Void Orders Obrien II 3

8/2/2019 Void Orders Obrien II 3

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NOTICE OF VOID ORDERS BY JUDGE OBRIEN1

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DennisEttlin,

InPropria

Persona

Dennis Ettlin4520 Toucan StreetTorrance, CA 90503310-795-9507IN PROPRIA PERSONA

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIACOUNTY OF LOS ANGELES

)

)))))))))))))))))

Los Angeles CountyCase No. YC064994

Lead for Consolidated cases

Dennis ETTLIN,

an individual; Petitioner/Plaintiff,

vs.

NOTICE OFVOID ORDERS AND JUDGMENTSBY JUDGE OBRIEN BASEDUPON HIS FRAUD ON THECOURT FOR NOT DISCLOSINGILLEGAL PAYMENTS FROM LOSANGELES COUNTY

Glenda VEASEY,an individual;Respondent/Defendant.

AND CONSOLIDATED MATTERS))

Ettlin v. Slawson, Case No. YC065018,Ettlin v. Kriegler, Case No. YC065019,Ettlin v. Taylor, Case No. YC065021,Ettlin v. Kuhl, Case No. YC065164,Cooper v. Weinbach, Case No. SC113064,Cooper v. Levanas, Case No. SC113137,

Cooper v. Todd, Case No. SC113135Cooper v. Ashmann, Case No. SC113136,

DATE:TIME:DEPT: Dept 59


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NOTICE OF VOID ORDERS AND JUDGEMENTS

This notice is made because Judge Robert OBrien has refused to recuse

himself based on his receipt of the unconstitutional judicial payments from Los

Angeles County. The notice is brought to conform this case to the legal reality that

all the judgments and orders of Judge OBrien are void under law and to pursue

case YC064994 with a proper judge with personal jurisdiction. This case needs

certainty, which it presently lacks. Judge OBrien has taken payments from Los

Angeles County, not disclosed such, refused to disqualify himself and thereby

committed a fraud on the court. Plaintiff and defendant are both victims of this

fraud on the court which has vitiated all case proceedings to date and voided all

of Judge OBriens orders and judgments. He also violated Canon 4 D(1) of the

Code of Judicial ethics by engaging in financial dealings with a person (L.A.

County) who was likely to appear before the court on which he serves; Canon 3 E

(2) by not disclosing the L.A. County payments; and 3E(1) and CCP Section

170.1(a)(6)(A)(iii) by not disqualifying himself.

Judge OBriens fraud on the court has caused the parties in this civil

case and parties in the underlying family law case to remain in legal limbo. This

case must be transferred to a judge who has not received payments from L.A.

County, who can render objective decisions and relieve the parties of the nether-

land caused by the illegal L.A. County payments to Judge OBrien and his fraud

on the court. The case needs to be completed, finalized and legal certainty

achieved to avoid further problems in the future for the parties who are the victims

of fraud on the court and violations of the Canons of the Code of Judicial Ethics

and the California Code of Civil Procedure.

L.A. County is an interested party in this civil case because the county

must protect the judicial partnership with the L.A. County Child Support Services

Department which establishes, modifies, and enforces financial and medical


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support obligation for children, enforces existing spousal support orders.... as

required under Federal and State law. It is a collaborative partner with the

Superior Court. It receives federal and state Title IV-D funding as a percentage of

the amount expended by the department with floor and incentive for collections,under Title 42, Chapter 7, Subchapter IV, Part D, Section 655 and Section 658(a).

Judge OBrien did not receive any retroactive immunity for presiding over

cases such as the present one in which L.A. County had an interest and in which

neither he nor L.A. County disclosed the L.A. County payments and in which he

did not disqualify himself.

LOCKYER-ISENBERG IS UNCONSTITUTIONAL

The half-truth presented in Defendants pleadings that Lockyer-Isenberg

authorizes payments denies the key ruling of both Sturgeon decisions; namely that

Lockyer-Isenberg improperly prescribes those payments. Thus the whole of

Lockyer-Isenberg is unconstitutional.

