Vidino - Arab Foreign Fighters and the Sacralization of the Chechen Conflict

8/12/2019 Vidino - Arab Foreign Fighters and the Sacralization of the Chechen Conflict

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Al Nakhlah

The Fletcher School Al Nakhlah Tufts University

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Despite the presence of foreign fighters, thefirst Chechen War represented a quintessentialnationalist conflict where an Islamic dimension wasalmost nonexistent. Aside from a fringe group ofradicals headed by the future president ofChechnya, Zelimkhan Yandarbiyev, the vastmajority of Chechen politicians and commanders to

lead the independence movement were committednationalists, largely unaffected by religion.

6Jokhar

Dudayev, the undisputed leader of the first war,was a former Soviet general whose knowledge ofIslam was minimal. His aim was to build a statepreserving Chechnyas social structure and Islamicidentity within a rigidly secular state framed by amodern constitution with freedom of religion andthe preservation of rights for both Chechens andRussians.

7

The Wahhabis, an extreme sect of Islamfinanced and spread largely by Saudi Arabians,had radically different plans for Chechnya. For

Khattab, Chechnya was another Muslim nationlike Afghanistan under attack from the infidels.Furthermore, he saw Chechnya as a country toliberate, Islamize, and use as a model for theconquest of all Muslim lands in the Caucasus andsouthern Russia.

8 While very few among the

Chechen population and leadership embraced thisview, external support was needed to overcome themilitary disparity with the Russians. As a result,the foreign Wahhabis were welcomed by mostChechens.

As marginal players during the first war, theforeign mujahideen gained influence in theinterwar period. Respected by Chechen authorities

for their military skillsand courted for theexternal funding fromIslamic charities andwealthy foreign donors,the Arabs establishedstrong links with someChechen commanders.According to Khattab,after the conflict ended in1996 the Arabs, wereasked by the [Chechen]civil and military

leadership and the President to train the people

because nobody was convinced the Russianswould completely withdraw.

9In fact, Khattab was

officially hired by the Chechen government toestablish the Chechen Armed Forces TrainingCenter in a former Soviet facility near the village ofSerzhen-Yurt.

10 With money and instructors

arriving from Afghanistan and the Middle East tothe newly independent republic, Khattabestablished another three camps, training anaverage of 400 people per two-month session.

11

Russian authorities estimate that up to 2,500fighters were trained in the camps during theinterwar period.

12 The trainees were not only

locals, but also came from other Muslim regions inthe Caucasus, southern Russia, and Central Asia.Lessons in militarytechniques, such as minelaying and ambushingtactics, were combinedwith a religiousindoctrination thatfollowed a strict Wahhabicurriculum and wassupervised by scholarsfrom Saudi Arabia andPakistan.

13

Shortly after theJanuary 1997 elections, theunity among Chechensthat had characterized the

first conflict ceased to existand some Chechencommanders began toembrace the radicalideology espoused byKhattab. While some clansand commandersremained loyal to thenewly-elected president Aslan Maskhadov, acommitted nationalist who, like Dudayev, desireda secular independent state with friendly relationstoward Moscow, many commanders strayed fromhis command. Clan-based militias also splintered,with some militias renouncing any ideology,

whether nationalist or Islamist. Some groupsturned to crime and banditry, while others found itmore convenient to join forces with Khattab.

It is very likely that at least a few commandersturned to Khattab hoping to satisfy personaleconomic and political ambitions with Saudisupport. Money also played a key role in attractingsoldiers. According to Russian media reports,clerics who converted to Wahhabism were givena lump sum of $1,000-$1,500, in addition toreceiving a monthly salary. Recruiters alsoreceived small sums for each recruit.

14While it is

impossible to estimate what percentage of Chechenfighters turned their backs to the central

government during the interwar period, it isundeniable that Maskhadov lost control of largeparts of the country within a few months of hiselectoral victory.

Conflicting personal ambitions,inexperienced leadership, widespread corruption,Russian interference, a nonexistent economy, andnationwide insecurity rapidly brought Chechnyato the point of complete implosion. Moreover,banditry grew rampant with easy access to cheap

Khattab saw Chechnyaas a country to liberate,Islamize, and use as a

model for the conquestof all Muslim lands in

the Caucasus andsouthern Russia

Today the character,actors, tactics, and thevery nature of theongoing second

Chechen war have allbeen profoundlyinfluenced by the

activities of the foreignmujahideen who have

successfully

sacralized aseparatist conflict into

a militant Islamistuprising


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and light arms, and the absence of a centralgovernment to enforce the rule of law. Armedmilitias who had previously fought the Russianarmy devoted their military efforts to kidnappingand attacks on trains and businesses, furthereroding Maskhadovs authority across Chechnyaand discouraging foreign investments in the

country.As the situation rapidly deteriorated,

conflicting views over the future of Chechnyaemerged. While all Chechens agreed on anindependent Chechnya, there was little agreementon the type of nation it should be. Basayev,Yandarbiyev, and other Wahhabized commanderspublicly expressed a desire to turn Chechnya into astrict Islamic state. Taking advantage ofMaskhadovs weakness, the newly-formed allianceof foreign fighters and Wahhabized commandersacted upon their words and began to create a statewithin the state.

