Violence and sustainable development in the Durban Metropolitan area

VIOLENCE A N D SUSTAINABLE D E V E L O P M E N T IN THE D U R B A N METROPOLITAN AREA

MIKE MORRIS, ZARINA PATEL AND MARK BYERLEY

Violence, crime and conflict impact on the potential for sustainable development. It is clear that a key element hinges on what is meant by sustainable and development.

Development in the South African context consists of the following elements:

�9 Economic growth based on a reintegration into the world economy which essentially involves a change in the trade regime to shift the composition of, and the relationship between, imports and exports; radically lowering protection of local industries and accelerating exports from a restructured manufacturing sector; attracting a major inflow of foreign investment.

�9 Redis t r ibut ion of access to resources, social infrastructure and opportunities to ensure that minimal basic needs are met.

�9 Creating adequate delivery mechanisms which involve the participation of local communities and stake-holders but ensure rapid and efficient delivery.

�9 Ensuring an efficient public and private institutional system through direct delivery mechanisms and indirect enabling frameworks.

�9 Democratising the institutional system of governance.

The key issue to bear in mind in the above is that these elements are not purely technical. Development does not mean everyone can be satisfied if only the right policies are inaugurated. Differing social interests are not eliminated in this perspective. On the contrary, there are always trade-offs that have to occur between the different interests in order to maintain a reasonable balance. Pursuing only one element can produce consequences which are extremely beneficial to some and extremely detrimental to others. This may well impact on the broad strategy in so far as it has the effect of jeopardising the realisation of other goals. In short, this development strategy attempts to create as broad a balance as possible, thereby securing maximum support from the various interest groups. Although no one particular interest may be wholly satisfied, the overall effect will be to make most interests more satisfied than any other alternative would have done. As a consequence, the long-term viability (sustainability) of development is more likely to be secured.

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Sustainability can be defined in at least two ways. One way is to present the issue of sustainability in a temporal sense.

Sustainable development is development which meets the needs of the present genera t ion wi thou t compromis ing the abi l i ty of future generations to meet their own needs.

Although this conceptualisation is couched in seemingly purely temporal and philosophical terms, it can be interpreted in ways that are more in line with an interest-based approach to development. This proceeds from the acceptance that development requires trade-offs and that not all interests can be secured at any point in time. Some have to be shelved in favour of others. This therefore builds compromise between particular interests into the very nature of the process of development. Sustainability adds to this conceptualisation the idea that the compromises having to be considered refer not only to interests of current competing social forces, but also integrally involve those of future generations. Competition over scarce resources does not therefore simply encompass the realm of the immediately 'possible'; it has by definition to be extended to the future. It has to encompass the other side of the feedback loop and take into account the consequences of policies and forms of imple- mentation set into motion, or indeed the consequences of taking no action and allowing current social, political and economic forces to follow their own course. Finally it should be noted that taking future interests and generations into account does not imply the long-term projection of prophecy. 'Generation' can refer to relatively short time spans. The injunction is not simply about avoiding visiting the sins of the parents on their children - it warns those parents about the consequences of their actions in period a on their own living conditions in period a+l.

Sustainability has also been viewed in somewhat different terms. It can for example be defined as:

Development that delivers basic environmental, social and economic services to all residents of a community without threatening the viability of the natural, built and social systems upon which the delivery of these services depends.

This approach (which accords with that of the International Council of Local Environmental Initiatives) does not pose the conflict around sustainability in temporal or interest terms, but rather as being concerned with the relationship between servicing basic needs and ensuring viability of the systems that make this possible. It therefore seems to place the focus more on the technical issues of ensuring that specific delivery mechanisms do not undermine the broader needs of the natural and social systems that sustain them. The approach here is

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less interest and trade-off based, and more technical and institutionally based. Given the development context that South African society is currently

grappling with, it is clear that both approaches need to be combined to give the necessary sense of maintaining a balance between a number of cross- cutting issues:

�9 Meeting specific interests �9 Instituting broad-based delivery systems �9 Maintaining the integrity of natural and institutional systems

Any discussion of the relationship between peace, justice and sustainable development would seem to have to take into account both these approaches in the context of the development tasks that South Africa is grappling with. For violence is not only physically destructive of the current generation of people, it also destroys the social, physical and institutional fabric that sustains future generations. Violence is not only socially disruptive of the basic living conditions of people, it also disrupts the institutional delivery mechanisms that make it possible to meet their basic needs and thereby improve the miserable lot they are thrown into. Violence is not only immediate and particular to those whose lives and property are destroyed, it has also long- term and general effects on the level of confidence and investment in economic growth. Violence does not only horrifyingly and finally obliterate the interests of certain groups of people, it also enhances the interests of others who are able to benefit and feed off its destructive social effects.