DEFENDANTS ARE INDIVIDUALS WITHOUT JUDICIAL IMMUNITY

Judge Strauss of San Diego Superior Court determined, in case 37-2011-

00093476-CU-CR-CTL, that the Defendant Thomas Trent Lewis, sued as an

individual (not a Judge), was not exempt from paying fees under Government Code

section 6103. The court did not hear Lewiss motion for clarification as the fees were

already paid at the time the motion was filed. Defendants payment of those fees

acknowledged his acceptance of the Courts determination of Defendant as an

individual. No alleged administrative action for return of those fees changes JudgeStrausss actions and denial of the motion for clarification.

Furthermore, by not filing the Demurrer immediately in San Diego, Lewis

accepted the courts jurisdiction to treat him as an individual.


4/18


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In the instant case, Judge OBriens October 12, 2011 orders upholding the

demurrer were based solely on Defendant Veaseys representation of the complaint

as erroneously sued and served against a judge. Neither Defendant not Judge

OBrien addressed the actual complaint (YC064994) against the actual Defendant,an individual.

SBX2 11 RETROACTIVE IMMUNITY

The very idea of "retroactive immunity" ... is so radical, so repugnant to the

most basic principles of the "rule of law," and so profoundly offensive that Sen.

Robert Kennedy (who had been the Attorney General when, prior to 1965, the

banks broke the law with their mergers), as well as then-Attorney General Nicholas

Katzenbach, together engaged in extraordinary efforts to try to put a stop to this

Congressional travesty. Congress in 1965 attempted to enact a law retroactively

legalizing the mergers by six large banks, which clearly -- as a federal court found -

- were illegal under our nation's antitrust laws.

The banks knew at the time they were violating anti-trust laws, did it

anyway, and dared the people to act. When courts began ruling that their behavior

was illegal, the banks ran to Congress for a law granting them amnesty, claiming

that the consequences would be ruinous if they were held accountable under the

law.

Likewise, after the Fourth Appellate Court, in SturgeonI, with an unlikely

twinge of conscience, held the judicial payments were unconstitutional; the

Administrative Office of the Courts knew the consequences were huge if they were

held accountable under the law and then together with the California JudgesAssociated they co-sponsored and scared the legislature into passing, under the

cover of darkness, the hasty and flawed SBX2 11 with retroactive immunity.

Judge OBrien did not receive any retroactive immunity for presiding over

cases such as the present one because L.A. County had an interest and because


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neither he nor L.A. County disclosed the L.A. County payments and in which he

did not disqualify himself.

SBX2 11 IS UNCONSTITUTIONAL

Plaintiff asserts SBX2 11 is unconstitutional. In 2010, the California

Commission on Judicial Performance also determined SBX2 11 to be

unconstitutional. Thus, continued payments by the counties and courts are illegal, no

retroactive immunity exists for Judges who accepted the bribes, and cases in which

Los Angeles County was directly or indirectly a party become void.

The unconstitutionality of judicial benefits is not new. In fact, it is a long

simmering debate and intrusion by Judges, at least in Los Angeles County, into the

labor-management relationship between the State and the Judges. In 1976 the

Attorney General issued an opinion that health insurance benefits were

unconstitutional;

The Attorney General has issued an opinion that a statute permitting

superior and municipal court judges to be covered under county health

insurance programs is an unconstitutional delegation of legislative authority.

59 Ops. Cal. Atty. Gen. 496 (1976). The constitutional provision at issue

states:The Legislature shallprescribe compensation for judges of courts of

record. Cal. Const. Art. VI, 19 (as amended in 1974; emphasis added).

The Attorney General argues that, Because of the use of prescribe

the Legislature cannot delegate the authority granted to it by Article VI, section

19 of the Constitution. Any attempt to make such a delegation would be

constitutionally invalid. 59 Ops. Cal. Atty. Gen. at 497. The Attorney General

reasons that benefits such as health insurance are part of compensation, that the

effect of the statute in question is to allow counties to determine this aspect of

a judges compensation, and thus the statute is an unconstitutional delegation

of legislative authority.