Wahhabis elected to the government beganadopting legislation to Islamize Chechen society.Soviet laws were replaced by a form of shariahmodeled on the Sudanese legal system and Islamiccourts were established across Chechnya under thesupervision of Islam Khalimov, a close associate ofKhattab and Minister of shariah state security.

15 A

Saudi Afghan Arab and close associate of Khattab,Abu Omar Al Seif, was put in charge of organizingthe new legal system and was later given the titleof Head of the Court of Cassation of Chechnya.

16

Graduates of Khattabs camps became theenforcers and defenders of this state within thestate, making it more difficult for the central

government to control. When the Chechen centralgovernment in Grozny attempted to exert pressureand influence over these Wahhabi enclaves, it metharsh resistance. In 1998 armed fights betweentroops loyal to Maskhadov and Wahhabi militiasbroke out near Gudermes. After the bloodyclashes, Maskhadov sacked many Wahhabiofficials (including Khalimov

17), dissolved the

shariah guards and issued a deportation orderagainst Khattab.

18The Saudi commander not only

ignored the order, but also solidified his alliancewith Shamil Basayev, deputy Prime Minister ofChechnya at the time.

19The two built new training

camps around Urus Martan and, according to

Akhmadov, the financial support from theVakhabites abroad enabled [them] to functionwithout any financial support from the state bodiesof Ichkeria.

20

Tensions increased in July 1997 when a revolterupted in Urus Martan as parts of the ChechenNational Guard, headed by Arby Barayev, sidedwith the Wahhabis and clashed with Sufi militiasfrom Gudermes. The revolt did not escalate intocivil war due in large part to Basayev and

Khattabs decision not to participate in the feud.Nonetheless, the fracture between Sufis andWahhabis had reached the point of no return.While the Sufi Congress of the Caucasus pushed toban Wahhabism through legislation, the GrandMufti, Akhmad Khadyrov, issued a fatwadenouncing the Wahhabis as enemies of Islam

and the Chechen nation.21Maskhadov took further action and ordered

the expulsion of foreign Wahhabis. He proclaimed:[We are] no longer going to tolerate foreignnationals in our land who are trying to enforcetheir rules andsplit the Chechen society intodifferent groups, movements, and parties, so as toprevent the building of an independent Chechenstate.

22 The Wahhabis responded by turning to

the Supreme ShariahCourt of Chechnya. The courtultimately ruled that Maskhadov had violatedlaws and ordered the suspension of the electedparliament. Institutional chaos reached its apex

when parliament, in turn, declared the Shariah Court unconstitutional. Maskhadov attempted todeflect the tension by issuing a decree thatintroduced full shariah law in Chechnya, but thedecision only emboldened the Wahhabis.

The Expansion of War into Dagestan

Basayevs intention to go furthermanifested itself in Dagestan, another troubledRussian territory in the Caucasus. As apredominantly Muslim population with closecultural ties to Chechnya, Dagestanis foughtalongside the Chechens against Russian

imperialism in the 19thcentury. After the Bolsheviktakeover, the two provinces united under Sufism tofight for the defense of the independent NorthCaucasus Republic.

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During the Soviet era, Dagestanis acceptedMoscows rule with less animosity than theirChechen neighbors, and once the communistregime fell, no major independence movementdeveloped. A partial explanation for this differentattitude is found in Dagestans fragmented ethnicmosaic with less than two million people andthirty-four distinct ethnic groups. Traditionally, themain allegiance lies in the djamaat, the village orsmall group of villages, that, according to MatthewEvangelista, operates more or less like an ancientcity-state.

24 This lack of unity, while preventing

the development of nationalistic impulses,constituted fertile ground for potential inter-communitarian animosities that religiousfundamentalists sought to exploit immediatelyafter the collapse of the Soviet Union.

Foreign Wahhabi missionaries began toappear in Dagestan in the late 1980s and became a


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serious force in the following decade when theyfinanced the construction of several mosquesthroughout the poverty-stricken region.