In short, development in South Africa involves creating a virtuous circle between growth, redistribution, stability and sustainability. Without economic growth, redistribution of resources is seriously limited; without redistribution of resources, stability is fundamentally fragile; without stability, economic growth is restricted and skewed. Without growth, redistribution and stability, the aim of sustainable development is seemingly unattainable. Without sustainability, the goals of growth, redistribution and stability are limited in time and space.

This provides the conceptual justification for linking violence and peace to the goals of sustainable development. Peace, democracy and represen- tativeness become necessary pre-conditions for sustainable development, as the concept of sustainable development attempts to overcome the destructive effects of phys ica l compet i t ion and channel these into ins t i tu t iona l mechanisms designed to induce social consensus and compromise between different interests. Peaceful co-existence and personal security are essential for any sustained human endeavour which aims to improve the quality of life, and minimise destructive impacts on others, and on the bio-physical environment. But societies embroiled in violent conflict do not prioritise the longer-term sustainability of their own actions, rather they are primarily

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concerned with their own physical survival and safety. Environmental degradation and the sustainability of development initiatives are hardly a major priority for people facing the very real possibility and constant threat of violence. Communities where violence is endemic become fragmented and dislocated, making the attainment of consensus around social interests extremely difficult. Development initiatives, instead of providing a route to changing the social conditions of existence, can easily become the factor facilitating enhanced and violent struggles over access to material resources. In that context the physically weaker - the women and the children - become the most vulnerable.

A first step in conflict-ridden areas, then, is the attainment of a negotiated and enduring peace. In addition, however, this peace has to be coupled with the rapid delivery of measurable developmental products, such as:

�9 Secure access to well located urban land �9 Safe and regular supply of water �9 Safe and habitable shelter �9 Efficient and effective domestic energy sources �9 Training and income-earning opportunities

Without the prompt delivery of such visible development products fragile peace agreements cannot hope to endure. Instead of posing the issue of sustainability, development drowns in the endless cycle of personal and political intolerance, contending claims to control, leadership and power, and the use of violence as a means to achieve power, control, and monopolisation of resources.

ENVIRONMENTAL SCARCITY

The struggle between competing communities for access to material resources in the context of rapid urbanisation has been emphasised as a major cause of the violence (Morris and Hindson 1992). The role of environmental scarcity (the scarcity of renewable resources) has, however, tended to be overlooked as a contributing factor to social instability in South Africa. Yet environmental scarcity has also contributed to the escalation of violence and may endanger the stability of the post-apartheid period.

South Africa is not well endowed with renewable resources, although rich in mineral resources. The system of apartheid served to further debilitate the ecosystem. It concentrated resources in the hands of a small segment of the population while forcing the majority to survive on a limited and quickly degrading resource base. The population of South Africa is growing at a rapid pace, and populat ion densities in informal settlements and the former homelands place huge pressures on the land and on the natural resource base.


It is clear therefore that resource patterns need to be made more sustainable to ensure that the demands on the country's renewable resource base do not outstrip their supply.

Environmental scarcity is most obvious in many of the former homelands and informal settlements in South Africa. The soil is severely eroded, water resources are inadequate and of a poor quality, fuel is scarce, and rural areas are growing unable to support the population subsisting on them. This results in a massive influx of people into urban areas. The inability of urban areas to provide for the demands of the people living and moving within their boundaries has led to the mushrooming of informal settlements under adverse environmental and health conditions. Infrastructure is deteriorating under the stress of high population levels. Social and political institutions are unable to provide essential services like refuse removal, piped water, sewerage and electricity. These conditions increase the level of political dissatisfaction and social frustration within South African society.

The importance of social and political factors in shaping the linkage be tween env i ronmen ta l scarcity, gr ievances and conflict are well demonstrated in KwaZulu-Natal. Social and political factors facilitated the violent expression of grievances as the apartheid system began to collapse (Morris and Hindson 1992; Percival 1995). The first democratic election, the creation of the legitimate Government of National Unity, and the adoption of the Reconstruction and Development Programme has radically changed the social and political context within South Africa. However, scarcity of natural resources remains severe and detrimentally affects the wellbeing of the population. Resources have yet to be redistributed and the socio-economic condition of most South Africans remains the same.

The goals of the Reconstruction and Development Programme are intimately entwined with the sustainable use of South Africa's natural resources, yet the RDP and the White Paper do not adequately address the degradation of South Africa's natural resource base (Percival 1995). Although the RDP has as one of its goals the equitable access to natural resources, it fails to identify which environmental resources are threatened and the most appropriate means to regulate this scarcity. Unless the scarcities of renewable resources and the social and economic effects of these scarcities are addressed, the social stability of the post-apartheid era may be in danger.

VIOLENCE AND DEVELOPMENT

Colonial conquest and rule, and the more recent history of apartheid and territorial segregation, resulted in a highly unequal allocation of land and social resources. In the context of a system of resource allocation which was highly skewed in class and racial terms, the process of rapid urbanisation in the 1980s and the disintegration of apartheid unleashed a major struggle for


political control between competing power centres and massive conflict over access to material resources. Violence has therefore become a pervasive feature of South African society.

