VJMUN Winter Workshop Study Guide

8/10/2019 VJMUN Winter Workshop Study Guide

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DOC/VJMUN/2015/WS_SG

VJTI MODEL UNITED NATIONS

WORKSHOPSTUDY GUIDE

Situation in the Korean Peninsula


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History

On June 25, 1950, the Korean War began when some 75,000 soldiers from the North Korean Peoples

Army poured across the 38th parallel, the boundary between the Soviet-backed Democratic Peoples

Republic of Korea to the north and the pro-Western Republic of Korea to the south. This invasion wasthe first military action of the Cold War. By July, American troops had entered the war on South

Koreas behalf. As far as American officials were concerned, it was a war against the forces of

international communism itself. After some early back-and-forth across the 38th parallel, the fighting

stalled and casualties mounted with nothing to show for them. Meanwhile, American officials worked

anxiously to fashion some sort of armistice with the North Koreans. The alternative, they feared,

would be a wider war with Russia and Chinaor even, as some warned, World War III. Finally, in July

1953, the Korean War came to an end. In all, some 5 million soldiers and civilians lost their lives during

the war. The Korean peninsula is still divided today.

The Armistice AgreementThe Korean Armistice Agreement is the armistice which ended the Korean War. It was signed by U.S.

Army Lieutenant General William Harrison, Jr. representing the United Nations Command (UNC),

North Korean General Nam Il representing the North Korean People's Army, and the Chinese Peoples

Volunteer Army. The armistice was signed on July 27, 1953, and was designed to "insure a complete

cessation of hostilities and of all acts of armed force in Korea until a final peaceful settlement is

achieved." No "final peaceful settlement" has been achieved yet. The signed armistice established the

Korean Demilitarized Zone (de facto a new border between the two nations), put into force a cease-

fire, and finalized repatriation of prisoners of war. The Demilitarized Zone runs not far from the 38th

parallel which separated Northern and Southern Koreas before the war.

Talks over the armistice agreement started on July 10, 1951, in the city Kaesng, a city occupied by

North Korea in North Hwanghae Province near the South Korean border. The primary negotiators

were General Nam Il, a North Korean Deputy Premier and Chief of Army Staff, and Vice Admiral

Charles Turner Joy, an American After a period of two weeks, on June 26, 1951, a five-part agenda

was agreed upon. This agenda guided talks until the signing of the armistice on July 27, 1953. The

agenda was:


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1. Adoption of agenda.

2. Fixing a military demarcation line between both sides so as to establish a demilitarized zone

as a basic condition for a cessation of hostilities in Korea.

3. Concrete arrangements for the realization of cease fire and armistice in Korea, including the

composition, authority and functions of a supervision organization for carrying out the terms

of a cease-fire and armistice.

4. Arrangements relating to prisoners of war.

5. Recommendations to the governments of the countries concerned on both sides.

After the agenda was decided talks proceeded slowly, with off and on again discussions. The longest

gap between discussions started on August 23, 1951. On that day, during the morning before sunrise,

North Korea and its allies claimed that the conference site in Kaesng had been bombed. North Korea

sought for the UNC to conduct an immediate investigation, which concluded that there was evidencethat a UNC aircraft had indeed attacked the conference site. The evidence, however, appeared to be

manufactured. The Communists subsequently refused to permit an investigation during daylight

hours. Armistice talks did not start again until October 25, 1951. The U.S. would not allow further

discussion to take place in Kaesng. Panmunjom, located in Kynggi Province bordering North and

South Korea, was agreed upon by both powers as the new location for peace agreement discussions

on the condition that both sides took responsibility for its protection.

Discussions continued slowly because of difficulties regarding the location of the border between

North and South Korea. China and North Korea believed and expected the line to remain at the 38th

parallel. Within weeks however, both nations accepted the Kansas Line, the place where the two sides

actually confronted each other at the time. The decision of what to do with the prisoners of war

repatriation was also an issue during negotiations. The Communists held 10,000 POWs and the UNC

held 150,000 POWs. The Peoples Volunteer Army (PVA), Korean Peoples Army (KPA), and the UNC

could not agree on a system of repatriation because many PVA and KPA soldiers refused to be

repatriated back to the north, which was unacceptable to the Chinese and North Koreans. In the final

armistice agreement, a Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission was set up to handle the matter.

The agreement provided for monitoring by an international commission. The Neutral Nations

Supervisory Commission (NNSC) was established to prevent reinforcements being brought into Korea,


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either additional military personnel or new weapons, and its member inspection teams from

Czechoslovakia, Poland, Sweden and Switzerland operated throghout Korea.

On July 19, 1953, delegates reached agreement over all issues regarding the armistice. On July 27,

1953, at 10:00 a.m. the armistice was signed by Nam Il, delegate of the Koreans Peoples Army and

the Chinese Peoples Volunteers, and William K. Harrison Jr., UNC delegate. Twelve hours after the

signing of the document, all agreed upon regulations came into effect.

The signed armistice established a complete cessation of all hostilities in Korea by all armed force

that was to be enforced by the commanders of both sides. Essentially a complete cease-fire was put

into force. The armistice is however only a cease-fire between military forces, rather than an

agreement between governments. No peace treaty was signed which means that the Korean War has

not officially ended.

