiscoveryinthedomainofsciencehelpsforusto

appreciatethesublimeteachingsoftheBuddhaGautama.”Heargued,“Buddhismisa

scientificreligion”and“Buddhismistantamounttoaknowledgeofothersciences.”172

Humphreysclaimed,theBuddha“producedascienceoflivingwhichrankswithany

other science known toman,” while Sōenmade the even stronger claim that the

“Buddha’steachingsareinexactagreementwiththedoctrinesofmodernscience.”173

Incontrast,amongthefirstworkstodiscussBuddhism,Buddhistsaresaidto

giveprioritytoscienceevenwhenthereisaconflictwithBuddhistdoctrine.174Even

so,formanythisisnottonegatereligiousknowledgealtogether.Onescholarargued

thatinordertonurtureBuddhism-sciencealignment,we“mustrespectthevaluesof

modern science, yet avoid reducing all existences to material or mathematical

formulae.”Buddhiststeachthattohaveknowledgeofthetruenatureofthings,we

should not limit ourselves to a single way of understanding the world, which

contradictstheimpermanent,changing,andrelativenatureofthings.175Thiscreates

a situation in which religious knowledge can be likened to scientific knowledge

withoutbeingreducedtoscienceandwithoutexcludingotherwaysofthinkingabout

theworld.

Buddhist and scientific knowledge are also aligned by framing the two as

intellectualenterprises.EdwinArnold(1832–1904),authorofthepopularworkon

theBuddhaTheLightofAsia(1879)andperhapsthegreatestoftheearlyWestern

popularizersofBuddhismclaimed, “betweenBuddhismandmodernscience there

exists a close intellectual bond.”176 Philosophers, artists, and authors have all

contributed to the construction of Buddhism as a highly intellectual tradition,

including Arthur Schopenhauer (1788–1860), Nietzsche, and Martin Heidegger

(1889–1976).177Buddhismwasoftendescribed inearlyWestern literatureon the

172QuotedinLopez(2008),191–192.173Humphreys (1951), 80; and Sōenquoted inMcMahan (2008), 64.Verhoeven (1998), 325, n.20creditedSōen’sstatementtoCarus.174Hardy(1860),23.175Nabeshima(2003),85–86.SeealsoNakasone(2003),78.176QuotedinTweed(1992),104.177Borup(2013),292and295.

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topic,andinsomeEasternworksaswell,asintellectual.178Moreover,manyWestern

converts havehistorically beenhighly educated. This expansive impact in various

intellectual circles has contributed to the image, and thus the construction, of

Buddhism as intellectual.179 And as an intellectual enterprise, Buddhism was

particularlysuitedtothenon-reductivelikeningofreligiousandscientificknowledge.

Betweenthe1950sand1960s,theideathatBuddhistandscientificknowledge

were in an inclusive, non-reductive relation seems to have become the common

view.180Oneauthor fromthe1960s took the ‘fact’ thatBuddhism is scientificasa

given,particularlyregarding“idealsandgeneralprinciples.”

Both advocate free and rational inquiry, empirical verification and freedom fromauthoritariandogma.Bothviewtheuniverseasregulatedbyimpersonallawsofcauseandeffectoperatingthroughoutaeonsoftime.Bothseemanasaproductoftheuniverseratherthanaspecialcreation.181

Besides ‘general principles’ specific tenets of Buddhist belief were said to have

scientific counterparts. For example, claims about the connections between

Buddhismandevolution—whetherascompatibleorwiththeformeranticipatingthe

latter’sdiscovery—werealsocommonduringthelatenineteenthandearlytwentieth

centuries,putforthbysomeofthemostprominentthinkersinBuddhiststudiesand

in the natural sciences.182 For instance, one early pamphlet on “Buddhism and

Science” (1902) drew comparisons between Buddhist doctrine and evolution and

alignedBuddhistethicswithrationality.183Regardingevolutionaryideas,ithasbeen

argued,“Asscience,inthediscoveryofthelawofselection[…]soinBuddhismwe

findthesamegeneralconclusion.”184

178E.g.,inthefollowingstatementfrom1875:“TheoneinfalliblediagnosticofBuddhismisabeliefintheinfinitecapacityofthehumanintellect.”QuotedinLum(1875a),195.Hecited“Hodgson”astheonewho spoke thesewords, likely referring to BrianHoughtonHodgsonwho,we have seen,wasinstrumentalintheconstructionofascientificityofBuddhism.SeealsoYiu(1946),65.179Borup(2013),295.180E.g.,Burns(1965).SeealsoKovoor(1980),whoidentifiedthiscommonthemeinthistimeperiodaswell,offeringEgertonC.Baptist(fl.1950s–1970s)andJayatillekeasexamples.181Burns(1965),22.182Lopez(2008),146and244n.38.183DescriptionofthepamphletisavailableinAnon.(1904),xvi.184Lum(1875a),195.

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Thecycleoflife,death,andrebirthhavebeenanalogizedtoevolutionaswell.

Andkarmahasbeeninterpretedintermsofcauseandeffect,aswellasevolution,the

strengthoftheparalleltosuchadegreesoasmanyhaveevendescribedkarmaasa

“naturallaw.”185OneearlyauthoronthetopicofBuddhistkarmaclaimedthatthisis

“averyfamiliartruth”andthat“modernscienceisequallyexplicit inaffirmingthe

sameidea.”186LikeningBuddhistbelieftothelawofcauseandeffect—the“sinequa

nonofthemodernscientificworldview”—andwithevolution—beingacutting-edge

viewinthelatenineteenthcentury—broughtBuddhismtogetherwithsomeofthe

mostimportantsignifiersofscience.187Olcottarguedthatscience“entirelysupports”

Buddhistdoctrineon cause andeffect, evolution, anduniversal laws, that there is

“endorsement of Buddhism by science,” and, in turn, endorsement of science by

Buddhism.188Caruspresentedkarmaastheethicalmanifestationofnaturallaw,the

doctrineofrebirthwasanalogizedtotheevolutionofspecies,healignedBuddhist

andmodernpsychology,theindividualverificationoftruthpromotedbytheBuddha

was likened to scientific empiricism, and he generally argued that the Buddha

“anticipatedeveninimportantdetails”thefindingsofscience.189Cleatheridentified

oneofthecentralaimsofherworkastoshowthatBuddhism“possessesasystemof

EvolutionfarmorecomprehensivethantheDarwinian[model].”Thereisdiscussion

of physical, intellectual, and spiritual evolution, as well as the role of karma—

understood in terms of the laws of cause and effect and of the conservation of

energy—insuchevolution.190

Thereareseveralotherexamplesofparallelsdrawnbetweenspecifictenets

ofBuddhismandscience.Buddhistmetaphysicshasbeencomparedtothelawofthe

conservationof energy, for instance.191AndSuzuki argued that “Buddhismclearly

anticipated the outcome of modern psychological researchers,” a link that was

185Vollmer&vonStuckrad(2017);Lopez(2012),17;McMahan(2008),64;Lopez(2008),21–22and146;Tweed(1992),104;andCleather(1928),36–40.SeealsoMcMahan(2011),120.186Lum(1875a),195.187McMahan(2008),92.188Olcott(1881),11–13and20.SeealsoMcMahan(2008),97–101.189McMahan(2008),103;[Carus]P.C.(1896),4845;andJackson(1968),81.190Cleather(1928),frontmatter,n.p.Seealsoibid.,33,36–40,and45–46.191Titcomb(1883),80.

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increasingly embraced as a bridge between religion and science at this time, also

advocated by important thinkers like Jung.192 The dynamism of matter in the

scientific worldview has been suggested to confirm the Buddhist view of the

fluctuatingandimpermanentnatureofthings,whilethenotionofrelativityhasbeen

likened to the contingent and relational nature of reality in the thought of the

importantBuddhistphilosopherNagarjuna(ca.150–250).GendünChöphel(1903–

1951)believedthatscientificobservationsconfirmedmanytenetsofBuddhistbelief,

includingimpermanenceandthedependentoriginationofallreality.193

The Buddha was said to be unsurpassed by his contemporaries in his

understandingofscience.194TheBuddha(rather thanBuddhist thoughtgenerally)

hasspecificallybeencreditedwiththediscoveryofthelawofcauseandeffectand

withanticipatingotherscientificdiscoveries,suchasmagnetism,radioactivity, the

mechanicalnatureof things, evolution, relativity, psychology, and theBigBang.195

Dharmapalaclaimed,“thetheoryofevolutionwasoneoftheancientteachingsofthe

Buddha.”196Whilemany have challenged such claims, this has not led to a break

between Buddhism and science. One early author on the topic of Buddhism and

scienceargued,the“Buddha,evenifhedidnotteachthetruthsofmodernscience,

taughtnothingopposedtothem.”197

Yet,itwasthehistoricaldiscoveryoftheBuddhabyWesternscholars“who

would become theBuddhawe know today, andwhowould become the Scientific

Buddha.”198Inotherwords,theBuddhaasscientistwasparticulartothisdiscourse.

Asearlyasthe1840s,theBuddhahasbeencharacterizedasreceptiveto“thecurrent

opinions of his day respecting natural philosophy” (on the close discursive

connection between science and natural philosophy, see Chapter Three) and

192 Quoted in Lopez (2008), 23. See also Fields (1992), 205; and Oldmeadow (2004), 96–100. OnBuddhismandpsychotherapy andpsychoanalysis, see alsoMcMahan (2008), 192–194; andPayne(2012),233–255.193Jinpa(2010),873.194Alabaster(1871),5,16,and232.195Lopez(2012),xi,14;Alabaster(1871),5and16;Kirthisinghe(1984),5;DuPré(1984b),147;andFields(1992),126.196QuotedinVerhoeven(2001),82–83.197Alabaster(1871),5,16,and232.198Lopez(2012),17

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“carefullynurtured in thesciences.”199TheBuddha is the “Newtonof thespiritual

world,” as Harold Fielding-Hall (1859–1917) put it in 1898.200 The Buddha has

regularlybeendepictedasamanofscience,inthathedidnotdiscovertruththrough

“revelation,” “but through investigation and analysis, testing hypotheses in the

laboratoryofhismindtoarriveatproofs.”201AndthismakesBuddhismuniqueinthe

religion-sciencerelation,asUChanHtoonstated,“WeclaimfortheBuddhathathe

wastheonlyreligiousteachertobringscientificmethodsofapproachtobearonthe

questionsofultimatetruth.”202TheBuddha isevencreditedwithhaving ‘supreme

science.’203TrinhXuanThuandescribedtheBuddhaasa“physicianofthesoul,”as

did Kirthisinghe, who added “he proceeded in a scientific manner.”204 Lopez

observed,“theBuddhaisseenasascientist,experimentinginhislaboratoryofthe

spirit.”205

Theassociationbetweenthe ‘Easternadept’andthescientistalsooccurs in

therelevantliterature.206InseveralearlyworksonBuddhism,itissuggestedthatone

oftherulesputforthbytheBuddhaforteachersasregardstheirdisciplesisto“teach

himinthefullestmanner,withoutabridgement,whetheritberelativetoscienceor

religion […].”207 The arhat (a Buddhist adept) has been depicted as “a student of

naturalscience”orasa‘spiritualscientist,’whilethemonasteryhasbeenreferredto

asa“houseofscience.”208Ithasbeenarguedthat“MostBuddhistsareopentothe

discoveries and theories of science, and they seek common ground between the

findingsofmodernscienceandBuddhistdoctrinesandbeliefs.”209

The end to such likenings is nowhere in sight. Such claims continue to be

produced,withtheparallelsoftenreflectingthesocialandintellectualinterestsofthe

199Gogerly(1845),7;Lum(1875a),194.SeealsoLum(1875b).200QuotedinLopez(2008),154.201Lopez(2012),7.202UChanHtoon(2008[1962]).Emphasisadded.203Baptist(1955),asinthetitleofhiswork.204Trinh(2001),207;andKirthisinghe(1984),4.205Lopez(2012),44.SeealsoMcMahan(2008),65–66.206E.g.,Monier-Williams(1888),16.207Hardy(1860),479.SeealsoRhysDavids(1877),145;andTitcomb(1883),92.208Sinnett(1883),7;Fields(1992),91–92;Batchelor(2011),269;andSchlagintweit(1863),12n.1.209Nakasone(2003),76.

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day.210Presently,manyclaimtheintersectionofBuddhistmeditationandcognitive

scienceisthemostpromising,fruitful,andactiveareainthefieldofBuddhismand

science.211Andthisislikelynottosubsideinthenearfuture,asmeditationhasbeen

constructed as the central activity of Buddhists—amounting to the Buddhist

enterpriseitself—inthediscourseonthescientificityofBuddhismand,moreover,it

hasproducedaspecializedfieldofstudyinthenaturalsciences.

4 TheBuddhistEnterpriseas‘Scientific’

NotonlyhassciencebeenconstructedwithinandbecomepartofBuddhisthistory,

sciencehasalsobeeninstrumentalinre-framingthegoalsofBuddhism.Itisnotan

exaggerationtosaythatmeditationismoreorlesstantamounttoBuddhisminthis

contextandmeditationhasoftenbeenconstructedinscientificterms.212Forexample,

JeremyHayward,anuclearphysicist,molecularbiologist,andBuddhistsympathizer,

claimedthat“theBuddhisttraditionisbased”onmeditationand“thegroundsforthe

validityofthemethodofmeditationarenotverydifferentfromthegroundsforthe

validityofthescientificmethod.”213Eventhoughhistoricallyspeakingmeditationhas

not been a centralBuddhist activity (but rather reserved for a specialist groupof

monks), meditation and science are also often positioned as bridging the divide

betweenvarioussects,unitingtheentireBuddhistenterpriseundertheirauspices.214

210Vollmer&vonStuckrad(2017).211 E.g., Slone (2013), 2096; Lopez (2012), 104; and Batchelor (2011), 363. Although a variety ofmeditative techniques from diverse traditions are being studied in the field of cognitive science,Buddhist approaches are themost frequently examined. Another area of thatwould havemade asuitablecasestudyisthescienceofyoga,whichhasastrongtraditioninscientificandclinicalresearch.Yoga,abroadtermfordiverseIndianmeditativetechniquesthatinvolvesmanipulationofthebodyinvariousways,hasalsobeenframedasa‘spiritualscience’anda‘scientificreligiouspractice.’See,e.g.,Kriyananda(2002[1985]).Suchstudiesaddtothemainthethrustoftheargumenthereaboutthescientificityofreligion.212Lopez(2012),14and92;McMahan(2008),7,183,212,and217;andBatchelor(2011),351and364.Inthepresentday,thetypeofmeditationusuallyunderdiscussionismindfulness.‘Mindfulness’is sometimes identifiedwith theSanskritvipaśyanā, i.e., ‘insight,’and sometimeswith theSanskritsmṛti, ‘memory’or ‘theremembered’and isgenerallyusedtodaytorefer toameditative,attentiveengagement to any activity. SeeMcMahan (2008), 215–240.On the issue of identifyingmeditativeexperiencewithBuddhism,seeSharf(1995).213Hayward(1987),2–3.214Fields(1992),369–370;andBatchelor(2011),344–351.

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The scientificity of meditation is constructed in primarily two ways: in terms of

meditationasscienceandviathescienceofmeditation.Inthefollowing,Iwilldiscuss

both.

IthasbeenarguedthatBuddhistmeditationbackedbyscience“willchange

the world” and that we are currently in an age of a ‘meditation revolution’ or a

“boom.”215Innotimeperiodismeditationconstructedasscientificonsucharegular

basisasinthecontemporaryperiod,howeverthishasbeenarecurringmotifsince

theoutsetof thisdiscourseof thescientificityofBuddhism.Meditative techniques

havebeenframedintermsofobservationandexperiment,withvariousformulations

ofmeditationas“meditativescience”ora“scienceofmind”fromamongtheearliest

EnglishlanguageworksonBuddhismdowntothepresentday.216Similarly,others

havemadethebroaderclaimthatAsianreligionshaddeveloped“internalempirical

sciences” to cultivate spiritual evolution.217 By 1984, Gerald Du Pré claimed

meditation“isscientificexaminationitself!”218

The contemporary period holds too many examples of the scientificity of

meditationtomentionthemall.However,B.AlanWallaceisparticularlyimportantto

mentioninhisroleofemployingtheneologism‘contemplativescience’tocombine

the‘scientificsystem’ofmeditationwiththemethod,theory,andobservationsofthe

cognitive sciences. He argued that despite differences between the two forms of

science, they “appear to be fundamentally complementary, rather than

incompatible.”219Thiswasspecificallyframedasnon-reductive:“[A]contemplative

215Taylor(2012);Gregoire(2014a);Gregoire(2014b);Pickert(2014);Wilson(2014);Borup(2013),293;andLopez(2012),99.216Foradiscussion,seeVollmer&vonStuckrad(2017);andMcMahan(2008),64and205.Someearlyexamples includeAlabaster (1871),xxxiii,88,103,137,144,182–183,192–194,and202;Titcomb(1883),147;Richard(1907),x;Goddard(2002[1930]),68;Yiu(1946),46and48;Jayatilleke(2008[1958])—inwhichtheBuddha’spathofsalvationthroughmeditationandotherfactorsisreferredtoasa“scientifichypothesis”;andThera(1962),23,38–39.Somemorerecentexampleswillbediscussedinthissection.217McMahan(2008),98.218DuPré(1984a),141.Emphasisoriginal.SeealsoDuPré(1984b),147.219Wallace(2007a),169.SeealsoWallace(1996),205;Wallace(1999),esp.186–187;Wallace(2000),11–13and120;andWallace(2001).

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scienceofmindthatdrawsfrombothourglobalspiritualheritageandourscientific

heritage.”220Wallaceelaborated:

This isnot tosuggest thatWesternsciencebediscarded in favorofEasterncontemplativescience[…]Norshouldthetwobesetincompetitionwitheachother[…]AtpresentweareinapositiontodrawfromthewisdomoftheEastandtheWest.221

ThereviewsofhisChoosingReality(1989),inwhichhefirstdevelopedtheseideas,

were not unfavorable and in the 1990smeditationwas increasingly described in

termsof“contemplativescience”or“Asianpsychologies,”understoodbroadlyasan

internal science.222 Already in 1991 Larry Fahlberg and Lauri Fahlberg saw a

contemplativeapproachinthesciencestobeontherise,noting:

A type of scientist is emerging today who has studied and used both empirical andphenomenological/hermeneutic,ordescriptiveandinterpretivesciences,respectively,andisnowstudyingandmasteringwhathasbeenreferredtoascontemplativescience.223

Inotherwords,scientistsbegantobothpracticeandstudymeditation,conjoiningthe

observationsofbothapproachesinanalysis.Whatweseeoccurringhereisthatthe

notion of meditation as science is being joined with the science of meditation. A

promotional poster for a research project at the Santa Barbara Institute for

Consciousness Studies (est. 2003) provides a good example. The poster reads

“MeditatetoAdvanceScience,”theimplicationbeingthatmeditationhassomething

to contribute to science in the scientific study ofmeditation, positioning the two

perspectivesasunited.224Buddhismisnotsimplyanobjectofstudy,butratherthe

claimrepeatedlyappearsthatBuddhismcanalsoadvancescience.225Forexample,

neuroscientist Christopher DeCharms suggested that Buddhism can contribute to

220Wallace(2000),13.221 Wallace (1996), 144. In 2007, Wallace further developed his ideas of ‘contemplative science,’droppingthelabel(thoughnotthediscussion)of‘Buddhism’thathehadearlieraffixedtothephrase.Heproposedanewdisciplineunderthatname.‘Contemplativescience’isunderstoodas“ascienceoftheworldofexperience,” including“investigationof thecausalefficacyofconsciousness […] in thenatural world.” Wallace (2007a), 27. Similarly, Ken Wilber has sought to integrate the various‘sciences’ ofmeditation and the scienceofmeditation to get amore completepictureof themind.Wilber(1983).222Forreviews,see,e.g.,Taber(1991);andCandy(2004).Onmeditationintermsofcontemplationandpsychologysee,e.g.,Rockefeller(1994);Loizzo&Blackhall(1998);andWalsh(2010).223Fahlberg&Fahlberg(1991).224 Buddhadharma (2011). See also, Santa Barbara Institute for Consciousness Studies (2005).Descriptionoftheposterderivedfrommypersonalcollection.225Cabezón(2003),54.

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neuroscienceinthat“theobservationalmethodsofBuddhismarewhatthepresent

science ofmind largely lacks in systematic form, and could almost certainly learn

from.”226

Indeed, the continued construction of the scientificity of Buddhism is now

ofteninthelab,creatingawholenewleveloflegitimizationfromandidentification

withthescientificcommunity.Thisinvolvesthestudyofmeditatingmonksandofthe

clinicalapplicationsofBuddhistmeditation.Thescientificstudyofmeditationbegan

inthe1960sinJapanwheremeditators’brainwavesweredocumented,whichwas

alsothetimethatmeditationbecameverypopularacrosstheWest.227Sincethistime,

therehavebeeninnumerablestudiesonthephysicalmanifestationsofmeditation,

including brain activity, hormonal levels, heart rate, attention levels, emotion

regulation, immune and central nervous systems functions, and neurological

structures.228 At present, there are thousands of empirical studies on meditation

available.229Bythe1980s,a“medicalizedunderstandingofmeditation”hadcometo

thefore,whichwasthoughttobecommonacrossreligionsandapplicablebeyond

them. Though likened to science,meditationwas not divorced from religion, and

monks and their interpretive commentarybecame the central objects of scientific

study.230 Insomecases, themonksevenparticipated indesigningtheexperiments

andtheconceptualframeworksforinterpretingthedata.231Inthe1990s,significant

dialoguewas establishedbetweenEastern contemplatives andWestern scientists,

with the support of prestigious institutions and topuniversitiesworldwide,while

226DeCharms(1998),46.227McMahan(2008),204;Baumann(2002),92;andCampbell(2007).228McMahan(2008),204.ForabriefoverviewofthehistoryofmeditationinWesternscienceandmedicine,seeHarrington(2008),205–242.229 Lutz, Dunne, & Davidson (2007), 499–500. For a general survey of the empirical literature onmeditationseePagano&Warrenburg(1983);Delmonte(1984);Holmes(1984);Delmonte(1985);Fenwick (1987); Murphy & Donovan (1997); Austin (1998); Cahn & Polich, (2006); Ospina et al(2007);Hussain&Bhushan(2010);Sedlmeieretal(2012);andEberth&Sedlmeier(2012).SeealsoFraser(2013);andtheentirespecialissueofKazak(2015).Despiteallthis,manyofthedetailsaboutthe neurophysiological processes and the effects of long-term contemplative practice remainunknown.230Harrington(2008),219–220,230,and233–234.Harringtonarguedthattherewasaphaseofmorestrictly medicalized understandings from the 1960s through the 1980s, followed by a period ofincreased identificationwithEasternreligions.Yet, clearly the1960sand1970swasa timeperiodcharacterizedbyanexplosionofBuddhism-sciencealignmentfromprofessionaltopopularcontexts.231Jinpa(2010),874.

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resultshavebeenandcontinuetobepublishedinleadingacademicjournalsandby

themostprestigiousacademicpresses.Forexample,thereistheCenterforHealthy

MindsattheUniversityofWisconsin-MadisonandtheCenterforMindfulnessatthe

UniversityofMassachusettswithitsMindfulness-BasedStressReductionprogram.232

Though the scientific framework is important, it has not been binding, andmany

contemplative research institutions take an interdisciplinary approach, such as

BrownUniversity’sContemplativeStudiesInitiative.233

Meditation is increasingly being used in scientific environments to treat a

range of mental and physical pathologies, including depression, obsessive-

compulsive disorder (OCD), chronic pain, anxiety disorders, and psoriasis, and to

cultivate general psychological well-being.234 One hospital poster prescribed

meditation to “manage stress; quiet habitual thoughts; boost disease resistance;

maintain overall health; manage high blood pressure, sleep disorders, life-style

changes,physicalandemotionalpain.”235Buddhistmeditationisroutinelyofferedin

medicalandpsychiatriccontextsaroundtheglobe.236Coursesonmeditation-based

healthtreatmentsextendbeyondtheclinicalsettingandareappliedinawidearray

ofcontexts.237Theincorporationofmeditationintohealthcarehasbeenacceptedin

Westernmainstreamculture,foundinprisons,schools,andcorporations.238

Withinthefirstdecadeofthetwenty-firstcentury,afirmlinkwasestablished

between‘contemplativescience’andthecognitivesciencesthroughtheworkofthose

suchasJoeLoizzo,RichardDavidson,AntonioDamasio,PaulEkman,ShaunaShapiro,

andJonKabat-Zinn,forexample,andtheideaofmeditativesciencebecamesalient.239

232Forcontemplativedegreeprogramsandconcentrations,seeTheCenterforContemplativeMindinSociety(2000–2015).SeealsoHarrington(2008),234–236;andVollmer&vonStuckrad(2017).Fora(long)listofprominentaffiliatesinvolvingonecontemplativescienceresearchproject,seeFraser(2013),195–196n.5.233BrownUniversity(n.d.).234Begley(2007),141;Schwartz&Begley(2002),54–95;Davidsonetal(2003);andGrossmanetal(2004).235QuotedinLopez(2012),97.236McMahan(2012),4.237Kabat-Zinn&Chapman-Waldrop(1988);andKabat-Zinn,Lipworth,&Burney(1985).238McMahan(2008),185.239Googlescholarproducesonlyafewdozenoccurrencesofthephrase‘contemplativescience’inthe1990s,increasingtonearlytwohundredfrom2000–2009andclosetofivehundredfrom2010–2016,increasinglydisplayingconnectionswithcognitivesciencethroughtime.

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Thereisaperceivabletransitionfrommarginaltomainstream,astherewasalotof

discussion about the ‘integration’ of meditation into the sciences, as well as the

increasedacceptanceof ‘alternativemedicines’asalegitimateapproach.240“It’sno

longer considered fringe,” National Institutes of Health senior scientist Esther

Sternberg stated.241 Today, references to meditation can easily be found in

mainstream encyclopedias and handbooks of medicine, cognitive science, and

consciousnessstudies,forexample,suggestingthatitisindeedbecomingrecognized

attheprofessionallevel.242Andthestancetakencontinuestobenon-reductive.The

Cambridge Handbook of Consciousness, for example, described the reason for the

selectionofBuddhistmeditationforneuroscientificresearchtobebecauseBuddhist

understanding“isstronglyconsistentwithourknowledgeoftheneurosciences.”243

By2003,NewYorkTimeswasasking“IsBuddhismGoodforYourHealth?”244

AsnotedinTimemagazine,“Scientistsstudyit.Doctorsrecommendit.Millions[…]

practiceiteveryday.Why?Becausemeditationworks.”245Thishascreatedasituation

in which Buddhism and science are strongly identified with one another, as

something that belongs tomainstream science and academia in its own right, yet

havingmaintainedits identityas ‘religion’ inmanycases,reflectingarobusttrend

towardthescientificityofreligion.In2005,theSocietyforNeuroscienceinvitedthe

DalaiLamatospeakaboutthebenefitsofmeditations,demonstratingthecontinuing

role of religion even within scientific communities. Though there was some

240See,e.g.,Moodley&West(2005);andLiveScienceStaff(2011).241Gregoire(2015).ThatthisisnotsomarginalanylongerisalsodemonstratedbythefactthattheUSgovernment has funded studies of integrativemedicine, in part involvingmeditation, through theNationalCenterforComplementaryandAlternativeMedicine,and,intheUK,wehavetheexampleofThePrince’sFoundationforIntegratedHealthandtheCollegeofMedicinewheretheintegrationofintegrativemedicineisoccurringaswell.Furthermore,aUSNationalHealthInterviewsurveyin2007concluded that thirty-eight percent of Americans used “complementary and alternativemedicine.”This increasefrom2002wasfoundtobe largelytheresultof“mind-bodytherapies,”suchasyoga,meditation,andtaichi,constitutingseventy-fivepercentoftherise.Thesurveyfoundmorethan6.3millionAmericansusedmind-bodytherapiesspecificallyduetoproviderreferral,whichalsoindicatesan increasing level of acceptance andmarks a turn toward legitimization inmedical and scientificfields.LiveScienceStaff(2011).242See,e.g.,Chrisman&Longe(2011).243Lutz,Dunne,&Davidson(2007),499–503.244Harrington(2008),241.245QuotedinHarrington(2008),205.Still,thereissignificantdebateaboutthemeaningoftheterms‘Buddhist,’‘meditation,’andnotinsignificantly‘works.’Lopez(2008),207.

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resistance,withcertainindividualsarguingthatreligiousperspectivesshouldnotbe

givenavoiceinscientificvenuesnomatterwhatcontributionsmightbemade,inthe

endoverthirteenthousandneuroscientistscametotheevent.246Theattendance,as

wellasthestandingovationtheDalaiLamareceived,suggestsanenormousreception

to the idea that religionmighthavesomescientific character, that theremaybea

scientificityofBuddhistmeditation.

Thetraitsassociatedwithmeditationalsogreatlycontributetotheretention

of religious signifiers. For example, one experiment found quantifiably that the

Buddhistmeditator studiedwas “the happiestman in the world” comparedwith

previous test subjects based on brain activity and immune system response. The

empirical results are constructed in such a way as to speak to our inner lives,

frequentlyunderstoodintermsofreligiousjourneys.Forexample,theresultswere

presentedas thediscoveryofa “spiritual state” that is “beyond thebrain.”247This

demonstrates that Buddhist practice produces scientific data that in turn impacts

religious outlooks, creating a circular influence. Religious sentiments, goals, and

practices are regarded as founded in scientific results. There are many other

examples aswell that have drawn upon scientific data in the attempt to address

existential,spiritual,andreligiousquestions,especiallyinpopularliterature,butalso

frequentlyfoundinhighprofilenewspaperandmagazinearticles.248

Takinganoveralllookatthesedevelopments,whatweseeoccuristhatthese

twomovementstowardunderstandingmeditationasscientificanddevelopingthe

scienceofmeditationhavemergedinmanyways.249Somehaveclaimeda“newera”

for cognitive science, in which scientists are trained in both scientific and

contemplativemethodsofinquiryinanintegrativeapproachtoinvestigation.250In

fact, many and perhaps most scientists involved in this dialogue are Buddhist

246Harrington(2008),241–242.247Shreeve(2005).SeealsoVollmer&vonStuckrad(2017).248E.g.,meditators featuredonthecoverofTime (US)magazine inAugust2003, thecoverofTime(Europe) magazine in October 2003, and the cover of Time (US, Asia, and Europe) magazine inFebruary2014,aswellasonthecoverofScientificAmericaninNovember2014.Allreportsaddressedthe‘scienceofmeditation,’extrapolatedtoalargercontextofnon-physical(i.e.,mental,spiritual,etc.)well-being.Vollmer&vonStuckrad(2017).249Borup(2013),296.250Desbordes&Negi(2013).