Two basic and overlapping explanations exist for the violence in South Africa. The one argues that violence is an expression of political conflict as competing groups struggle to gain control over territory and people. This operates not only between communities but also takes the form of internecine violence within communities resulting in the reinforcement of a lack of political tolerance. The other argues that violence is an expression of competition over access to, and the use of, scarce resources. The scarcity of natural resources and the social effects of this scarcity - particularly the migration of people into cities - increased people's demands on the state while decreasing its institutional ability to meet these demands. At the same time, powerful groups within various communities gained control of resource access which further debilitated the ability of state institutions to respond to society's needs. Grievances escalated as the standard of l iving of the population declined while expectations increased with the reform and collapse of apartheid. Group divisions that already existed become further entrenched under environmental strain. (Morris and Hindson 1994a; Percival 1995).

The attainment of peace and justice is integral to development sustainability in a number of ways:

�9 The outbreak of violent conflict and the absence of societally accepted definitions of justice promote the philosophy of individualism over that of collectivism.

�9 Loss of life and property due to violence and crime is destructive to households and communities.

�9 The social cohesion of the affected communities is shattered by endemic violence.

�9 Communities break up, flee and migrate to other areas. �9 They lose the household resources and access to infrastructure that make

urban existence possible. �9 They also lose the institutional connections that enabled them to access

further resources. �9 In so doing they slip through the institutional networks that are designed

to ensure delivery of resources and infrastructure. �9 The institutional systems and delivery mechanisms cease to operate as

supply vehicles to satisfy basic needs.

At the family and personal level, violence breaks up stable household structures with devastating social and personal consequences. It dis locates individuals from stable reference points of families, jobs, social relationships, and physical protection. It reinforces violent resolution of disputes in families,


in communities and between communities. It destroys the previously accepted gender and age roles, and channels conceptions of masculinity (particularly amongst the youth) into physically violent, personally abusive and socially militaristic forms. (Campbell 1992).

The breakdown of social cohesion at a settlement or wider scale spells disaster for attempts to initiate community-wide (or broader) commitment to any developmental initiative, much less sustainable ones. One cannot get community commitment to sustainable development practices in a climate of violence and intolerance; concerns over personal safety will predominate over almost all other concerns.

A further connection between violence and environmental sustainability are the effects that violence has on the physical landscape. The greatest of these effects is possibly the efflux of refugees from violence torn areas and their resettlement elsewhere. This may mean the occupation of further unoccupied land, the densification of receiver areas, or the dissipation of communities into a multitude of other areas and households, many of which are only able to eke out a marginal subsistence on available resources. The increased pressure of absorbing refugees places burdens on household , communi ty , and environment and can, and has, led to the further outbreak of violence, either between established residents and refugees or via the importation of violence into the area (Morris 1994).

In short, violence not only destroys existing development, and blocks proposed development initiatives, it also results in further violence as dislocated individuals, households and fragmented communities resort to increased competition, conflict and violence in order to ensure that some of their most basic needs are able to be met. Social and environmental scarcity is massively magnified; institutional breakdown means that such needs cannot easily be secured through conventional delivery mechanisms; dislocated social groupings emerge with an interest in maintaining this state of affairs, and consequently sustainable development recedes further and further into the distance.

VIOLENCE AND DEVELOPMENT IN DURBAN

Political and other forms of violence (criminal, ethnic, state, etc.) have plagued the Durban Metropolitan Area consistently since the early 1980s. The causes of this violence have been explored elsewhere (Byerley 1989; Hindson, Byerley and Morris 1994) and will only be mentioned in passing here. An integrated explanation of the causes of violence in Durban has argued that under apartheid the effects of the maldistribution of land, political power, and material resources all acted to reinforce each other and generate the violence in the 1980s as apartheid disintegrated and rapid urbanisation of the metropolitan periphery occurred.


Under these conditions African people were crowded into small areas on the periphery with limited or no access to basic amenities such as water, electricity, habitable shelter, health and educational facilities. In many cases the lack of available land and housing has resulted in uncontrolled occupation of vacant land, initially on the fringes of, or within, African townships, but since the mid-1980s in areas doser to the previously 'white' core of the city. This process of settlement has placed immense stress on the capacity of infrastructural, economic, and social systems within African townships, many of which suffer from a lack of maintenance or an inadequate supply of basic infrastructure. In addition, the effects on the environment have been to increase the sprawl of the city to further outlying areas with concomitant effects on natural resources.