In 1988 the County of Los Angeles, Office of the County Counsel, advised

Frank Zolin, County Clerk/Executive Officer of the Superior Court that it would be

permissible for the county to pay additional benefits for judges, although he

acknowledged the Attorney General had opinions otherwise. He encouraged the


6/18


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court to dare the Attorney General to file suit.

Leading up to the new legislation for Trial Court Unification, a memorandum

was generated in 1995 that again laid out the law and updated the Attorney

Generals opinion on the unconstitutionality of such county benefits. TheCommission staff memorandum then expressed a fear of the voters and went on to

conclude that the legislature should take action and gamble on the validity of the

delegation of authority.

Although there is certainly a possibility that SB 162 will be held to be

an invalid delegation of legislative authority ., a case can be made that this

will not occur. The problems that would be created if it is held invalid are

substantial. (emphasis added)

(see Trial Court Unification: Delegation of Legislative Authority; California Law

Revision Commission Staff Memorandum; Memorandum 95-77, Study J-1201;

November 27, 1995)

The SturgeonIdecision called the Legislatures bluffin the 1997 Lockyer-

Isenberg Trial Court Funding Act. Now the substantial problems of unconstitutionality

and bias accrued over the last 15 years must be made whole. SturgeonIwas no

surprise or rogue ruling.

Sturgeon v. County of Los Angeles, 167 Cal.App.4th 630 (2008) Rev. denied

12/23/08, held that the L.A. County payments to L.A. Superior Court judges violated

Article VI, Section 19 of the California Constitution because the 1997 Lockyer-

Isenberg Trial Court Funding Act, while it DID authorize judicial benefits, it did NOT

set any standards for exercising the delegated authority and THUS the authorization

under Lockyer-Isenberg of judicial benefits payments by counties to Superior Court

judges was an unconstitutional delegation of power.

As of December 23, 2008 the judicial payments made by Los Angeles County

became bribes. As of December 23, 2008 Judges lost all immunity for taking such

payments. As of December 23, 2008 Government Code Sections 810 and 821.6

were not applicable.

After the SturgeonIdecision, the State legislature hastily passed and the


7/18


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Governor signed Senate Bill SBX2 11, which became effective 5/21/09. The judiciary

and the legislature tried to do in two months what they failed to do in 30 years. It is no

surprise that SBX2 11 is also unconstitutional.

Senate Bill SBX2 11 attempted to give retroactive immunity such that nogovernmental entity, shall incur any liability or be subject to prosecution or

disciplinary action because of benefits provided to a judge under the official action

of a governmental entity prior to the effective date of this act on the ground that

those benefits were not authorized under law. With that one line the Judicial

Council attempted to replace the same one inch stack of Federal Authorities cited

in Court Counsels Demurrer in the ETTLIN and COOPER cases and undoubtedly

will be copied for Plaintiff LOCATELLI.

While SBX2 11 attempted to give immunity for receiving the money which

was not authorized under the law, Senate bill SBX2 11, Section 5, did not,

however, give retroactive immunity to judges or temporary judges who had

received the county payments and did not disclose such and presided over cases

in which the county had an interest. It did not give immunity for being disqualified

as a judge in the past, present or future. The Los Angeles County interest in the

Plaintiffs family law case is the critical point avoided by Court Counsel and Kevin

McCormick. Plaintiffs claims are firmly based on, and supported by evidence on,

the Title IV-D monies received by Los Angeles County and the partnership of the

Superior Court with the Title IV-D agencies.

Senate bill SBX2 11 acknowledged both the criminality of the payment of

judicial benefits by the counties to the judges and also the loss of immunity

protections under current state and federal laws by attempting to give all parties tothe bribes limited retroactive immunity. The immunity in SBX2 11, Section 5,

effective 5/21/09, is not part of California government codes. Most importantly, the

attempted immunity is unconstitutional under the California Constitution, ARTICLE

1, SECTION 9 that states A bill of attainder, ex post facto law, or law


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impairing the obligation of contracts may not be passed. Furthermore, the

legislation conflicts with the constitutional responsibilities of the Commission on

Judicial Performance (CJP). The extensive CJP analysis and arguments show the

legislatures attempt to usurp constitutional powers and requests an opinion fromthe California Attorney General on the constitutionality of SBX2 11.