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practitioners.251AsJacksonnoted,“Inasurprisingnumberofnotablecases,Western

seekers for Oriental solace have come from scientific and positivistic

backgrounds.”252 And as Slone noted, “Western scientists who practice Buddhism

contributetotheself-identificationofBuddhismasscientific.”253Forexample,inthe

Mindfulness-basedStressReductionprogram—whichappliesBuddhistmeditation

toarangeofmedicalandpsychologicalconditions—thetherapistsalsoengageinthe

practice before the teachings are transmitted, something that is not unlike the

Buddhist adept-student relationship.254 There is emphasis on therapists’ own

experiencesandgrowthasaprerequisitetoguidance.Choarguedthatthisisnotto

saythattheseareundercoverBuddhists,butrathershowsthedegreeofintegration,

wherediscoursesofscience“havebecomeanunexpectedplacefornon-reductivetalk

about thingssuchasreligiousexperienceandself-transformation.”255Theeffect is

that notions ofmeditation as a scientific systemand the science of contemplative

techniquesarebecomingsynonymous.Insomecases,thisiswellbeyondsuperficial

alignmenttothepointofahistoricalmergeroftwoideas,resultinginthescientificity

ofreligion.256

5 FromInclusivitytoScientificitytoMutualExclusivity

Thescientificityofreligionhasbeenexceedinglysuccessful.Bytheturnofthetwenty-

firstcentury,Buddhismhadbecome“trendreligion2000.”257Inthepresentday,itis

notanexaggerationtosaythatthe‘truths’ofsciencehavebeenbuiltintoBuddhism,

251Cabezón(2003),57.252Jackson(1968),91.253Slone(2013),2097.254McMahan(2008),185.SeealsoCenterforMindfulnessinMedicine,HealthCare,andSociety(2014),s.v.“StressReduction.”255Cho(2012),284.256Borup(2013),296.257QuotedinBaumann(2002),85.

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as Lopez has observed.258 And this discourse evolved as a result of inclusivity

structuringthechangestotheterms ‘Buddhism’and ‘science.’The ‘science’ that is

being likened to religion is the ‘science’ of inclusivity, whereby ‘religion’ is not

excluded.Because inclusivity set theparametersofengagement,whensimilarities

aredrawnupon,theresultisanon-reductiverelationalconstruct.Asevidencetothis,

thisformofBuddhismcontinuestoretainits“‘unscientific’elements,”asMcMahan

put it.259 Though describing them as ‘unscientific’ rests on notions of mutual

exclusivity, it still reorganizes the constellations of meaning surround ‘religion’

relative to ‘science.’ This is because being ‘unscientific’—understood to signify

religion, which was a result of mutual exclusivity—is not treated as mutually

exclusive with science. And the role that mutual exclusivity continues to play is

furtherevidencetomycentralclaiminthisworkregardingtherelationalnatureof

discursivechange.Thoughthesignifiersandtheconcept‘science’aretakenas‘not

excludingreligion,’manyofthesignifiersofsciencearethosethatemergedasper

mutual exclusivity. Buddhism and science are said to hold in common critical

investigation, theoretical understandings, the psychologization of the mind,

empiricism,andanemphasisonfactandrationalityoverbelief,forinstance.260

Despitethecontinuinginfluenceofthisrelationalconstruct,inclusivityisthe

constructthatisstructuringtheinterpretationofsuchlikenings.Wecanseethisin

thatsimilaritiesarenottakenas identities.Thenon-reductionofsimilaritiesoften

involvesthemaintenanceofdifferentiation,butinsuchcasesdifferencesaretreated

ascomplementarities.Asonescholarputit,“Therelationshipbetweenscienceand

Buddhismisnotcontradictory,foreachcanmutuallyunderstandtheknowledgeand

wisdomoftheother[…].”261Wehavealsoseenseveralexamplesinwhichthetwoare

framedinserviceofoneanother,asmutuallysupportiveinvariousways,suchasin

termsofexpandingknowledgeinbothspheres.SuchanexchangebetweenBuddhism

258 Lopez (2012), 5. To be clear, Lopez does not support the application of this interpretationthroughout Buddhist history. He merely noted this historical development in the perception andreceptionofBuddhisminthecontemporaryperiod.259McMahan(2011),137.260Borup(2013),296;Nabeshima(2003),85–86;Nakasone(2003),76;andCho&Squier(2016),25–48.261Nabeshima(2003),86.

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and science suggests differentiation, conceptually and in practical terms, while

likeningthetwojustthesame.Thisisnotconsideredcontradictoryasitwouldbe

underamutualexclusivitypointofview,becauseinsteadthe“binaryparts”makea

“greaterwhole.”Andreflectingthenon-reductivecharacterofscientificity,thereis

no“triumphalism.”262

Further supporting my argument that discursive change occurs via

relationalization,theideaofascientificreligionwastakenasachallengetothevery

term‘religion,’aswehaveseen.Suchananalysiswouldnotevenmakesensewithout

thetacitknowledgethatreligionisconceptualizedas‘notscience’andviceversa.Why

shouldreligionas ‘scientific’sayanythingabouttheparametersofthetermunless

religion and science were implicitly taken as mutually implicatory? As such

conversationsemerge,onewouldthinkthatwewouldfinallycometorealizehowthis

tacitknowledgeisframingthearticulationofalternativesinarelationalmanner.But

instead of coming to terms with the foundational issues of concept formation in

relativeperspective,representationisnowalsooftentakenasapremise.Likeningof

Buddhismtoscience inanon-reductivewayhascometobe implicitlyaccepted in

many circumstances.Academic articles and researchmaterials oftentimespresent

Buddhismascompatiblewithscience,whichhashelpedtolegitimizethisrelational

construct. For example, in one encyclopedia article, scholar of religion Jensine

AndresenclaimedBuddhists “conciselyweavereligionandscience together intoa

seamless fabric.”263 Buddhist scholar Naoki Nabeshima similarly stated,

“fundamentalBuddhistideas[…]arebasedonarationalapprehensionoftheworld

thatcanbelikenedtothemodernscientificmethod.”Nabeshimacontinued,“Because

of this basic shared approach, Buddhism and science do not come into serious

conflict.”264 Evenwhen it is granted that Buddhism has not always engagedwith

science,thesentimentisgenerallythatitdoessonowanditdoesitwell.

Evenwiththerepresentationconstructpresumedinmanycasesanddespite

thefactthatthisunderstandingof‘Buddhism’hasbeenincirculationfornearlytwo

262Cabezón(2003),50.263Andresen(2003),75.264Nabeshima(2003),81.

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hundredyears,onerecurringconclusionaboutthescientificnatureofBuddhismhas

been to analyze this characterization as an inauthentic one—particularly among

present-day scholars of Buddhism. As in the case of the religionization of

scientificatorsandthereligionizationoftheinclusivityconstruct,thisisameansof

delegitimizing the relational construct. It is an analysis that asserts a scientific

religion is not ‘really’ representative of the religion—a tendency reminiscent of

mutualexclusivity.RickFieldsstated,“TheWesternapprehensionofEasternreligion

in general and Buddhism in particular has actually been a series of

misapprehensions.”265Similarly,Lopezargued that thehistoricalBuddha isoneof

“whomtheScientificBuddha iscommonlymistaken,”andsuggeststhatweshould

“allowhimtopassaway.”266Whilethesescholarsareattemptingtosetthehistorical

recordstraight, thepartofhistory that is takenas thestandard-bearer is thepart

whichupholdspreconceivednotionsofwhatconstitutes‘Buddhism’and‘science.’

Cho and Squier summarized this common sentiment well: “Buddhism and

sciencearenothistoricallyrelated,whichleadsexpertsofBuddhismtoconcludethat

anysimilaritiesbetweenthemaresuperficialandspecious”andthatthistypeofwork

“bastardises‘real’Buddhism.”267SimilarlySlonenoted:

[S]omescholarshaverecentlycalledintoquestionthedegreetowhichtheBuddhismbeingpresented as in linewithmodern science is in linewith Buddhism. That is, scholars havequestionedthehistoricalauthenticityofthetypeofBuddhismthatissaidtobescientific.Thehypothesis is that the ‘scientificBuddhism’ that isbeingpresentedas in linewithmodernscienceisactuallyahistoricalinvention[…].268

Yet,suchapositionisproblematicforseveralreasons.Forone,thoughsome

arguethat thenaturalscienceswereneveran importantpartofBuddhistpractice

beforethemodernperiod,historicallyBuddhistshavebeenintimatelyinvolvedinthe

development of medicine and pharmacology, and adopted many practical

technologiesaswell—areasofstudyfrequentlydiscursivelyentangledwith‘science’

today.269 Secondly, there is thematter ofwhat constitutes ‘authenticity,’ ofwhich

265Fields(1992),367.266Lopez(2012),x–xi.267Cho&Squier(2016),viii.268Slone(2013),2096–2097.269See,e.g.,Nabeshima(2003),82–85;Salguero(2014);andPayne(2002),164–169.

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thereareacoupleofsub-issues.Typically,‘authenticsources’hasmeant,asStephen

Batchelor noted, “ordained Asian males” as the sole representatives of the

tradition.270And,regardingtherelationbetweenauthenticityandlocalvariants,Colin

Campbellstated:

[I]twouldseem that there is toomuchofa readiness […] toassumeanunquestioned linkbetweenprovenanceandauthenticity,thatistosay,toassumethatjustbecauseabelieforpractice is to be found in the East it therefore must be more authentic than any variantencounteredintheWest.271

Considerationsoftime,space,orinstitutioncannotalwaysdetermineauthenticity.

Third,authenticornot,authenticitydoesnotdeterminehistoricalsignificance.

AsNalikaGajaweeranoted,thepointisto“determinenotifaparticulartranslationis

accurate,butratherhowitformsandproducespeople’ssenseofspirituality.”272And,

onarelatednote,changedoesnotnegatehistoricalimportanceorauthenticityeither.

Similarly,Campbellpointedout,“therewouldseemtobenojustificationforassuming

[…] that because the form of the religion has changed, then the adherents’

commitmenttoitisquestionable.”273Granted,somemightunderstand‘authenticity’

tobe synonymous to ‘historical,’ so that timing is everything, but this ignores the

important role of lived religion, how it is practiced and how it is understood by

devotees,bringingmetomyfinalobjectiontothe‘bastardizingBuddhism’argument.

All else aside, and perhaps most importantly, as a living tradition, this deserves

scholarlyattention.AsSloneargued,“Regardlessofitshistoricalauthenticity[…]this

reformed version of Buddhism is now quite popular, both in the West and

increasinglyinAsia,andsoislikelyheretostay.”274

IfwetrulywanttoknowhowBuddhismhasbeenlived,howithasmanifested

inpeople’swordsandactions,thentheaccounthereisundoubtedlyaccurate,asare

theaccountsofmoretraditional formsthatcontinuetoenduretoday. Iagreewith

McMahan that Buddhism constructed as scientific, in addition to other constructs

relatedtomodernBuddhismasheunderstandsit,“areaccuraterepresentationsnot

270Batchelor(2011),275.271Campbell(2007),342–343.272Gajaweera(2016).273Campbell(2007),39.274Slone(2013),2096–2097.

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ofBuddhisminitsdiverseAsianhistoricalcontextsbutofanewBuddhismthathas

emergedmorerecently,” inboththeEastandWest.275Andtherealityofthis lived

religionisthattheterm‘Buddhism’hasevolvedinhistoricallysignificantwaysviaits

alignmentwiththeterm‘science,’resultinginparticularchangestotheconstruction

of the religion-science relation. Though this is relatively recent and distinct from

Buddhism’sdiversehistoricalcontexts,itisanuttershametodisregardnearlytwo

centuriesofthescientificityofreligionbecauseitdoesnotfitintoourdefinitions—

definitionsofwhichhappentoreinforcenotionsofmutualexclusivityaswhatis‘not

reallyreligion’isthescience.

Slone pinned the issue on the nose when he observed, the issue “turns

preciselyonwhatconstitutesa‘religion’atall.”276Wearealreadyquitefamiliarwith

theproblemsofdefiningreligionatthispointandtheterm‘Buddhism’faresnobetter.

AsMcMahanargued,“Wecansurelydispensewiththemythofthepureoriginalto

whicheveryadaptationmustconform.If‘trueBuddhism’isonlyonethatisunalloyed

bynovelculturalelements,noformsofBuddhismexistingtodayqualify.”277Aswe

haveseentimeandagain,challengestoreligion-sciencerelationscontinuallyhinge

ondefinitions,definitionsofwhichevolveinarelationalway.Is‘Buddhism’scientific?

Whenwelookattheetymological,social,historical,anddiscursivedevelopmentof

the termrelative toscience, ithas indeedbeenconstructedassuch inmanycases

fromasearlyasthe1820sandparticularlysincethe1860son.

Authenticornot,themorepertinentquestioniswhathistoricalcircumstances

shaped understandings, rather than to just dismiss them as blatantly false,which

seriously undermines the actual intellectual environment of the historical time

periods inquestion.Whetherwhat thesetraditionsbecamewasbasedontruthor

falsehoodsdoesnot change thepresent factof thematterand ifwe trulywant to

understandthehistoricalprocessesandreflectthedataaccurately,thenwehaveto

takeintoaccounthowfalsehoodsarejustaseffectiveinhistoricalformationsastruth.

Pointing out historical inaccuracies is not more historically important than

275McMahan(2008),4.276Slone(2013),2097.277McMahan(2008),254.

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understanding how and why these inaccuracies were taken to be accurate,

understandingthemindsandmotivesofthepeoplewhoformedmovementssolarge

astocontinuetoinformourdiscussionstoday.AsMcMahannoted:

[T]hemanymodernistscholarlyandpopularconstructionsofBuddhism,someofwhichhaveindeedbeenfantasies,neverthelesshavenotbeenidlefantasies.Theyhavebeenproductive,fashioningofnewwaysofbeingBuddhistpracticedby living,breathingpeoplearoundtheglobe.Fantasy,asthepsychoanalystshavetoldus,isnotsomethingeasilydismissed.Ittellsus important thingsabout the fantasizerandcantransformthatwhich is fantasizedabout.Modern representations of Buddhism, evenwhen they have been inadequate as historicaldescription,haveconditionedwhatBuddhismhasbecome.SeeingBuddhistmodernismsolelyintermsofrepresentationsandscholarlyconstruction,therefore,neglectsthemostimportantthing to the historian of religions: that a novel, historically unique form of Buddhism hasemerged[…].278

This form of Buddhism, I argue, came to be through a relationalization of

Buddhismand science that culminated into a very real phenomenonof historical,

discursive,andsocial interest.Buddhismhascometobe thoughtofascompatible

withsciencetoagreaterdegreethananyotherreligion.279Iwouldargueithasindeed

become compatible via it effective engagement with science.280 As Kocku von

Stuckradhasobserved,akeyelementofthecontemporaryreligiouslandscapeisthe

explicituseofscientificframeworksofmeaningand“Ratherthanconstructingaclear

distinction between religion and science, these understandings of religion

incorporatescientificlanguageintotheirownworldviews.”Thisincludes“ablending

of domains rather than a simple differentiation and polemical disjunction of

knowledge systems,” producing “a whole new field of religious convictions and

practices.”281ThescientificityofBuddhismisnotanisolatedincident,butratheris

demonstrativeofalargermovementtowardrepresentationconstructsappliedtothe

religion-sciencerelationthathistorianscannotignore.

WhilescholarsofBuddhismcontinuetodebatewhetherthereligioncanbe

considered scientific, scientists andBuddhists havemoved forwardwith research

anddialogueinutterdisregardoftheirconclusions.Fromtheperspectiveofthese

278 McMahan (2008), 21. Emphasis original. See also ibid., 114–115 where he reiterated thisconclusion.279Lopez(2005),2.280Forasimilarargument,seeMcMahan(2008),116and211;andMcMahan(2011).281vonStuckrad(2015),203and205.

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particular scientific and Buddhist communities, that Buddhism is scientific is a

‘scientific fact,’ backed by research outputs and other data. And from a relational

perspective,itsconstructionasa‘scientificfact’isindeedafact—ahistorical,social,

discursive,andrelationalfact.

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Chapter8:TheReligiosityofScience&theCaseofQuantumMysticism

Ihaveaspiritualpracticeusingquantumprinciples[…]Bothactivitiesareintegrativeandproducewholeness.—AmitGoswami1

1 Scienceas‘Religious’

TheoreticalphysicistAmitGoswamihasmademanystatementssimilartotheabove

quote.Hehasinitiateda‘spiritual’movement,likeningphysicstoreligionintermsof

methodology,truth/knowledge,practice,andethics.Thoughhehasbeendismissed

by scholars and scientists alike as misrepresenting science, his construction of

‘science’—in its relation to ‘religion’—is the very same as that of the founders of

quantum theory. These revolutionary thinkers not only turned the scientific

worldview on its head, they also repeatedly emphasized how the new paradigm

exhibits a religious character. And as these physicists developed quantum theory,

theycontinuallylookedtoreligiousphilosophiesinordertocometogripswiththe

newconceptsthenewsciencedemanded.Likeningphysicstoreligionconstitutesa

constellationofmeaningthatisstillsalienttoday.Itisthisdiscoursethatmakesup

thecasestudyforthischapter.

Whereas in the scientificity of religion movement beginning in the early

nineteenthcenturyemphasizedhowreligioncouldbescientific—asdiscussedinthe

previous chapter—a century later, the roles were reversed in which science was

lookingtoreligion“tostakeoutitsspiritualormetaphysicalclaims.”2Thisprimarily

tookplacewithin thenewlybuddingfieldofquantumphysics,withthefirstmajor

developmentsoccurringinthe1920s.Alreadyby1932,thephysicistsFritzLondon

(1900–1954) and Edmond Bauer (1880–1963) observed that the scientific

1QuotedinMoser(2013).2Verhoeven(2001),89.

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community “created a kind of spiritualistic society.”3 Historian JuanMiguel Marin

explained:

Todayitisseenassciencevs.religion,butatthetimeofthefoundationofquantummechanicsit was not. There were religious physicists on both sides of the controversy. Most of theimportant physicists held what we could call today religious beliefs, whetherWestern orEastern.4

Thetimeofquantumphysics’developmentwasconducivetotheconstruction

of a religious science. Albert Einstein (1879–1955) observed a larger intellectual

movementwhenhereferredtothereligiouscharactercreditedtophysicsintermsof

theculturalzeitgeistandthe“rampantgrowth”of“themysticaltrendofourtime.”5

TheoreticalphysicistMaxPlanck(1858–1947)similarlynotedtheriseofsuchviews:

[W]emight naturally assume that one of the achievements of sciencewouldhavebeen torestrictbelief inmiracle.But itdoesnot seemso.The tendency tobelieve in thepowerofmysteriousagenciesisanoutstandingcharacteristicofourownday.6

Thissciencealsocametobeconstructedashavingareligiouscharacterpartlydueto

thefactthatitemergedduringthereligionofsciencereformationfromthe1860sto

1940s.Aswesaw,theinclusivityconstructwasalsodevelopinginforcebytheturn

ofthetwentiethcentury,whichiswhenquantumphysicswasbeingestablished.As

exploredinChapterSix,inclusivityisaboutthenon-oppositionofdifferences,which

naturally lends itself to the construction of similarities.With an understanding of

religionandscienceasnon-oppositional,discourseon likening the two flourished.

ThiswasnotlimitedtothescientificityofBuddhism,butalsoincludedthelikeningof

Hinduism to science, of Eastern religious practices like meditation and yoga to

science, and of a generalized ‘religion’ to science. Aswe saw in the previous two

chapters, these movements took place in a larger context of discontent with the

mutualexclusivityandidentityconstructs.Thereweredemandsforthereconciliation

ofreligionandscienceonmanyfronts,aswellasasociallongingtoestablishcommon

groundforfeelingandintellect.AsstatedinChapterSeven,theanswerformanywas

3QuotedinMarin(2009),818.Emphasisoriginal.4QuotedinZyga(2009).5QuotedinMarin(2009),812.6QuotedinMarin(2009),816.

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either a scientific religion—as in the case of the scientificity of Buddhism—or a

religiousscience.Formany,quantumphysicsfitthelatterbill.

Still, thereweredeepdivisionsabouthowtoreconcile religionandscience

that often led the scientific community, among others, to formulate scientific

practices, goals, and beliefs in terms of some generalized religious culture, like

‘spiritualism’ and ‘mysticism.’7 Constructing a universal religion allowed,

conceptuallyspeaking,thelikeningofsciencetoreligionacrosstheboard,without

beingcaughtuponthedetailsofdifferingdogmas.AsDavidMcMahannoted,“these

universalistarticulationsofmysticismandspirituality[…]stemfromthesamedesire

[…]toestablishuniversaltruthbydirectencounter,therebyestablishingalanguage

oftruththattranscendsthepluralandparochialtruthclaimsofthereligions.”8This

universalization is also effective because both of the terms ‘spirituality’ and

‘mysticism’havealsobeentypicallyusedtorefertoageneralizedconceptof‘religious

experience,’whichisconsideredseparatefromspecifictenetsofbelief(seeChapter

Four). For instance, the scholar of religion Rudolf Otto (1869–1937) described

“spiritualexperience”ashaving“anultimateinwardhiddensimilarityofthehuman

spirit,andjustifiesusinspeakingofauniformnatureofmysticism.”9Asinthecaseof

Otto,mysticism,spirituality,andreligionareoftenconflatedinthisdiscourse,withno

cleardelineationbetweenthemfromacademictopopularliterature.10Focusingona

generalizedexperienceanddeemphasizingthevarietyamongthevariousreligions

makesthe ‘religion’ofmysticismandspiritualityparticularly inclusive,whether in

relationtootherreligionsorotherknowledgesystems,likescience.11

7Gilbert(1997),274;andSharf(2000),267.8McMahan(2008),206.9Otto(1932),v.Radhakrishnan(1940),viii–ix,58,and60–61alsoexhibitedsimilarconceptualization.SeealsoRestivo(1983),55–56;Routh(1937),360–363;andGallagher(1970).10 Sharf (2000), 268. Some examples—specifically in the context of likening physics to religion—include,Capra(2000[1975]),19;Josephson(1987),15and18;andGoswami(2000),xii–xiii.11AswesawinChapterFour,thenotionofreligionasasocialunifiernecessitatedtheidentificationofreligionwiththedomainofsubjectivityinordertoavoidtheproblemofdifferingdogmas.Thisalsoputreligionwithintheframeworkofscience,asasymbolofsociety.Inthecaseofscientification,thisledtothereductionofreligiontosocialandpsychological factors.However, the formulationof theessenceofreligionintermsofexperiencealsolentitselftothelikeningofreligionandscience,as“thenotionofreligiousexperienceprovidednewgroundsuponwhichtodefendreligionagainstsecularandscientificcritique.”Sharf(2000),271.Sinceoneofthemaincritiquesofreligioninconversationwithsciencewasinstitutionalizeddogma,theemphasisonexperienceandfeelingresolvedtheissue.

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Manydistinguishedprofessionalsandscientistshavearguedforthefunctional

vitality of mysticism in comprehending the world. For example, philosopher of

science Job Kozhamthadam stated, “A healthy partnership between science and

mysticism is the best course of action for any serious, in-depth apprehension of

reality.”12Similarly,historianandphilosopherofreligionRichardH.Jonesarguedthat

alonemysticismandsciencearelame,buttogether“givecognitiveinsightsintothe

nature of reality.” Reductionism is avoided and differences are treated as

complementarybecause“Bothenterprisesareacceptedasseparateandnecessary

forafullerunderstandingofreality.”13Asdiscussedintheprevioustwochapters,this

isaconceptualconsequenceoftheinterplaybetweeninclusivityandreligion-science

likeningbecausesimilaritiesarenotidentitiesandthusdifferentiationismaintained.

AccordingtothepopularastrophysicistCarlSagan(1934–1996),“Scienceisnotonly

compatiblewithspirituality;itisaprofoundsourceofspirituality.[…]Thenotionthat

scienceandspiritualityaresomehowmutuallyexclusivedoesadisservicetoboth.”14

Thesetypesofresolutionsforreligionandscience,drawingupontheinclusivityand

representationconstructs, found fertileground in thescienceofquantumphysics.

This field proved to be one of themost successful venues for likening science to

religion,presentfromthebirthofquantumtheorytotoday.15Forexample,physicist

Lawrence Beynam argued that with the discovery of quantum physics “we have

stumbled upon a comprehensive model for mystical experiences, which has the

additional advantage of deriving from the forefront of contemporary physics.”16

“[T]he new physics is offering us a scientific basis for religion,” another author

remarked,reflectingawidediscursiveandintellectualtrendthathasbeengoingon

fornearlyacentury.17

12QuotedinDas(2011),102.13Jones(2008),211and213–214.14QuotedinNanda(2012).15 While physics is most typically aligned with Eastern religious traditions, including Buddhism,Hinduism,andDaoism,foradiscussionrelativetootherreligioustraditions(primarilyChristianity)seePolkinghorne(2007b).16QuotedinWilber(1982),157.17Talbot(1980),161.

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This relationalization is what I refer to as the ‘religiosity of science,’ the

placementofscienceintoareligiousframeworkinanon-reductivewayasthesecond

manifestationofthe‘representationconstruct.’Asinthepreviouscasestudy,again

inclusivitystructuresthetermsofengagement,meaningthe‘religion’thatscienceis

likened to is understood as ‘not excluding science’—as I hypothesized as a

consequence of the relational structure of discursive change. This case study on

quantumphysicsexhibitssignifiersofinclusivereligion;inparticular,the‘religion’is

mostoften‘mysticism’or‘spirituality.’Thisbecamesucharegularoccurrenceasto

demand a neologism: ‘quantummysticism.’ The quantummysticalworldview has

also been referred to as ‘parallelism,’ indicating the tendency to draw parallels

betweenphysics and religion, oftenwith a strong emphasis onEastern thought.18

Predictably,consideringthisdiscourseoriginatedwiththescientificcommunity,this

likeningwasspecificallynon-reductive.Ifitwerenot,itwouldinvalidatetheirown

scientificobservationsas‘notscience.’Butthisnon-reductionisalsoduetothefact

that likening religion and science when departing from an inclusive perspective

meansthereisnomutuallyexclusiverelationthatdemandsafinalinterpretationof

religion or science when comparing the two. Not only have many non-reductive

parallelsbeendrawnbetweenquantumphysicsandreligion,butmoreoverquantum

theorywasformulatedinthescientificcommunityaccordingto(variouslylabeled)

‘religious,’ ‘spiritual,’ and ‘mystical’ musings to a significant degree. As such, the

presenceofdiscoursesofreligionareubiquitousinthehistoryofquantumphysics

andopenforanalysis.

As expected, to make ‘religion-like’ reflects what ‘religion’ means as per

inclusivity,thoughmostofthesignifiersof‘religion’arethosehistoricallyassignedto

thetermasperexclusivity,suchas‘immaterialism’and‘subjectivity.’Thesignifiers

of ‘science’however, changeddrastically in this context, a situation that isunique

comparedtoallothercasestudiesdiscussed.Eveninthecaseofthereligionizationof

science when science took on many of the signifiers of religion, science still

18E.g.,Restivo(1983);Scerri(1989),onEasternthoughtesp.688;Marin(2009);Crease(1993),133;andCrease&Mann(1990),302–303.

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maintainedmostofitsmain(historicallyandrelationallyspeaking)signifiersasper

exclusivity. So, for example ‘materialism,’ a recurring and central signifier, was

retained. Though likened to ‘dogma’ in a reductive way, the signifier endured

nonetheless.Hereitdoesnotandneitherdomostofthemainsignifiersofscience.

This novelty is exactlywhy the religiosity of sciencewas so successful. Themain

signifiersofquantumphysicsaretheexactoppositeofthoseof‘science’priortothe

emergenceofthisfieldofstudy.

Before the advent of quantum physics, the predominant understanding of

‘science’ was ‘science’ as per mutual exclusivity, specifically signified by

localizationism,determinism,materialism,andstrictobjectivityamongothers that

we have also already encountered in other chapters. All of these notions were

contrastedtoquantumphysics.Thiscreatedasituationinwhichthenew‘science’

meanttheoppositeoftheold.JustasBuddhismwascontrastedtoexclusivereligion,

quantum physics was constructed in contrast to exclusive science, or more

specificallytoclassical,Newtonianphysics,whichcarriedallthepertinentsignifiers.

Indeed“classical”refersto“beforequantummechanics,”whilequantumphysics is

calledthe ‘newphysics.’19Thetwowererelationallydefined in“contradistinction”

and this “self-discovery” was “a fundamentally religious-anthropomorphic

expression.” The break with classical physics corresponded with a bridge with

Eastern religious philosophies and mysticism. Indeed, in the relationalization of

classicalandquantumphysics,being‘notclassical’wasunderstoodinphilosophical

andreligiousterms,reflectingthedictatesoftherelationalizationof‘notscience’as

‘religion.’AsEgilAspremnoted,“thephilosophicalandsometimesdirectlyreligious

implicationsoftheir[certainquantumphysicists]discoverieswerepittedagainsta

caricaturedpictureof‘classical’physics.”20That‘caricature’wasexclusivescience.

Despitethefactthatquantumphysicswasconceptualizedindirectcontrastto

pre-established understanding of ‘science,’ the epithet of ‘science’ remains. In the

other case studies, the discursive changes were usually accompanied by the

19Weinberg(1992),66;andAsprem(2014),104–105.20Asprem(2014),105,142,147–148,and278.

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transformation of signifiers of ‘religion,’ fluctuating between supernaturalism and

naturalismandsuperstitionandrationality,forinstance.Inthiscasestudy,something

verydifferentoccurred,makingquantumphysicsparticularlysuitedforexemplifying

thereligiosityofscience.