The massive increase in numbers of people in limited and confined spaces on the peripheries of the townships, as Morris and Hindson have argued, has

greatly increased the scarcity of residential resources such as land, housing and services and thus heightened competition for these resources. Untrammeled competition for basic resources in the context of the collapse of local government, the reduction of state assistance for housing and transport and a shrinking resource base for res ident ia l life created ideal condi t ions for communa l mobil isat ion around access to control over these resources. Mobilisation to defend or control [or access] land and other basic resources was a major factor that fed into political mobilisation and conflict in the DFR. (1994a:158-59)

The draconian laws of apartheid, the various states of emergency, and the divide and rule/co-option approach of the authorities sought to restrict black political activity to the townships and squatter areas on the margins of the city. These factors acted to promote the emergence of a particular form of violence in the mid to late 1980s - internecine conflict over scarce resources. Whereas the violence of the early 1980s can largely be categorised as a state-people violence, in stark contrast the form violence took from August 1985 in Durban was that of mass confrontations between UDF supporters (largely youth) on one hand, and Inkatha supporters (largely adults at times backed by the security forces either openly or clandestinely) on the other. From the late 1980s there has been a further change in the form of violence towards a far more targeted and professionalised approach. Mass confrontations gave way increasingly to conflicts between heavily armed forces from one or other side of the political divide. Reports of violence in this period reinforce the notion of the emergence of a 'sub-economy of violence' with reports of assassinations, professional hit-men, targeted settlement or taxi killings, and the extensive use of automatic weapons. The role of various arms of the state in fomenting


violence has also to be taken into account, and this legacy continues today in two forms:

�9 That of state security personnel initially trained by the state but now acting independently or for some or other 'pay-master'

�9 In the formation of a particular police and security culture over the past decades

In the current period the extent of criminal violence has been highlighted, with incidents of car hijackings, armed robberies, burglaries, and the like. While political violence continues (and increased with the jockeying for political power in the run-up to the local government elections), this should not dis- count the fact that the extent of criminal violence has increased significantly over the past few years. For example:

�9 Armed robbery increased by 97 per cent between 1989 and 1994 �9 Murder increased by 48 per cent over the same period �9 Gun smuggling increased by 227 per cent between 1992 and 1993

One effect of rising crime rates - beside the oft-stated one of 'scaring off' international investment - has been to induce greater numbers of skilled professionals to emigrate with detrimental effects for development projects and programmes.

Extensive political and/or criminal violence adds to other socio-economic factors eroding households and family structures. This acts as a catalyst to increasing incidences of domestic violence as the culture of violence takes a greater hold on society in general and individuals in particular. Older men (fathers) feel impotent to fulfill their traditional roles:

The father is victim of expectations he is incapable of fulfilling. Families make demands on the basis of very real needs, then attribute the father's inability to meet them to personal inadequacy on his part. The father feels humiliated and emasculated (given that the notions of provider, household headship and masculinity seem to be closely interlinked ...). He will often turn to drink and other women for consolation, squandering a portion of his meagre salary on these indulgences and further embittering his family who take these bad habits as further proof of his lack of worth as a father. (Campbell 1992:619)

In the political context of an increasing assertiveness of the youth this is a powderkeg for inter-generational and family relations. Older men feel


emasculated and need to assert their authority. Manifestations of violent behaviour are one mechanism for asserting lost masculinity. Male youth become contemptuous of them, are regarded as 'wild' and disrespectful of the old ways. In turn, these youth establish their own social reference points, asserting their masculinity through quintessential concepts of violence. Derived from a macho culture of resistance, they characterise themselves as hard and ruthless. Women and girls exist to be controlled and obedient to the wishes and needs of men. Increasingly, violence is seen as a perfectly justifiable mode of social control over those less powerful and a means of resolving competition and conflict.

The Durban Metropolitan Area displays other forms of conflict which are less vociferous, but also serve to undermine the sustainability of development initiatives. The Cato Manor development for low-income housing provided a good example of the conflict that can arise over the inadequate provision of housing and basic services. In 1993 Chesterville residents forcibly occupied some six hundred unoccupied House of Delegates houses in Wiggans. The residents of Chesterville, who lived under conditions of severe overcrowding with no corresponding provision of basic services, experienced a feeling of relative deprivation. Many of the Chesterville residents felt betrayed by the House of Delegates, whom they accused of fuelling racial tensions between themselves and the Indian and coloured residents of Wiggans. The situation illustrates the potential for violent conflict over housing and other scarce resources in the built environment to assume racial dimensions. In addition, the crisis displayed the potential for conflict between people and the state over the housing question, particularly where the state is challenged to take action in defence of private property.

While the development of a taxonomy of violence, and an identification of the predominant forms of violence over time is useful, such a taxonomy may serve to otherwise disguise the interrelationships between different forms of violence - criminal and political violence, for example - which, it may be argued, are intrinsically interwoven in many cases.