25 In most

cases, Wahhabi imams lured local youth to convertto their radical interpretation of Islam by offeringthem money, jobs, and a sense of much-neededpurpose after the chaos that followed the

disintegration of theSoviet Union. In a regionwhere unemployment formen ages 18 to 28 was60%

26 and the per capita

GNP was $60,27

the $30reportedly given byWahhabi missionaries toevery convert attracted

many young Dagestanis.28

Over time, Wahhabienclaves were created in parts of the state wherethe influence of the central government was weakand local djamaatleaders welcomed foreign money.

While most djamaats and large segments of theDagestani population remained loyal to theirmoderate Sufi traditions, villages like Karamakhi,Chabanmaki, and Kadar became Wahhabienclaves within the Russian Federation by the endof the 1990s. These villages enforced their ownstrict interpretation of Islamic law, forbiddingmusic and forcing women to wear the full veil orniqab, a garment completely foreign to traditionalCaucasian customs. Trenches were dug andcheckpoints and border posts were also erected bythe Wahhabis to signal their de factoindependencefrom secular Dagestan.

29

By 1998, Dagestani police had lost complete

control in the portions of the state controlled byWahhabis. [The Wahhabis] tried to lure people ina friendly way at first, recounted the Sufi imam ofKaramakhi, Magomed Makhdiyev. But by 1999,they were saying, Join us or well cut your headoff.

30 Dagestani and Arab Wahhabis, most of

whom had trained in Khattabs camps inChechnya, began attacking various Dagestanistate institutions, assaulting police stations andkidnapping officials.

31 The rift with the Sufis

became insurmountable when the Wahhabiskilled the Sufi mufti of Dagestan. The troublefacing Dagestan in 1998 was expressed by RussiasInterior Minister: We believe the greatest threatcomes from Islamic fundamentalism, namelyWahhabism. It is a special from of extremismsimilar to terrorism.

32

Dagestan was ideal for Khattabs goal ofcreating a pan-Caucasian Islamic state because ofthe strong ties with Wahhabis. In the tight-knit andclan-based Caucasian societies, one way toestablish close relationships is through marriage.In fact, Khattab and sixteen of his men adapted to

the clan structure by marrying Dagestani womenfrom Karamakhi.

Other prominent Dagestani Wahhabis soonsettled in Chechnya where Chechen radicals suchas Basayev and Yandarbiyev welcomed them. InApril 1998, these forces formed the Congress of thePeoples of Chechnya and Dagestan, calling for a

unified theocratic state. Shamil Basayev waselected its chair, even though he still officiallyserved in Maskhadovs government as actingPrime Minister.

33 Hundreds of Dagestani

Wahhabis also trained in Khattabs camps and, insome cases, Chechen and Arab fighters crossed theborder to join their Dagestani brothers in attacksagainst Dagestani police forces and Russianpatrols. The responsibility for these actions wasoften claimed by the Central Front for theLiberalization of the Caucasus and Dagestan, agroup promoting a call tojihadin Dagestan.

34

Foreign-imported Wahhabism had usurped

power in another weak province of Russia.Wahhabi forces had expanded from Chechnya toDagestan and used it as a new base of operations tocontinue its fight against Russia. By 1998, Russianauthorities publicly recognized Wahhabism as amajor threat to the security of the Federation

35and

understood they could not tolerate furtherpropagation to its Muslimpopulation of 15 million.

36

Frequent attacks ongovernment facilitiescarried out by Chechen-trained militants (not onlyin Dagestan, but also in

other areas of theCaucasus and southernRussia) contributed toMoscows fear and anger.Russia could not possiblytolerate the presence of aweak, violence-ridden,and aggressive state onthe border of its weakestregion.

Anatol Lieven describes Russias situation as,a modern states nightmare It is as if Moscowhad a mixture of Afghanistan and Sierra Leone fora neighbor.

37 The problem only increased

because those who were de facto in charge of thecountry were intent on subtracting large parts ofRussian territory to fulfill their perceived religiousduty.

In May 1998 militiamen linked to theKhachilaev brothers, and supported by many ofKhattabs men, seized Dagestans State Councilbuilding.

38Other skirmishes also broke out at the

start of 1999 involving Chechen-trained militants.Despite Maskhadovs pending deportation order

The Wahhabi invasionof Dagestan triggeredthe start of the secondChechen War, which

continues today

Respected by Chechenauthorities for theirmilitary skills and

courted for the externa

funding from Islamiccharities and wealthyforeign donors , theArabs est abl ished

strong links with someChechen commanders


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against Khattab, the Congress of the Peoples ofChechnya and Dagestan commanded him to lead aforce of 700 Arab and Chechen fighters. The force, ade facto parallel army, was called thePeacekeeping Brigade and was designed tointervene in the case of a Russian attack against theWahhabi villages in Dagestan.

39At this point, the

tensions both inside Chechnya and with Russiahad reached a breaking point.