2 Historyof‘Religion’inQuantumPhysics

Quantumtheorydevelopedinthefirstdecadesofthetwentiethcenturyinresponse

to some increasingly persistent problems unresolved by classical physics.21 As a

solutiontosomeoftheseproblems,Planck—whoendedupreceivingtheNobelPrize

forhiswork—suggestedthatenergyexistsasdiscreteunits,or‘quanta,’ratherthan

continuousonesas in theclassicalview.22NielsBohr(1885–1962),anotherNobel

Laureateinphysics,appliedsimilarprinciplestootherproblemsofclassicalphysics

andputforthhishypothesisthatwhenanelectronmovesfromonediscreteorbitto

another,itdoesnotpassthespaceinbetween—ratheritinstantaneouslydisappears

andreappears.23Thisdiscontinuousmovementisreferredtoas‘jumpingorbit’oras

a ‘quantum leap.’ Quantum leaps violate the classical mechanical view that all

particlesmustfollowcontinuoustrajectoriesthroughspace,whichhadallowedfor

clear,deterministicoutcomesthatcouldbeaccuratelypredicted.Thesearchforan

alternativetoclassicalphysicswason.

Two theories of quantum phenomena had emerged by 1926: Werner

Heisenberg’s(1901–1976)matrixmechanicsandErwinSchrödinger’s(1887–1961)

wavemechanics.MaxBorn(1882–1970)andPaulDirac(1902–1984)foundthatthe

twotheoriesexpressedthesamegeneralprinciplesandJohnvonNeumann(1903–

1957) mathematically demonstrated that the two theories are experimentally

equivalent.Furthermore,boththeoriesgiverisetothe‘uncertaintyprinciple.’24The

21Polkinghorne(2002),6–8;Dickson(2003),670–671;andBaggott(2004),9–12.22Polkinghorne(2002),6–8;Dickson(2003),671;andBaggott(2004),15–18.23 Bohr’s ideas of discontinuitywere influenced by hismentor and friend, theDanish philosopherHaraldHøffding,whichmayaccountforsomeofhis‘mystical’leanings.OnthesocialandphilosophicalsourcesofBohr’squantumtheory,seeFeuer(1974),109–157.24Dickson(2003),671–672.

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uncertaintyprinciplestatesthatitisnotpossibletosimultaneouslyandaccurately

measure both position and momentum, or other ‘canonical conjugate quantities’

(observables that exclude observation of its pair), something that “the classical

physicist would regard as half-knowledge.”25 Uncertainty, also referred to as

‘indeterminacy,’isthenotionthatquantumeventsarenotcauseddeterministically

asintheclassicalview,butratherprobabilistically.26

In1964,JohnBell(1928–1990)foundthatnomatterwhatinterpretationof

quantumphysicsisadopteditmustaccountfornonlocality.27‘Nonlocality’istheterm

applied to the experimentally confirmed principle that pairs of particles are

correlatedwithoutanycommoncause.28Putdifferently,whilethepairsofparticles

actinconcert,acausecannotbeidentifiedthatiscommontoboth.Eventhoughthere

is no physical exchange of cause and effect and no local contact (hence the

terminology), the stateof oneparticle instantaneously affects the stateof itspair.

Again,theclassicalviewfailshere.

As the field developed, it became clear that reality at the quantum level

displayeddiscontinuity,indeterminism,andnonlocality,aswellassuperposition,and

stronglysuggestsaroleforsubjectivityandimmaterialism(thelatterthreediscussed

below).Noneofthiswaspermittedintheclassicalworldview,whichwaspartand

parcel to religion-science differentiation to beginwith. As such, the contrastwith

classicalphysicsmadequantumphysicsreligion-likeintermsof itssignifiers.This

wasnotlostonthefoundersofthefieldandquantumphysicswasregularlylikened

toreligioninthecommunityandbeyond.

25Polkinghorne(2002),33.SeealsoBaggott(2004),36–39.26 ‘Uncertainty’and ‘indeterminacy’areoftenused interchangeably in therelevant literature.Somedifferentiatebetweenthetwo,suggestingtheformerreferstotheabsenceofthesubjectiveknowledgeoftheprecisevaluesoftheobservables,whilethelatterreferstotheobjectiveabsenceoftheprecisevalues of the observables. Jammer (1974), 61. See also ibid., 79–84, which also includes severalrelevantreferences;andHilgevoord(2015).27Bell(1964).SeealsoSeager(2002),230.28Onexperimentaldata,see,e.g.,Hensenetal(2015).

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2.1 Nonlocalityas‘Religious’In order to produce nonlocal correlations, the pair must be in a state of

‘entanglement,’ as stated in Bell’s theorem,which Einstein famously described as

“spookyactionatadistance.”29Thisisbecause“Quantumentitiesthathaveinteracted

with each other remain mutually entangled, however far they may eventually

separatespatially.”30Thefailureoflocalityandcausalityinentanglementhasbeen

interpreted as indicative of an ‘interconnectedness,’ ‘non-separability,’ and “deep-

seatedrelationalitypresentinthefundamentalstructureofthephysicalworld.”31As

sociologist Sal Restivo analyzed it, “The gist of all this from the physical side is a

convictionamongphysiciststhattheyarebeingpressedtowardnewwaysofthinking

about systems of ‘many interconnected components.’”32 This notion of

interconnectednessisrootedinthetheoreticalphysicistDavidBohm’s(1917–1992)

and others’ observations that quantum theory may require that the universe be

treatedas “a single, indivisibleunit,” anewperspective that involvesa “relational

conceptionof‘state’inquantumtheory”asopposedtotheclassicalviewof‘wholes

andparts.’33

As physicist Taner Edis noted, “An omnipresent ‘force’ responsible for

instantaneous effects could well lead to a universe of occult correspondences.”34

Indeed,ithas.Entanglementisfrequentlyinterpretedintermsofarediscoveryofthe

“wholistic” worldview in mysticism.35 For example, speaking of “theological

transcendence,” non-locality has been said to provide a “physical way […] of

acknowledging the ‘unity the totality possesses.’”36 As one member of the

Fundamental Fysiks Group interpreted it in 1976, “Bell’s theorem gives precise

physicalcontenttothemysticmotto,‘weareallone.’”37

29QuotedinConner(2006),262.30Polkinghorne(2002),80.31Scerri(1989),690.Seealsod’Espagnat(1979);Polkinghorne(2002),90on‘holism’;andDickson(2003),673–675.32Restivo(1983),31.33FirstquoteBohm(1951),140;secondquoteRestivo(1983),31.Seealsoibid.,117.34Edis(2002),101.35Restivo(1983),116.Restivodistinguishedbetween‘wholism’asasystemofpartsand‘holism’astheviewof“wholesaswholes.”36Conner(2006),267.37QuotedinKaiser(2011),xxiv.

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Sometimesthisinterconnectednessisinterpretedintermsofspecificreligious

tenets. For instance, entanglement has been described as the quantum physics

versionoftheBuddhistnotionofdependentorigination,as:

[T]hestateofaparticularquantumparticlecannotbeexpressedbecauseitisdependentonthequantumsystemasawhole,muchlikeNagarjuna’sphenomenawhichcannothavetheirowninherentessencesbecausetheirexistenceisdependentontheconditionswhichbroughtthemforth.38

DrawingconnectionswithEasternthoughtonceagain,oneencyclopediaarticleon

religion and science claimed, “The idea that everything in the universe is

fundamentally interconnected in some subtle and all-embracing way is a view

implicitinancientHinduscienceandisfoundnowinquantumphysics.”39Otherstake

quantumphysicsasageneralbaselineforreligiousunderstandingsoftheworld.For

example, popular author Lynne McTaggart stated, “I think now our current

understandingofquantumphysicsisthisunderstandingofcompleteunityandsothat

wehavetoderiveourspiritualityfromasenseofunity.”40

Such views are not limited to so-called ‘fringe’ groups. Bohm’s views have

certainly been interpreted as having mystical implications. Though he had

reservations about the terminology, hebelieved thatmysticismandphysics could

learn fromoneanother,possiblyproducing “‘higher’ thought” since the twousea

“commonlanguage”anda“commonsetofbasicconcepts.”41Someof thereligious

ideas that thescience is likened tooriginated inBohm’s longdiscussionswith the

IndiansageJidduKrishnamurti(1895–1986),withwhomhecoauthoredacoupleof

books.42BohmhasalsohadexchangeswiththeDalaiLamaregardingthenatureof

reality.43Andthislikeningofentanglementandinterconnectednesswasoftenseen

“asamovementinthedirectionofmysticalconceptionsofreality.”44

38Oberhaus(2015).SeealsoAnon.(2015a).39Raman(2007),187.SeealsoDeloria(2007),77.40QuotedinArntz,Chasse,&Vicente(2005),201.41QuotedinWilber(1982),190and213.Seealsoibid.,188–189,194,198–200,andpassimin187–214;Polkinghorne(2002),80;Restivo(1983),31–33,117and121–125;andWeber(1986),23–49.42Weber(1986),24;andRestivo(1983),124.SeealsoKrishnamurti&Bohm(1985);Krishnamurti&Bohm(1986);andArntz,Chasse,&Vicente(2005),60.43Weber(1986),231–244.44Restivo(1983),33.

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Not only is interconnectedness associated with religion via general

metaphysicalconsiderations,itisalsosuggestedtobethemechanismbywhichpsi

phenomena and Jungian ‘synchronicity’might occur—the latter term referring to

acausal,meaningfulcoincidences.45Duetotheimplicationsofquantumphysics,Bell

himself expressed open-mindedness toward parapsychology, psi phenomena, and

mysticalinterpretationsofquantumphysics.46TheoreticalphysicistPascualJordan

(1902–1980),whoalsocontributedtothedevelopmentsofquantumphysicsandwas

a collaborator of vonNeumann’s, even dedicated a book to the topic of quantum

physicsandparapsychology,concludingquantumtheorycouldaccountfortelepathy

andclairvoyance.47TheoreticalphysicistandNobellaureateWolfgangPauli(1900–

1958), another founder, also delved into the intersection of quantumphysics and

parapsychology.48 Bohm, too, contributed to laboratory investigations of psi

phenomena,discussingtheresultsinthetopscientificjournalNature.49

The question has repeatedly come up, “Was action at a distance really so

different from clairvoyance, psychokinesis, or the Eastern mystics’ emphasis on

holism?” Further demonstrating the mainstream level of this discourse, such

inquirieshaveevenoccupiedtheCentralIntelligenceAgencyoftheUnitedStatesand

the military and defense laboratories in America and Soviet Russia.50 From the

founders, to academics, to popular authors, to governmental agencies, nonlocality

and entanglement have been interpreted, to a significant degree, as religiously

significantwithoutreducingthesciencetoreligion.

45Radin(2006);vonLucado&Romer(2007);Kaiser(2011),65–95;Peat(1987);Asprem(2014),144–146and371;andKoestler(1972),94–101.Othershavesuggestedthatquantumphysicscanaccountfor parapsychological phenomena in otherways aswell. See, e.g., Koestler (1972), 70–81; LeShan(1974),82–95;Toben(1975),63–84and151–157;andBeynam(1977).46Kaiser(2011),167–168.47DiscussedinKaiser(2011),68;andAsprem(2014),140–141and144.SeealsoJordan(1955).48Asprem(2014),146–147;andKoestler(1972),90–91.49DiscussedinKaiser(2011),72.ForthearticleinNature,seeHastedetal(1975).SeealsoHastedetal(2016).50Kaiser(2011),xxiv,65,and90.SeealsoKoestler(1972),16–18.

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2.2 Indeterminismas‘Religious’The failure of the causal worldview at the quantum level and the rise of

indeterminism resulted in a widespread “revolt against determinism,” as this

worldview is “in no way operative in the practice of scientists,” according to

philosopher JuliusWeinberg (1908–1971).51Though this statement isnotentirely

accurateinregardtothemacrolevelofclassicalphysics,therehasbeenwidespread

acceptanceofindeterminismatthemicrolevelinthescientificcommunity.52Andthis

legitimatedarenewedandseriousconsiderationofreligious ideasof freewilland

divine action, which is typically thought to require some indeterminism in the

workingsofnature.53Thisisbecausedeterminism,whichaccompaniesanygeneral

law of causation described by classical physics, has often been constructed as

mutually exclusive with all types of agency, from the individual to the divine.54

Thoughtherewereexceptionstothisview,manyupheldthispositionofexclusivity,

includingEinstein.55

Inshort,theintellectualrejectionoffreewillcouldbefoundinthe“apparently

uninterrupted causal chain” of physical processes, as Bohr noted.56 And yet, as

Heisenberg pointed out, “the incorrectness of the law of causality is a definitely

established consequence of quantum mechanics itself.”57 “Causality is no longer

applicable, it is true.”58 Causal laws are “meaningless” in the context of quantum

physics, Bohm added.59 As such, the indeterministic quantumworld is thought to

possibly suggest or, for some, confirm free will.60 As precise predictability for a

51FirstquoteFeuer(1974),177–199.Seealsoibid.,158.SecondquoteWeinberg(1973–1974),278.52Someeminentphysicistshavealsoarguedforindeterminismatthemacrolevel,demonstratedbythethoughtexperimentknownasSchrödinger’scat.Thereisexperimentalevidencesupportingthisviewwithrelativelylarge(comparedtothescalesofquantumphysics)objects.SeeWangetal(2016).However,furtherdiscussionisoutsidethescopeofthischapter.53E.g.,Weinberg(1992),77.Otherexampleswillbeprovidedinthefollowingdiscussion.54Bochner(1973–1974),495–496.55 Jaeger (2010),94–96.Onhow freewill is thought tobenegatedbydeterminism, seeMurphy&Brown(2007),267–272andpassim;andStapp(2011),154.SeealsoStanley(2015),194–241onthisissueincombinationwithadiscussioninthehistoricalcontextofreligionandscience.56QuotedinFeuer(1974),137.57QuotedinJammer(1974),75.58London&Bauer(1983),220.Emphasisoriginal.59Bohm(1951),625.60Foradiscussiononlikeningreligionandscienceinthecontextoffreewillandindeterminism,seeDavies(1983),135–143.

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certainparticle is limited, freewill issuggestedto function in these indeterminate

workings of nature, as discussed by scholar of religion Christopher Mooney and

theoreticalbiologistStuartA.Kauffman,forexample.61Bohrobserved,“Wearesofar

removedfromacausaldescriptionthatanatominastationarystatemayingeneral

evenbesaidtopossessafreechoicebetweenvariouspossibletransitionstoother

stationarystates.”62Thisisalsopartlyduetotheroleoftheobserverinthetransition

from an indeterminate to determinate state, as will be discussed further below.

However,hereitisimportanttonotethatforBohr,“theimpossibilityinintrospection

of sharplydistinguishingbetweensubjectandobjectas isessential to the idealof

causalitywould seem toprovide thenaturalplay for the feelingof freewill.”63As

physicist Henry P. Stapp interpreted it, “mental intent” is incorporated into the

quantumlawsthemselves.64SociologistLewisS.Feuer(1912–2002)aptlynoted,this

“seemed to dissolve the tormenting anxiety of determinism counterposed to free

will,”or,inotherwords,itdissolvedtherelationalopposition,asdeterminismatthe

macroleveldoesnotinterferewithindeterminismatthemicrolevel.65

Asstated,classicalphysicswasalsothoughttonegateapurposefulGod.66By

the late nineteenth century, even religious people increasingly understood “God’s

powersaslockedintonature’slaws.EvenwithGod’shelpmencouldnotleapover

natureorculturetochallengethe‘realities’oflifeasitis.”67Withthedevelopmentof

indeterminism,thispremisetoowasthrownintoquestion.Outsideoftheirscientific

researchpapers,Einstein,Bohr,andmanyothersdiscussedherespokeandwrote

61Harris(2002),225;andKauffman(2008),198–200and227–229.Thereisalsoasignificantbodyofliteratureonthistopicinphilosophyjournalsaswell.See,e.g.,Margenau(1967).62QuotedinFeuer(1974),137.Cf.Bohr(1998),88:“Iamfarfromsharing,however,thewidespreadopinion that the recent development in the field of atomic physics could help us in deciding suchquestionsas ‘mechanismorvitalism’and ‘freewillorcausalnecessity’ in favorofoneor theotheralternative. Just the fact that the paradoxes of atomic physics could be solved not by a one-sidedattitude towards the old problem of ‘determinism or indeterminism,’ but only by examining thepossibilitiesofobservationanddefinition,shouldratherstimulateustoarenewedexaminationofthepositioninthisrespectinthebiologicalandpsychologicalproblemsatissue.”63Bohr(1998),90.64Stapp(2011),155.65Feuer(1974),143–144.66Onhowdivineactionisthoughttobenegatedbydeterminism,see,e.g.,Alston(1999),187–188;andStenger(2009),209and214.67McLoughlin(1978),156.

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freelyandprolificallyaboutGod,design,andcreationandtherelevancyofquantum

physics to these views. As physicist, theologian, and Anglican priest John

Polkinghornenoted:

Thewidespreadpresenceofintrinsicunpredictabilities[…]meantthattheprocessesoftheworld were not as tame and controllable as classical Newtonian thinking had seemed tosuggest.[…]ithasbecomeclearthatthe‘defeaters’(thosewhoclaimedthatsciencehadruledout divine providence) have been defeated. Tomake the assertion that divine actionwasexcludedbyphysicswas, in fact, tomakeametaphysicalclaimopentorationalrefutation.Givenphilosophicalperplexitiesaboutthenatureofcausality,generalargumentcouldhardlybeexpectedto leadtoamorespecificresult.Afterall,science iscurrentlyunabletogiveadetailedaccountofhowitispossibleforhumanbeingstoactasintentionalagents.Yetifwecaninfluencethefuture inthisway, itwouldbehighlysurprising ifGodweretobetotallybereftofasimilarcapacity.68

Othershave likened indeterminism todivine action aswell, such asphysicist and

priestWilliamPollard(1911–1989),whomaintainedthatuncertaintyallowsGodto

interactwith theworld throughnaturalmeans,without contravening anynatural

laws.69SciencewriterJimBaggottalsonotedthatsincetheemergenceofquantum

theory, many have argued the explanatory need for a “substance with infinite

attributes.”Hethenlikenedthescientificideaofthisinfinitesubstancetoreligious

understandings,interpretedassomethingakinto‘God.’Baggottfurtherputforththe

possible interpretation of indeterminacy as “God’s guiding hand” and wondered

whetherwehave“finallyrunupagainstnature’sgrandarchitect.”70

Still,justbecauseindeterminismislikenedtofreewillanddivineactiondoes

notmeanthatthescienceisthoughttobejustreligionorthereligionjustscience.

Thereisroomforbothbecausedeterminismandagencyarenotmutuallyexclusive—

determinismresidesatthemacrolevel,whileagency—oratleastindeterminism—

canbefoundatthemicrolevel.Classicalphysicsremainsviable,withtheendresult

being, formany, that suchviewsdonot excludeotherwaysof thinking about the

world,makingthestancenon-reductive.

68Polkinghorne(2007a),14–15.69Harris(2002),225.Harriscited“WillardPollard,”butthisisatypo.OtherexamplesincludeAlston(1999), 188–189;Ellis (1995), 389; andRussell (1998), 203. See also Stenger (2009), 213–220, inwhichfurtherexamplesareprovided.70Baggott(2004),256–257and260.

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2.3 Superpositionas‘Religious’Indeterminacy has further implications in quantum physics that distance it from

exclusivescience.Inthecaseofcanonicalconjugatequantities,ifoneofthepairof

observablesisobservedandshowntohaveadefinitevalue,thentheotheroneofthe

pairthatisexcludedfromobservationwillbeina‘superposition’ofmanystates.In

thisstate,aparticleishere,there,andatthesametimemanyotherplaces,withabit

hereandbitthereaswell.Intheclassicalview,thissuperpositionisimpossible,as

theconditionofbeinghereisseenasmutuallyexclusivewithbeingsomewhereelse,

whichisintuitivebasedonourdailyexperiencesofwhichthingshaveadefiniteplace

andposition.Incontrast,superpositiondemonstratesthatthelawsofnatureproduce

statisticalprobabilities—notactualities—foragiveneventtooccur.Theprobabilistic

natureofquantumphysicswasanobservationthatwonBorntheNoblePrizein1954,

despitethefactthatmanyscientistswereresistanttothisnotionthatisincompatible

withtheworldviewofclassicalphysics.71

A physically observable manifestation of the superposition principle is

demonstrated by the double-slit experiment, as developed by polymath Thomas

Young (1773–1829). The double-slit experiment shows that a particle acts as a

particleorawavedependingonwhetherornot theobserverattempts to identify

wheretheparticleis.Iftheparticle’spositionistracked,itwillpassthroughonlyone

slot,AorB,andcreateapatternasaparticlewould.Iftheobserverdoesnottryto

identifywhethertheparticletravelsthroughslotAorB,theendpatternproducedby

thetravelingelectronindicatestheparticlehaspassedthroughbothslitsAandB,as

ifitwereawave(insuperposition).Ifyoulookforaparticle,yougetaparticle;ifyou

lookforawave,yougetawave,whichformanysuggestsaroleforconsciousness—

or at least the observer—in physical outcomes.While the double-slit experiment

originatedasa thoughtexperiment, ithasnowbeenexperimentallydemonstrated

thatboththewaveandparticlemanifestationsofaparticleare‘physicallyreal.’72

71Polkinghorne(2002),25.SeealsoJammer(1974),39;andCrease&Mann(1990),303.72 Jammer (1974), 44. See also Jönsson (1974);Merli,Missiroli, & Pozzi (1976); Rosa (2012); andRodgers(2002),thelatterofwhichreferstoseveralimportantexperiments.Theimplicationsaresoprofound andmoving that the 2002 readers ofPhysicsWorld magazine voted Young’s double-slit

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Onewaythishasbeeninterpretedisthatthewaveisthephysicalrealityofthe

potentialofaparticletobeinvariousdeterminatestates.Heisenberg,forexample,

conceived of these probabilitywaves as physically real in away he compared to

Aristotle’snotionofpotentia.Heisenbergelaborated:

Theconceptthateventsarenotdeterminedinaperemptorymanner,butthatthepossibilityor‘tendency’foraneventtotakeplacehasakindofreality—acertainintermediatelayerofreality,halfwaybetweenthemassiverealityofmatterandtheintellectualrealityoftheideaortheimage[…]Inmodernquantumtheory[…]itisformulatedquantitativelyasprobabilityandsubjecttomathematicallyexpressiblelawsofnature.73

Here we see the idea of the wave as expressing immaterial (‘intermediate,’

‘intellectual,’etc.)potentialityasphysicallyreal.Thisiswhywave-particlenatureis

oftendescribedasa‘duality,’aswaveandparticlephysicsgivewhatappeartobetwo

mutuallyexclusiveaccountsofphysicalreality.74

Observationsresultingindefiniteoutcomes(likethelocationoftheparticle)

are accompanied by moments of instantaneous and discontinuous change from

superpositiontospecificposition.Thisimmediatechangeisreferredtoas‘collapse,’

countertotheclassicalnotionofagradual,continuousflowofphysicalsystems.This

discontinuity has also been systematically related to religious thought.75 Bohr’s

notionofdiscontinuityhasbeensuggestedtobederivedfromSørenKierkegaard’s

(1813–1855) conception of discontinuous leaps between three stages of life: the

aesthetic,theethical,andthereligious.

[Kierkegaard’s idea]becamepartofNielsBohr’sdeepestemotional-intellectualstandpoint.Theatominits‘stationarystate’waslaterlikeoneofKierkegaard’sstadiaofexistence.Andtheleapoftheelectronsfromoneorbittoanotherwasliketheabrupt,inexplicabletransitionsoftheself.

experimentas “themostbeautiful experiment” inphysicsof all time.Crease (2002). SeealsoRosa(2012),178.73QuotedinJammer(1974),44.74Jammer(1974),67–69.This,accordingtoBohr,wasthefoundationoftheentiretheoryofquantumphysics;whereasHeisenbergwasforlongconvincedthat“theparticlepictureandthewavepicturearemerelytwodifferentaspectsofoneandthesamephysicalreality.”HeisenbergeventuallycametocedeBohr’sargument,asindeterminacyisalwaysbasedintheEinstein-deBroglieequations,whichdemonstrateaconnectionbetweenwaveandparticledescriptions,ofwhichwave-particledualityisimplicit.75 For a brief history of discontinuity in religion and philosophy of religion in the context ofdiscontinuityinscienceandthegeneralhistoryofthought,seeBochner(1973–1974),495–497.

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Kierkegaard’sinfluencewassodeepastoaffectthedescriptionofthequantumleap

asamatterof “freechoice”akin to thehumansubject choosing to leap tovarious

stages of life, as alluded to earlier. According to Feuer, “Bohr sought to confirma

subatomicworldisomorphicwithhisemotionalandphilosophicalself-definitionin

theeverydayworld.”Afurtherconsiderationtothispointhastodowiththeleapfrom

the stage of the ethical to the religious, which, according to Kierkegaard, is

renunciation. Notably, besides the term ‘complementarity’ (discussed below), no

conceptualwordappearsmorefrequentlyinBohr’swritingsthan‘renunciation.’He

used this term as a call for leaving behind the classical worldview for the

advancement of science, as well as for human freedom. As such “renunciation as

regards the causal space-time coordination of atomic processes”—as stated by

Bohr—was,Feuerconcluded,“nopurelylogicaladventureinanalternativemodeof

analysis; itwasafulfillmentofBohr’semotionalcravings,”aswellasreligiousand

existentiallongingsitseems.76

Superposition profoundly affected the scientific worldview. Mathematician

SalomonBochnersummarized:

Inthenineteenthcenturytherewerefirmdistinctionsandseparationsbetweenmaterialismand idealism, reality and imagination, phenomena and objects, experience and theory,experiments and explanations. But in the twentieth century, the spreading principles ofduality forparticle and field, for corpuscleandwave, and theprogressiveandunrelentingmathematizationofalloftheoreticalphysics,havebeendissolvingthescientificfoundationsforsuchdistinctionsandseparations.77

This transformation in the scientific outlook and the dual nature of the quantum

world,where light andmatter can act asbothwaves andparticles, hasplayed an

importantroleinthereligiosityofscienceconstruct.Thisisthoughttobesuggestive

of a duality of nature as a whole, likened to Daoist, Buddhist, and (the various

religions labeled as) ‘Hindu’ metaphysics.78 The dual nature of entities features

prominentlyinmanybranchesofEasternmetaphysics,typicallywithonebipartition

representingconventionalrealityandtheotherrepresentingultimatereality,suchas

76Feuer(1974),135–137and139–141.Seeesp.ibid.,140forseveralimportantquotesinwhichBohrusedthisterm‘renunciation’inthecontextofquantumphysics.77Bochner(1973–1974),497.78Dickson(2003),675–676.

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in themiddlewayofMadhyamaka teachingsofBuddhism,whichhas indeedbeen

likened to wave-particle duality by the Dalai Lama and those in the physics

community.79 The idea is that howwe experience things and the way things are

independent of that experience are very different in nature—though each are

typicallyregardedas‘real.’Indeed,subatomicscaleentitiesactinonewaywhennot

experiencedandanotherwhenexperienced(i.e.,observed).

However, this seeming paradox of dual natures has been explained by the

findingsofquantumfieldtheory.Afieldisspreadoutinspaceandtime,givingita

wavelike nature, but properties such as energy and momentum exhibit discrete,

countablequanta,likewhatisexpectedfromaparticle.Thus,wehaveanidentifiable

state inwhichboth thewaveandparticlepropertiescanbeclearlyaccounted for,

making dual quantum phenomenamonistic.80 And yet, thismonism too has been

interpretedassimilartoreligiousphilosophies,eveninfluencingtheformationofthe

veryidea.Pauli,amongthefirsttodevelopacomprehensiveaccountofquantumfield

theory, and theoretical physicist Hermann Klaus Hugo Weyl (1885–1955) both

conceivedof‘field’intermsofamysticalunionbetweenmindandphysics(though

eachwith their distinct ideas of what this ‘mysticism’ entailed).81 Pauli proposed

“physicsandpsychecouldbeseenascomplementaryaspectsofthesamereality”and

argued for the need to bring together “rational understanding” with “the mystic

experienceofone-ness.”82Thus,whetherintermsofdualismormonism,quantum

physicswasconceptualizedintermsofanon-reductivelikeningtoreligion.

2.4 Consciousnessas‘Religious’Thisunionofphysicalrealityandtheworldof themindisduetothefact thatthe

double-slitexperiment,thedelayedchoiceexperimentandreplicationstudies,along

withtheAspectexperiment,amongothers,suggestsaccordingtotheresearchersthat

truly reality does not exist in a determinate state until it is observed, that “the

79Oberhaus(2015).OtheraspectsofBuddhismhavebeencomparedtothenewphysicsaswell.Seealso Anon. (2015b); Zajonc & Houshmand (2004);Wallace (2007b); Mansfield (2008); and Capra(2000[1975]),passim.80Polkinghorne(2002),73–75.81Zyga(2009);andMarin(2009),810.82FirstquotePruett(2013b);andlattertwoquotedinKaiser(2011),68.

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behaviouroftheatomcanindeedbeinducedbyourchoiceofmeasurement.”83This

wasacommonpropositionamongthefoundersofquantumphysicsandwasusedto

addressmanyparadoxesinquantumtheory.

Theuseof themind to solve issues inquantumphysicswasnot limited to

theory, however. Von Neumann is often credited with applying consciousness to

quantumequations,specifically inordertosolvethemeasurementproblem.84The

‘measurement’ of the measurement problem refers to the act of observing an

objectivestate.The ‘problem’ is that theobjectivestatedoesnotcomeaboutuntil

observed, accompanied by collapse, leading to the question of how the act of

measuringaffectsthephysicalstateandwhat,ifany,istheroleoftheobserverand/or

consciousness in determining physical reality. As physicist and philosopher Max

Jammer(1915–2010)noted,“Thusmeasurement,thescientist’sultimateappealto

nature, becomes in quantum mechanics the most problematic and controversial

notionbecauseofitskeyposition.”85Itisaproblembecauseclassicalphysicsdoes

notadmit subjectivecauses.Yet, vonNeumann,amongmanyothers, argued, “it is

inherently entirely correct that the measurement or the related process of the

subjectiveperceptionisanewentityrelativetothephysicalenvironmentandisnot

reducibletothelatter.”86

Astheobjectivestatedoesnotcomeaboutuntilobserved,collapsecametobe

associatedwiththeimmaterialconsciousnessanditsroleasobserver—thoughitwas

hotlydebated in thephysicscommunity.Certainly,noteveryoneagreedabout the

religious ormystical implications either, thoughmanydid see challenges to strict

materialism. This led to theories of observer-induced collapse, also known as the

consciousness hypothesis or the idealist interpretation. Many have interpreted

quantum physics to implicate “the [classical] idea of an observableworld, totally

83Manningetal(2015).SeealsoWheeler(1978);Aspect,Grangier,&Roger(1982);Aspect,Dalibard,&Roger(1982);Jacquesetal(2007);Baggott(2004),182–184;andKaiser(2011),178.84 Zyga (2009); Goswami (1997), 527; Faye (2015); andMcFarlane (2000), 575–576. It has beensuggested,however,thatvonNeumanndeliberatelyusedambiguousterminologyinthediscussionsathand,sothatheleftopenthepossibilitythathecouldbeinterpretedfromeithersideofthedebate.Zyga(2009).85Jammer(1974),7.86vonNeumann(1955),418.