The Fourth Appellate Courts decision in Sturgeon v. County of Los

Angeles,__Cal App.4th___(4th Dist.,Div. 1) (2010), the so-called SturgeonII

concluded on page 14:

As the parties have recognized, SBX 211 both preserved the

status quo ante Sturgeon Iand commenced a process by which the

Legislature looks to adoption of a comprehensive judicial compensation

scheme. As we have explained, this response to SturgeonImeets therequirements of the Constitution and is wholly sensible under the

circumstances. The Legislature is uniquely competent to deal with the

complex policy problem of establishing a judicial compensation scheme

which both assures recruitment and retention of fully qualified judicial

officers throughout the state while at the same time providing equity

between judges in different parts of the state. By the same token our

role in ensuring that the more general requirements of the

Constitution have been met is, under our system of separate

governmental powers, quite limited. (emphasis added)

If SBX2 11 meets the requirements of the constitution as stated by the

court, why would taxpayers challenge it? The Appellate Court makes it clear that

their statement of constitutionality (which Court Counsel likes to use) only applies

to the three issues raised by Sturgeon. They also feel quite limited in ensuring

the Constitution is fully met and are not willing to fully address this issue. The

Sturgeon case and SBX2 11 only address the payment of county judicial benefits.

Plaintiffs civil action is undertaken, in part, as one of the citizen challenges

encouraged by SturgeonII but, more importantly, to address the issue of bias, the

non-disclosure of the payments, and the resulting fraud on the court that Sturgeon

does not address.

Since SturgeonIand SturgeonII both affirm that judicial payments are not

a county responsibility, since the county is allowed (with conditions under SBX2


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11) to terminate or reduce all payments and since the county is clearly an

interested party in all divorce and traffic cases; therefore the continued payments

must be in the countys interests. Those county interests are the Title-IV-D

incentives and huge reimbursements as well as the penalty assessments on traffictickets. Those county interests are the basis now for judicial recusal and void

orders in most divorce and traffic cases.

SBX2 11 deemed prior payments as criminal and in need of criminal

immunity. The bill granted immunity for monies paid and received prior to July

2009. This attempted ex post facto immunity is unconstitutional and furthermore

did not and could not restore Plaintiffs Constitutional guarantees of due process

and equal protection lost during the proceedings of Plaintiffs family law case.

Senate bill SBX2 11 did not even attempt to give immunity for the biases

inherent in the nature of a bribe. Commissioner Veasey, likewise, did not disclose the

county payments and then presided over a case in which the L.A. County Child Support

Services Department is a very interested party as it establishes financial ...support

obligations for children, enforces existing spousal support orders... as required under

federal and state law and is a collaborative partner with the Superior Court.

The SturgeonIIdecision was decided on only three very narrow grounds. The

relevant portions state:

Shortly after we filed our opinion in Sturgeon Iand while the

Legislature was in a special session, the Legislature passed and the

Governor signed legislation which addressed the constitutional defect we

identified in Sturgeon I. In particular, the legislation required that all counties

continue to provide sitting judges with whatever benefits the counties had

provided as of July 1, 2008. The Legislature permitted the counties to

terminate this obligation, but not with respect to sitting judges and only after

giving the Administrative Office of the Courts and any affected judges 180days' notice.

On remand Sturgeon asserted the legislation was invalid on three

grounds. He argued the legislation was outside the scope of the Governor's

proclamation calling the special session, did not adequately prescribe

benefits judges are to be provided, and in any event violated equal protection

principles by continuing a statewide system of unequal judicial benefits. The


10/18


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trial court rejected these contentions and granted the county's motion for

summary judgment.The legislation Sturgeon challenges, as enacted, implemented an

interim response to the constitutional issues we addressed in Sturgeon I.Aswe shall explain, the legislation fell within the scope of the Governor's

proclamation, adequately prescribed the benefits that must be provided tojudges and did not intrude upon any judge's right to equal protection of the

laws. Accordingly, we affirm.