The armistice also established the Korean Demilitarized Zone (DMZ). The DMZ was decided to be a

2.5-mile (4.0 km)-wide fortified buffer zone between the two Korean nations. The Demilitarized Zone

follows the Kansas Line where the two sides actually confronted each other at the time of the signed

armistice. The DMZ is currently the most heavily defended national border in the world.

The Armistice also established regulations regarding prisoners of war. The agreement stated that

Within sixty (60) days after this agreement becomes effective each side shall, without offering any

hindrance, directly repatriate and hand over in groups all those prisoners of war in its custody who

insist on repatriation to the side to which they belonged at the time of capture. Ultimately, more

than 22,000 North Korean or Chinese soldiers refused repatriation. On the opposite side, 327 South

Korean soldiers, 21 American soldiers and 1 British soldier also refused repatriation, and remained in

North Korea or in China. In addition to the established regulations listed above, the armistice also

gave recommendation to the governments of the countries concerned on both sides that, within

three (3) months after the Armistice Agreement is signed and becomes effective, a political

conference of a higher level of both sides be held by representatives appointed respectively to settle

through negotiation the questions of the withdrawal of all foreign forces from Korea, the peaceful

settlement of the Korean question, etc. Even in 2013, 60 years after the signing of the armistice

agreement, these issues have not been settled as a peaceful settlement of the Korean question has

not been solved and American troops still reside in South Korea.

After the armistice was signed the war is considered to have ended even though there was no official

peace treaty. Despite the three-year war, the Korean peninsula greatly resembled what it did before


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the war with national borders at similar locations. The U.S. views the war as a tie while North Korea

and China both claim that they won the Korean War.

The Six Party Talks

The six-party talks are a series of multilateral negotiations held intermittently since 2003 and

attended by China, Japan, North Korea, the Russian Federation, South Korea, and the United States,

with an aim to find a peaceful resolution to the security concerns as a result of the North Koreannuclear weapons program. The talks are hosted in Beijing and chaired by China.

Prior to the present crisis, North Korea and the United States were responsible for implementing the

1994 Agreed Framework, whereby North Korea pledged to freeze its nuclear program in exchange for

energy aid, including two proliferation-resistant light-water reactors. Japan, South Korea, and the

European Union (EU) assisted in the implementation of the agreement, but were not involved in its

original negotiation.

The Agreed Framework collapsed in October 2002 after Assistant Secretary of State James Kelly

confronted North Korea with evidence of a secret uranium enrichment program. North Koreaadmitted to the program, according to Kelly, but later publicly denied confessing to being in breach

of the Agreed Framework. In the following months the United States initiated the halting of energy

assistance to North Korea and Pyongyang expelled international monitors. In January 2003, North

Korea declared its withdrawal from the nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT).

U.S., Chinese, and North Korean officials resumed talks on the nuclear issue in April 2003. North Korea

had previously insisted on pursuing negotiations with the United States on a bilateral basis. The

administration of George W. Bush, on its part, preferred a multilateral approach that was in explicit

contrast with the strategy adopted by the Clinton administration that had led the Agreed Framework.

In early August 2003, North Korea declared its willingness to attend six-party talks to be held in Beijing

after reviewing a proposal from the United States.

FIRST ROUND

The First Round of talks began August 27, 2003 in Beijing. The initial North Korean position called for

a normalization of relations and a non-aggression pact with the United States, without which,

Pyongyang maintained, a dismantling of its nuclear program would be out of the question. The United

States had previously rejected a non-aggression pact proposal earlier that summer and remained firm

on that point during the talks; this stumbling block precluded any substantive agreement in the First

Round. On the second day of talks, the North Korean delegate, Deputy Foreign Minister Kim Yong Il

stated that North Korea would test a nuclear weapon soon to prove that it had acquired that ability.


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Chinese Vice Foreign Minister Wang Yi outlined six points of consensus that had been reached by the

end of the round. These included a commitment to work to resolve the nuclear issue through peaceful

means and dialogue, pursuing a nuclear-free Korean peninsula while bearing in mind the security of

North Korea, and avoiding acts that would aggravate the situation further.

SECOND ROUND

While China called for a return to the forum, South Korea, Japan and the United States met separately

to discuss joint strategies for the next round and possibilities for a verifiable inspection system. In late

October 2003, China secured an agreement from North Korean leader Kim Jong Il to return to the six-party talks, after U.S. President George W. Bush expressed an openness to providing informal security

assurances short of a non-aggression pact or peace treaty. The United States however, still would not

allow its diplomats to hold direct talks with North Korean negotiators and demanded unilateral

concessions on the part of Pyongyang. The central U.S. demand was that North Korea declare its

willingness to the complete, verifiable, and irreversible dismantlement of its nuclear programs, a

policy that had come to be known as CVID.

The Second Round of talks began February 25, 2004. On the second day of talks, the Chinese Foreign

Ministry and the Russian lead negotiator, Vice Foreign Minister Alexander Losiukov, both reported

that North Korea had offered to destroy its nuclear weapons program, but would not discontinue itspeaceful nuclear activities. This represented a partial reversal from its January offer . While both China

and Russia supported an agreement on this new basis, the United States, Japan, and South Korea

insisted that the North eliminate all of its nuclear facilities and programs. U.S. officials believed that

the North Korean civil nuclear program was impractical for economic use and was likely a front for

other activities.