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independentoftheobserver,wasavacuousidea.”87AccordingtophysicistAndrew

Truscott, “It proves thatmeasurement is everything.At thequantum level, reality

doesnotexistifyouarenotlookingatit.”88

The consciousness interpretation of quantum physics constitutes themost

common definition of ‘quantum mysticism,’ with or without further ‘religious’

content.89Putdifferently,itisthesignifierof‘consciousness’alonethatisthoughtto

validatealikeningto ‘religion,’aparallelismthathasbeenusedbybothadvocates

andcritics.Consciousnessisassociatedwithreligiousworldviewsduetothemutual

exclusivityconstruct.Recallthediscussiononmutualexclusivityandscientification,

inwhichIdiscusssomeofthemainsignifiersofreligion,includingsubjectivityand

the realmof themindmoregenerally.Forexample, asonecommentatornoted in

1874—in the context of John Tyndall’s (1820–1893) recently delivered Belfast

Address—what“markstheconflictofScienceandreligion,”isthatreligionisreduced

toscientificunderstandings,as“thedistinctionbetweenmindandmatter,ormatter

and spirit, is denied, and with it the personal immortality of man, the personal

dominionoftheuniverse,andallthattheseinvolve.”90Furthermore,consciousness

wastherealmofwhichreligionretreatedtowhenthenotionof‘objectivereligion’

fellintodisfavor,asdiscussedinChapterFour.Subjectivereligionwasemphasized

overexternalizedversionsandeventuallysubjectivestatesofreligiousexperiences

came to be equated to religion. As the internal became the realm of religion,

consciousnesstoowasassociatedwithreligion.Thus,theconsciousnesshypothesis

opensthedoortotherepresentationconstructbecauseitspecificallyalignsquantum

physicswithamajorsignifierofreligion.

Though the connection between the consciousness hypothesis and religion

wasalsoconstructedbycriticsinmovestowardthereductionofthishypothesisto

religious argument, the founders of quantum theory themselves saw a

correspondence between quantum physics and specific tenets of religious

87London&Bauer(1983),220.88Anon.(2015c).89Marin(2009),807and809;Edis(2002),97;Duran(2007),71;andStenger(2003),319–320.90Anon.(1874).

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philosophy, but in a specifically positive andnon-reductiveway. Formany at this

time,itcamedowntothefactthat“thepossibleroleofconsciousnesswasactually

introducedbysomeofthearchitectsofthetheory,andconsciousnesshappenstobe

thebasisoftheEasternmysticaltraditions.”91

ThoughitiswidelybelievedthatNobelPrizewinnerEugeneWigner(1902–

1995)wasthefirsttoformulatetheconsciousnesshypothesisin1961,othershave

agreedwithWignerthatBohrandhiscolleagueswerethefirsttogiveconsciousness

aroleinquantumphysics.92Infact,manyofWigner’spredecessorswerepreoccupied

with thequestionofconsciousness.Thesetofapproachesvariouslyrelated to the

CopenhageninterpretationdevelopedbyBohr,Heisenberg,andPauli,suggeststhat

prior tomeasurement of a property, themeasured cannot be said to possess any

definitevalueofthatproperty,thusgivingtheobserveracentralrole.93

Aboveall,itseemedtoBohrthatthedecisionsoftheperson,thesubject,whetherasobserverorparticipant,orindeedasboth,partiallydeterminedthecharacterofhisexternalreality,thestructureof theobject. […]Bohrcame to theviewthatscientific truthandphysical realitythemselves rested on subjective decisions, that the complementary physical realitiescorrespondedtocomplementarysubjectivedecisions,andthat, therefore,nocleardividinglineexistedbetweensubjectandobject.94

When Bohr began to introduce the observer to the workings of nature,

Einsteinchargedhimwithbringing ‘mysticism’ intophysics,withseveralagreeing

that this is “incompatible with science.”95 Einstein later called the consciousness

hypothesis the “Bohr-Heisenberg tranquilizing philosophy” or, for short, the

‘mystical’ interpretation,questioning if itwas indeeda“religion.”96Bohrspentthe

rest of his life refuting this accusation, which he claimed stemmed from

misunderstandinghisviews,thoughattimeshedid“seehimselfasakindofprophet

ofanemergingreligionofcomplementarity,”asscholarofreligionEgilAspremput

it.97

91Scerri(1989),689.92Marin(2009),807and811.93Seager(2002),229;Baggott(2004),104–105;Crease&Mann(1990),304–306;Stapp(2011),11–15;andWeinberg(1992),77.94Feuer(1974),142–143.95Marin(2009),808;andBohr(1998),83.Seealsoibid.,84–91.96Herbert(1985),22;Lindley(2007),163;andMarin(2009),812–813.97Asprem(2014),144.SeealsoMarin(2009),808.

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The ‘complementarity’ interpretationwas ametaphysical duality thatBohr

applied to the further development of the Copenhagen interpretation, which also

boosted parallelism.98 In 1926, Bohr put forth the notion that quantum physics

demonstrates a complementary nature of ultimate reality, which he saw in

indeterminacy, wave-particle duality, in the role of both subject and object in

quantum measurement, and in mind-body relations. Bohr argued that the dual

aspectsdidnotcontradictoneanother,butrathercomplementedeachotherandthus

mustbetakenequallyseriously—aswouldbeexpectedinareligiosityofscience.99

Becausethewave-particledualitycorrespondstodifferentexperimentalsettingsthat

couldnotbeusedsimultaneouslyandbecauseexperimentalsettingsaredetermined

bytheobserver,Bohrconcludedthe‘individuality’ofasingleatomicprocesswasa

fiction.Andtheincompatibleinformationproducedfromthesesettingsindicatesthat

the settings cannot be connected to one another in the usual way of causality,

requiringareplacementofthenotionofcausalitywiththemoregeneralcategoryof

complementarity.100 “For Bohr the renunciation of strict causality, despite the

hardshipitentailed,wastheessentialsteptothehighertruthofcomplementarity.”101

The complementarity that Bohr saw in the workings of quantum physics

broughttolighttheproblemofbinarythinkinginconceptualization,whichhesawas

animpedimenttounderstanding.Forexample,Bohrarguedfor“theimpossibilityof

astrictseparationofphenomenaandmeansofobservation,andthegenerallimitsof

man’s capacity to create concepts, which have their roots in our differentiation

betweensubjectandobject.”102Thus,hisnotionofcomplementaritywasmorethana

98Baggott(2004),106–109and181.SeealsoBohr(1934);andBohr(1998).99 Polkinghorne (2002), 36. Bohr never clearly defined ‘complementarity.’ The most preciseexplanationof theprinciplebyBohr is the following: “[Quantumphysics] forcesus toadoptanewmodeofdescriptiondesignatedascomplementarityinthesensethatanygivenapplicationofclassicalconceptsprecludesthesimultaneoususeoftheotherclassicalconceptswhichinadifferentconnectionareequallynecessaryfortheelucidationofphenomena.”QuotedinJammer(1974),89–90.SeealsoRestivo(1983),28;andFeuer(1974),141–146.OnBohr’sapplicationofcomplementaritytomind-bodyrelations,withadiscussion,seeBedau(1974),210–213.100Bohr(1998),84–85.101Feuer(1974),141.102QuotedinFeuer(1974),143.However,atanothertime,Bohrtreatedquantumphysicsasamodelonlyandsuggesteditdidnotnecessarilytellusthenatureofreality,aquestionbeyondthescopeofphysicistsinhisview.Polkinghorne(2002),83.

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quantum theory, but was thought to be applicable to the issue of relational

cognizance. In this way, his complementarity might be thought of as akin to the

inclusivityconstruct—notnecessarily in termsof thereligion-sciencerelation,but

moregenerallyintermsoftreatingconceptsasdifferentiated,butnon-oppositional.

Afterall,hechoseayin-yangsymbol—representativeofaonenessinduality—forhis

coat of armswhen hewas knighted in 1947,with the inscription “Contraria sunt

complementa”(‘oppositesarecomplementary’).103

Bohrappliedthenotionofcomplementaritybeyondphysicstobiologyandthe

studyofculture.OthershaveappliedBohr’sideatomanyfieldsaswellandthishas

even been extended to an analysis of the religion-science relationship.104 This

analysis reflects the representation construct, as religion and science are seen as

“equallynecessary,”butatthesametime“neithercansubstitutefororsupplantthe

other,”making it specifically inclusiveandnon-reductive.Bothare “necessaryand

true even though they appear to be in conflictwith each other,” allowing for the

maintenanceofdichotomies.TherelationbetweenBohr’scomplementarityandthat

ofreligionandscienceismoredirectthanmightappearintheaboveparallelsas“the

belief[…]quantummechanicsrequirescomplementarityhasencouragedthebelief

in the complementarity of science and religion,” thus bringing together the

reconceptualization of the terms ‘religion’ and ‘science’ in the context of the

religiosityofscienceandbroadernotionsaboutthereligion-sciencerelation.105

ThoughclearlyBohrdidnotfavorthe‘mysticism’label,atleastpublicallyor

incertainpublics,hedidsympathizewithsomeideasinEasternphilosophy.106He

admired themessagesof theBuddhaand theDaoist sageLaozias “parallel to the

lesson of atomic theory” and thought of them as relevant to the philosophical

implicationsofphysics.At the same time,Bohrargued that the “recognitionof an

103Crease(1993),133;Restivo(1983),8;Arntz,Chasse,&Vicente(2005),60;andFeuer(1974),145.Asamatterofinterest,Ialsofoundtheyin-yangsymbolatthebeginningofeachchapterinWheeler&Zurek (1983), aworkonquantum theory.Note this isnotapopular publication, but an esteemeduniversitypresspublication,whichisindicativeofthediscursiveimpact.104Jammer(1974),87–89;Restivo(1983),28;andFeuer(1974),119–130.105 Bedau (1974), 205–207. For another example of religion-science complementarity inspired byBohr’sviews,specificallyonparadoxesintheology,seeAustin(1967).106OnBohr’sselectivityofaudiencesforspeakingofmysticalinterpretations,seeAsprem(2014),261.

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analogy”toEasternreligion“doesinnowayimplyacceptanceinatomicphysicsof

anymysticismforeigntothetruespiritofscience.”Still,itisperhapsnotacoincidence

thattheline“anymysticismforeigntothetruespiritofscience”isambiguousenough

toallowformysticismthatisnotexternaltoscienceandBohrdidindeedarguethat

Easternthoughtcouldbehelpful“toclarifyconceptualdifficulties.”Hefurthermore

specificallydescribed the complementarity viewpoint as “Far fromcontaining any

mysticism contrary to the true spirit of science,” suggesting that this previously

employedphrasewasintendedtosuggestthatmysticismcouldbepartofscience.107

Infurthersupportofthisreading,forexample,Bohr—inthecontextofaccusationsof

mysticism—argued: “[M]y attitude is in no way in conflict with our common

endeavors to arrive at as great a unification of knowledge as possible by the

combatingofprejudicesineveryfieldofresearch.”Whatthoseprejudicesareexactly

isnotstated,howeverastheconcludingwordsofaspeechthatwasintroducedas

addressingthemysticismcontroversy,theimplicationisthattheprejudiceistoward

musings polemically labeled ‘mystical.’ This is further substantiated by his claim

elsewherethat“inscienceanyarbitraryrestrictionimpliesthedangerofprejudices

andthatouronlywayofavoidingtheextremesofmaterialismandmysticismisthe

neverendingendeavortobalanceanalysisandsynthesis.”108

Though Bohr did indeed support the consciousness hypothesis, at least

intermittently, that is not to say that he conclusively supported a mystical

interpretationofquantumphysics.109ItmayhavebeenPauliwhoinitiatedthismove

of bringing mysticism into physics. Pauli and Heisenberg had entertained such

notions since the beginning of their joint work. As Heisenberg explained it, “a

complete separation of the observer from the phenomenon to be observed in no

longer possible” and argued that this “emphasizes a subjective element in the

descriptionofatomicevents.”110Hethenwentontoask,“How,then,doesitstand

107Bohr(1958),19–20and27.Seealsoibid.,91.108Bohr(1998),91and93.109Marin(2009),811.110FirstquoteHeisenberg(1974),227;secondquotedinBaggott(2004),107.Duetothebreakdownofthesubject-objectdistinction,Heisenbergobserved,“Eveninscience,theobjectofresearchisnolongernatureitself,butman’sinvestigationofnature,”i.e.,howthesubjectinfluencesreality.QuotedinVerhoeven(2001),86.

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withtheoppositionbetweenscientificandreligioustruth?”Heisenbergfollowedthis

upwithadiscussionofhowtypicallyscienceisassignedtherealmoftheobjective

and the subject has been “the guiding image of Asianmysticism.”With quantum

physics,“Ourthinkingmovessomewhereinthemiddle.”Heconcludedbyarguingfor

“therightbalancebetweenthetwokindsoftruths.”111Infact,Heisenbergthoughtof

hiscontactwithIndianphilosophyasexceedinglyhelpfulinthedevelopmentofhis

workasaphysicistandarguedthatEasternphilosophymaymakeiteasierforoneto

adapttotheimplicationsofquantumtheory.112Theseemingdualityofsubjectand

objectareoneinthesame,asLondonandBauerargued:

Quantum physics has brought an essential advance to science, the finding that in everyexperimentormeasurementthereinescapablyentersthedualitybetweensubjectandobject,theactionandreactionofobserverandsystemobserved, theobserverand themeasuringapparatusbeingviewableasoneentity.113

Pauliunambiguouslydescribedhisperspectiveonthisas“lucidPlatonicmysticism,”

a“synthesisembracingbothrationalunderstandingandthemysticalexperienceof

unity,”withconsciousnessasthecontactpointofsynthesis.114Hespokeofvarious

syntheses, demonstratinghisnon-reduction, including thosebetween religionand

rationality,psychologyandphilosophy,andscienceandmysticism,inaclearembrace

of the representation construct.115 Pauli was heavily influenced by philosopher

Arthur Schopenhauer’s (1788–1860) support of Eastern mysticism, as in his The

World as Will and Representation (1818). Pauli adapted Schopenhauer’s ideas to

suggestthatquantumphysicscreatesasituationthattranscendsnaturalscienceand

mayhavea“religiousfunction.”116Heisveryexplicitabouthisaims:toreconcilethe

scientific“‘ideaofmaterialobjectsthatarecompletelyindependentofthemannerin

whichweobserve”with“AsiaticphilosophyandEasternreligions[inwhich]wefind

the complementary idea of a pure subject of knowledge.”117 And he argued, “I do

111Heisenberg(1974),227–229.112Wilber(1982),218;Heisenberg(1958),202;andCapra(1988),42–43.113London&Bauer(1983).114 Quoted in Marin (2009), 810. Pauli also collaborated with Carl Jung on the relations betweenphysics and psychology, regarding the relevance of consciousness, as did Jordan. See Pauli& Jung(1955);vonStuckrad(2014),52–53;andAsprem(2014),144–146.115Zyga(2009).116Marin(2009),810.117QuotedinMarin(2009),812.

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believethatthenaturalscienceswilloutofthemselvesbringforthacounterpolein

their adherents, which connects to the oldmystic elements.”118 This suggests his

notionofreligion-sciencerelationalityisoneofwhichreligionandscienceconstitute

two ends of a pole, but are nonetheless connected. It is a view of difference and

similarity,anon-reductivelikening,areligiosityofscience.

Schrödinger made a quite similar conclusion to that of Pauli. While

SchrödingerhadalsoadmiredSchopenhauerandEasternmysticismasayoungman,

andevengavelecturesontheUpanishads,herenouncedtheseviewsinhismid-life,

butacceptedmysticismoncemorewhenhisscientificobservationsledhimtosuch

conclusions.119 He then dedicated himself to understanding Easternmysticism.120

Schrödingerargued,“theworldofsciencehasbecomesohorriblyobjectiveastoleave

no room for the mind” and suggested not to “lose the logical precision that our

scientificthoughthasachieved,”whichcouldbemaintainedwiththeconsciousness

hypothesis.Schrödingerstated:

ToWesternthoughtthisdoctrine[…]isunpalatable,[…]fantastic,unscientific.Well,soitisbecauseourscience—Greekscience—isbasedonobjectivation,wherebyithascutitselfofffromanadequateunderstandingoftheSubjectofCognizance,ofthemind.ButIdobelievethatthisispreciselythepointwhereourpresentwayofthinkingdoesneedtobeamended,perhapsbyabitofbloodtransfusionfromEasternthought.

Inthisway,hecenteredtheissueontheunderstandingof‘science,’whichexcluded

themindandthesubjective.Herecognized,“Butsomeofyou,Iamsure,willcallthis

mysticism.”121 He saw the division as one between religion and science that put

unnecessary and unacceptable constraints on the scientific enterprise. Thus,

Schrödingerfoundfaultin“ourscience,”suggestingthesolutiontotheproblemisto

amendthemeaningof‘science.’Ifthisislabeled‘mysticism,’sobeit,heseemstohave

suggested. He rejected the dichotomy and embraced what likening may come

between religion and science, even suggesting a universal consciousness as an

answertothediscrepancybetweenmechanisticdeterminismandfreewill.122

118Marin(2009),810.119 Arntz, Chasse, & Vicente (2005), 60; Wilber (2001), 92–95; and Marin (2009), 819. See alsoSchrödinger(1951);Schrödinger(1964a);andSchrödinger(1964b),18–22.120Kaiser(2011),67.121QuotedinMarin(2009),819–820.122Asprem(2014),148.

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As mentioned, the consciousness hypothesis has also been supported by

Wigner, among others.123 Wigner argued that “consciousness evidently plays an

indispensable role,” as “it was not possible to formulate the laws of quantum

mechanics in a fully consistent way without reference to the consciousness” and

concluded materialism of the classical worldview is incompatible with quantum

physics.124Quantumphysicschallengestheclassicalviewthatonlytheobjectiveis

real—as this science has shown that the act of knowing necessitates an entity

conform to its nature, while the nature of the entity is revealed through our

knowledgeof it.125AsWignernoted, “physicistshave found it impossible togivea

satisfactory description of atomic phenomena without reference to the

consciousness.”126Bellmadethestrongerclaimthatthemind“hasacentralplacein

the ultimate nature of reality,” though he elsewhere emphasized that he saw “no

evidence”linkingtheobservertothesuccessofquantumphysics(whileatthesame

timestatinghewas“inclinedtohope”forthe“centralroleforconsciousmind”).127

Somehaveinterpretedquantumphysicsassuggestingthatrealityisobserver-

induced,not justobserver-influenced.Theacceptanceof the roleof the subject in

quantumphysics“wasonlyashortstep[…]totheconclusionthattheexistenceofthe

worlddependsonconsciousness—that,indeed,realityisourcreation.”128Yet,there

isnocommonfactorofthatroleamongthedifferenttheories.Itisclearthatwecan

speak of a ‘observer-influenced reality,’ or in theoretical physicist JohnWheeler’s

(1911–2008)termsa“participatoryuniverse,”butmuchmoredifficulttodefendan

‘observer-created reality.’129 However, influence is enough for many to liken the

sciencetoreligiousnotions.AsphilosopherandhistorianofscienceRobertP.Crease

noted:

123Bohmalso foundaplace forconsciousness inhismetaphysics.Bohm(1983).Cf.Bohm,Hiley,&Kaloyerou(1987).124Wigner(1995),34and252;andWigner(1967),172.Seealsoibid.,186;Wigner(1995),68;Marin(2009),807;andKaiser(2011),73–74.125Polkinghorne(2002),85and87.126Wigner(1995),34.127FirstquotedinConner(2006),284;latterquotesinBell(2004[1987]),170.128Crease&Mann(1990),306.129See,e.g.,Patton&Wheeler(1975),562.SeealsoPolkinghorne(2002),91;Dickson(2003),674;Grim(1990),267;Zukav(1979),53–54;Herbert(1985),17–18;andKaiser(2011),75–76.

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Iftheoryaimstopicturethebasicthingsoftheworld,andifmodernphysicsshowsthatsuchacompletepictureisnotpossibleandthateverypictureisfiniteandonlyemergeswhenweengagewiththeworld,thentheworldasitemergesinourtheoriesisanillusion,andrealityisourowncreation.Putthisway,thediscoveriesofquantummechanicsdoindeedsuggestsomesimilaritiestoEasternmysticism,atleastastheyarepopularlyandcursorilyunderstoodintheWest.130

Astrophysicist Arthur Eddington (1882–1944)—whowasmost famous for

confirming Einstein’s theory of relativity—supported notions of the primacy of

consciousness. Eddington reflected, “the stuff of the world is mind-stuff.”131

Eddingtonspokeofhowscientificadvancesathistimechangedourviewsofnature,

summarizedasthe“frankrealizationthatphysicalscienceisconcernedwithaworld

ofshadowsisoneofthemostsignificantofrecentadvances.”132Eddington’spopular

bookTheNatureofthePhysicalWorld(1929)broughtthemysticismcontroversyto

the public and these ideas began to spread across the world.133 Mystical

interpretations gained momentum with the ‘scientific mysticism’ he famously

defended, inwhich amystical religionwouldnot simply be based on science, but

employ science for self-reflection, bringing religion and science together without

conflatingthetwo.134PhysicistJamesJeans(1877–1946)echoedthesesentimentsin

hisclaimthatfromamathematicalphysicsperspective“theuniversebeginstolook

more like a great thought than like a great machine,” while he too argued for

correspondencesbetweenscienceandreligion.135

Heisenberg claimed that a synthesis between religion and rationality,

specificallydrawinguponEasternmysticism,constitutedtheconsensusamongthe

founders of quantum mechanics and J. Robert Oppenheimer (1904–1967)

concurred.136 Though the majority of the founders did support or were open to

parallelism, at the 1927 Solvay Congress, the consciousness hypothesiswas hotly

debated.Marinclaimed,“TheirdebateattheSolvayCongressovertheintroduction

130Crease(1993),140.AsimilarpositionwasputforthinBaggott(2004),257.131QuotedinAsprem(2014),266.132QuotedinPruett(2013b).133Zyga(2009).134Marin(2009),808;andAsprem(2014),269.Seealsoibid.,265–272and277–278.PrimarymaterialavailableinWilber(2001),209–223.135QuotedinAsprem(2014),275.Seealsoibid.(2014),272–278.Thatsaid,thetwomen’sviewsonthepositionofconsciousnessdiffered.136Marin(2009),811;andCrease(1993),134.

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ofconsciousnessinquantumtheorywasonebetweenwhattheycalled‘scientific’and

‘mystical’ viewpoints,” demonstrating the widespread understanding of

consciousness in terms of religious discourse from supporters to critics.137 The

mysticismcontroversycontinuedtoescalateandby1936,thetimeoftheCopenhagen

Congress for theUnityofScience, ithad found itsway into internationalmedia.138

Einstein,aswellasPlanck,publicallyaddressedthecontroversyforoveradecade,

which is indicative of its impact. Einstein and Planck’s solution to the ‘spooky’

workings of quantum mechanics was to conclude that the quantum mechanical

descriptionofrealitymustbeincomplete,as“Noreasonabledefinitionofrealitycould

beexpectedtopermitthis.”139Marinaptlyremarkedthatthisstatement“discloses

muchofthecontroversyhauntingthephysicscommunityatthattime.”140Quantum

physicssimplydidnotfitintotheclassicalworldviewand,assuch,itwasunderstood

asindicativeofreligion.

Einstein stated, regarding the mystical view, “No physicist believes that.

Otherwisehewouldn’tbeaphysicist.”Thisseemingunequivocalstatementmustbe

takenwithagrainofsalthowever,ashegoesontosay,“Neitherdo[Eddingtonand

Jeans].[…]Thesemenaregenuinescientistsandtheirliteraryformulationsmustnot

betakenasexpressiveoftheirscientificconvictions.”141Einsteinwasquiteawarethat

bothEddingtonandJeansassignedaroletoconsciousnessinphysics,inadditionto

their mystical leanings.142 Though the men were also clear on a line they drew

betweenscience,ontheonehand,andphilosophyandmysticism,ontheother,they

137Marin(2009),811.Marinadded“notonebetweenscientificandreligiousattitudes.”Idonotthinkhe is suggesting that there was no connection to religion here, but rather thatworldviews wereemphasizedoverattitudes.Seealsoibid.,807–808.138Marin(2009),807–808.139Einstein,Podolsky,&Rosen(1935),780.EventhoughEinsteinfoughtagainsttheincorporationofmysticismintophysics,hestillfoundaplaceforbothreligionandscienceinhisworldview.Heevencompared the feeling of scientific work to religious worship, suggesting that the representationrelational construction was applied. Holton (1973), 378. Furthermore, he promoted a religion ofscience.Holton (2005),9–15.SeealsoEinstein (1949),27–28;Einstein (1950),26and29–30;andJaeger(2010),83–130.Einsteinalsobelievedthattheorderlinessandbeautyoftheworkingsoftheuniversewereperhapsindicativeofahigherintelligencethattookforminthe“harmonyofnaturallaws.”Edis(2002),103.SeealsoEinstein(1954),40;andJammer(1999).140Marin(2009),817.141QuotedinMarin(2009),815.142Wilber(2001),135–158and181–223.

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alsodidnotseethedistinctionasprecludingmutualenrichment.Infact,theyfound

thesetwopolestobequitesimilar,whilemaintainingdifferentiationasexpectedina

non-reductivestance.ForEddingtonandJeans,areligiosityofsciencewaskey—an

inclusiveviewthatdoesnotconflatethetwo.AndeventhoughPlanckalsoopposed

theintroductionofmysticism,hestillclaimedthat“weareatlibertytoconstructany

miraculousbackgroundthatwelikeinthemysteriousrealmofourinnerbeing,even

thoughwemaybeatthesametimethestrictestscientists.”Heconcluded,“Therecan

never be any real opposition between religion and science; for the one is the

complementoftheother.”143WiththetwomajorexceptionsofEinsteinandPlanck,

as theauthorand integral theoristKenWilbernoted, “thesepioneeringphysicists

believedthatbothscienceandreligion,physicsandspirituality,werenecessaryfora

completeandfullandintegralapproachtoreality,butneithercouldbereducedto,or

derivedfrom,theother.”144

While there are objective collapse theories that are observer independent,

manyfindthesetheoriestobetooadhoctobesatisfactory.145For instance,Stapp

claimed collapsemechanisms could “be viewed as adhocmutilations designed to

force ontology to kneel to prejudice.”146 These theoriesmay simply have been an

attempttoupholdpreconceivednotionsofwhat‘science’meant,specificallyinterms

ofmaterialismtotheexclusionofconsciousnessorsubjectivecausality.Assuch,these

theoriesmightalsobeinterpretedasaproductoftakingtheviewofreligion-science

mutualexclusivitytointerpretquantumphysics.147Thoughtherearealsoproblems

with the consciousness hypothesis, all interpretations of quantum theory must

143Planck(1959),118and121.ThoughPlanckalsoarguedthatreligionis“closedtoscience,”atthesametimehelikenedthetwobasedonethics,values,andcommonfoundations.Ibid.,121–122.SeealsoMarin(2009),816.144Wilber(2001).145Polkinghorne(2002),50;andDickson(2003),674.146QuotedinGhirardi(2015).147Thoughestablishingthisclaimisoutsidethepurviewofthischapter,Stapp’scommentscertainlyseemtosuggestthispossibility,asdoesthelargercontextofwhichthesetheoriesemerged—i.e.,inanattempttoexplainawaytheroleoftheobserver,eventhoughconsciousnesshypotheseshavebeenabletoreplicatetheprobabilitiesofquantumtheorywithalotofprecision.

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somehowaccountfortheobserver,accordingtovonNeumannandothers.148Andas

statedbyhistorianofscienceStephenBrush:

[N]oonehasyet formulatedaconsistentworldviewthat incorporatestheCI[Copenhageninterpretation]ofQM[quantummechanics]whileexcludingwhatmostscientistswouldcallpseudosciences—astrology, parapsychology, creationism, […] and thousands of other cultsanddoctrines.149

Thisisbecausefromahistorical,relationalperspective,consciousnesshadcometo

signifybothreligionandscience,creatingasituationinwhichthetwocannotexclude

oneanother,astheysharecommonconceptsthatcannotbereducedtooneorthe

otherframeworks.

Thefirstresponsestotheimplicationsofquantumphysicsaretypicallyincredulity

andawe.And,infact,thosetworesponsesneatlysumuptheattitudesthatshaped

earlyinterpretationsofquantumtheory.Schrödingerwas,attimes,intheincredulity

camp and stated that if he would have known that his work would lead to the

developmentofthis“damnquantumjumping”hewouldhavewishedtohavenever

gotten involvedwithquantum theory.150Butnot toworry, asBohr famously said,

“Anyonewhoisnotshockedbyquantumtheoryhasnotunderstoodit.”151Partofthe

reasonforthisisbecausequantumphysicsdirectlyopposestheoldscientificpicture

ofreality, including itscontrastwithreligion.Though ithasbeennearlyacentury

sincetheadventofquantumphysics,eveninourpresenttime,“Despitethephysicist’s

abilitytodothecalculations[ofquantummechanics],theystilldonotunderstandthe

theory.”152 This is also because of several serious interpretive issues that are still

unresolved, such as complications with the naturalistic paradigm for scientific

knowledge.