Maskhadov, fearing a Basayev attack inDagestan, removed Basayev from his position asdeputy commander in chief of the Chechen army.Due to Maskhadovs weakness and isolation, hewas in no position to stop Basayev and Khattab.

40

In August 1999, a brigade of Chechen and foreignfighters crossed the border from Chechnya intoDagestan with the declared objective of defendingthe Wahhabi villages of Dagestan that had beensurrounded by Russian federal forces determinedto re-establish Russian sovereignty in the area.

Basayev and Khattab, who had received fatwasfrom Saudi and Pakistani clerics legitimizing theirholy war, led a 2,000-man force to cleanse Dagestanfrom world Zionism, not exactly the enemy mostChechens had in mind when they took up arms in1994.

41 In the first days of conflict, the Wahhabis

conquered 36 villages and declared the creation ofthe independent Islamic State of Dagestan. Theyestablished the Islamic Shura of Dagestan as itsgoverning body, immediately nominated Basayevas its commander, established shariah law over itsoccupied territory, and declared war on Russia.

Moscow did not tolerate the invasion of itsterritory and formally declared war. Russian

federal forces, together with thousands ofDagestani police officers and villagers who rejectedthe presence of Wahhabis, attacked the Wahhabienclave in Dagestan and liberated it in less than amonth, forcing most of the fighters back toChechnya. It is noteworthy that many Dagestanipeasants sided with Moscow, clearly stating theirpreference for traditional Sufism, democracy, andpeaceful coexistence with Russia.

42Vladimir Putin,

who was appointed Prime Minister by BorisYeltsin shortly after the Dagestani invasion,decided that Russias drive should not stop at theChechen border and deemed it necessary to uprootthe social and political conditions that permitted

the foreign invasion. What had started as aconquest quickly turned into a defensive war forthe Chechen Wahhabis. Backed by strong publicsupport, Putin ordered Russian-led attacks tocontinue in Chechnya, bombing Wahhabistrongholds in places like Vedeno, Urus-Martan,and Gudermes.

43 The Wahhabi invasion of

Dagestan triggered the start of the second ChechenWar, which continues today.

The Wahhabi motives for the Dagestaniinvasion are multidimensional. First, the desire todefend Wahhabi villages in Dagestan from theRussian attack and create a united Islamic stateconstitutes an important reason. However, pureambition and personal gain also accounted for whysome Chechen warlords participated in the

invasion. Additionally, access to the Caspian Seaand the opportunity to profit from the Dagestani oilpipeline were other strong motivating reasons forsome leaders.

44

Wahhabi Tactics for the New War

The second Chechen War was triggered bythe Wahhabis actions, where war dynamics andtactics bore the characteristics of the foreignmujahideen. With the second stage of operationsunder way, the Islamic fighters developedcompletely different fighting tactics to avoid being

targeted by Russian mass bombings as inDagestan. Purely military methods of the firstChechen War gave way to military-political ones.

45

With these intentions, Khattab announced themujahideens new strategy after the Dagestanidebacle. He was soon successful. In the three weeksfollowing the defeat in Dagestan, a series ofbombings ravaged apartment complexes andshopping centers inside Russia, killing more than300 people.

46 Russian investigators arrested the

perpetrators who were mostly Chechens andDagestanis and had received training inexplosives in Khattabs camps. Some of themconfessed to personally receiving several hundred

thousand dollars from Khattab to carry out theattacks.

47

The 1999 bombings were indicative of whatwas to come. Chechens had resorted to terrorism inthe first conflict, but with less frequency andbrutality. Until 1999, Chechen fighters (includingBasayev) had hijacked airplanes and placedexplosive devices in public places around Russia,but these actions were mostly demonstrative,designed to frighten Moscow and attract theattention of the international community. Even thedeadly 1995 Budennovsk siege, where more thanone hundred hostages were killed in the battle thatensued after Basayev and his men barricadedthemselves inside the local hospital, was more aby-product of a military operation gone astray thana terrorist operation designed to kill civilians.

48But

in the second war, terrorism became the weapon ofchoice of the Chechen Wahhabis.

Unlike the first war, today Chechen fighterslimit their actions inside Chechnya to ambushesand terrorism. After crushing defeats at the end of1999, the mujahideen relied exclusively on hit-and-


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run tactics.49

Unable to face Russian forces in openterritory, the mujahideen established their bases inthe mountains, and left their posts only to ambushRussian forces who rarely ventured away from theplains around Grozny. Commonly used forms ofattack included car-bombings, kidnappings, andthe use of suicide vehicles against militaryinstallations. Russian authorities revealed that themost frequent form of attack consisted of roadside

bomb detonations and thesubsequent attack onRussian convoys withheavy gunfire.

