Villagisation and the 1974-6 Economic Crisis in TanzaniaAuthor(s): John BriggsSource: The Journal of Modern African Studies, Vol. 17, No. 4 (Dec., 1979), pp. 695-702Published by: Cambridge University PressStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/160747 .

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VILLAGISATION AND ECONOMIC CRISIS IN TANZANIA 695 VILLAGISATION AND ECONOMIC CRISIS IN TANZANIA 695 VILLAGISATION AND ECONOMIC CRISIS IN TANZANIA 695 VILLAGISATION AND ECONOMIC CRISIS IN TANZANIA 695

Villagisation and the 1974-6 Economic Crisis in Tanzania by John Briggs, Lecturer in Geography, University of Glasgow, formerly of the University of Dar es Salaam

Since i967, the year of the Arusha Declaration, Tanzania's rural policy has provided a major focus for scholars interested in the problems of develop- ment in the Third World.' Jonathan Barker has noted that many writers on Tanzania's rural policy fall into one of two camps: 'production socialists' who make the basic assumption that communal production per se is desirable, and concentrate much of their research activity on the various social and political constraints; and 'production liberals' who are generally sceptical of the effectiveness of communal production, and they would prefer to see greater emphasis placed on the 'self-improvement motive of families and individuals '.2

Michael Lofchie in an interesting and, at times, highly provocative article in this Journal - 'Agrarian Crisis and Economic Liberalisation in Tanzania', Vol. xvi, No. 3, September 1978, pp. 451-75 - has contributed to the debate, arguing essentially that the major economic crisis encountered during the years 1974-6 was caused by the policy of collective villagisation, adopted in I967 as part of the Arusha Declaration and vigorously pursued during the early I970s. Indeed, he states that 'Since collective villagisation had been the cornerstone of Tanzania's rural policy for the preceding five years, it seemed obvious to conclude that this bore some responsibility for the food crisis' (p. 452). It is implied by Lofchie at this point that he is referring to the five-year period ending in March 1974. He goes on further to suggest that the economic crisis came about 'because of the disastrous attempt to imple- ment a programme of collective villagisation in fulfillment of the concept that the agricultural sector could be successfully organised on a socialist basis' (p. 460). It is perfectly clear that Lofchie lays the blame for the 1974-6 crisis at the door of the collectivisation policy associated with the development of ujamaa villages, based firmly on the acceptance of communal farming as the major mode of production.

My aim is to demonstrate that this is in fact not the case and, at the same time, to offer an alternative and more convincing explanation of the reasons leading to the I974-6 economic crisis.

Dimensions of the Crisis

There is no doubt that between I974 and I976 Tanzania's economy was in serious trouble. Lofchie is able to demonstrate this by using data from the Government's economic surveys, as well as statistics from the National Milling Corporation. Even more dramatic evidence of the crisis at that time has been provided recently by the Bank of Tanzania. As may be seen from Table i, food imports into Tanzania were relatively limited during the early 1970s, accounting for only a small proportion of all the country's imports;

A The Arusha Declaration of I967 committed Tanzania to a socialist-oriented means of developing the country's resources and people.

2 Jonathan Barker, 'The Debate on Rural Socialism in Tanzania', in B.U. Mwansasu and Cranford Pratt (eds.), Towards Socialism in Tanzania (Dar es Salaam, 1979), pp. 95-124.

Villagisation and the 1974-6 Economic Crisis in Tanzania by John Briggs, Lecturer in Geography, University of Glasgow, formerly of the University of Dar es Salaam

Since i967, the year of the Arusha Declaration, Tanzania's rural policy has provided a major focus for scholars interested in the problems of develop- ment in the Third World.' Jonathan Barker has noted that many writers on Tanzania's rural policy fall into one of two camps: 'production socialists' who make the basic assumption that communal production per se is desirable, and concentrate much of their research activity on the various social and political constraints; and 'production liberals' who are generally sceptical of the effectiveness of communal production, and they would prefer to see greater emphasis placed on the 'self-improvement motive of families and individuals '.2

Michael Lofchie in an interesting and, at times, highly provocative article in this Journal - 'Agrarian Crisis and Economic Liberalisation in Tanzania', Vol. xvi, No. 3, September 1978, pp. 451-75 - has contributed to the debate, arguing essentially that the major economic crisis encountered during the years 1974-6 was caused by the policy of collective villagisation, adopted in I967 as part of the Arusha Declaration and vigorously pursued during the early I970s. Indeed, he states that 'Since collective villagisation had been the cornerstone of Tanzania's rural policy for the preceding five years, it seemed obvious to conclude that this bore some responsibility for the food crisis' (p. 452). It is implied by Lofchie at this point that he is referring to the five-year period ending in March 1974. He goes on further to suggest that the economic crisis came about 'because of the disastrous attempt to imple- ment a programme of collective villagisation in fulfillment of the concept that the agricultural sector could be successfully organised on a socialist basis' (p. 460). It is perfectly clear that Lofchie lays the blame for the 1974-6 crisis at the door of the collectivisation policy associated with the development of ujamaa villages, based firmly on the acceptance of communal farming as the major mode of production.

My aim is to demonstrate that this is in fact not the case and, at the same time, to offer an alternative and more convincing explanation of the reasons leading to the I974-6 economic crisis.

Dimensions of the Crisis

There is no doubt that between I974 and I976 Tanzania's economy was in serious trouble. Lofchie is able to demonstrate this by using data from the Government's economic surveys, as well as statistics from the National Milling Corporation. Even more dramatic evidence of the crisis at that time has been provided recently by the Bank of Tanzania. As may be seen from Table i, food imports into Tanzania were relatively limited during the early 1970s, accounting for only a small proportion of all the country's imports;

A The Arusha Declaration of I967 committed Tanzania to a socialist-oriented means of developing the country's resources and people.

2 Jonathan Barker, 'The Debate on Rural Socialism in Tanzania', in B.U. Mwansasu and Cranford Pratt (eds.), Towards Socialism in Tanzania (Dar es Salaam, 1979), pp. 95-124.

Villagisation and the 1974-6 Economic Crisis in Tanzania by John Briggs, Lecturer in Geography, University of Glasgow, formerly of the University of Dar es Salaam

Since i967, the year of the Arusha Declaration, Tanzania's rural policy has provided a major focus for scholars interested in the problems of develop- ment in the Third World.' Jonathan Barker has noted that many writers on Tanzania's rural policy fall into one of two camps: 'production socialists' who make the basic assumption that communal production per se is desirable, and concentrate much of their research activity on the various social and political constraints; and 'production liberals' who are generally sceptical of the effectiveness of communal production, and they would prefer to see greater emphasis placed on the 'self-improvement motive of families and individuals '.2

Michael Lofchie in an interesting and, at times, highly provocative article in this Journal - 'Agrarian Crisis and Economic Liberalisation in Tanzania', Vol. xvi, No. 3, September 1978, pp. 451-75 - has contributed to the debate, arguing essentially that the major economic crisis encountered during the years 1974-6 was caused by the policy of collective villagisation, adopted in I967 as part of the Arusha Declaration and vigorously pursued during the early I970s. Indeed, he states that 'Since collective villagisation had been the cornerstone of Tanzania's rural policy for the preceding five years, it seemed obvious to conclude that this bore some responsibility for the food crisis' (p. 452). It is implied by Lofchie at this point that he is referring to the five-year period ending in March 1974. He goes on further to suggest that the economic crisis came about 'because of the disastrous attempt to imple- ment a programme of collective villagisation in fulfillment of the concept that the agricultural sector could be successfully organised on a socialist basis' (p. 460). It is perfectly clear that Lofchie lays the blame for the 1974-6 crisis at the door of the collectivisation policy associated with the development of ujamaa villages, based firmly on the acceptance of communal farming as the major mode of production.

My aim is to demonstrate that this is in fact not the case and, at the same time, to offer an alternative and more convincing explanation of the reasons leading to the I974-6 economic crisis.

Dimensions of the Crisis

There is no doubt that between I974 and I976 Tanzania's economy was in serious trouble. Lofchie is able to demonstrate this by using data from the Government's economic surveys, as well as statistics from the National Milling Corporation. Even more dramatic evidence of the crisis at that time has been provided recently by the Bank of Tanzania. As may be seen from Table i, food imports into Tanzania were relatively limited during the early 1970s, accounting for only a small proportion of all the country's imports;

A The Arusha Declaration of I967 committed Tanzania to a socialist-oriented means of developing the country's resources and people.

2 Jonathan Barker, 'The Debate on Rural Socialism in Tanzania', in B.U. Mwansasu and Cranford Pratt (eds.), Towards Socialism in Tanzania (Dar es Salaam, 1979), pp. 95-124.