148Moreover,somearguethisrolefortheobserverisalsoaroleforconsciousness,thusconcludingthatallinterpretationsinvolvesomeformoftheconsciousnesshypothesis.Scerri(1989),689,whichalsoincludesseveralrelevantsources.149Brush(1988),409.150QuotedinPolkinghorne(2002),26.SeealsoJammer(1974),57.151QuotedinDavies(1983),100.152Polkinghorne(2002),40.

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3 ScientificKnowledgeas‘Religious’

We have already seen quantumphysics challenge locality, determinism, causality,

materialism, and objectivity. It was only a natural discursive development that

naturalismwouldbecalledintoquestionaswell,sincemanyoftheabovefactorshave

featuredassignifiersofthenaturalistworldview.AsdiscussedinChapterThreeand

ChapterFour,materialismandnaturalismareoftenconflatedinscientificdiscourse.

Andthechallengestomaterialismhereareoftenthoughtintermsofchallengesto

naturalistic paradigm. “Quantum physics brought on the dematerialization of

physicalmatter,” as philosopher JohannaSeibtput it.153Heisenberg observed that

physics “no longer allowsany reinterpretationor elaboration tomake it fit into a

naïvematerialisticconceptoftheuniverse.Foratomsarenolongermaterialbodies

in the proper sense of the word.”154 Scholar of religionWilliam Grassie similarly

argued,“Theconceptofmaterialismdeconstructeditselfwiththeadventofquantum

mechanics and particle physics.”155 As quantum physics signaled “the demise of

materialism,”thelikeningofsciencetoreligionandthesignifierof‘supernaturalism’

rose.156

Thisisbecausequantumphysicshasbeenformulatedasnegatingnaturalism,

inthatitshowsthefundamentalworkingsoftheuniversedonotfollowNewtonian

laws, aparadigm inwhichwecould thinkof theworld in termsof itsmechanical

processes.Forexample,Paulistated,“thestatement‘theparticleisthere’is[tobe]

regarded as a ‘creation’ outside the laws of nature.”157 In the context of this

discussion,BornandPauli,intheircorrespondenceswithEinstein,madeacommon

argument inthereligion-sciencedebatesthattorejectconsiderationofalternative

hypothesis reflects a “philosophical prejudice,” specifically against the apparent

“spooky”natureofquantummechanicsas“outsidenaturallaws.”158Inotherwords,

153Seibt(2015).154QuotedinConner(2006),272.155Grassie(2010),169.156Davies&Gribbin(1992),14.157QuotedinMarin(2009),819.158Marin(2009),813.

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beingoutsidetheframeworkofnaturalismwasnotasufficientreasonforrejecting

thescience.Indeed,itwasthescienceitselfthatwasleadingawayfromnaturalism,

fromthisperspective.

This has been constructed as a “‘supernatural’ interpretation,” which is

perfectlycomprehensibleintermsofarelationalview—ifitisnot‘natural,’thenitis

‘supernatural’ as per mutual exclusivity.159 (However, in contrast to mutually

exclusivenotionsthatcreatedthenatural-supernaturaldichotomy,naturalismisalso

typicallymaintainedatthelevelofmacroscopicphysicalevents,meaningopposition

transformsintocomplementarity.)ThejournalistandrecipientoftheSonningPrize

ArthurKoestler(1905–1983),forone,argued“theoreticalphysicshasbecomemore

andmore‘occult’,cheerfullybreakingpracticallyeverypreviouslysacrosanct‘lawof

nature’[…]leaningtowardssuch‘supernatural’concepts.”160Indeed,manyinterpret

quantumphysicsasexpressingasupernaturalnatureofreality.

Thisisfurthercomprehensibleinlightofhowcausalitywasunderstoodatthis

time—as“theideathatnaturalphenomenaobeyexactlaws,”asHeisenbergputit.161

Assuch,thechallengesinquantumphysicstocausality—whichwasoftentreatedas

equal to determinism—was a challenge to the naturalist paradigm.162 Indeed,

indeterminism has been thought to implicate supernaturalism. For example,

Eddingtonstated,“Insofarassupernaturalismisassociatedwiththedenialofstrict

causality[…]Icanonlyanswerthatthatiswhatthemodernscientificdevelopment

ofthequantumtheorybringsusto.”Eddingtonnotedthatsupernaturalism“inthe

eyes ofmany is the same thing as superstition,” but disassociates the two terms,

claiming that we are “no longer able to stigmatise certain views as unscientific

superstition.”ForEddington,theclassicalworldviewofcausalitywas“badscience,”

whichadmits“invisibleagents”orwhathepolemicallyreferstoas“demons”thathe

comparedto“savage”beliefs.163Suchamovedelegitimizesexclusivescience,while

aligningsupernaturalismandquantumphysics,whichinhisviewreflectedthedata

159Marin(2009),819.160Koestler(1972),11.161QuotedinAsprem(2014),130.Seealsoibid.,131.162Edis(2002),86.163Eddington(1928),309–310and347.Emphasisoriginal.

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better. Inasimilarvein, thephilosopherLudwigWittgenstein(1889–1951)stated

thatnotindeterminism,butrather“beliefinthecausalnexusissuperstition.”164Here,

weseethat‘superstition’—aconventionalsignifierof‘religion’—isassociatedwitha

conventionalsignifierofscience,withtheintentofdelegitimizingaspecifictenetof

science.Itisaneffectivedelegitimizationstrategyinthattheendresultisthe‘science’

beingcriticizedisdifferentiatedfromthenewscienceofquantumphysicsandplacing

supernaturalismasthe‘real’or‘good’science.‘Real’scienceisnotmutuallyexclusive

with signifiers of religion, thus allowing for the likening of quantum physics and

religion.

Theroleofconsciousnessisalsooftenthoughttosuggesttheinvalidityofa

reduciblynaturalisticmetaphysics.Jordanremarked,“Observationsnotonlydisturb

whathastobemeasured,theyproduceit[…]Wecompel[theelectron]toassumea

definite position […]We ourselves produce the results of measurements.”165 The

connectionwithsignifiersofreligionisnotimmediatelyapparentinthisstatement,

requiring some explanation. Around this time, Jordan was toying with ideas of

parapsychological phenomena and the original German his remarks appeared in

revealstherolethesemusingsplayedinhisunderstanding.AsMarinnoted,theverb

‘toproduce’(hervorrufen)“isthesameverbusedwhenaspiritualistgroupgathersto

summonorconjureadeadsoul,a‘spook’,ora‘phantom.’Jordanforatimesawsome

symmetry in both.”166 Similarly, London and Bauer claimed that the scientific

communitybecamea“spiritualisticsociety”exactlybecause“theobjectsofphysicsare

phantomsproducedbytheobserverhimself.”167

Eddington also likenedquantumphysics to supernaturalism relative to the

consciousness hypothesis. He observed that it is by the very association of

supernaturalismwith consciousness on the part of critics that supernaturalism is

introducedtophysics.

Isupposeouradversary[tomysticism]admitsconsciousnessasafactandheisawarethatbutforknowledgebyconsciousnessscientificinvestigationcouldnotbegin.Doesheregard

164QuotedinFeuer(1974),180.165QuotedinMarin(2009),818.166Marin(2009),818.167QuotedinMarin(2009),818.Emphasisoriginal.

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consciousnessassupernatural?Thenitishewhoisadmittingthesupernatural.OrdoesheregarditaspartofNature?Sodowe.

Eddingtoncommentsdemonstratethatconceptualizationisacentralissueathand.It

isexactlybecauseconsciousnessisalreadyassociatedwithreligiousideasthatleads

tothenotionthatthisistointroducesupernaturalismintoscience.Andsinceitisthe

scientific data that leads to the consciousness hypothesis, then there is “no clear

distinction between theNatural and the Supernatural,” as Eddington put it.168 He

regardedsupernaturalismaswithinNature,nomatterwhichperspectiveistaken—

whether because the adversary puts it there because of his own conceptual

constraints or because the supernatural has become part of natural scientific

observations.ThoughEddingtonemphasizednon-distinction,hedidnotconsiderthe

science to benothingmore than religion, as is clear fromhis implication that the

supernaturalworldview is part of ‘good’ science. The supernaturalism-naturalism

dichotomyistakenasnon-oppositionalandscientificknowledgeislikenedtoreligion

inanon-reductiveway.

Along the same lines, Grassie argued that the failure of the materialist

paradigm did not mean “that we are compelled to adopt some form of

supernaturalism,butthefundamentalnatureofnatureturnsouttobefantastically

super.” He characterized the ‘supernatural’ as ‘unnatural,’ “in order to stigmatize

it.”169ButthisdoesnotmeanhewhollydiscountedtheexistenceofGodormiracles,

asthesewouldfallunderthecategoryofthe‘fantasticallysupernaturalism.’Those

things that are typically called ‘supernatural,’ Grassie finds to be plausible and

probable and within the realm of scientific investigation. As the authors Alice

LawheadandStephenLawheadnoted:

Increasingly, mathematicians talk like mystics, and scientific journals read like holy writ.Physics is becoming indistinguishable frommetaphysics. Scientists trained in the rigorousscientificmethods,graduatesoftheschoolofnaturalism,havepushedthatnaturalismtoitsfurthest extreme—to the extent that the most unlikely people have becomesupernaturalists.170

168Eddington(1928),309and348.169Grassie(2010),169and200.170QuotedinEdis(2002),86.

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Justaswehaveseenelsewhereinthisbook,scientificassumptionscanshape

thecontentandpresentationofthefactsand,similarly,attitudestowardtheroleof

consciousness“shapedthewayphysicistsunderstoodquantummechanicsevenat

theleveloffundamentalequations.”171ThisincludestheexamplesofvonNeumann’s

equations and the formation of quantum field theory, discussed earlier. Even

Schrödinger’s cat, and the indeterminacy at themacro scale it demonstrates,was

inspiredbyEasternphilosophicalobservations.172ThereisalsotheexampleofBohm

who,respondingtotheconcernthatquantumphysicsdoesnotfollowtheworkings

of classical physics, rewrote the equations of quantummechanics tomore closely

resembleNewtonianequations.Therewasoneexception to theresemblancewith

classicalphysicshowever—anadditionalforcethatproducesquantumeffects.“The

additionalforce,however,wasunusual.Itdidnotfalloffwithdistance,anditwasnot

calculable fromanysourcesanalogous tochargesormasses.”173Bohm laternoted

that these properties reflect an “implicate order” of reality, a “mystical union”

accordingtosomeinterpretationssinceBohmsuggested“consciousnessandmatter

ingeneralarebasicallythesameorder.”174AccordingtoBohm,“Thatisexactlywhat

is implied by quantum mechanical field theory.” This is not peripheral, as

“conventional physicists” “have accepted it.”175 And Bohm did see consonance

between his views on wholeness and Eastern religious philosophies.176 The

interpretationofBohm’shiddenvariablepostulateisagoodexampleofthedepthof

influencemysticismhashadinquantumphysics,tothepointthatwecannotseparate

it from some mathematical equations.177 Scientific knowledge becomes non-

reductivelysimilartoreligiousknowledge,fromthisperspective.

Thoughsomehavedeclaredanendtothemysticismcontroversy,aswellas

the consciousness hypothesis, philosopher Daniel Athearn noted that those who

171Marin(2009),808.172Harrison(1979a),781.173Edis(2002),101.174Bohm(1983),208.Edis(2002),101,interpretedthisasa“mysticalunion.”SeealsoScerri(1989),690;Campbell(2007),310;andWeber(1986),23–49.175QuotedinWeber(1986),34.Emphasisoriginal.176Bohm(1983),19and23.177 Mystical understandings also influenced interpretation of Einstein’s field equations. See Marin(2009),812–814.

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supporttheconsciousnesshypothesisare“Farfrombeingisolatedandunbalanced

eccentrics” and “the quantum ontologists currently dominate philosophical

discussion in the field, and constitute a genuine speculative branch of quantum

theory.”178Furthermore,parallelismhasevenfeaturedasthebasisofphysicscourses

andtheCopenhageninterpretationhasbecomestandardinquantumphysics(indeed,

often referred to as the ‘standard interpretation of quantum physics’). This

interpretation is part of the broader consciousness hypothesis, which has the

strongest discursive connection with religious philosophies among the parallels

drawninquantumphysics.179Assuch,thistrendishardlyontheouts.Today,there

certainlycontinuestobemanyexamplesofphysicistswhoshowsupport,tovarious

degrees, for parallels with mysticism, as well as Eastern religion, and the

consciousnesshypothesisendures.180Thoughthepopularityofquantummysticism

haswaxedandwaned,theseideasneverreallywentaway.

Physicist Roger Penrose has been among those arguing for “some kind of

active role [inphysics] for consciousness, and indeedapowerfulone […].”181Asa

variant from thenotion that consciousness induces collapse,Penrose andmedical

doctorandconsciousnessresearcherStuartHameroff,suggestedthatconsciousness

is collapse, attributed to quantum computations occurring inmicrotubuleswithin

neurons.182 Hameroff argued that observer-induced collapse “puts consciousness

178Marin(2009),820;Overbye(2006);andAthearn(1994),40–41.179Herbert(1985),xiii;Scerri(1989),688;andCrease&Mann(1990),306.180Scerri (1989),688,whichcontainsseveralrelevantreferences.Forexample,research intowhatrole consciousness plays in the shaping of reality has been conducted at Princeton EngineeringAnomaliesResearchprogram,whichisnowincorporatedinthebroaderInternationalConsciousnessResearch Laboratories. The research emphasizes, in part, “spiritual implications.” PrincetonEngineeringAnomaliesResearch(2010).SeealsoInternationalConsciousnessResearchLaboratories(n.d.).Otherexamples included’Espagnat (1979),158;Lanza&Berman(2009);andStapp(2011).Ibid.,13:“We,andinparticularourmentalaspects,haveenteredintothestructureofbasicphysicaltheory.”Forasimilarposition,seePagels(1982),145.Goswami,astrongsupporterofwhathereferstoas ‘sciencewithin consciousness,’ reportedon the concurrentdevelopmentofhisversionof theconsciousness hypothesis by several others and with many supporters. Moser (2013). After oneconference,heandhislike-mindedcolleaguesevensignedajointcommuniquédeclaringtheneedforarecognitionthatconsciousnessisprimaryandthatthisperspectivemakessciencemoreeffective.Goswami(2000),157.SeealsoCenterforQuantumActivism(n.d.),s.v.“About.”181QuotedinPruett(2013b).SeethisargumentunfoldinPenrose(1989).182Hameroff(2005);andBaggott(2004),254–255.Fortheoriginalresearch,seeHameroff(1994);andPenrose (1994). For a rebuff, seeGrush&Churchland (1995).And for a reply, seePenrose&Hameroff(1995).

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outsidescience.”Incontrast,inthePenrose-Hameroffmodel,knownas‘orchestrated

objectivereduction’(OrchOR)“consciousnessIScollapse,aself-organizingprocess

ontheedgebetweenquantumandclassicalrealms.OrchORplacesconsciousnessin

science,andiscompletelyoppositetotheobservereffect.”183Here‘consciousness’is

specificallyconstructedas“inscience,”arelationalmovethatconfersitastatusthat

isbeingdeniedtoalternativeconsciousnesshypothesesbysomeinthecommunity.

WhilethePenrose-Hameroffmodelofconsciousnesshasgenerateda lotofdebate

andskepticism,themodelhascontinuedtoproducetestablepredictionsthathave

heldtrue.184Andevensomeskepticsofquantummysticismhavegrantedtheremay

besomevaluetothismodel,demonstratinghowtheconsciousnessinterpretationis

constructedintermsofscientificknowledgeevenwithinthediscoursethatrejects

religion-science likenings and rejects the consciousness hypothesis due to its

signification of religion.185 For example, Edis, who denied the mysticism-physics

connection, noted that indeedwork in the field “evenby very eminent physicists,

weremysticalintone”andrecognizedthe“ideaoftyingconsciousnesstoquantum

physics occasionally emerges as a legitimate proposal,” providing Penrose as an

example.186WhilePenroserejectedmysticism“initsnegationofscientificcriteria,”

Hameroffhasengaged in likening,evenreferringtohimselfasakintoa“quantum

Buddhist.”187Hameroffalsodrewacorrespondencebetween thechallenges to the

naturalistic paradigm and the incorporation of consciousness into science. He

suggested that the negation of physicalism in quantum physics opens up such

possibilities.188

Likeotherinterpretationsofquantumphysics,theconsciousnesshypothesis,

nomatterthevariant,facessomemajorissues.Onequestionthatarisesishowcan

collapsebe accounted forprior to the emergenceof consciousness, assuming that

183Hameroff(2012).Emphasisoriginal.184Baggott(2004),255.185 Shermer (2005) lumped this approach in with “quantum quackery.” Regarding a response toShermer’s critiques, see Hameroff (2005). Seife (2000) treated the consciousness hypothesis asperipheralinthescientificcommunity,butashavingattracteda“largenumberofmystics.”186Edis(2006),49and117.SeealsoEdis(2002),117.187FirstquotedinGreg(2005);secondinPenrose(1994),12.188Hameroff(1998a).

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consciousnessemergeswithbiologicalbeings?Somehavesuggestedpanpsychism,

pantheism,orpanentheismasthesolutiontosuchproblems.Hameroffcomparedhis

perspectiveofquantumconsciousnesstopanpsychisminascholarlypublication.189

ThephilosopherWilliamSeageralsosupportedsuchaviewofpanpsychism,which

hespecificallyidentifiedas“quantummysticism.”Seagerdescribedconsciousnessas

“simply unsuitable for a naturalizing explanation” and yet argued that quantum

physicshintsatthepossibilitythatthe“venerablebutratherimplausibledoctrineof

panpsychism” as the most likely explanatory framework. Thus, he suggested the

metaphysical frameworkmust be something other than naturalism. Seager stated

thatquantumtheory“insists”that“theelementalunitsofphysicalnature[…]actina

waythatisinexplicablefromapurelyphysicalstandpoint.”Thisistakenasevidence

that“theworld’sbehaviourdoesatleastleaveroomforanadditionalfundamental

feature [of reality] with its own distinctive role,” such as the primacy of

consciousness.Asanaddition,thisisnotreductiveaswasnaturalism,demandingthat

weexplainonethingintermsofsomeothernaturalthing.Instead,thereisroomfor

both,fromhisperspective.190

Seageralsoarguedforacorrespondencebetweennotionsofpanpsychismand

quantumcoherence,whichissupportedbyalargenumberofscientists,philosophers,

andotherauthorsfromhisperspective.Andyet,“theyfailtoseetherathernatural

connectionbetweenpanpsychismandtheirownviews,”hestated.191Historically,we

knowthishasnotalwaysbeenthecase.Eddington,forexample,similarlyreferredto

the idea of a unified consciousness as ‘pantheism.’192 He stated, “The idea of a

universal Mind or Logos would be, I think, a fairly plausible inference form the

present state of scientific theory; at least it is in harmony with it.”193 Pauli saw

indeterminism as reintroducing the animamundi (‘world soul’) and argued for a

189Hameroff(1998b).190SeeSeager(2002),216–252forhisanalysisoftheprimacyofconsciousness.Seeibid.,256n.26forhischaracterizationofthisviewas“quantummysticism.”Outsidetheimplicationsofquantumphysics,Seagerreferredtothisviewmoregenerallyas“panpsychism.”Seealsoibid.,245,249,and252.191Seager(2002)247–248.192Wilber(2001),221;andAsprem(2014),270.193QuotedinWilber(2001),221.

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versionofpanentheism,asdidJeansandJordan.194Thus,thisparallelismalsohasits

rootsinthefoundersofquantumphysics.

AndthoughSeagerdoesnotfeelkinshipwithhiscontemporaries,Goswami,

forone,doesseeacorrespondencebetweenquantumphysicsandpanpsychism.He

argued the non-locality of quantum physics indicates ‘quantum consciousness’

extendsbeyondthelocaleofindividualbrainsandinterconnectsallofhumanity.He

stated“TraditionallywecallthissourceGod,butwedon’thaveto.Wecanequally

wellcallitquantumconsciousness.”195Heargued,thoughitisanonmaterialcausal

source,“It’sobjectiveandit’sscientific.”196Similarly,physicistPaulDaviesobserved

in the context of quantum physics, “it cannot be denied that science does have

somethingtosayaboutreligiousmatters,”concluding,“scienceoffersasurerpathto

Godthanreligion.”197Goswamiasked,“AretheuniverseandlifecreatedbyGod?”He

answered, “Yes, if you think of God as the creative principle that we call

consciousness.”198 This makes religion a potential narrative of science without

reductively identifying the two. Though the naturalistic paradigm for scientific

knowledgewaschallenged,thatwasnotthoughttoexcludetheideaaltogether.Aswe

would expect from the perspective of the representation construct, “materialist

cosmologyisnotwrong,butit’snotthecompletestory.Inthecompletionofthestory

thecosmologicalstrugglesofbothscienceandreligionare foundtoconverge,and

integrationbecomespossible.”199

4 ScientificEnterpriseas‘Religious’

194vonStuckrad(2014),52;andAsprem(2014),261–263and284.195Moser(2013).SeealsoStewart&Slade(2009).AsimilarpositionisexploredinBabuJoseph(2002),93–94.AndtheoreticalphysicistBrianJosephsonalsomadeanargumentforvitalism.SeeJosephson(1987),17.196Stewart&Slade(2009).197Davies(1983),frontmatterand218.198 Goswami (2000), 100. Goswami has also said ‘God is consciousness in its creative aspect,’ toparaphrase.SeeStewart&Slade(2009).199Goswami (2000), 18. For someofGoswami’s scientificpublicationson the issues, seeGoswami(1989);andGrinberg-Zylberbaumetal.(1994).

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Andwithintegration,ideasofaunifiedsystematicandpurposefulactivity—ajoint

enterprise—for bothquantumphysics and religionbegan to develop in force.We

have seen this already in the application of mystical understandings to interpret

scientific results and in the unification of scientific knowledge and mystical

frameworksofmeaning,buthereIwilldiscusssomethingmorealongthelinesofthe

unificationof scientific andmystical activities.As in theother chapters inwhich I

discuss how religion and science have been relationalized via their respective

enterprises, quantum physics and religion have been related in such away as to

producenotionsofmorality,systemsofethics,andguidestohumanfulfillment.And

the most prominent examples I found of such developments is in the work of

Goswami.Assuch,Iwilldiscusshimextensivelyinthissection,withreferencetoa

fewother lines of thinking to show that this discourse has developed in different

directions.

AsRestivonoted:

[I]nsofar as science is conceived as a Search forMeaning, or Truth, and insofar as it is asubstituteinthisstraightforwardwayforthereligiousquest(afunctionalalternative),thenwesee[…]whytherecanbeanaffinitybetweenexperienceswhicharelabeledscienceandthosewhicharelabeledmysticism.200

Indeed, the uniting enterprise of truth has been drawn upon in the likening of

quantumphysicstoreligion.Goswamiconstructedareligiosityofsciencebydenying

thattruthsingularlybelongstoreligionorscienceandthetruthsbelongingtoeach

need not be different or inconsistent. As noted in Chapter Six, appealing to ‘true’

religionand‘true’scienceisameansbywhichthe‘religion’and‘science’ofmutual

exclusivityarerejectedasfalse.Goswamiargued,“whycontinuethebattleofdogmas

whentruth isourobjective,notwhosedogmaisright?”201 ‘Dogma’constitutesthe

falsespiritofreligionandscience,while ‘truth’becomesthesharedessentialcore,

thuspositioningreligionandscienceasnon-reductivelysimilar.Therepresentation

construct is applied to religious and scientific methodology as well, as Goswami

claimedthatbothfaithandobservationinvolveparallelmethodsof“tryitandseefor

200Restivo(1983),74.Emphasisoriginal.201Goswami(2000),30.Seealsoibid.,3.

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yourself,”‘really’the“samemethodallalong.”202Moreover,inbothmethodologieshe

identifiedcomponentsofrationalismand“nonrationalism,”sincescienceinvolvesthe

creativeinvestigationoftheouterworldandspiritualitythesameoftheinnerworld,

makingthereligiousandscientificenterprisemuchthesame.203

Goswamifurtherunitedscientificandmysticalpracticeswithhisdevelopment

of a movement known as ‘Quantum Activism.’ Quantum Activism is “the idea of

changingourselvesandoursocieties inaccordancewith theprinciplesofquantum

physics.”204 Quantum Activism includes prescribed practices, ethics, institutions,

educationalprograms,research,andpoliticalmovements.205Hisworldviewhaseven

incorporated notions of heaven, hell, sin, and redemption. For example, Goswami

stated:

Therewardformoralactionisindeedheaven,butnotintheafterlife.Heavenisinthislife;itisnotaplacebutanexperienceof living inquantumnonlocality. […]What issin? […] Inaquantum view of ethics, the only sin is that of completely fossilizing the self or others inclassicalfunctioning,toblockone’sownoranother’saccesstothequantummodalityandtothemanifestationoffreedomandcreativity.[…]Forcondoningthisstasis,wedoendupinhell—thehell-on-earthofego-bondage[…].206

Healsodescribedquantumactivismas“themoralcompass”ofscienceandso

weseethattheethicsisnotreducedtoscience,butrather‘guides’scienceandsoalso

existsoutsideofitsdomain.207Science,Goswamiargued,canevendemonstratethe

efficacy of spiritual practices, situating science as religiously productive.

Furthermore,scientificknowledgehasbeenpositionedasameanstoreligiousself-

actualization.208At thesametime,sciencecannotsucceedwithoutspiritual truths,

202Goswami(2000),18–19.Thoughthis‘faith’heassignedtoesotericreligioustraditionsspecificallyanddisassociateditwith‘dogma.’203Goswami(2000),19.204CenterforQuantumActivism(n.d.),s.v.“Home.”SeealsoMoser(2013).205Quantumactivismhasbeenpromotedbyapoliticalmovement“basedonconsciousawarenessofthe truth of life on this planet,” referred to as the Awareness Party. See Goswami (n.d.); and TheAwareness Party (2010–2016), s.v. “Home.” A code of ethics is derived from quantum physics inGoswami(2012).206Goswami(1993),263.207CenterforQuantumActivism(n.d.),s.v.“Home.”208E.g.,Goswami stated,quantumphysics “cangiveyou faith in suddendiscontinuouschange [i.e.,“spiritualtransformation,”inhiswords].Thenoneday,whenyouleastexpectit,youarriveatcertainknowledge—asuddeninsight,asamadhi,asatori.”Goswami(2000),274.SamadhiisaSanskrittermthatreferstoadivineunionorahigherstateofconsciousnessinIndianreligion,whereassatoriisaJapaneseword referring to intuitivewisdom or sudden enlightenment in Zen Buddhism. Throughscience,itisclaimed,“heavenwillbemanifestedonearth.”Stewart&Slade2009.

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according to his perspective, which makes religion-science inclusivity key.209

Goswamihasbeencarefulnottopairreligion-sciencelikeningwithreligion-science

conflation.Whenharmonybetweenreligionandquantumphysicswasdiscussed,he

repeatedly emphasized that the science need not be interpreted in thisway, thus

keepingthe‘scienceasscience.’210

Still, ‘good’ scientific education will increase our spiritual connectedness,

whichwillinturnmanifestinhowweinteractwithsocietyviatheability“toexpress

Good,Beauty,Truth,Justice,andLove.”Inthisway,scientificeducationisframedas

the source of spiritual ideals.211 Quantum Activism has made other normative

prescriptions as well, including “right thinking,” “right living,” and “right

livelihood.”212 ‘Right thinking’ involves a worldview based on Goswami’s ‘science

withinconsciousness’andallitsimplicationsofinterconnectedness.213‘Rightliving’

isalso “empoweredbyright thinking”and involvesadopting thenewscienceasa

guide in understanding theworkings of theworld and how to act accordingly.214

‘Rightlivelihood’involvesearningalivinginaccordancewiththismodeofthinking,

withconsiderationsofthemutualimpactbetweentheindividualandthewhole.215In

recognizingtheinterconnectednessofhumanity,itisarguedthatthefirstthingtodo

isstartwithreformingoneself.Becauseinterconnectednesssuggeststhatbyhurting

others, oneself is harmed as well, forgiveness, kindness, and compassion are

emphasized.216Thethoughtofaquantumactivist is ifwechangetheself, thenthe

worldcanchangesimultaneously:bycultivatingpositiveemotionsandcreativeacts,

209Goswami(2000),xvi.210Goswami(2000).SeealsoGoswami(1993).211Pittman(2012).212SeePittman(2012);andGoswami(n.d.).Notably,theseareverysimilartoparticularelementsoftheBuddhistdoctrineoftheEightfoldPath.213Pittman(2012).SeealsoGoswami(2011),esp.37–104.214Pittman(2012).SeealsoGoswami(2011),esp.113–163.215Goswami(n.d.).SeealsoGoswami(2011),esp.171–265.216 Pittman (2012). See also Goswami (n.d.). One blog offers fourteen ways to practice QuantumActivism, which all include either cultivating a sense of oneness, by connecting with like-mindedpeopleandgettinginvolvedinone’scommunityforinstance,orengagingincreativeactivities,whichisthoughttoconnectonetothequantumconsciousness.Donworth(2011a);andDonworth(2011b).

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we can achieve a certain threshold by which these changes will take place in all

humanity.Inthisway,QuantumActivismcould“savecivilization.”217

Goswami also constructed a religiosity of science by directly addressing

notionsofmutualexclusivity,asahistoricallyandsociallycontingentworldview.In

arelationalmanner,therejectionofmutualexclusivityispairedwiththeaffirmation

ofinclusivityandrepresentation.Forexample,henoted:

TheinstitutionalseparationofscienceandspiritualitybeganintheseventeenthcenturyintheWestwhenthephilosopherRenéDescartesdividedrealityintomind(thedomainofreligion)andmatter (the domain of science) […] The separatist paradigmof science […] gaveway,however, in the twentieth century to a new paradigm, quantum physics. This newunderstandinghascreatedawindowintheboundarywallseparatingscienceandspirituality.