The Chairmans paper that was eventually circulated at the end of the discussions in lieu of a joint

statement did not include any initial steps agreements, but reaffirmed all parties commitment to a

nuclear-weapons-free Korean peninsula.

THIRD ROUND

On June 23, 2004, the six states reconvened to begin the Third Round of negotiations. Expectations

were muted by uncertainties generated by the Presidential election in the United States later that

year.

In the run up to the talks, the United States circulated its first set of formal proposals for a step-by-

step dismantling of the North Korean nuclear program. The proposal granted North Korea a three

month preparatory period to freeze its programs, and also requested the transmittal of a full account

of activities. South Korea presented a similar proposal that largely adhered to the base U.S. demand


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for CVID. At the opening ceremony of the Third Round, North Korean Deputy Foreign Minister Kim

Gye-gwan reiterated that his country was willing to accept a freeze for compensation program that

would lead to renunciation of its nuclear weapons program.

Again lacking the consensus necessary for a joint statement, a Chairmans statement was issued

instead. In addition to reaffirming commitments made previously, the parties stressed the need for a

words for words and action for action process towards resolution of the crisis.

FOURTH ROUND

Nearly a year of uncertainty divided the Third and Fourth Rounds of the six-party talks. In part, this

was due to the Presidential election in the United States, which took place in early November 2004

and resulted in a second term of office for George W. Bush. North Korea stated that it intended to

wait for a restatement of the second Bush administrations policies before deciding on whether to

attend the next round of talks.

In early February 2005, North Korea declared itself in possession of nuclear weapons and said it would

not attend future six-party talks. It accused the United States of attempting to overthrow its

government and referred to Secretary of State Condoleezza Rices statement in her confirmation

hearing that North Korea was an outpost of tyranny. Finally, following a July 2005 meeting in Beijingwith the new U.S. lead negotiator Christopher Hill, North Korean Deputy Foreign Minister Kim Gye-

gwan announced that his country would be willing to attend a new round of talks during the week of

July 25, 2005.

One of the inducements which drew North Korea back to the negotiating table was a U.S. recognition

of North Korea as a sovereign state coupled with a statement that it had no intention to invade North

Korea. These were reiterated on the first day of negotiations. The resulting talks were considerably

longer than previous rounds, lasting a full 13 days. The United States softened its opposition to a

North Korean civil energy program, while a joint statement based on resurrection of a 1992 Joint

Declaration of the Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula that barred the testing, production, and

deployment of nuclear weapons was discussed. The U.S. also engaged in lengthy bilateral discussions

with the North Korean delegation, lifting prior restrictions prohibiting U.S. negotiators from engaging

the North Koreans directly.

On September 19, 2005, the six parties achieved the first breakthrough in resolving the North Korean

nuclear crisis, issuing a joint statement on agreed steps toward the denuclearization of the Korean

Peninsula in a phased manner in line with the principle of commitment for commitment, action for

action.


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North Korea committed itself to abandoning all nuclear weapons and existing programs, returning to

the NPT and accepting IAEA inspections. In return, the other parties expressed their respect for North

Koreas assertion of a right to peaceful uses of nuclear energy and agreed to discuss the provision of

a light water nuclear reactor at an appropriate time. The United States and South Korea both

affirmed that they would not deploy nuclear weapons on the peninsula, and stated, along with Russia,

China, and Japan, their willingness to supply North Korea with energy aid. The United States and

Japan, further, committed themselves to working to normalizing relations with North Korea.

The day after the Joint Statement was agreed, North Koreas Foreign Ministry declared that the United

States should provide a light water reactor as early as possible. Although Pyongyang appeared to

back away from that demand in the following days, disagreements over the timing of discussions on

the provision of such a reactor remained.

FIFTH ROUND

The next round of talks began on November 9, 2005 and lasted three days. The Six Parties expressed

their views on how the Joint Statement should be implemented, but no new achievements were

registered. U.S. lead negotiator Christopher Hill said we were not expecting to make any major

breakthroughs. The meeting concluded without setting a date for the next round of talks.

Following the end of the first session, the negotiating climate deteriorated significantly. U.S. sanctions

on North Korean trading entities as well as Banco Delta Asia of Macau provoked strong condemnation

from Pyongyang. North Korea boycotted the six-party talks once again, and conducted multiple

missile tests in July and its first nuclear test on October 9, 2006.

In response, the UN Security Council passed Resolution 1718 on October 14, requiring North Korea to

refrain from further nuclear or missile testing, abandon its weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and

missile programs, and immediately rejoin the six-party talks.

Further discussions resumed in February 2007 which concluded in an agreement on initial steps to

implement the 2005 Joint Statement. The February 13 agreement called for steps to be taken over

the next 60 days in which North Korea committed to shutting down and sealing the Yongbyon nuclear

facilities and to discussing a list of its nuclear-related activities with the other parties. The United

States and Japan committed to engaging in talks to normalize relations, while all parties would work

to provide 50,000 tons of heavy fuel oil, all within the 60 day period. The United States also agreed to

begin the process of removing North Korea from its list of state sponsors of terrorism and terminating

the application of the Trading with the Enemy Act with regards to North Korea. The agreement set a

March 19 date for a Sixth Round of talks and outlined a framework for follow-on actions by the six

parties to implement the September 2005 Joint Statement.