50 While

successful in causing arelatively high number ofcasualties among Russianforces (and in obtainingmuch-needed weapons),these tactics failed toguarantee any territorial

gain, highlighting the mujahideens lack of clearmilitary strategy or goals.Since 1999, mujahideen trained in Khattabs

camps carried out hundreds of attacks both inChechnya and Russia. While the perpetrators aremostly from Chechnya and various regions of theCaucasus and southern Russia, their trainers arepredominantly Arab.

51 In 2003, Colonel Ilya

Shabalkin, spokesman for the Russian forces inChechnya, indicated that only about 200 foreignfighters were present in the region but highlightedtheir importance: The Arabs are the specialists,they are the experts in mines andcommunications.

52 Confirming Shabalkins

assessment, the forensic analysis of the landminesand detonators used most recently by Chechenfighters indicate that identical designs andmechanisms have been employed in the MiddleEast and other areas where jihadists are active.

53In

2002, a small group of Arab mujahideen establisheda presence in the Pankisi Gorge, a remote area ofGeorgia neighboring Chechnya where Chechenfighters gain shelter against Russian attacks.Reportedly, the Arabs were computer,communications and financial specialists, militarytrainers, chemists, and bombers who established abase of operations to support Khattabs groupinside Chechnya, while simultaneously preparing

for terrorist attacks against American and Westerntargets in Russia and Central Asia.

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Terrorism has called the worlds attention toChechnya. Aside from technical expertise, Arabsprovide religious guidance with fatwas beingissued by clerics close to Khattab and his successorsAbu Walid and Abu Hafs al-Urdani to justifyterrorist attacks and martyrdom operations.Moreover, one cannot avoid blaming the growingWahhabi influence for the arrival of suicide attacks

in Chechnya. While no suicide attack had takenplace in the region before 2000 and the strongpresence of Wahhabis, the last five years havebeen marred by dozens of suicide attacks, many ofwhom are women, both inside and outsideChechnya.

55Scores of suicide bombers have blown

themselves up in Moscows subway system, at arock concert, and on two Russian airliners. Teams ofready-to-die fanatics who had trained in Khattabscamps carried out the brazen operations of theDubrovka Theater and Beslan. Russian authorities,have blamed most of these attacks had beenplanned and financed by Khattab and AbuWalid.

56

Paul Murphy has outlined a list of reasonsthat can explain why terrorism has supplantedtraditional war, and even guerrilla tactics, inChechnya. Murphy believes Chechens haveembraced terrorism because: Other options arelimited; it is inexpensive and attracts bigger

foreign investment; Basayevs power has grown;and Chechens have become impatient.57

All thesereasons are valid but should be considered in lightof the drastic change of perspective brought to theregion by the Wahhabis. The enemy, as well as thenature of the conflict itself, is now seen by many ofthe fighters through the lens of Wahhabism,turning it into a cosmic religious war between goodand evil, and Allah and infidelity. While the largemajority of the Chechen population proudlyupholds its Sufi heritage, most of the fighters areWahhabis and have apowerful influence overhow the conflict is fought.

Naturally, when a wartakes these characteristicsand becomes sacralized,all constraints disappear,the use of violencebecomes legitimized, andatrocities becomeroutine.

58 All Russians

and non-Russians who donot support the Wahhabiproject are enemies anddo not deserve any mercy,as they are opposingGods will. The enemy is dehumanized and

satanized, being described as a cruel demon thatneeds to be killed to obey a divine order.

59

One aspect where this shift is most evident isin the attitude of the combatants toward their ownpopulation. While the first Chechen War can beduly characterized as a genuine popular struggleto obtain independence, todays conflict is foughtby lawless groups of militiamen, bandits, andreligious extremists who do not bother to fight thebattle for the hearts and minds of the local

Unlike the first war,today Chechen f ighters

limit their actionsinside Chechnya to

ambushes andterrorism

The Wahhabis figh t

todays war as acosmic confrontationin which all is

permitted and wherecivilian casualties,

even on their own sideare ir relevant collatera

damages


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radical Islam, a growing percentage of the fewthousand individuals fighting on the ground todayhave. More importantly, many of todays mostcharismatic and powerful Chechen leaders appearto have committed themselves to Wahhabiideology. For some of them, such as ShamilBasayev (who has even Arabized his name into

Amir Abdallah Shamil Abu-Idris70), theconversion to Wahhabism seems to be heartfelt.Others wage their own private wars, covering theirself-serving actions under the mantle of theChechen struggle and their conversion toWahhabism is a convenient tool for attainingseparatist ends

71 or to gain personal power, a

faade that reminds the public assertions ofcommunism made by many Third World rebelgroups during the Cold War to garner Sovietsupport.