But the disturbing portion of the decision is the final paragraph of the decision,

which contradicts the above opening statement by stating that SBX2 11 is not a

permanent response to the constitutional issues. How can a law be temporarily

constitutional? It either is or is not constitutional. Again, the Fourth Appellate Court,

acknowledges the contradiction, but this time refuses to again call the Legislatures

bluff, and encourages these particular civil suits by stating:

However, on its face SBX 211 is not a permanent response to

either the constitutional issues we identified in Sturgeon Ior the

difficult problem of adopting a compensation scheme that deals with

varying economic circumstances in an equitable and efficient

manner. Thus, we would be remiss in discharging our duties if we did

not state that while the Legislature's interim response to Sturgeon I

defeats the particular challenges asserted by Sturgeon in this

litigation, that interim remedy, if not supplanted by the morecomprehensive response SBX 211 plainly contemplates, most likelywill give rise to further challenges by taxpayers or members of the

bench themselves. As we noted at the outset, the issue of judicialcompensation is a state, not a county, responsibility. We are

confident that the Legislature within a reasonable period of time willact to adopt a uniform statewide system of judicial compensation.

The SBX2 11 Section 2 is unconstitutionally vague about the same terms and

conditions as were in effect on that date. Since the Fourth Appellate Court is

deferring to the taxpayers and judges, these civil cases will ask for jury decisions on

whether the countys terms and conditions were defined anywhere and thus are

arbitrary (and unconstitutional) or whether they were one year payments and thus

terminated on June 30, 2009. Section 2 only identifies judges as recipients. No


11/18


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authority is provided to pay Court Counsel or Commissioners. The Commission on

Judicial Performance (CJP) is also very interested in this matter and has requested

an opinion from the Attorney General.

The SBX2 11 Section 4 is unconstitutional because the Judicial Council is nowpaying judicial benefits to commissioners, Court Counsel and others, as will be

determined at trial. (The payments in SBX2 11 Section 2 made by L.A. County to

Commissioners are called warrants by the L.A. County Auditor because they are

issued by L.A. County but funded by the Judicial Council.) The continued payments

by the counties under Section 2 now makes these Judicial Council payments a

continued obligation, which is prohibited by Section 4. The opinions of the CJP are

that these payments are unconstitutional. The CJP has requested the Attorney

Generals opinion in this matter because the judges are clearly biased. Again, since

the Fourth Appellate Court is deferring to the taxpayers and judges, these civil cases

will ask for jury decisions on whether the Superior Court payments obligated by the

county payments are legal and constitutional.

The SBX2 11 Section 5 immunity is unconstitutional, has not been

challenged in the Appellate Court and preserved the status quo ante SturgeonI.

The attempted immunity is unconstitutional under the California Constitution,

ARTICLE 1, SECTION 9 states A bill of attainder, ex post facto law, or law

impairing the obligation of contracts may not be passed. Furthermore, SBX2 11

Section 5 legislation conflicts with the constitutional responsibilities of the

Commission on Judicial Performance (CJP). The extensive CJP analysis and

arguments shows the legislatures attempt to usurp constitutional powers and

requests an opinion from the California Attorney General on the constitutionality ofSBX2 11. Again, since the Fourth Appellate Court refused to call the legislatures

bluff a second time, and is now deferring to the taxpayers and judges themselves,

Plaintiff will seek damages by filing civil suits asking for jury decisions on the

constitutional questions of whether the judges have immunity from civil liability


12/18


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and if so whether the Plaintiff is due damages for the biases bought by the L.A.

County bribes.

LOS ANGELES COUNTY IS NOT A SOVEREIGN ENTITY

Los Angeles County is not a sovereign entity; only the Federal Government

and each of the 50 states are sovereign within the United States of America.

Therefore, under Lockyer-Isenberg and under SBX2 11, Los Angeles Countys

actual payments to a judge are no different than payments (hypothetically) by

Plaintiff. Both are bribes.

LOS ANGELES COUNTY IS AN INTERESTED PARTY

Judge OBrien collected the judicial payments from 1989-1999. The stated

purpose of Los Angeles County payments is to retain judges in Los Angeles

County. The favorable disposition related to job location choice reasonably and

easily carries over to a general pre-disposition toward Los Angeles County, its

supervisors and its law enforcement officials in matters where the county has an

interest.