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SIXTH ROUND

The next round of talks began on time but came to no substantive agreement in its initial sessions

after the North Korean delegation walked out over delays in the release of funds from the sanctioned

Banco Delta Asia. Diplomats had been optimistic that issues surrounding the bank had been

temporarily resolved, but a technical delay in the transmittal of funds led to the announcement of

another adjournment.

The IAEA confirmed in June 2007 that the 5 megawatt Yongbyon nuclear reactor had been shut down

and sealed. When talks resumed in September-October 2007, a second phase implementation planwas agreed upon which called for the disablement of three key nuclear facilities at the Yongbyon

complex and the provision of a list of North Korean nuclear activities, both by the end of the year.

North Korea further committed to not transferring nuclear materials, technology, or know-how to

other parties. The other parties agreed to increase aid to North Korea to a total of 1 million tons of

heavy fuel oil or fuel oil equivalents and to a continuation of the diplomatic normalization processes.

Following numerous delays in implementation, U.S. and North Korean negotiators met in Singapore

in April 2008 and agreed on three steps through which North Korea would detail or address its nuclear

activities: a declaration provided by North Korea regarding its plutonium program, the publication of

a U.S. "bill of particulars" detailing Washington's suspicions of a North Korean uranium-enrichment

program and Pyongyang's nuclear proliferation to other countries, and a North Korean understandingof the U.S. concerns.

Further six-party talks continued in June 2008, ending with the transmittal of North Koreas

declaration of nuclear activities. At the same time, U.S. President Bush announced that he had

removed North Korea from the Trading with the Enemy Act and had notified Congress of the countrys

removal from the list of state sponsors of terrorism.

Difficulties in agreeing on a verification system delayed the second action until October 11. The need

for a verification system had been reaffirmed in a July 12 joint communiqu issued by the six parties.

An August 11 proposal from the U.S. to allow verification inspections at sites throughout North Korea

was rejected emphatically. Insisting that inspections be limited to Yongbyon, North Korea announced

that it was reversing disablement actions and said it would restart its reprocessing plant. A verbal

agreement was established after Hill visited Pyongyang in early October. The agreement allowed for

inspections outside of Yongbyon when China, Japan, Russia, South Korea, and the United States

agreed by consensus.

Progress again foundered in November when North Korea denied that it had committed in the verbal

agreement to allowing the collection of samples at Yongbyon. Another session of six-party talks in


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December yielded no new consensus. North Korea maintained that if sampling were to take place, it

would not be during second phase implementation.

On April 5, 2009, after repeated warnings from the United States, Japan and South Korea, Pyongyang

test-fired a modified Taepo Dong-2 three-stage rocket, ostensibly as part of its civilian space program.

The UN Security Council issued a presidential statement April 13 calling the test a violation of

Resolution 1718, and expanded sanctions on North Korean firms shortly afterwards. North Korea

responded on April 14, declaring that it would no longer participate in the six-party talks and that it

would no longer be bound by any of the previous agreements reached in the discussions.On May 25, North Korea conducted a second nuclear test which immediately drew condemnation

from the six-party talks participants. According to experts, the explosive yield was larger than that of

the October 2006 test. The UN Security Council responded with further sanctions including an arms

embargo in Resolution 1874 of June 12. The following day, North Korea admitted for the first time

that it had a uranium enrichment program and that it would use enriched fuel to power a planned

light-water reactor.

The De-Militarized Zone

HISTORY

The 38th parallel northwhich divides the Korean Peninsula roughly in halfwas the original

boundary between the United States and Soviet brief administration areas of Korea at the end of

World War II. Upon the creation of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK, informally North

Korea) and the Republic of Korea (ROK, informally South Korea) in 1948, it became a de facto

international border and one of the most tense fronts in the Cold War.

Both the North and the South remained heavily dependent on their sponsor states from 1948 to the

outbreak of the Korean War. The conflict, which claimed over three million lives and divided the

Korean Peninsula along ideological lines, commenced on June 25, 1950, with a full-front DPRK

invasion across the 38th parallel, and ended in 1953 after international intervention pushed the front

of the war back to near the 38th parallel.

In the Armistice Agreement of July 27, 1953, the DMZ was created as each side agreed to move their

troops back 2,000 m (2,200 yards) from the front line, creating a buffer zone 4 km (2.5 mi) wide. The

Military Demarcation Line (MDL) goes down the center of the DMZ and indicates exactly where the

front was when the agreement was signed.


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Owing to this theoretical stalemate, and genuine hostility between the North and the South, large

numbers of troops are still stationed along both sides of the line, each side guarding against potential

aggression from the other side. The armistice agreement explains exactly how many military

personnel and what kind of weapons are allowed in the DMZ. Soldiers from both sides may patrol

inside the DMZ, but they may not cross the MDL. Sporadic outbreaks of violence due to North Korean

hostilities killed over 500 South Korean soldiers and 50 U.S. soldiers along the DMZ between 1953 and

1999.