Villagisation and the 1974-6 Economic Crisis in Tanzania by John Briggs, Lecturer in Geography, University of Glasgow, formerly of the University of Dar es Salaam

Since i967, the year of the Arusha Declaration, Tanzania's rural policy has provided a major focus for scholars interested in the problems of develop- ment in the Third World.' Jonathan Barker has noted that many writers on Tanzania's rural policy fall into one of two camps: 'production socialists' who make the basic assumption that communal production per se is desirable, and concentrate much of their research activity on the various social and political constraints; and 'production liberals' who are generally sceptical of the effectiveness of communal production, and they would prefer to see greater emphasis placed on the 'self-improvement motive of families and individuals '.2

Michael Lofchie in an interesting and, at times, highly provocative article in this Journal - 'Agrarian Crisis and Economic Liberalisation in Tanzania', Vol. xvi, No. 3, September 1978, pp. 451-75 - has contributed to the debate, arguing essentially that the major economic crisis encountered during the years 1974-6 was caused by the policy of collective villagisation, adopted in I967 as part of the Arusha Declaration and vigorously pursued during the early I970s. Indeed, he states that 'Since collective villagisation had been the cornerstone of Tanzania's rural policy for the preceding five years, it seemed obvious to conclude that this bore some responsibility for the food crisis' (p. 452). It is implied by Lofchie at this point that he is referring to the five-year period ending in March 1974. He goes on further to suggest that the economic crisis came about 'because of the disastrous attempt to imple- ment a programme of collective villagisation in fulfillment of the concept that the agricultural sector could be successfully organised on a socialist basis' (p. 460). It is perfectly clear that Lofchie lays the blame for the 1974-6 crisis at the door of the collectivisation policy associated with the development of ujamaa villages, based firmly on the acceptance of communal farming as the major mode of production.

My aim is to demonstrate that this is in fact not the case and, at the same time, to offer an alternative and more convincing explanation of the reasons leading to the I974-6 economic crisis.

Dimensions of the Crisis

There is no doubt that between I974 and I976 Tanzania's economy was in serious trouble. Lofchie is able to demonstrate this by using data from the Government's economic surveys, as well as statistics from the National Milling Corporation. Even more dramatic evidence of the crisis at that time has been provided recently by the Bank of Tanzania. As may be seen from Table i, food imports into Tanzania were relatively limited during the early 1970s, accounting for only a small proportion of all the country's imports;

A The Arusha Declaration of I967 committed Tanzania to a socialist-oriented means of developing the country's resources and people.

2 Jonathan Barker, 'The Debate on Rural Socialism in Tanzania', in B.U. Mwansasu and Cranford Pratt (eds.), Towards Socialism in Tanzania (Dar es Salaam, 1979), pp. 95-124.

This content downloaded from 169.229.32.137 on Thu, 8 May 2014 22:02:37 PMAll use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions

696 JOHN BRIGGS

TABLE I Tanzania's Food Imports, I970-61

Percentage Value of all

Year million Shs. imports

1970 64o0 2'8

1971 83*9 3.' 1972 I76-o 6*1 1973 I29.2 3T7

1974 1,OI3'3 18g9 1975 I,0oo84 17.7 1976 427 7 8o0

but in 1974 the amount spent on importing food was almost eight times that for the previous year, accounting for a record 1,013 million Tanzanian Shs. (about C68 million sterling at that time). More significantly, food imports, as a proportion of the total, reached almost 19 per cent compared to an average of 3-4 per cent per annum during the early I970s. The situation was little better in I975, with food imports amounting to just over I,ooo million Shs., or nearly I8 per cent of all imports. In I976, however, the worst was over, and the situation had eased considerably as food production within Tanzania again started to make a significant contribution to total national needs.

The result of these massive food imports, and the subsequent strain on the economy, are reflected in Tanzania's foreign-reserve holdings. As may be seen from Table 2, these stood during 1970 and 197I at about 850 million Shs. annually, and continued to increase so that by June I973 they had reached a level of I,700 million Shs. However, as food imports rose during 1974, the situation changed dramatically, and the foreign-reserve holdings dropped to 123 million Shs. (merely C8 million sterling) in November 1974. Throughout I975 and 1976 the Tanzanian reserves were so uncomfortably low that even the most essential items could only be imported with great difficulty.

The statistics for the foreign-trade balance also confirm the serious nature of the crisis, as may be seen from Table 3. During the late I96os, a small surplus was recorded for each year except 1968, but in the early 1970s trade deficits became an annual event, although of manageable proportions. Between I973 and I974, however, the deficit tripled to over 2,500 million Shs., and in 1975 the position had deteriorated still further when the trade deficit actually exceeded the total value of Tanzania's exports. In 1976 the situation, as with food imports, had eased considerably, although there was still little room for complacency.

Clearly, between 1974 and I976, Tanzania was in serious economic difficul- ties, primarily brought about by a huge shortfall in food production within the country itself, so necessitating massive imports of food to prevent a

1 Bank of Tanzania, Economic and Operations Report (Dar es Salaam), June 1977.

696 JOHN BRIGGS

TABLE I Tanzania's Food Imports, I970-61

Percentage Value of all

Year million Shs. imports

1970 64o0 2'8

1971 83*9 3.' 1972 I76-o 6*1 1973 I29.2 3T7

1974 1,OI3'3 18g9 1975 I,0oo84 17.7 1976 427 7 8o0

but in 1974 the amount spent on importing food was almost eight times that for the previous year, accounting for a record 1,013 million Tanzanian Shs. (about C68 million sterling at that time). More significantly, food imports, as a proportion of the total, reached almost 19 per cent compared to an average of 3-4 per cent per annum during the early I970s. The situation was little better in I975, with food imports amounting to just over I,ooo million Shs., or nearly I8 per cent of all imports. In I976, however, the worst was over, and the situation had eased considerably as food production within Tanzania again started to make a significant contribution to total national needs.

The result of these massive food imports, and the subsequent strain on the economy, are reflected in Tanzania's foreign-reserve holdings. As may be seen from Table 2, these stood during 1970 and 197I at about 850 million Shs. annually, and continued to increase so that by June I973 they had reached a level of I,700 million Shs. However, as food imports rose during 1974, the situation changed dramatically, and the foreign-reserve holdings dropped to 123 million Shs. (merely C8 million sterling) in November 1974. Throughout I975 and 1976 the Tanzanian reserves were so uncomfortably low that even the most essential items could only be imported with great difficulty.

The statistics for the foreign-trade balance also confirm the serious nature of the crisis, as may be seen from Table 3. During the late I96os, a small surplus was recorded for each year except 1968, but in the early 1970s trade deficits became an annual event, although of manageable proportions. Between I973 and I974, however, the deficit tripled to over 2,500 million Shs., and in 1975 the position had deteriorated still further when the trade deficit actually exceeded the total value of Tanzania's exports. In 1976 the situation, as with food imports, had eased considerably, although there was still little room for complacency.

Clearly, between 1974 and I976, Tanzania was in serious economic difficul- ties, primarily brought about by a huge shortfall in food production within the country itself, so necessitating massive imports of food to prevent a

1 Bank of Tanzania, Economic and Operations Report (Dar es Salaam), June 1977.

696 JOHN BRIGGS

TABLE I Tanzania's Food Imports, I970-61

Percentage Value of all

Year million Shs. imports

1970 64o0 2'8

1971 83*9 3.' 1972 I76-o 6*1 1973 I29.2 3T7

1974 1,OI3'3 18g9 1975 I,0oo84 17.7 1976 427 7 8o0

but in 1974 the amount spent on importing food was almost eight times that for the previous year, accounting for a record 1,013 million Tanzanian Shs. (about C68 million sterling at that time). More significantly, food imports, as a proportion of the total, reached almost 19 per cent compared to an average of 3-4 per cent per annum during the early I970s. The situation was little better in I975, with food imports amounting to just over I,ooo million Shs., or nearly I8 per cent of all imports. In I976, however, the worst was over, and the situation had eased considerably as food production within Tanzania again started to make a significant contribution to total national needs.

The result of these massive food imports, and the subsequent strain on the economy, are reflected in Tanzania's foreign-reserve holdings. As may be seen from Table 2, these stood during 1970 and 197I at about 850 million Shs. annually, and continued to increase so that by June I973 they had reached a level of I,700 million Shs. However, as food imports rose during 1974, the situation changed dramatically, and the foreign-reserve holdings dropped to 123 million Shs. (merely C8 million sterling) in November 1974. Throughout I975 and 1976 the Tanzanian reserves were so uncomfortably low that even the most essential items could only be imported with great difficulty.

The statistics for the foreign-trade balance also confirm the serious nature of the crisis, as may be seen from Table 3. During the late I96os, a small surplus was recorded for each year except 1968, but in the early 1970s trade deficits became an annual event, although of manageable proportions. Between I973 and I974, however, the deficit tripled to over 2,500 million Shs., and in 1975 the position had deteriorated still further when the trade deficit actually exceeded the total value of Tanzania's exports. In 1976 the situation, as with food imports, had eased considerably, although there was still little room for complacency.

Clearly, between 1974 and I976, Tanzania was in serious economic difficul- ties, primarily brought about by a huge shortfall in food production within the country itself, so necessitating massive imports of food to prevent a

1 Bank of Tanzania, Economic and Operations Report (Dar es Salaam), June 1977.

696 JOHN BRIGGS

TABLE I Tanzania's Food Imports, I970-61

Percentage Value of all

Year million Shs. imports

1970 64o0 2'8

1971 83*9 3.' 1972 I76-o 6*1 1973 I29.2 3T7

1974 1,OI3'3 18g9 1975 I,0oo84 17.7 1976 427 7 8o0

but in 1974 the amount spent on importing food was almost eight times that for the previous year, accounting for a record 1,013 million Tanzanian Shs. (about C68 million sterling at that time). More significantly, food imports, as a proportion of the total, reached almost 19 per cent compared to an average of 3-4 per cent per annum during the early I970s. The situation was little better in I975, with food imports amounting to just over I,ooo million Shs., or nearly I8 per cent of all imports. In I976, however, the worst was over, and the situation had eased considerably as food production within Tanzania again started to make a significant contribution to total national needs.