Goswami further argued Quantum Activism involves “subjectivity as well as

objectivity, spiritual matters as well as material ones”—there is no perceived

oppositionorreductiveidentificationinthedeploymentofbothsignifiersofreligion

and science.218 The construction of bipartitions as noncontradictory is further

demonstratedbyGoswami’sperspectivethat,inthe‘battle’ofreligionandscience,

bothcanwinand this isparalleled to thenotion thatbothGodandreasoncanbe

saved. And along this same line of argumentation, we find the assertion that the

adoptionofthisperspectivedoesnotnecessitateaconversiontoanewreligionand

thatneitherreligionnorscienceneedtobewrongforthisviewtowork,butrather

this perspective involves finding the ‘truth’ of “seeing how every belief can be

expanded.”219Thekeyistheintegrationof‘dualities.’Forexample,Goswamistated:

Gross/subtle, outer/inner, conditioning/creativity, ego/quantum self, doing/being,pleasure/happiness,theseareexamplesofdualitiesthattendtoseparateusfromthewhole.‘Tomake the two one,’ balancing the dualities in our living, iswhat right living is for thequantumactivist.220

AsAlexandraBrucepointedout,Goswami’s“idealistscience[…]integratesthedeep

dichotomies of human experience.”221 In this integration of dichotomies, with its

rejection of opposition and reduction, the religiosity of science takes shapewhen

217AsinthetitleofGoswami(2011).218Goswami(2000),xviand16.219Chopra(2000),xviii.220Goswami(2011),116.221Bruce(2005),110.

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likeningoccurs.Forinstance,Goswamistated,“Sciencetraditionallyhasemphasized

matterandspiritualtraditionshaveemphasizedconsciousness.Inquantumphysics,

thetwoemphasesconvergeintoonetapestry.”222Goswamigoesevenfurther:thisis

notjustabeliefthatscienceandspiritualitycouldconverge,butratherintegrationis

“anaccomplishedfact.”223Thismovementhasbeensuggestedtoconstitute“aunion,”

“a reconciliation,” and a “yoga of religion and science”—’yoga,’meaning ‘to yoke,’

suggests both connection anddifferentiation, characteristic of representation, as I

havedescribedit.224

Goswami has been dismissed as representative of “quantum flapdoodle,”

“quackery,”and“NewAge”and‘spiritual’thinking.225Goswami’stheoryisdismissed

as based in mysticism and thus as pseudoscience, from this mutually exclusive

perspective.226He“hasbeenslappedaroundinthepresslikesomekindoflowrent

hucksterofairy-fairyjunkscience,notastheemeritusprofessorofphysicswithover

threedecadesofuniversitytenurethatheisinactuality.”227Goswamihasnotbeen

blind to these critiques of ‘religious content’ and engaged with the relational

processes of such critiques. He stated, regarding the notion of quantum

consciousness,“Ifthissoundsasifwearere-establishingananthropocentricviewof

the universe, so be it. […] Suchmyths are compatiblewith quantum physics, not

contradictory.”228Mysticism,agency,andconsciousnesscannolongerbeframedas

‘not science,’ in this relational construct. When approached with the common

objection that this is not science, but simply spirituality disguised as science,

Goswami responded that this objection stems from a misunderstanding of what

mysticism is (paralleled with ‘spirituality’ and the ‘essence’ of religion here).

Mysticism,Goswamiexplained,couldbecharacterizedasanexperientiallyfounded

“transformativesystembasedon‘seeforoneself,’”muchlikescientificobservation.

Contrary to the naysayers’ analyses premised on mutual exclusivity, Goswami

222QuotedinMoser(2013).223Goswami(2000),xiii.224Riggs(2011).225Shermer(2005).226Bruce(2005),40–41;andEdis(2006),117.227Bruce(2005),101.228Goswami(1993),141.

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specificallyarguedfornon-reductivelikeningsuchaswhenhestated,“Letreligious

organizations get information from the new science, and let the new scientist

complement his or her personal spiritual search and research by sharing with

spiritualcommunities—thereligions.”229

SystemstheoristandphysicistFritjofCapraprovidesanotherexampleofthe

non-reductivelikeningofthescientificandreligiousenterprises.Evenmoresothan

Goswami,heisregularlycitedasdistortingscienceinfavorofreligiousworldviews,

used as an example of religion-science conflation.230 For instance, one author

characterizedCapra’sbest-sellingbookTheTaoofPhysics(1975)as“superficialand

profoundly misleading.”231 However, like Goswami, he specifically constructs

religion-sciencelikeninginanon-reductivewayandthiswasexceedinglypopular.232

While he tentatively (and enthusiastically) suggested there are some parallels

between physics and mysticism, he admitted there is not sufficient evidence to

establishafactofthematterandinsteademphasizedasubjectiveappreciationofthe

parallelism.Furthermore,heargued,“scienceandmysticismaretwocomplementary

manifestationsofthehumanmind;ofitsrationalandintuitivefaculties.”Inthisway,

weseethesignifiersofreligionandscienceareheldintact.Inotherwords,bothare

treatedasdistinctandinnoneedoftransformation,allthewhilethesedistinctions

arespecificallyconstructedassimilarinawiderframeworkofmeaning.Forinstance,

Caprastated,“Sciencedoesnotneedmysticismandmysticismdoesnotneedscience;

butmenandwomenneedboth.”233Furthermore,Capraarguedsciencecouldbea

pathtospirituality,a“pathwithaheart”thatcouldgiverisetoself-realizationand

229Goswami(2000),158and290.230E.g.,Crease&Mann(1990),308;andRestivo(1983),8.ThoughIlimitmyselftotheseandafewexamplesdiscussedbelow,nearlyeveryacademicpublicationonquantummysticismdescribedCaprainthisway.Incontrast,Caprareportedthatthephysicsportionofhisbookwaswellreceivedinthephysicscommunityandthatmanyphysicistsevencamearoundtothemysticalinterpretationaswell.Heisenberg,forone,was“veryinterestedandveryopen”toCapra’sbook.Wilber(1982),216–217.HetoldCapra, “Basically, Iamincompleteagreementwithyou.”Capra(1988),49.Kaiser(2011),162concurred thatCapra “got thephysics right” and that themysticalportionwasaccepted in certainacademiccommunities.231Bernstein(1979),340.232vonStuckrad(2014),88.Thereachof influenceis implicatedbythefactthathisbookhasgonethroughforty-threeeditionsandtranslatedintotwenty-threelanguages.233Capra(2000[1975]),306.SeealsoCapra(1982),38,47–48,and78;andRestivo(1983),9–10andpassim.

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otherspiritualknowledge.234Capraclaimed, “thescientificdiscoveriesofmenand

womencanbeinperfectharmonywiththeirspiritualaimsandreligiousbeliefs.”235

Capra’spublicationwaspartofalargermovementbeginninginthe1960sand

continuingthroughtoday.Wigner’s1961paperontheroleoftheconsciousobserver

inwave function collapse inspired a very successful pop genre ofmystic-physics,

followedbya largepopularmovement toward the fusionofquantumphysicsand

spirituality and/ormysticism.236AlongwithCapra’swork, there is theexampleof

Gary Zukav’s award-winningThe DancingWu Li Masters (1979).237 Though often

polemically separated as strictly ‘pop,’ these works have appeared on university

physicscourses’syllabionandoffthroughouttheyears.238Moreover,accordingto

philosopherofscienceEricR.Scerri,“Anyoneinvolvedinphysicseducationislikely

tobeaskedtocommentonparallelismatsomestage.”239Sowhilesomehaveseena

declineofquantummysticisminthemid-twentiethcentury,therecertainlyseemsto

beargumentsagainstthis.240Othersclaimthatquantummysticismdidnotevenreach

fullbloomuntilthe1970sand1980s,whileinthe1990sithasalsobeensuggested

that itwas “on the verge of becoming as firmly entrenched in popular culture as

astrology.”241 Certainly the public has showed a large interest, with the award-

winning quantum mystical documentary What the Bleep Do We Know?! (2004)

launchinganewHollywoodgenreandwithsomepopularsciencebooksonphysics

and religion enjoying more success than novels.242 The popularity of connecting

physicsandreligionispartlydueto,MargaretWertheimsurmised,“anassumption

234Capra(2000[1975]),25.235Capra(1982),78.236Wigner(1961).ReproducedinWigner(1967).SeealsoKaiser(2011),155.237 Zukav (1979). Discussed in Zyga (2009); Crease (1993), 134; and Leane (2007), 93–94. Otherexamples of this ‘pop’movement include LeShan (1974); Talbot (1980); Comfort (1984)—thoughComfortemployedthediscourseon ‘religion’moreregularlythan ‘mysticism’or ‘spirituality,’oftendiscussing‘Buddhism’and‘Hinduism.’SeealsoCapra(1988),31–37,42–43,and46–48.Therearetoomanybooksofthekindtoprovideacomprehensivelist.Therearealsoexamplesinothermedia,forinstancethesuccessfuldocumentaryfilmWhattheBleepDoWeKnow!?SeeArntz,Chasse,&Vicente(2004).238Woit(2011);andKaiser(2011),163–165and278.SeealsoHarrison(1979a).239Scerri(1989),688.240Onthedeclineofquantummysticism,see,e.g.,Edis(2006),49;Marin(2009),820;andOverbye(2006).241Crease&Mann(1990),303;andCrease(1993),133and136.242Figlar(2014).

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thatphysicistsarepeoplewhohavethecredentialstotalkaboutGod,thattheyare

peoplewhomthepublicwillacceptinatheologicalrole,”highlightingthereligiosity

ofscienceinthecaseofthescientificenterprise.243

5 FromInclusivitytoReligiositytoMutualExclusivity

As we have seen, relations structured the discursive changes here, in that when

sciencewas likenedto ‘religion’ itwas inclusivelyunderstood.Thisresultedinthe

non-reductionofsimilarities,asinthecaseofthedualisticworldview,aswellasthe

reformulation of the oppositional relational content of dichotomies as

complementarities,whichwesawinthethoughtofBohrandothers.Wecanalsosee

thisrelationalstructureinthereciprocalprocessofconceptualization.Forinstance,

the ‘immaterialism’ of quantum physics was likened to religion (since this was

already a signifier of this term) and because religion was also signified by

‘supernaturalism,’ this signifier was then applied to quantum physics. Recall

Eddington’s observation that it is exactly due to this association between

consciousnessandsupernaturalismthatsupernaturalismisintroducedtoquantum

theory.Changestoonetermaffecttheotherandthencirclebackaroundprecisely

because they are relational; they are ‘other-referential’ in a continuous cycle of

reciprocity.Astherelationalprocessesofdiscursivechangeinvolvedherehavebeen

extensivelydiscussedintheprevioustwochapters,IthinkIhavemademypointthat

inclusivitysettheparametersforinterpretinglikeningthatgaverisetothereligiosity

ofscienceregardingthesevariouscomponentsofconceptualization.

Despitethisrobustrelationalconstructofreligiosity,suchrelationalizations

areoftenanalyzedascontradictoryorconflating.Butthisissimplyfurtherevidence

that discursive change happens via relationalization since such conclusions take

mutual exclusivity as a departure point. Even though similar works on physics-

religionparallelismhavealsoappearedinpeer-reviewed,scientificjournalsandhave

beenforthbytheveryfoundersofquantumtheory,thosesuchasGoswamiandCapra

243Wertheim(1995),221.

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areoftenevaluatedasreduciblyreligious.244Andinalargercontext,theentirehistory

and significance of quantum mysticism is typically hand-waved away based on

generalargumentsthatbecauseitcontainsreligiouselements,itcannotbescience—

theclassicviewofexclusivity.Inotherwords,thelikeninginvolvedinreligiosityis

structuringchangesbacktomutualexclusivity,similartowhatwesawoccurinthe

caseofthescientificityofBuddhismconceptualizedasnot‘really’religion.Asscholar

of religion Kocku von Stuckrad noted in a general context, but using Capra as an

example:

Interestinglyenough,manyof theauthorswriting in the fieldofNEWAGESCIENCEhadbeendistinguishedscholarsintheirdisciplinesbeforetheyturnedtotheoriesthatlacktheapprovalofthemajorityoftheirpeers;itisthissocialaspect,ratherthantheempiricalstatusoftheiradoptedtheories,thatallowsscientiststotransmutateintopseudo-scientists.

Thisispartlyduetothefactthattheterminology‘NewAgescience’“participatesina

discourse of separating ‘real science’ from ‘pseudo-science’ and ‘professional’

knowledgeaboutnaturefrom‘amateurknowledge.’”245

In light of the findings regarding themutual exclusivity construct, it is not

difficult to understand why: if a hypothesis is not materialist, then it must be

pseudoscientific and religious; if it is religious, then itmust not be scientific. For

instance,theconsciousnesshypothesishasbeenlabeled“pseudoscientificnonsense”

and“cultscience”andequatedto“magicalshortcuts.”246Ithasbeensuggestedthat

consciousnesshypothesesare“radical”and“idiosyncratic,”thusmakingwhatwasa

central issue peripheral—though certainly these views have fallen in and out of

fashionsincetheearlydaysofquantumphysics.247Somehavedeniedthepresenceof

theconsciousnesshypothesisaltogether.PhysicistandphilosopherMarshallSpector

claimed,inthecontextofquantummysticism,“mindisnotbroughtwithintheambit

ofthenewtheory[i.e.,quantumtheory]anymorethanitwasinclassicalphysics.”248

244Examplesofsuchviewsinscientificjournalsapartfromthefoundersandtheothercontemporaryscientistsdiscussedalready(ofwhichrefertoothercitationsherein)includeCapra(1974);Harrison(1978);Harrison(1979a);andHarrison(1979b).Capra’sphysicalmodelswereevenpopularinthe1970samongphysicists.Crease&Mann(1990),308.245vonStuckrad(2014),88.Emphasisoriginal.246Woit(2011);Mone(2004);andEdis(2002),99.247Scerri(1989),690;Crease&Mann(1990),308;andKaiser(2011),xiv.248 Spector (1990), 342. Indeed, most physicists today avoid speaking of ‘consciousness’ in theiranalyses,preferringtousetheterminology‘observer,’probablytoavoidmysticalinterpretations,as

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Parallelsbetweentheconsciousnesshypothesisandreligionhavebeenconstructed

as “religious arguments,” ignoring or unknowing of the important role they have

playedandcontinuetoplayas‘scientificarguments.’249Anotherauthorreferredto

this theory as “a mystical misinterpretation of quantum mechanics,” while those

drawingparallelsbetweenphysicsandreligionhavebeensaidtobe“misguided”and

“ledastray,”who“misrepresentscience.”250Similarly,thebroader‘quantummystical’

worldviewhasbeendescribedas“distortingbothscienceandEasternmysticism,”

reducedto“anetworkofoccultcorrespondences.”251Parallelismhasbeenregarded

as“superficial”anda“contamination.”252Alternativestomaterialisticinterpretation

of quantum physics have often been constructed as ‘religious nonsense’ and

nonscientific,whichis“doomedtoretreatasscienceadvances.”253

The notions that this is ‘not science’ and just ‘religion’ are frequently

discursivelyentangled.Oneproblemwiththeseperspectives—whichunfortunately

constitute the vastmajority of accounts of ‘quantummysticism’ in contemporary

scholarlyanalyses—isthatthemaincriticismoftheconsciousnesshypothesisseems

tobethatitis‘mystical’andthisassociationisconsideredtobeacompleteargument

for itsexclusion fromconsideration.Attentivereaderswillquicklyrealize this isa

resultofthemutualexclusivityconstruct.Thus,itistheassociationwith‘religion’that

isusedasthepointofdemarcationas‘notscience,’withlittlefocusonthetheory’s

empirical viability or anything else for that matter. Put differently, it is a purely

relational conceptualization of consciousness and religion that results in its

demarcation as ‘not science.’ To drive the point home, let us think about a

to invoke the ‘observer’ is regarded as distinct from consciousness, though I have not found anarticulated differentiation. E.g., Scerri (1989), 689. Likely, the observer is thought of as a physicalsystem,whereasconsciousness isnot.Still, theanswermightnotevenbesosophisticated, insteadrestingonareligion-sciencedichotomywithnofurtherreflection.Insupportofthisinterpretationisthe fact that the consciousness hypothesis alone is regarded as ‘mystical’ even when there is noreferencetothemysticalbythoseputtingitforth,asnotedelsewhere.249Edis(2006),52.250Stenger(2007),384;andCrease&Mann(1990),307,312–313.251Ondistortion,seeCrease(1993),136;Crease&Mann(1990),310;andHammer&Lewis(2010),6–8.Onoccult,seeEdis(2002),97.Seealsoibid.,49;andGrim(1990),353–384,inwhich‘quantummysticism’featuresinthewidercontextofscienceandtheoccult.252Edis(2002),86;andRestivo(1983),24.253Edis(2002),97.

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hypothetical,inwhichreligionisstillcentrallysignifiedbynaturalism,asinthedays

ofnaturalphilosophy.Then following the same logicapplied to the consciousness

hypothesis,classicalphysicswouldbedismissedas‘religious’solelyforassertinga

naturalisticparadigm.Therearesimplynocriteriaexternaltorelationaldiscourse

thatmakesconsciousness‘religious’insomeofthesecases(thosecasesofwhichdo

notdrawupon‘religion’butareaccusedofit).

AsMarinnoted, pitting science against religion is a “forced choice that the

founders of quantum mechanics would have never recognized, much less

accepted.”254Thelikeningofreligionandsciencenevercreatedan‘and/or’situation

thatwouldhaveresultedinreduction,insteadquantummysticismwastakeninterms

of the representation construct—a religiosity of science. As such, this discourse

should be taken seriously. Though reductionism is just as valid as religiosity

conceptuallyspeaking(sinceallisrelationallyconstructed),ifwewanttoaccurately

reflect the data, then, alone, this reductionist view of quantum mysticism is

inadequate.Furthersupportingthispoint,thefoundersofquantumphysics,aswell

asmanyother‘quantummystics,’havenotdeniedaroletoclassicalphysics.Classical

physicsisstillapplicableatthemacrolevelofreality.AsBohmputit,“each[classical

physicsandquantumphysics] complements theother.”255Having thenewscience

definedincontrasttopreviousnotionsdidnotleadtotheexclusionofeitherofthe

conceptions,resultinginaninclusiverelationbetweenclassicalandquantumphysics

withthesimultaneousmaintenanceofdichotomoussignifiers.This,inturn,madethe

situationripeforapplyingtheinclusiveandrepresentationconstructstothereligion-

sciencerelation.Withthedevelopmentofquantumphysics,themutualexclusivityof

religion and science was transposed to religion-classical physics exclusivity. The

realmofspiritual/mysticalrealities,alongwiththequantumworld,haveoftenbeen

consideredoutsidethepurviewofclassicalphysics.Yet,sincequantumandclassical

physicsbothhavetheirplace,thisnon-reductionhasbeenthoughttointegrate“your

spiritualheartwithyourscientifichead,”evenleadingto“personalenlightenment,”

254QuotedinZyga(2009).255Bohm(1951),624.

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accordingtoonetheoreticalphysicist.256Eventhoughreligionandclassicalphysics

continuetoberegardedasmutuallyexclusiveinmanycases,thereisnoconflictwith

theNewtonianparadigmofscienceso longas it isproperlyappliedto itsrangeof

applicabilityfromthisperspective.257

Quantum mysticism has also been dismissed by scholars due to the

essentialization and conflation of all religions, the piecemeal treatment of physics

whendrawingparallels,andtheconfusionofreligiousandscientificterminology,and

how these issues result in associations between physics and religion where

historicallytheremaybenone.258Besidesthelastpoint,thesearereallyarguments

againsttheaccuracyoftheconceptualizationofparallelism,whichisirrelevanttothe

social and historical facts (and which conceptualization is taken as ‘correct’ is a

relational matter anyway). Put differently, even if we grant that the religion and

physicsare‘distorted’—whichIdonot,sinceconceptsarefluid—orthattheparallels

are unconvincing, this does not make the construct historically and socially

unimportant.Marinrecognizedthispointwhenhearguedfortheneedtogainsome

historical perspective on quantummysticism, as “Becoming aware of this subject

wouldhelpgeneralaudiencesrealizethattherearemanyotheralternativesbesides

theonesofferedby thedisjunctionbetweenscienceandreligion.”259Thiswas the

generalsentimentsurroundingareligiosityofscienceuponitsfoundinginquantum

physics.Weneedtoexpandourunderstandingaboutrelationalconstructsandthe

formstheytakeon.

256Goswami(2000),xi–xivand3.257E.g.,Goswami(2000),59.258 Crease (1993), 134–135.On the conflation of all Eastern religions, see, e.g., Scerri (1989), 688.Indeed, there is some ‘conflation’ in the sense that mysticism and spirituality are treated as theessentialaspectsofreligion(though,‘conflation’is,ofcourse,amatterofrelationalityandtheevolvingmeaning of concepts).However, at the same time, the secondary literature repeatedly emphasizesconflation,indicatingthatactuallythereismoreemphasisonthedifferencesofthereligioustraditions.Moreover, most authors in the primary readings do recognize differences between the religioustraditions, to warn the reader of the caveats, and then go on to argue for some possiblegeneralizations—something that religious scholars have also done time and again, particularlydominantinthepastcentury.Thisisnottosaythatgeneralitiesare‘right,’butonlytopointoutthattheproblemseemsblownoutofproportioninthiscontext.259Marin(2009),819.

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As to the last objectionon the lackof historical associations, this is simply

wrong. Quantum physics has been historically constructed as both religious and

scientific. And “the foundations [of parallelism]was laid by leading physicists.”260

Marinconvincinglyshowedtheassociationbetweenquantumphysicsandreligious

worldviewspermeatedtheculturalandscientificatmosphereintheearlytwentieth

century, while physicist and historian of science David Kaiser thoroughly

demonstrated that encounters with mysticism and Eastern thought were

instrumental in the physics revival of the 1970s.261 And as Asprem noted, “the

developmentofquantummechanics,withdeepimplicationsforworldview,religion,

andspirituality[…]hasitsoriginamongphysicistsseekinganalternativeidentityfor

their profession,” specifically a “re-enchantment” of science relative to past

“disenchanted”forms.Heconcluded:

In this sense theemichistoriographyof science isnota result ofnon-scientificdiscoursestryingtoclaimlegitimacybyrhetoricalappealstoscienceanditshistory—itisitselfaresultofdiscursivepositioningbyscientistswithinacademicdiscourse.262

Physicists today who deny quantum mysticism a role are not in philosophical

agreement with the founders and with later groundbreakers of the theory. The

religiosity of science began and took shape in the scientific community, thus

challengingtheadequacyoftheargumentthatthisisnotrepresentativeof‘science,’

asRobertBolgerandothershaveargued.263(Atthesametime,popularizersandthose

outsideofthescientificcommunityhavealsoplayedimportantroles,ofcourse,and

havetendedtospeakmorefreelyonparallelism.)

Though parallelism is certainly ‘scientific’ in the sense of the predominant

discursiveconstructionoftherelevanthistoricalfiguresas‘scientists’andtheirwork

as ‘science,’ still there is not something like ‘science’ thatwe canmisrepresent or

represent.AsRestivonoted,likeningphysicstomysticismareideas“imputedtothem

260Asprem(2014),148.261Marin(2009);andKaiser(2011).SeealsoCrease(1993),133;andAsprem(2014),128–149,esp.141–149,whichgenerallyengagedwiththecultural influencesonthephilosophical thinkingofthefounders.Forselectedreadingsonthemysticalwritingsofseveralcentralfiguresinthedevelopmentofquantumphysics,seeWilber(2001).262Asprem(2014),537.Emphasisoriginal.Regardingtherelationsbetweenthesocialenvironmentandthedevelopmentofquantumphysics,seeFeuer(1974),passim.263Bolger(2012).

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andarenotinherentinthem.”264Thereligiosityofscienceisaconstruct,asismutual

exclusivity.Anaccuratereflectionofthedatademonstratesthatthehistoricalfigures

involveddiddescribequantumphysicsasinclusiveofandnon-reductivelysimilarto

religion,butthisdoesnotmeanthatquantummechanicsisinherentlyreligious.No

conceptshaveinherentmeaningafterall.Butthephysicsdidbecomereligious.We

arediscussingadiscursivebirth,ahistoricalontology.

Anothercritiqueoftheliteratureonquantummysticismemphasizestheneed

to “answer the question ofwhymodern physics lends itself to quantummystical

interpretation.”265Theanswerprovidedhere,inshort,isrelationalism.Andthisisnot

solely due to the inclusivity construct. Considering the fact that the mechanistic

worldviewandscientificmaterialismwereregularlypresentedtothepublicinterms

ofreligious implications—oftenthought tonegatereligiousworldviews—itshould

comeasnosurprisethatthisexactscientificrhetoricshouldbeturnedbackuponits

constructorsasthescientificworldviewchanged.Inotherwords,itwasthediscourse

ofscienceinnegativerelativeperspectivetoreligionthatprimedquantumphysicsto

lenditselftoparallelism.Mutualexclusivityactuatedareligiosityofscience,sincethe

consciousness hypothesis, for instance, was constructed as religious as per the

mutual exclusivity construct.But as the scientific community came to support the

notionofconsciousnessoncemore,ittransformedintoameansbywhichthereligion-

sciencedividecouldbebridgedagain.Thisisagaindemonstrativeofhowpre-existing

relationalconstructsarestructuringthediscursivechangeshere.Asquantumphysics

wasconstructedincontrasttoclassicalphysics—incontrasttoexclusivescience—it

wasbytherelationalnatureofthediscoursethatitwasconstructedasreligion-like.

Itisbytheverystructureofthediscoursethatthesesignifiersofquantumphysicsare

related to religion—the signifiers of quantum physics are discursively ‘religious,’

historically‘religious,’andrelationally‘religious.’

264Restivo(1983),94.265Crease&Mann(1990),312.

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Chapter9:ReflectionsonRelationalism

Itisstrangehowthemostprofoundphilosophicalconvictionsrevolvedaroundtheemotionseducedbysuchwordsas‘and,’‘either-or,’and‘not.’—LewisS.Feuer(1912–2002)1

1 RelationsasaConceptualMapThe abovewords spokenby sociologist Lewis S. Feuer are exceedingly applicable

here.Thesethreeterms—‘and,’‘either-or,’and‘not’—constitutemuchofthecontent

that constructed ‘religion’ relative to ‘science’ and vice versa. Mutual exclusivity

createdaneither-orsituationforknowledgecategorization,suchthat‘science’came

to mean ‘not religion’ and vice versa, making their definitions conceptually

oppositional.Departingfromnotionsofmutualexclusivity,affirmationofoneconcept

intheidentityconstructnecessitatedanegationoftheotherevenwhilelikeningthe

two,withtheendresultbeingthatreligionandsciencewerereducedtooneanother’s

frameworkofmeaning.And inclusivity constructedanon-oppositional conceptual

space for religion and science by excluding mutually exclusive views. The

representation construct, though, isprobablybest representedby the conjunction

‘and-or,’bypositioningreligionandscienceasbothnon-oppositionalandsimilarbut

innoneedofsubstitutionsinceitrejectsthereductionismoftheidentityconstruct

when likening the two. In making the religion-science relation, much can be

attributedtotheselittle,butpowerful,words.

What makes them particularly potent is not simply that they represent

perspectives on the relation, but rather construct them. Still, such a statement is

deceptivelysimplebecausethisisnotjustamatterofconstructingarelationbetween

static entities, but rather the relation itself resulted in particular etymological

developments and concrete dispositives for the individual terms. The relations

producedtherelata.Thosedevelopmentsthenstructuredfurtherchanges,resulting

1Feuer(1974),147.

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innewrelations,newsignifiers,andnewrelationalcontentbetweensignifiers(e.g.,

oppositionaldichotomyvs.complementarity).It isacomplexhistorical,social,and

discursive process, but one thing is constant: the changing perspectives on the

relationship and new meanings for the terms ‘religion’ and ‘science’ have been

productsofputtingvariousconceptsandrelationalconstructsinperspective.

Yet,becauseofthiscomplexity,drawingaboundarywithinasingleworkcan

bechallenging.SociologistMustafaEmirbayeridentified“boundaryspecification”as

oneof themainchallengestorelationalperspectives,as“thequestionofwhereto

drawlinesacrossrelationalwebspossessingnoclearcut,naturalboundaries.”2This

can be resolved, however, by a focus on the relational network of meaning

surrounding‘religion’inthechosencontext.Inthisway,thestudyisbounded,butnot

isolated from alternativewebs ofmeaning. For instance, the network ofmeaning

surrounding‘religion’inthecognitivescienceofreligionshouldberecognizedasone

ofwhichreligionislikenedtoscience,intermsofnaturalismandlocalizationism.The

studywouldbeboundedbyitsconceptionofreligion,allthewhilerecognizingthat

eachrelationaltenetcouldbechallenged—thatis,thatreligionisunlikescience,that

religionisnotnaturalorlocalizable.Exposingthenetworkofmeaningalsoindicates

that there are wider constellations of meaning—naturalism in its understanding

relative to supernaturalism, for example. Furthermore, by making one’s own

relational construct transparent—perhaps the reductive stance of scientification

here—there is no claim to a ‘natural boundary,’ but rather a claim to a reflective

constructthatremainsopentoanalysis.

Ontheotherendoftheboundaryspectrum,relationalityanalysisprovidesus

withaconceptualmaptounderstandbroadermovementsandanalyzethe fieldof

religionandscienceasawhole.Aswehaveseen,putting ‘religion’and ‘science’ in

relativeperspectivehasstructureddiscursivechangesamongavarietyofhistorical

contexts indiverse fields.Relationalismprovides apointof continuity among this

diversity.Meanwhile,arelationalperspectivealsodemonstrateshowinthecourseof

comparative studies, most comparisons do not have pre-existing connections of

2Emirbayer(1997),303.Emphasisoriginal.

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historicalorphysicalrelations.Rather,comparisonsconstructsimilarities,aswellas

disjunctions, a creation that is a result of the processes of conceptualization, as

JonathanZ.Smithargued.3Thismeans thatrelationalityanalysisprovidesameta-

analysisof comparativestudyand theirconceptual structures, taking intoaccount

howtheprocessesofanalysiscreatecertainviewsoftheworld.

But a relational analysis need not be limited to religion and science. A

relational perspective can make the wider discipline of religious studies more

comprehensiveandresolvethedebateoverwhatconstitutesthefield,whichhasbeen

in a stalemate because of disagreement about themeaning of the term ‘religion.’

Religionisamultidisciplinarytopicanditsdefinitionsareasdiverseasthedisciplines

andmethodologiesitappearsin.However,ifwetreattheterm‘religion’asrelational,

allofthesemeaningscanbeplacedwithinasingleconceptualscheme.Thisisbecause

relationalism can mediate between diverse conceptions of ‘religion’ at cognitive

levels,intermsofpractice,andatthelevelsofdiscourse,history,society,andculture.