Moreover, while it is true that the overallChechen society has maintained its traditions, it is

undeniable that the clan system is facing a crisisand that, in Anatol Lievens words, a growingnumber of young Chechens perceive radical Islamas, the only discipline that can hold their societytogether.

72 The sense of frustration and

desperation that fifteen years of savage war hasbrought upon the Chechens has been exploited bya few extremists. Today, a growing number ofyoung Chechen men and women turn tofundamentalism. Russian brutality also played akey role in this process and an analysis of theevolution of the conflict shows that the sacralizationof the Chechen conflict was a reaction to conditionsrather than a cause.

73 More than ten years ago,

even Dudayev foresaw the sacralization of theconflict due to Russias blind policies, stating that,Russiahas forced us to take the Islamic path.

74

What can be defined as a mixture of ethnic andcriminal insurgency has increasingly taken adeeply ideological bent, losing its former secularcharacteristics.

75 While the ethnonationalism that

motivated and united Chechen clans during the1990s is still important among most Chechens, themajority of the forces fighting on the ground todayhave replaced clan ties with a visceral form ofreligious fundamentalism that is foreign toChechen tradition.

Given these premises, the future of the conflictlooks grim. In the post-9/11 world, the Chechenmujahideen have been increasingly linked to al-Qaeda. Furthermore, Moscows claim thatChechnya is just one of the battles waged by BinLaden against the West has now been (somehowreluctantly) accepted by the United States. While

the links to al-Qaeda are undeniable, equating theconflict with Bin Ladens globaljihaddenies justiceto the legitimate claims of the Chechens and givesthe Russians virtual carte blanchein dealing with allforces on the ground, Wahhabis and Chechennationalists alike.

The death of Maskhadov, killed undermysterious circumstances in March 2005, washailed by Russian authorities as an importantsuccess. Nevertheless, Maskhadov might havebeen Moscows last hope for a negotiated solutionin Chechnya. Despite his undeniable flaws,Maskhadov, the former president of Ichkeria, wasthe last Chechen leader with a secular view whohad retained significant military power andnational prestige. In 2004, the nationalist andsecular forces controlled by Maskhadovrepresented roughly one third of the entireChechen movement.

76 But with the commanders

death, Wahhabi militants have now gainedvirtually unchallenged prominence. In fact,immediately after Maskhadovs death, Basayevannounced that the new president of Ichkeria wasthe little-known Islamic scholar Abdul KhalimSadulaev, at the time head of the Wahhabi-instituted Supreme ShariahCourt.

77Non-Wahhabi

forces led by commanders such as Doku Umarov, a

traditional Sufi who has repeatedly condemnedWahhabi terrorism, have indeed continued to fighttenaciously. Many believe that with Maskhadovsdeath the real power rests more solidly in thehands of Basayev and other Wahhabi fighters,making peace in Chechnya a distant dream.

The views and opinions expressed in articles are strictlythe authors own, and do not necessarily represent thoseof Al Nakhlah, its Advisory and Editorial Boards, or theProgram for Southwest Asia and Islamic Civilization(SWAIC) at The Fletcher School.


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1Yoav Karny, Undying Enmity; The Chechen Leaders Thrive On Perpetual, Idealized War, Washington

Post, October 10, 1999.2On the limited military role of the Arabs in Afghanistan, see for example Gilles Kepel,Jihad; the Trail of

Political Islam,Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2002. 147-8.3

Yavus Akhmadov, Stephen R. Bowers, Marion T. Doss Jr., Islam in the North Caucasus. The Journal ofSocial, Political, and Economic Studies; Fall 2001; Volume 26, Number 3. 577.4Profile of Ibn ul Khattab, Azzam Publications, August 1999. Khattabs real name is Samir Salih Abdallah al

Suwaylim and he was born in Saudi Arabia in 1970.5For the involvement of al Qaeda and BIF in Chechnya, see the Government Evidentiary Proffer

Supporting the Admissibil ity of Co-conspirator Statements," in United States of America v. Enaam M. Arnout,U.S. District Court, Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division, 02-CR-892 (N. D. Ill. filed Jan. 6, 2003).6John B. Dunlop, Russia Confronts Chechnya. Roots of a Separatist Conflict, Cambridge, UK; Cambridge

University Press, 1998. 92-95.7Confirming Dudayevs lack of Islamist tendencies, reports indicate that Dudayev commanded Soviet

forces in the war in Afghanistan, taking parts in bombing campaigns against fellow Muslims in westernAfghanistan. See Dunlop, Russia Confronts Chechnya. Roots of a Separatist Conflict. 97.8Life and Times of Ibn ul Khattab, documentary released by the Ansaar News Agency, Birmingham, UK,