The result of these massive food imports, and the subsequent strain on the economy, are reflected in Tanzania's foreign-reserve holdings. As may be seen from Table 2, these stood during 1970 and 197I at about 850 million Shs. annually, and continued to increase so that by June I973 they had reached a level of I,700 million Shs. However, as food imports rose during 1974, the situation changed dramatically, and the foreign-reserve holdings dropped to 123 million Shs. (merely C8 million sterling) in November 1974. Throughout I975 and 1976 the Tanzanian reserves were so uncomfortably low that even the most essential items could only be imported with great difficulty.

The statistics for the foreign-trade balance also confirm the serious nature of the crisis, as may be seen from Table 3. During the late I96os, a small surplus was recorded for each year except 1968, but in the early 1970s trade deficits became an annual event, although of manageable proportions. Between I973 and I974, however, the deficit tripled to over 2,500 million Shs., and in 1975 the position had deteriorated still further when the trade deficit actually exceeded the total value of Tanzania's exports. In 1976 the situation, as with food imports, had eased considerably, although there was still little room for complacency.

Clearly, between 1974 and I976, Tanzania was in serious economic difficul- ties, primarily brought about by a huge shortfall in food production within the country itself, so necessitating massive imports of food to prevent a

1 Bank of Tanzania, Economic and Operations Report (Dar es Salaam), June 1977.

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VILLAGISATION AND ECONOMIC CRISIS IN TANZANIA 697 VILLAGISATION AND ECONOMIC CRISIS IN TANZANIA 697 VILLAGISATION AND ECONOMIC CRISIS IN TANZANIA 697 VILLAGISATION AND ECONOMIC CRISIS IN TANZANIA 697

TABLE 2

Tanzania's Foreign-Reserve Holdings, Ig70-71 million Shs.

Year Month Reserves

1970 June 841-2 December 767.8

1971 June 886-8 December 905 I

1972 June I,139-0 December I,378-3

1973 June 1,705'1 December I,6I3-7

1974 June ,I167*4 December 590-4

1975 June 54I-0 December 405-2

1976 June 534'5 December 560-9

1977 June 1,563'o

TABLE 3 Tanzania's Foreign-Trade Balance, I965-762

million Shs.

Year Exports Imports Balance

I965 I,479.5 1,402-0 77'5

1966 1,893-6 I1690o5 203-1 I967 I,798-0 1,621.7 176-3 I968 I,719-0 1,833-6 -i I6.6

I969 I,751'0 1,710-0 46-o

1970 I,797'0 2,2741 -477 I 1971 I,988-8 2,725-6 -736-8 1972 2,312-6 2,877-8 -565-2

1973 2,581 0 3,478-9 -897-9 1974 2,860o8 5,377'0 -2,516-2

1975 2,763-9 5,709-5 -2,945-6

1976 4,107 8 5,349 5 -I,241*7

serious and widespread famine. The question to be answered is how did this shortfall come about?

Villagisation: the main cause of the crisis

It is necessary to recognise that Tanzania's rural policy since I967 falls into three fairly distinct phases, and not, in fact, one continuous process of communal production based on the voluntary co-operation of the peasants

TABLE 2

Tanzania's Foreign-Reserve Holdings, Ig70-71 million Shs.

Year Month Reserves

1970 June 841-2 December 767.8

1971 June 886-8 December 905 I

1972 June I,139-0 December I,378-3

1973 June 1,705'1 December I,6I3-7

1974 June ,I167*4 December 590-4

1975 June 54I-0 December 405-2

1976 June 534'5 December 560-9

1977 June 1,563'o

TABLE 3 Tanzania's Foreign-Trade Balance, I965-762

million Shs.

Year Exports Imports Balance

I965 I,479.5 1,402-0 77'5

1966 1,893-6 I1690o5 203-1 I967 I,798-0 1,621.7 176-3 I968 I,719-0 1,833-6 -i I6.6

I969 I,751'0 1,710-0 46-o

1970 I,797'0 2,2741 -477 I 1971 I,988-8 2,725-6 -736-8 1972 2,312-6 2,877-8 -565-2

1973 2,581 0 3,478-9 -897-9 1974 2,860o8 5,377'0 -2,516-2

1975 2,763-9 5,709-5 -2,945-6

1976 4,107 8 5,349 5 -I,241*7

serious and widespread famine. The question to be answered is how did this shortfall come about?

Villagisation: the main cause of the crisis

It is necessary to recognise that Tanzania's rural policy since I967 falls into three fairly distinct phases, and not, in fact, one continuous process of communal production based on the voluntary co-operation of the peasants

TABLE 2

Tanzania's Foreign-Reserve Holdings, Ig70-71 million Shs.

Year Month Reserves

1970 June 841-2 December 767.8

1971 June 886-8 December 905 I

1972 June I,139-0 December I,378-3

1973 June 1,705'1 December I,6I3-7

1974 June ,I167*4 December 590-4

1975 June 54I-0 December 405-2

1976 June 534'5 December 560-9

1977 June 1,563'o

TABLE 3 Tanzania's Foreign-Trade Balance, I965-762

million Shs.

Year Exports Imports Balance

I965 I,479.5 1,402-0 77'5

1966 1,893-6 I1690o5 203-1 I967 I,798-0 1,621.7 176-3 I968 I,719-0 1,833-6 -i I6.6

I969 I,751'0 1,710-0 46-o

1970 I,797'0 2,2741 -477 I 1971 I,988-8 2,725-6 -736-8 1972 2,312-6 2,877-8 -565-2

1973 2,581 0 3,478-9 -897-9 1974 2,860o8 5,377'0 -2,516-2

1975 2,763-9 5,709-5 -2,945-6

1976 4,107 8 5,349 5 -I,241*7

serious and widespread famine. The question to be answered is how did this shortfall come about?

Villagisation: the main cause of the crisis

It is necessary to recognise that Tanzania's rural policy since I967 falls into three fairly distinct phases, and not, in fact, one continuous process of communal production based on the voluntary co-operation of the peasants

TABLE 2

Tanzania's Foreign-Reserve Holdings, Ig70-71 million Shs.

Year Month Reserves

1970 June 841-2 December 767.8

1971 June 886-8 December 905 I

1972 June I,139-0 December I,378-3

1973 June 1,705'1 December I,6I3-7

1974 June ,I167*4 December 590-4

1975 June 54I-0 December 405-2

1976 June 534'5 December 560-9

1977 June 1,563'o

TABLE 3 Tanzania's Foreign-Trade Balance, I965-762

million Shs.

Year Exports Imports Balance

I965 I,479.5 1,402-0 77'5

1966 1,893-6 I1690o5 203-1 I967 I,798-0 1,621.7 176-3 I968 I,719-0 1,833-6 -i I6.6

I969 I,751'0 1,710-0 46-o

1970 I,797'0 2,2741 -477 I 1971 I,988-8 2,725-6 -736-8 1972 2,312-6 2,877-8 -565-2

1973 2,581 0 3,478-9 -897-9 1974 2,860o8 5,377'0 -2,516-2

1975 2,763-9 5,709-5 -2,945-6

1976 4,107 8 5,349 5 -I,241*7

serious and widespread famine. The question to be answered is how did this shortfall come about?

Villagisation: the main cause of the crisis

It is necessary to recognise that Tanzania's rural policy since I967 falls into three fairly distinct phases, and not, in fact, one continuous process of communal production based on the voluntary co-operation of the peasants

1 Ibid. 1 Ibid. 1 Ibid. 1 Ibid. 2 Ibid. 2 Ibid. 2 Ibid. 2 Ibid.

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themselves. Certainly, this can be legitimately argued for the first phase from I967 until the beginning of 1970, when the movement into the ujamaa villages was very much on a voluntary basis and, perhaps because of this, only about half a million were then registered as living there. In addition, the spatial distribution of ujamaa villages was highly uneven, the majority being located in southern Tanzania, principally in Lindi, Mtwara, Ruvuma, and Iringa regions. By I970 the five most economically important regions of Tanzania - Coast (including Dar es Salaam), Tanga, Kilimanjaro, Mwanza, and West Lake - were practically untouched as far as ujamaa development was concerned.

Because of the slow growth of ujamaa villages and their uneven distribution throughout the country, both the Government and the Party started in I970 to take a much more active and direct interest in their development, and in this second phase the dividing line between voluntary and forced move- ment at times became somewhat blurred, particularly in Dodoma and Singida regions.1 But by I973, despite these strenuous efforts by the Govern- ment and the Party, only two million peasants were living in ujamaa villages, accounting for about 15 per cent of Tanzania's total population. In that year the annual T.A.N.U. Conference approved a major shift in policy to simple villagisation as opposed to ujamaasation. That is, the rural population should continue to be moved and grouped, but without any communal production component being necessary in these villages. This third phase can be interpreted as a recognition by T.A.N.U. that the previous policy had not gained widespread acceptance by the peasantry. Villagisation was, therefore, introduced as an interim measure to bring people together into villages before attempting to introduce the principles of communal production at some later date.