STRUCTURE

Inside the DMZ, near the western coast of the peninsula, Panmunjeom is the home of the Joint

Security Area (JSA). Originally, it was the only connection between North and South Korea but that

changed in 2007 when a Korail train crossed the DMZ to the North on the new Donghae Bukbu Line

built on the east coast of Korea.

There are several buildings on both the north and the south side of the MDL, and a few are built right

on top of it. The JSA is the location where all negotiations since 1953 have been held, including

statements of Korean solidarity, which have generally amounted to little except a slight decline of

tensions. The MDL goes through the conference rooms and down the middle of the conference tables

where the North Koreans and the United Nations Command (primarily South Koreans and Americans)meet face to face.

Within the JSA are a number of buildings for joint meetings called Conference Row. These are used

for direct talks between the Korean War participants and parties to the armistice. Facing the

Conference Row buildings is DPRK's Panmungak (English: Panmun Hall) and ROK's Freedom House. In

1994, North Korea enlarged Panmungak by adding a third floor. In 1998, South Korea built a new

Freedom House for its Red Cross staff and to possibly host reunions of families separated by the

Korean War. The new building incorporated the old Freedom House Pagoda within its design.

Though generally calm, the DMZ has been the scene of much saber-rattling between the two Koreas

over the years. Several small skirmishes have occurred within the JSA since 1953. The Axe Murder

Incident in August 1976 involved the attempted trimming of a poplar tree which resulted in two

deaths (CPT Arthur Bonifas and 1LT Mark Barrett) and Operation Paul Bunyan. Beforehand, the

soldiers of both sides were permitted to go back and forth across the MDL inside of the JSA, a privilege

since revoked as a result of this incident.

Another incident occurred on November 23, 1984, when a Soviet tourist, who was part of an official

trip to the JSA (hosted by the North), ran across the MDL shouting that he wanted to defect. North

Korean troops immediately chased after him opening fire. Border guards on the South Korean side

returned fire eventually surrounding the North Koreans as they pursued the Russian national. One


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South Korean and three North Korean soldiers were killed in the action. The defector was not

captured. In late 2009, South Korean forces in conjunction with the United Nations Command began

renovation of its three guard posts and two checkpoint buildings within the JSA compound.

Construction was designed to enlarge and modernize the structures. Work was undertaken a year

after North Korea finished replacing four JSA guard posts on its side of the MDL.

The Northern Limit Line

The Northern Limit Line (NLL) remains one of the most serious flashpoints for conflict on the Korean

Peninsula. The NLL was promulgated on 30 August 1953 by the United Nations Command (UNC),

though the precise origins of the line remain murky. The line was drawn approximately mid-channel

between the North Korean coast and five islands, known collectively as the Northwest Islands (NWI)

recognized in the armistice as under UNC control. For two decades, little was said about the NLL, but

in October 1973, North Korea began a concerted effort to draw attention to its displeasure with the

NLL. On 1 December 1973 at the 346th Military Armistice Commission (MAC) meeting, North Korean

representatives asserted a claim of 12 nautical miles (nm) for their territorial waters, a claim that

placed the five NWI in their coastal waters. Accordingly, Pyongyang maintained South Korean vessels

transiting to and from the islands were traveling in North Korean waters and were in violation of thearmistice. Moreover, North Korean representatives implied that the NLL was invalid and that any ships

wishing to pass through these North Korean coastal waters would require Pyongyangs permission.

Failure to do so would result in harsh punishment for any violations. These claims and further North

Korean actions over the next two years elevated tension in the region, raising several serious security

and legal issues concerning the NLL. The documents in this collection span 3 December 1973 to 15

September 1975 and follow in the wake of North Korean demands to invalidate the NLL, with

particular emphasis on the U.S. response to these claims.

The issue that may be of most interest in this collection is the glimpse into the thinking of U.S. officials

regarding the NLL, the armistice, and North Korean demands to alter the maritime line. U.S. officials

were deeply worried with North Korean claims made during the 346th MAC meeting. Specifically,

officials were concerned about the demand for permission to navigate in waters contiguous to the

NWI and the unspecified actions North Korea threatened to take should South Korea and the United

States fail to comply. While determined to refuse North Korean demands, which U.S. officials did not

believe were consistent with the armistice, the documents also show caution noting we do not

repeat not wish to see or provoke military incidents over these issues, but at the same time we do

not intend to accept interference with established rights under the agreement to these islands. Thus,

the primary concern for U.S. officials was upholding the armistice. However, it was also clear U.S.

officials were watchful to avoid entanglement in North-South territorial claims and the dispute over


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the NLL. A National Security Council memorandum cautions to not make a legal defense of the

Northern Limit Line which North Korean naval patrols began penetrating in late October. In

addition, a CIA document notes that a major complication in the dispute is the Northern Limit Line,

and that the NLL has no legal basis in international law, nor does it conform along some of its length

to even minimal provisions regarding the division of territorial waters, despite South Korean

assertions that the line is the de facto maritime boundary between the two Korean countries

(Document No. 6).