2002.9Life and Times of Ibn ul Khattab, documentary by the Ansaar News Agency, Birmingham, UK, 2002.10

Paul J. Murphy, The Wolves of Islam: Russia and the Faces of Chechen Terror, Washington, D.C.; Brasseys Inc.,2004. 39.11

Life and Times of Ibn ul Khattab, documentary released by the Ansaar News Agency, Birmingham,UK, 2002.12

Dimitri V. Trenin and Aleksei Malashenko with Anatol Lieven, Russias Restless Frontier. The ChechnyaFactor in Post-Soviet Russia,Washington, D.C.: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2004. 94.13

A famous Islamist scholar that contributed to the indoctrination of the trainees in the Chechen camps wasYusuf al Ayiri. Al Ayiri worked closely with Khattab and published several fatwasand writing on thesituation in Chechnya even after Khattabs death (including the writing The Theatre Operation inMoscow. What have the Mujahidin Benefited from it?). Al Ayri was kil led by Saudi security forces inRiyadh in May 2003.14

Dimitri V. Trenin and Aleksei Malashenko with Anatol Lieven, Russias Restless Frontier. The Chechnya

Factor in Post-Soviet Russia,Washington, D.C.: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2004. 95.15


Murad al Shishani, Portrait of a Chechen Mujahid Leader, Terrorism Monitor, The JamestownFoundation, Volume 2, Issue 8 (April 23, 2004). Al Seif is widely respected among Islamist circles as a scholarand theorist, and his writings on the legitimacy of suicide bombings have had wide circulation.17

Mayrbek Vachagaev, Evolution of the Chechen Djamaat, The Jamestown Foundation, April 6, 2005.http://www.jamestown.org/publications_details.php?volume_id=409&issue_id=3291&article_id=236956118

Paul J. Murphy. The Wolves of Islam: Russia and the Faces of Chechen Terror. Washington, D.C.; BrasseysInc., 2004. 41.19

According to Murphy, the bond between the two was solidified by the adoption of Khattab as a son byBasayevs parents, a necessary step to make foreigners acceptable to Chechen society. See Murphy, 90.20

Yavus Akhmadov, Stephen R. Bowers, Marion T. Doss Jr.. Islam in the North Caucasus, The Journal ofSocial, Political, and Economic Studies; Fall 2001; Volume 26, Number 3. 578.21



Anatol Lieven, Chechnya: Tombstone of Russian Power,New Haven and London: Yale University Press,1998. 317.


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24Matthew Evangelista, TheChechen Wars: Will Russia Go the Way of the Soviet Union?Washington D.C., The

Brookings Institution, 2002. 93.25

Yavus Akhmadov, Stephen R. Bowers, Marion T. Doss Jr.. Islam in the North Caucasus, The Journal ofSocial, Political, and Economic Studies; Fall 2001; Volume 26, Number 3.26

Matthew Evangelista. TheChechen Wars: Will Russia Go the Way of the Soviet Union?Washington D.C., The

Brookings Institution, 2002. 92.27The Dynamics of Dagestan, Financial Times Asia Intelligence Wire, August 24, 1999.28

Sharon LaFraniere, How Jihad Made its way to Chechnya; Secular Separatist Movement Transformed byMilitant Vanguard, Washington Post,April 26, 2003.29


Sharon LaFraniere, How Jihad Made its way to Chechnya; Secular Separatist Movement Transformed byMilitant Vanguard, Washington Post, April 26, 2003.31


Yoav Karny,Highlanders: A Journey to the Caucasus,New York: Farrar, Strauss and Giraux, 2000. 258-9.33

Dimitri V. Trenin, Aleksei V. Malashenko with Anatol Lievenm, Russias Restless Frontier. The ChechnyaFactor in Post-Soviet Russia, Washington D.C.: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2004. 34.34

Paul J. Murphy, The Wolves of Islam: Russia and the Faces of Chechen Terror, Washington, D.C.; Brasseys Inc.,2004. 45-6.35

Security of CIS Threatened by Religious Extremism, Segodnia, June 5, 1998.36

The exact number of Muslims in the Russian Federation is debated. See Alexei Malashenko, The IslamicFactor in Russia, New Europe Review, November 2004.37

Anatol Lieven, Nightmare in the Caucasus, Washington Quarterly, Winter 2000, 23:1. 145.38

Nabi Abdullaev, Nadir and Magomed Khachilaev: Politicians for the New Russia, The JamestownFoundation, PRISM, Volume 5, Issue 18. October 22, 1999.39



Paul J. Murphy, The Wolves of Islam: Russia and the Faces of Chechen Terror, Washington, D.C.; Brasseys Inc.,