This significant change in policy has not always been clearly identified in the literature but is vital in any understanding of the 1974-6 economic crisis in Tanzania. Lofchie displays some confusion over this point when he writes: 'The roots of this policy [economic liberalisation] can be dated as early as the Fall of 1974, with the decision to de-emphasise collectivism as a goal of the villagisation programme' (p. 458). This decision was in fact taken a full 12 months before this date, as Reginald H. Green and A. Mascarenhas have noted.2 Indeed, according to Barker:

September 1973: TANU Conference resolved that all rural Tanzanians must live in clustered villages by 1976. Villagisation operations followed throughout rural Tanzania with no

requirement for socialist practices in most cases.3

Clearly, the third critical phase of Tanzania's post-Arusha rural policy was under way by the end of I973. Referring back to Tables 1-3 it can be seen that the economic crisis became critical only during 1974, when the

1 For a most illuminating discussion of developments in Dodoma region during the second phase of the rural policy, see F. Hill, 'Ujamaa: African socialist productionism in

Tanzania', in Helen Desfosses and Jacques Levesque (eds.), Socialism in the Third World

(New York, 1975), pp. 216-51. 2 Cf. Reginald H. Green, 'Power Grows in Villages', in The Guardian (Manchester),

I March 1979; and A. Mascarenhas, 'After Villagisation - What?', in Mwansasu and Pratt

(eds), op.cit. pp. 145-65. 3 Barker, loc. cit. p. 99.

themselves. Certainly, this can be legitimately argued for the first phase from I967 until the beginning of 1970, when the movement into the ujamaa villages was very much on a voluntary basis and, perhaps because of this, only about half a million were then registered as living there. In addition, the spatial distribution of ujamaa villages was highly uneven, the majority being located in southern Tanzania, principally in Lindi, Mtwara, Ruvuma, and Iringa regions. By I970 the five most economically important regions of Tanzania - Coast (including Dar es Salaam), Tanga, Kilimanjaro, Mwanza, and West Lake - were practically untouched as far as ujamaa development was concerned.

Because of the slow growth of ujamaa villages and their uneven distribution throughout the country, both the Government and the Party started in I970 to take a much more active and direct interest in their development, and in this second phase the dividing line between voluntary and forced move- ment at times became somewhat blurred, particularly in Dodoma and Singida regions.1 But by I973, despite these strenuous efforts by the Govern- ment and the Party, only two million peasants were living in ujamaa villages, accounting for about 15 per cent of Tanzania's total population. In that year the annual T.A.N.U. Conference approved a major shift in policy to simple villagisation as opposed to ujamaasation. That is, the rural population should continue to be moved and grouped, but without any communal production component being necessary in these villages. This third phase can be interpreted as a recognition by T.A.N.U. that the previous policy had not gained widespread acceptance by the peasantry. Villagisation was, therefore, introduced as an interim measure to bring people together into villages before attempting to introduce the principles of communal production at some later date.

This significant change in policy has not always been clearly identified in the literature but is vital in any understanding of the 1974-6 economic crisis in Tanzania. Lofchie displays some confusion over this point when he writes: 'The roots of this policy [economic liberalisation] can be dated as early as the Fall of 1974, with the decision to de-emphasise collectivism as a goal of the villagisation programme' (p. 458). This decision was in fact taken a full 12 months before this date, as Reginald H. Green and A. Mascarenhas have noted.2 Indeed, according to Barker:

September 1973: TANU Conference resolved that all rural Tanzanians must live in clustered villages by 1976. Villagisation operations followed throughout rural Tanzania with no

requirement for socialist practices in most cases.3

Clearly, the third critical phase of Tanzania's post-Arusha rural policy was under way by the end of I973. Referring back to Tables 1-3 it can be seen that the economic crisis became critical only during 1974, when the

1 For a most illuminating discussion of developments in Dodoma region during the second phase of the rural policy, see F. Hill, 'Ujamaa: African socialist productionism in

Tanzania', in Helen Desfosses and Jacques Levesque (eds.), Socialism in the Third World

(New York, 1975), pp. 216-51. 2 Cf. Reginald H. Green, 'Power Grows in Villages', in The Guardian (Manchester),

I March 1979; and A. Mascarenhas, 'After Villagisation - What?', in Mwansasu and Pratt

(eds), op.cit. pp. 145-65. 3 Barker, loc. cit. p. 99.

themselves. Certainly, this can be legitimately argued for the first phase from I967 until the beginning of 1970, when the movement into the ujamaa villages was very much on a voluntary basis and, perhaps because of this, only about half a million were then registered as living there. In addition, the spatial distribution of ujamaa villages was highly uneven, the majority being located in southern Tanzania, principally in Lindi, Mtwara, Ruvuma, and Iringa regions. By I970 the five most economically important regions of Tanzania - Coast (including Dar es Salaam), Tanga, Kilimanjaro, Mwanza, and West Lake - were practically untouched as far as ujamaa development was concerned.

Because of the slow growth of ujamaa villages and their uneven distribution throughout the country, both the Government and the Party started in I970 to take a much more active and direct interest in their development, and in this second phase the dividing line between voluntary and forced move- ment at times became somewhat blurred, particularly in Dodoma and Singida regions.1 But by I973, despite these strenuous efforts by the Govern- ment and the Party, only two million peasants were living in ujamaa villages, accounting for about 15 per cent of Tanzania's total population. In that year the annual T.A.N.U. Conference approved a major shift in policy to simple villagisation as opposed to ujamaasation. That is, the rural population should continue to be moved and grouped, but without any communal production component being necessary in these villages. This third phase can be interpreted as a recognition by T.A.N.U. that the previous policy had not gained widespread acceptance by the peasantry. Villagisation was, therefore, introduced as an interim measure to bring people together into villages before attempting to introduce the principles of communal production at some later date.

This significant change in policy has not always been clearly identified in the literature but is vital in any understanding of the 1974-6 economic crisis in Tanzania. Lofchie displays some confusion over this point when he writes: 'The roots of this policy [economic liberalisation] can be dated as early as the Fall of 1974, with the decision to de-emphasise collectivism as a goal of the villagisation programme' (p. 458). This decision was in fact taken a full 12 months before this date, as Reginald H. Green and A. Mascarenhas have noted.2 Indeed, according to Barker:

September 1973: TANU Conference resolved that all rural Tanzanians must live in clustered villages by 1976. Villagisation operations followed throughout rural Tanzania with no

requirement for socialist practices in most cases.3

Clearly, the third critical phase of Tanzania's post-Arusha rural policy was under way by the end of I973. Referring back to Tables 1-3 it can be seen that the economic crisis became critical only during 1974, when the

1 For a most illuminating discussion of developments in Dodoma region during the second phase of the rural policy, see F. Hill, 'Ujamaa: African socialist productionism in

Tanzania', in Helen Desfosses and Jacques Levesque (eds.), Socialism in the Third World

(New York, 1975), pp. 216-51. 2 Cf. Reginald H. Green, 'Power Grows in Villages', in The Guardian (Manchester),

I March 1979; and A. Mascarenhas, 'After Villagisation - What?', in Mwansasu and Pratt

(eds), op.cit. pp. 145-65. 3 Barker, loc. cit. p. 99.

themselves. Certainly, this can be legitimately argued for the first phase from I967 until the beginning of 1970, when the movement into the ujamaa villages was very much on a voluntary basis and, perhaps because of this, only about half a million were then registered as living there. In addition, the spatial distribution of ujamaa villages was highly uneven, the majority being located in southern Tanzania, principally in Lindi, Mtwara, Ruvuma, and Iringa regions. By I970 the five most economically important regions of Tanzania - Coast (including Dar es Salaam), Tanga, Kilimanjaro, Mwanza, and West Lake - were practically untouched as far as ujamaa development was concerned.

Because of the slow growth of ujamaa villages and their uneven distribution throughout the country, both the Government and the Party started in I970 to take a much more active and direct interest in their development, and in this second phase the dividing line between voluntary and forced move- ment at times became somewhat blurred, particularly in Dodoma and Singida regions.1 But by I973, despite these strenuous efforts by the Govern- ment and the Party, only two million peasants were living in ujamaa villages, accounting for about 15 per cent of Tanzania's total population. In that year the annual T.A.N.U. Conference approved a major shift in policy to simple villagisation as opposed to ujamaasation. That is, the rural population should continue to be moved and grouped, but without any communal production component being necessary in these villages. This third phase can be interpreted as a recognition by T.A.N.U. that the previous policy had not gained widespread acceptance by the peasantry. Villagisation was, therefore, introduced as an interim measure to bring people together into villages before attempting to introduce the principles of communal production at some later date.

This significant change in policy has not always been clearly identified in the literature but is vital in any understanding of the 1974-6 economic crisis in Tanzania. Lofchie displays some confusion over this point when he writes: 'The roots of this policy [economic liberalisation] can be dated as early as the Fall of 1974, with the decision to de-emphasise collectivism as a goal of the villagisation programme' (p. 458). This decision was in fact taken a full 12 months before this date, as Reginald H. Green and A. Mascarenhas have noted.2 Indeed, according to Barker:

September 1973: TANU Conference resolved that all rural Tanzanians must live in clustered villages by 1976. Villagisation operations followed throughout rural Tanzania with no

requirement for socialist practices in most cases.3

Clearly, the third critical phase of Tanzania's post-Arusha rural policy was under way by the end of I973. Referring back to Tables 1-3 it can be seen that the economic crisis became critical only during 1974, when the

1 For a most illuminating discussion of developments in Dodoma region during the second phase of the rural policy, see F. Hill, 'Ujamaa: African socialist productionism in

Tanzania', in Helen Desfosses and Jacques Levesque (eds.), Socialism in the Third World

(New York, 1975), pp. 216-51. 2 Cf. Reginald H. Green, 'Power Grows in Villages', in The Guardian (Manchester),

I March 1979; and A. Mascarenhas, 'After Villagisation - What?', in Mwansasu and Pratt

(eds), op.cit. pp. 145-65. 3 Barker, loc. cit. p. 99.