The favorable disposition purchased by the Los Angeles County judicial

payments certainly extends to protecting a judicial colleague in this civil case as

well as protecting the underlying stream of Title IV-D monies.

The partnership of L.A. County and with the Los Angeles Superior court is

clearly documented (in lead case YC064994) for all Family Law and Traffic Court

cases. The L.A. County Payments are bribes as they influence Judges, in family

law cases, to award unequal custody and thus by L.A. County Child SupportServices Department (CSSD) guidelines establish higher custody payments from

noncustodial parents. The L.A. County Child Support Services Department

establishes financial .... support obligations for children... as required under

federal and state law and works as a collaborative Partner with the Superior


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Court. The payment of money by L.A. County, to the judge who rules on the

amount of child support (which taken in the aggregate) directly determines the

expenses of the L.A. County Child Support Services Department. The amount of

those expenses then directly determines the amount of money that the L.A. CountyChild Support Services Department receives in Title IV-D federal and state funds.

($176 million received from Title IV-D compared to the small $3 million cost to L.A.

County.) The annual $30 million cost of judicial benefits was cost effective for L.A.

County at a ratio of 6:1 for just that one single program.

The higher the number and monetary amount of support orders against

non-custodial parents, the higher the expenses of the L.A. County Child Support

Services Department, the higher the amount of Title IV-D federal and state funding.

L.A. County has a direct interest in the judge setting the greatest number and the

highest monetary child support orders. L.A. County is a real party in interest in

every divorce case as it reaps a huge financial benefit.

The payments by L.A. County to the judge in a divorce case have no

purpose other than to influence the judges decision to create a non-custodial

parent and a subsequent high child support order, which frequently requires use of

federally funded enforcement resources.

Commissioner Veaseys acceptance of the L.A. County bribes and her

sitting on a case in which L.A. County is an interested party voids all her orders

and judgments. Judge OBriens protection of Commissioner Veaseys failures to

disclose the county payments to Plaintiff, also constitutes an extrinsic fraud on the

court. All of Judge OBriens (case YC064994) and Commissioner Veaseys (case

YD041085) orders are and will be void.

EXTRINSIC FRAUD

Extrinsic fraud is a basis for setting aside an earlier judgment. See U.S. v.

Throckmorton 98 U.S. 61 (1878) since fraud on the court vitiates the entire


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case, all orders from that court or any subsequent court are void as none of the

courts had subject matter jurisdiction. No court has the lawful authority to validate a

void order. See Vallely v. Northern Fire and Marine Co., 254 U.S. 348 (1920) a

void order is void at all times, cannot be made valid by any judge, nor does it gainvalidity by the passage of time.

The U.S. Supreme Court has stated in the case ofOffutt v. United States,

348 U.S. 11, 14 (1954): A judge receiving a bribe from an interested party over

which he is presiding does not give the appearance of justice.

In essence, by making all L.A. Superior Court judges eligible for the L.A.

County payments, L.A. County has bought the L.A. Superior Court. The U.S.

Supreme Court stated in the case ofCaperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co., Inc., 566

U.S. ___ (2009) at Slip Opinion page 16 in relevant part:

...... just as no man is allowed to judge his own cause,

similar fears of bias can arise when, without the consent of theother parties, a man chooses a judge in his own cause.

By making the payments available to every L.A. Superior Court judge, no

party in a divorce case received a fair trial, as the judge was biased to rule to

benefit the L.A. County Child Support Services Department over the interests of

the parties to the case.

Likewise, by making the payments available to every L.A. Superior Court

judge as individuals, no party in a civil case decided by the Judges of the Superior

Court can receive a fair trial, as the judge is biased to rule for any benefit to L.A.

County over the interests of the other parties to the case.

The data (see case filings) in the Judicial Council of California report titled,

Historical Analysis of Disparities in Judicial Benefits, dated December 15, 2009, aswell as the Superior Court auditors data (see case filings) and the Los Angeles

County auditors data (see case filings), combined with the 2010-2011 L.A. County

proposed budget Trial Court Operations section (see case filings) show and

demonstrate a clear pattern that L.A. County has bought the L.A. County


15/18


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Superior Court without the consent of the other party opposing them in any case.