One of the perplexing dimensions of the NLL line is the exact origin of the line. Most authors note thatthe line was drawn on 30 August 1953 by the UNC but do not cite a specific document. The line may

have been a military control line that was used during the Korean War to separate enemy combatants

and was utilized to keep UNC and ROK vessels

from wandering too far north. The documents in

this collection provide some evidence to clarify

the origins of the line but it is contradictory. A CIA

report dated January 1974 notes that no

documentation can be found to indicate that the

NLL was established prior to 1960 (Document No.

6). However, another document in thecollection dated December 1973 states

that the UNC declared the NLL unilaterally in the mid-1950s, a notation that appears to narrow the

timeframe of the NLLs inception (Document No. 5). Though an exact document has been elusive, it

is possible that earlier documentation does exist, perhaps referring to the NLL under a different name

such as the Northern Patrol Limit Line that provides a more precise date.

The dossier also contains several cables from the Romanian Embassy in Pyongyang to its home office

in Bucharest. Romanian documents are an interesting source as relations between Bucharest and

Pyongyang were close throughout most of the Cold War, including a friendship between Kim Il-sung

and Romanian leader Nicolae Ceausescu. However, the collection contains a telegram from a

Romanian representative in Pyongyang that indicates some skepticism regarding a DPRK explanation

of an incident that occurred on 26 February 1975. According to this telegram, the North Korean

Ministry of Foreign Affairs showed insufficient preparation to completely and accurately inform

heads of diplomatic missions during a briefing session. Moreover, the North Korean representative

was unable to elaborate on details when queried further and required repeated and direct

questioning before admitting to certain details that were left out of Pyongyangs public statements.


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The NLL has a habit of leaping into the headlines periodically as crises occur but the dispute has a

long, complicated history.

The DPRK Nuclear Program

North Korea had been suspected of maintaining a clandestine nuclear weapons development

program since the early 1980s when it constructed a plutonium-producing Magnox nuclear reactor at

Yongbyon. Various diplomatic means had been used by the international community to attempt tolimit North Korea's nuclear program to peaceful power generation and to encourage North Korea to

participate in international treaties.

In May 1992, North Korea's first inspection by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA)

uncovered discrepancies suggesting that North Korea had reprocessed more plutonium than

declared. IAEA requested access to additional information and access to two nuclear waste sites at

Yongbyon. North Korea rejected the IAEA request and announced on March 12, 1993, an intention to

withdraw from the NPT.

In 1994, North Korea pledged, under the "Agreed Framework" with the United States, to freeze itsplutonium programs and dismantle all its nuclear weapons programs in return for several kinds of

assistance, including construction of two modern nuclear power plants powered by light-water

reactors.

However, by 2002, the United States believed that North Korea was pursuing both uranium

enrichment technology and plutonium reprocessing technologies in defiance of the Agreed

Framework. North Korea reportedly told American diplomats in private that they were in possession

of nuclear weapons, citing American failures to uphold their own end of the "Agreed Framework" as

a motivating force. North Korea later "clarified" that it did not possess weapons yet, but that it had

"a right" to possess them, despite the Agreed Framework. In late 2002 and early 2003, North Korea

began to take steps to eject International Atomic Energy Agency inspectors while re-routing spent

fuel rods for plutonium reprocessing for weapons purposes. As late as the end of 2003, North Korea

claimed that it would freeze its nuclear program in exchange for additional American concessions, but

a final agreement was not reached. North Korea withdrew from the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty

in 2003.

On October 9, 2006, North Korea demonstrated its nuclear capabilities with its first underground

nuclear test, detonating a plutonium based deviceand the estimated yield was 0.21 kiloton. The test

was conducted at P'unggye-yok, and US intelligence officials later announced that analysis of


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radioactive debris in air samples collected a few days after the test confirmed that the blast had taken

place. The United Nations Security Council condemned the test in Resolution 1874.

On January 6, 2007, the North Korean government further confirmed that it had nuclear weapons. In

February 2007, following the six-party talks disarmament process, Pyongyang agreed to shut down its

main nuclear reactor. On October 8, 2008, IAEA inspectors were forbidden by the North Korean

government to conduct further inspections of the site. On May 25, 2009, North Korea conducted its

second underground nuclear test. Geological Survey calculated its origin in proximity of the site of the

first nuclear test. The test was more powerful than the previous test, estimated at 2 to 7 kilotons. Thesame day, a successful short range missile test was also conducted.

On April 25, 2009, the North Korean government announced that the country's nuclear facilities had

been reactivated, and that spent fuel reprocessing for arms-grade plutonium has been restored.

North Korea's plutonium-based nuclear reactors are located at the Yongbyon Nuclear Scientific

Research Center, about 90 km north of Pyongyang.

One Soviet-supplied IRT-2000 research reactor, completed in 1967. Uranium irradiated in this reactor

was used in North Korea's first plutonium separation experiments in 1975. Nevertheless, the primary

purpose of the reactor is not to produce plutonium and North Korea has had trouble acquiring enoughfuel for constant operation. The U.S. Department of Energy estimated that this reactor could have

been used to produce up to 12 kg of plutonium, though the Joint Atomic Energy Intelligence

Committee said that the amount was no more than a few hundred grams.