698 698 698 698 JOHN BRIGGS JOHN BRIGGS JOHN BRIGGS JOHN BRIGGS

This content downloaded from 169.229.32.137 on Thu, 8 May 2014 22:02:37 PMAll use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions

VILLAGISATION AND ECONOMIC CRISIS IN TANZANIA 699 massive food imports reflected a short-fall in internal food production the previous year. There are two reasons for this poor performance. First of all, Tanzania suffered a severe drought in many parts of the country. The Coast region was particularly affected as well as central Tanzania; in Singida region, for instance, relief food supplies became necessary, and the Govern- ment encouraged the introduction of serena maize, a drought-resistant variety which, it was hoped, would avert the disastrous consequences of any future droughts. In Iramba district of Singida region several legal require- ments were introduced in an attempt to increase agricultural production; for example, peasants were required by law to grow not less than one and a half acres of serena annually, and to store at least two debes (4-gallon tins) of grain for future use. Drought was clearly a problem during I973.

The second explanation for the poor agricultural performance that year was the uncertainty and unsettling influence on the peasants of the T.A.N.U. decision of September I973. Before this was actually taken, discussions on villagisation and its possible consequences had been taking place, and many peasants understood that the programme of implementation would involve moving them from their existing dispersed patterns into clustered commun- ities. The atmosphere of uncertainty that this created during the 1973 growing season(s) was considerable, resulting in significant numbers of peasants not being fully committed to maximum agricultural production during that year. Emphasis was placed on producing sufficient for family requirements, and so little surplus was available for the National Milling Corporation to purchase. Under the prevailing uncertain conditions in the rural sector, this was a very understandable strategy. However, combined with the drought of that year, it proved to be disastrous.

As Table I shows, however, food imports during 1975 were at about the same level as in 1974, accounting for over 17 per cent of all Tanzania's imports, demonstrating that food production during I974 was still falling dramatically short of the country's requirements. The poor agricultural performance for the second successsive year has been explained in two ways. The Bank of Tanzania places the blame exclusively on the continuing drought during the 1974 growing season(s), and Green also considers this to be an important factor.1 But while not denying the importance of drought conditions at this time, care must be taken not to over-emphasise the point.

Lofchie, on the other hand, suggests that the economic crisis of 1974-6 was a result of the collective villagisation policy - the ujamaasation of the rural population - but this argument is unconvincing. During the first two phases of the post-Arusha policy, up until mid-I973, agricultural output had remained stagnant at best. Indeed, the annual rate of increase of farm output between I967 and I973 stood at only 2-7 per cent, slightly less than the annual population growth in Tanzania,2 and the food supply was just about able to keep up with this. Export crops produced a similar picture of stag- nation, but as Uma Lele points out, no agricultural collapse was imminent.3 It is apparent, then, that during the years which Lofchie interprets as

1 Bank of Tanzania, op. cit. and Green, loc. cit. 2 'Back to Back: a survey of Kenya and Tanzania', in The Economist (London), i i March

1978, p. 8. 3 Uma Lele, The Design of Rural Development: lessonsfrom Africa (Washington, 1975).

VILLAGISATION AND ECONOMIC CRISIS IN TANZANIA 699 massive food imports reflected a short-fall in internal food production the previous year. There are two reasons for this poor performance. First of all, Tanzania suffered a severe drought in many parts of the country. The Coast region was particularly affected as well as central Tanzania; in Singida region, for instance, relief food supplies became necessary, and the Govern- ment encouraged the introduction of serena maize, a drought-resistant variety which, it was hoped, would avert the disastrous consequences of any future droughts. In Iramba district of Singida region several legal require- ments were introduced in an attempt to increase agricultural production; for example, peasants were required by law to grow not less than one and a half acres of serena annually, and to store at least two debes (4-gallon tins) of grain for future use. Drought was clearly a problem during I973.

The second explanation for the poor agricultural performance that year was the uncertainty and unsettling influence on the peasants of the T.A.N.U. decision of September I973. Before this was actually taken, discussions on villagisation and its possible consequences had been taking place, and many peasants understood that the programme of implementation would involve moving them from their existing dispersed patterns into clustered commun- ities. The atmosphere of uncertainty that this created during the 1973 growing season(s) was considerable, resulting in significant numbers of peasants not being fully committed to maximum agricultural production during that year. Emphasis was placed on producing sufficient for family requirements, and so little surplus was available for the National Milling Corporation to purchase. Under the prevailing uncertain conditions in the rural sector, this was a very understandable strategy. However, combined with the drought of that year, it proved to be disastrous.

As Table I shows, however, food imports during 1975 were at about the same level as in 1974, accounting for over 17 per cent of all Tanzania's imports, demonstrating that food production during I974 was still falling dramatically short of the country's requirements. The poor agricultural performance for the second successsive year has been explained in two ways. The Bank of Tanzania places the blame exclusively on the continuing drought during the 1974 growing season(s), and Green also considers this to be an important factor.1 But while not denying the importance of drought conditions at this time, care must be taken not to over-emphasise the point.

Lofchie, on the other hand, suggests that the economic crisis of 1974-6 was a result of the collective villagisation policy - the ujamaasation of the rural population - but this argument is unconvincing. During the first two phases of the post-Arusha policy, up until mid-I973, agricultural output had remained stagnant at best. Indeed, the annual rate of increase of farm output between I967 and I973 stood at only 2-7 per cent, slightly less than the annual population growth in Tanzania,2 and the food supply was just about able to keep up with this. Export crops produced a similar picture of stag- nation, but as Uma Lele points out, no agricultural collapse was imminent.3 It is apparent, then, that during the years which Lofchie interprets as

1 Bank of Tanzania, op. cit. and Green, loc. cit. 2 'Back to Back: a survey of Kenya and Tanzania', in The Economist (London), i i March

1978, p. 8. 3 Uma Lele, The Design of Rural Development: lessonsfrom Africa (Washington, 1975).

VILLAGISATION AND ECONOMIC CRISIS IN TANZANIA 699 massive food imports reflected a short-fall in internal food production the previous year. There are two reasons for this poor performance. First of all, Tanzania suffered a severe drought in many parts of the country. The Coast region was particularly affected as well as central Tanzania; in Singida region, for instance, relief food supplies became necessary, and the Govern- ment encouraged the introduction of serena maize, a drought-resistant variety which, it was hoped, would avert the disastrous consequences of any future droughts. In Iramba district of Singida region several legal require- ments were introduced in an attempt to increase agricultural production; for example, peasants were required by law to grow not less than one and a half acres of serena annually, and to store at least two debes (4-gallon tins) of grain for future use. Drought was clearly a problem during I973.

The second explanation for the poor agricultural performance that year was the uncertainty and unsettling influence on the peasants of the T.A.N.U. decision of September I973. Before this was actually taken, discussions on villagisation and its possible consequences had been taking place, and many peasants understood that the programme of implementation would involve moving them from their existing dispersed patterns into clustered commun- ities. The atmosphere of uncertainty that this created during the 1973 growing season(s) was considerable, resulting in significant numbers of peasants not being fully committed to maximum agricultural production during that year. Emphasis was placed on producing sufficient for family requirements, and so little surplus was available for the National Milling Corporation to purchase. Under the prevailing uncertain conditions in the rural sector, this was a very understandable strategy. However, combined with the drought of that year, it proved to be disastrous.

As Table I shows, however, food imports during 1975 were at about the same level as in 1974, accounting for over 17 per cent of all Tanzania's imports, demonstrating that food production during I974 was still falling dramatically short of the country's requirements. The poor agricultural performance for the second successsive year has been explained in two ways. The Bank of Tanzania places the blame exclusively on the continuing drought during the 1974 growing season(s), and Green also considers this to be an important factor.1 But while not denying the importance of drought conditions at this time, care must be taken not to over-emphasise the point.

Lofchie, on the other hand, suggests that the economic crisis of 1974-6 was a result of the collective villagisation policy - the ujamaasation of the rural population - but this argument is unconvincing. During the first two phases of the post-Arusha policy, up until mid-I973, agricultural output had remained stagnant at best. Indeed, the annual rate of increase of farm output between I967 and I973 stood at only 2-7 per cent, slightly less than the annual population growth in Tanzania,2 and the food supply was just about able to keep up with this. Export crops produced a similar picture of stag- nation, but as Uma Lele points out, no agricultural collapse was imminent.3 It is apparent, then, that during the years which Lofchie interprets as

1 Bank of Tanzania, op. cit. and Green, loc. cit. 2 'Back to Back: a survey of Kenya and Tanzania', in The Economist (London), i i March

1978, p. 8. 3 Uma Lele, The Design of Rural Development: lessonsfrom Africa (Washington, 1975).

VILLAGISATION AND ECONOMIC CRISIS IN TANZANIA 699 massive food imports reflected a short-fall in internal food production the previous year. There are two reasons for this poor performance. First of all, Tanzania suffered a severe drought in many parts of the country. The Coast region was particularly affected as well as central Tanzania; in Singida region, for instance, relief food supplies became necessary, and the Govern- ment encouraged the introduction of serena maize, a drought-resistant variety which, it was hoped, would avert the disastrous consequences of any future droughts. In Iramba district of Singida region several legal require- ments were introduced in an attempt to increase agricultural production; for example, peasants were required by law to grow not less than one and a half acres of serena annually, and to store at least two debes (4-gallon tins) of grain for future use. Drought was clearly a problem during I973.