Through a theoretical model of relationalism, we can simultaneously account for

discoursesasvariedasthecognitivescienceofreligionandquantummysticism.As

such,approaching theconceptof religionasperarelationalperspectiveopensup

manypossibilitiesforinterdisciplinaryresearch,sincethemultitudeofdisciplinescan

be united under a meta-model of conceptual construction that simultaneously

upholdsdifferingperspectives.

2 RelationalityAnalysisinPerspective

Throughoutthiswork,Ihavemaintainedthatrelationsstructurediscursivechange.

Ifmyhypothesisiscorrect,thentheconstructionof‘relationalism’mustalsobeviaa

relationalstructure.Indeed,Ihavedevelopedthisconceptrelativetootherdominant

modesofintellectualthought,constructing‘relationalism’inarelationalway.Iwill

reflectonthesedevelopmentsinthefollowingtwosubsections.

3Smith(1982),21–22and35.

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2.1 PostmodernismandRelationalismArguing for an underlying structure ofmeaningmaking is not new. Structuralists

have tended to emphasize a deep-level structure that maintains the world as is.

Structuralism, though, has been criticized for its inattention to historical

contingencies, as no structure could be separable from time or circumstance.

Structuralism has also been critiqued because it overlooked the ambiguity of

language and the fact that even structures are mutable. This gave rise to

deconstructionism, one of the main schools of thought associated with the

postmodernworld.4

ThephilosopherJacquesDerrida(1930–2004)arguedthatstructuretooisa

metaphor,an idea in theattempt toorganizereality.Toargue forstructure is like

arguingforanyothermetaphysicalpresence,like‘forms,’‘reason,’or‘God.’Structures

are impermanent historical products. Derrida regarded structures as “convenient

fictions,” in thewordsofphilosopherWilliamD.Gairdner.There isnounchanging

objecttospeakof,makingthesemutablestructuresincapableofaccountingforother

processes of change. “[N]o discourse has the objective capacity to analyze another

discourse.”5

Leavingasidetheproblemthatthisisaself-refutingstatement,myresponse

wouldbealongthelinesoftheBuddhistobservationthat‘emptinessisitselfempty.’6

TheBuddhistnotionof‘emptiness’restsontheobservationthatallisbasedoncauses

and conditions and thus has no so-of-itselfness. But even our understanding of

‘emptiness’ is based in contrast to the non-empty, in co-dependent arising on the

conditionsofrelationalcognizance.Andso,emptinessisalsoempty.Emptinessorco-

dependent arising does indicate a lack of objective capacity (as there is no

separatenesstoallowforit),butthisdoesnotdetractfromthemetaphysicalstatus

4Sarup(1993),32and129.Onsomecharacteristicsofpostmodernthought,seealsoibid.,131–158;andMcHale(2015),66–72.5Gairdner(2008),250–252.Emphasisoriginal.Onthepostmoderncritiqueofstructuralism,seealsoCherwitz&Hikins(1995),75–77.6Ontheproblemoftheself-refutingnatureofdeconstructionism,seeCherwitz&Hikins(1995),82–83.

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ofrelationsorfromourabilitytoutilizethemforanalysis.Onthecontrary,itconfirms

itasthelackofobjectivityisareflectionoftheco-constitutionofconceptsandthe

interrelationsofallthings.

Though Derrida was against the notion of structure, I believe his

poststructural observations actually lend themselves to an understanding of

structurenonetheless,butonethataccountsfordynamism.7Takingdynamismasa

departurepointisabreakfromthestructuralistassumptionoftotalityoruniversality

sincethereisnomaintenanceoftheworldasis,onlymaintenanceofmutability.To

borrowanotherBuddhistphrase,‘theonlyconstantischange.’Thenwhatweneedis

to find the structure of change. And change is always relational, arising in co-

dependenceonprecedingcausesandconditions.Ratherthanrejectfoundationalist

claims due to observations of the continuous, evolving flow of ideas, reality, and

existence,howwoulditbeifweinsteadtreatedthatflowasthefoundation?

This is what I have proposed and as suchmy theorymight be positioned

betweenstructuralismanddeconstructionism.Thestructureisdynamic(theconstant

ischange;beingisbecoming)andthestructureisanaccountofdynamism(changeis

relational; relations structure change). For instance,we have seen the concept of

‘science’evolvefrom‘notreligion’toreductivelyaccountingforreligionandthento

being reduced to religion. The relational construct changed and this changed the

relata. Therewere no specific points—relational constructs, relational content, or

signifiers—that went uncontested, but the changes were not random. ‘Science’

constructed as ‘not religion’ led to the association of science with naturalism,

naturalismwas thenused toexplainawayreligion, thisreductivestancewas then

associated with dogma and framed science in terms of ‘religion.’ So, as the

deconstructionistswouldhaveit,‘science’isnotastaticentityandtherelationsthat

structuredthechangeswerenotconstant.Yet,inagreementwithstructuralism,the

discursivechangesfollowedasortoflogic,givingusanaccountofthestructureof

change.Eachrelationalconstructwasastructuredresponsetopre-existingideas.You

7 To clarify, Derrida’s observations exhibited a structured response relative to structuralism.Furthermore, he argued for the constancy of change, meaning there is a constant nonetheless.Constancysuggestsstructure.

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cannot cross a bridge without stepping foot on both sides after all. A relational

perspective demonstrates both continuity and change in a systematic fashion,

reflectinghowthediscourseitselfunfolds.Thoughmeaningisincrediblydynamic,it

isnotchaotic.Existingculturalorconceptualcategoriesareusedtocomprehendnew

categories,asanthropologistMarshallSahlinsdemonstrated.Viathisactofreference,

thecategoriesacquirenewvaluesandnewreferentsandthereforechangemeaning.

As historian and social theoreticianWilliamH. Sewell Jr. explained it, “Any act of

referencechangestheempiricalcontentstowhichthecategoryrefers,andtherefore

affectstherangeofcharacteristicswhichitmayinclude.”Assuch,transformationis

both amodeof reproduction andof novel categorization—or,wemight say, both

structuredanddynamic.8

In the sameway that relationalism constitutes a compromise between the

perspectivesofstructuralismanddeconstructionism,thistheoryisalsoamiddleway

between essentialism and contextualism. The essence (or foundation) is the

transitoryandrelationalnatureofconceptsandthecontextcomesfromsituatingthe

relational constructs in the historical discourse. The relational parameters of

meaning allow us to discuss the termswithout the futile attempt to define them

withinagiveninstance.AsdiscussedinChapterOne,oneproblemofcontextualism

istheproblemofdefinition.Imentionedalreadythatthiscouldnotberesolvedby

furthernarrowing thecontextual scope.Even ifwe takecontextualism toextreme

levels of detail, following one individual’s formation of the term in question for

instance, we still could not avoid the problem of definition. John Tyndall (1820–

1893), for example, described ‘science’ as ‘empirical’ when compared to the

‘metaphysics’of‘religion’andas‘theoretical’whencontrastedwiththe‘empiricism’

ofmechanicians.9Furtherfocusinginoneitherthecontextofreligionormechanics

wouldexcludeimportantdataonthevarietyofmeaningsof‘science,’whichhappens

tobe a relational construction—that is, ‘science’ relative to ‘religion’ and ‘science’

relative to ‘mechanics.’ Depending on what science was defined relative to

8Sewell(2005),200,202–203,and217.Sahlinsdiscussedinibid.9Gieryn(1983),787.SeealsoGieryn(1999),37–64.

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determinedwhatsciencemeant,evenproducingcontradictorydefinitions.AsGieryn

noted:

[S]cientificknowledge isatoncetheoreticalandempirical,pureandapplied,objectiveandsubjective,exactandestimative,democratic(openforalltoconfirm)andelitist(expertsaloneconfirm),limitlessandlimited(tocertaindomainsofknowledge).

Asinglepointofdifferencedeterminedthesevariousunderstandingsof‘science’and

thatwastherelation.Gierynconcurred:“[C]haracteristicsattributedtosciencevary

widelydependinguponthespecificintellectualorprofessionalactivitydesignatedas

‘non-science’ […].”10 Furthermore, how definitions are understood vary widely

dependingontherelationalcontentofthesignifiers.Forinstance,wehaveseenthat

whether the objective excludes the subjective is contingent on the relation.

Contextualismtreatstermsasiftheyareindependententitiesparticulartotimeand

place, when concepts are actually very interdependent. Taking the relational

structureastheessenceshowshowrelationalprocessesdirecttheparticularsina

giveninstancewithoutgettingcaughtuponthoseparticularsasdefinitive. It isan

essentialismthatgivesanaccountofthecontextand,assuch,alsoprovidesalarger

historicalpictureviathemoregeneralizingrelationalprocesses.

Inthisway—byfocusingontheprocessesthatleadtotheparticulars—wecan

accountforcontingenciesbutstilldocomparisons—namely,regardingtherelational

constructs applied. To give a concrete example, we can see how the relational

construct of mutual exclusivity has endured despite the differing signifiers of

‘religion’and‘science.’JohnWilliamDraper(1811–1882)statedin1874,“Thehistory

ofScience[…]isanarrativeoftheconflictoftwocontendingpowers,theexpansive

force of the human intellect on one side, and the compression arising from

traditionary[sic]faithandhumaninterestsontheother.”11InDraper’sview,‘science’

referred to human intellect and ‘religion’ referred to tradition, faith, and human

interests.12Movingforwardtothetwenty-firstcentury,weseesimilarcommentson

the religion-science relation. Philosopher SamHarris stated, the “spirit ofmutual

10Gieryn(1983),792.11Draper(1875),vi–vii.12Asthiswasaworkontheconflictofreligionandscience,wecanbesurethatthelattercontendingpowerreferredtoreligion.

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inquiry,whichisthefoundationofallrealscience,istheveryantithesisofreligious

faith.”13Heassociated ‘religion’with irrationality anddogmaandhedrew further

associationsofsciencewithreasonandfacts.14InboththeDraperandHarrisquotes

weseemutualexclusivityinthenotionofthefundamentaloppositionofreligionand

science. However, in Draper’s understanding science was associated more with

intellect,whileforHarristhestrongerconnotationregardedinquiry.AndforDraper

religionwasthoughtofmainlyintermsoftradition,whileHarrissawitprimarilyas

dogma.Whilethealternativesignifiersof‘religion’and‘science’arenotworldsapart,

thecentralmeaningsandassociationshaveshiftedfocus.Thus,wemightnotbeable

tosoeasilysaythatbothseereligionandscienceinthesamewayandinsteadargue

that theseconceptsneed tobehistorically contextualized.However, the relational

constructapplied—mutualexclusivity—canbeseen inboth.Harrisused theword

‘antithesis,’whileDraperput the two ‘contendingpowers’ atopposite endsof the

spectrum.Thewayreligionandscienceareplacedrelativetooneanotheristhesame.

Relational constructs can be traced through time. They provide enduring

subject matter of analysis, as even when notions of religion and science change,

despiteallthevariances,therelationremains.Thus,drawingcomparisonsdoesnot

inanywaytakeawayfromcontextualconsiderations.Onewaytoexemplifythisisto

thinkabouttherelationshipsbetweencolors,whichwecananalogizetorelational

constructs.Redandgreenareonesetofcomplementarycolorsandblueandorange

another. In a relational analysis, whetherwe point to red and green or blue and

orangeisirrelevant,becausethefocusisonrelations—inthiscasecomplementarity

(which are opposites on the colorwheel). Draper’s andHarris’ understandings of

‘religion’ and ‘science’ in terms of color are as different as red/green is to

blue/orange.Butthatisnotproblematicbecausewearenotanalyzingcolors,weare

analyzing the relation between red and green and the relation between blue and

orange,whichisthesamerelation.Weareanalyzingcomplementarycolors,notthe

13Harris(2005b).Harrisfurtherclaimedthattheconflictis“inherent”and“(verynearly)zero-sum,”reflectingmutualexclusivity.Harris(2006).14SeealsoHarris(2005a),41.

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colors themselves. The relations of the colors are the objects of analysis because

colorsvaryandwewanttolookatsomethingmoreenduring.

Nonetheless the relation still tells us something about the specifics of the

deviating definitions, thus providing contextual insight. If we are discussing the

complementary color of blue, we know we are talking about orange; if we are

discussingtheoppositeofnaturalaspermutualexclusivity,weknowwearetalking

aboutthesupernatural. Inthisway,relationalityanalysisalsohelpsclarifywhatis

meant by the individual words of the definition. As the research has shown, the

naturalism-supernaturalism opposition and its relation to the religion-science

relationisnotconstant.Ifreligionandsciencearemutuallyexclusive,sciencedefined

intermsofnaturalismmeansnaturalismopposesreligion;iftheidentityconstructis

applied, religion will be wholly natural; if inclusive, naturalism will not oppose

religion;ifrepresentative,naturalismcannotbereductivelyidentifiedwithreligion

orscience.Arelationalperspectiverevealsmanydifferentmeaningsof‘naturalism’

here,dependingontheconstructapplied.Inthisway,relationalityanalysisallowsfor

generality(therelationalconstruct),aswellasspecificity(theparticularsignifiers

and their relational content). It allows for both historical comparison and

contextualization.Andevenwithinthiscomparison,mutualexclusivityisregardedas

onemanifestationofrelationalizationandtheoppositionalcontentofthesignifiers

are identified as one possible consequence of mutual exclusivity. The essentially

relational nature of concepts provides the continuity of which to draw historical

comparisons, while also highlighting the dynamism of the processes involved in

conceptformationandthoseprocesses,inturn,giveusstabilityandsingularaccounts

intheparticulars.

However,theessentialismofrelationalismisofadistinctivekind.Fromthis

perspective, a discussion of universals is misleading, since being is becoming,

meaningentitiesareasetofrelations,notindividualunits.Thus,relationsbecome

the essence, however by its very nature this precludes an essence to individual

entities (as innominalism),asarelationalessence indicatesco-dependentarising.

Against the grain, scholar of religion Jeppe Sinding Jensen has argued for the

importance and inescapability of universals, but for him universals imply

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“comparability”not“identity.”OneconsequenceofJensen’spositionisthatwecan

stepawayfromtheargumentontheprecisionofdefinitions,asiftheycouldpossibly

berealortrue,andinsteadtreatdefinitionsas“shorthandtheorieswhichrely[…]

uponcomplexesofconceptsandassemblagesofuniversals.”ThisJensendescribedas

amiddlewaybetweenessentialismandnominalism—labeled‘conceptualism’:

[T]he idea that we have universals in the form of concepts (as thoughts) with which weperformandgraspactions,eventsandthings,andbythehelpofwhichweareabletoclassifybymeansofnamesandtocomparethingsthatmayhavesomethingincommonaccordingtoourconcepts.

And, in the studyof religion, the central concepts of academic interest tend to be

generalandabstract,orspecificallytendtobeuniversals,makingtheissueofcentral

concern.Beingthattheseuniversalsdonotreferdirectlytoanempiricalobject,“They

are only meaningful in sets of relations of other terms, models, definitions,

generalizations,etc.inamoreholisticsystemorparadigm.”15

Taking relations as the essence gives us insight into the delusiveness of

definitional precision. Definitions are the coming into being of new networks of

meaning;theyarenottheidentificationofthings.Weactuallyloseprecisionwiththe

burgeoningofevermoreandvaryingdefinitionsbecauseitexponentiallyexpandsthe

relational dynamics involved. It is a particularly persistent illusion as detailed

explanationsobviouslyseemtocreateamorevividpicture,butthispicture,inturn,

couldbefurtherexplained,makingthatinitialdepictionbroadincomparisontoits

conceptionpriortothatexplanation.Putdifferently,eachlevelofexplanationmakes

thenetworkofmeaningsurroundingtheexplanandummorebroadandthusmore

complex,notmoreprecise.‘Precision’hasactuallymadeanalyticalcategoriesmore

obscure.Truly,wecannotseetheforestthroughthetrees.Solongaswecontinuewith

the standard definitional approach, these issues cannot be avoided. Instead, to

understand the word ‘religion’ we need to understand how words mean—to

understandtherelationalconstructionofmeaning.

Though nominalism reflects a postmodern outlook, essentialism certainly

doesnot.Westernphilosophywaslongpreoccupiedwithfindingasortoffinaltheory

15Jensen(2001),241,255,and259.

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ofknowledgebasedonunchangingfactorsthatcansimplifyallunderasoleideaor

origin. This has resulted in many ‘grand narratives’ that have since fallen out of

fashionwiththeriseofpostmodernism.PhilosopherJean-FrancoisLyotard(1924–

1998) even specifically defined this intellectual shift as an “incredulity toward

metanarratives.”16 Scholar of religion David McMahan similarly pointed out that

claims of homogeneity or of a monolithic nature to anything is the butt of the

academic’s joke, constituting “the most fashionable and stinging critique.”17 The

reason for this isbecause, in thepostmodernoutlook, it iswidely recognized that

there is little constancy to anything, all residing on some contingencies, and that

meaningiselusive.Andyetwerarelyseethisrecognizeddynamismtakenseriously

inregardtohowwedefineourterms.Mostacknowledgetheproblem—contingencies

arerecognized—butthendefinitionsareproposedthatarethoughttobemeaningful.

Thiscertainlyseemsabitessentialistinthattoholdsuchanargumentonemustthink

thereissomeperceptiblecommonalitycorrespondingtothesewords.Or,atthevery

least,suchaviewfails toupholdnominalismin thethought thataproliferationof

concepts proposed in definitionswill help to forma general term. Sometimes the

problemissidestepped,aswhenmanyarguethereisnowayoutoftheproblemof

contingencyandcontextualism,butalasthisisanothermetanarrative.

Critiquesofessentialismabound,butwhatIfindtobethemostproblematic

point for the grand narrative account is that essence is commonly understood as

static,immutable,stable.However,the‘essence’Iproposeisrelationalandthusitis

necessarily characterized by process, not stasis.18 In this case, the essence of the

‘individual’unitisnotmonadic.Ifessenceisrelationalthentheontologyofwhatwe

understandasindividuationsisnecessarilymultiple,whichisimplicitintheideaof

16Lyotard(1984),xxiv.17McMahan(2008),149.18Relationalismissodifficulttodiscussexactlybecausewethinkrelationally.Conceptsbifurcatetheworldandlanguageispredisposedto‘unit’talk.AsthesocialtheoristNorbertEliasoncesaid,“Ourlanguagesareconstructedinsuchawaythatwecanoftenonlyexpress[…]constantchangeinwayswhichimplythatithasthecharacterofanisolatedobject[…]Wesay,‘Thewindisblowing,’asifthewindwereactuallyathingatrestwhich,atagivenpointintime,beginstomoveandblow.Wespeakasifawindcouldexistwhichdidnotblow.”QuotedinEmirbayer(1997),283.Itisthesamewhenweattempttodescribearelationalessence.Wespeakasifarelationsact,likethewindblows,wheninfact,relationsareactionsasthewindistheblowing.

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‘relation.’Entities “arenotassumedas independentexistencespresentanterior to

anyrelation,but…gaintheirwholebeing…first inandwiththerelationswhichare

predicatedofthem.Such‘things’aretermsofrelations[…].”19Thesameistruefor

concepts:“[C]onceptscannotbedefinedontheirownassingleontologicalentities;

rather,themeaningofoneconceptcanbedecipheredonlyintermsofits‘place’in

relation to the other concepts in its web.”20 This means two things: (1) being is

ontologically multiple—to be is to be in a relation; existence is characterized by

networks,notnodes;and(2)nodesderivefromnetworksandtherearemany,such

thatthereareotherontologiesfor‘units’like‘religion’and‘science’dependingonthe

relation.So,theontologyforthe‘units’aremultipleandtherearemultipleontologies

fortheseontologicallymultiple‘units.’

Ithinktheideathat‘relation’impliesontologicalmultiplicityisclearenough,

howeverregardingthepointthattherearemultipleontologiesfortherelatamight

needfurtherexplanation.Here,itmightbeofsomehelptomentionMarioBlaser,who

argued, “ontology is a way of worlding.” Simplifying his complex argument, he

maintainedthatontologyshouldbeunderstoodasacategory“inwhichtheheuristic

devicecontributestoenactthefact.”Ontologyis“aformofenactingareality”andthis

ismultifarious.21Similarlyadiscursiveperspectivecontends that “if thediscourse

changes,theobjectnotonlychangesitsmeaning,butitbecomesadifferentobject;it

loses itsprevious identity.”22Asstated inChapterTwo, Ihavetakenaperspective

akintohistoricalontology,whichfocusesonthecomingintobeingofobjects.When

we apply Blaser’s understanding ofmultiple ontologies to the historical ontology

perspective,wecanconceiveofthecomingintobeingsofobjectsasvariedaswell.

And the relational analysis herein has shown that this is indeed the case—the

historical ontology of religion and science is really a story of ontologies. Which

19QuotedinEmirbayer(1997),287.SeealsoCherwitz&Darwin(1995),19:“[E]ntitiesthemselvesarenotself-containedormonadic;relationallyconceived,entitiesareconstitutedbyandgivenintegritythrough their intersection and coalescence with other entities.” Emphasis original. Though I thinkreaderswill get the point that there are no individual entities, still language is inhibiting here, as‘intersection’and‘coalescence’bothimplya‘comingtogether’ofdistinctunits.20QuotedinEmirbayer(1997),300.21Blaser(2013),551.22Jäger(2001),43.

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relationalconstruct isapplied—whichheuristicdevice—notonlybringstheobject

intobeing,orputdifferentlyexpressesthebecomingoftheobject,butalsoenactsthe

fact,likethefactofconflictforinstance.Asstatedpreviously,religionandscienceare

notmutuallyexclusivebecause theyconflict, theyconflictbecause theyhavebeen

constructedasmutuallyexclusive.Thehistoricalontologyofmutualexclusivity—the

comingintobeingofmutualexclusivity—enactedthefactofconflict.AsSewellnoted,

categorization“makesthings intoresourcesofaspecificsortandtherebysubjects

them to socialdynamics characteristicof that category.”23Theontologyofmutual

exclusivitymakesa‘religion’and‘science’ofaparticularkindthatthenactsaccording

to that category. It isawayofworlding that constitutesone formofenactingone

reality.Butthereareotherways;therearemultipleontologies—the‘religions’and

‘sciences’of ‘religionandscience’areeachontologicallydistinctaseachrelational

constructhasbroughtintobeingdifferent‘objects.’

Oneconsequenceisthatthispositionofmultipleontologiesisitselfaheuristic

proposition, constituting “a foundationless foundational claim.” Put differently,

because the heuristic device enacts the fact, the position is self-generating, “an

experiment of bringing itself into being.” Though self-generating, this is not self-

refuting,asinsteadoffocusingontheproblemofontologicalconflicts,“Theproblem

space can thenbe characterizedas thedynamics throughwhichdifferentwaysof

worldingsustainthemselvesevenastheyinteract, interfere,andminglewitheach

other.”24Certainlythereareotherontologiesofconceptsandmeaningstructurethat

are odds withmy own, but various ways of looking at the world, such as in the

postmodernview,havealsointeractedandmingledwithmyownperspective,giving

it conceptual space via contrast. And thinking on this problem space in terms of

religion-science relations, I hope to have shown the central place of relational

dynamics in themultiple historical ontologies of religion and science and to have

showntheanalyticalvalueinthis‘experimentofbringingrelationalityanalysisinto

being.’ The performative character of my ontology will become clearer when we

23Sewell(2005),216.24Blaser(2013),551–552.

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consider its position relative to other dominant modes of intellectual thought

following the postmodern turn, further highlighting the construction of

‘relationalism’inarelationalway.

2.2 Post-postmodernismandRelationalismWhatwehaveseenthusfaristhatthemetanarrativehereisquitedifferentfromthe

structuralistgrandnarrativeofacrystalizedframework.Andevenwiththisdynamic

metanarrativeguidingmywork,Ionlysuggestabeginningtosomethingthatmight

developintoagrandernarrativeofdynamism,ofmultiplicity,includinganaccountof

solely standing narratives. The solely standing narrative (of a multiplicity of

narratives)thatisrelevanthereisthatofrelationalismandthisneedstobeaccounted

for under its own theory, something the critical theories of postmodernism have

famously struggled with. The postmodern credo against all narratives places the

postmodern narrative under the same critique. Michel Foucault (1926–1984)

regarded this as an unavoidable and irresolvable problem. Foucault claimed,

“interpretation can never be brought to an end,” because all interpretation is a

constructthatcanneverapproachtruth.25

Inpostmodernthought,theproblematizationofinterpretationhassooftenled

to a nihilistic view of linguistic comprehensibility. Instead of leading to the anti-

foundationalist conclusion that there is no truth beyond experience, we can take

interpretationasthefoundation.SomehavetakenFoucaultthisway.ButI,unlikethe

relativists, do not comportwith FriedrichWilhelmNietzsche’s (1844–1900) view

thatthereisnothingmorethan“arbitraryconstructionsofmeaningonwhatwould

otherwisebenothingbutchaos.”26Ibelievethatrelationalityanalysisisawayoutof

the dead end of postmodernpreoccupationwith the problems of language—their

relativities and contingencies and the multiplicity of narratives accompanying

them—while at the same time recognizing their importance. In order to advance

thingsbeyondthepreoccupationwithdefinitions,Ihavetalkedaboutnothingother

25QuotedinGairdner(2008),256.26QuotedinGairdner(2008),260.SeealsoCherwitz&Hikins(1995),74,whichalsoincludesseveralreferencestoscholarswhotreatlanguageasarbitrary.

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than our definitions. In many ways, I found this a loathsome project, but it was

somethingthatneededtobedone.Themainthrustandmotivationofthisworkwas

toliberatewordsfromthisnihilisticcesspool.AssociologistPierpaoloDonatinoted,

“Theproblemofrelativismisresolvedbyspecifyingtherelationsamongthedifferent

systemsofreference,orbyspecifyingthevariablescharacteristicofnontrivialstates

ofthesystem,whichareusedforanalysis[…].”27Interpretationmaybeconstructed,

butitisnotarbitrary,atleast,notinentirety.Interpretationisstructured,structured

by relational constructs, signifiers, and relational content of signifiers. Though

meaningforanygiventermisinnumerable(wecanalwaysentanglenewdiscourses)

andconstitutesasociallycontingentfact,onemustfollowtherulesofconstructionor

otherwise be incomprehensible. If meaning making were completely arbitrary I

daresaythatwewouldnotbeabletocommunicateatall!Apostmodernperspective

mightupholdthat indeedwecannot,butthenhowcouldweevenunderstandthis

claimtoincomprehensibility?Theremustbesomegroundsfordiscernment.

Furthermore,becausetherearemultipleontologiesenactingthefactofmany

objectssolabeled‘religion’and‘science,’these‘units’arenotfallacious,butnorare

they reflections of ‘ultimate reality.’ Rather, Blaser argued, “they partake in the

performanceofthatwhichtheynarrate,”suchasinthecaseoftheenactmentofthe

factofmutuallyexclusivityintheconflictthesis.28Assuch,relationalconstructsare

contingentlystabilized,anobservationappliedtocategoryformationbysociologist

Margaret R. Somers.29 This is both an ontological and epistemological claim, as

relationality“determinesthepossibilitiesfor‘things’intheworld,”aswellas“what

canbeknown.”30Oneconsequenceofthisisthatyoucannotseparateoutrealityfrom

interpretation, since to some degree they are mutually constitutive. Such a

perspective isneeded toaccount for thedialectical relationshipbetweenconcepts

andhumanactivities,whereby“ratherthan ‘referringto,’ language ‘referswith.’”31

27Donati(2010),18.28Blaser(2013),552.29DiscussedinEmirbayer(1997),300.30Cherwitz&Hikins(1995),81.31Cherwitz&Darwin(1994),314.SeealsoCherwitz&Darwin(1995);andCherwitz&Hikins(1995),79.

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Andrelatedtothisconsequenceisthatreductionistviewoflanguageisavoided—the

viewofastaticprocessofreferentialitytoaworld‘outthere.’Inrhetoricaltheories

ofmeaning,thereistypicallyacategoricaldistinctionbetweenlanguageandobjects.

A relational view, in contrast, emphasizes co-arising andmutual definition.32 This

means that reality “constrains rhetoric,” while meanings simultaneously “shape

reality.”33 And this is exactly what we have seen in the dialogic development of

relational constructs. Meaning making is a process “where a term is created or

employedtoembodycertainsetsofrelataandtheirinterrelationships.”Thisleadsto

theconclusionthat“thereisaninherentontologicalbondbetweenthemeaningful

termsinalanguageandthecontextofrealitywithinwhichtheyoperate,”meaning

“language is most certainly not arbitrary.”34 As such, I again take a middle-way

approach,thistimetothenominalist-realistdivide,adistinctionthatisblurredfrom

the perspective of a relational metaphysics already. This means that knowledge

formationisdependentonbothrealityandourperceptionsofit—becauserealityis

thisrelation—inaco-constitutiveformationwherebymentalconstructsconcretize

realityintheshapethatwecanfurtherinteractwith.Fromarelationalperspective,

meaningorlanguageisnotentirelydeterministicnorisitentirelysubjective.35

Gairdner also argued that postmodernism “inevitably produces a kind of

discursivechaosbecauseiteliminatesnotonlytheexpectationofobjectivetruthbut

alsotheveryconditionsforitspossibility.”36Thisisacommonobjectionleveledat

discourseanalysisaswell.37Idisagreethatthelackofanidentifiableobjectivetruth

leavesuswithchaos.Discourseanalysis,evenifregardedasagameofwordsearch,

is a game with rules. It seems to me that the logic of interpretation cannot be

deconstructed.Putdifferently,thoughindividualinterpretationsaredeconstructible,

how interpretations are structured, by relationalization, is constant. But

32HowarelationalviewchallengesreductionisttheoriesofmeaningisdiscussedinCherwitz&Darwin(1994);andCherwitz&Darwin(1995).33Cherwitz&Darwin(1994),316.Emphasisoriginal.34Cherwitz&Hikins(1995),80.Emphasisoriginal.35Cherwitz&Darwin(1995),24.36Gairdner(2008),262.37Ontheobjectionoflimitlessnesstodiscourseanalysisandaresponse,seevonStuckrad(2016b),220–221.