2004. 99.42Matthew Evangelista, TheChechen Wars: Will Russia Go the Way of the Soviet Union?Washington D.C., The

Brookings Institution, 2002. 90-6.43




Matthew Evangelista, TheChechen Wars: Will Russia Go the Way of the Soviet Union?Washington D.C., TheBrookings Institution, 2002. 67.47

Paul J. Murphy, The Wolves of Islam: Russia and the Faces of Chechen Terror, Washington, D.C.; Brasseys Inc.,2004. 103-7.48

Anatol Lieven, Chechnya: Tombstone of Russian Power,New Haven and London: Yale University Press,1998. 124-5.49


Mark Kramer, The Perils of Counterinsurgency; Russias War in Chechnya, International Security,Volume 29, Issue 3 (Winter 2004). 19.51

In a 2000 interview with the Islamist website Sawt al Qoqaz (Voice of the Caucasus,www.qoqaz.net)Shamil Basayev confirmed the importance of the teachings of the Arab mujahideen for some Chechencommanders: We have benefited from studying the Afghan Jihad, particularly after CommandersKhattab, Yaqub al Ghamidi and his deputy Abu Waled al Ghamidi, Abu Jafar al Yemeni, Hakim al Madani


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and Abu Bakr Aqeedah (may Allah have mercy upon these two) explained to us the details of whathappened in Afghanistan. We studied the various dimensions and developments of their cause and we areknowledgeable about what happened.52


Mark Kramer, The Perils of Counterinsurgency; Russias War in Chechnya, International Security,Volume 29, Issue 3 (Winter 2004). 31.54

Paul Quinn-Judge, Inside al Qaedas Georgia Refuge, Time, October 19, 2002.55

John Reuter, Chechnyas Suicide Bombers: Desperate, Devout or Deceived? The American Committee forPeace in Chechnya, September 16, 2004.56



Mark Jurgensmeyer, Terror in the Mind of God, Los Angeles & Berkeley, California; University ofCalifornia Press, 2000. 163.59

Mark Jurgensmeyer, Terror in the Mind of God, Los Angeles & Berkeley, California; University ofCalifornia Press, 2000. 172.60

Interview with residents of Alkhan-Yurt, Human Rights Watch. Available at:http://www.hrw.org/reports/2000/russia_chechnya2/Rusch004-02.htm61

Videos include Life and Times of Ibn ul Khattab and Russian Hell 1 and 2, which are available athttp://www.tibyan.net/home.asp62

Carlotta Gall and Thomas de Waal, Chechnya; Calamity in the Caucasus, New York: New York UniversityPress, 2000. 215-28.63

Steven Lee Myers, Putin's Candidates Sweep Chechnya Elections, New York Times, November 29, 2005.64


Chechen Court Convicts Kadirov of Apostasy, Sawt al Qoqaz, March 21, 2001.66


Timothy L. Thomas, The Battle of Grozny: Deadly Classroom for Urban Combat, Parameters, US ArmyWar College Quarterly, Summer 1999. Yavus Akhmadov, Stephen R. Bowers, Marion T. Doss Jr.. Islam in theNorth Caucasus, The Journal of Social, Political, and Economic Studies; Fall 2001; Volume 26, Number 3. 569-73.68

Yavus Akhmadov, Stephen R. Bowers, Marion T. Doss Jr.. Islam in the North Caucasus. The Journal ofSocial, Political, and Economic Studies; Fall 2001; Volume 26, Number 3. 569-73.69

Anatol Lieven. Chechnya: Tombstone of Russian Power.New Haven and London: Yale University Press,1998. 340.70

See for example the message with which Basayev claimed responsibility for the October 2005 operation inNalchik, which is available at: http://www.kavkazcenter.com/eng/content/2005/10/17/4156.shtml71


Anatol Lieven, Chechnya: Tombstone of Russian Power,New Haven and London: Yale University Press,1998. 302.73

Dimitri V. Trenin and Aleksei Malashenko with Anatol Lieven, Russias Restless Frontier. The ChechnyaFactor in Post-Soviet Russia, Washington, D.C.: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2004. 79.74Dimitri V. Trenin and Aleksei Malashenko with Anatol Lieven, Russias Restless Frontier. The ChechnyaFactor in Post-Soviet Russia,Washington, D.C.: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2004. 7475

Donald Snow, UnCivil Wars, Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1996. 56.76

Chechen Guerrillas,Janes World Insurgency and Terrorism, June 25, 2004.77

Paul Tumelty, A Biography of Abdul-Khalim Sadulaev, Chechnya Weekly, Volume 6, Issue 11 (March 16,2005).

Vidino - Arab Foreign Fighters and the Sacralization of the Chechen Conflict

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