The second explanation for the poor agricultural performance that year was the uncertainty and unsettling influence on the peasants of the T.A.N.U. decision of September I973. Before this was actually taken, discussions on villagisation and its possible consequences had been taking place, and many peasants understood that the programme of implementation would involve moving them from their existing dispersed patterns into clustered commun- ities. The atmosphere of uncertainty that this created during the 1973 growing season(s) was considerable, resulting in significant numbers of peasants not being fully committed to maximum agricultural production during that year. Emphasis was placed on producing sufficient for family requirements, and so little surplus was available for the National Milling Corporation to purchase. Under the prevailing uncertain conditions in the rural sector, this was a very understandable strategy. However, combined with the drought of that year, it proved to be disastrous.

As Table I shows, however, food imports during 1975 were at about the same level as in 1974, accounting for over 17 per cent of all Tanzania's imports, demonstrating that food production during I974 was still falling dramatically short of the country's requirements. The poor agricultural performance for the second successsive year has been explained in two ways. The Bank of Tanzania places the blame exclusively on the continuing drought during the 1974 growing season(s), and Green also considers this to be an important factor.1 But while not denying the importance of drought conditions at this time, care must be taken not to over-emphasise the point.

Lofchie, on the other hand, suggests that the economic crisis of 1974-6 was a result of the collective villagisation policy - the ujamaasation of the rural population - but this argument is unconvincing. During the first two phases of the post-Arusha policy, up until mid-I973, agricultural output had remained stagnant at best. Indeed, the annual rate of increase of farm output between I967 and I973 stood at only 2-7 per cent, slightly less than the annual population growth in Tanzania,2 and the food supply was just about able to keep up with this. Export crops produced a similar picture of stag- nation, but as Uma Lele points out, no agricultural collapse was imminent.3 It is apparent, then, that during the years which Lofchie interprets as

1 Bank of Tanzania, op. cit. and Green, loc. cit. 2 'Back to Back: a survey of Kenya and Tanzania', in The Economist (London), i i March

1978, p. 8. 3 Uma Lele, The Design of Rural Development: lessonsfrom Africa (Washington, 1975).

This content downloaded from 169.229.32.137 on Thu, 8 May 2014 22:02:37 PMAll use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions

producing the economic crisis of 1974-6, agricultural production was stagnant but not in major decline: it only reached cataclysmic proportions at the start of the third phase of the rural policy - that is, villagisation as opposed to ujamaasation.

The major thrust of the new policy took place in I974. During the early 1970s the growth of the village population had been relatively slow: 0o5 million in 1970, I*5 million in 197I, and just over 2 million in 1973. At the beginning of 1974, the figure was 2i5 million, but by I975 had reached over 9 million - indeed, over 6-5 million Tanzanian peasants had been 'villagised' in one year, constituting a massive re-location of the rural population.'

With this immense scale of movement in such a short period of time, it is not at all surprising that agricultural production in I974 should be at such a low level, reflected in the statistics from the following year. The disruption of production during the I974 rural upheavals left the Government with no choice but to spend over I,ooo million Shs. in I975 to prevent widespread famine. The position during the post-I973 villagisation campaign is suc- cinctly summarised by Andrew Coulson: 'Wherever the move took place there was a severe adverse short-term effect of reduced acreages planted and reduced yields'.2 Villagisation had a dramatic effect on agricultural produc- tion, albeit ignored by Lofchie.

However, it was not just the scale of the population movements or the disruption involved in 1974 that helped to create the crisis, but also the distances involved, as well as inadequate planning procedures, and the unfortunate timing of the programme. Few statistics are as yet available, but movements of four to five miles were common, with instances of people being shifted up to 40 miles from their former homes to a new village. It must be remembered that micro-environments can alter substantially even over a short distance, particularly with regard to soil fertility and water availability. Thus, the fund of local knowledge built up by the peasant farmer over many years may be of limited value on his new land. New experiences have to be gained and, in the meantime, agricultural production must fall.

The situation could have been alleviated if the new village sites had been carefully planned in detail, but the speed of implementation of the new policy during 1974 ensured that such measures were at best only superficial. For example, about ioo miles south of Dar es Salaam, the re-settlement of peasants from the flood plains of the Rufiji valley onto higher ground led to a reduction of agricultural production for several reasons.3 The soils along the

1 Personal communication, Prime Minister's Office, Dar es Salaam. Also quoted by Mas- carenhas, loc. cit. p. 152.

2 Andrew Coulson, 'Whatever Happed to Ujamaa?', in New Internationalist (Wallingford, Berkshire), 48, February 1977, pp. 17-19.

3 The first re-settlement in Rufiji took place after the 1968 floods, when peasants from the middle reaches of the river were moved out of the flood-plains onto the northern levee. Further re-settlement took place during the villagisation campaign in 1974, but this did not necessarily involve the movement of peasants; in the delta area, for instance, some judicious boundary-drawing created villages without moving the population. For an excellent account of Rufiji agriculture, see A. Sandberg, 'Socio-Economic Survey of the Lower Rufiji Flood Plain', Bureau of Resource Assessment and Land Use Planning, University of Dar es Salaam, 1974.

producing the economic crisis of 1974-6, agricultural production was stagnant but not in major decline: it only reached cataclysmic proportions at the start of the third phase of the rural policy - that is, villagisation as opposed to ujamaasation.

The major thrust of the new policy took place in I974. During the early 1970s the growth of the village population had been relatively slow: 0o5 million in 1970, I*5 million in 197I, and just over 2 million in 1973. At the beginning of 1974, the figure was 2i5 million, but by I975 had reached over 9 million - indeed, over 6-5 million Tanzanian peasants had been 'villagised' in one year, constituting a massive re-location of the rural population.'

With this immense scale of movement in such a short period of time, it is not at all surprising that agricultural production in I974 should be at such a low level, reflected in the statistics from the following year. The disruption of production during the I974 rural upheavals left the Government with no choice but to spend over I,ooo million Shs. in I975 to prevent widespread famine. The position during the post-I973 villagisation campaign is suc- cinctly summarised by Andrew Coulson: 'Wherever the move took place there was a severe adverse short-term effect of reduced acreages planted and reduced yields'.2 Villagisation had a dramatic effect on agricultural produc- tion, albeit ignored by Lofchie.

However, it was not just the scale of the population movements or the disruption involved in 1974 that helped to create the crisis, but also the distances involved, as well as inadequate planning procedures, and the unfortunate timing of the programme. Few statistics are as yet available, but movements of four to five miles were common, with instances of people being shifted up to 40 miles from their former homes to a new village. It must be remembered that micro-environments can alter substantially even over a short distance, particularly with regard to soil fertility and water availability. Thus, the fund of local knowledge built up by the peasant farmer over many years may be of limited value on his new land. New experiences have to be gained and, in the meantime, agricultural production must fall.

The situation could have been alleviated if the new village sites had been carefully planned in detail, but the speed of implementation of the new policy during 1974 ensured that such measures were at best only superficial. For example, about ioo miles south of Dar es Salaam, the re-settlement of peasants from the flood plains of the Rufiji valley onto higher ground led to a reduction of agricultural production for several reasons.3 The soils along the

1 Personal communication, Prime Minister's Office, Dar es Salaam. Also quoted by Mas- carenhas, loc. cit. p. 152.

2 Andrew Coulson, 'Whatever Happed to Ujamaa?', in New Internationalist (Wallingford, Berkshire), 48, February 1977, pp. 17-19.

3 The first re-settlement in Rufiji took place after the 1968 floods, when peasants from the middle reaches of the river were moved out of the flood-plains onto the northern levee. Further re-settlement took place during the villagisation campaign in 1974, but this did not necessarily involve the movement of peasants; in the delta area, for instance, some judicious boundary-drawing created villages without moving the population. For an excellent account of Rufiji agriculture, see A. Sandberg, 'Socio-Economic Survey of the Lower Rufiji Flood Plain', Bureau of Resource Assessment and Land Use Planning, University of Dar es Salaam, 1974.

producing the economic crisis of 1974-6, agricultural production was stagnant but not in major decline: it only reached cataclysmic proportions at the start of the third phase of the rural policy - that is, villagisation as opposed to ujamaasation.

The major thrust of the new policy took place in I974. During the early 1970s the growth of the village population had been relatively slow: 0o5 million in 1970, I*5 million in 197I, and just over 2 million in 1973. At the beginning of 1974, the figure was 2i5 million, but by I975 had reached over 9 million - indeed, over 6-5 million Tanzanian peasants had been 'villagised' in one year, constituting a massive re-location of the rural population.'

With this immense scale of movement in such a short period of time, it is not at all surprising that agricultural production in I974 should be at such a low level, reflected in the statistics from the following year. The disruption of production during the I974 rural upheavals left the Government with no choice but to spend over I,ooo million Shs. in I975 to prevent widespread famine. The position during the post-I973 villagisation campaign is suc- cinctly summarised by Andrew Coulson: 'Wherever the move took place there was a severe adverse short-term effect of reduced acreages planted and reduced yields'.2 Villagisation had a dramatic effect on agricultural produc- tion, albeit ignored by Lofchie.