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relationalism, following the lineof thinking to thenext level, is alsoaffirmativeof

something non-relational, but this affirmation is not a ‘positive’ philosophy, but

affirmswhatisbeyondthedistinctionofpositiveandnegative,foundationalandanti-

foundational,therelationalandnon-relational.Recall,emptinessisitselfempty.This

islikehowthephilosopherJohnCaputointerpretedthelateDerrida,afterhisturn

toward the undeconstructibles, as even though deconstruction is a negative

philosophy, thenegativemust be relative to something,which affirms a structure

pervadingsuchbinaries.38

Ihavethoughtofmyworkasareactionagainstpostmodernism,particularly

becauseIfounditsclaimsoftheincomprehensibilityofhumancommunicationtobe

(ironically)nonsense.Throughoutmyworkonthisproject,Ibegantothinkofitasa

post-postmodernmanifesto, though Ihadyet to realize that ‘post-postmodernism’

was a term already in somewhat regular use. Despite the hegemony of

postmodernism inourpresent academic fad,many scholarsof intellectualhistory

agreethatpostmodernismisanageofthepast.Whaterahasreplacedit,though,has

beenlabeledmanythings.39Alternativesasides,theunsavory‘post-postmodernism’

seems to be themost oftenused label,whichoften involves a sprinkling of ‘post-

poststructuralism’ and ‘post-deconstructionism.’ Though, as with any intellectual

movement,post-postmodernismrefers toawidespanofmorespecific systemsof

thought and cultural practices, what is of interest here are notions of knowledge

formation,the(in)comprehensibilityoflanguage,andtheontologyofconcepts.

Cultural theorists Timotheus Vermeulen and Robin van der Akker

characterizedthisphase,‘metamodernism,’asontologicallybetweenmodernismand

postmodernism.40Theydescribedanoscillationbetween“modernenthusiasmand

postmodern irony, between hope and melancholy, between naïveté and

knowingness,empathyandapathy,unityandplurality, totalityand fragmentation,

purityandambiguity.”Thisisconceptualizedasa“‘both-neither’dynamic,”“atonce

38DiscussedinGairdner(2008),267.SeealsoCaputo(1997),128–129.39 E.g., ‘metamodernism,’ ‘postmillennialism,’ ‘pseudomodernism,’ and ‘hypermodernism,’‘altermodernism’—allidentifiedwithaturnawayfrompostmodernism.Alltermsvaryastowhetherahyphenispresentorwhethertheprefixconstitutesaseparateword.40Vermeulen&vandenAkker(2010).

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bothhereandthereandnowhere.”Thisresonateswiththerelationalismperspective

in its embraceof amultiplicityofnarratives includingaccountsof solely standing

narratives,makingithere,there,andnowhere.VermeulenandvanderAkkerinsisted

thatthisoscillationisapendulumswingandnotabalance,asthe“unificationoftwo

opposedpoles” “will not, cannever, and shouldnever” be realized. This seems to

reflectthemoodoftheage,asseenintheinclusivity,representation,andrelational

perspectives, which involve a reconciliation of the deep dichotomies of human

existencewithoutareductiveidentitybetweenthe‘opposed’poles.Butcontraryto

Vermeulen and van der Akker, I think this is a rejection that dichotomies are

oppositional, which is exactly what allows them, conceptually speaking, to be

simultaneouslymaintained. It leaves thedichotomies intact,but rejects thenotion

thatthis leavesuswithaneither-orchoice. It is, indeed, ‘both-neither,’whileeven

‘and-or’ is acceptable. From a relational perspective, there is no exclusion, even

exclusion is included. As the artist Luke Turner stated in his “Metamodernist

Manifesto,”“Allinformationisgroundsforknowledge[…]nomatteritstruth-value.”

Themanifestois“inpursuitofapluralityofdisparateandelusivehorizons.”41

Thoughmy comments on the ‘mood of the age’ are in part speculative, as

evidencewecanlookagaintothecurrentstatusofthereligion-sciencerelation.Ido

notthinkit isanexaggerationtosaythereligionandscienceconstitutetwoofthe

main—if not the two main—knowledge systems that impact human meaning

making.42Assuch,thereligion-sciencerelationcantellusalotaboutourintellectual

eraand,asIhavediscussedthoroughly,inclusivityandrepresentationconstitutetwo

particularlysalientrelationalconstructsinthepresentage.Theapathy,skepticism,

andmilitantagnosticismofthepostmoderncondition—aswellasthehubrisinthe

sciencesofthemoderncondition—remainprevalentaswell,buttherehascontinued

tobeastructuredresponsetothesepositionsintheattempttoofferalternatives.In

thisway,IagreewithVermeulenandvanderAkkerthatourpresentdayandagecan

bedescribedintermsofareactiontobothmodernismandpostmodernism,findinga

41Turner(2011).42 Although all views require some philosophical premises, perhaps making philosophy the mostinfluential.Andyetreligionandscienceareoftenthesourcesofthesephilosophicalpremises.

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space‘between’thatis,inasense,“atonceaplaceandnotaplace,aterritorywithout

boundaries,apositionwithoutparameters.”43Though,Ihavetakenthestancethat

there are parameters, but those parameters are relational and dynamic; the

foundationisflow.AsTurnerstated,“Werecogniseoscillationtobethenaturalorder

of the world […] with diametrically opposed ideas […] propelling the world into

action.”44

Perhapsinterpretationisaneverlasting issueasFoucaultclaimed,however

this need not be negatively evaluative or result in nihilistic views toward

communication.Interpretationisthefoundingflowofmeaningmaking.Stillthisdoes

bringtheissuetolightoftheneedforself-reflectionandofplacingourownnarratives

underthepurviewofouranalysis.Tothatend,wemusttakenotethatrelationalism

isitselfrelationallyconstructed—indeed,“itadvancesamethodfordefendingitsown

theoreticaltenets.”45Whereaspostmodernismcannotaccountforitselfunderitsown

narrative,theperspectiveofrelationalismcanberelationalizedtobringtheargument

to its logical conclusion.46 All things aremutually conceptualized after all. I have

explicatedmytheoryandmethodinspecificcontrasttothecustomarydefinitional

approach. I have developed my ideas of dynamism in response to reification of

conceptsasstaticentities. Ihaverepeatedlyemphasizedbecomingoverbeingand

processes rather than stasis. I have placed my theory relative to the binaries of

modernism/postmodernism, structuralism/deconstruction,

essentialism/contextualism, essentialism/nominalism, and nominalism/realism.

Relationalismisastructuredreactiontotherelationalcontent,specificallythemutual

exclusivity,of these theoretical frameworks.Theserelationalizationsconstruct the

relevantconceptsathand,creatingaconceptualspaceforarticulatingnovelwaysof

thinking about theworld.More than any other one thing, relationalism has been

43Vermeulen&vandenAkker(2010).44Turner(2011).45Cherwitz&Darwin(1995),28.46By‘conclusion,’Idonotmeananendtomeaningmaking,butratherIamreferringtoargumentsdeducedfromtheimplicationsofthetheoryappliedtothetheoryitself.Arelationalviewcouldalwaysresultinnewrelationsrelativetopre-existingconcepts,givingrisetonewrelationalities,adinfinitum.Still,thatwouldnotnegatetheconclusionshere,butrathercontinuetoaffirmtherelationalnatureofconceptformation.

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constructedrelative tonon-relationalmodelsand inspecific contrast to thesolely

standingperspectivesembodiedintheindividualrelationalconstructsdiscussed.

As such, applying relationalism to the studyof the religion-science relation

also creates another relational construct—one that levels the playing field for all

relationalconstructs.Whatwemightcallthe‘relationalismconstruct’isaconstruct

thatencompassesallconstructs,butconstructedincontrasttotakingasoleconstruct.

Still,relationalismtakesaninclusiveandrepresentationalview(inthesenseofthe

constructs—that is, non-oppositional and non-reductive) toward all relational

constructs,aswellasnon-relationalmodels,meaningitdoesnottakesolelystanding

narrativesasnegatedinthisview.Inthisway,inclusivityandrepresentationcreated

theparametersforarelationalview,takingtheirpresumptionstowardreligionand

science, but applying them to all relational constructs. There is no opposition or

reductionbetweenanyoftheconstructs,onlycomplementarity,withrelationalism

constituting thewhole. It is an account of solely standingnarratives, but one that

rejects the position of one or the other as a misunderstanding of the nature of

concepts.Thatdoesnotmakethesolelystandingnarrativeswrong—theycannotbe,

sinceconceptsaremutable.Eachrelationalconstructisvalidasanexpressionofthe

data.But itdoespositionsolelystandingnarratives to theexclusionofalternative

narrativesasanalyticallyweakbecausebycommittingtoasolestance,theydonot

recognizethismutability.

Theproblemforrelationalism,then,istojustifyatheoreticalcommitmentto

this stance. In this work, I have shown that our definitions implicitly affirm

presumptions of relations and relations constructwords.No one has a privileged

position and knowledge cannot be stigmatized because it does not follow one’s

compartmentalization of ‘religion’ and ‘science.’ Yet, this is not about eliminating

justified belief; it is about justifying the plurality of belief. Such an argument for

pluralism,though,mightseemtounderminethiscommitmenttorelationalismasthe

mostadequateframework.However,sincethetheoryofrelationalismisconstructed

relationally,aswithallthings,itisoneperspectiveonabi-perspectivalviewingand

thus is not a complete concept on its own. At the same time, because of the self-

reflective perspective that accommodates the two poles of bifurcation, the

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‘incompleteness’isenfoldedinthetheorynonetheless.Theexpositionofthetheory

itself acknowledges the presence of and relation to alternate theories—reflexivity

andpluralityarebuiltintoarelationalview.Inthisway,relationalism“accountsfor

itself as a theory” as a product of relationalization. As such, “the theory’s own

situatednesscanberevealedandcritiqued.”47Thisissimilartothecriticalreflection

found in discourse analysis, which accounts for the discursive position itself as a

productofdiscourse.48AsKockuvonStuckradstated:

Inacriticaldialoguewehavetolayopentheconditionsthatgavebirthtoourmeaningsandsubsequentpropositions.Onlythenwillitbepossibletoshowthatthoseconditionsaremorethanthediscourseoftheday.Theyareshapedbycustomarypatternsofthoughtorhabitandbypersistenttraditionsthatareanythingbutrandom.49

Therelationalityofrelationalismmightbeconsidered‘post-deconstructionist’

because it accepts the variety and veracity of interpretation, but rejects the

conclusionthatthisinvolvesamoveawayfromstructuralism.Still,structuremustbe

thoughtofanew,intermsofrelations,thussecuring“thepossibilityofbothmultiple

meanings/interpretations, aswell as objectively accessiblewaysof accounting for

suchinterrelations,”includingnon-relationalmodels,whichhaveaplaceinthismeta-

model.Incontrasttodeconstructionism,thoughinterpretationismultiple,itisatthe

same time “limited by the ontological and epistemological constraints relational

possibility affords.”50 Still, I have yet to find any systematic treatment of post-

poststructuralism or post-deconstructionism. Richard Cherwitz and James Hikins

touched on the subject, and, indeed, they did describe post-deconstructionism in

termsofaturntowardarelationalviewofmeaning.Fromtheirperspective,meaning

is a function of relations, they embody relations, and language identifies

47Firstquote,Cherwitz&Darwin(1995),27;second,Cherwitz&Darwin(1994),316.48vonStuckrad(2010),157–158;andvonStuckrad(2016b),216.49vonStuckrad(2003),261.50Cherwitz&Hikins(1995),84.Though,Iwouldfavortheterm‘bounded’over‘limited.’CherwitzandHikinsarguedthatrelationalimpossibilitiesarenotpermissiblesubjectsofinterpretation—therearenosquarecirclestospeakof,forinstance.Seeibid.,85.But,speakingoftheabsenceofsquarecirclesistospeakofthem.Itcreatesadiscourse.Butthediscourseisonlypermissiblebecausetheconceptof‘relational impossibilities’ is relative to ‘relational possibilities’ after all. Just because relationsstructuremeaningmakingdoesnot lead to theconclusion that interpretation is limited.Bywayofanalogy,wecanthinkoftheflowofariver,boundedbythestructureofterrain,butgrowthis,atleastinprinciple,endless.Structuredoesnotnecessitatefinitude.

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interrelationships.51 I too anticipate that the post-deconstructionist age will be a

criticaltheorynotunlikerelationalism,atheoryofstructureddynamism,bounded

ambiguity, and contextualized universals—‘ontologically betweenmodernism and

postmodernism.’Relationallyspeaking,thisisthenaturaloutgrowthofthediscourse,

a structured response to the pre-established systems of meaning in relative

perspective.

3 FutureDirectionsforResearch

Inthiswork,Ihaveattemptedtoshowtherelationalnatureofdiscursivechange,that

meaningisproceduralandcannotbeisolatedtoapointeveninspecificcontexts,and

thattheproblemofdefinitioncanbeovercome.Wheredowegofromhere?Weneed

toreframeourhistoricalanalysisappropriately,inarelational,proceduralmanner

that reflects the data, as I have attempted to do here. In doing so, the virtues of

historicalanalysisandofthestudyofreligioncanbemaintained.Wecancontinueto

do comparative work, but now the comparison is between relational constructs

insteadofstaticdefinitions.Contextualismcanremaininstrumental,butnowwithan

eyetorelationalparameters,whichrevealfurthernuances.Wecancontinuetotreat

religious studies as a unified field based on the concept ‘religion,’ but now the

continuityoftheconceptlieswithinitsrelationalstructure.AsJensenobserved,there

must be some commonality otherwise the ideaof the ‘studyof religion’wouldbe

incoherent.52Butfromarelationalviewthereisnosingular‘religion’beinganalyzed,

ratherthereareprocessesofobjectreificationthatarenowbeinginvestigated.

Therearemanyapplicationsofarelationalapproach,someofwhichIalluded

to inpassing throughout thiswork.Oneareaof research that I think relationality

analysiswouldbeparticularlyfruitful is intherealmoftranslationandlinguistics.

Translationisinterpretation,asmanyhaveargued.Thisispartlybecausewhatever

termsarechosen“cannothelpbutpickupthetremendousculturalresonances”the

51Cherwitz&Hikins(1995).52Jensen(2001),238.

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wordsinvoke.53Thisisarelationalmatter,notonlyintermsofwhatconnotationsthe

translatedwordseduce,butalsoconcerningwhichtermischosentobeginwith.As

mentioned in Chapter Seven, bodhi was translated as ‘enlightenment’ for the

particularpurposesof itsconnotationwiththeEuropeanEnlightenment.Relations

determinedwhyitwaschosenandrelationsdeterminedhowthetermledtofurther

developments in theBuddhism-sciencerelation.Relationalityanalysiscanprovide

reflectiononthismeta-level,butitcanalsobeusedinfuturetranslationprojectsto

bring some transparency to the relational implications. For example, mokṣa

translated as ‘freedom’ would need to take into account freedom fromwhat and

compared and contrasted towhat, thereby deemphasizing the great political and

intellectualassociationsthistermhashadthroughouthistory.54Relationalityanalysis

canalsoprovideameanstomoreaccuratelytranslateterms.Iftranslatorsintroduce

termsbytheirrelationalconstructioninthemotherlanguage,terminologycouldbe

alotmoreeffectiveandunderstandinggreatlyenhanced.Forinstance,thedao(‘the

way’)ofDaoismwasconstructedrelativetode(‘virtue’)intheearliestDaoistusesof

the term (i.e., in the Daodejing). This gives insight into the network of meaning

surroundingthetermoutsideofastrictlyliteraltranslationoftheChinesecharacters.

Relationality analysis can also legitimate the comparison of words from different

languages, like ‘scientia’ and ‘science,’ for example, giving an account of their

relationaletymology.Byfocusingonconstructioninrelativeperspective,thereare

noclaimsofinherentlinks,butratherafocusonthehistorical,social,anddiscursive

developmentsthatcreatedsuchconnections.

Relationality analysis would also be tremendously helpful in addressing

traditional binaries in academic study, like the East and West, the Orient and

Occident.Likeinthefieldofreligionandscience,manyinaccuraciesofsuchsimplistic

schemes have been problematized with historical contingencies and contexts.

However,relationalityanalysiscanaddtothisbyshowingtheprocessofconceptual

emergence andhow the relational constructs applied to these binaries have been

53McMahan(2008),18.54DiscussedinMcMahan(2008),18.

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manipulatedtoproducenewviewsoftheworld.Forexample,theEasthashistorically

beeninterpretedintheWestasthe ‘Other,’openingupallsortsofpossibilitiesfor

relationalconstruction.55SociologistColinCampbell,forone,argued,“onecanthink

oftheWestascontainingtheEastwithinitself[…]asapurelylogicalcounterpoint,

but also in the form of a kind of ever-present alter ego.”56While this played into

colonialism, the rhetoric was turned back against the European suppressors, as

Asians actively presented their traditions “asmore intuitive,moremystical,more

experiential,andthus ‘purer’thanthediscursivefaithsoftheWest. Inshort, if the

Westexcelledmaterially,theEastexcelledspiritually.”BuddhologistRobertH.Sharf

concluded, “This strategyhad the felicitous result of thwarting theEnlightenment

critiqueofreligionontheonehand,andthethreatofWesternculturalhegemonyon

theother.”57Assuch,weseehowpre-existingrelationalconstructsstructured the

emergenceofnovelconceptualizationsonceagain.Usingarelationalperspectiveas

aguide,wecanaccountfortheconceptualtransformationsfromEast-Westmutual

exclusivity,tonotionsofWesternizationandEasternization—alikeningthatexhibits

theidentityconstruct—toideasofglobalization—akintoinclusivity—andeventhe

‘glocal’—notunlikerepresentation,whichtakesintoaccounttheextremepolesofthe

globalandthelocal.

Futurework in relationality analysis need not be limited by the relational

constructs proposed. As mentioned in Chapter Two, these constructs are not

exhaustive.Relationalityanalysiscouldalso lookat triadicrelations,which I think

wouldbeparticularlyrelevantinthestudyofreligion,science,andmagic,sincemagic

has frequently been analyzed in terms of a middle ground between religion and

science. There is also the role of super- and sub-ordinated concepts to consider.

Looking to the example of religion and science once again, this brings tomind a

particularlysalientsuper-ordinatedconcept—‘knowledgesystems.’Placingreligion

55Batchelor(2011),275–276.56Campbell(2007),146.SeealsoMcMahan(2008),77.TheconstructionoftheEastasthe‘Other’oftheWest isa topiccoveredextensively in the literature.Foronekey text, seeSaid(1978).ThoughEdward Said focused on the Middle East, his thesis has been applied across Asia in numerouspublications.57Sharf(2000),275.SeealsoMcMahan(2011),138.

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andscienceasunderthecategoryofknowledgesystemscreatesauniquerelational

construct,wherebythetwoaredifferentiated,butcouldbelikenedornot,opposed

ornot,reducedtooneanotherornot,andstillmaintaintherelationalstructure.This

is unlike any of the other relational constructs discussed herein, aside from the

relationalismconstruct.Religionandsciencehavealsohistoricallybeentreatedas

sub-ordinatedconceptsunderalarger‘family’ofmeaning,like‘ethics’and‘morality,’

making the two differentiated at the first level and likened to the degree of

identificationatameta-level.This,too,constitutesauniqueconstruct.

Though I have argued that defining ‘religion’ and ‘science’ in relative

perspectivehasbeenamajorcarrierofmeaningmakingfortheterms,thereare,of

course,additionalinfluentialtermsthatdeserveconsideration.Therelationalization

of ‘science’ and ‘technology’ has been particularly important; and on the side of

‘religion,’therelationalizationwith‘spirituality’makesforoneofthemostimportant

identitymarkersofourage.

Regardingreligionandscience,thereisanothercentralconceptinthemaking

ofthereligion-sciencerelationthatdeservesconsideration:theterm‘secular.’Future

workontherelationalityofreligionandsciencecouldgreatlybenefitfromfurther

investigationofthisnetworkofmeaning.Thisisbecausebythetwentiethcentury,

scientific knowledge production had become practically synonymous with

secularism.58Thisinfluentialversionofthesecularizationthesiscanbeanalyzedasa

manifestationofthemutualexclusivityconstruct,of‘scienceasnotreligion.’59Thisis

apparent intheparticularaspectofthethesis’notionthatreligionandscienceare

inverselyrelated—asonewaxestheotherwanes—whichwasforatimethemaster

modelofsociology.60However,justaswehaveseenelsewhereregardingthereligion-

58LittleHersh(2010),523.Seealso,Berger(1967),158, inwhich ‘science’ isdescribedas ‘secularreason.’Cf.Bruce(1996),48–52andBruce(2002),106–117,whoofferedmanycounterexamplesandreferences, thoughstill recognizeda connectionbetweenscienceandsecularization.Bruce (1996),106–117arguedagainst,butnoteditstheoreticalprevalence.SeealsoAechtner(2015),218–219.59Thoughthisisnotnecessary.Thereareotherstrandsofsecularizationthatdonotnecessarilyappealtotheauthorityofscience.SeeEvans&Evans(2008),99,whichalsoincludesseveralreferences.60E.g.,Stark&Finke(2000),61.SeealsoNorris&Inglehart(2004),3.Conceptualizingbothsecularismand the progression of scientific knowledge in terms of religious declinewas expressed bymanyseminal social thinkers of the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, including Auguste Comte(1798–1857),KarlMarx(1818–1883),Spencer,ÉmileDurkheim(1858–1917),SigmundFreud(1856–

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sciencerelation,therelationalconstructismalleable.Secularizationtheoryhasbeen

suggestedtobesimplydisguisedmilitantsecularism.61Suchaviewhasbeentreated

as a counter-religious ideology, reminiscent of religionization as this ‘religion’ is

treated as an inadequate and false science, an agenda-based sociological theory.62

Thiscanleadtotheconclusionthatitisnot‘science’or‘sociology,’butreductively

religiousasintheidentityconstruct.Theinclusivityandrepresentationconstructs

havealsobeenappliedtothesecular-religionrelation.SociologistsRodneyStarkand

William Sims Bainbridge assert that secularization can produce religious change,

takingtheformofrevivalorinnovation.63Secularismitselfhasevenbeenshownto

bereligiousproductive.64Secularismcanparticipate“wherereligiousorganizations

arenoteffectivelyprovidingservicestomeetthisdemand[forreligion].”65Secular

knowledge, like science, can also produce religious knowledge. Indeed, notions of

‘secular religion’ have emerged.66 The secular has also been analyzed in terms of

‘irreligion’and‘non-religion,’emphasizingarelationalconstructionthatstrugglesto

dealwithitsidentityanddifferencerelativetoreligion.67Withthiscomplexity,the

‘secular’hasbecomeanotoriouslydifficultconceptualcategory,whichcouldbenefit

from an in depth relational analysis. ‘Secularization’ is already understood as a

relationaltermafterall—itisalwaysaccompaniedbyacomplementaryexplanation

ofthedecreasingpossibilityofthealternativesitisthoughttodisplace.Assuch,itis

alreadyprimedforsuchanalysis.

Thethemeofsecularizationasbothaproductandproducerofreligion-science

relationalityissolargeandinfluentialthatmuch,muchmorecouldbesaid,ofwhich

1939),andMaxWeber(1864–1920).Norris&Inglehart(2004),3.SeealsoAldridge(2000),56–88;andWallace (1966), 264–265 on the view of the decreasing significance of religion in an age ofsecularizationandthenotionthatasscienceadvances,religiondeclines.61E.g.,Aldridge(2000),86.Seealsoibid.,60–62.ThischargeisparticularlyleveledatComteandMarx.Comte’ssentimentstowardreligionandscience,however,aremuchmorecomplexandchangedoverhislifetime.SeeChapterFive.62See,e.g.,Aldridge(2000),86.63Stark&Bainbridge(1985),429–439.64vonStuckrad(2013b);andHanegraaff(1999).65Evans&Evans(2008),99.66E.g.,Milbank(1992),37and42.67Lee(2012),130andpassim;andBalagangadhara(2014).

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thereisnotsufficientspaceheretodoitjustice.68Ionlyhintatitheretopointtothe

prevalenceofreligion-sciencerelationalityinthewiderareaofsociologyandhistory

ofreligionandtoexemplifythewiderapplicabilityofrelationalityanalysis.Though

manyhaveproclaimedthesecularizationthesisafailedtheory,whileothersarguefor

itsresilience,thetruthorfalsityisbesidethepoint.69Secularizationtheoryhasbeen

centraltothemakingofthemeaningof‘religion,’particularlyinacademia.However,

this has repercussions for society and culture as well. The independence of the

secular from religion is oft seen as a defining parameter of modern Western

democraticsocieties.Itisboththefoundingvalueandinstitutionofthesesocieties.

Religion-science relationality is so deeply ingrained as to constitute the way we

understand the self, society, and the individual-to-society relationship. Future

research could reveal the central role of relationalization at, between, and among

these various levels, expose the spectrum of views, and contribute to a greater

understandingofthesesignificantidentitymarkersinourcontemporarydayandage.

4 FinalRemarks

Theonlymeansof falsifying the theoryof relationalism—at leastaccording tomy

limited imagination—is to identify a concept that is sui generis and thusdoesnot

requirearelationalbifurcationoftheworld. ‘Holism’seemsa likelycandidate,but

alasthisisunderstoodincontrasttothe‘parts.’Evennotionsofthesuigenerisare

constructedas‘notlikeanythingelse,’requiringitscontrastforconceptualization.If

atheorycannotbeshowntofail—ifitisnotfalsifiable—itwillbedeclarednotworthy

oftheepithet‘knowledge’andfail.Ifatheorycanbeshowntofail,itwill.Damnedif

you do; damned if you don’t.Well, damn it all. Failing eitherway, the theory has

nothingtoloseandIhopewillhavesomethingtocontributenonetheless.

As argued in Chapter Two, I believe that relationalism reflects something

fundamental about cognizance and that iswhatmakes the theorywork.With the

68Foranintroductiontothesecularizationparadigm,seeTaylor(2007);andCasanova(1994).69E.g.,cf.Stark&Finke(2000)withNorris&Inglehart(2011).

Reflections

387

Chomskyan revolution, and the discovery that some of the same structures are

operativeinalllanguages,languagecametobeviewedmoreasaproductofthemind,

ratherthanofsociety.70Again,Itakeamiddleview:Iseethe‘how’ofmeaningmaking

as a product of relational cognizance, butwhich relational construct is applied is

determinedbyhistory,society,anddiscourse.

Jensenaptlynoted,“Ironically,weseemtoknowmuchmoreabouttheworld

thanweknowaboutourknowledgeoftheworld.”71Toremedythis,Ihaveargued

thatfamiliarizingourselveswiththestructureandprocessesofconceptualizationcan

openoureyestothebasisofknowledge.ImmanuelKant(1724–1804)suggestedthat

knowledge isnotbased in thestructureof theworld,which isonlyevident in the

constant flux of phenomena anyway, but rather from the structure of cognition.

Human cognition contains the conditions thatmake knowledge possible.72 It only

seemsnaturalthatthethingsofthisworldwouldappeartousundertheconditions

ofourcognitivestructure. Itseemsbothunnecessaryand impossible to findsome

criterion for demarcating concepts like ‘science’ and ‘religion’ separate from and

superiortothecognitiveprocessesandrulesofthosedoingthedemarcating.Ifwe

think relationally, then we should analyze relationally and give up on finding

somethingouttheretodotheworkforus,particularlysincewearethecreators—the

authors of this world. We cannot understand what we think without first

understandinghowwethink.Ananalysisdepartingfromhowwethinktodescribe

conceptswillresultwiththeunificationoftheoryandpractice—asrelationsformthe

‘startingpoint’forboth.

Webeganwiththequestionofwhatisthereligion-sciencerelation.Ihopeto

haveshownthatitisnotthemeaningof‘religion’and‘science’thatmaketherelation,

buttherelationthatmakesthemeaningof ‘religion’and ‘science.’Weneednotbe

attachedtoparticulardefinitions,astheyaremoreconstructivethandescriptiveand,

whendescriptive,theycanonlylooselyexpressthesocialreality.AsaBuddhistmonk

onceremarked,“onceyourealizetheapproximatenatureofallconcepts,thenyou

70Gairdner(2008),293.71Jensen(2001),259.72Byrne(1996),210.

Reflections

388

canreallylovethem,becauseyoulovethemwithoutattachment.”73Byappreciating

theirfluidityandfocusingontheprocessesofwhichtheparticularsemerge,wecan

begintoloveourconceptsonceagainandusethemwithoutthefearthatwehavenot

qualifiedtheiruseineverypossibleway.

Sincethecentralquestionofthisresearchhasbeenaboutthenatureofthe

religion-sciencerelation,itonlyseemsfairthatIgivemyownviewaboutthis,despite

thefactthatIhaveattemptedtobeasneutralaspossible.Neutralityisimpliedinmy

theoreticalstancebecauseifwethinkofconceptualizationasarelationalprocessthis

involvessomerelativisminwhatconstitutesthemeaningoftheterms.But,again,I

amnotarelativist;IamarelationalistandneutralityisthestanceIamarguingfor.At

thesametime,Ithinktakingapositionisperfectlyacceptablesolongaswemake

transparentourown relationalpresumptions, and thus take responsibility for the

makingofthereligion-sciencerelation.

Neutrality, though, does not answer the question of what is the religion-

sciencerelation.Noneofthemeaningsforreligionorsciencehaveheldtruetoany

degreeastowarrantsuchclaimsforoneparticularrelation,aseverymajorsignifier

hasbeenshowntochangeincertaincontexts.Myanswerthenis,astheacademicand

poet Poul Møller (1794–1838) put it, “the knowledge that these questions

themselves, since theyarebasedonuntrueconceptsmustvanishaway.”74Weare

askingthewrongquestion.Weshouldnotbeaskingwhattherelationis,buthowit

ismade.Thisisbecausethe‘how’isthe‘what’—beingisbecoming.Butdoesthisthen

meanthatbecausetherelationisconstructedthereisnothingtoitall?Certainlynot,

anymorethanabuilding,asaconstructedobject,failstobeperfectlyandevidently

real.Instead,whatthistellsusisthattherearemanypossibilitiesforreligion-science

relations.Assuch, there isnothingstoppingus fromconstructing therelation ina

beneficialway,whetherforacademicanalysesorsocialvalues.Therelationalityof

religionandscienceisinourhands.

73QuotedinWilber(1982),223.74QuotedinFeuer(1974),115.

389

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