KEY AREAS FOR ACTION

In promoting sustainable development one needs to confront the issue of competi t ion for scarce resources, existing political and other forms of intolerance or outright antagonism, localised power figures or gate keepers, and the commonly held perceptions of the security forces, judicial system, and other sectors of the state. One starting point is to begin to question our own preconceptions with regard to development and ask whether alternative approaches may not perhaps be more appropriate.


Is Peace a Precondition for Development?

While it appears to be a self-evident truth that peace is a pre-condition for sustainable economic and social development, it may be possible in particular conflict situations to initiate a development intervention in order to galvanise or stimulate the search for a peaceful end to a conflict. This, however, requires a detailed knowledge of the circumstances, individuals, groups, and of the communities embroiled in conflict, as well as of the issues which are seen to be informing the violence and the linkages of these issues to the groups involved in a particular setting.

It must be recognised, however, that the route to peace is not easy, negotiations constantly break down for a myriad reasons, including:

�9 Changes in 'leadership" �9 Changes in the national or provincial political spheres �9 Alternative or h idden agendas on the part of those party to the

negotiations �9 A shortage of skilled communi ty negotiators and the scarcity of

resources �9 The presence of shacklords, warlords, or criminals who are threatened

by such negotiations

It may be necessary in such instances to institute a top-down approach to development in order to create the preconditions which will allow peace to emerge. It might be proposed, for example, that as telephones and street lights were identified in Inanda as priority needs, the top-down delivery of such services is essential to create the preconditions for peaceful negotiations to emerge. Such services provide a means whereby local people can both identify incidents and perpetrators of violence and report these to the necessary bodies.

Is a Top-down Approach Desirable or Even Possible?

Many developers are now of the view that given the high risk of car hijackings, theft, and personal violence on the one hand, and the low profitability margins, and prolonged negotiations required on the other, that it is just not worth their while to even contemplate development projects based in the shack areas or townships. In such circumstances, in particular where violent conflict is endemic to an area, the top-down approach coupled with effective and widely accepted policing processes may be the only method of breaking the development deadlock. This may, however, require a change of attitude on the part of some of the political bodies if such an approach is to be sanctioned by the various levels of the state.


It may be recognised that a top-down approach is a possible path to development, distinct from the participation route, and some thought needs to be given to where and when and for what development products such a top- down approach may be pursued. The provision of street lighting, telephones, and mobile police stations in a top-down fashion may be seen as necessary to create the preconditions for peace to emerge in some cases - with the rider that the police forces need to be seen to be non-partisan, efficient, and responsive to the needs of the wider community rather than merely to one par t icular segment of it, one political group over another, for example,. If the top-down approach is adopted in particular circumstances it is crucial that the reasons for this, and the specific development objectives, be relayed to the actual households who will benefit from the development. In a context of conflict, intolerance, and non-accountable 'leadership" this may only be possible via radio, local media, flyers, and so on.

In concert with the adoption of such a top-down route (if used) there is the need to promote the emergence of agencies of civil society which, it is posited, will emerge as the community development partners when the conditions 'normalise' sufficiently for this to be possible. Thus, it is argued, attempts to generate meaningful participation need to be pursued simultaneously with the process of delivering essential services to embattled communities, in order to al low the res idents concerned to take ownership of the peace and development process as changing conditions make this increasingly possible.

Is Development Participation Essential ?

The delay of development projects (either infrastructural or social) is often bogged down by the lengthy and arduous route of community participation, particularly in situations where the definition of 'community' is tenuous, and where local 'strongmen', criminals and gangsters can use 'participation' to actively work against development intervention for their own dubious ends. Despite the fact that 'correct procedures ' have been followed in many instances, changes in local 'leadership', or historical antagonism between differing groups wi th in a ' communi ty ' often lead to a b reakdown in negotiations and development stagnation.

A further comment on the community participation route is that such local- level negotiations seldom promote a wider geographic, social, environmental, or sustainable view on development. Thus each community argues that unemployed people from wi th in their area must be given jobs in the development initiative. Yet this militates against the ongoing delivery of meaningful skills to unemployed persons, and is inefficient in terms of training, costs, and time taken.

It is widely accepted that a culture of violence and criminality is prevalent in South Africa, and it has further been suggested that the historical co- existence of two opposing 'cultures' - simplistically seen as 'progressive' and

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'conservative' - has served to reinforce intolerance for other viewpoints and therefore the likelihood of violence as a solution to problems is enhanced. In areas with weak community structures - as is almost invariably the case in Durban - the ability of the bulk of peace-seeking individuals to hold 'leadership' to account is notably lacking, and the very 'leaders' who claim to be pursuing peace may only be involved in order to raise all kinds of barriers to successfully implementing a peaceful solution.