However, it was not just the scale of the population movements or the disruption involved in 1974 that helped to create the crisis, but also the distances involved, as well as inadequate planning procedures, and the unfortunate timing of the programme. Few statistics are as yet available, but movements of four to five miles were common, with instances of people being shifted up to 40 miles from their former homes to a new village. It must be remembered that micro-environments can alter substantially even over a short distance, particularly with regard to soil fertility and water availability. Thus, the fund of local knowledge built up by the peasant farmer over many years may be of limited value on his new land. New experiences have to be gained and, in the meantime, agricultural production must fall.

The situation could have been alleviated if the new village sites had been carefully planned in detail, but the speed of implementation of the new policy during 1974 ensured that such measures were at best only superficial. For example, about ioo miles south of Dar es Salaam, the re-settlement of peasants from the flood plains of the Rufiji valley onto higher ground led to a reduction of agricultural production for several reasons.3 The soils along the

1 Personal communication, Prime Minister's Office, Dar es Salaam. Also quoted by Mas- carenhas, loc. cit. p. 152.

2 Andrew Coulson, 'Whatever Happed to Ujamaa?', in New Internationalist (Wallingford, Berkshire), 48, February 1977, pp. 17-19.

3 The first re-settlement in Rufiji took place after the 1968 floods, when peasants from the middle reaches of the river were moved out of the flood-plains onto the northern levee. Further re-settlement took place during the villagisation campaign in 1974, but this did not necessarily involve the movement of peasants; in the delta area, for instance, some judicious boundary-drawing created villages without moving the population. For an excellent account of Rufiji agriculture, see A. Sandberg, 'Socio-Economic Survey of the Lower Rufiji Flood Plain', Bureau of Resource Assessment and Land Use Planning, University of Dar es Salaam, 1974.

producing the economic crisis of 1974-6, agricultural production was stagnant but not in major decline: it only reached cataclysmic proportions at the start of the third phase of the rural policy - that is, villagisation as opposed to ujamaasation.

The major thrust of the new policy took place in I974. During the early 1970s the growth of the village population had been relatively slow: 0o5 million in 1970, I*5 million in 197I, and just over 2 million in 1973. At the beginning of 1974, the figure was 2i5 million, but by I975 had reached over 9 million - indeed, over 6-5 million Tanzanian peasants had been 'villagised' in one year, constituting a massive re-location of the rural population.'

With this immense scale of movement in such a short period of time, it is not at all surprising that agricultural production in I974 should be at such a low level, reflected in the statistics from the following year. The disruption of production during the I974 rural upheavals left the Government with no choice but to spend over I,ooo million Shs. in I975 to prevent widespread famine. The position during the post-I973 villagisation campaign is suc- cinctly summarised by Andrew Coulson: 'Wherever the move took place there was a severe adverse short-term effect of reduced acreages planted and reduced yields'.2 Villagisation had a dramatic effect on agricultural produc- tion, albeit ignored by Lofchie.

However, it was not just the scale of the population movements or the disruption involved in 1974 that helped to create the crisis, but also the distances involved, as well as inadequate planning procedures, and the unfortunate timing of the programme. Few statistics are as yet available, but movements of four to five miles were common, with instances of people being shifted up to 40 miles from their former homes to a new village. It must be remembered that micro-environments can alter substantially even over a short distance, particularly with regard to soil fertility and water availability. Thus, the fund of local knowledge built up by the peasant farmer over many years may be of limited value on his new land. New experiences have to be gained and, in the meantime, agricultural production must fall.

The situation could have been alleviated if the new village sites had been carefully planned in detail, but the speed of implementation of the new policy during 1974 ensured that such measures were at best only superficial. For example, about ioo miles south of Dar es Salaam, the re-settlement of peasants from the flood plains of the Rufiji valley onto higher ground led to a reduction of agricultural production for several reasons.3 The soils along the

1 Personal communication, Prime Minister's Office, Dar es Salaam. Also quoted by Mas- carenhas, loc. cit. p. 152.

2 Andrew Coulson, 'Whatever Happed to Ujamaa?', in New Internationalist (Wallingford, Berkshire), 48, February 1977, pp. 17-19.

3 The first re-settlement in Rufiji took place after the 1968 floods, when peasants from the middle reaches of the river were moved out of the flood-plains onto the northern levee. Further re-settlement took place during the villagisation campaign in 1974, but this did not necessarily involve the movement of peasants; in the delta area, for instance, some judicious boundary-drawing created villages without moving the population. For an excellent account of Rufiji agriculture, see A. Sandberg, 'Socio-Economic Survey of the Lower Rufiji Flood Plain', Bureau of Resource Assessment and Land Use Planning, University of Dar es Salaam, 1974.

700 700 700 700 JOHN BRIGGS JOHN BRIGGS JOHN BRIGGS JOHN BRIGGS

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VILLAGISATION AND ECONOMIC CRISIS IN TANZANIA 701

levee on the north side were much less fertile, as well as not being susceptible to re-fertilisation by sediment brought down by the annual Rufiji flood. For other peasants, water availability became a problem on the higher ground. They could, of course, opt to cultivate their former land on the flood plains, but as the new village sites were some distance away, this necessitated a dispropor- tionately large amount of time being spent on the daily journey to work, two hours by foot not being uncommon. The result has been that Rufiji district is now liable to food shortages. Similarly, cotton production declined drastically from 6,154 bales in 1974 to I30 bales in I977, only two per cent of what it was three years previously.1 Not surprisingly, the Tanzania Cotton Authority announced that they were seriously considering closing their operations as an input source and market outlet for Rufiji cotton producers, and transferring as much equipment as possible to Sukumaland.

The timing of the villagisation programme was particularly unfortunate. First, it took place when the Tanzanian economy was coming under in- creasing pressure from international developments, notably the large in- creases in world oil prices. But as this was outside Tanzanian control, there was little that could be done. Secondly, and this poor piece of timing could have been avoided, large numbers of peasants were villagised at various points during the 1974 growing-season(s). This meant that they were re- quired to leave behind their own growing crops to move to a new village where land had to be cleared and prepared before any cultivation could take place. For these peasants, the 1974 season(s) produced very little. For those who resisted any form of movement during the cultivation cycle, the burning of crops and destruction of houses were not unusual strategies adopted by some regional authorities as a means of 'persuasion'. Under these conditions it is not at all surprising that agricultural production in I974 should once more fall short of the country's needs.

This raises a further issue, that of the use of force and coercion. Up to 1970, emphasis had been placed on the persuasive and voluntary aspects of ujamaasation, but after I970 more forcible means had been employed. It is also apparent from my own fieldwork that the dividing-line between per- suasion and coercion during the villagisation campaign, particularly in 1974, had at times become somewhat blurred as far as many peasants were concerned, and that some were forcibly moved against their will into villages, despite the President's denials that this had ever been the case. This resulted in much resentment among peasants in some rural areas; participatory planning was 'out' and imposition was most definitely 'in'.

Conclusion

It is the contention of this short article, then, that the economic crisis in Tanzania between I974 and 1976 was primarily a result of the villagisation campaign launched in late 1973, along with the effects of the drought that year, and not, as Lofchie suggests, because of the ujamaasation policy of the early I970s. The relatively small proportion of Tanzanians living in ujamaa villages (still only 15 per cent in early I973), and their concentration in the less productive parts of the country, ensured that national production figures

1 Daily News (Dar es Salaam), 2 February 1978.

VILLAGISATION AND ECONOMIC CRISIS IN TANZANIA 701

levee on the north side were much less fertile, as well as not being susceptible to re-fertilisation by sediment brought down by the annual Rufiji flood. For other peasants, water availability became a problem on the higher ground. They could, of course, opt to cultivate their former land on the flood plains, but as the new village sites were some distance away, this necessitated a dispropor- tionately large amount of time being spent on the daily journey to work, two hours by foot not being uncommon. The result has been that Rufiji district is now liable to food shortages. Similarly, cotton production declined drastically from 6,154 bales in 1974 to I30 bales in I977, only two per cent of what it was three years previously.1 Not surprisingly, the Tanzania Cotton Authority announced that they were seriously considering closing their operations as an input source and market outlet for Rufiji cotton producers, and transferring as much equipment as possible to Sukumaland.

The timing of the villagisation programme was particularly unfortunate. First, it took place when the Tanzanian economy was coming under in- creasing pressure from international developments, notably the large in- creases in world oil prices. But as this was outside Tanzanian control, there was little that could be done. Secondly, and this poor piece of timing could have been avoided, large numbers of peasants were villagised at various points during the 1974 growing-season(s). This meant that they were re- quired to leave behind their own growing crops to move to a new village where land had to be cleared and prepared before any cultivation could take place. For these peasants, the 1974 season(s) produced very little. For those who resisted any form of movement during the cultivation cycle, the burning of crops and destruction of houses were not unusual strategies adopted by some regional authorities as a means of 'persuasion'. Under these conditions it is not at all surprising that agricultural production in I974 should once more fall short of the country's needs.

This raises a further issue, that of the use of force and coercion. Up to 1970, emphasis had been placed on the persuasive and voluntary aspects of ujamaasation, but after I970 more forcible means had been employed. It is also apparent from my own fieldwork that the dividing-line between per- suasion and coercion during the villagisation campaign, particularly in 1974, had at times become somewhat blurred as far as many peasants were concerned, and that some were forcibly moved against their will into villages, despite the President's denials that this had ever been the case. This resulted in much resentment among peasants in some rural areas; participatory planning was 'out' and imposition was most definitely 'in'.