In 1989, a 5MWe reactor was shut down for a period of seventy to a hundred days. In this time it is

estimated that up to fifteen kilograms of plutonium could have been extracted. In 1994, North Korea

unloaded its reactors again. The IAEA had these under full surveillance until later being denied the

ability to observe North Korean power plants. Under normal operation, the reactor can produce about

6 kg of plutonium per year although the reactor would need to be shut down and the fuel rods

extracted to begin the plutonium separation process. Hence, plutonium separation stages alternate

with plutonium production stages. Reprocessing (also known as separation) is known to have taken

place in 2003 for the first core and 2005 for the second core.

Fuel reprocessing facility that recovers uranium and plutonium from spent fuel using the PUREX

process. Based on extended Eurochemic reprocessing plant design at the Mol-Dessel site in Belgium.

In 1994 its activity was frozen in accord with the Agreed Framework. On 25 April 2009, North Korean

news agency KCNA, reported the resumption of reprocessing of spent fuel to recover plutonium.


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On March 12, 1993, North Korea said that it planned to withdraw from the Nuclear Non-Proliferation

Treaty (NPT) and refused to allow IAEA inspectors access to its nuclear sites. By 1994, the United

States believed that North Korea had enough reprocessed plutonium to produce about 10 bombs

with the amount of plutonium increasing. Faced with diplomatic pressure after UN Security Council

Resolution 825 and the threat of American military air strikes against the reactor, North Korea agreed

to dismantle its plutonium program as part of the Agreed Framework in which South Korea and the

United States would provide North Korea with light water reactors and fuel oil until those reactors

could be completed.

Because the light water reactors would require enriched uranium to be imported from outside North

Korea, the amount of reactor fuel and waste could be more easily tracked, making it more difficult to

divert nuclear waste to be reprocessed into plutonium. However, the Agreed Framework was mired

in difficulties, with each side blaming the other for the delays in implementation; as a result, the light

water reactors were never finished. In late 2002, after fuel aid was suspended, North Korea returned

to using its old reactors.

In 2006, there were eight sites identified as potential test explosion sites for current (and future) tests

according to a statement by the South Korean Parliament. These sites were distinguished from a

number of other nuclear materials production facilities in that they are thought to be most closelyidentified with a military, or potentially military purpose.

HIGHLY ENRICHED URANIUM PROGRAM

North Korea possesses uranium mines containing an estimated 4 million tons of high grade uranium

ore.

Prime minister Benazir Bhutto of Pakistan allegedly, through Pakistan's former top scientist, Dr. Abdul

Qadeer Khan, supplied key data, stored in CDs, on uranium enrichment and information to North

Korea in exchange for missile technology around 19901996, according to U.S.intelligence officials.

President Pervez Musharraf and Prime minister Shaukat Aziz acknowledged in 2005 that Khan had

provided centrifuges and their designs to North Korea. In May 2008, Khan, who had previouslyconfessed to supplying the data on his own initiative, retracted his confession, claiming that the

Pakistan Government forced him to be a "scapegoat". He also claimed that North Korea's nuclear

program was well advanced before his visits to North Korea.

Highly enriched uranium (HEU) program was publicized in October 2002 when the United States asked

North Korean officials about the program. Under the Agreed Framework, North Korea explicitly

agreed to freeze plutonium programs (specifically, its "graphite moderated reactors and related

facilities"). The agreement also committed North Korea to implement the Joint Declaration on the


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Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula, in which both Koreas committed not to have enrichment

or reprocessing facilities. The United States argued North Korea violated its commitment not to have

enrichment facilities.

In December 2002, claiming North Korean non-compliance, the United States persuaded the KEDO

Board to suspend fuel oil shipments, which led to the end of the Agreed Framework. North Korea

responded by announcing plans to reactivate a dormant nuclear fuel processing program and power

plant north of Pyongyang. North Korea soon thereafter expelled United Nations inspectors and

announced a unilateral "withdrawal" from the Non-Proliferation Treaty.

In 2007, a Bush administration official assessed that, while there was still a "high confidence" that

North Korea acquired materials that could be used in a "production-scale" uranium program, there is

only a "mid-confidence" level such a production-scale uranium (rather than merely plutonium)

program exists.

STOCKPILE ESTIMATES AND PROJECTIONS

ISIS

For 2013, the Institute for Science and International Security gives a mid-range estimate of 12 to 27

"nuclear weapon equivalents", including plutonium and uranium stockpiles. By 2016, North Korea isprojected to have 14 to 48 nuclear weapon equivalents. (For uranium weapons, each weapon is

assumed to contain 20 kilograms of weapon-grade uranium.)

FAS

As of 2012, the Federation of American Scientists estimates North Korea has fewer than 10 plutonium

warheads.

SIPRI

As of Jan 2013, the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute estimates North Korea has 6-8

warheads.

The Foal Eagle DrillsThe primary purpose of Foal Eagle is to demonstrate American-South Korean military resolve to deter

war on the Korean peninsula and to improve the combined and joint operational posture of those

forces. Foal Eagle is a purely defensive exercise which tests the capability of South Korea to defend

itself, assisted by U.S. Armed Forces, and it is also primarily a rear area security and stability

operations, onward movement of critical assets to the forward area, special operations, ground

maneuver, amphibious operations, combat air operations, maritime action group operations and

counter special operations forces exercises.