There is a dire need to broaden and deepen community involvement beyond the political groups in order to begin to de-politicise development and entrench it within a community which will have a self-interest in promoting the success of such development despite what the opposing political groups or local ' leaders' may be saying. The importance of accessing beneficiaries directly rather than via gate-keepers or self-declared "leaders' (often with their own agenda) cannot be emphasised strongly enough. In this regard, an appropriate strategy to access these beneficiaries timeously and involve them both in an effective and efficient manner in the development process requires serious consideration.

A major problem of peace structures is that they are largely controlled by political groups or leaders. Given that development is about improving the lives of, and empowering normal community members, agencies of civil society (churches and church groups, burial societies, savings clubs, housing clubs, womens' groups, traders associations, business groups, and so on) need to have a far greater involvement in peace and development structures at their own local level. In concert with such a deepening of community involvement the importance of skills training of local actors needs to be stressed. Yet this all costs money and takes time. If rapid delivery is required, this needs to be traded off against the time delays inherent in consultative and participatory approaches.

The idea of promoting accessible development information (on costs of different options, choices, level of services, etc.) directly to communities via radio, local media, community newsletters, flyers, and so on has been suggested as a means to by-pass the gate-keeping functions of (frequently self- appointed) 'leaders'. In this regard the possibility of including a Development Supplement to one of the local newspapers on a fortnightly or monthly basis may be investigated as a means of delivering essential information in order to generate informed consumers able to make informed development choices. Any such initiative will need to receive the support of the political bodies at a metropolitan or higher level and the allocation of dedicated finances for it to be successful.

Is There a Need for Change in the Security and Judicial Systems ?

There is no national constitution and no guidelines on how Community Policing Forums should constitute themselves and function. In addition, such


forums do not have sufficient powers, for example, to get a Station Comman- der replaced for just reasons. Thus while such forums shift the responsibility for policing on to communities, these self-same communities do not have the necessary associated power.

The need for a change in the culture of the police force is widely recognised. In addition, the need to weed out corruption, promote efficiency, enlarge the capacity, and undertake more efficient training prograrnmes is acknowledged. The advent in the future of a metropoli tan police force may offer the opportunity to begin to address some of the issues relating to Community Policing Forums and changing the culture of the existing police forces. There has to be a committed thrust towards getting Community Policing Forums to work effectively where they exist, and to enable them to emerge where they do not.

The importance of independent and community monitors must be stressed in this regard. The presence of such monitors is a means of holding police accountable and ensuring that they perform their essential functions - arrest identified criminals, insti tute criminal procedures, collect and present evidence, and so on. A general information drive which informs local communities of the procedures for investigation may be useful, including, for example the importance of making statements, getting case record numbers, and so on.

Related to this policing role is the functioning of the judicial system. It is entirely unacceptable for identified criminals to be released on bail only to return to communities and threaten potential witnesses. Such a process, while outside the direct influence of the local police, serves to further undermine the credibility of the police in the eyes of the local community. A witness protection programme may be needed in order to encourage local people to come forward and testify to particular events. The need for transparency on the part of the judicial system is essential; people need to know what is happening if they are to have faith in the judicial system.

The appoin tment of Communi ty Assessors in the recent past is an important contribution towards making the judicial system more transparent and accountable and 'communities will have to continue with their attempts to have justice committees built up around each magisterial court' (Kinnes, 1995:5). Such committees consist of

groups of residents from communities in the jurisdiction of the court who work with prosecutors and magistrates in an advisory capacity. The Justice Committees appoint the Community Assessors who are also community members. They operate like a jury, sitting in court with the magistrate and participating in assessing individual cases. (Kinnes 1995).


In a context where criminals are seldom arrested, are released on bail, and are seldom convicted, the image of the police and the courts deteriorates while that of the People's Courts will be enhanced; they, at least, are perceived (rightly or not) to be delivering rapid visible justice. If Community Policing Forums and Justice Committees are not seen to be working then the phenomenon of People's Courts will pick up again.

There is no option, if one seeks to enhance the commonly held view of the police and courts, but to make them more accountable for their actions. The police and the judicial system have seldom been held to account for their actions or, as is often the case, inaction, this due to various states of emergency which protected the police, the arm36 and the courts from public accountability. If we do not want to go the route of street justice and kangaroo courts then properly constituted Community Policing Forums and Justice Committees, with the necessary institutional support and powers need to be encouraged.

Is there a Need for Independent Monitors and a Dynamic Civil Society?.

While the Durban area had developed considerable capacity and skills in the role of monitoring and mediation, this capacity has largely dissipated over the past year, but the current need for it is equally important. This situation emerged after the 1994 elections when a range of funding agencies no longer saw the need to commit funds to violence-related work as they saw this as the responsibility of the new government. Yet limited government resources are available for this essential work. Essential, because an independent civil body is required in the current context to monitor the actions of the security forces and to push for investigations to take place, culprits to be arrested, bail to be refused, and to service Community Policing Forums.