The L.A. County interest and partnership with the court is clearly

documented for all Family Law cases (see case filings). Along with the payment

information for Robert OBrien in the complaint, Plaintiff has serious doubts thatany Los Angeles County judge can be impartial during a jury trial on damages due

to the biases inherent in the L.A. County bribes. Furthermore, since Los Angeles

judges have failed to recuse themselves, the real and perceived biases constitute

fraud on the court and the Los Angeles Plaintiffs COOPER and ETTLIN and San

Diego Plaintiff LOCATELLI are all denied due process by denying them the right to

an impartial tribunal. In Re Murchison, 349 U.S. 133, 136 (1955).

FOURTH APPELLATE COURT CALLED FOR THESE CIVIL SUITS

The Fourth Appellate Court deferred to this taxpayer challenge in its decision

ofSturgeon v. County of Los Angeles,__Cal App.4th___(4th Dist.,Div. 1) (2010)

(Sturgeon II).

However, on its face SBX 211 is not a permanent response to

the constitutional issues we identified in Sturgeon I[and] that

interim remedy [SBX2 11], if not supplanted by the morecomprehensive response SBX 211 plainly contemplates, most

likely will give rise to further challenges by taxpayers or members

of the bench themselves. As we noted at the outset, the issue of

judicial compensation is a state, not a county, responsibility.

(emphasis added)

Plaintiffs actions are a direct application of the guidance and

expectation of the Fourth Appellate Court ruling.

COURT COUNSEL IS BRIBED AND BIASED

Payments to Court Counsel Brett Bianco are similarly unconstitutional and

illegal. His direction of the filings by Kevin McCormick of Benton, Orr, Duval and


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Buckingham are an expenditure of public funds on behalf of individuals. Those, too,

are illegal expenditures.

JUDGE ROBERT OBRIEN REFUSED TO RECUSE HIMSELF

Judge OBrien received Los Angeles County payments from 1989-1999.

Based on his refusal to recuse himself all his orders and judgments are void under

the U.S. Supreme Court precedents ofThrockmorton, supra and Vallely, supra.

Dated: March 12, 2012

Respectfully Submitted ______________________________________

DENNIS M. ETTLIN, In Pro Per


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PROOF OF SERVICE BY FIRST-CLASS MAIL --CIVIL

PROOF OF SERVICE

STATE OF CALIFORNIA, COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES

111 N. Hill Street, Dept 59Los Angeles, CA 90012

Central District - Stanley Mosk Courthouse

YC064994, lead casePETITIONER/PLAINTIFF: Dennis EttlinRESPONDENT/DEFENDANT: Glenda Veasey, an individual

I am over 18 years of age and not a party to this action. I am a resident of oremployed in the county where the mailing took place. My residence or businessaddress is

2608 E. Victoria St. #108Rancho Dominguez, CA 90220

On March 12, 2012,I served by first class mail, a copy of the following document

NOTICE OF VOID ORDERS AND JUDGMENTS BY JUDGE OBRIENBASED UPON HIS FRAUD ON THE COURT FOR NOT DISCLOSING ILLEGALPAYMENTS FROM LOS ANGELES COUNTY

on the interested parties in this action (SEE ATTACHED SERVICE LIST) byenclosing a copy thereof in an envelope and depositing the sealed envelope with

the United States Postal Service with the postage fully prepaid at RANCHODOMINGUEZ, CALIFORNIA

I declare under penalty of perjury under the laws of the State of California that theforegoing is true and correct.

Executed on March 12, 2012 at Los Angeles County, California,

________________________________FRED SOTTILE


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PROOF OF SERVICE BY FIRST-CLASS MAIL --CIVIL

SERVICE LIST

Defendant:

Kevin M. McCormickBenton, Orr, Duval and Buckingham39 North California Street, Post Office Box 1178Ventura, California 93002

Void Orders Obrien II 3

Documents

Transcript of Void Orders Obrien II 3