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United Nations Command informs the Korean People's Army in North Korea that South Korea and the

United States would be conducting the routine defensive exercise. The United Nations Command also

reassured the Korean People's Army at general officer-level talks that these exercises, conducted

annually in or around March, are purely defensive in nature and have no connection to ongoing or

current events. The Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission monitors the exercise to ensure that

there are no violations of the Korean Armistice Agreement. Since 2001, Foal Eagle combined with the

annual American-South Korean Reception, Staging, Onward movement, and Integration (RSOI)

combined exercises, with RSOI being renamed Key Resolve in 2008.

Recent Developments

Reuters report dated 30/3/2013

North Korea said on March 30th it was entering a "state of war" with South Korea, but Seoul and its

ally the United States played down the statement as tough talk

http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/03/30/us-korea-north-war-idUSBRE92T00020130330

Pyongyang also threatened to close a border industrial zone, the last remaining example of inter-

Korean cooperation which gives the impoverished North access to $2 billion in trade a year.The United States said it took Pyongyang's threats seriously but cautioned that the North had a history

of bellicose rhetoric. Russia, another a permanent U.N. Security Council member, urged all sides to

show restraint.

Tensions have been high since the North's new young leader Kim Jong-un ordered a third nuclear

weapons test in February, breaching U.N. sanctions and ignoring warnings from North Korea's sole

major ally, China, not to do so.

"From this time on, the North-South relations will be entering the state of war and all issues raised

between the North and the South will be handled accordingly," a statement carried by the North's

official KCNA news agency said.

KCNA said the statement was issued jointly by the North's government, ruling party and other

organizations.

The Seoul government said there was nothing in the North's latest statement to cause particular

alarm. "North Korea's statement today ... is not a new threat but is the continuation of provocative

threats," the South's Unification Ministry, which handles political ties with the North, said in a

statement.


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On Friday, Kim signed an order putting the North's missile units on standby to attack U.S. military

bases in South Korea and the Pacific, after the United States flew two nuclear-capable stealth

bombers over the Korean peninsula in a rare show of force.

U.S. officials described the flight as a diplomatic sortie aimed at reassuring allies South Korea and

Japan, and at trying to nudge Pyongyang back to nuclear talks, though there was no guarantee Kim

Jong-un would get the message as intended.

The two Koreas have been technically in a state of war since a truce that ended their 1950-53 conflict.Despite its threats, few people see any indication Pyongyang will risk a near-certain defeat by re-

starting full-scale war.

There was no sign of unusual activity in the North's military to suggest an imminent aggression, a

South Korean defense ministry official said.

CALLSFORRESTRAINT

Russia, which has often balanced criticism of North Korea, a Soviet-era client state, with calls on the

United States and South Korea to refrain from belligerent actions, said a recurrence of war was

unacceptable. "We hope that all parties will exercise maximum responsibility and restraint and no-one will cross the point of no return," Grigory Logvinov, a senior Russian Foreign Ministry official, told

Interfax news agency.

France said it was deeply worried about the situation on the Korean peninsula while NATO Deputy

Secretary General Alexander Vershbow said the alliance hoped "that this is more posturing than a

prelude to any armed hostilities."

China has repeatedly called for restraint on the peninsula.

The North has been threatening to attack the South and U.S. military bases almost on a daily basis

since the beginning of March, when U.S. and South Korean militaries started routine drills that havebeen conducted for decades without incident.

Many in the South have regarded the North's willingness to keep open the Kaesong industrial zone,

located just a few miles (km) north of the heavily-militarized border, as a sign that Pyongyang will not

risk losing a lucrative source of foreign currency by mounting a real act of aggression.

The Kaesong zone is a vital source of hard currency for the North and hundreds of South Korean

workers and vehicles enter daily after crossing the armed border.


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Closure could also trap hundreds of South Korean workers and managers of the more than 100 firms

that have factories there.

The North has previously suspended operations at the factory zone at the height of political tensions

with the South, only to let it resume operations later.

North Korea has canceled an armistice agreement with the United States that ended the Korean War

and cut all hotlines with U.S. forces, the United Nations and South Korea.

More recently, A United Nations General Assembly committee voted in favor of a draft resolutionreferring North Korea to the International Criminal Court for crimes against humanity as well as

"targeted sanctions" for rampant human rights abuses.

The 111-19 vote, with 55 abstentions, is merely a recommendation. The General Assembly does not

have the power to refer the regime or its leader Kim Jong Un to the ICC.The authority to refer a

country to the ICC lies only with the U.N. Security Council, a 15-member body charged with

maintaining global security. The five permanent members at the core of the Security Council,

including China and Russia, wield veto powers. Opponents of the resolution -- including China, Russia

and Cuba -- said the measure was politically manipulated and would set a precedent for other nations

to be targeted in the future. A North Korea representative told the U.N. gathering Tuesday that theresolution "provoked confrontation" and "failed to reflect the reality on the ground."

VJMUN Winter Workshop Study Guide

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