The role of the churches in promoting peace may be a possible means of bringing structures of civil society more fully into peace processes. It is postulated that the value systems propagated by the churches could play a role in promoting peace if harnessed and integrated into other initiatives, such as psychological programmes aimed at teaching youth non-violent methods of problem solving. Important in such a process is the ability to isolate critical moral values and commonalities between parties and groups. The identification of common values may then serve as a basis for negotiations between opposition groups.

While the police officer and the community worker may espouse similar moral values, this is seldom self-evident and needs to be drawn out in processes of mediation, negotiation, conflict resolution and problem solving. The possibility of promoting programmes which aim to draw out common moral values amongst diverging parties via the churches and organisations such as FAMSA and the Street Law Programme needs to be investigated. Such


a programme will need to aim to transform the emergent culture of violence and intolerance into one of peaceful problem solving and political tolerance for other viewpoints. Such investigations and programmes will, however, require dedicated financing, intensive training and skills acquisition, and not insignificant resources.

KEY INDICATORS

In assessing indicators it is necessary to differentiate between data on political violence and criminal violence. Although most of the attention regarding violence in KwaZulu-Natal is centered on political violence, the actual number of deaths arising from criminal violence far outweighs those from political violence. In looking at development there is a need to take into account the general level of violence, including that of criminal violence. This is reinforced by a trend emerging in the past two years whereby political violence often merges into criminal activity (Morris and Hindson 1994b). Indeed, it is the latter that has the most distorting effect on development and in the end is likely to render it unsustainable. Certainly if the general level of violence (both criminal and political) is not radically altered, and the perception remains in people's minds that this is 'the dangerous province', then KwaZulu-Natal and Durban will not be able to attract adequate investment funds, skilled personnel and tourists.

The other distinction that needs to be made refers to the residential site where violence occurs. This involves spatial location between core city and periphery, as well as socio-economic categorisation of residential areas. There is a trend for violence to occur in the marginalised periphery, which contains the residential areas dominated by shack settlements (Hindson, Byerley and Morris 1994). These are also precisely the areas where the majority of people have the least access to services to meet their basic needs; they are the places where attention to environmental issues is most required and the institutional fabric of the society is least able to give it. Unfortunately the current data are not avai lable in a form which makes it possible to create a direct cor respondence be tween local ised violence and res iden t ia l form. Disaggregating the data into such a finely grained sieve so as to pinpoint peripheral shack settlements by name is not yet possible.

Table I provides data on death as a result of political violence by magisterial area. This a l lows trends over t ime to be ident i f ied as well as broad generalisations regarding the distribution of death by political violence between core city and peripheral residential areas.

The highest levels of violence between 1993 and 1995 occurred in the magisterial districts of Embumbulu, Inanda and Umlazi. The first two are clearly on the marginalised periphery of the Durban metropolitan area and have very high shack settlement populations. The violence in the Umlazi

VIOLENCE A N D DEVELOPMENT 199

Table 1: Deaths from political violence in the Durban Functional Region: 1986 - June 1995

Magisterial 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1 9 9 5 Total

districts June

Chatsworth 1 1 0 0 2 1 0 8 3 1 17

Durban 35 6 11 24 29 16 33 44 76 31 305 Embumbulu 34 18 10 13 160 140 277 184 111 21 968 Empurnalanga 0 47 126 167 224 68 84 37 16 4 773 Inanda 31 5 17 113 116 37 16 189 121 33 678 Ndwedwe 0 0 4 13 78 31 47 30 116 8 327 Ntuzuma 14 19 13 88 86 60 82 85 122 1 570 Pinetown 9 15 135 49 33 32 35 17 7 3 335 Umlazi 8 10 9 15 68 47 190 166 126 75 714

Total 132 121 325 482 796 432 764 760 698 177

Source: Conflict Trends in KwaZulu-Natal project 1995

magisterial district has tended to be concentra ted in the shack set t lements on the p e r i p h e r y of the f o r m a l t o w n s h i p of U m l a z i a n d in t he soc i a l l y marginal ised hostels (Louw 1995). N d w e d w e is a p redominan t ly rural area and the political violence that flared up in 1994 was concentra ted in a shor t space of t ime pr ior to the April elections (Louw 1994). The political violence in the N t u z u m a area was heavily focused on the Bhambayi shack set t lement .

KwaZulu-Nata l has become k n o w n for its dea th figures result ing from acts of political violence. High as these are, however , the following statistics make it clear that the pr incipal p rob lem lies wi th the prevalence of criminal violence.

Recent police statistics reveal that 1 210 murde r s occurred in the greater Durban area out of a provincial total of 4 321 in the first three quarters of 1995 (Natal Mercun d 9 Oct. 1995). This should be compared to the dea th as a result of political violence of 177 in the Durban metropol i tan area for the first half of 1995. If one does a s imple projection for the ou t s tand ing three m o n t h s that still leaves an es t imated dea th rate of 265, which accounts for approximate ly only a quar ter of total murde r s . The m u r d e r rate as a result of polit ical violence remains roughly a quarter of criminally at t r ibuted murde r s over the per iod.