Conclusion

It is the contention of this short article, then, that the economic crisis in Tanzania between I974 and 1976 was primarily a result of the villagisation campaign launched in late 1973, along with the effects of the drought that year, and not, as Lofchie suggests, because of the ujamaasation policy of the early I970s. The relatively small proportion of Tanzanians living in ujamaa villages (still only 15 per cent in early I973), and their concentration in the less productive parts of the country, ensured that national production figures

1 Daily News (Dar es Salaam), 2 February 1978.

VILLAGISATION AND ECONOMIC CRISIS IN TANZANIA 701

levee on the north side were much less fertile, as well as not being susceptible to re-fertilisation by sediment brought down by the annual Rufiji flood. For other peasants, water availability became a problem on the higher ground. They could, of course, opt to cultivate their former land on the flood plains, but as the new village sites were some distance away, this necessitated a dispropor- tionately large amount of time being spent on the daily journey to work, two hours by foot not being uncommon. The result has been that Rufiji district is now liable to food shortages. Similarly, cotton production declined drastically from 6,154 bales in 1974 to I30 bales in I977, only two per cent of what it was three years previously.1 Not surprisingly, the Tanzania Cotton Authority announced that they were seriously considering closing their operations as an input source and market outlet for Rufiji cotton producers, and transferring as much equipment as possible to Sukumaland.

The timing of the villagisation programme was particularly unfortunate. First, it took place when the Tanzanian economy was coming under in- creasing pressure from international developments, notably the large in- creases in world oil prices. But as this was outside Tanzanian control, there was little that could be done. Secondly, and this poor piece of timing could have been avoided, large numbers of peasants were villagised at various points during the 1974 growing-season(s). This meant that they were re- quired to leave behind their own growing crops to move to a new village where land had to be cleared and prepared before any cultivation could take place. For these peasants, the 1974 season(s) produced very little. For those who resisted any form of movement during the cultivation cycle, the burning of crops and destruction of houses were not unusual strategies adopted by some regional authorities as a means of 'persuasion'. Under these conditions it is not at all surprising that agricultural production in I974 should once more fall short of the country's needs.

This raises a further issue, that of the use of force and coercion. Up to 1970, emphasis had been placed on the persuasive and voluntary aspects of ujamaasation, but after I970 more forcible means had been employed. It is also apparent from my own fieldwork that the dividing-line between per- suasion and coercion during the villagisation campaign, particularly in 1974, had at times become somewhat blurred as far as many peasants were concerned, and that some were forcibly moved against their will into villages, despite the President's denials that this had ever been the case. This resulted in much resentment among peasants in some rural areas; participatory planning was 'out' and imposition was most definitely 'in'.

Conclusion

It is the contention of this short article, then, that the economic crisis in Tanzania between I974 and 1976 was primarily a result of the villagisation campaign launched in late 1973, along with the effects of the drought that year, and not, as Lofchie suggests, because of the ujamaasation policy of the early I970s. The relatively small proportion of Tanzanians living in ujamaa villages (still only 15 per cent in early I973), and their concentration in the less productive parts of the country, ensured that national production figures

1 Daily News (Dar es Salaam), 2 February 1978.

VILLAGISATION AND ECONOMIC CRISIS IN TANZANIA 701

levee on the north side were much less fertile, as well as not being susceptible to re-fertilisation by sediment brought down by the annual Rufiji flood. For other peasants, water availability became a problem on the higher ground. They could, of course, opt to cultivate their former land on the flood plains, but as the new village sites were some distance away, this necessitated a dispropor- tionately large amount of time being spent on the daily journey to work, two hours by foot not being uncommon. The result has been that Rufiji district is now liable to food shortages. Similarly, cotton production declined drastically from 6,154 bales in 1974 to I30 bales in I977, only two per cent of what it was three years previously.1 Not surprisingly, the Tanzania Cotton Authority announced that they were seriously considering closing their operations as an input source and market outlet for Rufiji cotton producers, and transferring as much equipment as possible to Sukumaland.

The timing of the villagisation programme was particularly unfortunate. First, it took place when the Tanzanian economy was coming under in- creasing pressure from international developments, notably the large in- creases in world oil prices. But as this was outside Tanzanian control, there was little that could be done. Secondly, and this poor piece of timing could have been avoided, large numbers of peasants were villagised at various points during the 1974 growing-season(s). This meant that they were re- quired to leave behind their own growing crops to move to a new village where land had to be cleared and prepared before any cultivation could take place. For these peasants, the 1974 season(s) produced very little. For those who resisted any form of movement during the cultivation cycle, the burning of crops and destruction of houses were not unusual strategies adopted by some regional authorities as a means of 'persuasion'. Under these conditions it is not at all surprising that agricultural production in I974 should once more fall short of the country's needs.

This raises a further issue, that of the use of force and coercion. Up to 1970, emphasis had been placed on the persuasive and voluntary aspects of ujamaasation, but after I970 more forcible means had been employed. It is also apparent from my own fieldwork that the dividing-line between per- suasion and coercion during the villagisation campaign, particularly in 1974, had at times become somewhat blurred as far as many peasants were concerned, and that some were forcibly moved against their will into villages, despite the President's denials that this had ever been the case. This resulted in much resentment among peasants in some rural areas; participatory planning was 'out' and imposition was most definitely 'in'.

Conclusion

It is the contention of this short article, then, that the economic crisis in Tanzania between I974 and 1976 was primarily a result of the villagisation campaign launched in late 1973, along with the effects of the drought that year, and not, as Lofchie suggests, because of the ujamaasation policy of the early I970s. The relatively small proportion of Tanzanians living in ujamaa villages (still only 15 per cent in early I973), and their concentration in the less productive parts of the country, ensured that national production figures

1 Daily News (Dar es Salaam), 2 February 1978.

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702 JOHN BRIGGS

were relatively unaffected before 1973. Production was stagnant but not in disastrous decline; that did not follow until villagisation was underway, involving over 6*5 million peasants, and causing a major dislocation of agricultural production, population distribution, and the existing socio- economic infrastructure in the rural areas.

Finally, it is perhaps more realistic to interpret the villagisation campaign as a temporary halt in Tanzania's rural policy based on the creation and development of ujamaa villages, an interim stage to help bridge the gap between individualistic production on isolated farms and communal produc- tion within clustered village communities. With people settled in villages, political persuasion, re-education, and control become easier for both the Party and the Government, and the aims and philosophy of ujamaa can be more satisfactorily communicated to the peasants, the long-term plan being to convert as many settlements as possible into ujamaa villages. It would now appear that many Party officials have learnt the expensive lesson that peasants cannot be forced into situations of which they are unsure and uncertain, but must be persuaded and convinced that they will truly benefit from any change.

702 JOHN BRIGGS

were relatively unaffected before 1973. Production was stagnant but not in disastrous decline; that did not follow until villagisation was underway, involving over 6*5 million peasants, and causing a major dislocation of agricultural production, population distribution, and the existing socio- economic infrastructure in the rural areas.

Finally, it is perhaps more realistic to interpret the villagisation campaign as a temporary halt in Tanzania's rural policy based on the creation and development of ujamaa villages, an interim stage to help bridge the gap between individualistic production on isolated farms and communal produc- tion within clustered village communities. With people settled in villages, political persuasion, re-education, and control become easier for both the Party and the Government, and the aims and philosophy of ujamaa can be more satisfactorily communicated to the peasants, the long-term plan being to convert as many settlements as possible into ujamaa villages. It would now appear that many Party officials have learnt the expensive lesson that peasants cannot be forced into situations of which they are unsure and uncertain, but must be persuaded and convinced that they will truly benefit from any change.

702 JOHN BRIGGS

were relatively unaffected before 1973. Production was stagnant but not in disastrous decline; that did not follow until villagisation was underway, involving over 6*5 million peasants, and causing a major dislocation of agricultural production, population distribution, and the existing socio- economic infrastructure in the rural areas.

Finally, it is perhaps more realistic to interpret the villagisation campaign as a temporary halt in Tanzania's rural policy based on the creation and development of ujamaa villages, an interim stage to help bridge the gap between individualistic production on isolated farms and communal produc- tion within clustered village communities. With people settled in villages, political persuasion, re-education, and control become easier for both the Party and the Government, and the aims and philosophy of ujamaa can be more satisfactorily communicated to the peasants, the long-term plan being to convert as many settlements as possible into ujamaa villages. It would now appear that many Party officials have learnt the expensive lesson that peasants cannot be forced into situations of which they are unsure and uncertain, but must be persuaded and convinced that they will truly benefit from any change.

702 JOHN BRIGGS

were relatively unaffected before 1973. Production was stagnant but not in disastrous decline; that did not follow until villagisation was underway, involving over 6*5 million peasants, and causing a major dislocation of agricultural production, population distribution, and the existing socio- economic infrastructure in the rural areas.

Finally, it is perhaps more realistic to interpret the villagisation campaign as a temporary halt in Tanzania's rural policy based on the creation and development of ujamaa villages, an interim stage to help bridge the gap between individualistic production on isolated farms and communal produc- tion within clustered village communities. With people settled in villages, political persuasion, re-education, and control become easier for both the Party and the Government, and the aims and philosophy of ujamaa can be more satisfactorily communicated to the peasants, the long-term plan being to convert as many settlements as possible into ujamaa villages. It would now appear that many Party officials have learnt the expensive lesson that peasants cannot be forced into situations of which they are unsure and uncertain, but must be persuaded and convinced that they will truly benefit from any change.

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