Cr ime statistics of the different met ropol i tan areas in South Africa, s h o w n in Table 2, are also very revealing, for they situate met ropol i tan Durban in a compara t ive context.

Based on 1994 crime rates Durban ranks second for property offences (behind Johannesburg and Soweto), third for violent offences (behind Port Elizabeth, 1 Johannesburg and Soweto), and second for the big six (behind Johannesburg and Soweto). The mos t significant conclusion revealed by Table 2 is that cr ime


rates in Durban manifested major increases between 1992 and 1994. The most significant increase was in the big six offences (the most serious types of crime) which was the highest in the whole country and increased faster than other types of offence.

Glanz (1995) interrogates the comparat ive violent crime rates with interesting results. Although the rate of murder was highest in Durban, the rate there of aggravated assault (which in effect is usually interpersonal violence where victim and offender are often known to each other) is the lowest of all the metropolitan areas. Glanz (1995) concludes that 'although overall levels of violence in Durban are very high, it seems that violence here is more of the "stranger-on-stranger" type'.

Table 2: Crime in metropol i tan areas 1994 and percentage change 1992 - 1994

Durban and Johannesburg Cape Pensisula Pretoria Bloemfontein surrounds and Soweto and surrounds and surrounds

Type of offence No. Rate % No. Rate % No. Rate % No. Rate % No. Rate %

Property 68887 5707 +7 118200 5812 +2 89686 4220 -5 62857 4687 +.3 22470 3983 +11

Vlolance 31079 2575 +15 58100 2857 +5 47624 2241 +8 29124 2172 +20 13177 2336 +18

BkJsiX 49948 4138 +23 96877 4764 +11 33445 2985 -1 42964 3204 +9 14640 2595 +17

Source: Glanz 1995

Notes: Rates are given per I00 000 of the population, based on the 1991 census 2 V'uJlent offences include: rape, attempted rape, assault, murder, attempted murder, robbery. The big six include: murder, attempted murder, rape, attempted rape, aggravated assault/robbery,

burglar~ motor theft.

CONCLUSION

The transition to a representative democracy could have several impacts on the relationship between environmental scarcity and conflict. The RDP promises to address structural inequalities that have resulted in limited access to natural resources for the majority of the population. As development needs are addressed, it is expected that levels of grievance may decrease and be transformed from one of violence to a more peaceful one. However, the degradation of natural resources is still a priority issue to be addressed. Rural development must be promoted, as well as the provision of basic infrastructure in informal settlements and other forms of urban development. Condi t ions to help communi t ies , par t icular ly the women , e m p o w e r themselves, must be created. If these issues are not addressed, the root causes of the conflict will remain, and sustainability will be undermined.

VIOLENCE A N D DEVELOPMENT 201

The pursuance of sustainable development requires that we have to follow an approach which seeks to integrate three essential processes:

The need for a effective and widely accepted policing and judicial process. This requires that substantial resources are made available to the police force, that the policing and justicial systems actively work to shed their historical baggage, and that the police work with local communities via structured and monitored forums which have the necessary 'teeth' and are not token bodies.

The urgent need to deepen and broaden the involvement of agencies of civil society in both peace and development processes. This requires that present 'community leaders' are made accountable, and that the necessary political, financial, and institutional support be made available in order to enable peace and development pacts to be timeously produced with the support of the bulk of the end beneficiaries - local household residents.

The crucial delivery of visible development products. This has to be done in a manner which is socially, economically, and ecologically sustainable and which serves to improve the physical, social, economic, and psychological needs of beneficiary households and communities in a manner that encourages self-determination and personal advancement via a longer-term development programme.

In the final analysis the issue of violence, although seemingly tangential, is in fact at the very core of sustainable development. For economic growth, which is essential for any sustainable development, will be severely stunted by continuing violence. Effective redistribution of resources, which is also essential for meeting basic needs and creating a required balance between residential utilisation of resources and the environment, will always be problematic if violence is not contained. Stability, which is the institutional foundation of future balanced development, cannot be achieved if violence continues to shatter the social fabric of the region. In short, skewed economic growth and imbalanced development can occur but sustainable development hangs on resolving the problem of escalating violence and crime.

NOTES

This paper was originally produced for the project on the Environment and Development commissioned by the City of Durban in 1995.

1. Statistics for Port Elizabeth are not included in this table. See Glanz 1995. 2. It is well known that the 1991 census exhibited notorious undercounts,

202 URBAN F O R U M 7:2, 1996

particularly in KwaZulu-Natal. This will affect the calculations on which the rates are based. If the undercount factor is compensated for then Durban's rate figures are likely to be lower than detailed in Table 2..

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Violence and sustainable development in the Durban Metropolitan area

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